Investment Company Act of 1940 — Sections 12(d)(2) and 12(d)(3)
SPDR S&P Dividend ETF

March 28, 2016

Response of the Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Investment Management

IM Ref. No. 20151221518
SPDR S&P Dividend ETF
File No. 811-08839

Your letter dated March 24, 2016, requests our assurance that we would not recommend enforcement action to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) under sections 12(d)(2) and 12(d)(3) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Company Act”) against SPDR S&P Dividend ETF (the “Fund”), a portfolio of the SPDR Series Trust (the “Trust”), if the Fund invests such that it may (i) own more than 10% of the total outstanding voting stock of an insurance company and/or (ii) purchase more than 5% of an outstanding class of equity securities of an issuer that, in its most recent fiscal year, derived more than 15% of its gross revenues from securities related activities (an “Equity Issuer”).[1]

BACKGROUND

You state the following:

The Trust is a registered investment company under the Company Act and offers investment portfolios that seek to track the performance of specified market sectors represented by various indexes sponsored by index providers that are not affiliated with the investment portfolios or their investment adviser, SSGA Funds Management, Inc. (the “Adviser”).[2] The Fund is a portfolio of the Trust, and its shares are listed for trading on the NYSE Arca, Inc. The investment objective of the Fund is to seek to provide investment results that, before fees and expenses, correspond generally to the total return performance of the S&P High Yield Dividend Aristocrats Index (the “Index”), which is sponsored by Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (the “Index Provider”).[3]

The Index is designed to measure the performance of the highest dividend yielding S&P Composite 1500 Index constituents that have followed a managed-dividends policy of consistently increasing dividends every year for at least 20 consecutive years. Insurance companies and financial services firms that derive a substantial portion of their revenues from securities related activities comprise the Index, among others.[4] The Index Provider determines the composition of the Index, relative weightings of the securities in the Index and publishes information regarding the market value of the Index. Stocks within the Index are weighted by indicated yield (annualized gross dividend payment per share divided by price per share) and weight-adjusted each quarter. To prevent the Index from being concentrated in only a few names, the methodology incorporates limits so that no individual stock represents more than 4% of the Index weight.

The Fund is not managed according to traditional methods of “active” investment management involving the buying and selling of securities based upon economic, financial and market analyses and investment judgment but the Adviser instead attempts to approximate the investment performance of the Index by investing in a portfolio of stocks with generally the same risk and return characteristics of the Index. The Fund was previously managed using a replication strategy, whereby the Adviser sought to hold all of the constituents of the Index in approximately the same proportion as the issuers represent in the Index. Some of the issuers represented on the Index either are insurance companies or derive a substantial portion of their revenues from securities related activities. Accordingly, as the Fund has grown in size and encountered the regulatory restrictions of sections 12(d)(2) and 12(d)(3) of the Company Act and rule 12d3-1 thereunder limiting the percentage amount an investment company may own of the outstanding voting stock of insurance companies or securities of issuers engaged in securities related activities, the Adviser has been unable to employ a replication strategy for the Fund.[5]

Accordingly, the Adviser began to employ a sampling strategy for the Fund (the “Sampling Strategy”), whereby the Adviser uses quantitative analysis to select securities included in the Index, securities that are not included in the Index, and derivatives that have a similar investment profile (in terms of key risk factors, performance attributes and other economic characteristics) as the Index or components of the Index (e.g., market capitalization, industry weightings, etc.).

Notwithstanding the Adviser’s use of the Sampling Strategy, you argue that the most efficient and accurate way to manage the Fund consistent with its investment objective would be to acquire the outstanding voting stock of insurance companies and the securities issued by Equity Issuers in the same approximate proportion as these issuers represent in the Index, as discussed below. Therefore, the Fund would like to purchase the outstanding voting stock of insurance companies and securities issued by Equity Issuers in the same approximate proportion that such stocks represent in the Index, subject to the representations set forth below.[6]

ANALYSIS

Section 12(d)(2) of the Company Act

Section 12(d)(2) of the Company Act generally prohibits a registered investment company from purchasing or otherwise acquiring any security issued by any insurance company if, as a result of the purchase or acquisition, the registered investment company (and any company or companies controlled by it) would own in the aggregate, or as a result of such purchase or acquisition will own, more than 10% of the total outstanding voting stock of the insurance company. The legislative history relating to section 12(d)(2) provides that “investment companies acquiring controlling blocks of stock of insurance companies” was a “relationship [that] may have very undesirable features.”[7] Moreover, Congress deemed section 12(d)(2) a “salutary provision, because of the possible effect upon the insurance companies through the ownership by investment companies whose business it is to trade in securities.”[8] You state that the Commission historically has interpreted section 12(d)(2) as “prohibiting control of an insurance company by an investment company but permitted acquisition of stock of an insurance company upon assurance that there would be no such control.”[9]

As a preliminary matter, you represent that the Fund is an “index fund” and its investment objective is to seek to provide investment results that, before fees and expenses, correspond generally to the total return performance of the Index. You represent that the most efficient and accurate way to manage the Fund consistent with this objective would be to acquire the securities issued by insurance companies in the same proportion as such issuers represent in the Index.[10] You represent that the Fund will not own the securities of an insurance company in an amount exceeding the approximate proportion that the insurance company’s stock represents in the Index. You also maintain that the Fund has a non-fundamental investment restriction that prevents it from investing in the securities of a company for the purpose of exercising management or control. Moreover, you represent that the Fund will not exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of the insurance company and will either: (a) vote its shares in the insurance company as directed by an independent third party,[11] or (b) vote its shares in the insurance company in the same proportion as the vote of all other holders of the insurance company’s shares.

We believe that it would not be inconsistent with the intent of section 12(d)(2) if the Fund exceeded the limitations set forth in section 12(d)(2) of the Company Act by purchasing or acquiring the outstanding voting stock of an insurance company in the approximate proportion that the insurance company’s stock represents in the Index, based on the facts and representations in your letter. Accordingly, we would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission under section 12(d)(2) of the Company Act against the Fund if the Fund, or the company or companies controlled by it, own more than 10% of the total outstanding voting stock of an insurance company, as described in your letter.

Section 12(d)(3) of the Company Act

Section 12(d)(3) of the Company Act generally prohibits a registered investment company from purchasing or otherwise acquiring any security issued by a broker, dealer, an underwriter, an investment adviser to an investment company or an investment adviser registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”). Rule 12d3-1 under the Company Act exempts from the prohibitions of section 12(d)(3) certain acquisitions of securities issued by persons engaged in securities related activities (as defined in rule 12d3-1(d)(1)). Rule 12d3-1(b)(1) permits a registered investment company, immediately after its acquisition of an equity security, to own no more than 5% of the outstanding securities of that class of an issuer that, in its most recent fiscal year, derived more than 15% of its gross revenues from securities related activities.[12]

In releases proposing amendments to rule 12d3-1, the Commission identified two apparent Congressional purposes for prohibiting investment company investments in securities issued by persons engaged in securities related activities: (i) “to limit, at least to some extent, the exposure of registered investment companies to entrepreneurial risks peculiar to securities related businesses,” and (ii) “to prevent potential conflicts of interest and reciprocal practices,” such as directed brokerage.[13]

Entrepreneurial Risks. You note that the Commission has acknowledged that the concern regarding the unusual risks of investments in securities issued by persons that engage in securities related activities “is adequately addressed by prohibiting the acquisition of general partnership interests.”[14] You state that virtually all securities firms are currently organized as corporations and not general partnerships, and therefore Congress’s purpose in limiting the exposure of entrepreneurial risks to investment companies is theoretical. You further argue that paragraph (c) of rule 12d3-1 effectively precludes a registered investment company from acquiring general partnership interests in a broker, dealer, registered investment adviser, or underwriter and therefore adequately addresses Congress’s concerns regarding an investment company’s exposure to the entrepreneurial risks of investing in a securities issued by persons that engage in securities related activities.[15]

Conflicts of Interest and Reciprocal Practices. You note that the Commission has expressed concerns that an investment company may purchase the securities of a broker-dealer as a reward for selling the investment company’s shares or, direct brokerage to a broker-dealer to enhance the broker-dealer’s profitability.[16] You believe, however, that the Fund’s investments, as a practical matter, do not raise the concerns at issue. As a general matter, you argue that the Fund’s investment objective, which is to seek to provide investment results that correspond generally to the total return performance of the Index, helps to address the concern that the Fund would be purchasing securities of a broker-dealer as a reward for selling Fund shares.[17] In addition, you state even when the Adviser employs its Sampling Strategy, it has limited discretion to choose the portfolio securities or the amount of such securities to be purchased as it is obligated to seek to track the performance of the Index, the components of which are determined by the Index Provider. Notwithstanding the above, you represent that (a) the Fund will not use an Equity Issuer as the executing broker for any Fund transactions, and (b) the Fund will not acquire the securities issued by an Equity Issuer in an amount exceeding the approximate proportion that the issuer represents in the Index.

Directed Brokerage. Similarly, with regard to the Commission’s concerns about directed brokerage,[18] you state that it would be difficult for the Adviser, as a practical matter, to direct brokerage either to reward a broker-dealer for selling the Fund’s shares or to enhance the broker-dealer’s profitability and still seek to obtain best execution. You argue that any brokerage executed through a broker-dealer represented in the Index would likely be de minimis in relation to the broker-dealer’s trading activity and that due to the Fund’s investment objective, it would be extremely unlikely that the amount of brokerage transactions directed to any such broker-dealer (even if not de minimis) would have any significant or meaningful effect on the market value or profitability of the broker-dealer.[19] You also argue that because the Fund only permits purchases and redemptions of its securities in Creation Units (except in limited circumstances where the purchase and redemption will include cash), the need for the Fund to trade portfolio securities and direct brokerage is greatly diminished.[20]

You also state that the Adviser selects brokers or dealers (including affiliated brokers-dealers) to execute securities transactions on behalf of the Fund by considering the full range of brokerage capabilities applicable to a particular transaction that may be considered when seeking to obtain best execution, which may include, but is not limited to, the following factors: price, commission, ability and willingness to aggregate trades, access to markets and trading venues, and broker financial strength and stability.[21] You maintain that the certain matters may influence the importance placed by the Adviser upon any of those factors, such as, the nature and characteristics of the order or transaction. You represent that, if the Fund owns more than 5% of the value of outstanding securities issued by persons that engage in securities related activities (with the exception of Equity Issuers, as discussed below[22]), the Fund will comply with the provisions of section 17(e) of the Company Act and rule 17e-1 thereunder when using that issuer, or any affiliated person of that issuer, as a broker for the purchase or sale of any security in the Fund’s portfolio. You represent that the Fund will not use an Equity Issuer as the executing broker for any Fund transactions, and you further represent that the Fund will comply with the provisions of section 17(e) of the Company Act and rule 17e-1 thereunder when using any affiliated person of such Equity Issuer.

You note that the staff has previously given assurances under section 12(d)(3) and rule 12d3-1. In particular, the Division has given assurances in the context of rule 12d3-1(c) to an index fund that purchased or acquired securities of an affiliated person of the fund’s adviser on a non-volitional basis (for no reason other than to match the performance of the respective index).[23] In that letter, the fund stated that it attempted to duplicate the results of the index and thus did not manage the fund in the “traditional sense,” however, it may have held a representative portion of the stocks in the index due to the illiquidity of some stocks.[24] You argue that, although those letters concerned conflicts of interest and reciprocal practices, the staff gave assurances based on the non-volitional nature of the fund’s transactions and noted that this non-volitional nature “eliminated the abuse that Section 12(d)(3) was designed, among other things, to address, the selection of a fund’s portfolio securities in the interests of the fund’s investment adviser, principal underwriter, and brokers or dealers.”[25] Similarly, you maintain that the same potential conflicts of interest at issue in subparagraph (b)(3) of rule 12d3-1, under which the staff has also given no-action assurances, exist as applied to subparagraph (b)(1), at issue here.[26]

For the reasons set forth above, you believe the Fund’s investment activities, insofar as they implicate the provisions of section 12(d)(3) of the Company Act and rule 12d3-1 thereunder, do not raise the concerns that underlie those sections. We agree and believe that it would not be inconsistent with the intent of section 12(d)(3) of the Company Act if the Fund exceeded the limitations set forth in rule 12d3-1 under the Company Act by acquiring equity securities issued by Equity Issuers in the same approximate proportion as these issuers represent in the Index, based on the facts and representations in your letter. Accordingly, we would not recommend the Commission take enforcement action under section 12(d)(3) of the Company Act against the Fund if the Fund owns securities issued by an Equity Issuer, as described in your letter.

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This response expresses the Division’s position on enforcement action only and does not express any legal conclusions on the issues presented. Because this position is based on the facts and representations in your letter, you should note that any different facts or circumstances might require a different conclusion.

Incoming Letter

The Incoming Letter is in Acrobat format.

http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2016/spdr-sp-dividend-etf-032816-12d2.htm