Mar. 23, 2023
March 23, 2023
To whom it may concern,
Conflicts of interest should not be enabled or supported in any capacity. Exemptions given to \"market makers\" are concerning in that exceptions generally (including here) weaken the overall level of protection provided by this change. Financial institutions have already demonstrated immense capacity to accept fines and penalties as outlined in this amendment.
The argument that market makers, when receiving an order, are selling on behalf of the customer does not guarantee integrity of the act of purchasing on behalf of the customer, or even the integrity of the larger market. In addition, several definitions associated with market making activities are not defined sufficiently. For example, what is a commercially reasonable amount? Is the level of liquidity present in the current market making system commercially reasonable? Is it the level of total trading yesterday, or is it the ability to develop leveraged positions that close over a year? What about the definition of bonafide market making? How can market making be bonafide when operated by the same organization making trades against the purchaser? Due to the discrepancies in the definitions and the overcomplexity in the proposed article that lends itself to an asymmetric marketplace, I do not support providing exemptions.
To address specific requests brought forward by the writers. 59: consequences should be significant and proportional to the scale of transactions such to sufficiently act as a deterrent to all such acts. This should mean significant penalty to company cashflow, that would prevent cases of repeated/rampant conflicts of interest. 60. Compliance programs have not sufficiently deterred other forms of financial fraud and will be insufficient to provide a level of protection suitable for a free market.