UBS Global Asset Management (US) Inc.
51 W. 52nd St.
New York, NY 10019

Amy R. Doberman
Managing Director
General Counsel
Tel: 212-882-5570
Fax: 212-882-5271
amy.doberman@ubs.com

March 16, 2004

VIA E-MAIL: rule-comments@sec.gov

Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20549-0609

Re: Investment Adviser Codes of Ethics

SEC Release Nos. IA-2209; IC-26337 (the "Proposing Release"); File No. S7-04-04

Dear Mr. Katz:

UBS Global Asset Management ("UBS Global AM")1 appreciates the opportunity to comment on the rule proposal described in the above referenced SEC releases (the "Proposed Rule") that would require registered investment advisers to adopt written codes of ethics.

Under the Proposed Rule, the codes of ethics would: (1) set forth standards of conduct for advisory personnel; (2) include provisions reasonably designed to safeguard material non-public information about client transactions; and (3) address conflicts of interest that arise from personal trading by advisory personnel.

The Commission has solicited comment on whether certain substantial provisions should be mandated in the codes, and whether the Proposed Rule should require the reporting of transactions and holdings in unaffiliated mutual funds. We hereby provide comment on these issues.

New Rule Should Favor Tailoring of Codes of Ethics

Section 204A of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 states that an adviser's policies and procedures should be designed "taking into account the nature of such investment adviser's business." The Proposing Release acknowledges the need "to give advisers flexibility to adopt codes appropriate to their businesses." (Proposing Release, Section II.C.1.) Accordingly, if the Proposed Rule is adopted, we urge the Commission to mandate few, if any, substantive requirements for the adviser's code of ethics, in favor of allowing advisers the flexibility to determine the requirements that are appropriate to their business model, an approach consistent with the Commission's history in adopting and amending Rule 17j-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Both at the time Rule 17j-1 was originally adopted, as well as when it was recently amended, the Commission considered whether to dictate substantive code provisions or to leave the determination of the vast majority of substantive restrictions to the judgment of each fund and adviser based on the parameters of their business. Both times, the Commission largely decided to enable funds and advisers to tailor restrictions based on their unique business considerations.2 We submit that, consistent with the language of Section 204A, and the approach taken in adopting and amending Rule 17j-1, a new rule under Section 204A should leave the determination of specific code provisions to the judgment of those who are closest to the business.

Requirement to Report Holdings and Transactions in Unaffiliated Mutual Funds

The Commission has solicited comment on whether the Proposed Rule should also require reporting of transactions and holdings in unaffiliated mutual funds. We respectfully submit that only marginal benefit would be gained in broadening the reporting requirement to include holdings and transactions in unaffiliated funds. Advisers have no fiduciary responsibility to unaffiliated funds or their shareholders. Moreover, an adviser's personnel typically do not as part of their responsibilities as employees of the adviser have knowledge of the portfolio securities of unaffiliated funds, and as such, are not "in a position to exploit [any] inside knowledge." (Proposing Release at Section II.C.2.) If an employee does somehow obtain such knowledge, it is clearly outside the scope of his or her employment. The employing adviser would not, as a legal matter, be responsible for any potential violations caused by the employee in this regard. There are numerous ways an unscrupulous person can engage in market timing, in which case the fund itself would be in a better position than an unaffiliated adviser to detect such activity. Therefore, we believe that the burden on an adviser's compliance department outweighs any additional investor protection caused by the remote possibility that the adviser might detect a fraud or other violation for which it is not even liable.

If you have any questions concerning these comments or would like additional information, please contact the undersigned at 212-882 5570.

Sincerely yours,

Amy R. Doberman
Managing Director & General Counsel
UBS Global Asset Management

Endnotes

1 UBS Global Asset Management (US) Inc. and its affiliate UBS Global Asset Management (Americas) Inc. are both indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of UBS AG and members of the UBS Global Asset Management division, which had approximately $463 billion in assets under management worldwide as of December 31, 2003. UBS Global Asset Management (US) Inc. and UBS Global Asset Management (Americas) Inc. are registered investment advisers, and manage over 68 registered mutual funds, with more than $58 billion in assets, as of December 31, 2003.

2 The release that originally proposed Rule 17j-1 stated that "[t]he precise nature of the standards and procedures which would have to be prescribed in a code of ethics in order to meet the requirements of . . . Proposed Rule 17j-1 would depend on the circumstances of the entity adopting the code, and the Commission believes that the determination can best be made by the investment company, its investment adviser and its principal underwriter." Prevention of Certain Unlawful Activities With Respect to Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 10162 (March 28, 1978), 43 FR 12721, at 8-9.

In the release that adopted Rule 17j-1, the Commission echoed its determination "to retain the approach taken in the proposed rule, i.e., to let individual entities take fully into account their own unique circumstances in designing their codes of ethics prescribing standards or conduct which effectuate the purposes of the Rule." Prevention of Certain Unlawful Activities With Respect to Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 11421 (October 31, 1980), 45 FR 73915, at 11-12.

In the 1995 proposal to amend Rule 17j-1, the Commission "refrained from requiring by rule that codes of ethics contain specific restrictions, prohibitions or other provisions, preferring instead that each board establish an appropriate code for its fund." Personal Investment Activities of Investment Company Personnel and Codes of Ethics of Investment Companies and their Investment Advisers and Principal Underwriters, Investment Company Act Release No. 21341 (September 8, 1995), 60 FR 47844, at 15.

Finally, when the Commission adopted amendments to Rule 17j-1 in 2000, it noted that "[c]omments on the rule proposals confirmed that a `one-size-fits-all' approach to these codes would not be more effective in preventing fraudulent personal trading practices . . . . " Personal Investment Activities of Investment Company Personnel, Investment Company Act Release No. 23958 (August 20, 1999, as corrected March 6, 2000), 64 FR 46821, at 10.