

December 18, 2012

VIA E-MAIL

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

Re: *General Electric Company*
Shareowner Proposal of the CWA Employees Pension Fund
Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Rule 14a-8

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This letter is to inform you that our client, General Electric Company (the “Company”), intends to omit from its proxy statement and form of proxy for its 2013 Annual Meeting of Shareowners (collectively, the “2013 Proxy Materials”) a shareowner proposal (the “Proposal”) and statement in support thereof (the “Supporting Statement”) received from the CWA Employees Pension Fund (the “Proponent”).

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), we have:

- filed this letter with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) no later than eighty (80) calendar days before the date the Company expects to file its definitive 2013 Proxy Materials with the Commission; and
- concurrently sent copies of this correspondence to the Proponent.

Rule 14a-8(k) and Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (Nov. 7, 2008) (“SLB 14D”) provide that shareowner proponents are required to send companies a copy of any correspondence that the proponents elect to submit to the Commission or the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”). Accordingly, we are taking this opportunity to inform the Proponent that if the Proponent elects to submit additional correspondence to the Commission or the Staff with respect to the Proposal, a copy of that correspondence should be furnished concurrently to the undersigned on behalf of the Company pursuant to Rule 14a-8(k) and SLB 14D.

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THE PROPOSAL

The Proposal states in relevant part:

Resolved, the shareholders request that the Board of Directors take the steps necessary to adopt a policy that shall limit executive compensation of the senior executives named in the proxy statement to a competitive base salary, an annual bonus of not more than fifty per cent of base salary, and competitive retirement benefits.

In the Supporting Statement the Proponent states that it believes “that the compensation of our company’s executives is excessive,” devotes a number of paragraphs to criticizing past bonuses paid to executives, which are characterized as “excessive discretionary bonuses,” and questions the utility of incentive compensation paid by the Company in aligning executives’ interests “with the long-term interests of shareholders.”

The Company received the Proposal on November 13, 2012. A copy of the Proposal, the Supporting Statement and related correspondence with the Proponent is attached to this letter as Exhibit A.

BASIS FOR EXCLUSION

We hereby respectfully request that the Staff concur in our view that the Proposal may be excluded from the 2013 Proxy Materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(11) because the Proposal substantially duplicates another shareowner proposal previously submitted to the Company that the Company intends to include in the Company’s 2013 Proxy Materials.

ANALYSIS

The Proposal May Be Excluded Under Rule 14a-8(i)(11) Because It Substantially Duplicates Another Proposal That The Company Intends To Include In Its Proxy Materials.

Rule 14a-8(i)(11) provides that a shareowner proposal may be excluded if it “substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the company by another proponent that will be included in the company’s proxy materials for the same meeting.” The Commission has stated that “the purpose of [Rule 14a-8(i)(11)] is to eliminate the possibility of shareholders having to consider two or more substantially identical proposals submitted to an issuer by proponents acting independently of each other.” Exchange Act Release No. 12999 (Nov. 22, 1976).

The standard for determining whether proposals are substantially duplicative is whether the proposals present the same “principal thrust” or “principal focus.” *Pacific Gas & Electric*

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Co. (avail. Feb. 1, 1993). A proposal may be excluded as substantially duplicative of another proposal despite differences in terms or breadth and despite the proposals requesting different actions. *See, e.g., News Corp. (Legal & General)* (avail. Jul. 16, 2012) (concurring that a proposal to grant the holders of one class of the company's common stock, who collectively owned "nearly 70% of the company," the right to elect 30% of the membership of the board of directors was substantially duplicative of a proposal to eliminate the company's "dual-class capital structure and provide that each outstanding share of common stock has one vote"); *Abbott Labs* (avail. Feb. 4, 2004) (concurring that a proposal to limit the company's senior executives' salaries, bonuses, long-term equity compensation, and severance payments was substantially duplicative of a proposal requesting adoption of a policy prohibiting future stock option grants to senior executives); *Siebel Systems, Inc.* (avail. Apr. 15, 2003) (concurring that a proposal requesting a policy that "a significant portion of future stock option grants to senior executives shall be performance-based" was substantially duplicative of a prior proposal requesting an "Equity Policy" designating the intended use of equity in management compensation programs," including the portions of equity to be provided to employees and executives, the performance criteria for options, and holding periods for shares received).

Further, the Staff has found shareowner proposals to have the same principal thrust, and thus to be substantially duplicative, where one proposal subsumed the other. *See, e.g., Bank of America Corp.* (avail. Feb. 24, 2009) (concurring with the exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(11) of a proposal requesting a policy requiring senior executives to hold at least 75% of shares acquired through equity compensations programs until two years after their termination or retirement as substantially duplicative of an earlier proposal in which a similar policy was one of the many requests made). In *Merck & Co., Inc.* (avail. Jan. 10, 2006), the Staff considered a proposal requesting the adoption of a policy that a "significant portion of future stock option grants to senior executives" be performance based. It permitted the company to exclude this proposal as substantially duplicative of a proposal requesting that "NO future NEW stock options are awarded to ANYONE." Because the earlier proposal restricted the award of any new compensation in the form of stock options, it subsumed and thereby was substantially similar to the later proposal that stock options be tied to performance.

On September 27, 2012, before the Company received the Proposal, the Company received a proposal from Timothy Roberts (the "Roberts Proposal"). *See Exhibit B.* The Roberts Proposal states:

The Proposal: The Board of Directors are requested to consider voting a cessation of all Executive Stock Option Programs, and Bonus Programs. Rewards via a bona fide salary program are a necessity. Salary increases to deserving Executives will reward only those who productively enhance the Company's Business. Only if and when profit increases are published and compiled annually, and verified by a Certified Accounting Firm a

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realistic salary increase commensurate with the increase in the Company's Business can be considered.

Should there be no increase in the Company's Business, or a decline in Corporate Business is published and compiled annually, and verified by a Certified Accounting Firm, no salary increase(s) will be forthcoming. Rewards via the above measurements will suffice, and remove the bonus and Executive Stock Option Program(s) permanently.

The Company intends to include the Roberts Proposal in its 2013 Proxy Materials.

Although phrased differently, the principal thrust or principal focus of the Proposal and the Roberts Proposal are the same and each accomplishes the same goal: limiting compensation paid to the Company's senior executives to a salary, eliminating or significantly limiting bonuses and eliminating equity-based compensation. That the Roberts Proposal and the Proposal share the same principal thrust or focus is also evidenced by the language of both proposals and supporting statements:

- *The Proposal and the Roberts Proposal each require that base salary be the primary form of compensation to the Company's senior executives.* The Proposal limits executive compensation to salary plus bonus (which cannot be greater than 50% of salary) and retirement benefits. The Roberts Proposal requires the cessation of "Executive Stock Option Programs" and "Bonus Programs" and provides for "[r]ewards via a bona fide salary program." Each proposal thus envisions base salary to be the primary form of executive compensation.
- *The supporting statements of each proposal articulate a view that using base salary as the primary form of compensation to the Company's senior executives is good corporate governance.* Commenting on the comparison between the amount spent on bonuses versus the amount spent on salary, the Proposal states that "such a disproportionate allocation of annual bonuses to overall compensation is excessive and unnecessary." The Roberts Proposal similarly states that "[r]ewards via a bona fide salary program are a necessity." Both proposals adopt the stance that granting the Company's senior executives compensation primarily in the form of salary will be good corporate governance because it will better align the interests of such executives with the shareowners.
- *Each proposal limits non-salary compensation.* The Proposal limits bonuses to "not more than fifty percent of base salary," and the Roberts Proposal eliminates bonuses completely. Both the Proposal and the Roberts Proposal also eliminate equity-based compensation for the Company's executives.

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- *The supporting statements of the Proposal and the Roberts Proposal each focus on the amount of compensation received by the Company's senior executives. The Proposal asserts that the Company paid bonuses of \$101.8 million to its senior executives between 2006 and 2011, and that this amount exceeded the amount of base salary by 73%. The Roberts Proposal asserts that, during September 2003, a certain senior executive officer was able to receive a net profit of \$1,956,480 from the sale of shares awarded to him as options, and that other senior executives were similarly able to make significant profits from the sale of options awarded as compensation.*
- *The Proposal and the Roberts Proposal each propose a compensation system that their supporting statements argue will better align the interests of the Company's senior executives to the performance of the Company. The Proposal implies that implementing its terms will cause the Company to cease "undermin[ing] the principle of pay for performance." The Roberts Proposal contemplates increasing the salaries "only [for those executives] who productively enhance the Company's Business." Thus, each proposal is concerned with changing the current compensation structure to one that its proponent believes will better align the interests of senior executives with the interests of other shareowners of the Company.*

The principal thrust of each of the Proposal and the Roberts Proposal relates to limiting compensation received by the Company's executives to a salary, eliminating equity-based compensation and cutting back bonuses in order to, in the proponents' opinions, better tie executive compensation to the Company's performance and shareowners' interests. Therefore, the Proposal substantially duplicates the earlier-received Roberts Proposal.

The Staff has previously found shareowner proposals on compensation to be substantially duplicative where the proposals share the same principal thrust, even when the specific terms of the proposal differed. For example, as noted above, in *Merck*, the Staff considered a proposal requesting the adoption of a policy that a "significant portion of future stock option grants to senior executives" be performance based. It permitted the company to exclude this proposal as substantially duplicative of an earlier proposal requesting that "NO future NEW stock options are awarded to ANYONE." The difference in scope between the two proposals did not change their common principal thrust, as both proposals focused on restricting executive compensation. Similarly, the fact that the Proposal would permit limited bonuses to senior executives to "not more than fifty per cent of base salary" and that the Roberts Proposal completely eliminates bonuses does not distinguish the two proposals' principal thrusts; implementing the Roberts Proposal's elimination of bonuses in fact satisfies the Proposal's goal that bonuses be "no more than" fifty per cent of salary. Both proposals and supporting statements: (i) address concerns about over-compensation; (ii) discuss the Company's current compensation practices as contributing to the misalignment of the

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interests of the Company's senior executives and those of its shareowners; and (iii) propose a compensation scheme that is focused on base salary and eliminates bonuses and equity-based compensation as a means to mitigate this misalignment. As *Merck* illustrates, the fact that the Proposal permits some limited bonuses and the Roberts Proposal prohibits all bonuses does not distinguish the principal thrust of the two proposals.

The proposals at issue here are not like those in *AT&T, Inc.* (avail. Jan. 24, 1997), where the Staff did not find that a proposal to reduce executives' salaries proportionally to the drop in the company's stock price substantially duplicated a proposal to stop all equity compensation programs. In *AT&T*, the later proposal directly tied executive pay to performance, whereas the earlier proposal simply limited the forms of executive compensation without regard for performance. In contrast, the Proposal and the Roberts Proposal both limit the forms of executive compensation and, as discussed above, both intend for these limits to better align executive compensation with the interests of the Company's shareowners.

Finally, shareowners would have to consider substantially the same matters if asked to vote on both the Proposal and the Roberts Proposal. This would result from each proposal's focus on promoting base salary as the primary form of compensation, eliminating or reducing other forms of compensation that are asserted to create a misalignment of the interests of executives and shareowners, and addressing concerns about excessive executive compensation. As noted above, the purpose of Rule 14a-8(i)(11) "is to eliminate the possibility of shareholders having to consider two or more substantially identical proposals submitted to an issuer by proponents acting independently of each other." Exchange Act Release No. 12999 (Nov. 22, 1976). Thus, consistent with the Staff's previous interpretations of Rule 14a-8(i)(11), the Company believes that the Proposal may be excluded as substantially duplicative of the Roberts Proposal.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we respectfully request that the Staff concur that it will take no action if the Company excludes the Proposal from its 2013 Proxy Materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(11).

We would be happy to provide you with any additional information and answer any questions that you may have regarding this subject. Correspondence regarding this letter should be sent to shareholderproposals@gibsondunn.com. If we can be of any further

GIBSON DUNN

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assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to call me at (202) 955-8671 or Lori Zyskowski, the Company's Executive Counsel, Corporate, Securities and Finance at (203) 373-2227.

Sincerely,



Ronald O. Mueller

Enclosures

cc: Lori Zyskowski, General Electric Company
Tony Daley, CWA Research Department

EXHIBIT A

Communications
Workers of America
AFL-CIO, CLC

501 Third Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001-2797
202/434-1100 Fax: 202/434-1279

VIA Fax & Mail

November 13, 2012

Brackett Denniston
Senior Vice President, Corporate Secretary, and General Counsel
General Electric Company
3135 Easton Turnpike
Fairfield, CT 06431

Dear Mr. Denniston:


Re: Submission of Shareholder Proposal

On behalf of the CWA Employees Pension Fund ("Fund"), we hereby submit the enclosed Shareholder Proposal ("Proposal") for inclusion in the General Electric Company proxy statement to be circulated to Company shareholders in conjunction with the next annual meeting of shareholders in 2012. The Proposal is submitted under Rule 14(a)-8 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's proxy regulations.

The Fund is a beneficial holder of General Electric common stock with market value in excess of \$2,000 held continuously for more than a year prior to this date of submission.

The Fund intends to continue to own at least \$2,000 of General Electric common stock continuously through the date of the Company's 2013 annual meeting. Either the undersigned or a designated representative will present the Proposal for consideration at the annual meeting of stockholders. Please direct all communications regarding this matter to Mr. Tony Daley, CWA Research Department. He can be reached at tdaley@cwa-union.org or 202-434-9515.

Sincerely,



George Kohl
Senior Director

Enclosure

Shareholder Proposal

Resolved, the shareholders request that the Board of Directors take the steps necessary to adopt a policy that shall limit executive compensation of the senior executives named in the proxy statement to a competitive base salary, an annual bonus of not more than fifty per cent of base salary, and competitive retirement benefits.

Supporting Statement

We believe that the compensation of our company's executives is excessive.

The total 2011 compensation of the company's five senior executives came to \$90.2 million, an average \$18 million. Annual bonuses totaled \$16.8 million, or over 18 per cent of total compensation. For the six years of 2006-2011, our company spent \$485.3 million on total compensation and handed out bonuses of \$101.8 million (21%). Indeed, for these five years, bonuses **exceeded** base salary by 73%. Given the range of other compensation received by executives – base salary, stock awards, option awards, non-equity incentive plan compensation, pensions, deferred compensation and perks – such a disproportionate allocation of annual bonuses to overall compensation is excessive and unnecessary.

For example, CFO Keith Sherin's bonuses from 2009-2011 totaled \$8.82 million, significantly exceeding his base salary in the same period of \$4.845 million. Similarly, Vice Chairman John Krenicki's base salary in 2009-2011 came to \$4.2 million, while his bonus of \$8.3 million almost doubles his salary.

This compensation excess was most pronounced in the case of Robert C. Wright, former Vice Chairman. For the period 2006-2008, Mr. Wright received \$50.9 million in total compensation, of which \$17.3 million was in the form of bonus. Mr. Wright received bonuses that were 2.8 times his base salary of \$6.2 million!

We believe that our company needs compensation policies that are more focused, transparent, and not driven by excessive discretionary bonuses that distort any notion of reasonable and balanced compensation policies. In our view, it is simply nonsense to assume that an executive may be motivated by "incentives" to enhance the level of his or her performance by a factor of more than 50%.

Finally, we are concerned that high awards of incentive pay may encourage risky behavior. As a New York Times report noted (November 17, 2008), "There is a widespread belief that the way Wall Street awarded bonuses in recent years helped feed the risky behavior that eventually created big losses . . . and helped create the current [economic] crisis." Executive pay should be aligned with the long-term interests of shareholders, and our company should have policies in place that do not undermine the principle of pay for performance. Outsized annual bonuses should not be a practice that is reflected in our company's compensation.

For the reasons outlined above, we urge shareholders to support the proposal.



Lori Zyskowski
Executive Counsel
Corporate, Securities & Finance

General Electric Company
3135 Easton Turnpike
Fairfield, CT 06828

T (203) 373-2227
F (203) 373-3079
lori.zyskowski@ge.com

November 20, 2012

VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL

George Kohl
Senior Director
Communications Workers of America
501 Third Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear Mr. Kohl:

I am writing on behalf of General Electric Company (the "Company"), which received on November 13, 2012 the shareowner proposal you submitted on behalf of the CWA Employees Pension Fund (the "Fund") for consideration at the Company's 2013 Annual Meeting of Shareowners (the "Proposal").

The Proposal contains certain procedural deficiencies, which Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulations require us to bring to your attention. Rule 14a-8(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, provides that shareowner proponents must submit sufficient proof of their continuous ownership of at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of a company's shares entitled to vote on the proposal for at least one year as of the date the shareowner proposal was submitted. The Company's stock records do not indicate that the Fund is the record owner of sufficient shares to satisfy this requirement. In addition, to date we have not received proof that the Fund has satisfied Rule 14a-8's ownership requirements as of the date that the Proposal was submitted to the Company.

To remedy this defect, the Fund must submit sufficient proof of its continuous ownership of the requisite number of Company shares for the one-year period preceding and including the date the Proposal was submitted to the Company (November 13, 2012). As explained in Rule 14a-8(b) and in SEC staff guidance, sufficient proof must be in the form of:

- (1) a written statement from the "record" holder of the Fund's shares (usually a broker or a bank) verifying that the Fund continuously held the requisite

number of Company shares for the one-year period preceding and including the date the Proposal was submitted (November 13, 2012); or

- (2) if the Fund has filed with the SEC a Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4 or Form 5, or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting the Fund's ownership of the requisite number of Company shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins, a copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in the ownership level and a written statement that the Fund continuously held the requisite number of Company shares for the one-year period.

If the Fund intends to demonstrate ownership by submitting a written statement from the "record" holder of its shares as set forth in (1) above, please note that most large U.S. brokers and banks deposit their customers' securities with, and hold those securities through, the Depository Trust Company ("DTC"), a registered clearing agency that acts as a securities depository (DTC is also known through the account name of Cede & Co.). Under SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F, only DTC participants are viewed as record holders of securities that are deposited at DTC. You can confirm whether the Fund's broker or bank is a DTC participant by asking the broker or bank or by checking DTC's participant list, which is available at <http://www.dtcc.com/downloads/membership/directories/dtc/alpha.pdf>. In these situations, shareowners need to obtain proof of ownership from the DTC participant through which the securities are held, as follows:

- (1) If the Fund's broker or bank is a DTC participant, then the Fund needs to submit a written statement from its broker or bank verifying that the Fund continuously held the requisite number of Company shares for the one-year period preceding and including the date the Proposal was submitted (November 13, 2012).
- (2) If the Fund's broker or bank is not a DTC participant, then the Fund needs to submit proof of ownership from the DTC participant through which the shares are held verifying that the Fund continuously held the requisite number of Company shares for the one-year period preceding and including the date the Proposal was submitted (November 13, 2012). You should be able to find out the identity of the DTC participant by asking the Fund's broker or bank. If the broker is an introducing broker, you may also be able to learn the identity and telephone number of the DTC participant through the Fund's account statements, because the clearing broker identified on the account statements will generally be a DTC participant. If the DTC participant that holds the Fund's shares is not able to confirm the Fund's holdings but is able to confirm the holdings of the Fund's broker or bank, then the Fund needs to satisfy the proof of ownership requirements by obtaining and submitting two proof of ownership statements verifying that, for the one-year period preceding and including the date the Proposal was submitted (November 13, 2012), the requisite number of Company shares were continuously held: (i) one from the Fund's broker or

bank confirming the Fund's ownership, and (ii) the other from the DTC participant confirming the broker or bank's ownership.

The SEC's rules require that the Fund's response to this letter be postmarked or transmitted electronically no later than 14 calendar days from the date you receive this letter. Please address any response to me at General Electric Company, 3135 Easton Turnpike, Fairfield, CT 06828. Alternatively, you may transmit any response by facsimile to me at (203) 373-3079.

If you have any questions with respect to the foregoing, please contact me at (203) 373-2227. For your reference, I enclose a copy of Rule 14a-8 and Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14F.

Sincerely,



Lori Zyskowski

cc: Tony Daley, CWA Research Department

Enclosure

November 28, 2012

Brackett Denniston
Senior Vice President, Corporate Secretary, and General Counsel
General Electric Company
3135 Easton Turnpike
Fairfield, CT 06431


RE: Proof of ownership of GE Common Stock for CWA Pension Plan

Dear Mr. Denniston:

Please find enclosed a letter from SunTrust Bank, Record Holder of GE shares and Custodian for the CWA Employees' Pension Fund, which verifies that that the CWA Pension Fund has held sufficient shares for the requisite time period to be able to file a shareholder resolution.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at 202-434-9515, or you can send me an e-mail at tdaley@cwa-union.org.

Sincerely,



Tony Daley
Research Economist

Enclosure



Deborah S. Knight, CFA, CFP
VP, Client Manager
Tel 202 661-0605
Fax 202 879-6073

Foundations & Endowments
Specialty Practice
1445 New York Ave., NW CDC 5303
Washington, DC 20005
deborah.knight@suntrust.com

November 26, 2012

Brackett Denniston
Senior Vice President, Corporate Secretary, and General Counsel
General Electric Company
3135 Easton Turnpike
Fairfield, CT 06431

RE: Proof of ownership of GE Common Stock for CWA Pension Fund

Dear Mr. Denniston:

This letter confirms that the CWA Employees' Pension Fund held over \$ 2,000 at all times of General Electric Common Stock for the period November 1, 2011 through the present date.

The shares were, and still are, held by SunTrust Bank as Custodian for the CWA Pension Fund.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call me at 202 661-0605 or I may be reached at Deborah.knight@suntrust.com.

Sincerely,


Deborah S. Knight

EXHIBIT B

Timothy Roberts

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***


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SEP 27 2012

B. B. DENNISTON III

I Timothy Roberts wish to include the attached shareholder proposal in the proxy material GE will publish in the year 2013. Please find my proof of ownership from Depository Trust Company (DTC) Participant # 0705 Scottrade Inc. I will hold these shares until and during the 2013 GE annual shareholder meeting.

Sincerely;



9/24/2012

Timothy Roberts Sept 24, 2012

3624 S Hurstbourne Pkwy
Louisville KY 40299-7316
502-499-1106 • 1-800-925-9980

September 24, 2012

Mr. Timothy Clay Roberts

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

RE: Scottrade Account & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

To Whom It May Concern:

As of September 23, 2012, Timothy Roberts held and has held continuously for at least a year, 200 shares of GE common stock.

If you need any additional assistance please call us locally at (502) 499-1106

Sincerely,



Angie Kelly
Stock Broker

I am the owner of 200 common shares of General Electric Stock, and respectfully submit the following Share Owner Proposal.


"While the rest of us were losing our shirts on GE Stock, Vickers reports, Jeffrey R. Immelt Chairman at GE made 'wise' investment decisions. On Sept. 9, 2003 he purchased 96,000 shares of his Company's stock at \$8.05 per share and sold 47,836 of these shares for \$31.18 per share and made, or netted a profit of \$1,106,447. Only two months before that Mr. Immelt lucked out again. On July 29, 2003 he purchased another 96,000 shares at that magic number, \$8.05 per share, for a cost of \$772,800. On the very same day, he sold the 96,000 shares at \$28.43 per share for \$2,729,280. Again, Mr. Immelt very wisely made a net profit of \$1,956,480. September of 2003 was a lucky month for other Executives at General Electric Corporation. To mention a few Vickers reported that Michael A. Neal and Kathryn A. Cassidy were as fortunate as Mr. Immelt, as they bought thousands of GE Shares at \$8.05 and sold thousands of GE shares between \$30.79 per share and \$31.11 per share on the same day. The 52 week low price of GE Stock as listed on the NYSE was \$21.30.

"The Proposal: The Board of Directors are requested to consider voting a cessation of all Executive Stock Option Programs, and Bonus Programs. Rewards via a bona fide salary program are a necessity. Salary increases to deserving Executives will reward only those who productively enhance the Company's Business. Only if and when profit increases are published and compiled annually, and verified by a Certified Accounting Firm a realistic salary increase commensurate with the increase in the Company's Business can be considered.

Should there be no increase in the Company's Business, or a decline in Corporate Business is published and compiled annually, and verified by a Certified Accounting Firm, no salary increase(s) will be forthcoming. Rewards via the above measurements will suffice, and remove the bonus and Executive Stock Option Program(s) permanently."

Timothy C. Roberts


*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***



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U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
LOUISVILLE, KY
40299
SEP 24, 12
AMOUNT

\$5.75
00091785-19

General Electric Company

3135 Easton Turnpike

Fairfield, CT 06828

Attention: Bracket Denniston

RETURN RECEIPT
REQUESTED

X-RAYED
BY MAIL CENTER

EB

068280001 0000

