
JOHN CHEVEDDEN

January 3, 2021

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

3 Rule 14a-8 Proposal
Dow Inc. (DOW)
Written Consent
Kenneth Steiner

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is in regard to the December 14, 2020 no-action request.

Management could bolster its claim if it stated that company directors have no access to outside experts.

Dozens or maybe even hundreds of companies have adopted a shareholder right to act by written consent since 2010. However Dow management has not shown one example of an outlaw version of written consent being adopted.

Management did not show one example of a preliminary proxy being kicked back because it included a step for shareholders to approve an outlaw version of written consent.

Sincerely,


John Chevedden

cc: Kenneth Steiner

Jon Wendt <jonathan.wendt@dow.com>

December 20, 2020

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

2 Rule 14a-8 Proposal
Dow Inc. (DOW)
Written Consent
Kenneth Steiner

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is in regard to the December 14, 2020 no-action request.

The resolved statement requests that the Board “take such steps as may be necessary to permit written consent ...”

The proposal does not request that the board adopt a version of written consent that would conflict with the bylaws of the company.

The proposal does not request that the board adopt an aggressive version of written consent.

Management has not shown a problem with any Board of Directors actually adopting a version of written consent that conflicted with the bylaws of any company in the universe.

And management is not opposed to a specific sentence being reinserted in the resolved statement if the Staff believes that it is appropriate.

Sincerely,



John Chevedden

cc: Kenneth Steiner

Jon Wendt <jonathan.wendt@dow.com>

JOHN CHEVEDDEN

December 14, 2020

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

1 Rule 14a-8 Proposal
Dow Inc. (DOW)
Written Consent
Kenneth Steiner


Ladies and Gentlemen:

This is in regard to the December 14, 2020 no-action request.

If a topic for written consent would not be consistent with the bylaws then it would not be an appropriate topic for written consent.

This proposal does not call for an expansion of what written consent might apply to.

Sincerely,



John Chevedden

cc: Kenneth Steiner

Jon Wendt <jonathan.wendt@dow.com>

[DOW: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, October 28, 2020]

[This line and any line above it – *Not* for publication.]

Proposal 4 – Shareholder Right to Act by Written Consent

Shareholders request that our board of directors take such steps as may be necessary to permit written consent by shareholders entitled to cast the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize the action at a meeting at which all shareholders entitled to vote thereon were present and voting. This includes shareholder ability to initiate any appropriate topic for written consent.

This proposal topic won 95%-support at a Dover Corporation shareholder meeting and 88%-support at an AT&T shareholder meeting.

Taking action by written consent in place of a meeting is a means shareholders can use to raise important matters outside the normal annual meeting cycle like the election of a new director. Candidates for replacement could include Samuel Allen, Ajay Banga, Jacqueline Barton and Richard Davis each of who received more than 42 million negative votes at the 2020 annual meeting. And Chairman Jeff Fettig received more than 61 million negative votes.

A shareholder right to act by written consent affords Dow management strong protection. Due to the low shareholder participation in annual meeting elections any action taken by written consent would still need more than 70% supermajority approval from the shares that normally cast ballots at the annual meeting to equal a majority from the Dow shares outstanding.

And since the publication of the 2020 Dow annual meeting proxy written consent has become more important due to the near extinction of in-person shareholder meetings. And in any event it takes 35% of the shares that normally vote at the Dow annual meeting to call for a special meeting. And the percentage of shares needed to call a special meeting is imbedded in the Certificate of incorporation which intentionally makes it more difficult to change it to a more reasonable percentage.

With the near universal use of tightly controlled online annual shareholder meetings, which can be only 10-minutes of routine formalities, shareholders are severely restricted in engaging with management and making their views known because all challenging questions and comments directed to management can be screened out. And management is free to have insiders opine in lockstep support of management.

For instance Goodyear management hit the mute button right in the middle of a formal shareholder proposal presentation at its 2020 shareholder meeting to bar constructive criticism.

Plus AT&T management would not even allow the proponents of shareholder proposals to read their proposals by telephone at the 2020 AT&T online annual meeting during the pandemic.

Please see:

AT&T investors denied a dial-in as annual meeting goes online

<https://whbl.com/2020/04/17/att-investors-denied-a-dial-in-as-annual-meeting-goes-online/1007928/>

Imagine the control a management like AT&T could have over an online special shareholder meeting.

Now more than ever shareholders need to have the option to take action outside of a shareholder meeting since tightly controlled online shareholder meetings are a shareholder engagement wasteland.

Please vote yes:

Shareholder Right to Act by Written Consent – Proposal 4

[The line above – *Is* for publication. Please assign the correct proposal number in the 2 places.]

SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP

599 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10022-6069
+1.212.848.4000

December 14, 2020

VIA E-MAIL

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549
shareholderproposals@sec.gov

Re: *Dow Inc.*
Stockholder Proposal of John Chevedden
Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Rule 14a-8

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This letter is to inform you that Dow Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company” or “Dow”), pursuant to Rule 14a-8(b)(1) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), intends to omit from its proxy statement and form of proxy for its 2021 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the “Annual Meeting”) (collectively, the “2021 Proxy Materials”) the stockholder proposal and statements in support thereof (the “Proposal”) received from John Chevedden as representative (the “Representative”) on behalf of Kenneth Steiner (the “Proponent”), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), we have:

- filed this letter with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) no later than eighty (80) calendar days before Dow intends to file its definitive 2021 Proxy Materials with the Commission; and
- simultaneously sent copies of this correspondence to the Representative on behalf of the Proponent.

Rule 14a-8(k) and Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (November 7, 2008) (“SLB 14D”) provide that stockholder proponents are required to send companies a copy of any correspondence that the proponents elect to submit to the Commission or the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”). Accordingly, we are taking this opportunity to inform the Representative that if the Proponent, or the Representative on his behalf, elects to submit additional correspondence to the Commission or the Staff with respect to the Proposal, a copy of that correspondence should be furnished concurrently to the undersigned on behalf of Dow pursuant to Rule 14a-8(k) and SLB 14D.

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Shearman & Sterling LLP is a limited liability partnership organized in the United States under the laws of the state of Delaware, which laws limit the personal liability of partners.

THE PROPOSAL

The Proposal sets forth the following resolution to be voted on by stockholders at the Annual Meeting:

Shareholders request that our board of directors take such steps as may be necessary to permit written consent by shareholders entitled to cast the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize the action at a meeting at which all shareholders entitled to vote thereon were present and voting. This includes shareholder ability to initiate any appropriate topic for written consent.

See Exhibit A.

BASIS FOR EXCLUSION

We hereby respectfully request that the Staff concur in our view that the Proposal may be excluded from Dow's 2021 Proxy Materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because it is impermissibly vague and indefinite such that it is inherently misleading in violation of Rule 14a-9 under the Exchange Act. Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits exclusion of a proposal if the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials. The Staff has taken the position that a stockholder proposal is excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) if it is so vague and indefinite that "neither the stockholders voting on the proposal, nor the company in implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires." Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (September 15, 2004) ("SLB 14B").

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 28, 2020, Dow received notice of the Proposal via e-mail only. The submission did not include any proof of ownership.

As required by Rule 14a-8(f), Dow sent a notice of deficiency (the "Deficiency Notice," which is included in Exhibit B to this letter) to the Representative by overnight courier and e-mail on November 10, 2020, or within 14 calendar days of receipt of the Proposal. The Deficiency Notice specified that the Proponent must demonstrate eligibility under Rule 14a-8 within 14 calendar days of receipt of the Deficiency Notice by (i) providing proof of ownership that satisfies the requirements of Rule 14a-8(b) and (ii) identification of the specific proposal to be submitted as required by Rule 14a-8(b) and further addressed in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I (November 1, 2017).

On November 24, 2020, within the required 14 calendar day timeframe, the Proponent sent (i) a revised Proposal (the "Revised Proposal," which is included in Exhibit C to this letter), which clarified the Proponent's letter to identify the specific proposal authorized to be submitted and (ii)

a copy of a letter from TD Ameritrade, Inc. (the “Broker Letter,” which is included in Exhibit D to this letter), which confirmed that the Proponent beneficially held the requisite number of shares of Dow continuously for at least one year as of the date of the submission of the Proposal.

ANALYSIS

The Proposal May Be Excluded Under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because the Proposal is Impermissibly Vague and Indefinite such that it is Inherently Misleading and thereby Contrary to the Commission’s Proxy Rules.

Rule 14a-8(i)(3) provides that a company may exclude a stockholder proposal from its proxy materials if the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission’s proxy rules. The Staff has consistently taken the position that vague and indefinite stockholder proposals are inherently misleading and therefore excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because “neither the shareholders voting on the proposal, nor the company in implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires,” as indicated in SLB 14B. The Staff has further explained that a stockholder proposal can be sufficiently misleading and therefore excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) when the company and its stockholders might interpret the proposal differently such that “any action ultimately taken by the [c]ompany upon implementation [of the proposal] could be significantly different from the actions envisioned by the shareholders voting on the proposal.” *Fuqua Industries, Inc.* (March 12, 1991). Such stockholder disagreement would further complicate the task of the board of directors (the “Board”) in taking action to implement such proposal.

The Staff has, on many occasions, concurred in the exclusion of stockholder proposals as vague and indefinite under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) where such proposals requesting certain actions, use inconsistent language and fail to provide any guidance as to how such inconsistencies should be resolved, including when such inconsistencies are based on relevant facts not addressed on the face of the proposal which would not allow or otherwise affect the implementation or operation of the proposal. For instance, in *USA Technologies, Inc.* (March 27, 2013), the proposal asked the company’s board of directors to adopt a policy requiring that the chairman of the board be an “independent director who has not served as an executive officer of the [c]ompany.” The company argued that its by-laws required that “[t]he chairman of the board shall be the chief executive officer of the corporation” and that the proposal therefore was vague because it did “not request the [b]oard to make any modification or amendment to ... the [c]ompany’s by-laws or even refer to the resulting direct conflict between the [p]roposal and the by-laws.” The Staff concurred that the proposal could be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3), noting that, “in applying this particular proposal to [the company], neither shareholders nor the company would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires.” Similarly, in *Bank of America Corporation* (March 12, 2013), the proposal requested for the formation of a committee to explore “extraordinary transactions that could enhance stockholder value, including but not limited to an extraordinary transaction resulting in the separation of one or more of [the company’s] businesses.” The company successfully argued that the proposal used “ambiguous and inconsistent language” providing for “alternative interpretations,” but that it failed “to provide any

guidance as to how the ambiguities should be resolved.” In particular, the company noted that the proponent’s definition of an extraordinary transaction as one “for which stockholder approval is required under applicable law or stock exchange listing standard” was inconsistent with examples of so-called extraordinary transactions throughout the proposal and the supporting statement. In light of this inconsistent language, the Staff concurred that the company could exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) as vague and indefinite.

In *General Electric Company* (January 15, 2014), the proposal that General Electric received was also from John Chevedden and Kenneth Steiner and was substantially similar to the Proposal submitted to Dow with one important difference. General Electric’s proposal requested its board of directors “to permit written consent by shareholders... includ[ing] shareholder ability to initiate any topic for written consent *consistent with applicable law*” (emphasis added). General Electric argued that such statements were inconsistent because implementing a right for stockholders to act through the written consent process, as opposed to solely at a stockholders’ meeting, would not entitle stockholders to “initiate *any* topic ... consistent with applicable law.” Specifically, General Electric noted that “[i]mplementing written consent, even written consent with no procedural restrictions and no carved-out actions where shareowners could act through a vote at a meeting but not through written consent, would not impact the substantive matters upon which shareowners are and are not entitled to act.” As an example, General Electric explained that “while the New York Business Corporation Law provides that shareowners may be authorized to set the number of directors constituting the board, [its] Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws does not permit shareowners to set the size of the board at less than ten members.” To change such restriction would require an amendment to General Electric’s Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws with the requisite number of votes necessary and “[this process] will not change even if [the company] implemented written consent without restrictions.” In response to General Electric’s letter to exclude such proposal, the proponent argued that the proposal is not inherently vague or indefinite because “the proposal does not ask for a shareholder right to act by written consent in order to take action not permitted by the Certificate of Incorporation or By-Laws” and particularly emphasized that the proposal requests for shareholder ability to initiate any topic for written consent “consistent with applicable law.” The Staff was unable to concur with the view that General Electric may exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) for being inherently vague or indefinite.

As with the Staff precedent cited above and in notable contrast to the proposal in *General Electric Company*, Dow’s Proposal does not include language requesting shareholder ability to act by written consent ***consistent with applicable law***. Specifically, the Proposal does not include the following sentence: *This written consent is to be consistent with giving shareholders the fullest power to act by written consent in accordance with applicable law.* The Proposal also does not include the italicized portion in the following sentence: This includes shareholder ability to initiate any appropriate topic for written consent *consistent with applicable law*. Such language was the central basis upon which the Proponent argued in *General Electric Company* that its proposal should not be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) for being inherently vague or indefinite. The current Proposal, as it is written on its face, would directly conflict or create inconsistencies with certain

provisions of Dow's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (the "Certificate of Incorporation"), its Amended and Restated Bylaws (the "Bylaws") and/or the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL"), the applicable state law for Dow as a Delaware corporation.

Similar to *USA Technologies, Inc.* and *Bank of America Corporation*, the Proposal not only uses inconsistent language that directly conflicts with applicable law or creates inconsistencies that would result in alternative interpretations as to which actions were to be taken, but also fails to provide any guidance as to how such conflicts or inconsistencies should be resolved. These statements in the Proposal are inconsistent because implementing a right for stockholders to act through the written consent process, as opposed to solely at a stockholders' meeting, would not entitle stockholders to "initiate *any* appropriate topic" without directly running afoul of Dow's Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws unless actions are taken to amend such conflicting provisions. Any stockholder action by written consent that conflicts with a provision in Dow's Certificate of Incorporation would require the Company to seek and obtain stockholder approval to amend its Certificate of Incorporation in the next annual meeting or a special meeting of stockholders in the manner prescribed by the DGCL. Similarly, any stockholder action by written consent that conflicts with Dow's Bylaws could only be implemented after an amendment of such provision after receiving the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all of the shares of capital stock of Dow then entitled to vote generally in the election of directors. However, the Proposal neither acknowledges the need for such amendments nor provides any guidance as to how such conflicts or inconsistencies should be resolved. In contrast to *General Electric Company* in which the proposal had a defined or ascertainable scope under which such Proposal should be applied, such as the limitation provided by the phrase "consistent with applicable law," the current Proposal does not have any such limitation. If the Board were to implement the Proposal as it is written on its face, it may result in permitting shareholders to act by written consent to take actions that are not permitted under Dow's Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws and could have very different consequences than shareholders envisioned by approving it.

For instance, under the DGCL, the number of a company's directors is to be set "by, or in the manner provided in, the bylaws" unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. *See* DGCL § 141(b). As permitted by the DGCL, Dow's Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws restrict such right to the Board,¹ and this process would not change even if the Company implemented the Proposal by taking the steps necessary to authorize action by written consent. To allow the stockholders to set the size of the Board would require the Company to seek and obtain stockholder approval to amend its Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws. The stockholders would not be able to initiate a change in the size of the Board by written consent, notwithstanding

¹ Section 5.2 of Dow's Certificate of Incorporation states, in part:

The number of directors constituting the entire Board of Directors shall be fixed from time to time exclusively by a vote of a majority of the entire Board of Directors in the manner provided in the Bylaws.

Section 3.1 of Dow's Bylaw states, in part:

The business and affairs of the Company shall be managed by or under the direction of its Board. The number of Directors constituting the entire Board shall be not less than six nor more than twenty-one, as fixed from time to time exclusively by a resolution of majority of the entire Board.

the assertion in the Proposal that its implementation will provide stockholders the ability to initiate any appropriate topic for written consent.

Likewise, the DGCL permits certain types of mergers, such as a merger with a single direct or indirect wholly-owned subsidiary, without requiring the approval of stockholders, unless the company's certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. *See* DGCL § 251(g). As permitted by the DGCL, Dow's Certificate of Incorporation does not grant stockholders such a right. Thus, the right to act by written consent would not authorize stockholders to act on such mergers by written consent without a corresponding amendment of the Certificate of Incorporation, yet the Proposal does not acknowledge this fact.

These examples demonstrate that implementing the Proposal to permit written consent by shareholders, including shareholder ability to "initiate *any* appropriate topic" for written consent, would result in direct conflict or inconsistencies with applicable provisions of Dow's Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws, and is therefore inherently vague and misleading. In order to resolve such conflicts or inconsistencies, Dow would need to amend its Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws, which the Proposal neither acknowledges nor requests to do. Further, the Proposal fails to provide any guidance as to how such conflicts or inconsistencies should be resolved and lacks any defined or ascertainable scope under which such Proposal should be applied, such as the limitation provided by the phrase "consistent with applicable law" in *General Electric Company*. If the Board were to implement the Proposal as it is written on its face, it may result in permitting shareholders to act by written consent to take actions that are not permitted under Dow's Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws and could have very different consequences than shareholders envisioned by approving it. As a result, in applying this particular Proposal to Dow, the effect of the Proposal's statement to "include shareholder ability to initiate *any* appropriate topic for written consent" directly conflicts and creates inconsistencies with Dow's Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws without providing any guidance as to how such ambiguities should be resolved. If the Proposal were to be included in the 2021 Proxy Materials, Dow's stockholders voting on the Proposal would not have any reasonable certainty as to the actions or measures upon which they would be voting.

Accordingly, the Company believes that it may exclude the Proposal in its entirety from the 2021 Proxy Materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because the Proposal is impermissibly vague and indefinite such that it is inherently misleading in violation of Rule 14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials and therefore contrary to the Commission's proxy rules.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we respectfully request that the Staff concur with the Company's view and confirm that the Staff will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if the Company excludes the Proposal from its 2021 Proxy Materials. If the Staff does not concur with the Company's position, we would appreciate an opportunity to confer with the Staff concerning these matters prior to the issuance of its response. We would be happy to provide you with any additional information and answer any questions that you may have regarding this subject. Correspondence regarding this letter should be sent to Richard B. Alsop at (212) 848-7333 or Richard.Alsop@Shearman.com. Please let us know if we can be of any further assistance in this matter.

Respectfully yours,

Richard Alsop

Richard B. Alsop

Attachments

cc: John Chevedden
Amy E. Wilson, Dow Inc.
Jonathan P. Wendt, Dow Inc.

Exhibit A

Kenneth Steiner

Ms. Aray J. Wilson
Dow Inc (DOW)
2201 N.H. Dow Way
Midland, MI 48674
PH: 989-636-1000

Dear Ms. Wilson,

I purchased stock in our company because I believed our company had potential for improved performance. My attached Rule 14a-8 proposal is submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This Rule 14a-8 proposal is submitted as a low-cost method to improve company performance.

My proposal is for the next annual shareholder meeting. I will meet Rule 14a-8 requirements including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the forthcoming shareholder meeting. My submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is my proxy for John Chevedden or his designee to forward this Rule 14a-8 proposal to the company, and to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal, and/or modification of it, for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications regarding my rule 14a-8 proposal to John Chevedden.

To facilitate prompt and verifiable communications, please identify this proposal as my proposal exclusively.

This letter does not cover proposals that are not rule 14a-8 proposals. This letter does not grant the power to vote. Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of my proposal promptly by email to [REDACTED].

Kenneth Steiner

10/14/20
Date

Jonathan Wendi <jonathan.wendi@dow.com>
Katheryn Burch <KSBurch@dow.com>

[DOW: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, October 28, 2020]

[This line and any line above it – *Not* for publication.]

Proposal 4 – Shareholder Right to Act by Written Consent

Shareholders request that our board of directors take such steps as may be necessary to permit written consent by shareholders entitled to cast the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize the action at a meeting at which all shareholders entitled to vote thereon were present and voting. This includes shareholder ability to initiate any appropriate topic for written consent.

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AT&T investors denied a dial-in as annual meeting goes online

<https://whbl.com/2020/04/17/att-investors-denied-a-dial-in-as-annual-meeting-goes-online/1007928/>

Imagine the control a management like AT&T could have over an online special shareholder meeting.

Now more than ever shareholders need to have the option to take action outside of a shareholder meeting since tightly controlled online shareholder meetings are a shareholder engagement wasteland.

Please vote yes:

Shareholder Right to Act by Written Consent – Proposal 4

[The line above – *Is* for publication. Please assign the correct proposal number in the 2 places.]

Notes:

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including (emphasis added):

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(l)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

We believe that it is appropriate under rule 14a-8 for companies to address these objections in their statements of opposition.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

The stock supporting this proposal will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email

Exhibit B



November 10, 2020

Mr. John Chevedden

Subject: Stockholder Proposal – Shareholder Right to Act by Written Consent

Dear Mr. Chevedden:

We received the stockholder proposal dated October 14, 2020 (the “Proposal”) that was purportedly submitted on behalf of Mr. Kenneth Steiner (the “Proponent”) to Dow Inc. (“Dow” or the “Company”) on October 28, 2020.

The Proposal contains certain procedural deficiencies, which Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regulations require us to bring to your attention.

Proof of Ownership

Rule 14a-8(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), requires that in order to be eligible to submit a proposal for inclusion in Dow’s proxy statement for its annual meeting of stockholders, the Proponent must, among other things, have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of Dow’s common stock for at least one year prior to the date the Proponent submits the proposal, and must continue to hold such common stock through the date of the Dow annual meeting. Our stock records indicate that the Proponent is not currently the registered holder of any shares of Dow’s common stock and has not provided proof of ownership of Dow’s common stock.

Accordingly, Rule 14a-8(b) requires that a proponent of a proposal prove eligibility as a beneficial stockholder of the company that is the subject of the proposal by submitting either:

- a written statement from the “record” holder of the shares (usually a bank or broker) verifying that, at the time the proponent submitted the Proposal, the proponent had continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of Dow’s common stock for at least the one-year period prior to and including the date the Proposal was submitted, and that the proponent intend to continue to hold such common stock through the date of the Dow annual meeting; or
- a copy of a filed Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4, Form 5, or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting the proponent’s ownership of shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins, the proponent’s

written statement that it has continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period as of the date of the statement and the proponent's written statement that the proponent intends to continue ownership of the shares through the date of the Dow annual meeting.

Your letter did not include the sufficient proof of the Proponent's ownership of Dow's common stock. By this letter, I am requesting that you provide to us acceptable documentation that the Proponent has held the required value or number of shares to submit a proposal continuously for at least the one-year period preceding and including the October 28, 2020 date the proposal was submitted.

To help stockholders comply with the requirements when submitting proof of ownership to companies, the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division") published Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F ("SLB 14F"), dated October 18, 2011, and Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G ("SLB 14G"), dated October 16, 2012, a copy of both of which are attached for your reference. SLB 14F and SLB 14G provide that for securities held through The Depository Trust Company ("DTC"), only DTC participants should be viewed as "record" holders of securities that are deposited at DTC. The Proponent can confirm whether its bank or broker is a DTC participant by checking DTC's participant list, which is currently available on the Internet at: <https://www.dtcc.com/client-center/dtc-directories>.

If the Proponent holds shares through a bank or broker that is not a DTC participant, it will need to obtain proof of ownership from the DTC participant through which the bank or broker holds the shares, or an affiliate of such DTC participant. The Proponent should be able to find the name of the DTC participant by asking its bank or broker. If the DTC participant that holds the Proponent's shares knows the holdings of its bank or broker, but does not know the Proponent's holdings, the Proponent may satisfy the proof of ownership requirements by submitting two proof of ownership statements — one from the Proponent's bank or broker confirming its ownership and the other from the DTC participant confirming the bank's or broker's ownership. Please review SLB 14F carefully before submitting proof of ownership to ensure that it is compliant.

Copies of Rule 14a-8, which applies to stockholder proposals submitted for inclusion in proxy statements, and SLB 14F and SLB 14G, which applies to stockholders' compliance with requirements when submitting proof of ownership to companies, are enclosed for your reference.

Identification of the Specific Proposal to be Submitted

Separately, your correspondence did not include sufficient documentation demonstrating that you had the legal authority to submit the Proposal on behalf of the Proponent as of the date the Proposal was submitted (October 28, 2020). In Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I (Nov. 1, 2017) ("SLB 14I"), a copy of which is attached for your reference, the Division noted that proposals submitted by proxy, such as the Proposal, may present challenges and concerns, including "that shareholders may not know that proposals are being submitted on their behalf."

Accordingly, in evaluating whether there is a basis to exclude a proposal under the eligibility requirements of Rule 14a-8(b) of the Exchange Act, as addressed below, SLB 14I states that in general the Division would expect any shareholder who submits a proposal by proxy to provide documentation to:

- identify the shareholder-proponent and the person or entity selected as proxy;
- identify the company to which the proposal is directed;
- identify the annual or special meeting for which the proposal is submitted;
- identify the specific proposal to be submitted; and
- be signed and dated by the shareholder.


The documentation that you provided with the Proposal raises the concerns referred to in SLB 14I. Specifically, the documentation from the Proponent purporting to authorize you to act on the Proponent's behalf does not identify the Proposal as the specific proposal to be submitted.

To remedy this defect, the Proponent should provide documentation that confirms that, as of the date you submitted the Proposal, the Proponent had instructed or authorized you to submit the Proposal to the Company on the Proponent's behalf. Such documentation should identify the specific proposal authorized to be submitted and expressly identify the Company as the subject company of the Proposal.

A copy of SLB 14I, which applies to "proposals by proxy", is enclosed for your reference.

In order to meet the eligibility requirements for submitting a stockholder proposal, the SEC rules require that the documentation be postmarked or transmitted electronically to us no later than 14 calendar days from the date you receive this letter. Please address any response to me at jonathan.wendt@dow.com or the mailing address provided above.

Sincerely,



Jonathan P. Wendt
Assistant Secretary
Office of the Corporate Secretary
jonathan.wendt@dow.com
(989) 638-2343

cc: Kenneth Steiner,

Attachments



**Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission**

Shareholder Proposals

Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F (CF)

Action: Publication of CF Staff Legal Bulletin

Date: October 18, 2011

Summary: This staff legal bulletin provides information for companies and shareholders regarding Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Supplementary Information: The statements in this bulletin represent the views of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division"). This bulletin is not a rule, regulation or statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission"). Further, the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved its content.

Contacts: For further information, please contact the Division's Office of Chief Counsel by calling (202) 551-3500 or by submitting a web-based request form at https://www.sec.gov/forms/corp_fin_interpretive.

A. The purpose of this bulletin

This bulletin is part of a continuing effort by the Division to provide guidance on important issues arising under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8. Specifically, this bulletin contains information regarding:

- Brokers and banks that constitute "record" holders under Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) for purposes of verifying whether a beneficial owner is eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8;
- Common errors shareholders can avoid when submitting proof of ownership to companies;
- The submission of revised proposals;
- Procedures for withdrawing no-action requests regarding proposals submitted by multiple proponents; and
- The Division's new process for transmitting Rule 14a-8 no-action responses by email.

You can find additional guidance regarding Rule 14a-8 in the following bulletins that are available on the Commission's website: [SLB No. 14](#), [SLB No. 14A](#), [SLB No. 14B](#), [SLB No. 14C](#), [SLB No. 14D](#) and [SLB No. 14E](#).

B. The types of brokers and banks that constitute "record" holders under Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) for purposes of verifying whether a beneficial owner is eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8

1. Eligibility to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8

To be eligible to submit a shareholder proposal, a shareholder must have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the shareholder meeting for at least one year as of the date the shareholder submits the proposal. The shareholder must also continue to hold the required amount of securities through the date of the meeting and must provide the company with a written statement of intent to do so.¹

The steps that a shareholder must take to verify his or her eligibility to submit a proposal depend on how the shareholder owns the securities. There are two types of security holders in the U.S.: registered owners and beneficial owners.² Registered owners have a direct relationship with the issuer because their ownership of shares is listed on the records maintained by the issuer or its transfer agent. If a shareholder is a registered owner, the company can independently confirm that the shareholder's holdings satisfy Rule 14a-8(b)'s eligibility requirement.

The vast majority of investors in shares issued by U.S. companies, however, are beneficial owners, which means that they hold their securities in book-entry form through a securities intermediary, such as a broker or a bank. Beneficial owners are sometimes referred to as "street name" holders. Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) provides that a beneficial owner can provide proof of ownership to support his or her eligibility to submit a proposal by submitting a written statement "from the 'record' holder of [the] securities (usually a broker or bank)," verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, the shareholder held the required amount of securities continuously for at least one year.³

2. The role of the Depository Trust Company

Most large U.S. brokers and banks deposit their customers' securities with, and hold those securities through, the Depository Trust Company ("DTC"), a registered clearing agency acting as a securities depository. Such brokers and banks are often referred to as "participants" in DTC.⁴ The names of these DTC participants, however, do not appear as the registered owners of the securities deposited with DTC on the list of shareholders maintained by the company or, more typically, by its transfer agent. Rather, DTC's nominee, Cede & Co., appears on the shareholder list as the sole registered owner of securities deposited with DTC by the DTC participants. A company can request from DTC a "securities position listing" as of a specified date, which identifies the DTC participants having a position in the company's securities and the number of securities held by each DTC participant on that date.⁵

3. Brokers and banks that constitute "record" holders under Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) for purposes of verifying whether a beneficial owner is eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8

In *The Hain Celestial Group, Inc.* (Oct. 1, 2008), we took the position that an introducing broker could be considered a "record" holder for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i). An introducing broker is a broker that engages in sales and other activities involving customer contact, such as opening customer accounts and accepting customer orders, but is not permitted to maintain custody of customer funds and securities.⁶ Instead, an introducing broker engages another broker, known as a "clearing broker," to hold custody of client funds and securities, to clear and execute customer trades, and to handle other functions such as issuing confirmations of customer trades and customer account statements. Clearing brokers generally are DTC participants; introducing brokers generally are not. As introducing brokers generally are not DTC participants, and therefore typically do not appear on DTC's securities position listing, *Hain Celestial* has required companies to

accept proof of ownership letters from brokers in cases where, unlike the positions of registered owners and brokers and banks that are DTC participants, the company is unable to verify the positions against its own or its transfer agent's records or against DTC's securities position listing.

In light of questions we have received following two recent court cases relating to proof of ownership under Rule 14a-8⁷ and in light of the Commission's discussion of registered and beneficial owners in the Proxy Mechanics Concept Release, we have reconsidered our views as to what types of brokers and banks should be considered "record" holders under Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i). Because of the transparency of DTC participants' positions in a company's securities, we will take the view going forward that, for Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) purposes, only DTC participants should be viewed as "record" holders of securities that are deposited at DTC. As a result, we will no longer follow *Hain Celestial*.

We believe that taking this approach as to who constitutes a "record" holder for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) will provide greater certainty to beneficial owners and companies. We also note that this approach is consistent with Exchange Act Rule 12g5-1 and a 1988 staff no-action letter addressing that rule,⁸ under which brokers and banks that are DTC participants are considered to be the record holders of securities on deposit with DTC when calculating the number of record holders for purposes of Sections 12(g) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act.

Companies have occasionally expressed the view that, because DTC's nominee, Cede & Co., appears on the shareholder list as the sole registered owner of securities deposited with DTC by the DTC participants, only DTC or Cede & Co. should be viewed as the "record" holder of the securities held on deposit at DTC for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i). We have never interpreted the rule to require a shareholder to obtain a proof of ownership letter from DTC or Cede & Co., and nothing in this guidance should be construed as changing that view.

How can a shareholder determine whether his or her broker or bank is a DTC participant?

Shareholders and companies can confirm whether a particular broker or bank is a DTC participant by checking DTC's participant list, which is currently available on the Internet at <http://www.dtcc.com/~media/Files/Downloads/client-center/DTC/alpha.ashx>.

What if a shareholder's broker or bank is not on DTC's participant list?

The shareholder will need to obtain proof of ownership from the DTC participant through which the securities are held. The shareholder should be able to find out who this DTC participant is by asking the shareholder's broker or bank.⁹

If the DTC participant knows the shareholder's broker or bank's holdings, but does not know the shareholder's holdings, a shareholder could satisfy Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) by obtaining and submitting two proof of ownership statements verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, the required amount of securities were continuously held for at least one year – one from the shareholder's broker or bank confirming the shareholder's ownership, and the other from the DTC participant confirming the broker or bank's ownership.

How will the staff process no-action requests that argue for exclusion on the basis that the shareholder's proof of ownership is not from a DTC

participant?

The staff will grant no-action relief to a company on the basis that the shareholder's proof of ownership is not from a DTC participant only if the company's notice of defect describes the required proof of ownership in a manner that is consistent with the guidance contained in this bulletin. Under Rule 14a-8(f)(1), the shareholder will have an opportunity to obtain the requisite proof of ownership after receiving the notice of defect.

C. Common errors shareholders can avoid when submitting proof of ownership to companies

In this section, we describe two common errors shareholders make when submitting proof of ownership for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2), and we provide guidance on how to avoid these errors.

First, Rule 14a-8(b) requires a shareholder to provide proof of ownership that he or she has "continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal" (emphasis added).¹⁰ We note that many proof of ownership letters do not satisfy this requirement because they do not verify the shareholder's beneficial ownership for the entire one-year period preceding and including the date the proposal is submitted. In some cases, the letter speaks as of a date *before* the date the proposal is submitted, thereby leaving a gap between the date of the verification and the date the proposal is submitted. In other cases, the letter speaks as of a date *after* the date the proposal was submitted but covers a period of only one year, thus failing to verify the shareholder's beneficial ownership over the required full one-year period preceding the date of the proposal's submission.

Second, many letters fail to confirm continuous ownership of the securities. This can occur when a broker or bank submits a letter that confirms the shareholder's beneficial ownership only as of a specified date but omits any reference to continuous ownership for a one-year period.

We recognize that the requirements of Rule 14a-8(b) are highly prescriptive and can cause inconvenience for shareholders when submitting proposals. Although our administration of Rule 14a-8(b) is constrained by the terms of the rule, we believe that shareholders can avoid the two errors highlighted above by arranging to have their broker or bank provide the required verification of ownership as of the date they plan to submit the proposal using the following format:

"As of [date the proposal is submitted], [name of shareholder] held, and has held continuously for at least one year, [number of securities] shares of [company name] [class of securities]."¹¹

As discussed above, a shareholder may also need to provide a separate written statement from the DTC participant through which the shareholder's securities are held if the shareholder's broker or bank is not a DTC participant.

D. The submission of revised proposals

On occasion, a shareholder will revise a proposal after submitting it to a company. This section addresses questions we have received regarding revisions to a proposal or supporting statement.

1. A shareholder submits a timely proposal. The shareholder then submits a revised proposal before the company's deadline for receiving proposals. Must the company accept the revisions?

Yes. In this situation, we believe the revised proposal serves as a replacement of the initial proposal. By submitting a revised proposal, the shareholder has effectively withdrawn the initial proposal. Therefore, the shareholder is not in violation of the one-proposal limitation in Rule 14a-8(c).¹² If the company intends to submit a no-action request, it must do so with respect to the revised proposal.

We recognize that in Question and Answer E.2 of SLB No. 14, we indicated that if a shareholder makes revisions to a proposal before the company submits its no-action request, the company can choose whether to accept the revisions. However, this guidance has led some companies to believe that, in cases where shareholders attempt to make changes to an initial proposal, the company is free to ignore such revisions even if the revised proposal is submitted before the company's deadline for receiving shareholder proposals. We are revising our guidance on this issue to make clear that a company may not ignore a revised proposal in this situation.¹³

2. A shareholder submits a timely proposal. After the deadline for receiving proposals, the shareholder submits a revised proposal. Must the company accept the revisions?

No. If a shareholder submits revisions to a proposal after the deadline for receiving proposals under Rule 14a-8(e), the company is not required to accept the revisions. However, if the company does not accept the revisions, it must treat the revised proposal as a second proposal and submit a notice stating its intention to exclude the revised proposal, as required by Rule 14a-8(j). The company's notice may cite Rule 14a-8(e) as the reason for excluding the revised proposal. If the company does not accept the revisions and intends to exclude the initial proposal, it would also need to submit its reasons for excluding the initial proposal.

3. If a shareholder submits a revised proposal, as of which date must the shareholder prove his or her share ownership?

A shareholder must prove ownership as of the date the original proposal is submitted. When the Commission has discussed revisions to proposals,¹⁴ it has not suggested that a revision triggers a requirement to provide proof of ownership a second time. As outlined in Rule 14a-8(b), proving ownership includes providing a written statement that the shareholder intends to continue to hold the securities through the date of the shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8(f)(2) provides that if the shareholder "fails in [his or her] promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of [the same shareholder's] proposals from its proxy materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years." With these provisions in mind, we do not interpret Rule 14a-8 as requiring additional proof of ownership when a shareholder submits a revised proposal.¹⁵

E. Procedures for withdrawing no-action requests for proposals submitted by multiple proponents

We have previously addressed the requirements for withdrawing a Rule 14a-8 no-action request in SLB Nos. 14 and 14C. SLB No. 14 notes that a company should include with a withdrawal letter documentation demonstrating that a shareholder has withdrawn the proposal. In cases where a proposal submitted by multiple shareholders is withdrawn, SLB No. 14C states that, if each shareholder has designated a lead individual to act

on its behalf and the company is able to demonstrate that the individual is authorized to act on behalf of all of the proponents, the company need only provide a letter from that lead individual indicating that the lead individual is withdrawing the proposal on behalf of all of the proponents.

Because there is no relief granted by the staff in cases where a no-action request is withdrawn following the withdrawal of the related proposal, we recognize that the threshold for withdrawing a no-action request need not be overly burdensome. Going forward, we will process a withdrawal request if the company provides a letter from the lead filer that includes a representation that the lead filer is authorized to withdraw the proposal on behalf of each proponent identified in the company's no-action request.¹⁶

F. Use of email to transmit our Rule 14a-8 no-action responses to companies and proponents

To date, the Division has transmitted copies of our Rule 14a-8 no-action responses, including copies of the correspondence we have received in connection with such requests, by U.S. mail to companies and proponents. We also post our response and the related correspondence to the Commission's website shortly after issuance of our response.

In order to accelerate delivery of staff responses to companies and proponents, and to reduce our copying and postage costs, going forward, we intend to transmit our Rule 14a-8 no-action responses by email to companies and proponents. We therefore encourage both companies and proponents to include email contact information in any correspondence to each other and to us. We will use U.S. mail to transmit our no-action response to any company or proponent for which we do not have email contact information.

Given the availability of our responses and the related correspondence on the Commission's website and the requirement under Rule 14a-8 for companies and proponents to copy each other on correspondence submitted to the Commission, we believe it is unnecessary to transmit copies of the related correspondence along with our no-action response. Therefore, we intend to transmit only our staff response and not the correspondence we receive from the parties. We will continue to post to the Commission's website copies of this correspondence at the same time that we post our staff no-action response.

¹ See Rule 14a-8(b).

² For an explanation of the types of share ownership in the U.S., see Concept Release on U.S. Proxy System, Release No. 34-62495 (July 14, 2010) [75 FR 42982] ("Proxy Mechanics Concept Release"), at Section II.A. The term "beneficial owner" does not have a uniform meaning under the federal securities laws. It has a different meaning in this bulletin as compared to "beneficial owner" and "beneficial ownership" in Sections 13 and 16 of the Exchange Act. Our use of the term in this bulletin is not intended to suggest that registered owners are not beneficial owners for purposes of those Exchange Act provisions. See Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-12598 (July 7, 1976) [41 FR 29982], at n.2 ("The term 'beneficial owner' when used in the context of the proxy rules, and in light of the purposes of those rules, may be interpreted to have a broader meaning than it would for certain other purpose[s] under the federal securities laws, such as reporting pursuant to the Williams Act.").

³ If a shareholder has filed a Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4 or Form 5 reflecting ownership of the required amount of shares, the shareholder may instead prove ownership by submitting a copy of such filings and providing the additional information that is described in Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(ii).

⁴ DTC holds the deposited securities in “fungible bulk,” meaning that there are no specifically identifiable shares directly owned by the DTC participants. Rather, each DTC participant holds a pro rata interest or position in the aggregate number of shares of a particular issuer held at DTC. Correspondingly, each customer of a DTC participant – such as an individual investor – owns a pro rata interest in the shares in which the DTC participant has a pro rata interest. See Proxy Mechanics Concept Release, at Section II.B.2.a.

⁵ See Exchange Act Rule 17Ad-8.

⁶ See Net Capital Rule, Release No. 34-31511 (Nov. 24, 1992) [57 FR 56973] (“Net Capital Rule Release”), at Section II.C.

⁷ See *KBR Inc. v. Chevedden*, Civil Action No. H-11-0196, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36431, 2011 WL 1463611 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2011); *Apache Corp. v. Chevedden*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 723 (S.D. Tex. 2010). In both cases, the court concluded that a securities intermediary was not a record holder for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b) because it did not appear on a list of the company’s non-objecting beneficial owners or on any DTC securities position listing, nor was the intermediary a DTC participant.

⁸ *Techne Corp.* (Sept. 20, 1988).

⁹ In addition, if the shareholder’s broker is an introducing broker, the shareholder’s account statements should include the clearing broker’s identity and telephone number. See Net Capital Rule Release, at Section II.C.(iii). The clearing broker will generally be a DTC participant.

¹⁰ For purposes of Rule 14a-8(b), the submission date of a proposal will generally precede the company’s receipt date of the proposal, absent the use of electronic or other means of same-day delivery.

¹¹ This format is acceptable for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b), but it is not mandatory or exclusive.

¹² As such, it is not appropriate for a company to send a notice of defect for multiple proposals under Rule 14a-8(c) upon receiving a revised proposal.

¹³ This position will apply to all proposals submitted after an initial proposal but before the company’s deadline for receiving proposals, regardless of whether they are explicitly labeled as “revisions” to an initial proposal, unless the shareholder affirmatively indicates an intent to submit a second, *additional* proposal for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials. In that case, the company must send the shareholder a notice of defect pursuant to Rule 14a-8(f)(1) if it intends to exclude either proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on Rule 14a-8(c). In light of this guidance, with respect to proposals or revisions received before a company’s deadline for submission, we will no longer follow *Layne Christensen Co.* (Mar. 21, 2011) and other prior staff no-action letters in which we took the view that a proposal would violate the Rule 14a-8(c) one-proposal limitation if such proposal is submitted to a company after the company has either submitted a Rule 14a-8 no-action request to exclude an earlier proposal submitted by

the same proponent or notified the proponent that the earlier proposal was excludable under the rule.

¹⁴ See, e.g., Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-12999 (Nov. 22, 1976) [41 FR 52994].

¹⁵ Because the relevant date for proving ownership under Rule 14a-8(b) is the date the proposal is submitted, a proponent who does not adequately prove ownership in connection with a proposal is not permitted to submit another proposal for the same meeting on a later date.

¹⁶ Nothing in this staff position has any effect on the status of any shareholder proposal that is not withdrawn by the proponent or its authorized representative.

<http://www.sec.gov/interp/leg/cfs1b14f.htm>



**Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission**

Shareholder Proposals

Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14G (CF)

Action: Publication of CF Staff Legal Bulletin

Date: October 16, 2012

Summary: This staff legal bulletin provides information for companies and shareholders regarding Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Supplementary Information: The statements in this bulletin represent the views of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division"). This bulletin is not a rule, regulation or statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission"). Further, the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved its content.

Contacts: For further information, please contact the Division's Office of Chief Counsel by calling (202) 551-3500 or by submitting a web-based request form at https://www.sec.gov/forms/corp_fin_interpretive.

A. The purpose of this bulletin

This bulletin is part of a continuing effort by the Division to provide guidance on important issues arising under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8. Specifically, this bulletin contains information regarding:

- the parties that can provide proof of ownership under Rule 14a-8(b) (2)(i) for purposes of verifying whether a beneficial owner is eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8;
- the manner in which companies should notify proponents of a failure to provide proof of ownership for the one-year period required under Rule 14a-8(b)(1); and
- the use of website references in proposals and supporting statements.

You can find additional guidance regarding Rule 14a-8 in the following bulletins that are available on the Commission's website: [SLB No. 14](#), [SLB No. 14A](#), [SLB No. 14B](#), [SLB No. 14C](#), [SLB No. 14D](#), [SLB No. 14E](#) and [SLB No. 14F](#).

B. Parties that can provide proof of ownership under Rule 14a-8(b) (2)(i) for purposes of verifying whether a beneficial owner is eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8

1. **Sufficiency of proof of ownership letters provided by affiliates of DTC participants for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2) (i)**

To be eligible to submit a proposal under Rule 14a-8, a shareholder must, among other things, provide documentation evidencing that the shareholder has continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the shareholder meeting for at least one year as of the date the shareholder submits the proposal. If the shareholder is a beneficial owner of the securities, which means that the securities are held in book-entry form through a securities intermediary, Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) provides that this documentation can be in the form of a "written statement from the 'record' holder of your securities (usually a broker or bank)..."

In SLB No. 14F, the Division described its view that only securities intermediaries that are participants in the Depository Trust Company ("DTC") should be viewed as "record" holders of securities that are deposited at DTC for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i). Therefore, a beneficial owner must obtain a proof of ownership letter from the DTC participant through which its securities are held at DTC in order to satisfy the proof of ownership requirements in Rule 14a-8.

During the most recent proxy season, some companies questioned the sufficiency of proof of ownership letters from entities that were not themselves DTC participants, but were affiliates of DTC participants.¹ By virtue of the affiliate relationship, we believe that a securities intermediary holding shares through its affiliated DTC participant should be in a position to verify its customers' ownership of securities. Accordingly, we are of the view that, for purposes of Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i), a proof of ownership letter from an affiliate of a DTC participant satisfies the requirement to provide a proof of ownership letter from a DTC participant.

2. Adequacy of proof of ownership letters from securities intermediaries that are not brokers or banks

We understand that there are circumstances in which securities intermediaries that are not brokers or banks maintain securities accounts in the ordinary course of their business. A shareholder who holds securities through a securities intermediary that is not a broker or bank can satisfy Rule 14a-8's documentation requirement by submitting a proof of ownership letter from that securities intermediary.² If the securities intermediary is not a DTC participant or an affiliate of a DTC participant, then the shareholder will also need to obtain a proof of ownership letter from the DTC participant or an affiliate of a DTC participant that can verify the holdings of the securities intermediary.

C. Manner in which companies should notify proponents of a failure to provide proof of ownership for the one-year period required under Rule 14a-8(b)(1)

As discussed in Section C of SLB No. 14F, a common error in proof of ownership letters is that they do not verify a proponent's beneficial ownership for the entire one-year period preceding and including the date the proposal was submitted, as required by Rule 14a-8(b)(1). In some cases, the letter speaks as of a date *before* the date the proposal was submitted, thereby leaving a gap between the date of verification and the date the proposal was submitted. In other cases, the letter speaks as of a date *after* the date the proposal was submitted but covers a period of only one year, thus failing to verify the proponent's beneficial ownership over the required full one-year period preceding the date of the proposal's submission.

Under Rule 14a-8(f), if a proponent fails to follow one of the eligibility or procedural requirements of the rule, a company may exclude the proposal only if it notifies the proponent of the defect and the proponent fails to

correct it. In SLB No. 14 and SLB No. 14B, we explained that companies should provide adequate detail about what a proponent must do to remedy all eligibility or procedural defects.

We are concerned that companies' notices of defect are not adequately describing the defects or explaining what a proponent must do to remedy defects in proof of ownership letters. For example, some companies' notices of defect make no mention of the gap in the period of ownership covered by the proponent's proof of ownership letter or other specific deficiencies that the company has identified. We do not believe that such notices of defect serve the purpose of Rule 14a-8(f).

Accordingly, going forward, we will not concur in the exclusion of a proposal under Rules 14a-8(b) and 14a-8(f) on the basis that a proponent's proof of ownership does not cover the one-year period preceding and including the date the proposal is submitted unless the company provides a notice of defect that identifies the specific date on which the proposal was submitted and explains that the proponent must obtain a new proof of ownership letter verifying continuous ownership of the requisite amount of securities for the one-year period preceding and including such date to cure the defect. We view the proposal's date of submission as the date the proposal is postmarked or transmitted electronically. Identifying in the notice of defect the specific date on which the proposal was submitted will help a proponent better understand how to remedy the defects described above and will be particularly helpful in those instances in which it may be difficult for a proponent to determine the date of submission, such as when the proposal is not postmarked on the same day it is placed in the mail. In addition, companies should include copies of the postmark or evidence of electronic transmission with their no-action requests.

D. Use of website addresses in proposals and supporting statements

Recently, a number of proponents have included in their proposals or in their supporting statements the addresses to websites that provide more information about their proposals. In some cases, companies have sought to exclude either the website address or the entire proposal due to the reference to the website address.

In SLB No. 14, we explained that a reference to a website address in a proposal does not raise the concerns addressed by the 500-word limitation in Rule 14a-8(d). We continue to be of this view and, accordingly, we will continue to count a website address as one word for purposes of Rule 14a-8(d). To the extent that the company seeks the exclusion of a website reference in a proposal, but not the proposal itself, we will continue to follow the guidance stated in SLB No. 14, which provides that references to website addresses in proposals or supporting statements could be subject to exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) if the information contained on the website is materially false or misleading, irrelevant to the subject matter of the proposal or otherwise in contravention of the proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9.³

In light of the growing interest in including references to website addresses in proposals and supporting statements, we are providing additional guidance on the appropriate use of website addresses in proposals and supporting statements.⁴

1. References to website addresses in a proposal or supporting statement and Rule 14a-8(i)(3)

References to websites in a proposal or supporting statement may raise concerns under Rule 14a-8(i)(3). In SLB No. 14B, we stated that the

exclusion of a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) as vague and indefinite may be appropriate if neither the shareholders voting on the proposal, nor the company in implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires. In evaluating whether a proposal may be excluded on this basis, we consider only the information contained in the proposal and supporting statement and determine whether, based on that information, shareholders and the company can determine what actions the proposal seeks.

If a proposal or supporting statement refers to a website that provides information necessary for shareholders and the company to understand with reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires, and such information is not also contained in the proposal or in the supporting statement, then we believe the proposal would raise concerns under Rule 14a-9 and would be subject to exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) as vague and indefinite. By contrast, if shareholders and the company can understand with reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires without reviewing the information provided on the website, then we believe that the proposal would not be subject to exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) on the basis of the reference to the website address. In this case, the information on the website only supplements the information contained in the proposal and in the supporting statement.

2. Providing the company with the materials that will be published on the referenced website

We recognize that if a proposal references a website that is not operational at the time the proposal is submitted, it will be impossible for a company or the staff to evaluate whether the website reference may be excluded. In our view, a reference to a non-operational website in a proposal or supporting statement could be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) as irrelevant to the subject matter of a proposal. We understand, however, that a proponent may wish to include a reference to a website containing information related to the proposal but wait to activate the website until it becomes clear that the proposal will be included in the company's proxy materials. Therefore, we will not concur that a reference to a website may be excluded as irrelevant under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) on the basis that it is not yet operational if the proponent, at the time the proposal is submitted, provides the company with the materials that are intended for publication on the website and a representation that the website will become operational at, or prior to, the time the company files its definitive proxy materials.

3. Potential issues that may arise if the content of a referenced website changes after the proposal is submitted

To the extent the information on a website changes after submission of a proposal and the company believes the revised information renders the website reference excludable under Rule 14a-8, a company seeking our concurrence that the website reference may be excluded must submit a letter presenting its reasons for doing so. While Rule 14a-8(j) requires a company to submit its reasons for exclusion with the Commission no later than 80 calendar days before it files its definitive proxy materials, we may concur that the changes to the referenced website constitute "good cause" for the company to file its reasons for excluding the website reference after the 80-day deadline and grant the company's request that the 80-day requirement be waived.

¹ An entity is an "affiliate" of a DTC participant if such entity directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls or is controlled by, or is under common control with, the DTC participant.

² Rule 14a-8(b)(2)(i) itself acknowledges that the record holder is "usually," but not always, a broker or bank.

³ Rule 14a-9 prohibits statements in proxy materials which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, are false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements not false or misleading.

⁴ A website that provides more information about a shareholder proposal may constitute a proxy solicitation under the proxy rules. Accordingly, we remind shareholders who elect to include website addresses in their proposals to comply with all applicable rules regarding proxy solicitations.

<http://www.sec.gov/interp/leg/cfs1b14g.htm>

ELECTRONIC CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

e-CFR data is current as of November 4, 2020

Title 17 → Chapter II → Part 240 → §240.14a-8

Title 17: Commodity and Securities Exchanges
PART 240—GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

§240.14a-8 Shareholder proposals.

[Link to an amendment published at 85 FR 70284, Nov. 4, 2020.](#)

This section addresses when a company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders. In summary, in order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you must be eligible and follow certain procedures. Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude your proposal, but only after submitting its reasons to the Commission. We structured this section in a question-and-answer format so that it is easier to understand. The references to "you" are to a shareholder seeking to submit the proposal.

(a) *Question 1: What is a proposal?* A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at a meeting of the company's shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company must also provide in the form of proxy means for shareholders to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval, or abstention. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "proposal" as used in this section refers both to your proposal, and to your corresponding statement in support of your proposal (if any).

(b) *Question 2: Who is eligible to submit a proposal, and how do I demonstrate to the company that I am eligible?* (1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting.

(2) If you are the registered holder of your securities, which means that your name appears in the company's records as a shareholder, the company can verify your eligibility on its own, although you will still have to provide the company with a written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders. However, if like many shareholders you are not a registered holder, the company likely does not know that you are a shareholder, or how many shares you own. In this case, at the time you submit your proposal, you must prove your eligibility to the company in one of two ways:

(i) The first way is to submit to the company a written statement from the "record" holder of your securities (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, at the time you submitted your proposal, you continuously held the securities for at least one year. You must also include your own written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders; or

(ii) The second way to prove ownership applies only if you have filed a Schedule 13D (§240.13d-101), Schedule 13G (§240.13d-102), Form 3 (§249.103 of this chapter), Form 4 (§249.104 of this chapter) and/or Form 5 (§249.105 of this chapter), or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting your ownership of the shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins. If you have filed one of these documents with the SEC, you may demonstrate your eligibility by submitting to the company:

(A) A copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in your ownership level;

(B) Your written statement that you continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period as of the date of the statement; and

(C) Your written statement that you intend to continue ownership of the shares through the date of the company's annual or special meeting.

(c) *Question 3: How many proposals may I submit?* Each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders' meeting.

(d) *Question 4: How long can my proposal be?* The proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.

(e) *Question 5: What is the deadline for submitting a proposal?* (1) If you are submitting your proposal for the company's annual meeting, you can in most cases find the deadline in last year's proxy statement. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting last year, or has changed the date of its meeting for this year more than 30 days from last year's meeting, you can usually find the deadline in one of the company's quarterly reports on Form 10-Q (§249.308a of this chapter), or in shareholder reports of investment companies under §270.30d-1 of this chapter of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In order to avoid controversy, shareholders should submit their proposals by means, including electronic means, that permit them to prove the date of delivery.

(2) The deadline is calculated in the following manner if the proposal is submitted for a regularly scheduled annual meeting. The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's proxy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's annual meeting. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting the previous year, or if the date of this year's annual meeting has been changed by more than 30 days from the date of the previous year's meeting, then the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(3) If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

(f) *Question 6: What if I fail to follow one of the eligibility or procedural requirements explained in answers to Questions 1 through 4 of this section?* (1) The company may exclude your proposal, but only after it has notified you of the problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it. Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company must notify you in writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies, as well as of the time frame for your response. Your response must be postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days from the date you received the company's notification. A company need not provide you such notice of a deficiency if the deficiency cannot be remedied, such as if you fail to submit a proposal by the company's properly determined deadline. If the company intends to exclude the proposal, it will later have to make a submission under §240.14a-8 and provide you with a copy under Question 10 below, §240.14a-8(j).

(2) If you fail in your promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.

(g) *Question 7: Who has the burden of persuading the Commission or its staff that my proposal can be excluded?* Except as otherwise noted, the burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.

(h) *Question 8: Must I appear personally at the shareholders' meeting to present the proposal?* (1) Either you, or your representative who is qualified under state law to present the proposal on your behalf, must attend the meeting to present the proposal. Whether you attend the meeting yourself or send a qualified representative to the meeting in your place, you should make sure that you, or your representative, follow the proper state law procedures for attending the meeting and/or presenting your proposal.

(2) If the company holds its shareholder meeting in whole or in part via electronic media, and the company permits you or your representative to present your proposal via such media, then you may appear through electronic media rather than traveling to the meeting to appear in person.

(3) If you or your qualified representative fail to appear and present the proposal, without good cause, the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings held in the following two calendar years.

(i) *Question 9: If I have complied with the procedural requirements, on what other bases may a company rely to exclude my proposal?* (1) *Improper under state law:* If the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's organization;

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (i)(1): Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.

(2) *Violation of law:* If the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject;

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (i)(2): We will not apply this basis for exclusion to permit exclusion of a proposal on grounds that it would violate foreign law if compliance with the foreign law would result in a violation of any state or federal law.

(3) *Violation of proxy rules:* If the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including §240.14e-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials;

(4) *Personal grievance; special interest*: If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the company or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to you, or to further a personal interest, which is not shared by the other shareholders at large;

(5) *Relevance*: If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business;

(6) *Absence of power/authority*: If the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal;

(7) *Management functions*: If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations;

(8) *Director elections*: If the proposal:

(i) Would disqualify a nominee who is standing for election;

(ii) Would remove a director from office before his or her term expired;

(iii) Questions the competence, business judgment, or character of one or more nominees or directors;

(iv) Seeks to include a specific individual in the company's proxy materials for election to the board of directors; or

(v) Otherwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election of directors.

(9) *Conflicts with company's proposal*: If the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting;

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (i)(9): A company's submission to the Commission under this section should specify the points of conflict with the company's proposal.

(10) *Substantially implemented*: If the company has already substantially implemented the proposal;

NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (i)(10): A company may exclude a shareholder proposal that would provide an advisory vote or seek future advisory votes to approve the compensation of executives as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K (§229.402 of this chapter) or any successor to Item 402 (a "say-on-pay vote") or that relates to the frequency of say-on-pay votes, provided that in the most recent shareholder vote required by §240.14a-21(b) of this chapter a single year (*i.e.*, one, two, or three years) received approval of a majority of votes cast on the matter and the company has adopted a policy on the frequency of say-on-pay votes that is consistent with the choice of the majority of votes cast in the most recent shareholder vote required by §240.14a-21(b) of this chapter.

(11) *Duplication*: If the proposal substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the company by another proponent that will be included in the company's proxy materials for the same meeting;

(12) *Resubmissions*: If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another proposal or proposals that has or have been previously included in the company's proxy materials within the preceding 5 calendar years, a company may exclude it from its proxy materials for any meeting held within 3 calendar years of the last time it was included if the proposal received:

(i) Less than 3% of the vote if proposed once within the preceding 5 calendar years;

(ii) Less than 6% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed twice previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; or

(iii) Less than 10% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed three times or more previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; and

(13) *Specific amount of dividends*. If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.

(j) *Question 10*: What procedures must the company follow if it intends to exclude my proposal? (1) If the company intends to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials, it must file its reasons with the Commission no later than 80 calendar days before it files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy with the Commission. The company must simultaneously provide you with a copy of its submission. The Commission staff may permit the company to make its submission later than 80 days before the company files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy, if the company demonstrates good cause for missing the deadline.

(2) The company must file six paper copies of the following:

(i) The proposal;

(ii) An explanation of why the company believes that it may exclude the proposal, which should, if possible, refer to the most recent applicable authority, such as prior Division letters issued under the rule; and

(iii) A supporting opinion of counsel when such reasons are based on matters of state or foreign law.

(k) *Question 11: May I submit my own statement to the Commission responding to the company's arguments?*

Yes, you may submit a response, but it is not required. You should try to submit any response to us, with a copy to the company, as soon as possible after the company makes its submission. This way, the Commission staff will have time to consider fully your submission before it issues its response. You should submit six paper copies of your response.

(l) *Question 12: If the company includes my shareholder proposal in its proxy materials, what information about me must it include along with the proposal itself?*

(1) The company's proxy statement must include your name and address, as well as the number of the company's voting securities that you hold. However, instead of providing that information, the company may instead include a statement that it will provide the information to shareholders promptly upon receiving an oral or written request.

(2) The company is not responsible for the contents of your proposal or supporting statement.

(m) *Question 13: What can I do if the company includes in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should not vote in favor of my proposal, and I disagree with some of its statements?*

(1) The company may elect to include in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should vote against your proposal. The company is allowed to make arguments reflecting its own point of view, just as you may express your own point of view in your proposal's supporting statement.

(2) However, if you believe that the company's opposition to your proposal contains materially false or misleading statements that may violate our anti-fraud rule, §240.14a-9, you should promptly send to the Commission staff and the company a letter explaining the reasons for your view, along with a copy of the company's statements opposing your proposal. To the extent possible, your letter should include specific factual information demonstrating the inaccuracy of the company's claims. Time permitting, you may wish to try to work out your differences with the company by yourself before contacting the Commission staff.

(3) We require the company to send you a copy of its statements opposing your proposal before it sends its proxy materials, so that you may bring to our attention any materially false or misleading statements, under the following timeframes:

(i) If our no-action response requires that you make revisions to your proposal or supporting statement as a condition to requiring the company to include it in its proxy materials, then the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 5 calendar days after the company receives a copy of your revised proposal; or

(ii) In all other cases, the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 30 calendar days before its files definitive copies of its proxy statement and form of proxy under §240.14a-6.

[63 FR 29119, May 28, 1998; 63 FR 50622, 50623, Sept. 22, 1998, as amended at 72 FR 4166, Jan. 29, 2007; 72 FR 70456, Dec. 11, 2007; 73 FR 877, Jan. 4, 2008, 76 FR 6045, Feb. 2, 2011; 75 FR 56782, Sept. 16, 2010]

Need assistance?



**Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission**

Shareholder Proposals

Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14I (CF)

Action: Publication of CF Staff Legal Bulletin

Date: November 1, 2017

Summary: This staff legal bulletin provides information for companies and shareholders regarding Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Supplementary Information: The statements in this bulletin represent the views of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Division"). This bulletin is not a rule, regulation or statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission"). Further, the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved its content.

Contacts: For further information, please contact the Division's Office of Chief Counsel by submitting a web-based request form at https://www.sec.gov/forms/corp_fin_interpretive.

A. The purpose of this bulletin

This bulletin is part of a continuing effort by the Division to provide guidance on important issues arising under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8. Specifically, this bulletin contains information about the Division's views on:

- the scope and application of Rule 14a-8(i)(7);
- the scope and application of Rule 14a-8(i)(5);
- proposals submitted on behalf of shareholders; and
- the use of graphs and images consistent with Rule 14a-8(d).

You can find additional guidance about Rule 14a-8 in the following bulletins that are available on the Commission's website: [SLB No. 14](#), [SLB No. 14A](#), [SLB No. 14B](#), [SLB No. 14C](#), [SLB No. 14D](#), [SLB No. 14E](#), [SLB No. 14F](#), [SLB No. 14G](#) and [SLB No. 14H](#).

B. Rule 14a-8(i)(7)

1. Background

Rule 14a-8(i)(7), the "ordinary business" exception, is one of the substantive bases for exclusion of a shareholder proposal in Rule 14a-8. It permits a company to exclude a proposal that "deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations." The purpose of the exception is "to confine the resolution of ordinary business problems to management and the board of directors, since it is impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such problems at an annual shareholders meeting."^[1]

2. The Division's application of Rule 14a-8(i)(7)

The Commission has stated that the policy underlying the "ordinary business" exception rests on two central considerations.[2] The first relates to the proposal's subject matter; the second, the degree to which the proposal "micromanages" the company. Under the first consideration, proposals that raise matters that are "so fundamental to management's ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight" may be excluded, unless such a proposal focuses on policy issues that are sufficiently significant because they transcend ordinary business and would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.[3] Whether the significant policy exception applies depends, in part, on the connection between the significant policy issue and the company's business operations.[4]

At issue in many Rule 14a-8(i)(7) no-action requests is whether a proposal that addresses ordinary business matters nonetheless focuses on a policy issue that is sufficiently significant. These determinations often raise difficult judgment calls that the Division believes are in the first instance matters that the board of directors is generally in a better position to determine. A board of directors, acting as steward with fiduciary duties to a company's shareholders, generally has significant duties of loyalty and care in overseeing management and the strategic direction of the company. A board acting in this capacity and with the knowledge of the company's business and the implications for a particular proposal on that company's business is well situated to analyze, determine and explain whether a particular issue is sufficiently significant because the matter transcends ordinary business and would be appropriate for a shareholder vote.

Accordingly, going forward, we would expect a company's no-action request to include a discussion that reflects the board's analysis of the particular policy issue raised and its significance. That explanation would be most helpful if it detailed the specific processes employed by the board to ensure that its conclusions are well-informed and well-reasoned. We believe that a well-developed discussion of the board's analysis of these matters will greatly assist the staff with its review of no-action requests under Rule 14a-8(i)(7).

C. Rule 14a-8(i)(5)

1. Background

Rule 14a-8(i)(5), the "economic relevance" exception, is one of the substantive bases for exclusion of a shareholder proposal in Rule 14a-8. It permits a company to exclude a proposal that "relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business."

2. History of Rule 14a-8(i)(5)

Prior to adoption of the current version of the exclusion in Rule 14a-8(i)(5), the rule permitted companies to omit any proposal that "deals with a matter that is not significantly related to the issuer's business." In proposing changes to that version of the rule in 1982, the Commission noted that the staff's practice had been to agree with exclusion of proposals that bore no economic relationship to a company's business, but that "where the proposal has reflected social or ethical issues, rather than economic concerns, raised by the issuer's business, and the issuer conducts any such business, no matter how small, the staff has not issued a no-action letter with respect to the omission of the proposal." [5] The

Commission stated that this interpretation of the rule may have “unduly limit[ed] the exclusion,” and proposed adopting the economic tests that appear in the rule today.[6] In adopting the rule, the Commission characterized it as relating “to proposals concerning the functioning of the economic business of an issuer and not to such matters as shareholders’ rights, e.g., cumulative voting.”[7]

Shortly after the 1983 amendments, however, the District Court for the District of Columbia in *Lovenheim v. Iroquois Brands, Ltd.*, 618 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1985) preliminarily enjoined a company from excluding a proposal regarding sales of a product line that represented only 0.05% of assets, \$79,000 in sales and a net loss of (\$3,121), compared to the company’s total assets of \$78 million, annual revenues of \$141 million and net earnings of \$6 million. The court based its decision to grant the injunction “in light of the ethical and social significance” of the proposal and on “the fact that it implicates significant levels of sales.” Since that time, the Division has interpreted *Lovenheim* in a manner that has significantly narrowed the scope of Rule 14a-8(i)(5).

3. The Division’s application of Rule 14a-8(i)(5)

Over the years, the Division has only infrequently agreed with exclusion under the “economic relevance” exception. Under its historical application, the Division has not agreed with exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(5), even where a proposal has related to operations that accounted for less than 5% of total assets, net earnings and gross sales, where the company conducted business, no matter how small, related to the issue raised in the proposal. The Division’s analysis has not focused on a proposal’s significance to the company’s business. As a result, the Division’s analysis has been similar to its analysis prior to 1983, with which the Commission expressed concern.

That analysis simply considered whether a company conducted any amount of business related to the issue in the proposal and whether that issue was of broad social or ethical concern. We believe the Division’s application of Rule 14a-8(i)(5) has unduly limited the exclusion’s availability because it has not fully considered the second prong of the rule as amended in 1982 – the question of whether the proposal “deals with a matter that is not significantly related to the issuer’s business” and is therefore excludable. Accordingly, going forward, the Division’s analysis will focus, as the rule directs, on a proposal’s significance to the company’s business when it otherwise relates to operations that account for less than 5% of total assets, net earnings and gross sales. Under this framework, proposals that raise issues of social or ethical significance may be included or excluded, notwithstanding their importance in the abstract, based on the application and analysis of each of the factors of Rule 14a-8(i)(5) in determining the proposal’s relevance to the company’s business.

Because the test only allows exclusion when the matter is not “otherwise significantly related to the company,” we view the analysis as dependent upon the particular circumstances of the company to which the proposal is submitted. That is, a matter significant to one company may not be significant to another. On the other hand, we would generally view substantive governance matters to be significantly related to almost all companies.

Where a proposal’s significance to a company’s business is not apparent on its face, a proposal may be excludable unless the proponent demonstrates that it is “otherwise significantly related to the company’s business.”[8] For example, the proponent can provide information demonstrating that the proposal “may have a significant impact on other segments of the issuer’s business or subject the issuer to significant contingent liabilities.”[9] The proponent could continue to raise social or ethical issues in its arguments,

but it would need to tie those to a significant effect on the company's business. The mere possibility of reputational or economic harm will not preclude no-action relief. In evaluating significance, the staff will consider the proposal in light of the "total mix" of information about the issuer.

As with the "ordinary business" exception in Rule 14a-8(i)(7), determining whether a proposal is "otherwise significantly related to the company's business" can raise difficult judgment calls. Similarly, we believe that the board of directors is generally in a better position to determine these matters in the first instance. A board acting with the knowledge of the company's business and the implications for a particular proposal on that company's business is better situated than the staff to determine whether a particular proposal is "otherwise significantly related to the company's business." Accordingly, we would expect a company's Rule 14a-8(i)(5) no-action request to include a discussion that reflects the board's analysis of the proposal's significance to the company. That explanation would be most helpful if it detailed the specific processes employed by the board to ensure that its conclusions are well-informed and well-reasoned.

In addition, the Division's analysis of whether a proposal is "otherwise significantly related" under Rule 14a-8(i)(5) has historically been informed by its analysis under the "ordinary business" exception, Rule 14a-8(i)(7). As a result, the availability or unavailability of Rule 14a-8(i)(7) has been largely determinative of the availability or unavailability of Rule 14a-8(i)(5). Going forward, the Division will no longer look to its analysis under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) when evaluating arguments under Rule 14a-8(i)(5). In our view, applying separate analytical frameworks will ensure that each basis for exclusion serves its intended purpose.

We believe the approach going forward is more appropriately rooted in the intended purpose and language of Rule 14a-8(i)(5), and better helps companies, proponents and the staff determine whether a proposal is "otherwise significantly related to the company's business."

D. Proposals submitted on behalf of shareholders

While Rule 14a-8 does not address shareholders' ability to submit proposals through a representative, shareholders frequently elect to do so, a practice commonly referred to as "proposal by proxy." The Division has been, and continues to be, of the view that a shareholder's submission by proxy is consistent with Rule 14a-8.^[10]

The Division is nevertheless mindful of challenges and concerns that proposals by proxy may present. For example, there may be questions about whether the eligibility requirements of Rule 14a-8(b) have been satisfied. There have also been concerns raised that shareholders may not know that proposals are being submitted on their behalf. In light of these challenges and concerns, and to help the staff and companies better evaluate whether the eligibility requirements of Rule 14a-8(b) have been satisfied, going forward, the staff will look to whether the shareholders who submit a proposal by proxy provide documentation describing the shareholder's delegation of authority to the proxy.^[11] In general, we would expect this documentation to:

- identify the shareholder-proponent and the person or entity selected as proxy;
- identify the company to which the proposal is directed;
- identify the annual or special meeting for which the proposal is submitted;

- identify the specific proposal to be submitted (e.g., proposal to lower the threshold for calling a special meeting from 25% to 10%); and
- be signed and dated by the shareholder.

We believe this documentation will help alleviate concerns about proposals by proxy, and will also help companies and the staff better evaluate whether the eligibility requirements of Rule 14a-8(b) have been satisfied in connection with a proposal's submission by proxy. Where this information is not provided, there may be a basis to exclude the proposal under Rule 14a-8(b).^[12]

E. Rule 14a-8(d)

1. Background

Rule 14a-8(d) is one of the procedural bases for exclusion of a shareholder proposal in Rule 14a-8. It provides that a "proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words."

2. The use of images in shareholder proposals

Questions have recently arisen concerning the application of Rule 14a-8(d) to proposals that include graphs and/or images.^[13] In two recent no-action decisions,^[14] the Division expressed the view that the use of "500 words" and absence of express reference to graphics or images in Rule 14a-8(d) do not prohibit the inclusion of graphs and/or images in proposals.^[15] Just as companies include graphics that are not expressly permitted under the disclosure rules, the Division is of the view that Rule 14a-8(d) does not preclude shareholders from using graphics to convey information about their proposals.^[16]

The Division recognizes the potential for abuse in this area. The Division believes, however, that these potential abuses can be addressed through other provisions of Rule 14a-8. For example, exclusion of graphs and/or images would be appropriate under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) where they:

- make the proposal materially false or misleading;
- render the proposal so inherently vague or indefinite that neither the stockholders voting on the proposal, nor the company in implementing it, would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires;
- directly or indirectly impugn character, integrity or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly make charges concerning improper, illegal, or immoral conduct or association, without factual foundation; or
- are irrelevant to a consideration of the subject matter of the proposal, such that there is a strong likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would be uncertain as to the matter on which he or she is being asked to vote.^[17]

Exclusion would also be appropriate under Rule 14a-8(d) if the total number of words in a proposal, including words in the graphics, exceeds 500.

^[1] Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998).

^[2] *Id.*

^[3] *Id.*

- [4] See Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (Oct. 22, 2015), *citing* Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (Oct. 27, 2009) (stating that a proposal generally will not be excludable “as long as a sufficient nexus exists between the nature of the proposal and the company”).
- [5] Release No. 34-19135 (Oct. 14, 1982).
- [6] *Id.*
- [7] Release No. 34-20091 (Aug. 16, 1983).
- [8] Proponents bear the burden of demonstrating that a proposal is “otherwise significantly related to the company’s business.” See Release No. 34-39093 (Sep. 18, 1997), *citing* Release No. 34-19135.
- [9] Release No. 34-19135.
- [10] We view a shareholder’s ability to submit a proposal by proxy as largely a function of state agency law provided it is consistent with Rule 14a-8.
- [11] This guidance applies only to proposals submitted by proxy after the date on which this staff legal bulletin is published.
- [12] Companies that intend to seek exclusion under Rule 14a-8(b) based on a shareholder’s failure to provide some or all of this information must notify the proponent of the specific defect(s) within 14 calendar days of receiving the proposal so that the proponent has an opportunity to cure the defect. See Rule 14a-8(f)(1).
- [13] Rule 14a-8(d) is intended to limit the amount of space a shareholder proposal may occupy in a company’s proxy statement. See Release No. 34-12999 (Nov. 22, 1976).
- [14] *General Electric Co.* (Feb. 3, 2017, *recon. granted* Feb. 23, 2017); *General Electric Co.* (Feb. 23, 2016).
- [15] These decisions were consistent with a longstanding Division position. See *Ferrofluidics Corp.* (Sep. 18, 1992).
- [16] Companies should not minimize or otherwise diminish the appearance of a shareholder’s graphic. For example, if the company includes its own graphics in its proxy statement, it should give similar prominence to a shareholder’s graphics. If a company’s proxy statement appears in black and white, however, the shareholder proposal and accompanying graphics may also appear in black and white.
- [17] See *General Electric Co.* (Feb. 23, 2017).

<http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14i.htm>

From: Wendt, Jon (JP) <jonathan.wendt@dow.com>
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 6:02 PM
To: John Chevedden
Cc: Birch, Kimberly (KS); Wilson, Amy (AE)
Subject: RE: Rule 14a-8 Proposal (DOW)``
Attachments: Dow - Chevedden Deficiency Letter (Shareholder Proposal 2021).pdf

Mr. Chevedden – Attached please find correspondence relating to the shareholder proposal you recently submitted. Copies have also been sent via Federal Express to Mr. Steiner and you.

Regards,

Jonathan P. Wendt

Dow Inc.
Assistant Secretary
Director – Office of the Corporate Secretary
and Affiliated Companies
2211 H.H. Dow Way | Midland, MI 48674
Office: 989.638.2343 | Mobile: 989.492.6104
Email: jonathan.wendt@dow.com



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From: John Chevedden [***]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2020 10:41 PM
To: Wilson, Alan (A) <AWilson@dow.com>
Cc: Wendt, Jon (JP) <jonathan.wendt@dow.com>; Birch, Kimberly (KS) <KSBirch@dow.com>
Subject: Rule 14a-8 Proposal (DOW)``

This email originated from outside of the organization.

Dear Ms. Wilson,
Please see the attached rule 14a-8 proposal to improve corporate governance and enhance long-term shareholder value at de minimis up-front cost – especially considering the substantial market capitalization of the company.

I expect to forward a broker letter soon so if you acknowledge this proposal in an email message it may not be necessary for you to write a formal letter requesting a broker letter.


Sincerely,
John Chevedden

ORIGIN ID: MBSA (989) 636-2270
 KIM BIRCH
 THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
 GLOBAL DOW CENTER
 2211 H.H. DOW WAY
 MIDLAND, MI 48674
 UNITED STATES US

SHIP DATE: 10NOV20
 ACT WGT: 0.50 LB
 CAD: 104415749NINET4280
 BILL SENDER

TO JOHN CHEVEDDEN

INV: _____
 PO: _____
 DEPT: _____




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 WED - 11 NOV 12:00P
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ORIGIN ID: MBSA (999) 638-5434
 KIM BIRCH
 THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY
 GLOBAL DOW CENTER
 2211 H.H. DOW WAY
 MIDLAND, MI 48874
 UNITED STATES US

SHIP DATE: 10NOV20
 ACT WGT: 0.50 LB
 CAD: 104415749NET4280
 BILL SENDER

TO **KENNETH STEINER**

PO:

DEPT:



4282020071401uv

56R.6/3AP9/H766

WED - 11 NOV 12:00P
 PRIORITY OVERNIGHT


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Exhibit C

Mr. Amy E. Wilson
Dow Inc. (DOW)
2211 H.H. Dow Way
Midland, MI 48674
PH: 989-636-1000

Dear Ms. Wilson:

I purchased stock in our company because I believed our company had potential for improved performance. My attached Rule 14a-8 proposal is submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This Rule 14a-8 proposal is submitted as a low-cost method to improve company performance.

My proposal is for the next annual shareholder meeting. I will meet Rule 14a-8 requirements including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting. My submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is my proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to forward this Rule 14a-8 proposal to the company and to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal, and/or modification of it, for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications regarding my rule 14a-8 proposal to John Chevedden

to facilitate prompt and verifiable communications. Please identify this proposal as my proposal exclusively.

This letter does not cover proposals that are not rule 14a-8 proposals. This letter does not grant the power to vote. Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of my proposal promptly by email to *****

Sincerely,



Kenneth Steiner

10-14-20

Date

cc: Jon Wendt <jonathan.wendt@dow.com>
Kimberly Birch <KBirch@dow.com>

Proposal 4 - Shareholder Right to Act by Written Consent



11-10-20

Exhibit D



11/05/2020

Kenneth Steiner

Re: Account ending *** in TD Ameritrade Clearing Inc DTC# 0188

Dear Kenneth Steiner,

As you requested this letter confirms that as of the date of this letter you have continuously held no less than 500 shares of each of the following stocks in the above reference account since August 17, 2019:

Valley National Bancorp (VLY)
Bank of America Corporation (BAC)
Dow Inc. (DOW)
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (BK)

If we can be of any further assistance, please let us know. Just log in to your account and go to the Message Center to write us. You can also call Client Services at 800-665-3900. We're available 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

Sincerely,

Gabriel Elliott
Resource Specialist
TD Ameritrade

This information is furnished as part of a general information service and TD Ameritrade shall not be liable for any damages arising out of any inaccuracy in the information. Because this information may differ from your TD Ameritrade monthly statement, you should rely only on the TD Ameritrade monthly statement as the official record of your TD Ameritrade account.

Market volatility, volume, and system availability may delay account access and trade executions.

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