

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

January 11, 2018

Margaret M. Madden Pfizer Inc. margaret.m.madden@pfizer.com

Re: Pfizer Inc.

Incoming letter dated December 20, 2017

Dear Ms. Madden:

This letter is in response to your correspondence dated December 20, 2017 concerning the shareholder proposal (the "Proposal") submitted to Pfizer Inc. (the "Company") by The City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System for inclusion in the Company's proxy materials for its upcoming annual meeting of security holders. Copies of all of the correspondence on which this response is based will be made available on our website at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8.shtml. For your reference, a brief discussion of the Division's informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals is also available at the same website address.

Sincerely,

Matt S. McNair Senior Special Counsel

Enclosure

cc: Christopher DiFusco

Board of Pensions and Retirement

Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement

Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System

christopher.difusco@phila.gov

Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance

Re: Pfizer Inc.

Incoming letter dated December 20, 2017

The Proposal asks the board to adopt a policy that, whenever possible, the chairman should be a director who has not previously served as an executive officer of the Company and who is "independent" of management, as defined in the Proposal.

There appears to be some basis for your view that the Company may exclude the Proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(11). We note that the Proposal is substantially duplicative of a previously submitted proposal that will be included in the Company's 2018 proxy materials. Accordingly, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if the Company omits the Proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(11).

Sincerely,

Evan S. Jacobson Special Counsel

DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

The Division of Corporation Finance believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division's staff considers the information furnished to it by the company in support of its intention to exclude the proposal from the company's proxy materials, as well as any information furnished by the proponent or the proponent's representative.

Although Rule 14a-8(k) does not require any communications from shareholders to the Commission's staff, the staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes and rules administered by the Commission, including arguments as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would violate the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff's informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversarial procedure.

It is important to note that the staff's no-action responses to Rule 14a-8(j) submissions reflect only informal views. The determinations reached in these no-action letters do not and cannot adjudicate the merits of a company's position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S. District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. Accordingly, a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement action does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of a company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the company in court, should the company's management omit the proposal from the company's proxy materials.



Margaret M. Madden
Senior Vice President and Corporate Secretary
Chief Governance Counsel

Pfizer Inc. – Legal Division 235 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017 Tel 212 733 3451 Fax 646 563 9681 margaret.m.madden@pfizer.com

BY EMAIL (shareholderproposals@sec.gov)

December 20, 2017

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporation Finance Office of Chief Counsel 100 F Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20549

RE: Pfizer Inc. – 2018 Annual Meeting

Omission of Shareholder Proposal of

The City of Philadelphia

Public Employees Retirement System

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We are writing pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, to request that the Staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the "Staff") of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") concur with our view that, for the reasons stated below, Pfizer Inc., a Delaware corporation ("Pfizer"), may exclude the shareholder proposal and supporting statement (the "Proposal") submitted by The City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System (the "Proponent") from the proxy materials to be distributed by Pfizer in connection with its 2018 annual meeting of shareholders (the "2018 proxy materials").

In accordance with Section C of Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (Nov. 7, 2008) ("SLB 14D"), we are emailing this letter and its attachments to the Staff at shareholderproposals@sec.gov. In accordance with Rule 14a-8(j), we are simultaneously sending a copy of this letter and its attachments to the Proponent as notice of Pfizer's intent to omit the Proposal from the 2018 proxy materials.

Rule 14a-8(k) and Section E of SLB 14D provide that shareholder proponents are required to send companies a copy of any correspondence that the shareholder proponents elect to submit to the Commission or the Staff. Accordingly, we are taking this opportunity to remind the Proponent that if the Proponent submits correspondence to the Commission or the Staff with respect to the Proposal, a copy of that correspondence should concurrently be furnished to the undersigned.

I. The Proposal

The text of the resolution contained in the Proposal is set forth below:

RESOLVED: The stockholders of Pfizer, Inc. ("Pfizer"), ask the board of directors to adopt a policy that, whenever possible, the board chairman should be a director who has not previously served as an executive officer of the Company and who is "independent" of management. For these purposes, a director shall not be considered "independent" if, during the last three years, he or she—

- was affiliated with a company that was an advisor or consultant to the Company, or a significant customer or supplier of the Company;
- was employed by or had a personal service contract(s) with the Company or its senior management;
- was affiliated with a company or non-profit entity that received the greater of \$2 million or 2% of its gross annual revenues from the Company;
- had a business relationship with the Company that the Company had to disclose under the Securities and Exchange Commission regulations;
- has been employed by a public company at which an executive officer of the Company serves as a director;
- had a relationship of the sort described above with any affiliate of the Company; and,
- was a spouse, parent, child, sibling or in-law of any person described above.

The policy should be implemented without violating any contractual obligation and should specify how to select an independent chairman if a current chairman ceases to be independent between annual shareholder meetings. Compliance with the policy may be excused if no independent director is available and willing to be chairman.

II. Basis for Exclusion

We hereby respectfully request that the Staff concur with Pfizer's view that the Proposal may be excluded from the 2018 proxy materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(11) because the Proposal substantially duplicates a shareholder proposal previously submitted to Pfizer that Pfizer intends to include in its 2018 proxy materials.

III. Background

Pfizer received the Proposal, accompanied by a cover letter from the Proponent, by email on November 3, 2017. On November 6, 2017, after confirming that the Proponent was not a shareholder of record, in accordance with Rule 14a-8(f)(1), Pfizer sent a letter to the Proponent (the "Deficiency Letter") that requested a written statement from the record owner of the Proponent's shares verifying that the Proponent had beneficially owned the requisite number of shares of Pfizer common stock continuously for at least one year as of the date the Proposal was submitted. Pfizer received a letter from J.P. Morgan, dated November 7, 2017, verifying the Proponent's stock ownership as of such date, by email on November 7, 2017 (the "Broker Letter"). Copies of the Proposal, cover letter, Deficiency Letter, Broker Letter and related correspondence are attached hereto as Exhibit A.

IV. The Proposal May be Excluded Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(11) Because the Proposal Substantially Duplicates Another Proposal Previously Submitted to Pfizer that Pfizer Intends to Include in its 2018 Proxy Materials.

Under Rule 14a-8(i)(11), a company may exclude a shareholder proposal if it substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the company by another proponent that will be included in the company's proxy materials for the same meeting. The Commission has stated that the purpose of Rule 14a-8(i)(11) is to eliminate the possibility of shareholders having to consider two or more substantially identical proposals submitted by proponents acting independently of each other. *See* Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-12598 (July 7, 1976). Two shareholder proposals need not be identical in order to provide a basis for exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(11). Proposals are substantially duplicative when the principal thrust or focus is substantially the same, even though the proposals differ in terms of the breadth and scope of the subject matter. *See*, *e.g.*, *Pfizer Inc*. (Feb. 17, 2012); *Ford Motor Co.* (Feb. 15, 2011); *Wells Fargo & Co.* (Jan. 7, 2009); *General Motors Corp.* (Apr. 5, 2007); *Weyerhaeuser Co.* (Jan. 18, 2006); *Abbott Laboratories* (Feb. 4, 2004).

Pfizer received a proposal (the "Prior Proposal") from The Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia via United Parcel Service on October 20, 2017. Pfizer intends to include the Prior Proposal, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B, in the 2018 proxy materials.

The text of the resolution contained in the Prior Proposal is set forth below:

RESOLVED: The shareholders request the Board of Directors to adopt as policy, and amend the bylaws as necessary, to require the Chair of the Board of Directors, whenever possible, to be an independent member of the Board. This policy would be phased in for the next CEO transition.

If the Board determines that a Chair who was independent when selected is no longer independent, the Board shall select a new Chair who satisfies the requirements of the policy within a reasonable amount of time. Compliance

Office of Chief Counsel December 20, 2017 Page 4

with this policy is waived if no independent director is available and willing to serve as Chair.

The Proposal and the Prior Proposal both request that the board of directors adopt a policy that, whenever possible, the chairman of the board be an independent director. Thus, the principal thrust or focus of the Proposal and the Prior Proposal are identical. The main difference between the two proposals is that the Prior Proposal references an independent chairman of the board simply as "an independent member of the Board," whereas the Proposal expands on that concept by defining "independent" with a series of seven bullet points and describing an independent chairman of the board as "a director who has not previously served as an executive officer of the Company and who is 'independent' of management." Among other minor differences, the Prior Proposal calls for the independent chairman policy to be phased in for the next CEO transition, whereas the Proposal calls for the independent chairman policy to be implemented without violating any contractual rights. The Proposal's more expansive articulation of director independence and the other minor differences, however, do not change the fact that both proposals focus on having an independent chairman of the board.

The Staff has consistently concurred with the exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(11) of substantially duplicative proposals relating to an independent chairman of the board of directors, even where the proposals have minor differences in their terms or scope. See Nabors Industries Ltd. (February 28, 2013) (proposal requesting adoption of a policy to require the chairman to be an independent director who has not previously served as an executive officer of the company and to implement the policy so as not to violate any contractual obligation may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(11) because it substantially duplicates a previously submitted proposal requesting adoption of a policy to require the chairman to be an independent member of the board and to apply the policy prospectively); JP Morgan Chase & Co. (March 7, 2011) (proposal requesting the board amend the bylaws to require that the chairman be an independent director may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(11) because it substantially duplicates a previously submitted proposal requesting the board to adopt a bylaw to require that the "Lead Director" be an independent director); Wells Fargo & Co. (January 17, 2008) (proposal requesting adoption of a policy separating the roles of chairman and chief executive officer may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(11) because it substantially duplicates a previously submitted proposal requesting the board amend the bylaws to require the chairman to be an independent director); *Time Warner Inc.* (March 2, 2006) (proposal requesting the board amend the company's governing documents to require the chairman "serve in that capacity only and have no management duties, titles or responsibilities" may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(11) because it substantially duplicates a previously submitted proposal requesting the adoption of a policy requiring the chairman to be an independent director who had not previously served as an executive officer).

As described above, the principal thrust or focus of the Proposal and the Prior Proposal is the adoption of a policy providing for an independent chairman of the board of directors of Pfizer. As a result, inclusion of both of these proposals in Pfizer's 2018 proxy

Office of Chief Counsel December 20, 2017 Page 5

materials would be duplicative and would frustrate the policy concerns underlying the adoption of Rule 14a-8(i)(11). Consequently, because the Proposal substantially duplicates the Prior Proposal, which was previously submitted to Pfizer and will be included in the 2018 proxy materials, the Proposal may be excluded pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(11).

V. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we respectfully request that the Staff concur that it will take no action if Pfizer excludes the Proposal from its 2018 proxy materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(11).

Should the Staff disagree with the conclusions set forth in this letter, or should any additional information be desired in support of Pfizer's position, we would appreciate the opportunity to confer with the Staff concerning these matters prior to the issuance of the Staff's response. Please do not hesitate to contact me at (212) 733-3451 or Marc S. Gerber of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP at (202) 371-7233.

Very truly yours,

Margaret M. Madden

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Enclosures

cc: Christopher DiFusco

Chief Investment Officer

The City of Philadelphia Public Employee Retirement System

EXHIBIT A

(see attached)



BOARD OF PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT

PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM

BOARD MEMBERS:
ROB DUBOW, Chairperson
ALAN BUTKOVITZ, Esq
SOZI PEDRO TULANTE, Esq.
MICHAEL DIBERARDINIS, Esq.
PEDRO RODRIQUEZ.
VERONICA M. PANKEY
RONALD STAGLIANO, Vice Chair
CAROL G STUKES-BAYLOR
BRIAN COUGHLIN

CHRISTOPHER DIFUSCO Chief Investment Officer

Sixteenth Floor Two Penn Center Plaza Philadelphia, PA 19102-1712 (215) 496-7461 FAX (215) 496-7460

November 2, 2017

By regular mail and email Margaret.M.Madden@pfizer.com

Ms. Margaret M. Madden Senior Vice President, Chief Governance Counsel, and Corporate Secretary Pfizer 235 East 42nd Street New York, NY 10017-5755

Re: The City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System

Dear Ms. Madden:

In my capacity as the Chief Investment Officer of The City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System (the "Fund"), I write to give notice that pursuant to the 2017 proxy statement of Pfizer (the "Company"), the Fund intends to present the attached proposal (the "Proposal") at the 2018 annual meeting of shareholders (the "Annual Meeting"). The Fund requests that the Company include the Proposal in the Company's proxy statement for the Annual Meeting.

A letter from the Fund's custodian documenting the Fund's continuous ownership of the requisite amount of the Company's stock for at least one year prior to the date of this letter is being sent under separate cover. The Fund also intends to continue its ownership of at least the minimum number of shares required by the SEC regulations through the date of the Annual Meeting.

I represent that the Fund or its agent intends to appear in person or by proxy at the Annual Meeting to present the attached Proposal. I declare the Fund has no "material interest" other than that believed to be shared by stockholders of the Company generally.

Sincerely,

Christopher DiFusco
Chief Investment Officer

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RESOLVED: The stockholders of Pfizer, Inc. ("Pfizer"), ask the board of directors to adopt a policy that, whenever possible, the board chairman should be a director who has not previously served as an executive officer of the Company and who is "independent" of management. For these purposes, a director shall not be considered "independent" if, during the last three years, he or she—

- was affiliated with a company that was an advisor or consultant to the Company, or a significant customer or supplier
 of the Company;
- was employed by or had a personal service contract(s) with the Company or its senior management;
- was affiliated with a company or non-profit entity that received the greater of \$2 million or 2% of its gross annual revenues from the Company;
- had a business relationship with the Company that the Company had to disclose under the Securities and Exchange Commission regulations;
- · has been employed by a public company at which an executive officer of the Company serves as a director;
- had a relationship of the sort described above with any affiliate of the Company; and,
- was a spouse, parent, child, sibling or in-law of any person described above.

The policy should be implemented without violating any contractual obligation and should specify how to select an independent chairman if a current chairman ceases to be independent between annual shareholder meetings. Compliance with the policy may be excused if no independent director is available and willing to be chairman.

SUPPORTING STATEMENT:

The Board of Directors, led by its chairman, is responsible for protecting shareholders' long-term interests by providing independent oversight of management, including the Chief Executive Officer, in directing the corporation's affairs. This oversight can be diminished when the chairman is not independent. Since December 2011, Ian C. Read has served as both the Chair and CEO of Pfizer.

An independent chairman who sets agendas, priorities, and procedures for the board can enhance its oversight and accountability of management and ensure the objective functioning of an effective board. We view the alternative of a lead outside director, even one with a robust set of duties, as adequate only in exceptional circumstances fully disclosed by the board.

These considerations are especially critical at Pfizer given the potential reputational, legal and regulatory risks Pfizer faces through its wholly owned subsidiary Hospira, Inc. related to the sale and pricing of naloxone and naloxone-containing products. Naloxone blocks the effects of opioids and is an ingredient in Suboxone; a medication used in opioid addition treatment. Naloxone's price has significantly increased at a time when demand is high in response to the nation's opioid epidemic. We are concerned that Pfizer faces financial and reputational consequences of litigation, adverse publicity, and regulatory actions and investigations that may negatively impact Pfizer's long-term performance. At this critical junction in the nation's opioid epidemic, we believe oversight by an independent chairman is necessary.

We urge you to vote FOR this proposal.



Suzanne Y. Rolon

Director – Corporate Governance Legal Division Pfizer Inc. 235 East 42nd Street, 19/6, New York, NY 10017 Tel +1 212 733 5356 Fax +1 212 573 1853 suzanne y.rolon@pfizer.com

Via FedEx

November 6, 2017

Mr. Christopher DiFusco
Chief Investment Officer
Board of Pensions and Retirement
The City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System
Sixteenth Floor
Two Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1712

Re: Shareholder Proposal for 2018 Annual Meeting of Shareholders: Independent Chair

Dear Mr. DiFusco:

This letter will acknowledge receipt on November 3, 2017 of a letter from The City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System (the "proponent"), dated November 2, 2017, to Pfizer Inc. submitting a shareholder proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") for consideration at our 2018 Annual Meeting of Shareholders.

Rule 14a-8(b) of the Exchange Act provides that the proponent must submit sufficient proof that it has continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's common stock that would be entitled to be voted on the proposal for at least one year, preceding and including November 3, 2017, the date the proposal was submitted to the company.

Our records indicate that the proponent is not a registered holder of Pfizer common stock. Please provide a written statement from the record holder of the proponent's shares (usually a bank or broker) and a participant in the Depository Trust Company (DTC) verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, which was November 3, 2017, the proponent had beneficially held the requisite number of shares of Pfizer common stock continuously for at least one year preceding and including November 3, 2017.

Mr. Christopher DiFusco November 6, 2017 Page 2

Sufficient proof may be in the form of a written statement from the record holder of the proponent's shares (usually a broker or bank) and a participant in the Depository Trust Company (DTC)¹ verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, the proponent continuously held the requisite number of shares for at least one year.

If the broker or bank holding the proponent's shares is not a DTC participant, the proponent also will need to obtain proof of ownership from the DTC participant through which the shares are held. You should be able to find out who this DTC participant is by asking the proponent's broker or bank. If the DTC participant knows the proponent's broker or bank's holdings, but does not know the proponent's holdings, the proponent can satisfy Rule 14a-8 by obtaining and submitting two proof of ownership statements verifying that, at the time the proposal was submitted, the required amount of shares were continuously held for at least one year – one from the proponent's broker or bank confirming the proponent's ownership, and the other from the DTC participant confirming the broker or bank's ownership.

The rules of the SEC require that your response to this letter be postmarked or transmitted electronically no later than 14 days from the date you receive this letter. Please send any response to me at the address or email address provided above. For your reference, please find enclosed a copy of Rule 14a-8.

Once we receive any response, we will be in a position to determine whether the proposal is eligible for inclusion in the proxy materials for our 2018 Annual Meeting of Shareholders. We reserve the right to seek relief from the SEC as appropriate.

We will reach out soon to arrange a convenient time to speak. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me directly.

Sincerely,

Suzanne X. Rolon

cc: Margaret M. Madden, Pfizer Inc.

Attachment

In order to determine if the broker or bank holding your shares is a DTC participant, you can check the DTC's participant list, which is currently available on the Internet at http://www.dtcc.com/client-center/dtc-directories.

§ 240.14a-8 Shareholder proposals.

This section addresses when a company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders. In summary, in order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you must be eligible and follow certain procedures. Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude your proposal, but only after submitting its reasons to the Commission. We structured this section in a question-and-answer format so that it is easier to understand. The references to "you" are to a shareholder seeking to submit the proposal.

- (a) Question 1: What is a proposal? A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at a meeting of the company's shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company must also provide in the form of proxy means for shareholders to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval, or abstention. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "proposal" as used in this section refers both to your proposal, and to your corresponding statement in support of your proposal (if any).
- (b) Question 2: Who is eligible to submit a proposal, and how do I demonstrate to the company that I am eligible? (1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting.
- (2) If you are the registered holder of your securities, which means that your name appears in the company's records as a shareholder, the company can verify your eligibility on its own, although you will still have to provide the company with a written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders. However, if like many shareholders you are not a registered holder, the company likely does not know that you are a shareholder, or how many shares you own. In this case, at the time you submit your proposal, you must prove your eligibility to the company in one of two ways:
- (i) The first way is to submit to the company a written statement from the "record" holder of your securities (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, at the time you submitted your proposal, you continuously held the securities for at least one year. You must also include your own written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders; or
- (ii) The second way to prove ownership applies only if you have filed a Schedule 13D (§240.13d–101), Schedule 13G (§240.13d–102), Form 3 (§249.103 of this chapter), Form 4 (§249.104 of this chapter) and/or Form 5 (§249.105 of this chapter), or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting your ownership of the shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins. If you have filed one of these documents with the SEC, you may demonstrate your eligibility by submitting to the company:
- (A) A copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in your ownership level;
- (B) Your written statement that you continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period as of the date of the statement; and
- (C) Your written statement that you intend to continue ownership of the shares through the date of the company's annual or special meeting.
- (c) Question 3: How many proposals may I submit? Each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders' meeting.
- (d) Question 4: How long can my proposal be? The proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.
- (e) Question 5: What is the deadline for submitting a proposal? (1) If you are submitting your proposal for the company's annual meeting, you can in most cases find the deadline in last year's proxy statement. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting last year, or has changed the date of its meeting for this year more than 30 days from last year's meeting, you can usually find the deadline in one of the company's quarterly reports on Form 10–Q (§249.308a of this chapter), or in shareholder reports of investment companies under §270.30d–1 of this chapter of the Investment Company Act of 1940. In order to avoid controversy, shareholders should submit their proposals by means, including electronic means, that permit them to prove the date of delivery.
- (2) The deadline is calculated in the following manner if the proposal is submitted for a regularly scheduled annual meeting. The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's proxy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's annual meeting. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting the previous year, or if the date of this year's annual meeting has been changed by more

than 30 days from the date of the previous year's meeting, then the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.

- (3) If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and send its proxy materials.
- (f) Question 6: What if I fail to follow one of the eligibility or procedural requirements explained in answers to Questions 1 through 4 of this section? (1) The company may exclude your proposal, but only after it has notified you of the problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it. Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company must notify you in writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies, as well as of the time frame for your response. Your response must be postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days from the date you received the company's notification. A company need not provide you such notice of a deficiency if the deficiency cannot be remedied, such as if you fail to submit a proposal by the company's properly determined deadline. If the company intends to exclude the proposal, it will later have to make a submission under §240.14a–8 and provide you with a copy under Question 10 below, §240.14a–8(j).
- (2) If you fail in your promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.
- (g) Question 7: Who has the burden of persuading the Commission or its staff that my proposal can be excluded? Except as otherwise noted, the burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.
- (h) Question 8: Must I appear personally at the shareholders' meeting to present the proposal? (1) Either you, or your representative who is qualified under state law to present the proposal on your behalf, must attend the meeting to present the proposal. Whether you attend the meeting yourself or send a qualified representative to the meeting in your place, you should make sure that you, or your representative, follow the proper state law procedures for attending the meeting and/or presenting your proposal.
- (2) If the company holds its shareholder meeting in whole or in part via electronic media, and the company permits you or your representative to present your proposal via such media, then you may appear through electronic media rather than traveling to the meeting to appear in person.
- (3) If you or your qualified representative fail to appear and present the proposal, without good cause, the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings held in the following two calendar years.
- (i) Question 9: If I have complied with the procedural requirements, on what other bases may a company rely to exclude my proposal? (1) Improper under state law: If the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's organization;

Note to paragraph (i)(1): Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.

(2) Violation of law: If the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject;

Note to paragraph (i)(2): We will not apply this basis for exclusion to permit exclusion of a proposal on grounds that it would violate foreign law if compliance with the foreign law would result in a violation of any state or federal law.

- (3) Violation of proxy rules: If the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including \$240.14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials;
- (4) Personal grievance; special interest: if the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the company or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to you, or to further a personal interest, which is not shared by the other shareholders at large;
- (5) Relevance: If the proposal relates to operations which account fer less than 5 percent of the company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business;
- (6) Absence of power/authority: If the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal;

- (7) Management functions: If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations;
- (8) Director elections: If the proposal:
- (i) Would disqualify a nominee who is standing for election;
- (ii) Would remove a director from office before his or her term expired;
- (iii) Questions the competence, business judgment, or character of one or more nominees or directors;
- (iv) Seeks to include a specific individual in the company's proxy materials for election to the board of directors; or
- (v) Otherwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election of directors.
- (9) Conflicts with company's proposal: If the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.

Note to paragraph (i)(9): A company's submission to the Commission under this section should specify the points of conflict with the company's proposal.

(10) Substantially implemented: If the company has already substantially implemented the proposal;

Note to paragraph (i)(10): A company may exclude a shareholder proposal that would provide an advisory vote or seek future advisory votes to approve the compensation of executives as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S–K (§229.402 of this chapter) or any successor to Item 402 (a "say-on-pay vote") or that relates to the frequency of say-on-pay votes, provided that in the most recent shareholder vote required by §240.14a–21(b) of this chapter a single year (i.e., one, two, or three years) received approval of a majority of votes cast on the matter and the company has adopted a policy on the frequency of say-on-pay votes that is consistent with the choice of the majority of votes cast in the most recent shareholder vote required by §240.14a–21(b) of this chapter.

- (11) Duplication: If the proposal substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the company by another proponent that will be included in the company's proxy materials for the same meeting;
- (12) Resubmissions: If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another proposal or proposals that has or have been previously included in the company's proxy materials within the preceding 5 calendar years, a company may exclude it from its proxy materials for any meeting held within 3 calendar years of the last time it was included if the proposal received:
- (i) Less than 3% of the vote if proposed once within the preceding 5 calendar years;
- (ii) Less than 6% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed twice previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; or
- (iii) Less than 10% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed three times or more previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; and
- (13) Specific amount of dividends: If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.
- (j) Question 10: What procedures must the company follow if it intends to exclude my proposal? (1) If the company intends to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials, it must file its reasons with the Commission no later than 80 calendar days before it files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy with the Commission. The company must simultaneously provide you with a copy of its submission. The Commission staff may permit the company to make its submission later than 80 days before the company files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy, if the company demonstrates good cause for missing the deadline.
- (2) The company must file six paper copies of the following:
- (i) The proposal;
- (ii) An explanation of why the company believes that it may exclude the proposal, which should, if possible, refer to the most recent applicable authority, such as prior Division letters issued under the rule; and

- (iii) A supporting opinion of counsel when such reasons are based on matters of state or foreign law.
- (k) Question 11: May I submit my own statement to the Commission responding to the company's arguments?

Yes, you may submit a response, but it is not required. You should try to submit any response to us, with a copy to the company, as soon as possible after the company makes its submission. This way, the Commission staff will have time to consider fully your submission before it issues its response. You should submit six paper copies of your response.

- (I) Question 12: If the company includes my shareholder proposal in its proxy materials, what information about me must it include along with the proposal itself?
- (1) The company's proxy statement must include your name and address, as well as the number of the company's voting securities that you hold. However, instead of providing that information, the company may instead include a statement that it will provide the information to shareholders promptly upon receiving an oral or written request.
- (2) The company is not responsible for the contents of your proposal or supporting statement.
- (m) Question 13: What can I do if the company includes in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should not vote in favor of my proposal, and I disagree with some of its statements?
- (1) The company may elect to include in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should vote against your proposal. The company is allowed to make arguments reflecting its own point of view, just as you may express your own point of view in your proposal's supporting statement.
- (2) However, if you believe that the company's opposition to your proposal contains materially false or misleading statements that may violate our anti-fraud rule, §240.14a=9, you should promptly send to the Commission staff and the company a letter explaining the reasons for your view, along with a copy of the company's statements opposing your proposal. To the extent possible, your letter should include specific factual information demonstrating the inaccuracy of the company's claims. Time permitting, you may wish to try to work out your differences with the company by yourself before contacting the Commission staff.
- (3) We require the company to send you a copy of its statements opposing your proposal before it sends its proxy materials, so that you may bring to our attention any materially false or misleading statements, under the following timeframes:
- (i) If our no-action response requires that you make revisions to your proposal or supporting statement as a condition to requiring the company to include it in its proxy materials, then the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 5 calendar days after the company receives a copy of your revised proposal; or
- (ii) In all other cases, the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 30 calendar days before its files definitive copies of its proxy statement and form of proxy under §240.14a–6.

J.P.Morgan

Neil Kleinberg Client Service CIB Client Service Americas

11/7/17

By regular mail and email Margaret.M.Madden@pfizer.com

Ms. Margaret M. Madden Senior Vice President, Chief Governance Counsel, and Corporate Secretary Pfizer 235 East 42nd Street New York, NY 10017-5755

Re: The City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System

Dear Ms. Madden:

As custodian of The City of Philadelphia Public Employees Retirement System (the "Fund"), we are writing to report that as of the close of business on 11/3/17 the Fund held shares of Pfizer ("Company") stock in our account at Depository Trust Company and registered in its nominee name of Cede & Co. The Fund has held in excess of \$2,000 worth of shares in your Company continuously since 11/3/16.

If there are any other questions or concerns regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me at 212-623-8787.

Sincerely, MUJMUMY

Neil Kleinberg

EXHIBIT B

(see attached)



October 19, 2017

Margaret M. Madden Corporate Secretary Pfizer, Inc. 235 E. 42nd Street New York, NY 10017-5755

Dear Ms. Madden:

Peace and all good! The Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia have been shareholders in Pfizer for many years. As responsible shareholders, we believe good corporate governance includes the separation of the roles of Chair of the Board and Chief Executive Officer. Through previous, and much appreciated, conversations with our company, we learned that the Board feels Ian Read is uniquely qualified to perform as both the Board Chair and CEO. We, however, contend that good governance precludes the Board from both overseeing the CEO and reporting to him/her as Chair, regardless of the individual.

The Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia are therefore submitting the enclosed shareholder proposal regarding the separation of Chair of the Board and CEO. I submit it for inclusion in the proxy statement for consideration and action by the stockholders at the 2018 annual meeting in accordance with Rule 14a-8 of the General Rules and Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. A representative of the shareholders will attend the annual meeting to move the resolution as required by SEC rules. Please note that the contact person for this resolution/proposal will be: Tom McCancy, Associate Director, Corporate Social Responsibility. Contact information: 610-716-2766 or tmccancy@osfphila.org.

As verification that we are beneficial owners of common stock in Pfizer, I enclose a letter from Northern Trust Company, our portfolio custodian/Record holder, attesting to the fact. It is our intention to keep these shares in our portfolio at least until after the annual meeting.

Respectfully Yours,

Tom McCaney

Tion Mc Corner

Associate Director, Corporate Social Responsibility

Enclosures

OCT 2 0 2017

PFIZER
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEPT

Pfizer - Separate Chair & CEO

RESOLVED: The shareholders request the Board of Directors to adopt as policy, and amend the bylaws as necessary, to require the Chair of the Board of Directors, whenever possible, to be an independent member of the Board. This policy would be phased in for the next CEO transition.

If the Board determines that a Chair who was independent when selected is no longer independent, the Board shall select a new Chair who satisfies the requirements of the policy within a reasonable amount of time. Compliance with this policy is waived if no independent director is available and willing to serve as Chair.

Supporting Statement:

We believe:

- The role of the CEO and management is to run the company.
- The role of the Board of Directors is to provide independent oversight of management and the CEO.
- There is a potential conflict of interest for a CEO to be her/his own overseer as Chair while managing the business.

Pfizer's CEO Ian Read serves both as CEO and Chair of the Company's Board of Directors. We believe the combination of these two roles in a single person weakens a corporation's governance structure.

As Andrew Grove, Intel's former chair, stated, "The separation of the two jobs goes to the heart of the conception of a corporation. Is a company a sandbox for the CEO, or is the CEO an employee? If he's an employee, he needs a boss, and that boss is the Board. The Chairman runs the Board. How can the CEO be his own boss?"

In our view, shareholders are best served by an independent Board Chair who can provide a balance of power between the CEO and the Board. The primary duty of a Board of Directors is to oversee the management of a company on behalf of shareholders. A combined CEO / Chair creates a potential conflict of interest, resulting in excessive management influence on the Board and weaker oversight of management.

Numerous institutional investors recommend separation of these two roles. For example, California's Retirement System CalPERS' Principles & Guidelines encourage separation, even with a lead director in place.

According to ISS "2015 Board Practices", (April 2015), 53% of S&P 1,500 firms separate these two positions and the number of companies separating these roles is growing.

Chairing and overseeing the Board is a time intensive responsibility. A separate Chair also frees the CEO to manage the company and build effective business strategies.

Shareholder resolutions urging separation of CEO and Chair received approximately 30% in 2017 according to Sullivan & Cromwell's "2017 Proxy Review, an indication of strong investor support.

To simplify the transition, this policy would be phased in and implemented when the next CEO is chosen.



October 19, 2017

To Whom It May Concern:

This letter will confirm that the Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia hold **200** shares of **Pfizer Inc. Com (CUSIP 717081103)**. These shares have been held for more than one year and will be held continuously through the time of your next annual meeting.

The Northern Trust Company serves as custodian/record holder for the Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia. The above mentioned shares are registered in the nominee name of the Northern Trust Company.

This letter will further verify that Sister Nora M. Nash and/or Thomas McCaney are representatives of the Sisters of St. Francis of Philadelphia and are authorized to act on their behalf.

Sincerely,

Lisa M. Martinez- Shaffer Second Vice President

