From: BerryEberry1@aol.com Sent: Friday, May 31, 2002 4:00 PM To: rule-comments@sec.gov Cc: Holmes@holmesdev.com; berryeberry1@hotmail.com Subject: File No. S7-16-02 Subject line: File No. S7-16-02 To: rule-comments@sec.gov Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 450 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20549-0609 Dear Mr. Katz: My name is James Berry and I am a retired attorney, government officer, and investment broker. Here is my comment on your proposed rulemaking "Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about the Application of Critical Accounting Policies." [Release Nos. 33-8098; 34-45907 International Series Release No. 1258 File No. S7-16-02]. In general, you should exercise your jurisdiction to regulate Real Estate Investment Trusts and the real estate segment of companies that derive a substantial revenue from real estate properties. You should require that a publicly traded firm obtain an MAI appraisal, that is, an independent appraisal from a licensed appraiser, of its properties, and include that appraisal in its annual report and the SEC filings required in this rule. You should widely publicize this new requirement and you should obtain from OMB an enforcement budget and enforce the rule as a means to build investor confidence and to stem the tendency of management's in an overvalued commercial real estate market to gut their REITs and other companies by failing to maintain their properties, diverting their funds to the buyout of management officers, and spiking the market price of their stock by paying out return of capital in the guise of ordinary income dividends. "We seek comment on the proposed definition of critical accounting estimates. Is the definition appropriately tailored?" [No, you need an appraisal with a hard number by an independent, that is , a state-licensed appraiser.] "Does the definition capture the appropriate type and scope of accounting estimates?" [No, it is too vague.] "Is the definition appropriately designed to identify the accounting estimates that require management to use significant judgment or that are the most uncertain? If not, what other aspects descriptive of that type of estimate should be included?" 1. An independent appraisal by a state-licensed appraiser that individually appraises all properties, totals their present market values, 2. An estimate of the private market capitalization of the net operating income of the REIT or real estate segment of a company, stating the capitalization rate or range, using as guidance the prevailing rate of completed sales of properties in the same real estate sector as the REIT, 3. A statement of the net asset value of the REIT, defined as the appraised total value plus non-income producing assets, such as cash, cash equivalents, receivables, and land held for development, less liabilities, which should include preferred stock and all off-balance sheet liabilities such as commitments to buy out officers, directors, shareholders, or other investors such as limited partners, 4. A report of sources of cash used for dividends and distributions to investors such as a. ordinary taxable earnings, b. capital gains, c. return of capital, d. retained earnings, and e. loans, 5. A capitalization report of all investor equity, including outstanding shares, operating partnership units, convertible securities, and employee options and reports and the return of capital dividends and other issues. "Is the definition appropriately designed to identify the accounting estimates involving a high potential to result in a material impact on the company's financial presentation?" [No, it is missing the hard numbers of an independent appraisal.] "Would it be difficult for a company to discern which of its accounting estimates require assumptions about highly uncertain matters? [No.] If so, how could the proposal better target them?" [With an appraisal and a breakout of return of capital and a disclosure of management buyouts about to take place in cash terms in the critical estimates, not in numbers of shares buried in a footnote.] "Should we consider setting a minimum percentage impact on results of operations in the second criterion of the definition, or would that be unnecessary because the proposed definition would not capture changes that have an insignificant impact?" [No.] "How many accounting estimates would a company typically identify as critical accounting estimates under the proposed definition?" [Five, as indicated.] "Would a company with multiple segments have a greater number of critical accounting estimates than a company without multiple segments? If so, please provide an explanation." [Require an appraisal for the real estate segment.] Should we establish a maximum number of accounting estimates that may be discussed as critical accounting estimates (e.g., seven)? [No.] "Should we expand the definition to include MD&A disclosure of volatile accounting estimates that use complex methodologies but do not involve significant management judgment? Should we do so only when the underlying assumptions or methodologies of those estimates are not commonly used and therefore not understood by investors?" [The premise here that it is all just too complex is an uninteresting application of the well-known Washington Monument syndrome. Everyone can understand an appraisal and a clear breakdown of return of capital and ordinary income dividends.] "For each critical accounting estimate, a company would have to explain its significance to the company's financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of operations and, where material, identify its effect on the line items in the company's financial statements.59 Because not all estimates themselves are line items in the financial statements,60 their existence and their effect may not be readily apparent. Thus, this disclosure would provide additional information and clarity for investors." [The report should link the reduced appraisal value to the likely effect on rental income and therefore on accounts receivable, and therefore on the income dividend, and therefore on the stock price. In this way the SEC can help make investors who are rate shoppers and who make bad economic decisions because they are seduced by tax considerations realize the dangerous game they and REIT management's are playing with their future income.] "There are two areas of the proposed MD&A disclosure relating to critical accounting estimates in which we explicitly would require a presentation of quantitative information.61 First, the proposals would require disclosure that demonstrates the sensitivity of financial results to changes made in connection with each critical accounting estimate. Second, the proposals would require quantitative disclosure relating to historical changes in a company's critical accounting estimates in the past three years." [Require an appraisal each year, and a breakdown of income and return of capital in a dividend each year.] "a. Quantitative disclosures to demonstrate sensitivity. "We propose to require that a company present quantitative information about changes in its overall financial performance and, to the extent material, [real estate] line items in the financial statements that would result if certain changes relating to a critical accounting estimate were assumed to occur. The company would identify the change being assumed and discuss quantitatively its impact on the company. Because the point of the disclosure is to demonstrate the degree of sensitivity, the impact on overall financial performance would be discussed regardless of how large that is. "Are there any critical accounting estimates for which neither of the two choices for selecting the assumed changes would be appropriate?" [Yes, the appraisal and the breakdown of return of capital and income dividends.] "Will companies be able to select appropriate changes in their most material assumption or assumptions, or should we provide further guidance?" [Your guidance should be hard numbers for the independent MAI appraisal of the real estate assets.] "We solicit comment on the proposed disclosure of past material changes in critical accounting estimates. "Is sufficient disclosure of these changes already required under current MD& A requirements?" [No, you need an appraisal requirement.] "Is a three-year period the most appropriate period of time over which investors should consider changes? If not, why would a shorter or longer period be more appropriate?" [An annual appraisal is required because real estate can rapidly deteriorate due to water damage, et cetera in the course of a year if management is not doing proper maintenance, but rather withholding the necessary expenditures and siphoning them off into, for example, private homes and trips to the Bahamas. The test is, could an analyst with a Wall Street investment banking firm learn something from the hard number in an appraisal, and the change in the breakdown of return of capital and income in the dividend, and the value of, for example, 90 strip malls in the eastern United States.] "Would requiring disclosure over a longer period, such as five years, make it easier for investors to identify trends?" [No, for heaven's sake!] "Should we mandate a standardized format for quantitative disclosure about past changes in critical accounting estimates (e.g., a chart illustrating the dollar value of the change from the prior year for each year showing the impacted line items and other effects in each year)?" [Yes.] "We believe that senior management should discuss the company's critical accounting estimates with the audit committee of its board of directors.... This type of oversight would have the potential to improve the quality and the transparency of disclosure." [This whole discussion misses the point of an independent appraisal. Management and the audit committee from the point of view of the investor are foxes consulting with foxes.] "We request comment on the proposed disclosure about discussions between senior management and the audit committee regarding the development, selection and disclosure of critical accounting estimates. "Would the proposed requirement provide useful information to investors?" [No.] "Under the proposals, if a company operates in more than one segment92 and a critical accounting estimate affects fewer than all of the segments, the company would have to identify the segments it affects. A company also would have to determine whether it must include, in addition to the disclosure on a company-wide basis, a separate discussion of the critical accounting estimates for each identified segment about which disclosure is otherwise required.93 That determination would follow an analysis similar to that in the 1989 guidance. A company would have to provide a discussion on a segment basis to the extent that discussion only on a company-wide basis would result in an omission that renders the disclosure materially misleading.94 We would not mandate repetition on a segment basis of all matters discussed on a company-wide basis. Rather, a company would have to disclose only that information necessary to avoid an incomplete or misleading picture." [If it is the real estate segment, don't leave it up to the company.] "Should we provide more guidance for determining the circumstances that warrant segment disclosure? [Yes.] "Should we require the additional segment discussion only when more than one segment is affected?" [No, you have to reach the real estate, even if it is only one segment. It is the vast holdings of overvalued real estate in corporate America that threatens the whole economy. You must reach it with hard numbers and real enforcement, and soon.] "The company follows the provisions of FASB SFAS No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of.96 That accounting standard requires that if the sum of the future cash flows expected to result from the assets, undiscounted and without interest charges, is less than a company's reported value of the assets, then the asset is not recoverable and the company must recognize an impairment. The amount of impairment to be recognized is the excess of the reported value of the assets over the fair value of those assets." [There is no FASB rule for REITs and the FASB has disclaimed jurisdiction over REITs. On May 6, 2002, Mr. Edmund Jenkins wrote me that the subject of REIT appraisals "is not one that is within the jurisdiction of the FASB. Mr. Jackson Day has written that the SEC defers to the FASB. Catch 22!] "Possible MD&A disclosure under the proposal "Application of Critical Accounting Policies "We evaluate our property, plant and equipment ("PP&E") for impairment whenever indicators of impairment exist. Accounting standards require that if the sum of the future cash flows expected to result from a company's asset, undiscounted and without interest charges, is less than the reported value of the asset, an asset impairment must be recognized in the financial statements. The amount of impairment to recognize is calculated by subtracting the fair value of the asset from the reported value of the asset." [We need an independent appraisal of the real estate. To get that fair market value, you need an independent appraisal.] "We believe that the accounting estimate related to asset impairment is a "critical accounting estimate" because: (1) it is highly susceptible to change from period to period because it requires company management to make assumptions about future sales and cost of sales over the life of the hard drive-related PP&E (generally seven years); and (2) the impact that recognizing an impairment would have on the assets reported on our balance sheet as well as our net loss would be material." [The reason that the asset is subject to change, and the rental revenues may decline, may be that management may not keep real estate up, reluctant to spend the necessary money on repair. An independent appraisal would catch this failure, and alert investment analysts at the large institutional shareholder firms like brokerage houses, mutual funds, state retirement funds, and insurance companies. They in turn could warn investors. In this way, by a simple requirement, SEC would bring the whole private reporting system into play in support of the interests of the investor. Management has a tendency to hide its failures. State-licensed appraisers have their own reputation at stake, and if they are bought, then the states prosecute them, something they must think about in doing outside, independent real estate appraisals.] "E. Auditor Examination of MD&A Disclosure Relating to Critical Accounting Estimates. "A company's management bears primary responsibility for its accounting estimates. Auditors also have important responsibilities regarding a company's accounting estimates. A company's auditor currently is responsible for evaluating the reasonableness of the accounting estimates made by management in the context of the financial statements taken as a whole.97 When a company's audited financial statements are included in an annual report filed with the Commission, the independent auditor is required to read the information in the entire filed document, including the MD&A, and consider whether such information, or the manner of its presentation, is materially inconsistent with information, or the manner of its presentation, appearing in the financial statements.98" [But the auditor is barred from aggressive investigation of possible fraud, as the SEC is not. The shift from relying on an indifferent FASB to an SEC interested in protecting REIT shareholders from sharp practice is the SEC's broader governmental power, and the question is, what sanctions will attach to its accounting rules. A range of sanctions for a range of violations will make the rules more credible and improve the chances of the SEC achieving its major purpose, which should be less fraud, and fewer unjustified market bubbles. Every market bubble in history has burst. Sanctions already attach to independent appriasers.] "One possible approach would be to adopt a requirement that an independent auditor must examine, in accordance with Attestation Standards,99 the new MD& A disclosure relating to critical accounting estimates." [Yes, an independent auditor, and an independent appraiser.] "To complete an examination, an auditor must examine documents and records and accumulate sufficient evidence in support of the disclosures and assum ptions and take other steps to get reasonable assurance of detecting both intentional and unintentional misstatements that are material to the MD&A presentation.102 To accept an examination engagement, an auditor must have sufficient knowledge about the company and its operations. AT §701 therefore requires that an auditor must have at least audited the company's financial statements for the most recent period covered by the MD&A, and the other periods covered by the MD&A must have been audited by it or another auditor.103" [But as of now the auditor lacks a crucial piece of evidence: he lacks an independent appraisal of the real estate held by the company as part of that evidence. The SEC could require it.] "If we were to require examinations by auditors of part or all of MD&A disclosures, should we also require that a company file, or disclose the results of, the auditor's reports?" [Yes.] "What would be the relative benefits and costs of a requirement for an auditor examination with respect to the critical accounting estimates portion of the MD&A?" [The benefit to the investor and his brokerage analyst is the knowledge as to whether he should risk a portion of his retirement by investing or continuing to invest in the company. The primary client of the SEC is the investing public, not the accounting profession and not the companies it regulates.] "If we do not require auditor examination or review, are there other steps we should take to help ensure the quality of disclosure in this proposed section of MD&A?" [Yes, the independent licensed appraiser's appraisal of the real estate segment.] "...We believe that quarterly updates to reflect material developments would be appropriate. Disclosure of material developments made only at the end of each fiscal year also may not identify changes quickly enough to inform investors adequately." [This is closing the barn door on Enron, a relatively rare trading phenomenon. Far more important and pervasive is the existence of overvalued real estate. An annual appraisal with a hard number is a solid requirement, less often would be inappropriate, and more often would be burdensome. However, each quarter a REIT should compare and report the stock market price of its shares and the Net Asset Value for that period, on the assumption that the annual appraisal is still valid. That would address the coming crisis of confidence in commercial real estate, which pervades the whole country, as opposed to the unique Enron energy trading abuses, which are unlikely to be repeated. It is better to prepare for the next war rather than fight the last war.] "We solicit comment on the quarterly updating requirement for U.S. companies. "Are there some accounting estimates or material assumptions or methodologies that would normally be considered by companies only on a less frequent basis than quarterly? If so, which ones?" [The appraisal.] "Should they be omitted from the quarterly updating requirement on that basis?" [Each quarter a REIT should compare and report the stock market price of its shares and the Net Asset Value for that period, on the assumption that the annual appraisal is still valid.] "Is the scope of the disclosure required in a quarterly update appropriate? If not, what should be added or omitted?" [The appraisal.] "We seek comment on the proposed disclosures related to initial adoption of accounting policies. "Would the proposed disclosures about initial adoption of accounting policies provide useful information to investors and other readers of financial reports?" [The independent appraisal is crucial to the investment analysts at the major firms, and especially the large institutional investors on behalf of retirees.] "Are there particular situations involving the initial adoption of a material accounting policy for which we should require additional disclosure? If so, what are those situations and what additional disclosure should we require?" [Yes, REITs throughout the country on which retirees are relying are hiding management buyouts, neglecting buildings, and touting return of capital as if it were income in dividends. These are endemic practices in the REIT industry, and a high profile SEC campaign to stop them is in order. That is how to ensure that investors are not confused: clear, prominent, national publicity, not obscure tinkering with existing rules. The assumption of Federal responsibility where there is Federal jurisdiction should be broadcast to the markets. This is not anti-business. It is an attempt to gradually deflate the commercial real estate bubble before we have a deflationary implosion like that of Japan, which was driven by non disclosure of problems with banks and real estate and the stock market, all tied in together.] "Should we require companies to disclose, in MD&A or in the financial statements, the estimated effect of adopting accounting policies that they could have adopted, but did not adopt, upon initial accounting for unusual or novel transactions?" [Yes, hiding the buyout of departing management is a novel transaction in technical terms, although as a practice it is par for the course.] "What would be the costs for companies to prepare disclosure about the effects of alternative accounting policies that could have been chosen but were not?" [The SEC should solicit each of the 50 State governments for information on the cost of an MAI appraisal of the assets of Real Estate Investment Trusts in that state. The SEC should also solicit the views of the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, NAREIT, on the cost issue.] "Would investors be confused if companies presented disclosure of the effects of acceptable alternative policies that were not chosen?" [Institutional investors are not going to be confused by the truth, nor are intelligent individuals.] "Should we require in MD&A a discussion of whether the accounting policies followed by a company upon initial adoption differ from the accounting policies applied, in similar circumstances, by other companies in its industry, and the reasons for those differences?" [No, let each company worry about its own problems without surveying its industry.] "Please explain." [This is more closing the barn door.] "If such a discussion should be required, please identify the specific disclosures companies should make. Would a company know the policies applied in similar circumstances by other companies in its industry? If not, would auditing firms or other financial advisors be able to assist companies in determining whether their accounting policies generally diverge from industry practices? [The AICPA rule requires them to so state. It is the meaning of the term, "generally accepted accounting principles," for heaven's sake. It is the independent auditor's job, not the company's job.] "The proposed MD&A discussion must be presented in language, and a format, that is clear, concise and understandable to the average investor." [The "average investor" is an overly tax conscious rate shopper who refuses to recognize that high rates of dividend return mean high risk of losing that return altogether. Not much can be can be done for this "average" investor, even with simple and straightforward language that says, "this is a high risk, we are in a real estate bubble, every bubble has burst, don't make this investment." Nothing can penetrate his imprudence. But a great deal can be done for the institutions that serve this investors' interests, and that invest for him -- the analysts at the Wall Street firms, the major insurance companies, the huge state and private retirement funds, the mutual funds, none of whom at present have access to independent appraisals of the REITs they, too have unwisely placed in their huge portfolios, so they cannot do their job, which is to spot the bad appleas and unload them. So, please, never mind about the "average" investor, focus instead on the highly sophisticated mutual fund manager and other large institutional investors, the kind that read the Crain publication, Pension and Investment Age. If there is hope it lies not with the investment proles, but with the institutional investor pros. Give them the tools they need.] "...The purpose of the proposed disclosure would be hindered if a company were to include disclosures that consisted principally of blanket disclaimers of legal responsibility for its application of a new accounting policy or its development of its critical accounting estimates in light of the uncertainties associated with them. While the Commission fully expects companies to craft the proposed disclosure responsibly to take advantage of any available safe harbors, simple disclaimers of legal liability would be contrary to the disclosure goals underlying the proposal and would not be permitted.115" [These disclaimers would have little impact when the SEC took them to court for non-compliance. Enforcement, however, will not happen if the OMB guts SEC's enforcement budget. In this way OMB can render all of this meaningless.] "Should the proposed disclosure be presented in a separate section of MD&A or should we require that it be integrated into the other discussions of financial condition, changes in financial condition, results of operations and liquidity and capital resources when the proposed disclosure is closely related to an aspect discussed in those separate sections of MD&A?" [Real estate should be separate.] "Should other requirements relating to the language and format be added to the requirement for clear, concise and understandable disclosure? If so, what requirements?" [A hard number in an independent appraisal.] "The Exchange Act and the Securities Act contain parallel safe harbor protection for forward-looking statements against private legal actions that are based on allegations of a material misstatement or omission. 130 In addition, two Commission rules under those Acts that pre-date the adoption of the statutory safe harbors also provide protection for forward-looking statements." [But these do not reach concealment of the deterioration of assets, and of tens of million dollar buyouts of departing management that are hidden in footnotes and expressed as a number of shares to be disbursed for an unnamed purpose, with no cash amount stated. In short, they higher bar to private suits does not mean that courts will ignore this standard fraudulent method of gutting REITs and other companies while propping up the stock price through returns of capital labeled as income dividends. The higher bar in the safe harbor act does not protect against litigation when a company is gutted in this way. The higher bar is not a complete bar. An action for common law fraud still survives. And institutional investors are interest parties with the assets and the will to pursue litigation, even if the SEC mounts a weak enforcement effort.] "Some of the proposed MD&A disclosure, but not all of it, would require a company to make forward-looking statements. [But not the appraisal, which is present value. This simple, hard, independent number does not fall afoul of all the usual cautions about forward-looking statements. It is not subject to collateral attack as too complex, or too burdensome, or too speculative. It is useful, clear, and simple.] "In addition to the requirements we propose, are there particular aspects of critical accounting estimates or their development or impact that the proposals should specifically require companies to address? If so, what are they?" [The appraisal.] "In addition to the requirements we propose, are there particular aspects concerning a company's initial adoption of an accounting policy that the proposals should specifically require companies to address? If so, what are they? "Is disclosure necessary concerning the procedures that management follows in selecting its critical accounting estimates? If so, what additional disclosure should be provided?" [An independent, state-licensed appraiser, where licensing exists. The SEC should invite the state governments to comment on this rule, after it republishes it to include the appraisal requirement.] [A new SEC rule that reads something like this: [Each publicly traded Real Estate Investment Trust shall prepare each year a new MAI appraisal of the properties in its portfolio, and include it in its annual report, filing it at the same time with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Security regulation authority in each state in which it has a principal place of business.] Thank you for your consideration of these comments. Sincerely, James Berry