



DIVISION OF
CORPORATION FINANCE

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549-3010

February 16, 2009

Amy L. Goodman
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5306

Re: Time Warner Inc.
Incoming letter dated December 29, 2008

Dear Ms. Goodman:

This is in response to your letter dated December 29, 2008 concerning the shareholder proposal submitted to Time Warner by William Steiner. We also have received a letter on the proponent's behalf dated January 21, 2009. Our response is attached to the enclosed photocopy of your correspondence. By doing this, we avoid having to recite or summarize the facts set forth in the correspondence. Copies of all of the correspondence also will be provided to the proponent.

In connection with this matter, your attention is directed to the enclosure, which sets forth a brief discussion of the Division's informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals.

Sincerely,

Heather L. Maples
Senior Special Counsel

Enclosures

cc: John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

February 16, 2009

Response of the Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance

Re: Time Warner Inc.
Incoming letter dated December 29, 2008

The proposal asks the board to take the steps necessary to amend the bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of Time Warner's outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareholder meetings and further provides that such bylaw and/or charter text shall not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareholders but not to management and/or the board.

We are unable to concur in your view that Time Warner may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(2). Accordingly, we do not believe that Time Warner may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(2).

We are unable to concur in your view that Time Warner may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(3). Accordingly, we do not believe that Time Warner may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).

We are unable to concur in your view that Time Warner may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(6). Accordingly, we do not believe that Time Warner may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(6).

We are unable to concur in your view that Time Warner may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(10). Accordingly, we do not believe that Time Warner may omit the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(10).

Sincerely,

Michael J. Reedich
Special Counsel

**DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE
INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS**

The Division of Corporation Finance believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division's staff considers the information furnished to it by the Company in support of its intention to exclude the proposals from the Company's proxy materials, as well as any information furnished by the proponent or the proponent's representative.

Although Rule 14a-8(k) does not require any communications from shareholders to the Commission's staff, the staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes administered by the Commission, including argument as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would be violative of the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff's informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversary procedure.

It is important to note that the staff's and Commission's no-action responses to Rule 14a-8(j) submissions reflect only informal views. The determinations reached in these no-action letters do not and cannot adjudicate the merits of a company's position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S. District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. Accordingly a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement action, does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of a company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the company in court, should the management omit the proposal from the company's proxy material.

JOHN CHEVEDDEN

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

January 21, 2009

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

**# 1 Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher and Time Warner Inc. (TWX)
Rule 14a-8 Proposal by William Steiner
Special Shareholder Meetings**

Ladies and Gentlemen:

This responds to the company December 29, 2008 no action request regarding this rule 14a-8 proposal by William Steiner with the following text (emphasis added):

3 - Special Shareowner Meetings

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

Statement of William Steiner

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If an attainable percentage of shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer.

This proposal topic won impressive support at the following companies (based on 2008 yes and no votes):

Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

...

Notes:

William Steiner,
proposal.

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

sponsored this

The attached *Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation* (January 12, 2009) Staff Reply Letter may be relevant since it concerns a proposal with the exact same text as the Time Warner proposal.

Although the rule 14a-8 objections by these two companies have differences, Burlington Northern had ample time since December 5, 2008 to add some or all of the Time Warner objections (as potentially superior objections) and did not. And Burlington Northern had the same objective as Time Warner.

This no action request is moot because the company has not properly identified any rule 14a-8 proposal. The company addresses a non-existent proposal improperly identified by the company with the name of another person. The proposal and the submittal letter clearly state that the proposal is by Mr. William Steiner. The company should not be allowed to benefit by creating confusion.

The proposal is internally consistent. The first sentence of the proposal would empower each shareholder, without exception or exclusion, to be part of 10% of shareholders (acting in the capacity of shareholders only) able to call a special meeting. This sentence does not exclude any shareholder from being part of the 10% of shareholders. The fact that there is no exclusion of even a single shareholder – contradicts the core company “exclusion” argument. The company has not named one shareholder who would be excluded.

This rule 14a-8 proposal does not seek to place limits on management and/or the board when members of the management and/or the board act exclusively in the capacity of individual shareholders. For instance this proposal does not seek to compel a member of management and/or the board to vote their shares with or against the proxy position of the entire board on ballot items or to require directors to buy stock.

The company’s speculative misinterpretation of the proposal appears to be based on a false premise that the overwhelming purpose of shareholder proposals is to only ask the individual board members to take action on their own and only in their limited capacity as private shareholders. To the contrary most, if not all, rule 14a-8 proposals ask the board to act in its capacity as the board.

The company has not produced evidence of any rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal to back up its speculative misinterpretations in which board members were asked to take action on their own and only in their limited capacity as private shareholders. And the company has not produced any evidence of a shareholder proposal with the purpose of restricting rights of the directors when they act as private shareholders. The company apparently drafts its no action request based on a belief that the key to writing a no action request is to produce a number of speculative or highly speculative meanings for the resolved statements of rule 14a-8 proposals.

The company does not explain why it does not alternatively back up its (i)(3) objection by requesting that the second sentence of the resolved statement be omitted.

The company objection is confused because it creates the false assumption that the resolved statement of shareholder proposals concerning the board of directors is directed to the members of the board in their capacity as individual shareholders.

Thus the well-established 2008 Invacare Corporation proposal in the next paragraph, that was voted at the 2008 Invacare annual meeting (and all similar proposals), could be excluded henceforth using the same company concept in the no action request. Specifically through a claim that the Invacare proposal is in reality asking the board to declassify the board and yet it is limiting this request and calling for the board members to only act in the capacity of private shareholders to declassify the board (and private shareholders have no power to declassify the board).

“BE IT RESOLVED, that the stockholders of Invacare Corporation request that the Board of Directors take the necessary steps to declassify the Board of Directors and establish annual elections of directors, whereby directors would be elected annually and not by classes. This policy would take effect immediately, and be applicable to the re-election of any incumbent director whose term, under the current classified system, subsequently expires.”

Shareholders should not be denied the opportunity to vote on this topic in 2009. The following resolved text, which was excluded in 2008 at some companies, nonetheless was sufficiently comprehended by shareholders to receive 39% to 48% support at five major companies in 2008: **RESOLVED, Special Shareholder Meetings, Shareholders ask our board to amend our bylaws and any other appropriate governing documents in order that there is no restriction on the shareholder right to call a special meeting, compared to the standard allowed by applicable law on calling a special meeting.**

Apparently 39% to 48% of the shareholders (based on yes and no votes) at these companies were not confused on the immediately above text on this topic:

Home Depot (HD)	39%
Sprint Nextel (S)	40%
Allstate (ALL)	43%
Bank of America (BAC)	44%
CVS Caremark (CVS)	48%

The above voting results are evidence of the importance of this topic to shareholders and given this level of importance – shareholders should not be denied the opportunity to vote on this topic in 2009.

The company (i)(2) objection appears to be dependent on unqualified acceptance of its (i)(3) objection and hence gratuitous.

The company (i)(6) objection appears to be dependent on unqualified acceptance of its (i)(3) objections and hence gratuitous. The outside opinion even repeats some of rationale behind the company (i)(3) objections and then states (emphasis added): “For the purposes of this opinion, we have *assumed* that the Proposal would be read to have this effect.”

The key to analyzing the outside opinion appears to be for the reader to look for the false premises that are the basis of lengthy purported support. Even if the lengthy purported support is meticulously crafted in multiple layers, it is irrelevant if based on a single false or misleading premise.

The company fails to provide any no action request precedents for proposals being determined substantially implemented in cases where there is a large gap, for instance between a 10% requirement and a 25% requirement – a 150% gap.

The company in effect claims that 25% of shareholders is the same as 10% of shareholders in the right to call a special meeting. Due to the dispersed ownership of the company (please see the attachment), the requirement of 25% of shareholders to call a special meeting essentially prevents a special shareholder meeting from being called.

The dispersed ownership (827 institutions) of the company greatly increases the difficulty of calling a special meeting especially when 25% of this dispersed group of shareholders are required to take the extra effort to support the calling of a special meeting. For many of these shareholders their percentage of the total ownership of the company is small and their ownership of the company is also a small part of their total portfolio.

The company has provided no evidence from any experts that would contradict this. And the company has not provided one example of 25% of shareholders of a company with a dispersed ownership of 827 institutions ever calling a special meeting.

The company has not provided one precedent in which the dispersed ownership issue was introduced.

When the company cites the 25% requirement in its 2008 bylaw change it also seems to be claiming that a rule 14a-8 proposal should be determined implemented by looking at the text of a 2008 proposal rather than the 2009 proposal. And the company provides no precedents of a proposal determined implemented through a comparison to a prior year's proposal in preference to the current year's proposal.

Additionally the 2009 rule 14a-8 proposal did not ask that the company be enabled to thwart a special meeting regarding election of directors or to highlight the facilitation of asking shareholders to revoke their call for a special meeting per the following bylaw text:


In addition, a Special Meeting Request shall not be valid if (i) the Special Meeting Request relates to an item of business that is not a proper subject for stockholder action under applicable law; (ii) the Special Meeting Request is received by the Corporation during the period commencing 90 days prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting and ending on the date of the next annual meeting; (iii) an identical or substantially similar item (a "Similar Item") was presented at any meeting of stockholders held within 120 days prior to receipt by the Corporation of such Special Meeting Request (and, for purposes of this clause (iii), the election of directors shall be deemed a "Similar Item" with respect to all items of business involving the election or removal of directors); (iv) a Similar Item is included in the Corporation's notice as an item of business to be brought before a stockholder meeting that has been called but not yet held; or (v) such Special Meeting Request was made in a manner that involved a violation of Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or other applicable law.

Stockholders may revoke a Special Meeting Request by written revocation delivered to the Corporation at any time prior to the special meeting; provided, however, the Board shall have the discretion to determine whether or not to proceed with the special meeting.

The company mentions *Borders Group, Inc.* (March 11, 2008) and *Allegheny Energy, Inc.* (February 19, 2008) where the respective 2008 proposals had different wording and additionally allowed for up to 25% of shareholders to be able to call a special meeting – not the 10% in the 2009 Time Warner proposal.

For these reasons it is requested that the staff find that this resolution cannot be omitted from the company proxy. It is also respectfully requested that the shareholder have the last opportunity to submit material in support of including this proposal – since the company had the first opportunity.

Sincerely,


John Chevedden

cc:

William Steiner

Julie Kim <Julie.Kim@timewarner.com>

January 12, 2009

**Response of the Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance**

Re: Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation
Incoming letter dated December 5, 2008

The proposal asks the board to take the steps necessary to amend the bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of BNSF's outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings.

We are unable to concur in your view that BNSF may exclude the proposal or portions of the supporting statement under rule 14a-8(i)(3). Accordingly, we do not believe that BNSF may omit the proposal or portions of the supporting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3).

Sincerely,

Julie F. Bell
Attorney-Adviser

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP

LAWYERS

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December 29, 2008

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VIA E-MAIL

Office of Chief Counsel
Division of Corporation Finance
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

Re: *Time Warner Inc.; Stockholder Proposal of John Chevedden (William Steiner)*
Exchange Act of 1934—Rule 14a-8

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

This letter is to inform you that our client, Time Warner Inc. (the “Company”), intends to omit from its proxy statement and form of proxy for its 2009 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (collectively, the “2009 Proxy Materials”) a stockholder proposal (the “Proposal”) and statements in support thereof submitted by John Chevedden (the “Proponent”) purportedly under the name of William Steiner as his nominal proponent.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j), we have:

- filed this letter with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) no later than eighty (80) calendar days before the Company intends to file its definitive 2009 Proxy Materials with the Commission; and
- concurrently sent copies of this correspondence to the Proponent and his nominal proponent.

Rule 14a-8(k) and Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D (Nov. 7, 2008) (“SLB 14D”) provide that stockholder proponents are required to send companies a copy of any correspondence that the proponents elect to submit to the Commission or the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (the “Staff”). Accordingly, we are taking this opportunity to inform the Proponent that if the

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Office of Chief Counsel
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Proponent elects to submit additional correspondence to the Commission or the Staff with respect to this Proposal, a copy of that correspondence should concurrently be furnished to the undersigned on behalf of the Company pursuant to Rule 14a-8(k) and SLB 14D.

THE PROPOSAL

The Proposal states:

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

A copy of the Proposal, as well as related correspondence with the Proponent, is attached to this letter as Exhibit A.

BASES FOR EXCLUSION

We believe that the Proponent has exceeded the one proposal limitation of Rule 14a-8(c) and does not satisfy the ownership requirements of Rule 14a-8(b) for the reasons addressed in a separate no-action request submitted concurrently herewith and, accordingly, that the Proposal is excludable on those bases. In addition, we believe that the Proposal may properly be excluded from the 2009 Proxy Materials pursuant to:

- Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because the Proposal is impermissibly vague and indefinite so as to be inherently misleading;
- Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because implementation of the Proposal would cause the Company to violate state law;
- Rule 14a-8(i)(6) because the Company lacks the power or authority to implement the Proposal; and
- Rule 14a-8(i)(10) because the Company has substantially implemented the Proposal.

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ANALYSIS

I. The Proposal May Be Excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) Because the Proposal Is Impermissibly Vague and Indefinite so as to Be Inherently Misleading.

Rule 14a-8(i)(3) permits the exclusion of a stockholder proposal if the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules or regulations, including Rule 14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials. For the reasons discussed below, the Proposal is so vague and indefinite as to be misleading and, therefore, is excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3).

The Staff consistently has taken the position that vague and indefinite stockholder proposals are inherently misleading and therefore excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) because "neither the stockholders voting on the proposal, nor the company in implementing the proposal (if adopted), would be able to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires." Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (Sept. 15, 2004) ("SLB 14B"); *see also Dyer v. SEC*, 287 F.2d 773, 781 (8th Cir. 1961) ("[I]t appears to us that the proposal, as drafted and submitted to the company, is so vague and indefinite as to make it impossible for either the board of directors or the stockholders at large to comprehend precisely what the proposal would entail."). In this regard, the Staff has permitted the exclusion of a variety of stockholder proposals, including proposals requesting amendments to a company's certificate of incorporation or by-laws. *See Alaska Air Group Inc.* (avail. Apr. 11, 2007) (concurring with the exclusion of a stockholder proposal requesting that the company's board amend the company's governing instruments to "assert, affirm and define the right of the owners of the company to set standards of corporate governance" as "vague and indefinite."); *Peoples Energy Corp.* (avail. Dec. 10, 2004) (concurring in the exclusion as vague of a proposal requesting that the board amend the certificate and by-laws "to provide that officers and directors shall not be indemnified from personal liability for acts or omissions involving gross negligence or reckless neglect"). In fact, the Staff has concurred that numerous stockholder proposals submitted by the Proponent requesting companies to amend provisions regarding the ability of stockholders to call special meetings were vague and indefinite and thus could be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3). *See Raytheon Co.* (avail. Mar. 28, 2008) (concurring with the exclusion of the Proponent's proposal that the board of directors amend the company's "bylaws and any other appropriate governing documents in order that there is no restriction on the shareholder right to call a special meeting"); *Office Depot Inc.* (avail. Feb. 25, 2008); *Mattel Inc.* (avail. Feb. 22, 2008); *Schering-Plough Corp.* (avail. Feb. 22, 2008); *CVS Caremark Corp.* (avail. Feb. 21, 2008); *Dow Chemical Co.* (avail. Jan. 31, 2008); *Intel Corp.* (avail. Jan. 31, 2008); *JPMorgan Chase & Co.* (avail. Jan. 31, 2008); *Safeway Inc.* (avail. Jan. 31, 2008); *Time Warner Inc.* (avail. Jan. 31, 2008); *Bristol Myers Squibb Co.* (avail. Jan. 30, 2008); *Pfizer Inc.* (avail. Jan. 29, 2008); *Exxon Mobil Corp.* (avail. Jan. 28, 2008).

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Moreover, the Staff has on numerous occasions concurred that a stockholder proposal was sufficiently misleading so as to justify exclusion where a company and its stockholders might interpret the proposal differently, such that “any action ultimately taken by the [c]ompany upon implementation [of the proposal] could be significantly different from the actions envisioned by shareholders voting on the proposal.” *Fuqua Industries, Inc.* (avail. Mar. 12, 1991). *See also Bank of America Corp.* (avail. June 18, 2007) (concurring with the exclusion of a stockholder proposal calling for the board of directors to compile a report “concerning the thinking of the Directors concerning representative payees” as “vague and indefinite”); *Puget Energy, Inc.* (avail. Mar. 7, 2002) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal requesting that the company’s board of directors “take the necessary steps to implement a policy of improved corporate governance”).

In the instant case, neither the Company nor its stockholders can determine the measures requested by the Proposal, because the Proposal itself is internally inconsistent. The operative language in the Proposal consists of two sentences. The first sentence requests that the Company’s Board of Directors take the steps necessary “to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings.” The second sentence requires further that “such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners.” However, the by-law or charter text requested in the first sentence of the Proposal on its face includes an “exclusion condition,” in that it explicitly excludes holders of less than 10% of the Company’s outstanding common stock from having the ability to call a special meeting of stockholders.¹ Thus, the by-law or charter text requested in the first sentence of the Proposal is inconsistent with the requirements of the text requested in the second sentence of the Proposal and, accordingly, neither the Company nor its stockholders can know what is required.²

¹ The clause in the second sentence that, effectively, would allow any exception or exclusion condition required by any state law to which the Company is subject does not address or remedy the conflict between the two sentences, because the 10% stock ownership condition called for in the first sentence is not required by Delaware state law, under which the Company is incorporated.

² Evidence of this confusion can be seen in the alternative ways that requirements of the Proposal have been interpreted by other companies receiving the same Proposal. *See, e.g., Verizon Communications Inc.* (incoming No-Action request, filed Dec. 15, 2008) (interpreting the limitation on “exception or exclusion conditions” to apply to procedural and notice provisions); *Home Depot, Inc.* (incoming No-Action request, filed Dec. 12, 2008) (interpreting the limitation on “exception or exclusion conditions” to apply to the subject

[Footnote continued on next page]

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The Staff previously has recognized that when such internal inconsistencies exist within the resolution clause of a proposal, the proposal is rendered vague and indefinite and may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3). For example, in *Verizon Communications Inc.* (avail. Feb. 21, 2008), the resolution clause of the proposal included a specific requirement, in the form of a maximum limit on the size of compensation awards, and a general requirement, in the form of a method for calculating the size of such compensation awards. However, when the two requirements proved to be inconsistent with each other because the method of calculation resulted in awards exceeding the maximum limit, the Staff concurred with the exclusion of the proposal as vague and indefinite. *See also Boeing Co.* (avail. Feb. 18, 1998) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal as vague and ambiguous because the specific limitations in the proposal on the number and identity of directors serving multiple-year terms were inconsistent with the process it provided for stockholders to elect directors to multiple-year terms). Similarly, the resolution clause of the Proposal includes the specific requirement that only stockholders holding 10% of the Company's stock have the ability to call a special meeting, which conflicts with the Proposal's general requirement that there be no "exception or exclusion conditions." In fact, the Proposal creates more confusion for stockholders than the *Verizon* compensation proposal because the inconsistency is patent and does not require any hypothetical calculations.

Consistent with the Staff precedent, the Company's stockholders cannot be expected to make an informed decision on the merits of the Proposal if they are unable "to determine with any reasonable certainty exactly what actions or measures the proposal requires." SLB 14B; *see also Boeing Corp.* (avail. Feb. 10, 2004); *Capital One Financial Corp.* (avail. Feb. 7, 2003) (excluding a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) where the company argued that its stockholders "would not know with any certainty what they are voting either for or against"). Here, the operative language of the Proposal is self-contradictory and, therefore, neither the Company's stockholders nor its Board of Directors would be able to determine with any certainty what actions the Company would be required to take in order to comply with the Proposal. Accordingly, we believe that as a result of the vague and indefinite nature of the Proposal, the Proposal is impermissibly misleading and, thus, excludable in its entirety under Rule 14a-8(i)(3).

II. The Proposal May Be Excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) Because Implementation of the Proposal Would Cause the Company to Violate State Law.

Rule 14a-8(i)(2) permits a company to exclude a stockholder proposal if implementation of the proposal would cause it to violate any state, federal or foreign law to which it is subject. The Company is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware. For the reasons set forth

[Footnote continued from previous page]

matter of special meetings); *Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp.* (incoming No-Action request, filed Dec. 5, 2008) (same as *Home Depot*).

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in the legal opinion regarding Delaware law attached hereto as Exhibit B (the "Delaware Law Opinion"), the Company believes that the Proposal is excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because implementation of the Proposal would cause the Company to violate the Delaware General Corporation Law (the "DGCL").

The Proposal requests that any "exception or exclusion conditions" applied to stockholders in the by-law and/or charter text giving stockholders the ability to call a special meeting also be applied to "management and/or the board." However, as discussed in the Delaware Law Opinion, "the certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may not limit the express power of the board of directors to call special meetings." Section 211(d) of the DGCL provides that "[s]pecial meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors," without any means to limit or restrict such power in a company's by-laws or otherwise. Yet, the Proposal requests both that the ability of stockholders to call special meetings be conditioned upon holding 10% of the Company's shares and that such condition be applied to "management and/or the board." Thus, as supported by the Delaware Law Opinion, implementation of the Proposal would cause the Company to violate state law³ because the Proposal requests the imposition of "exception or exclusion conditions" on the unrestricted power of the Company's Board to call a special meeting.

The Staff previously has concurred with the exclusion, under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) or its predecessor, of stockholder proposals that requested the adoption of a by-law or certificate amendment that if implemented would violate state law. *See, e.g., PG&E Corp.* (avail. Feb. 14, 2006) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal requesting the amendment of the company's governance documents to institute majority voting in director elections where Section 708(c) of the California Corporations Code required that plurality voting be used in the

³ The reference in the Proposal to "the fullest extent permitted by state law" does not affect this conclusion. On its face, such language addresses the extent to which the requested "bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions" (*i.e.*, there will be no exception or exclusion conditions not required by state law) and highlights the conflict between the first and second sentences of the Proposal discussed in Section I above. The language does not limit the exception or exclusion conditions that would apply "to management and/or the board." Were it to do so, the entire second sentence of the proposal would be rendered a nullity because, as supported by the Delaware Law Opinion, there is no extent to which the exception or exclusion condition included in the Proposal can be applied to the board under state law. This ambiguity is yet another example of why, as set forth in Section I above, the Proposal can be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) as vague and indefinite because the Company's stockholders would be unable "to determine with any reasonable certainty what actions would be taken under the proposal." *Fuqua Industries, Inc.* (avail. Mar. 12, 1991).

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election of directors); *Hewlett-Packard Co.* (avail. Jan. 6, 2005) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal recommending that the company amend its by-laws so that no officer may receive annual compensation in excess of certain limits without approval by a vote of “the majority of the stockholders” in violation of the “one share, one vote” standard set forth in DGCL Section 212(a)); *GenCorp Inc.* (avail. Dec. 20, 2004) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal requesting an amendment to the company’s governing instruments to provide that every stockholder resolution approved by a majority of the votes cast be implemented by the company since the proposal would conflict with Section 1701.59(A) of the Ohio Revised Code regarding the fiduciary duties of directors); *see also Boeing Co.* (avail. Mar. 4, 1999) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal requesting that every corporate action requiring stockholder approval be approved by a simple majority vote of stock since the proposal would conflict with provisions of the DGCL that require a vote of at least a majority of the outstanding stock on certain issues); *Tribune Co.* (avail. Feb. 22, 1991) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal requesting that the company’s proxy materials be mailed at least 50 business days prior to the annual meeting since the proposal would conflict with Sections 213 and 222 of the DGCL, which set forth certain requirements regarding the notice of, and the record date for, stockholder meetings).

The Proposal requests that any “exception or exclusion conditions” applied to the ability of stockholders to call a special meeting also be applied to “management and/or the board.” However, Delaware law provides the Company’s Board with unrestricted power to call a special meeting, which cannot be altered by the Company. Therefore, the Proposal is excludable pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) because, as supported by the Delaware Law Opinion, implementation of the Proposal would cause the Company to violate applicable state law.

III. The Proposal May Be Excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(6) Because the Company Lacks the Power or Authority to Implement the Proposal.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(6), a company may exclude a proposal “if the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal.” The Company lacks the power and authority to implement the Proposal and the Proposal can be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(6) both because: (a) the Proposal “is so vague and indefinite that [the Company] would be unable to determine what action should be taken,” *see International Business Machines Corp.* (avail. Jan. 14, 1992) (applying predecessor Rule 14a-8(c)(6)); and (b) the Proposal seeks action contrary to state law, *see, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp.* (avail. Mar. 27, 2008); *Bank of America Corp.* (avail. Feb. 26, 2008); *Boeing Co.* (avail. Feb. 19, 2008); *PG&E Corp.* (avail. Feb. 25, 2008) (concurring with the exclusion of a proposal under both Rule 14a-8(i)(2) and Rule 14a-8(i)(6)).

As discussed in Section I above, the Proposal is vague and indefinite because it is internally inconsistent and requests that the Company’s Board take the impossible actions of both (a) adopting a by-law provision containing an exclusion condition and (b) not including any exclusion conditions in such by-law provision. Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons

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that the Proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) as impermissibly vague and indefinite, it is also excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(6) as beyond the Company's power to implement.

As discussed in Section II above, the Proposal's implementation would violate the DGCL. Specifically, Delaware law provides the Company's Board unrestricted power to call a special meeting, which cannot be altered by the Company. Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons that the Proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(2) as violating state law, it is also excludable under Rule 14a-8(i)(6) as beyond the Company's power to implement.

IV. The Proposal May Be Excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) Because the Proposal Has Already Been Substantially Implemented by the Company.

Rule 14a-8(i)(10) permits a company to exclude a stockholder proposal from its proxy materials if the company has substantially implemented the proposal. The Commission stated in 1976 that the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) was "designed to avoid the possibility of shareholders having to consider matters which already have been favorably acted upon by the management." Exchange Act Release No. 12598 (July 7, 1976) (the "1976 Release"). Originally, the Staff narrowly interpreted this predecessor rule and granted no-action relief only when proposals were "'fully' effected" by the company. See Exchange Act Release No. 19135 (Oct. 14, 1982). By 1983, the Commission recognized that the "previous formalistic application of [the Rule] defeated its purpose" because proponents were successfully convincing the Staff to deny no-action relief by submitting proposals that differed from existing company policy by only a few words. Exchange Act Release No. 20091, at § II.E.6. (Aug. 16, 1983) (the "1983 Release"). Therefore, in 1983, the Commission adopted a revision to the rule to permit the omission of proposals that had been "substantially implemented." 1983 Release. The 1998 amendments to the proxy rules reaffirmed this position. See Exchange Act Release No. 40018 at n.30 and accompanying text (May 21, 1998).

Applying this standard, the Staff has noted that "a determination that the company has substantially implemented the proposal depends upon whether [the company's] particular policies, practices and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the proposal." *Texaco, Inc.* (avail. Mar. 28, 1991). In other words, substantial implementation under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) requires that a company's actions satisfactorily address the underlying concerns of the proposal and that the essential objective of the proposal has been addressed. See, e.g., *Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc.* (avail. Jan. 17, 2007); *ConAgra Foods, Inc.* (avail. Jul. 3, 2006); *Johnson & Johnson* (avail. Feb. 17, 2006); *Talbots Inc.* (avail. Apr. 5, 2002); *Masco Corp.* (avail. Mar. 29, 1999).

For the Company's 2007 annual meeting, the Proponent submitted a proposal (the "2007 Proposal") requesting that the Board amend the Company's by-laws "to give holders of 10% to 25% of the outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareholder meeting." After the 2007 Proposal was included in the Company's proxy statement and received a 64% favorable

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vote from stockholders at the Company's 2007 annual meeting, the Board fully implemented the 2007 Proposal by amending the Company's by-laws to give the ability to request that a special meeting be called to stockholders representing at least 25% of the outstanding shares of all classes and series of stock of the Company entitled to vote in the election of directors (as amended, the "By-Laws," attached hereto as Exhibit C). Nevertheless, the Proponent revised the proposal and submitted the current Proposal, which addresses the same essential objective as his now-implemented prior proposal.⁴ This is exactly the scenario contemplated by the Commission when it adopted the predecessor to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) "to avoid the possibility of shareholders having to consider matters which already have been favorably acted upon by the management." 1976 Release. When a company has acted responsively and favorably to an issue addressed in a stockholder proposal, Rule 14a-8(i)(10) does not require the company and its stockholders to reconsider the issue. See, e.g., *Allegheny Energy, Inc.* (avail. Feb. 20, 2008); *Honeywell International, Inc.* (avail. Jan. 24, 2008) (concurring with the exclusion of the Proponent's rephrased proposal as substantially implemented under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) for the *fourth year*, when the company had implemented the Proponent's prior proposal regarding the same matter). Accordingly, the Proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) as substantially implemented.

The By-Laws substantially implement the Proposal for purposes of Rule 14a-8(i)(10) because they implement the Proposal's essential objective of giving a significant portion of the Company's stockholders the ability to call special meetings. Such objective is evidenced by the arguments advanced in support of the Proposal, which exclusively focus on the benefits of giving "a significant, but not unattainable or unmaintainable, percentage of shareowners" such ability. The By-Laws address the concerns raised in the supporting statement and accomplish the Proposal's essential objective by giving a significant percentage of stockholders the ability to request that a special meeting be called. For this reason, despite the wide variety of phrasing chosen for the Proponent's proposals requesting the ability of stockholders to call special meetings, the Staff has concurred with the exclusion of such proposals as substantially implemented by provisions similar to the By-Laws. See, e.g., *Borders Group Inc.* (avail. Mar. 11, 2008) (concurring that a proposal requesting "no restriction on the shareholder right to call a special meeting" was substantially implemented by a by-law allowing 25% of shares entitled to vote to call a special meeting); *Chevron Corp.* (avail. Feb. 19, 2008) (concurring that a proposal seeking "to give holders of 10% to 25% of our outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareholder meeting" and "favor[ing] 10% from the above range," was

⁴ The Proposal actually marks the third time that the Proponent has submitted a proposal requesting that the Company's board consider the issue of the stockholders' ability to call a special meeting. In 2007, the Proponent submitted another revised version of the same proposal; however, the Staff concurred with its exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) as vague and indefinite. See *Time Warner Inc.* (avail. Jan. 31, 2008).

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substantially implemented by a by-law allowing 25% of common stock to call a special meeting); *Johnson & Johnson* (avail Feb. 19, 2008) (concurring that a proposal “to give holders of a reasonable percentage of our outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareholder meeting,” which “favors 10% . . . to call a special shareholder meeting,” was substantially implemented by a by-law allowing 25% of common stock to call a special meeting); *Hewlett Packard Co.* (avail. Dec. 11, 2007) (concurring that a proposal “to give holders of 25% or less of our outstanding common stock . . . the power to call a special shareholder meeting” was substantially implemented by a by-law allowing 25% of shares entitled to vote to call a special meeting).

The Proponent’s modification of the numerical percentage of stock necessary for stockholders to call a special meeting is the only difference between the Proposal and the By-Laws and does not preclude the By-Laws from substantially implementing the Proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(10). The Proponent previously has tried, and failed, to use the tactic of changing a number requested in a proposal to avoid the application of Rule 14a-8(i)(10). In *General Motors* (avail. Mar. 3, 2004), the Proponent submitted a proposal requesting a stockholder vote on the adoption of a poison pill “at the earliest next [stock]holder election.” The Staff concurred with the exclusion of the proposal as substantially implemented by a company policy, adopted in response to prior stockholder proposals, that provided for a stockholder vote “within 12 months of the date of adoption.” Similar to this case, despite the implementation of his proposal, the Proponent submitted the same proposal the next year, modifying it specifically to require a stockholder vote “within 4-months.” Unlike this case, the supporting statement focused on the timing of the vote and argued that 12 months was too long a delay. However, the Staff again concurred with the exclusion of the revised proposal as substantially implemented under Rule 14a-8(i)(10). See *General Motors Corp.* (avail. Mar. 14, 2005); see also *Boeing Co.* (avail. Mar. 9, 2005); *Home Depot, Inc.* (avail. Mar. 7, 2005). Similarly, the Proponent’s tactic of modifying the numerical percentage has not changed the essential objective of the Proposal – to give a significant percentage of stockholders the ability to call a special meeting. To conclude otherwise would render Rule 14a-8(i)(10) a nullity because it would allow the Proponent to resubmit the Proposal indefinitely with a different percentage each year.

The Proposal does not contain any other requests that the By-Laws do not substantially implement. The By-Laws do not contain “any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law)” that apply to stockholders, management or the Board, with exception of the minimum stock holding condition, which is also requested by the first sentence of the Proposal. There are provisions that consist of procedural and disclosure requirements necessary to implement the essential objective of the Proposal, but they are not “exception or exclusion conditions” to the ability to call a special meeting. In this regard, the Staff previously has recognized that similar provisions do not constitute restrictions on the ability to call a special meeting. In *Allegheny Energy, Inc.* (avail. Feb. 19, 2008), the proposal requested that Allegheny amend its by-laws and other governing documents “in order that there is no restriction on the shareholder right to call a special meeting.” Like the Company, Allegheny’s existing by-laws

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provided the ability to call a special meeting to holders of 25% of the stock entitled to vote at the special meeting and included procedural and disclosure requirements. Moreover, unlike the Company, Allegheny's existing by-laws conditioned the calling of such a special meeting on the payment of mailing costs by the requesting stockholders and the business of the special meeting not having been considered in the last twelve months. Despite these provisions, the Staff concurred with exclusion of the proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(10), as the existing by-laws substantially implemented the request that there be "no restriction" on the stockholder ability to call a special meeting. *See also Borders Group Inc.* (avail. Mar. 11, 2008) (concurring with the exclusion of an identical proposal as substantially implemented by existing by-laws containing procedural and disclosure requirements). In the instant case, the Proposal is much less expansive because it only limits "exception and exclusion conditions," and the By-Laws do not contain such conditions. Accordingly, the Proposal may be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) as substantially implemented by the By-Laws.

We believe that, for the reasons set forth above, the Proposal may be excluded from the Company's 2009 Proxy Materials under Rule 14a-8(i)(10).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we respectfully request that the Staff concur that it will take no action if the Company excludes the Proposal from its 2009 Proxy Materials. We would be happy to provide you with any additional information and answer any questions that you may have regarding this subject.

If we can be of any further assistance in this matter, please do not hesitate to call me at (202) 955-8653 or Julie Y. Kim, the Company's Counsel, at (212) 484-8142.

Sincerely,



Amy L. Goodman

ALG/ser
Enclosures

cc: Julie Y. Kim, Time Warner Inc.
John Chevedden
William Steiner

EXHIBIT A

William Steiner

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Mr. Richard D. Parsons
Time Warner Inc. (TWX)
1 Time Warner Center
New York NY 10019
Phone: 212 484-8000

Rule 14a-8 Proposal

Dear Mr. Parsons,

This Rule 14a-8 proposal is respectfully submitted in support of the long-term performance of our company. This proposal is for the next annual shareholder meeting. Rule 14a-8 requirements are intended to be met including the continuous ownership of the required stock value until after the date of the respective shareholder meeting and the presentation of this proposal at the annual meeting. This submitted format, with the shareholder-supplied emphasis, is intended to be used for definitive proxy publication. This is the proxy for John Chevedden and/or his designee to act on my behalf regarding this Rule 14a-8 proposal for the forthcoming shareholder meeting before, during and after the forthcoming shareholder meeting. Please direct all future communications to John Chevedden-@TWX


*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***
to facilitate prompt communications and in order that it will be verifiable that communications have been sent.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,



William Steiner



Date

cc: Paul F. Washington <Paul.Washington@TimeWarner.com>
Corporate Secretary
PH: 212-484-6753
FX: 212-484-7174
Janet Silverman <Janet.Silverman@timewarner.com>
Assistant General Counsel

[TWX: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, November 5, 2008]

3 – Special Shareowner Meetings

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

Statement of William Steiner

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If an attainable percentage of shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer.

This proposal topic won impressive support at the following companies (based on 2008 yes and no votes):

Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

A significant, but not unattainable or unmaintainable, percentage of shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration. Management should not have excessive latitude to interfere with the calling of a special meeting by shareholders and should not have excessive power to revoke the calling of such a meeting. And shareowners should not be easily excluded from introducing topics important to our company at a special meeting.

Fidelity and Vanguard have supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting. The proxy voting guidelines of many public employee pension funds also favor this right. Governance ratings services, such as The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, have taken special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

**Special Shareowner Meetings –
Yes on 3**

Notes:

William Steiner, *** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 *** sponsored this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.

TimeWarner

VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL
CONFIRMATION OF RECEIPT REQUESTED

VIA EMAIL

November 10, 2008

Mr. John Chevedden

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Re: Proposal Submitted to Time Warner Inc.

Dear Mr. Chevedden:

A letter from Mr. William Steiner addressed to Richard D. Parsons signed October 1, 2008, received by Time Warner Inc. ("TWI") on November 5, 2008, in which you were designated to act on behalf of Mr. Steiner in connection with a Rule 14a-8 proposal he has submitted to TWI, has been forwarded to me. A copy of Mr. Steiner's letter is attached. As you are aware, Rule 14a-8 promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 governs the requirements for stockholders submitting proposals to a company for inclusion in the company's proxy material for its stockholders' meetings and the situations in which a company is not required to include any such proposal in such proxy material.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(b), to be eligible to have a proposal included in the proxy material of TWI, the proponent is required to own, at the time of submitting the proposal, at least \$2,000 worth of securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting and to have held such securities continuously for at least one year. To date, we have not received documentary proof of this share ownership. We have reviewed our records of registered stockholders and could not confirm the proponent's ownership. Accordingly, as permitted by Rule 14a-8, TWI requests a written statement from the "record" holder of the TWI common stock (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, as of November 5, 2008, the proponent continuously held the requisite number of shares of TWI common stock for at least one year and providing the number of shares owned.


Pursuant to Rule 14a-8(f)(1), this requested documentation must be provided to TWI within 14 days of your receipt of this request.

Mr. John Chevedden
November 10, 2008
Page 2

The proxy rules also provide certain substantive criteria pursuant to which a company is permitted to exclude from its proxy materials a stockholder's proposal. This letter addresses only the procedural requirements for submitting your proposal and does not address or waive any of our substantive concerns.

Please address any future correspondence relating to the proposal to my attention. Please note that any correspondence sent to me via fax should be sent to 212-484-7278.

Sincerely,



Julie Kim
Counsel

Attachment

cc: William Steiner

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

William Steiner

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

Mr. Richard D. Parsons
Time Warner Inc. (TWX)
1 Time Warner Center
New York NY 10019
Phone: 212 484-8000

Rule 14a-8 Proposal

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*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***
to facilitate prompt communications and in order that it will be verifiable that communications have been sent.

Your consideration and the consideration of the Board of Directors is appreciated in support of the long-term performance of our company. Please acknowledge receipt of this proposal promptly by email.

Sincerely,



William Steiner

10/1/08
Date

cc: Paul F. Washington <Paul.Washington@TimeWarner.com>
Corporate Secretary
PH: 212-484-6753
FX: 212-484-7174
Janet Silverman <Janet.Silverman@timewarner.com>
Assistant General Counsel

[TWX: Rule 14a-8 Proposal, November 5, 2008]

3 – Special Shareowner Meetings

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

Statement of William Steiner

Special meetings allow shareowners to vote on important matters, such as electing new directors, that can arise between annual meetings. If an attainable percentage of shareowners cannot call special meetings, management may become insulated and investor returns may suffer.

This proposal topic won impressive support at the following companies (based on 2008 yes and no votes):

Occidental Petroleum (OXY)	66%	Emil Rossi (Sponsor)
FirstEnergy Corp. (FE)	67%	Chris Rossi
Marathon Oil (MRO)	69%	Nick Rossi

A significant, but not unattainable or unobtainable, percentage of shareowners should have the ability to call a special meeting when a matter is sufficiently important to merit prompt consideration. Management should not have excessive latitude to interfere with the calling of a special meeting by shareholders and should not have excessive power to revoke the calling of such a meeting. And shareowners should not be easily excluded from introducing topics important to our company at a special meeting.

Fidelity and Vanguard have supported a shareholder right to call a special meeting. The proxy voting guidelines of many public employee pension funds also favor this right. Governance ratings services, such as The Corporate Library and Governance Metrics International, have taken special meeting rights into consideration when assigning company ratings.

Please encourage our board to respond positively to this proposal:

**Special Shareowner Meetings –
Yes on 3**

Notes:

William Steiner, *** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 *** sponsored this proposal.

The above format is requested for publication without re-editing, re-formatting or elimination of text, including beginning and concluding text, unless prior agreement is reached. It is respectfully requested that this proposal be proofread before it is published in the definitive proxy to ensure that the integrity of the submitted format is replicated in the proxy materials. Please advise if there is any typographical question.

Please note that the title of the proposal is part of the argument in favor of the proposal. In the interest of clarity and to avoid confusion the title of this and each other ballot item is requested to be consistent throughout all the proxy materials.

The company is requested to assign a proposal number (represented by "3" above) based on the chronological order in which proposals are submitted. The requested designation of "3" or higher number allows for ratification of auditors to be item 2.

This proposal is believed to conform with Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14B (CF), September 15, 2004 including:

Accordingly, going forward, we believe that it would not be appropriate for companies to exclude supporting statement language and/or an entire proposal in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3) in the following circumstances:

- the company objects to factual assertions because they are not supported;
- the company objects to factual assertions that, while not materially false or misleading, may be disputed or countered;
- the company objects to factual assertions because those assertions may be interpreted by shareholders in a manner that is unfavorable to the company, its directors, or its officers; and/or
- the company objects to statements because they represent the opinion of the shareholder proponent or a referenced source, but the statements are not identified specifically as such.

See also: Sun Microsystems, Inc. (July 21, 2005).

Stock will be held until after the annual meeting and the proposal will be presented at the annual meeting. Please acknowledge this proposal promptly by email.

Rule 14a-8 -- Proposals of Security Holders

This section addresses when a company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an annual or special meeting of shareholders. In summary, in order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, and included along with any supporting statement in its proxy statement, you must be eligible and follow certain procedures. Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitted to exclude your proposal, but only after submitting its reasons to the Commission. We structured this section in a question-and-answer format so that it is easier to understand. The references to "you" are to a shareholder seeking to submit the proposal.

- a. **Question 1: What is a proposal?** A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at a meeting of the company's shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company must also provide in the form of proxy means for shareholders to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval, or abstention. Unless otherwise indicated, the word "proposal" as used in this section refers both to your proposal, and to your corresponding statement in support of your proposal (if any).
- b. **Question 2: Who is eligible to submit a proposal, and how do I demonstrate to the company that I am eligible?**
 1. In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at least \$2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting.
 2. If you are the registered holder of your securities, which means that your name appears in the company's records as a shareholder, the company can verify your eligibility on its own, although you will still have to provide the company with a written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders. However, if like many shareholders you are not a registered holder, the company likely does not know that you are a shareholder, or how many shares you own. In this case, at the time you submit your proposal, you must prove your eligibility to the company in one of two ways:
 - i. The first way is to submit to the company a written statement from the "record" holder of your securities (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, at the time you submitted your proposal, you continuously held the securities for at least one year. You must also include your own written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders; or
 - ii. The second way to prove ownership applies only if you have filed a Schedule 13D, Schedule 13G, Form 3, Form 4 and/or Form 5, or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting your ownership of the shares as of or before the date on which the one-year eligibility period begins. If you have filed one of these documents with the SEC, you may demonstrate your eligibility by submitting to the company:
 - A. A copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in your ownership level;
 - B. Your written statement that you continuously held the required number of shares for the one-year period as of the date of the statement; and
 - C. Your written statement that you intend to continue ownership of the shares through the date of the company's annual or special meeting.

- c. Question 3: How many proposals may I submit: Each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders' meeting.
- d. Question 4: How long can my proposal be? The proposal, including any accompanying supporting statement, may not exceed 500 words.
- e. Question 5: What is the deadline for submitting a proposal?
 - 1. If you are submitting your proposal for the company's annual meeting, you can in most cases find the deadline in last year's proxy statement. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting last year, or has changed the date of its meeting for this year more than 30 days from last year's meeting, you can usually find the deadline in one of the company's quarterly reports on Form 10-Q or 10-QSB, or in shareholder reports of investment companies under Rule 30d-1 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. [Editor's note: This section was redesignated as Rule 30e-1. See 66 FR 3734, 3759, Jan. 16, 2001.] In order to avoid controversy, shareholders should submit their proposals by means, including electronic means, that permit them to prove the date of delivery.
 - 2. The deadline is calculated in the following manner if the proposal is submitted for a regularly scheduled annual meeting. The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's proxy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's annual meeting. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting the previous year, or if the date of this year's annual meeting has been changed by more than 30 days from the date of the previous year's meeting, then the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and sends its proxy materials.
 - 3. If you are submitting your proposal for a meeting of shareholders other than a regularly scheduled annual meeting, the deadline is a reasonable time before the company begins to print and sends its proxy materials.
- f. Question 6: What if I fail to follow one of the eligibility or procedural requirements explained in answers to Questions 1 through 4 of this section?
 - 1. The company may exclude your proposal, but only after it has notified you of the problem, and you have failed adequately to correct it. Within 14 calendar days of receiving your proposal, the company must notify you in writing of any procedural or eligibility deficiencies, as well as of the time frame for your response. Your response must be postmarked, or transmitted electronically, no later than 14 days from the date you received the company's notification. A company need not provide you such notice of a deficiency if the deficiency cannot be remedied, such as if you fail to submit a proposal by the company's properly determined deadline. If the company intends to exclude the proposal, it will later have to make a submission under Rule 14a-8 and provide you with a copy under Question 10 below, Rule 14a-8(j).
 - 2. If you fail in your promise to hold the required number of securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders, then the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meeting held in the following two calendar years.
- g. Question 7: Who has the burden of persuading the Commission or its staff that my proposal can be excluded? Except as otherwise noted, the burden is on the company to demonstrate that it is entitled to exclude a proposal.
- h. Question 8: Must I appear personally at the shareholders' meeting to present the proposal?
 - 1. Either you, or your representative who is qualified under state law to present the proposal on your behalf, must attend the meeting to present the proposal. Whether you attend the meeting yourself or send a qualified representative to the meeting in your place, you should make sure that you, or your representative, follow the proper state law procedures for attending the meeting and/or presenting your proposal.

2. If the company holds its shareholder meeting in whole or in part via electronic media, and the company permits you or your representative to present your proposal via such media, then you may appear through electronic media rather than traveling to the meeting to appear in person.
 3. If you or your qualified representative fail to appear and present the proposal, without good cause, the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings held in the following two calendar years.
- i. Question 9: If I have complied with the procedural requirements, on what other bases may a company rely to exclude my proposal?
1. Improper under state law: If the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's organization;

Note to paragraph (i)(1)

Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.

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2. Violation of law: If the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject;

Note to paragraph (i)(2)

Note to paragraph (i)(2): We will not apply this basis for exclusion to permit exclusion of a proposal on grounds that it would violate foreign law if compliance with the foreign law could result in a violation of any state or federal law.

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3. Violation of proxy rules: If the proposal or supporting statement is contrary to any of the Commission's proxy rules, including Rule 14a-9, which prohibits materially false or misleading statements in proxy soliciting materials;
 4. Personal grievance; special interest: If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance against the company or any other person, or if it is designed to result in a benefit to you, or to further a personal interest, which is not shared by the other shareholders at large;
 5. Relevance: If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the company's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the company's business;
 6. Absence of power/authority: If the company would lack the power or authority to implement the proposal;

7. Management functions: If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the company's ordinary business operations;
8. Relates to election: If the proposal relates to a nomination or an election for membership on the company's board of directors or analogous governing body; or a procedure for such nomination or election:
9. Conflicts with company's proposal: If the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.

Note to paragraph (i)(9)

Note to paragraph (i)(9): A company's submission to the Commission under this section should specify the points of conflict with the company's proposal.

10. Substantially implemented: If the company has already substantially implemented the proposal;
 11. Duplication: If the proposal substantially duplicates another proposal previously submitted to the company by another proponent that will be included in the company's proxy materials for the same meeting;
 12. Resubmissions: If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as another proposal or proposals that has or have been previously included in the company's proxy materials within the preceding 5 calendar years, a company may exclude it from its proxy materials for any meeting held within 3 calendar years of the last time it was included if the proposal received:
 - i. Less than 3% of the vote if proposed once within the preceding 5 calendar years;
 - ii. Less than 6% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed twice previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; or
 - iii. Less than 10% of the vote on its last submission to shareholders if proposed three times or more previously within the preceding 5 calendar years; and
 13. Specific amount of dividends: If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.
- j. Question 10: What procedures must the company follow if it intends to exclude my proposal?
1. If the company intends to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials, it must file its reasons with the Commission no later than 80 calendar days before it files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy with the Commission. The company must simultaneously provide you with a copy of its submission. The Commission staff may permit the company to make its submission later than 80 days before the company files its definitive proxy statement and form of proxy, if the company demonstrates good cause for missing the deadline.
 2. The company must file six paper copies of the following:
 - i. The proposal;
 - ii. An explanation of why the company believes that it may exclude the proposal, which should, if possible, refer to the most recent applicable authority, such as prior Division letters issued under the rule; and

- iii. A supporting opinion of counsel when such reasons are based on matters of state or foreign law.

- k. Question 11: May I submit my own statement to the Commission responding to the company's arguments?

Yes, you may submit a response, but it is not required. You should try to submit any response to us, with a copy to the company, as soon as possible after the company makes its submission. This way, the Commission staff will have time to consider fully your submission before it issues its response. You should submit six paper copies of your response.

- l. Question 12: If the company includes my shareholder proposal in its proxy materials, what information about me must it include along with the proposal itself?

1. The company's proxy statement must include your name and address, as well as the number of the company's voting securities that you hold. However, instead of providing that information, the company may instead include a statement that it will provide the information to shareholders promptly upon receiving an oral or written request.
2. The company is not responsible for the contents of your proposal or supporting statement.

- m. Question 13: What can I do if the company includes in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should not vote in favor of my proposal, and I disagree with some of its statements?

1. The company may elect to include in its proxy statement reasons why it believes shareholders should vote against your proposal. The company is allowed to make arguments reflecting its own point of view, just as you may express your own point of view in your proposal's supporting statement.
2. However, if you believe that the company's opposition to your proposal contains materially false or misleading statements that may violate our anti-fraud rule, Rule 14a-9, you should promptly send to the Commission staff and the company a letter explaining the reasons for your view, along with a copy of the company's statements opposing your proposal. To the extent possible, your letter should include specific factual information demonstrating the inaccuracy of the company's claims. Time permitting, you may wish to try to work out your differences with the company by yourself before contacting the Commission staff.
3. We require the company to send you a copy of its statements opposing your proposal before it sends its proxy materials, so that you may bring to our attention any materially false or misleading statements, under the following timeframes:
 - i. If our no-action response requires that you make revisions to your proposal or supporting statement as a condition to requiring the company to include it in its proxy materials, then the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 5 calendar days after the company receives a copy of your revised proposal; or
 - ii. In all other cases, the company must provide you with a copy of its opposition statements no later than 30 calendar days before its files definitive copies of its proxy statement and form of proxy under Rule 14a-6.

From: olmsted@isma & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***
Sent: Monday, November 10, 2008 5:13 PM
To: Kim, Julie
Subject: TWX

Dear Ms. Kim, The letters were received.
Sincerely,
John Chevedden

From: olmsted@ISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***
Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2008 3:16 PM
To: Kim, Julie
Cc: Silverman, Janet
Subject: Rule 14a-8 Broker Letter (TWX) SPM
Attachments: CCE00006.pdf

Dear Ms. Kim,
Attached is the broker letter requested. Please advise within one business day whether there is any further rule 14a-8 requirement.
Sincerely,
John Chevedden



Date: 13 Nov 2008

To whom it may concern:

As introducing broker for the account of William Steiner,
 account number _____, held with National Financial Services Corp.
 as custodian, DJF Discount Brokers hereby certifies that as of the date of this certification
William Steiner is and has been the beneficial owner of 12000
 shares of Time Warner Inc.; having held at least two thousand dollars
 worth of the above mentioned security since the following date: 10/10/85, also having
 held at least two thousand dollars worth of the above mentioned security from at least one
 year prior to the date the proposal was submitted to the company.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Mark Filiberto'.

Mark Filiberto,
 President
 DJF Discount Brokers

Post-it® Fax Note	7671	Date	11-13-08	# of pages	▶
To	Jalig Kim	From	John Chevedden		
Co./Dept.		Co.			
Phone #		Phone #			
Fax #	212-484-7174	Fax #			

** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

EXHIBIT B

December 19, 2008

Time Warner Inc.
One Time Warner Center
New York, NY 10019

Re: Stockholder Proposal Submitted by John Chevedden

Ladies and Gentlemen:

We have acted as special Delaware counsel to Time Warner Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), in connection with a proposal (the "Proposal") submitted by John Chevedden (the "Proponent"), under the name of William Steiner as his nominal proponent, that the Proponent intends to present at the Company's 2009 annual meeting of stockholders (the "Annual Meeting"). In this connection, you have requested our opinion as to a certain matter under the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the "General Corporation Law").

For the purpose of rendering our opinion as expressed herein, we have been furnished and have reviewed the following documents:

- (i) the Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware (the "Secretary of State") on July 27, 2007, as amended by the Certificate of Amendment of the Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Company, as filed with the Secretary of State on June 4, 2008 (collectively, the "Certificate of Incorporation");
- (ii) the Bylaws of the Company, as amended (the "Bylaws"); and
- (iii) the Proposal and the supporting statement thereto.

With respect to the foregoing documents, we have assumed: (a) the genuineness of all signatures, and the incumbency, authority, legal right and power and legal capacity under all applicable laws and regulations, of each of the officers and other persons and entities signing or whose signatures appear upon each of said documents as or on behalf of the parties thereto; (b) the conformity to authentic originals of all documents submitted to us as certified, conformed, photostatic, electronic or other copies; and (c) that the foregoing documents, in the forms submitted to us for our review, have not been and will not be altered or amended in any respect material to our opinion as expressed herein. For the purpose of rendering our opinion as expressed herein, we have not reviewed any document other than the documents set forth above, and, except as set forth in this opinion, we assume there exists no provision of any such other

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document that bears upon or is inconsistent with our opinion as expressed herein. We have conducted no independent factual investigation of our own, but rather have relied solely upon the foregoing documents, the statements and information set forth therein, and the additional matters recited or assumed herein, all of which we assume to be true, complete and accurate in all material respects.

The Proposal

The Proposal reads as follows:

3 – Special Shareowner Meetings

RESOLVED, Shareowners ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders of 10% of our outstanding common stock (or the lowest percentage allowed by law above 10%) the power to call special shareowner meetings. This includes that such bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions (to the fullest extent permitted by state law) that apply only to shareowners but not to management and/or the board.

Discussion

You have asked our opinion as to whether implementation of the Proposal would violate Delaware law. For the reasons set forth below, in our opinion, implementation of the Proposal by the Company would violate the General Corporation Law. The fact that the Proposal purports to be precatory does not alter our conclusions as set forth herein.

The first sentence of the Proposal requests that the Board of Directors of the Company (the "Board") "take the steps necessary" to amend the Bylaws and/or Certificate of Incorporation to provide the holders of 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock with the power to call special meetings of stockholders. The second sentence of the Proposal provides that any "exception or exclusion conditions" applying to the stockholders' power to call a special meeting must also be applied to the Company's "management" and/or the Board. One "exception or exclusion condition" imposed on the stockholders' power to call special meetings under the Proposal is their holding 10% or more of the Company's outstanding common stock. As applied to the Board pursuant to the language of the Proposal, this condition would require the directors to hold at least 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock to call a special meeting of stockholders. For purposes of this opinion, we have assumed that the Proposal would be read to have this effect. Notably, the Proposal does not seek to impose a process-oriented limitation on the Board's power to call special meetings (e.g., requiring unanimous Board approval to call special meetings), but instead purports to preclude the Board from calling special meetings unless the directors have satisfied an external condition—namely, the ownership of 10% of the Company's stock—that is unrelated to the process through which the Board makes decisions. As

a result of this restriction, for the reasons set forth below, in our opinion, the Proposal, if implemented, would violate the General Corporation Law.

Section 211(d) of the General Corporation Law governs the calling of special meetings of stockholders. That subsection provides: "Special meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws." 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Thus, Section 211(d) vests the board of directors with the power to call special meetings, and it gives the corporation the authority, through its certificate of incorporation or bylaws, to give to other parties as well the right to call special meetings. In considering whether implementation of the Proposal would violate Delaware law, the relevant question is whether a provision conditioning the Board's power to call special meetings on the directors' ownership of at least 10% of the outstanding common stock would be valid if included in the Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws. In our opinion, such a provision, whether included in the Certificate of Incorporation or Bylaws, would be invalid.

A. The Provision Contemplated by the Proposal May Not Be Validly Included in the Certificate of Incorporation.

Because the Proposal seeks to modify or eliminate a "core" power of the Board, the Proposal may not be implemented through the Certificate of Incorporation. Section 102(b)(1) of the General Corporation Law provides that a certificate of incorporation may contain:

Any provision for the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders . . . ; if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of [the State of Delaware].

8 Del. C. § 102(b)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, a corporation's ability to curtail the directors' powers through the certificate of incorporation is not without limitation. Any provision adopted pursuant to Section 102(b)(1) that is otherwise contrary to Delaware law would be invalid. See Lions Gate Entm't Corp. v. Image Entm't Inc., 2006 WL 1668051, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006) (footnote omitted) (noting that a charter provision "purport[ing] to give the Image board the power to amend the charter unilaterally without a shareholder vote" after the corporation receives payment for its stock "contravenes Delaware law [i.e., Section 242 of the General Corporation Law] and is invalid."). In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. 1952), the Court found that a charter provision is "contrary to the laws of [Delaware]" if it transgresses "a statutory enactment or a public policy settled by the common law or implicit in the General Corporation Law itself."

The Court in Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 A.2d 78, 81

(Del. Ch. 1968), adopted this view, noting that "a charter provision which seeks to waive a statutory right or requirement is unenforceable." More recently, the Court in Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., 883 A.2d 837 (Del. Ch. 2004), suggested that certain statutory rights involving "core" director duties may not be modified or eliminated through the certificate of incorporation. The Jones Apparel Court observed:

[Sections] 242(b)(1) and 251 do not contain the magic words ["unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation"] and they deal respectively with the fundamental subjects of certificate amendments and mergers. Can a certificate provision divest a board of its statutory power to approve a merger? Or to approve a certificate of amendment? Without answering those questions, I think it fair to say that those questions inarguably involve far more serious intrusions on core director duties than does [the record date provision at issue]. I also think that the use by our judiciary of a more context- and statute-specific approach to police "horribles" is preferable to a sweeping rule that denudes § 102(b)(1) of its utility and thereby greatly restricts the room for private ordering under the DGCL.

Id. at 852. While the Court in Jones Apparel recognized that certain provisions for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation may be made subject to modification or elimination through the private ordering system of the certificate of incorporation and bylaws, it indicated that other powers vested in the board—particularly those touching upon the directors' discharge of their fiduciary duties—are so fundamental to the proper functioning of the corporation that they cannot be so modified or eliminated. Id.

The structure of, and legislative history surrounding, Section 211(d) confirm that the board's statutory power to call special meetings, without limitation or restriction, is a "core" power reserved to the board. Consequently, any provision of the certificate of incorporation purporting to infringe upon that fundamental power (other than an ordinary process-oriented limitation)¹ would be invalid. As noted above, Section 211(d) provides that "[s]pecial meetings of the stockholders may be called by the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of incorporation or by the bylaws." 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Section 211(d) was adopted in 1967 as part of the wholesale revision of the General Corporation Law. In the review of Delaware's corporate law prepared for the committee tasked with submitting the revisions, it was noted, in respect of then-proposed Section 211(d), "[m]any states specify in greater or less detail who may call special stockholder meetings," and it was "suggested that the common understanding be codified by providing that special meetings may be called by the board of directors or by any other person authorized by the by-laws or the certificate of incorporation." Ernest L. Folk, III, Review of the Delaware Corporation Law for the Delaware

¹ For a discussion of process-oriented limitations, see infra, n.5 and surrounding text.

Corporation Law Revision Committee, at 112 (1968). It was further noted that "it is unnecessary (and for Delaware, undesirable) to vest named officers, or specified percentages of shareholders (usually 10%), with statutory, as distinguished from by-law, authority to call special meetings . . ." Id. The language of the statute, along with the gloss provided by the legislative history, clearly suggests that the power to call special meetings is vested by statute in the board, without limitation, and that other parties may be granted such power through the certificate of incorporation and bylaws. While the certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may expand the statutory default with regard to the calling of special meetings (i.e., parties in addition to the board of directors may be authorized to call special meetings), the certificate of incorporation and/or bylaws may not limit the express power of the board of directors to call special meetings, except through ordinary process-oriented limitations.

That the board of directors' power to call special meetings must remain unfettered (other than through ordinary process-oriented limitations)² is consistent with the most fundamental precept of the General Corporation Law: the board of directors is charged with a fiduciary duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. That duty may require the board of directors to call a special meeting at any time (regardless of the directors' ownership of the corporation's then-outstanding stock) to present a significant matter to a vote of the stockholders. Indeed, the Delaware courts have indicated that the calling of special meetings is one of the principal acts falling within the board's duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 856 (Del. Ch. 1957) (upholding a bylaw granting the corporation's president (in addition to the board) the power to call special meetings and noting that the grant of such power did "not impinge upon the statutory right and duty of the board to manage the business of the corporation"). "[T]he fiduciary duty of a Delaware director is unremitting," Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). It does not abate during those times when the directors fail to meet a specified stock-ownership threshold. As the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, "[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). See also Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998). The provision contemplated by the Proposal would impermissibly infringe upon the Board's fiduciary duty to manage the business and affairs of the Company and would therefore be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

B. The Provision Contemplated by the Proposal May Not Be Validly Included in the Bylaws.

As with the charter provision contemplated by the Proposal, the bylaw provision contemplated thereby would impermissibly infringe upon the Board's power under Section 211(d) of the General Corporation Law to call special meetings. In that respect, such provision would violate the General Corporation Law and could not be validly implemented through the

² See infra, n. 5 and surrounding text.

Bylaws. See 8 Del. C. § 109(b) ("The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.").

Moreover, the Proposal could not be implemented through the Bylaws, since it would restrict the Board's power to call special meetings (other than through an ordinary process-oriented bylaw)³ as part of its power and duty to manage the business and affairs of the Company. Under Section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law, the directors of a Delaware corporation are vested with the power and authority to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. Section 141(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.

8 Del. C. § 141(a) (emphasis added). Section 141(a) expressly provides that if there is to be any deviation from the general mandate that the board of directors manage the business and affairs of the corporation, such deviation must be provided in the General Corporation Law or the certificate of incorporation. Id.; see, e.g., Lehrman v. Cohen, 222 A.2d 800, 808 (Del. 1966). The Certificate of Incorporation does not (and, as explained above, could not) provide for any substantive limitations on the Board's power to call special meetings, and, unlike other provisions of the General Corporation Law that allow the Board's statutory authority to be modified through the bylaws,⁴ Section 211(d) does not provide that the board's power to call special meetings may be modified through the bylaws. See 8 Del. C. § 211(d). Moreover, the phrase "except as otherwise provided in this chapter" set forth in Section 141(a) does not include bylaws adopted pursuant to Section 109(b) of the General Corporation Law that could disable the board entirely from exercising its statutory power. In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234-35 (Del. 2008), the Court, when attempting to determine "the scope of shareholder action that Section 109(b) permits yet does not improperly intrude upon the directors' power to manage [the] corporation's business and affairs under Section 141(a)," indicated that while reasonable bylaws governing the board's decision-making process are

³ See infra, n. 5 and surrounding text.

⁴ For example, Section 141(f) authorizes the board to act by unanimous written consent "[u]nless otherwise restricted by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws." See 8 Del. C. § 141(f).

generally valid, those purporting to divest the board entirely of its substantive decision-making power and authority are not.⁵

The Court's observations in CA are consistent with the long line of Delaware cases highlighting the distinction implicit in Section 141(a) of the General Corporation Law between the role of stockholders and the role of the board of directors. As the Delaware Supreme Court has stated, "[a] cardinal precept of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation." Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811. See also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000) ("One of the fundamental principles of the Delaware General Corporation Law statute is that the business affairs of a corporation are managed by or under the direction of its board of directors.") (citing 8 Del. C. § 141(a)); Quickturn Design, 721 A.2d at 1291 ("One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.") (footnote omitted). The rationale for these statements is as follows:

Stockholders are the equitable owners of the corporation's assets. However, the corporation is the legal owner of its property and the stockholders do not have any specific interest in the assets of the corporation. Instead, they have the right to share in the profits of the company and in the distribution of its assets on liquidation. Consistent with this division of interests, the directors rather than the stockholders manage the business and affairs of the corporation and the directors, in carrying out their duties, act as fiduciaries for the company and its stockholders.

Norte & Co. v. Manor Healthcare Corp., C.A. Nos. 6827, 6831, slip op. at 9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 21, 1985) (citations omitted); see also Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) ("The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a majority of shares.").⁶ Because the bylaw contemplated by the

⁵ The Court stated: "It is well-established Delaware law that a proper function of bylaws is not to mandate how the board should decide specific substantive business decisions, but rather, to define the process and procedures by which those decisions are made. . . . Examples of the procedural, process-oriented nature of bylaws are found in both the DGCL and the case law. For example, 8 Del. C. § 141(b) authorizes bylaws that fix the number of directors on the board, the number of directors required for a quorum (with certain limitations), and the vote requirements for board action. 8 Del. C. § 141(f) authorizes bylaws that preclude board action without a meeting." CA, 953 A.2d at 234-35 (footnotes omitted).

⁶ But see UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005). In that case, the Court held that a board of directors could agree, by adopting a board policy and

Proposal would go well beyond governing the process through which the Board determines whether to call special meetings – in fact, it would potentially have the effect of disabling the Board from exercising its statutorily-granted power to call special meetings – such bylaw would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

In addition, the Proposal could not be implemented through the Bylaws, since the provision contemplated thereby would be inconsistent with the Certificate of Incorporation. Consistent with Section 211(d) of the General Corporation Law, Article VI of the Certificate of Incorporation expressly provides the Board, pursuant to a resolution approved by a majority of the entire Board, with the unfettered power to call special meetings of stockholders.⁷ If the bylaw contemplated by the Proposal were adopted, it would condition the Board's power to call special meetings on the directors' ownership of 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock. In that respect, such bylaw would conflict with Article VI of the Certificate of Incorporation, which allows for no such restrictions or limitations on the Board's power to call special meetings. As a result, such bylaw would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

Under Delaware law, a bylaw may not conflict with a provision of the certificate of incorporation. 8 Del. C. § 109(b) ("The bylaws may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation. . .") (emphasis added). Indeed, "[w]here a by-law provision is in conflict with a provision of the charter, the by-law provision is a 'nullity.'" Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 929 (Del. 1990). In Centaur Partners, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a proposal for a bylaw to be adopted by stockholders that provided that it "is not subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Board of Directors" was in conflict with the board's authority as provided for in the certificate of incorporation to amend the bylaws and hence would be invalid even if adopted by the stockholders. Centaur Partners, 582 A.2d at 929. Because the bylaw contemplated by the

promising not to subsequently revoke the policy, to submit the final decision whether to adopt a stockholder rights plan to a vote of the corporation's stockholders. The board's voluntary agreement to contractually limit its discretion in UniSuper, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. The bylaw contemplated by the Proposal, if adopted by the stockholders and implemented, would potentially result in stockholders divesting the Board of its statutory power to call special meetings.

⁷ Article VI of the Certificate of Incorporation provides: "Except as otherwise required by law and subject to the rights of the holders of any series of Preferred Stock or Series Common Stock or any class or series of stock having a preference over the Common Stock as to dividends or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up, special meetings of stockholders of the Corporation may be called only by the Board of Directors pursuant to a resolution approved by a majority of the entire Board of Directors or as otherwise provided in the By-laws of the Corporation." Thus, Article VI grants the Board the power to call special meetings, without limitation, and provides that other parties may be granted the power to do so through the Bylaws.

Proposal would condition the Board's power to call a special meeting on the directors' ownership of 10% of the Company's outstanding common stock, it would conflict with Article VI of the Certificate of Incorporation and would therefore be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

Finally, the "savings clause" that purports to limit the mandates of the Proposal "to the fullest extent permitted by state law" does not resolve this conflict with Delaware law. On its face, such language addresses the extent to which the requested "bylaw and/or charter text will not have any exception or exclusion conditions" (*i.e.*, there will be no exception or exclusion conditions not required by state law). The language does not limit the exception and exclusion conditions that would apply "to management and/or the board," and were it to do so the entire second sentence of the Proposal would be a nullity. The "savings clause" would not resolve the conflict between the provision contemplated by the Proposal and the dictates of the General Corporation Law. Section 211(d), read together with Sections 102(b)(1) and 109(b), allows for no limitations on the board's power to call a special meeting (other than ordinary process-oriented limitations);⁸ thus, there is no "extent" to which the restriction on that power contemplated by the Proposal would otherwise be permitted by state law. The "savings clause" would do little more than acknowledge that the Proposal, if implemented, would be invalid under Delaware law.

Conclusion

Based upon and subject to the foregoing, and subject to the limitations stated herein, it is our opinion that the Proposal, if adopted by the stockholders and implemented by the Board, would be invalid under the General Corporation Law.

The foregoing opinion is limited to the General Corporation Law. We have not considered and express no opinion on any other laws or the laws of any other state or jurisdiction, including federal laws regulating securities or any other federal laws, or the rules and regulations of stock exchanges or of any other regulatory body.

The foregoing opinion is rendered solely for your benefit in connection with the matters addressed herein. We understand that you may furnish a copy of this opinion letter to the SEC in connection with the matters addressed herein and that you may refer to it in your proxy statement for the Annual Meeting, and we consent to your doing so. Except as stated in this paragraph, this opinion letter may not be furnished or quoted to, nor may the foregoing opinion be relied upon by, any other person or entity for any purpose without our prior written consent.

Very truly yours,

Richard S. Langston & Fingler, P.A.

DAB/JMZ

⁸ See *supra*, n. 5 and surrounding text.

EXHIBIT C

TIME WARNER INC.
BY-LAWS
As Amended Through February 21, 2008

ARTICLE I

Offices

SECTION 1. Registered Office. The registered office of TIME WARNER INC. (hereinafter called the "Corporation") in the State of Delaware shall be at 1209 Orange Street, City of Wilmington, County of New Castle, Delaware 19801, and the registered agent shall be The Corporation Trust Company, or such other office or agent as the Board of Directors of the Corporation (the "Board") shall from time to time select.

SECTION 2. Other Offices. The Corporation may also have an office or offices, and keep the books and records of the Corporation, except as may otherwise be required by law, at such other place or places, either within or without the State of Delaware, as the Board may from time to time determine or the business of the Corporation may require.

ARTICLE II

Meetings of Stockholders

SECTION 1. Place of Meeting. All meetings of the stockholders of the Corporation (the "stockholders") shall be at a place to be determined by the Board.

SECTION 2. Annual Meetings. The annual meeting of the stockholders for the election of directors and for the transaction of such other business as may properly come before the meeting shall be held on such date and at such hour as shall from time to time be fixed by the Board. Any previously scheduled annual meeting of the stockholders may be postponed by action of the Board taken prior to the time previously scheduled for such annual meeting of the stockholders.

SECTION 3. Special Meetings. (a) General. Except as otherwise required by law or the Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the Corporation (the "Certificate"), and subject to the rights of the holders of any series of Preferred Stock or Series Common Stock or any class or series of stock having a preference over the Common Stock as to dividends or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up, special meetings of the stockholders for any purpose or purposes may be called by the Chief Executive Officer or a majority of the entire Board. Only such business as is specified in the Corporation's notice of any special meeting of stockholders shall come before such meeting. A special meeting shall be held at such place, on such date and at such time as shall be fixed by the Board.

(b) Stockholder Requested Special Meetings. Subject to the provisions of this Section 3(b), a special meeting of stockholders shall be called by a majority of the entire Board, or a Committee delegated such authority by the Board, in accordance with this paragraph, following receipt by the Secretary of the Corporation of a written request for a special meeting (a "Special Meeting Request") from the record holders of shares representing at least twenty-five percent of the combined voting power of the then outstanding shares of all classes and series of capital stock of the Corporation entitled generally to vote in the election of directors of the Corporation, voting as a single class (the "Requisite Holders"), if such Special Meeting Request complies with the requirements of this Section 3(b) and all other applicable sections of these By-laws. The Board shall determine whether all requirements set forth in these By-laws have been satisfied and such determination shall be binding on the Corporation and its stockholders. If a Special Meeting Request is made that complies with this Section 3(b) and all other applicable sections of these By-laws, the Board may (in lieu of calling the special meeting requested in such Special Meeting Request) present an identical or substantially similar item (a "Similar Item") for stockholder approval at any other meeting of stockholders that is held within 120 days after the Corporation receives such Special Meeting Request.

A Special Meeting Request must be delivered by hand or by mail by registered U.S. mail or courier service, postage prepaid, to the attention of the Secretary of the Corporation (the "Secretary") during regular business hours. A Special Meeting Request shall only be valid if it is signed and dated by each of the Requisite Holders or its duly authorized agent and include: (i) a statement of the specific purpose(s) of the special meeting, the matter(s) proposed to be acted on at the special meeting and the reasons for conducting such business at the special meeting; (ii) the text of any proposed amendment to the By-laws to be considered at the special meeting; (iii) the name and address, as they appear on the Corporation's books, of each stockholder of record signing such request, the date of each such stockholder's signature and the name and address of any beneficial owner on whose behalf such request is made; (iv) the class or series and number of shares of the Corporation that are owned of record or beneficially by each such stockholder and any such beneficial owner and documentary evidence of such record or beneficial

ownership; (v) any material interest of each stockholder or any such beneficial owner in the business proposed to be conducted at the special meeting; (vi) a representation that the stockholders and such beneficial owners submitting the Special Meeting Request intend to appear in person or by proxy at the special meeting to present the proposal(s) or business to be brought before the special meeting; (vii) if any stockholder submitting the Special Meeting Request intends to solicit proxies with respect to the stockholders' proposal(s) or business to be presented at the special meeting, a representation to that effect; (viii) all information relating to each stockholder signing the Special Meeting Request that must be disclosed in solicitations for proxies for election of directors in an election contest (even if an election contest is not involved), or is otherwise required, in each case pursuant to Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and (ix) if the purpose of the special meeting includes the election of one or more directors, all the information such stockholder or stockholders would be required to include in a notice delivered to the Corporation pursuant to the fourth sentence of the first paragraph of Section 3 of Article III.

In addition, a Special Meeting Request shall not be valid if (i) the Special Meeting Request relates to an item of business that is not a proper subject for stockholder action under applicable law; (ii) the Special Meeting Request is received by the Corporation during the period commencing 90 days prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting and ending on the date of the next annual meeting; (iii) an identical or substantially similar item (a "Similar Item") was presented at any meeting of stockholders held within 120 days prior to receipt by the Corporation of such Special Meeting Request (and, for purposes of this clause (iii), the election of directors shall be deemed a "Similar Item" with respect to all items of business involving the election or removal of directors); (iv) a Similar Item is included in the Corporation's notice as an item of business to be brought before a stockholder meeting that has been called but not yet held; or (v) such Special Meeting Request was made in a manner that involved a violation of Regulation 14A under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or other applicable law.

Stockholders may revoke a Special Meeting Request by written revocation delivered to the Corporation at any time prior to the special meeting; provided, however, the Board shall have the discretion to determine whether or not to proceed with the special meeting.

If none of the stockholders who submitted the Special Meeting Request for a special meeting of stockholders appears or sends a qualified representative to present the proposal(s) or business submitted by the stockholders for consideration at the special meeting, the Corporation need not present such proposal(s) or business for a vote at such meeting.

SECTION 4. Notice of Meetings. Except as otherwise provided by law, notice of each meeting of the stockholders, whether annual or special, shall be given by the Corporation not less than 10 days nor more than 60 days before the date of the meeting to each stockholder of record entitled to notice of the meeting and shall be called by the Corporation. If mailed, such notice shall be deemed given when deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, directed to the stockholder at such stockholder's address as it appears on the records of the Corporation. Each such notice shall state the place, date and hour of the meeting, and, in the case of a special meeting, the purpose or purposes for which the meeting is called. Notice of any meeting of the stockholders shall not be required to be given to any stockholder who shall attend such meeting in person or by proxy without protesting, prior to or at the commencement of the meeting, the lack of proper notice to such stockholder, or who shall waive notice thereof as provided in Article X of these By-laws. Notice of adjournment of a meeting of the stockholders need not be given if the time and place to which it is adjourned are announced at such meeting, unless the adjournment is for more than 30 days or, after adjournment, a new record date is fixed for the adjourned meeting.

SECTION 5. Quorum. Except as otherwise provided by law or by the Certificate, the holders of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the stockholders entitled to vote generally, present in person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum at any meeting of the stockholders; provided, however, that in the case of any vote to be taken by classes or series, the holders of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the stockholders of a particular class or series, present in person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum of such class or series.

SECTION 6. Adjournments. The chairman of the meeting or the holders of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the stockholders who are present in person or by proxy may adjourn the meeting from time to time whether or not a quorum is present. In the event that a quorum does not exist with respect to any vote to be taken by a particular class or series, the chairman of the meeting or the holders of a majority of the votes entitled to be cast by the stockholders of such class or series who are present in person or by proxy may adjourn the meeting with respect to the vote(s) to be taken by such class or series. At any such adjourned meeting at which a quorum may be present, any business may be transacted which might have been transacted at the meeting as originally called.

SECTION 7. Order of Business. At each meeting of the stockholders, the Chairman of the Board or, in the absence of the Chairman of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer, (if the position is held by an individual other than the Chairman of the Board), or in the absence of the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer, such person as shall be selected by the Board shall act as chairman of the meeting. The order of business at each such meeting shall be as determined by the chairman of the meeting. The chairman of the meeting shall have the right and authority to prescribe such

rules, regulations and procedures and to do all such acts and things as are necessary or desirable for the proper conduct of the meeting, including, without limitation, the establishment of procedures for the maintenance of order and safety, limitations on the time allotted to questions or comments on the affairs of the Corporation, restrictions on entry to such meeting after the time prescribed for the commencement thereof and the opening and closing of the voting polls.

At any annual meeting of the stockholders, only such business shall be conducted as shall have been brought before the annual meeting (i) by or at the direction of the chairman of the meeting or (ii) by any stockholder who is a holder of record at the time of the giving of the notice provided for in this Section 7, who is entitled to vote at the meeting and who complies with the procedures set forth in this Section 7.

For business properly to be brought before an annual meeting of stockholders by a stockholder, the stockholder must have given timely notice thereof in proper written form to the Secretary). To be timely, a stockholder's notice must be delivered to or mailed and received at the principal executive offices of the Corporation not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting; provided, however, that in the event that the date of the annual meeting is more than 30 days earlier or more than 60 days later than such anniversary date, notice by the stockholder to be timely must be so delivered or received not earlier than the 120th day prior to such annual meeting and not later than the close of business on the later of the 90th day prior to such annual meeting or the 10th day following the day on which public announcement of the date of such meeting is first made; provided, further, that for the purpose of calculating the timeliness of stockholder notices for the 2001 annual meeting of stockholders, the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting shall be deemed to be May 18, 2000. To be in proper written form, a stockholder's notice to the Secretary shall set forth in writing as to each matter the stockholder proposes to bring before the annual meeting: (i) a brief description of the business desired to be brought before the annual meeting and the reasons for conducting such business at the annual meeting; (ii) the name and address, as they appear on the Corporation's books, of the stockholder proposing such business; (iii) the class or series and number of shares of the Corporation which are beneficially owned by the stockholder; (iv) any material interest of the stockholder in such business; and (v) if the stockholder intends to solicit proxies in support of such stockholder's proposal, a representation to that effect. The foregoing notice requirements shall be deemed satisfied by a stockholder if the stockholder has notified the Corporation of his or her intention to present a proposal at an annual meeting and such stockholder's proposal has been included in a proxy statement that has been prepared by management of the Corporation to solicit proxies for such annual meeting; provided, however, that if such stockholder does not appear or send a qualified representative to present such proposal at such annual meeting, the Corporation need not present such proposal for a vote at such meeting, notwithstanding that proxies in respect of such vote may have been received by the Corporation. Notwithstanding anything in these By-laws to the contrary, no business

shall be conducted at any annual meeting except in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section 7. The chairman of an annual meeting may refuse to permit any business to be brought before an annual meeting which fails to comply with the foregoing procedures or, in the case of a stockholder proposal, if the stockholder solicits proxies in support of such stockholder's proposal without having made the representation required by clause (v) of the third preceding sentence.

SECTION 8. List of Stockholders. It shall be the duty of the Secretary or other officer who has charge of the stock ledger to prepare and make, at least 10 days before each meeting of the stockholders, a complete list of the stockholders entitled to vote thereat, arranged in alphabetical order, and showing the address of each stockholder and the number of shares registered in such stockholder's name. Such list shall be produced and kept available at the times and places required by law.

SECTION 9. Voting. Except as otherwise provided by law or by the Certificate, each stockholder of record of any series of Preferred Stock or Series Common Stock shall be entitled at each meeting of the stockholders to such number of votes, if any, for each share of such stock as may be fixed in the Certificate or in the resolution or resolutions adopted by the Board providing for the issuance of such stock, and each stockholder of record of Common Stock shall be entitled at each meeting of the stockholders to one vote for each share of such stock, in each case, registered in such stockholder's name on the books of the Corporation:

(1) on the date fixed pursuant to Section 6 of Article VII of these By-laws as the record date for the determination of stockholders entitled to notice of and to vote at such meeting; or

(2) if no such record date shall have been so fixed, then at the close of business on the day next preceding the day on which notice of such meeting is given, or, if notice is waived, at the close of business on the day next preceding the day on which the meeting is held.

Each stockholder entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders may authorize not in excess of three persons to act for such stockholder by proxy. Any such proxy shall be delivered to the secretary of such meeting at or prior to the time designated for holding such meeting, but in any event not later than the time designated in the order of business for so delivering such proxies. No such proxy shall be voted or acted upon after three years from its date, unless the proxy provides for a longer period.

At each meeting of the stockholders, all corporate actions to be taken by vote of the stockholders (except as otherwise required by law and except as otherwise provided in the Certificate or these By-laws) shall be authorized by a majority of the votes cast by the stockholders entitled to vote thereon who are present in person or represented by proxy, and where a separate vote by class or series is required, a majority

of the votes cast by the stockholders of such class or series who are present in person or represented by proxy shall be the act of such class or series.

Unless required by law or determined by the chairman of the meeting to be advisable, the vote on any matter, including the election of directors, need not be by written ballot.

SECTION 10. Inspectors. The chairman of the meeting shall appoint two or more inspectors to act at any meeting of the stockholders. Such inspectors shall perform such duties as shall be required by law or specified by the chairman of the meeting. Inspectors need not be stockholders. No director or nominee for the office of director shall be appointed such inspector.

SECTION 11. Public Announcements. For the purpose of Section 7 of this Article II and Section 3 of Article III, "public announcement" shall mean disclosure (i) in a press release reported by the Dow Jones News Service, Reuters Information Service or any similar or successor news wire service or (ii) in a communication distributed generally to stockholders and in a document publicly filed by the Corporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to Sections 13, 14 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any successor provisions thereto.

ARTICLE III

Board of Directors

SECTION 1. General Powers. The business and affairs of the Corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of the Board, which may exercise all such powers of the Corporation and do all such lawful acts and things as are not by law or by the Certificate directed or required to be exercised or done by the stockholders.

SECTION 2. Number, Qualification and Election. Except as otherwise fixed by or pursuant to the provisions of Article IV of the Certificate relating to the rights of the holders of any series of Preferred Stock or Series Common Stock or any class or series of stock having preference over the Common Stock as to dividends or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up, subject to Section 15 of this Article III, the number of directors constituting the Whole Board shall be determined from time to time by the Board. The term "Whole Board" shall mean the total number of authorized directors, whether or not there exist any vacancies or unfilled previously authorized directorships.

The directors, other than those who may be elected by the holders of shares of any series of Preferred Stock or Series Common Stock or any class or series of stock having a preference over the Common Stock of the Corporation as to dividends or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up pursuant to the terms of Article IV of the Certificate or any resolution or resolutions providing for the issuance of such stock adopted by the Board, shall be elected by the stockholders entitled to vote thereon at each annual meeting of the stockholders, and shall hold office until the next annual meeting of the stockholders and until each of their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified.

Each director shall be at least 21 years of age. Directors need not be stockholders of the Corporation.

In any uncontested election of directors, each person receiving a majority of the votes cast shall be deemed elected. For purposes of this paragraph, a 'majority of the votes cast' shall mean that the number of votes cast 'for' a director must exceed the number of votes cast 'against' that director (with 'abstentions' and 'broker non-votes' not counted as a vote cast with respect to that director). In any contested election of directors, the persons receiving a plurality of the votes cast, up to the number of directors to be elected in such election, shall be deemed elected. Any incumbent director who fails to receive a majority of the votes cast shall submit an offer to resign from the Board no later than two weeks after the certification by the Corporation of the voting results. An uncontested election is one in which the number of individuals who have been nominated for election as a director is equal to, or less than, the number of directors constituting the Whole Board. A contested election is one in which the number of persons nominated exceeds the number of directors to be elected as of the date that is ten days prior to the date that the Corporation first mails its notice of meeting for such meeting to the stockholders.

The Board shall consider the resignation offer and may either (i) accept the offer of resignation or (ii) reject the offer and seek to address the underlying cause(s) of the majority-withheld vote. While the Board may delegate to a committee the authority to assist the Board in its review of the matter, the Board shall decide whether to accept or reject the resignation offer within 90 days following the certification of the stockholder vote. Once the Board makes this decision, the Corporation will promptly make a public announcement of the Board's decision in the manner described in Section 11 of Article II. If the Board rejects the offer of resignation, the public announcement will include a statement regarding the reasons for its decision.

The chairman of the nominating and governance committee described in Section 1 of Article IV will have the authority to manage the Board's review of the resignation offer. In the event it is the chairman of the nominating and governance committee who received a majority-withheld vote, the independent directors who did not receive majority-withheld votes shall select a director to manage the process, and that

director shall have the authority otherwise delegated to the chairman of the nominating and governance committee by this Section 2 of Article III. Any director who tenders his or her offer of resignation as a result of a majority-withheld vote shall not participate in the committee's or the Board's deliberations or vote on whether to accept or reject the resignation offer.

A majority of the members of the Board shall be persons determined by the Board to be independent directors. In order to determine that a director is independent pursuant to this Section 2, the Board shall make an affirmative determination that the director satisfies applicable regulatory requirements to be an independent director of the Corporation, that the director has no material relationship with the Corporation and its consolidated subsidiaries (collectively, the "Company"), and that the director is free of any other relationship (with the Company or otherwise) that would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment by such director. In making this determination, the Board shall consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including commercial, charitable, and familial relationships that exist between the director and the Company, or between entities with which the director is affiliated and the Company. The Board may, from time to time, adopt categorical standards to guide its determination of materiality.

SECTION 3. Notification of Nominations. Subject to the rights of the holders of any series of Preferred Stock or Series Common Stock or any class or series of stock having a preference over the Common Stock as to dividends or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up, nominations for the election of directors may be made by the Board or by any stockholder who is a stockholder of record at the time of giving of the notice of nomination provided for in this Section 3 and who is entitled to vote for the election of directors. Any stockholder of record entitled to vote for the election of directors at a meeting may nominate persons for election as directors only if timely written notice of such stockholder's intent to make such nomination is given, either by personal delivery or by United States mail, postage prepaid, to the Secretary. To be timely, a stockholder's notice must be delivered to or mailed and received at the principal executive offices of the Corporation (i) with respect to an election to be held at an annual meeting of the stockholders, not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting; provided, however, that in the event that the date of the annual meeting is more than 30 days earlier or more than 60 days later than such anniversary date, notice by the stockholder to be timely must be so delivered or received not earlier than the 120th day prior to such annual meeting and not later than the close of business on the later of the 90th day prior to such annual meeting or the 10th day following the day on which public announcement of the date of such meeting is first made; provided, further, that for the purpose of calculating the timeliness of stockholder notices for the 2001 annual meeting of stockholders, the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting shall be deemed to be May 18, 2000 and (ii) with respect to an election to be held at a special meeting of the stockholders for the election of directors, not earlier than the 90th day prior to such special meeting and not later than the close of business on the later of the 60th day prior to such special

meeting or the 10th day following the day on which public announcement is first made of the date of the special meeting and of the nominees to be elected at such meeting. Each such notice shall set forth: (a) the name and address, as they appear on the Corporation's books, of the stockholder who intends to make the nomination and the name and address of the person or persons to be nominated; (b) the class or series and numbers of shares of the Corporation which are beneficially owned by the stockholder; (c) a representation that the stockholder is a holder of record of stock of the Corporation entitled to vote in the election of directors and intends to appear in person or by proxy at the meeting to nominate the person or persons specified in the notice; (d) a description of all arrangements or understandings between the stockholder and each nominee and any other person or persons (naming such person or persons) pursuant to which the nomination or nominations are to be made by the stockholder; (e) such other information regarding each nominee proposed by such stockholder as would have been required to be included in a proxy statement filed pursuant to the proxy rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission had each nominee been nominated, or intended to be nominated, by the Board; (f) the executed written consent of each nominee to serve as a director of the Corporation if so elected; and (g) if the stockholder intends to solicit proxies in support of such stockholder's nominee(s), a representation to that effect. The chairman of the meeting may refuse to acknowledge the nomination of any person not made in compliance with the foregoing procedure or if the stockholder solicits proxies in favor of such stockholder's nominee(s) without having made the representations required by the immediately preceding sentence. Only such persons who are nominated in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section 3 shall be eligible to serve as directors of the Corporation.

Notwithstanding anything in the immediately preceding paragraph of this Section 3 to the contrary, in the event that the number of directors to be elected to the Board at an annual meeting of the stockholders is increased and there is no public announcement naming all of the nominees for directors or specifying the size of the increased Board made by the Corporation at least 90 days prior to the first anniversary of the date of the immediately preceding annual meeting, a stockholder's notice required by this Section 3 shall also be considered timely, but only with respect to nominees for any new positions created by such increase, if it shall be delivered to or mailed to and received by the Secretary at the principal executive offices of the Corporation not later than the close of business on the 10th day following the day on which such public announcement is first made by the Corporation.

SECTION 4. Quorum and Manner of Acting. Except as otherwise provided by law, the Certificate or these By-laws, a majority of the Whole Board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the Board, and, except as so provided, the vote of a majority of the directors present at any meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the Board. The chairman of the meeting or a majority of the directors present may adjourn the meeting to another time and place whether or not a quorum is present. At any adjourned meeting at which a quorum is

present, any business may be transacted which might have been transacted at the meeting as originally called.

SECTION 5. Place of Meeting. Subject to Sections 6 and 7 of this Article III, the Board may hold its meetings at such place or places within or without the State of Delaware as the Board may from time to time determine, or as shall be specified or fixed in the respective notices or waivers of notice thereof.

SECTION 6. Regular Meetings. No fewer than six regular meetings per year of the Board shall be held at such times as the Board shall from time to time by resolution determine, at such locations as the Board may determine. If any day fixed for a regular meeting shall be a legal holiday under the laws of the place where the meeting is to be held, the meeting which would otherwise be held on that day shall be held at the same hour on the next succeeding business day.

SECTION 7. Special Meetings. Special meetings of the Board shall be held whenever called by the Chairman of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer or by a majority of the non-employee directors, and shall be held at such place, on such date and at such time as he or they, as applicable, shall fix.

SECTION 8. Notice of Meetings. Notice of regular meetings of the Board or of any adjourned meeting thereof need not be given. Notice of each special meeting of the Board shall be given by overnight delivery service or mailed to each director, in either case addressed to such director at such director's residence or usual place of business, at least two days before the day on which the meeting is to be held or shall be sent to such director at such place by telecopy or by electronic transmission or shall be given personally or by telephone, not later than the day before the meeting is to be held, but notice need not be given to any director who shall, either before or after the meeting, submit a waiver of such notice or who shall attend such meeting without protesting, prior to or at its commencement, the lack of notice to such director. Unless otherwise required by these By-laws, every such notice shall state the time and place but need not state the purpose of the meeting.

SECTION 9. Rules and Regulations. The Board may adopt such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of law, the Certificate or these By-laws for the conduct of its meetings and management of the affairs of the Corporation as the Board may deem proper.

SECTION 10. Participation in Meeting by Means of Communications Equipment. Any one or more members of the Board or any committee thereof may participate in any meeting of the Board or of any such committee by means of conference telephone or other communications equipment by means of which all persons participating in the meeting can hear each other or as otherwise permitted by law, and such participation in a meeting shall constitute presence in person at such meeting.

SECTION 11. Action Without Meeting. Any action required or permitted to be taken at any meeting of the Board or any committee thereof may be taken without a meeting if all of the members of the Board or of any such committee consent thereto in writing or as otherwise permitted by law and, if required by law, the writing or writings are filed with the minutes or proceedings of the Board or of such committee.

SECTION 12. Resignations. Any director of the Corporation may at any time resign by giving written notice to the Board, the Chairman of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer or the Secretary. Such resignation shall take effect at the time specified therein or, if the time be not specified therein, upon receipt thereof; and, unless otherwise specified therein, the acceptance of such resignation shall not be necessary to make it effective.

SECTION 13. Vacancies. Subject to the rights of the holders of any series of Preferred Stock or Series Common Stock or any class or series of stock having a preference over the Common Stock of the Corporation as to dividends or upon dissolution, liquidation or winding up, any vacancies on the Board resulting from death, resignation, removal or other cause shall only be filled by the Board, and not by the stockholders, by the affirmative vote of a majority of the remaining directors then in office, even though less than a quorum of the Board, or by a sole remaining director, and newly created directorships resulting from any increase in the number of directors, which increase shall be subject to Section 15 of this Article III, shall only be filled by the Board, or if not so filled, by the stockholders at the next annual meeting thereof or at a special meeting called for that purpose in accordance with Section 3 of Article II of these By-laws. Any director elected in accordance with the preceding sentence of this Section 13 shall hold office until the next annual meeting of the stockholders and until such director's successor shall have been elected and qualified.

SECTION 14. Compensation. Each director, in consideration of such person serving as a director, shall be entitled to receive from the Corporation such amount per annum and such fees (payable in cash or stock-based compensation) for attendance at meetings of the Board or of committees of the Board, or both, as the Board shall from time to time determine. In addition, each director shall be entitled to receive from the Corporation reimbursement for the reasonable expenses incurred by such person in connection with the performance of such person's duties as a director. Nothing contained in this Section 14 shall preclude any director from serving the Corporation or any of its subsidiaries in any other capacity and receiving compensation therefor.

ARTICLE IV

Committees of the Board of Directors

SECTION 1. Establishment of Committees of the Board of Directors; Election of Members of Committees of the Board of Directors; Functions of Committees of the Board of Directors.

(a) The Corporation shall have such committees of the Board as the Board shall determine from time to time in accordance with this Section 1 of Article IV, including the following committees of the Board with the following powers and authority: the nominating and governance committee, the audit and finance committee, and the compensation and human development committee.

(b) The nominating and governance committee shall have the following powers and authority: (i) evaluating and recommending director candidates to the Board, (ii) overseeing the assessment of Board and committee performance not less frequently than every year, (iii) recommending director compensation and benefits policies for the Board, (iv) evaluating and recommending to the Board candidates for Chief Executive Officer, (v) reviewing individual director performance as issues arise, (vi) reviewing and recommending to the Board changes to the size and composition of the Board, (vii) periodically reviewing the Corporation's corporate governance profile (viii) overseeing and monitoring the Corporation's development and articulation of its core values, its public reputation, and its involvement in the communities in which it does business and (ix) performing such other functions as the Board shall determine in accordance with this Section 1 of Article IV. The nominating and governance committee shall also have the powers and authority set forth in any nominating and governance committee charter adopted by the Board in accordance with this Section 1 of Article IV as may from time to time be required by any rule or regulation to which the Corporation is subject. Only directors who are determined by the Board, pursuant to Section 2 of Article III of these By-laws, to be independent and to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements may serve as members of the nominating and governance committee.

(c) The audit and finance committee shall have the following powers and authority: (i) approving the appointment or removal of independent public accountants to audit the books of account, accounting procedures and financial statements of the Corporation and to perform such other duties from time to time as the audit and finance committee may prescribe, (ii) receiving the reports and comments of the Corporation's internal auditors and of the independent public accountants selected by the committee and taking such action with respect thereto as it deems appropriate, (iii) requesting the Corporation's consolidated subsidiaries and affiliated companies to employ independent public accountants to audit their respective books of account, accounting procedures and financial statements, (iv) requesting the independent public accountants to furnish to the

compensation committee the certifications required under any present or future stock option, incentive compensation or employee benefit plan of the Corporation, (v) reviewing the adequacy of the Corporation's internal financial controls, (vi) reviewing the accounting principles employed in the Corporation's financial reporting, (vii) reviewing and making recommendations to the Board concerning the financial structure and financial condition of the Corporation and its subsidiaries, including annual budgets, long-term financial plans, corporate borrowings, investments, capital expenditures, long-term commitments and the issuance of stock, (viii) approving such matters that are consistent with the general financial policies and direction from time to time determined by the Board and (ix) performing such other functions as the Board shall determine in accordance with this Section 1 of Article IV. The audit and finance committee shall also have the powers and authority set forth in any audit and finance committee charter adopted by the Board in accordance with this Section 1 of Article IV as may from time to time be required by any rule or regulation to which the Corporation is subject. Only directors who are determined by the Board, pursuant to Section 2 of Article III of these By-laws, to be independent and to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements may serve as members of the audit and finance committee.

(d) The compensation and human development committee shall have the following powers and authority: (i) determining and fixing the compensation for all senior officers of the Corporation and its subsidiaries and divisions that the compensation and human development committee shall from time to time consider appropriate, as well as all employees of the Corporation compensated at a rate in excess of such amount per annum as may be fixed or determined from time to time by the Board, (ii) performing the duties of the committees of the Board provided for in any present or future stock option, restricted stock, incentive compensation or employee benefit plan of the Corporation and administering the stock option, restricted stock and stock incentive plans of the Corporation, (iii) delegating, to the extent permitted by law and to the extent it deems appropriate, any of its powers in connection with the administration of the stock option, stock incentive, restricted stock plans and other employee benefit plans of the Corporation, (iv) reviewing the operations of and policies pertaining to any present or future stock option, incentive compensation or employee benefit plan of the Corporation that the compensation and human development committee shall from time to time consider appropriate, (v) overseeing and monitoring the Corporation's human resources initiatives, including but not limited to efforts related to workforce diversity, and (vi) performing such other functions as the Board shall determine in accordance with this Section 1 of Article IV. The compensation and human development committee shall also have the powers and authority set forth in any compensation and human development committee charter adopted by the Board in accordance with this Section 1 of Article IV as may from time to time be required by any rule or regulation to which the Corporation is subject. Only directors who are determined by the Board, pursuant to Section 2 of Article III of these By-laws, to be independent and to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements may serve as members of the compensation and human development committee.

(e) Except as otherwise provided by law or the Certificate, the Board may, from time to time, establish, eliminate and modify the power and authority of any of the Board's committee; change the size of a committee; and add, remove, or replace the chairman or member of any committee.

SECTION 2. Procedure; Meetings; Quorum. Regular meetings of committees of the Board, of which no notice shall be necessary, may be held at such times and places as shall be fixed by resolution adopted by a majority of the total number of authorized committee members, whether or not there exist any vacancies or unfilled previously authorized committee seats. Special meetings of any committee of the Board shall be called at the request of any member thereof. Notice of each special meeting of any committee of the Board shall be sent by overnight delivery service, or mailed to each member thereof, in either case addressed to such member at such member's residence or usual place of business, at least two days before the day on which the meeting is to be held or shall be sent to such member at such place by telecopy or by electronic transmission or be given personally or by telephone, not later than the day before the meeting is to be held, but notice need not be given to any member who shall, either before or after the meeting, submit a waiver of such notice or who shall attend such meeting without protesting, prior to or at its commencement, the lack of such notice to such member. Unless otherwise required by these By-laws, every such notice shall state the time and place but need not state the purpose of such meeting. Any special meeting of any committee of the Board shall be a legal meeting without any notice thereof having been given, if all the members thereof shall be present thereat and no member shall protest the lack of notice to such member. Notice of any adjourned meeting of any committee of the Board need not be given. Any committee of the Board may adopt such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of law, the Certificate or these By-laws for the conduct of its meetings as such committee of the Board may deem proper. A majority of the authorized members of any committee of the Board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting, and the vote of a majority of the members thereof present at any meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of such committee. Each committee of the Board shall keep written minutes of its proceedings and shall report on such proceedings to the Board.

ARTICLE V

Officers

SECTION 1. Number; Term of Office. The officers of the Corporation shall be elected by the Board and may consist of: a Chairman of the Board, a Chief Executive Officer, a Chief Operating Officer, a Chief Financial Officer and one or more Vice Chairmen and Vice Presidents (including, without limitation, Assistant, Executive, Senior and Group Vice Presidents) and a Treasurer, Secretary and Controller and such

other officers and agents with such titles and such duties as the Board may from time to time determine, each to have such authority, functions or duties as in these By-laws provided or as the Board may from time to time determine, and each to hold office for such term as may be prescribed by the Board and until such person's successor shall have been chosen and shall qualify, or until such person's death or resignation, or until such person's removal in the manner hereinafter provided. The Chairman of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer and the Vice Chairmen shall be elected from among the directors. One person may hold the offices and perform the duties of any two or more of said officers; provided, however, that no officer shall execute, acknowledge or verify any instrument in more than one capacity if such instrument is required by law, the Certificate or these By-laws to be executed, acknowledged or verified by two or more officers. The Board may require any officer or agent to give security for the faithful performance of such person's duties.

SECTION 2. Removal. Subject to Section 14 of this Article V, any officer may be removed, either with or without cause, by the Board at any meeting thereof called for the purpose or by any superior officer upon whom such power may be conferred by the Board.

SECTION 3. Resignation. Any officer may resign at any time by giving notice to the Board, the Chief Executive Officer or the Secretary. Any such resignation shall take effect at the date of receipt of such notice or at any later date specified therein; and, unless otherwise specified therein, the acceptance of such resignation shall not be necessary to make it effective.

SECTION 4. Chairman of the Board. The Chairman of the Board may be an officer of the Corporation, subject to the control of the Board, and shall report directly to the Board.

SECTION 5. Chief Executive Officer. The Chief Executive Officer shall have general supervision and direction of the business and affairs of the Corporation, subject to the control of the Board, and shall report directly to the Board.

SECTION 6. Chief Operating Officer. The Chief Operating Officer shall perform such senior duties in connection with the operations of the Corporation as the Board or the Chief Executive Officer shall from time to time determine, and shall report directly to the Chief Executive Officer. The Chief Operating Officer shall, when requested, counsel with and advise the other officers of the Corporation and shall perform such other duties as may be agreed with the Chief Executive Officer or as the Board may from time to time determine.

SECTION 7. Vice Chairmen. Any Vice Chairman shall, when requested, counsel with and advise the other officers of the Corporation and shall perform such other duties as he may agree with the Chief Executive Officer or as the Board may from time to time determine.

SECTION 8. Chief Financial Officer. The Chief Financial Officer shall perform all the powers and duties of the office of the chief financial officer and in general have overall supervision of the financial operations of the Corporation. The Chief Financial Officer shall, when requested, counsel with and advise the other officers of the Corporation and shall perform such other duties as he may agree with the Chief Executive Officer or as the Board may from time to time determine. The Chief Financial Officer shall report directly to the Chief Executive Officer.

SECTION 9. Vice Presidents. Any Vice President shall have such powers and duties as shall be prescribed by his superior officer or the Board. A Vice President shall, when requested, counsel with and advise the other officers of the Corporation and shall perform such other duties as he may agree with the Chief Executive Officer or as the Board may from time to time determine. A Vice President need not be an officer of the Corporation and shall not be deemed an officer of the Corporation unless elected by the Board.

SECTION 10. Treasurer. The Treasurer, if one shall have been elected, shall supervise and be responsible for all the funds and securities of the Corporation; the deposit of all moneys and other valuables to the credit of the Corporation in depositories of the Corporation; borrowings and compliance with the provisions of all indentures, agreements and instruments governing such borrowings to which the Corporation is a party; the disbursement of funds of the Corporation and the investment of its funds; and in general shall perform all of the duties incident to the office of the Treasurer. The Treasurer shall, when requested, counsel with and advise the other officers of the Corporation and shall perform such other duties as he may agree with the Chief Executive Officer or as the Board may from time to time determine.

SECTION 11. Controller. The Controller shall be the chief accounting officer of the Corporation. The Controller shall, when requested, counsel with and advise the other officers of the Corporation and shall perform such other duties as he may agree with the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financial Officer or as the Board may from time to time determine.

SECTION 12. Secretary. It shall be the duty of the Secretary to act as secretary at all meetings of the Board, of the committees of the Board and of the stockholders and to record the proceedings of such meetings in a book or books to be kept for that purpose; the Secretary shall see that all notices required to be given by the Corporation are duly given and served; the Secretary shall be custodian of the seal of the Corporation and shall affix the seal or cause it to be affixed to all certificates of stock of

the Corporation (unless the seal of the Corporation on such certificates shall be a facsimile, as hereinafter provided) and to all documents, the execution of which on behalf of the Corporation under its seal is duly authorized in accordance with the provisions of these By-laws; the Secretary shall have charge of the books, records and papers of the Corporation and shall see that the reports, statements and other documents required by law to be kept and filed are properly kept and filed; and in general shall perform all of the duties incident to the office of Secretary. The Secretary shall, when requested, counsel with and advise the other officers of the Corporation and shall perform such other duties as he may agree with the Chief Executive Officer or as the Board may from time to time determine.

SECTION 13. Assistant Treasurers, Assistant Controllers and Assistant Secretaries. Any Assistant Treasurers, Assistant Controllers and Assistant Secretaries shall perform such duties as shall be assigned to them by the Board or by the Treasurer, Controller or Secretary, respectively, or by the Chief Executive Officer. An Assistant Treasurer, Assistant Controller or Assistant Secretary need not be an officer of the Corporation and shall not be deemed an officer of the Corporation unless elected by the Board.

SECTION 14. Additional Matters. The Chairman of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Operating Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of the Corporation shall have the authority to designate employees of the Corporation to have the title of Vice President, Assistant Vice President, Assistant Treasurer, Assistant Controller or Assistant Secretary. Any employee so designated shall have the powers and duties determined by the officer making such designation. The persons upon whom such titles are conferred shall not be deemed officers of the Corporation unless elected by the Board.

ARTICLE VI

Indemnification

SECTION 1. Right to Indemnification. The Corporation, to the fullest extent permitted or required by the DGCL or other applicable law, as the same exists or may hereafter be amended (but, in the case of any such amendment and unless applicable law otherwise requires, only to the extent that such amendment permits the Corporation to provide broader indemnification rights than such law permitted the Corporation to provide prior to such amendment), shall indemnify and hold harmless any person who is or was a director or officer of the Corporation and who is or was involved in any manner (including, without limitation, as a party or a witness) or is threatened to be made so involved in any threatened, pending or completed investigation, claim, action, suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative (including, without limitation, any action, suit or proceedings by or in the right of the Corporation to procure

a judgment in its favor) (a "Proceeding") by reason of the fact that such person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the Corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the Corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise (including, without limitation, any employee benefit plan) (a "Covered Entity") against all expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with such Proceeding; provided, however, that the foregoing shall not apply to a director or officer of the Corporation with respect to a Proceeding that was commenced by such director or officer unless the proceeding was commenced after a Change in Control (as hereinafter defined in Section 4(e) of this Article VI). Any director or officer of the Corporation entitled to indemnification as provided in this Section 1 is hereinafter called an "Indemnitee". Any right of an Indemnitee to indemnification shall be a contract right and shall include the right to receive, prior to the conclusion of any Proceeding, payment of any expenses incurred by the Indemnitee in connection with such Proceeding, consistent with the provisions of the DGCL or other applicable law, as the same exists or may hereafter be amended (but, in the case of any such amendment and unless applicable law otherwise requires, only to the extent that such amendment permits the Corporation to provide broader rights to payment of expenses than such law permitted the Corporation to provide prior to such amendment), and the other provisions of this Article VI.

SECTION 2. Insurance, Contracts and Funding. The Corporation may purchase and maintain insurance to protect itself and any director, officer, employee or agent of the Corporation or of any Covered Entity against any expenses, judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement as specified in Section 1 of this Article VI or incurred by any such director, officer, employee or agent in connection with any Proceeding referred to in Section 1 of this Article VI, whether or not the Corporation would have the power to indemnify such person against such expense, liability or loss under the DGCL. The Corporation may enter into contracts with any director, officer, employee or agent of the Corporation or of any Covered Entity in furtherance of the provisions of this Article VI and may create a trust fund, grant a security interest or use other means (including, without limitation, a letter of credit) to ensure the payment of such amounts as may be necessary to effect indemnification as provided or authorized in this Article VI.

SECTION 3. Indemnification Not Exclusive Right. The right of indemnification provided in this Article VI shall not be exclusive of any other rights to which an Indemnitee may otherwise be entitled, and the provisions of this Article VI shall inure to the benefit of the heirs and legal representatives of any Indemnitee under this Article VI and shall be applicable to Proceedings commenced or continuing after the adoption of this Article VI, whether arising from acts or omissions occurring before or after such adoption.

SECTION 4. Advancement of Expenses; Procedures; Presumptions and Effect of Certain Proceedings; Remedies. In furtherance, but not in limitation of the foregoing provisions, the following procedures, presumptions and remedies shall apply with respect to advancement of expenses and the right to indemnification under this Article VI:

(a) Advancement of Expenses. All reasonable expenses (including attorneys' fees) incurred by or on behalf of the Indemnitee in connection with any Proceeding shall be advanced to the Indemnitee by the Corporation within 20 days after the receipt by the Corporation of a statement or statements from the Indemnitee requesting such advance or advances from time to time, whether prior to or after final disposition of such Proceeding. Such statement or statements shall reasonably evidence the expenses incurred by the Indemnitee and, if required by law at the time of such advance, shall include or be accompanied by an undertaking by or on behalf of the Indemnitee to repay the amounts advanced if ultimately it should be determined that the Indemnitee is not entitled to be indemnified against such expenses pursuant to this Article VI.

(b) Procedure for Determination of Entitlement to Indemnification. (i) To obtain indemnification under this Article VI, an Indemnitee shall submit to the Secretary a written request, including such documentation and information as is reasonably available to the Indemnitee and reasonably necessary to determine whether and to what extent the Indemnitee is entitled to indemnification (the "Supporting Documentation"). The determination of the Indemnitee's entitlement to indemnification shall be made not later than 60 days after receipt by the Corporation of the written request for indemnification together with the Supporting Documentation. The Secretary shall, promptly upon receipt of such a request for indemnification, advise the Board in writing that the Indemnitee has requested indemnification.

(ii) The Indemnitee's entitlement to indemnification under this Article VI shall be determined in one of the following ways: (A) by a majority vote of the Disinterested Directors (as hereinafter defined in Section 4(e) of this Article VI), whether or not they constitute a quorum of the Board, or by a committee of Disinterested Directors designated by a majority vote of the Disinterested Directors; (B) by a written opinion of Independent Counsel (as hereinafter defined in Section 4(e) of this Article VI) if (x) a Change in Control shall have occurred and the Indemnitee so requests or (y) there are no Disinterested Directors or a majority of such Disinterested Directors so directs; (C) by the stockholders of the Corporation; or (D) as provided in Section 4(c) of this Article VI.

(iii) In the event the determination of entitlement to indemnification is to be made by Independent Counsel pursuant to Section 4(b)(ii) of this Article VI, a

majority of the Disinterested Directors shall select the Independent Counsel, but only an Independent Counsel to which the Indemnitee does not reasonably object; provided, however, that if a Change in Control shall have occurred, the Indemnitee shall select such Independent Counsel, but only an Independent Counsel to which a majority of the Disinterested Directors does not reasonably object.

(c) Presumptions and Effect of Certain Proceedings. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Article VI, if a Change in Control shall have occurred, the Indemnitee shall be presumed to be entitled to indemnification under this Article VI (with respect to actions or omissions occurring prior to such Change in Control) upon submission of a request for indemnification together with the Supporting Documentation in accordance with Section 4(b)(i) of this Article VI, and thereafter the Corporation shall have the burden of proof to overcome that presumption in reaching a contrary determination. In any event, if the person or persons empowered under Section 4(b) of this Article VI to determine entitlement to indemnification shall not have been appointed or shall not have made a determination within 60 days after receipt by the Corporation of the request therefor, together with the Supporting Documentation, the Indemnitee shall be deemed to be, and shall be, entitled to indemnification unless (A) the Indemnitee misrepresented or failed to disclose a material fact in making the request for indemnification or in the Supporting Documentation or (B) such indemnification is prohibited by law. The termination of any Proceeding described in Section 1 of this Article VI, or of any claim, issue or matter therein, by judgment, order, settlement or conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, adversely affect the right of the Indemnitee to indemnification or create a presumption that the Indemnitee did not act in good faith and in a manner which the Indemnitee reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the Corporation or, with respect to any criminal proceeding, that the Indemnitee had reasonable cause to believe that such conduct was unlawful.

(d) Remedies of Indemnitee. (i) In the event that a determination is made pursuant to Section 4(b) of this Article VI that the Indemnitee is not entitled to indemnification under this Article VI, (A) the Indemnitee shall be entitled to seek an adjudication of entitlement to such indemnification either, at the Indemnitee's sole option, in (x) an appropriate court of the State of Delaware or any other court of competent jurisdiction or (y) an arbitration to be conducted by a single arbitrator pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association; (B) any such judicial proceeding or arbitration shall be de novo and the Indemnitee shall not be prejudiced by reason of such adverse determination; and (C) if a Change in Control shall have occurred, in any such judicial proceeding or arbitration, the Corporation shall have the burden of proving that the Indemnitee is not entitled to indemnification under this Article VI (with respect to actions or omissions occurring prior to such Change in Control).

(ii) If a determination shall have been made or deemed to have been made, pursuant to Section 4(b) or (c) of this Article VI, that the Indemnitee is entitled to indemnification, the Corporation shall be obligated to pay the amounts constituting such indemnification within five days after such determination has been made or deemed to have been made and shall be conclusively bound by such determination unless (A) the Indemnitee misrepresented or failed to disclose a material fact in making the request for indemnification or in the Supporting Documentation or (B) such indemnification is prohibited by law. In the event that (X) advancement of expenses is not timely made pursuant to Section 4(a) of this Article VI or (Y) payment of indemnification is not made within five days after a determination of entitlement to indemnification has been made or deemed to have been made pursuant to Section 4(b) or (c) of this Article VI, the Indemnitee shall be entitled to seek judicial enforcement of the Corporation's obligation to pay to the Indemnitee such advancement of expenses or indemnification. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Corporation may bring an action, in an appropriate court in the State of Delaware or any other court of competent jurisdiction, contesting the right of the Indemnitee to receive indemnification hereunder due to the occurrence of an event described in sub-clause (A) or (B) of this clause (ii) (a "Disqualifying Event"); provided, however, that in any such action the Corporation shall have the burden of proving the occurrence of such Disqualifying Event.

(iii) The Corporation shall be precluded from asserting in any judicial proceeding or arbitration commenced pursuant to this Section 4(d) that the procedures and presumptions of this Article VI are not valid, binding and enforceable and shall stipulate in any such court or before any such arbitrator that the Corporation is bound by all the provisions of this Article VI.

(iv) In the event that the Indemnitee, pursuant to this Section 4(d), seeks a judicial adjudication of or an award in arbitration to enforce rights under, or to recover damages for breach of, this Article VI, the Indemnitee shall be entitled to recover from the Corporation, and shall be indemnified by the Corporation against, any expenses actually and reasonably incurred by the Indemnitee if the Indemnitee prevails in such judicial adjudication or arbitration. If it shall be determined in such judicial adjudication or arbitration that the Indemnitee is entitled to receive part but not all of the indemnification or advancement of expenses sought, the expenses incurred by the Indemnitee in connection with such judicial adjudication or arbitration shall be prorated accordingly.

(e) Definitions. For purposes of this Article VI:

(i) "Authorized Officer" means any one of the Chairman of the Board, the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Operating Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, any Vice President or the Secretary of the Corporation.

(ii) "Change in Control" means the occurrence of any of the following: (w) any merger or consolidation of the Corporation in which the Corporation is not the continuing or surviving corporation or pursuant to which shares of the Corporation's Common Stock would be converted into cash, securities or other property, other than a merger of the Corporation in which the holders of the Corporation's Common Stock immediately prior to the merger have the same proportionate ownership of common stock of the surviving corporation immediately after the merger, (x) any sale, lease, exchange or other transfer (in one transaction or a series of related transactions) of all, or substantially all, the assets of the Corporation, or the liquidation or dissolution of the Corporation or (y) individuals who would constitute a majority of the members of the Board elected at any meeting of stockholders or by written consent (without regard to any members of the Board elected pursuant to the terms of any series of Preferred Stock) shall be elected to the Board and the election or the nomination for election by the stockholders of such directors was not approved by a vote of at least two-thirds of the directors in office immediately prior to such election.

(iii) "Disinterested Director" means a director of the Corporation who is not or was not a party to the Proceeding in respect of which indemnification is sought by the Indemnitee.

(iv) "Independent Counsel" means a law firm or a member of a law firm that neither presently is, nor in the past five years has been, retained to represent: (x) the Corporation or the Indemnitee in any matter material to either such party or (y) any other party to the Proceeding giving rise to a claim for indemnification under this Article VI. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the term "Independent Counsel" shall not include any person who, under the applicable standards of professional conduct then prevailing under the law of the State of Delaware, would have a conflict of interest in representing either the Corporation or the Indemnitee in an action to determine the Indemnitee's rights under this Article VI.

SECTION 5. Severability. If any provision or provisions of this Article VI shall be held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable for any reason whatsoever: (a) the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions of this Article VI (including, without limitation, all portions of any paragraph of this Article VI containing any such provision held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable, that are not themselves invalid, illegal or unenforceable) shall not in any way be affected or impaired thereby;

and (b) to the fullest extent possible, the provisions of this Article VI (including, without limitation, all portions of any paragraph of this Article VI containing any such provision held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable, that are not themselves invalid, illegal or enforceable) shall be construed so as to give effect to the intent manifested by the provision held invalid, illegal or unenforceable.

SECTION 6. Indemnification of Employees Serving as Directors. The Corporation, to the fullest extent of the provisions of this Article VI with respect to the indemnification of directors and officers of the Corporation, shall indemnify any person who is or was an employee of the Corporation and who is or was involved in any manner (including, without limitation, as a party or a witness) or is threatened to be made so involved in any threatened, pending or completed Proceeding by reason of the fact that such employee is or was serving (a) as a director of a corporation in which the Corporation had at the time of such service, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater equity interest (a "Subsidiary Director") or (b) at the written request of an Authorized Officer, as a director of another corporation in which the Corporation had at the time of such service, directly or indirectly, a less than 50% equity interest (or no equity interest at all) or in a capacity equivalent to that of a director for any partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise (including, without limitation, any employee benefit plan) in which the Corporation has an interest (a "Requested Employee"), against all expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such Subsidiary Director or Requested Employee in connection with such Proceeding. The Corporation may also advance expenses incurred by any such Subsidiary Director or Requested Employee in connection with any such Proceeding, consistent with the provisions of this Article VI with respect to the advancement of expenses of directors and officers of the Corporation.

SECTION 7. Indemnification of Employees and Agents. Notwithstanding any other provision or provisions of this Article VI, the Corporation, to the fullest extent of the provisions of this Article VI with respect to the indemnification of directors and officers of the Corporation, may indemnify any person other than a director or officer of the Corporation, a Subsidiary Director or a Requested Employee, who is or was an employee or agent of the Corporation and who is or was involved in any manner (including, without limitation, as a party or a witness) or is threatened to be made so involved in any threatened, pending or completed Proceeding by reason of the fact that such person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the Corporation or of a Covered Entity against all expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection with such Proceeding. The Corporation may also advance expenses incurred by such employee or agent in connection with any such Proceeding, consistent with the provisions of this Article VI with respect to the advancement of expenses of directors and officers of the Corporation.

ARTICLE VII

Capital Stock

SECTION 1. Certificates for Shares. The shares of stock of the Corporation shall be represented by certificates, or shall be uncertificated shares that may be evidenced by a book-entry system maintained by the registrar of such stock, or a combination of both. To the extent that shares are represented by certificates, such certificates whenever authorized by the Board, shall be in such form as shall be approved by the Board. The certificates representing shares of stock of each class shall be signed by, or in the name of, the Corporation by the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer, or by any Vice President, and by the Secretary or any Assistant Secretary or the Treasurer or any Assistant Treasurer of the Corporation, and sealed with the seal of the Corporation, which may be a facsimile thereof. Any or all such signatures may be facsimiles if countersigned by a transfer agent or registrar. Although any officer, transfer agent or registrar whose manual or facsimile signature is affixed to such a certificate ceases to be such officer, transfer agent or registrar before such certificate has been issued, it may nevertheless be issued by the Corporation with the same effect as if such officer, transfer agent or registrar were still such at the date of its issue.

The stock ledger and blank share certificates shall be kept by the Secretary or by a transfer agent or by a registrar or by any other officer or agent designated by the Board.

SECTION 2. Transfer of Shares. Transfers of shares of stock of each class of the Corporation shall be made only on the books of the Corporation upon authorization by the registered holder thereof, or by such holder's attorney thereunto authorized by a power of attorney duly executed and filed with the Secretary or a transfer agent for such stock, if any, and if such shares are represented by a certificate, upon surrender of the certificate or certificates for such shares properly endorsed or accompanied by a duly executed stock transfer power (or by proper evidence of succession, assignment or authority to transfer) and the payment of any taxes thereon; provided, however, that the Corporation shall be entitled to recognize and enforce any lawful restriction on transfer. The person in whose name shares are registered on the books of the Corporation shall be deemed the owner thereof for all purposes as regards the Corporation; provided, however, that whenever any transfer of shares shall be made for collateral security and not absolutely, and written notice thereof shall be given to the Secretary or to such transfer agent, such fact shall be stated in the entry of the transfer. No transfer of shares shall be valid as against the Corporation, its stockholders and creditors for any purpose, except to render the transferee liable for the debts of the Corporation to the extent provided by law, until it shall have been entered in the stock records of the Corporation by an entry showing from and to whom transferred.

SECTION 3. Registered Stockholders and Addresses of Stockholders.

The Corporation shall be entitled to recognize the exclusive right of a person registered on its records as the owner of shares of stock to receive dividends and to vote as such owner, shall be entitled to hold liable for calls and assessments a person registered on its records as the owner of shares of stock, and shall not be bound to recognize any equitable or other claim to or interest in such share or shares of stock on the part of any other person, whether or not it shall have express or other notice thereof, except as otherwise provided by the laws of Delaware.

Each stockholder shall designate to the Secretary or transfer agent of the Corporation an address at which notices of meetings and all other corporate notices may be given to such person, and, if any stockholder shall fail to designate such address, corporate notices may be given to such person by mail directed to such person at such person's post office address, if any, as the same appears on the stock record books of the Corporation or at such person's last known post office address.

SECTION 4. Lost, Destroyed and Mutilated Certificates. The holder of any certificate representing any shares of stock of the Corporation shall immediately notify the Corporation of any loss, theft, destruction or mutilation of such certificate; the Corporation may issue to such holder a new certificate or certificates for shares, upon the surrender of the mutilated certificate or, in the case of loss, theft or destruction of the certificate, upon satisfactory proof of such loss, theft or destruction; the Board, or a committee designated thereby, or the transfer agents and registrars for the stock, may, in their discretion, require the owner of the lost, stolen or destroyed certificate, or such person's legal representative, to give the Corporation a bond in such sum and with such surety or sureties as they may direct to indemnify the Corporation and said transfer agents and registrars against any claim that may be made on account of the alleged loss, theft or destruction of any such certificate or the issuance of such new certificate.

SECTION 5. Regulations. The Board may make such additional rules and regulations as it may deem expedient concerning the issue, transfer and registration of certificated or uncertificated shares of stock of each class and series of the Corporation and may make such rules and take such action as it may deem expedient concerning the issue of certificates in lieu of certificates claimed to have been lost, destroyed, stolen or mutilated.

SECTION 6. Fixing Date for Determination of Stockholders of Record. In order that the Corporation may determine the stockholders entitled to notice of or to vote at any meeting of the stockholders or any adjournment thereof, or entitled to receive payment of any dividend or other distribution or allotment of any rights, or entitled to exercise any rights in respect of any change, conversion or exchange of stock or for the purpose of any other lawful action, the Board may fix, in advance, a record date, which shall not be more than 60 days nor less than 10 days before the date of such meeting, nor more than 60 days prior to any other action. A determination of stockholders entitled to

notice of or to vote at a meeting of the stockholders shall apply to any adjournment of the meeting; provided, however, that the Board may fix a new record date for the adjourned meeting.

SECTION 7. Transfer Agents and Registrars. The Board may appoint, or authorize any officer or officers to appoint, one or more transfer agents and one or more registrars.

ARTICLE VIII

Seal

The Board shall approve a suitable corporate seal, which shall be in the form of a circle and shall bear the full name of the Corporation and shall be in the charge of the Secretary. The seal may be used by causing it or a facsimile thereof to be impressed or affixed or in any other manner reproduced.

ARTICLE IX

Fiscal Year

The fiscal year of the Corporation shall end on the 31st day of December in each year.

ARTICLE X

Waiver of Notice

Whenever any notice whatsoever is required to be given by these By-laws, by the Certificate or by law, the person entitled thereto may, either before or after the meeting or other matter in respect of which such notice is to be given, waive such notice in writing or as otherwise permitted by law, which shall be filed with or entered upon the records of the meeting or the records kept with respect to such other matter, as the case may be, and in such event such notice need not be given to such person and such waiver shall be deemed equivalent to such notice.

ARTICLE XI

Amendments

These By-laws may be altered, amended or repealed, in whole or in part, or new By-laws may be adopted by the stockholders or by the Board at any meeting thereof; provided, however, that notice of such alteration, amendment, repeal or adoption of new By-laws is contained in the notice of such meeting of the stockholders or in the notice of such meeting of the Board and, in the latter case, such notice is given not less than twenty-four hours prior to the meeting. Unless a higher percentage is required by the Certificate, all such amendments must be approved by either the holders of a majority or more of the combined voting power of the outstanding shares of all classes and series of capital stock of the Corporation entitled generally to vote in the election of directors of the Corporation, voting as a single class, or by a majority of the Board.

ARTICLE XII

Miscellaneous

SECTION 1. Execution of Documents. The Board or any committee thereof shall designate the officers, employees and agents of the Corporation who shall have power to execute and deliver deeds, contracts, mortgages, bonds, debentures, notes, checks, drafts and other orders for the payment of money and other documents for and in the name of the Corporation and may authorize (including authority to redelegate) by written instrument to other officers, employees or agents of the Corporation. Such delegation may be by resolution or otherwise and the authority granted shall be general or confined to specific matters, all as the Board or any such committee may determine. In the absence of such designation referred to in the first sentence of this Section, the officers of the Corporation shall have such power so referred to, to the extent incident to the normal performance of their duties.

SECTION 2. Deposits. All funds of the Corporation not otherwise employed shall be deposited from time to time to the credit of the Corporation or otherwise as the Board or any committee thereof or any officer of the Corporation to whom power in respect of financial operations shall have been delegated by the Board or any such committee or in these By-laws shall select.

SECTION 3. Checks. All checks, drafts and other orders for the payment of money out of the funds of the Corporation, and all notes or other evidences of indebtedness of the Corporation, shall be signed on behalf of the Corporation in such manner as shall from time to time be determined by resolution of the Board or of any committee thereof or by any officer of the Corporation to whom power in respect of

financial operations shall have been delegated by the Board or any such committee thereof or as set forth in these By-laws.

SECTION 4. Proxies in Respect of Stock or Other Securities of Other Corporations. The Board or any committee thereof shall designate the officers of the Corporation who shall have authority from time to time to appoint an agent or agents of the Corporation to exercise in the name and on behalf of the Corporation the powers and rights which the Corporation may have as the holder of stock or other securities in any other corporation or other entity, and to vote or consent in respect of such stock or securities; such designated officers may instruct the person or persons so appointed as to the manner of exercising such powers and rights; and such designated officers may execute or cause to be executed in the name and on behalf of the Corporation and under its corporate seal, or otherwise, such written proxies, powers of attorney or other instruments as they may deem necessary or proper in order that the Corporation may exercise its said powers and rights.

SECTION 5. Subject to Law and Certificate of Incorporation. All powers, duties and responsibilities provided for in these By-laws, whether or not explicitly so qualified, are qualified by the provisions of the Certificate and applicable laws.