Jul. 31, 2024
In my haste to meet the deadline for submitting comments, I forgot to include any real-life examples of how this proposal would affect shareholders of CEFs. Over the past 29 years, we have participated in a number of proxy contests for CEFs and submitted many Rule 14a-8 proposals. We won some votes and lost some. Without annual meetings, shareholders would not have had an opportunity to vote for our alternative nominees or on any of our proposals. In Amalgamated Clothing v. Wal-Mart Stores, 54 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit Court of appeals said that “the right[ of shareholders] to cast an informed vote, in and of itself, is a substantial interest worthy of vindication.” For example, on June 12, 2024, at the annual meeting of BNY Mellon Municipal Income, Inc. (DMF), we nominated three persons to replace the incumbent directors. Our nominees were elected in what can fairly be called a landslide victory. Had DMF not held an annual meeting, the shareholders would have had no opportunity to vote for the persons responsible for managing that CEF. The NYSE’s proposal seeks to disenfranchise shareholders of DMF and all CEFs and therefore should be rejected by the SEC.