UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549-4561 **DIVISION OF** CORPORATION FINANCE February 16, 2010

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Eric T. Hoover	FEB 1 6 2010	
Senior Counsel	A	+: 1934
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Comp	anvashington DC 202.5	ection:
Dupont Legal, D8048-2		le: 14a-8
1007 Market Street		blic
Wilmington, DE 19898		alability: 02-16-2010

Re: E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company Incoming letter dated December 23, 2009

Dear Mr. Hoover:

This is in response to your letter dated December 23, 2009 concerning the shareholder proposal submitted to DuPont by Clark Phippen. Our response is attached to the enclosed photocopy of your correspondence. By doing this, we avoid having to recite or summarize the facts set forth in the correspondence. Copies of all of the correspondence also will be provided to the proponent.

In connection with this matter, your attention is directed to the enclosure, which sets forth a brief discussion of the Division's informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals.

Sincerely,

Heather L. Maples Senior Special Counsel

Enclosures

cc: Clark Phippen

*** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 ***

February 16, 2010

Response of the Office of Chief Counsel <u>Division of Corporation Finance</u>

Re: E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company Incoming letter dated December 23, 2009

The proposal relates to the chairman of the board.

There appears to be some basis for your view that DuPont may exclude the proposal under rule 14a-8(h)(3). We note your representation that DuPont included the proponent's proposal in its proxy statement for its 2008 annual meeting, but that neither the proponent nor his representative appeared to present the proposal at this meeting. Moreover, the proponent has not stated a "good cause" for the failure to appear. Under the circumstances, we will not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if DuPont omits the proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(h)(3).

Sincerely,

Rose A. Zukin Attorney-Adviser

DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

The Division of Corporation Finance believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division's staff considers the information furnished to it by the Company in support of its intention to exclude the proposals from the Company's proxy materials, as well as any information furnished by the proponent or the proponent's representative.

Although Rule 14a-8(k) does not require any communications from shareholders to the Commission's staff, the staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes administered by the Commission, including argument as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would be violative of the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff's informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversary procedure.

It is important to note that the staff's and Commission's no-action responses to Rule 14a-8(j) submissions reflect only informal views. The determinations reached in these noaction letters do not and cannot adjudicate the merits of a company's position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S. District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. Accordingly a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement action, does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of a company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the company in court, should the management omit the proposal from the company's proxy material.



Erik T. Hoover DuPont Legal, D8048-2 1007 Market Street Wilmington, DE 19898 Telephone: (302) 774-0205 Facsimile: (302) 355-1958

December 23, 2009

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL (shareholderproposals@sec.gov)

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporation Finance Office of Chief Counsel 100 F Street, N.E. Washington, D.C. 20549

Re: E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY PROXY STATEMENT – 2010 ANNUAL MEETING PROPOSAL BY CLARK PHIPPEN

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am writing on behalf of E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, a Delaware corporation ("DuPont" or "Company"), pursuant to Rule 14a-8(j) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended ("Act"), to respectfully request that the Staff of the Division of Corporate Finance ("Staff") of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") concur with DuPont's view that, for the reasons stated below, the shareholder proposal ("2010 Proposal") submitted by Clark Phippen ("Proponent") may properly be omitted from DuPont's 2010 Annual Meeting Proxy Statement ("2010 Proxy").

This request is being submitted via electronic mail in accordance with *Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14D* (Nov. 7, 2008). A copy of this letter is also being sent to the Proponent as notice of DuPont's intent to the Proposal from the 2010 Proxy. DuPont intends to file the 2010 Proxy with the Commission on or about March 19, 2010. Accordingly, we are submitting this letter not less than eighty (80) days before the company intends to file its definitive proxy statement.

The 2010 Proposal reads as follows:

RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors of the DuPont Company ("Company") analyze and report in an open and timely manner to the shareholders of the Company on the advisability of amending the Company by-laws to require that the Chairman of the Board of Directors shall not serve concurrently as Chief Executive Officer, and that whenever possible an independent Director shall serve of Chairman of the Board of Directors. A copy of the 2010 Proposal is attached hereto as <u>Exhibit A</u>. DuPont received from the Proponent a similar proposal ("2008 Proposal") for inclusion in DuPont's 2008 Annual Meeting Proxy Statement ("2008 Proxy"). A copy of the 2008 Proposal as it appeared in the 2008 Proxy is attached hereto as <u>Exhibit B</u>.

The Proposal is Excludable Under Rule 14a-8(h)(3)

DuPont respectfully requests that the Staff concur with the its view that the Company may exclude the 2010 Proposal from the 2010 Proxy because the Proponent failed to appear and present the 2008 Proposal at DuPont's 2008 annual meeting of shareholders. As evidence of the foregoing, a copy of the relevant excerpt from the transcript of that meeting is attached as <u>Exhibit C</u>.

Rule 14a-8(h)(1) requires from each proponent of a shareholder proposal that "[e]ither you, or your representative who is qualified under state law to present the proposal on your behalf, must attend the meeting to present the proposal." Rule 14a-8(h)(3) further provides that "[i]f you or your qualified representative fail to appear and present the proposal, without good cause, the company will be permitted to exclude all of your proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings held in the following two calendar years."

DuPont held its 2008 annual meeting of shareholders on April 30, 2008. After Mary E. Bowler, Corporate Secretary, placed the 2008 Proposal before the meeting, Charles O. Holliday, then Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of DuPont, asked if anyone would like to introduce the proposal. Neither the Proponent nor his qualified representative appeared to present the 2008 Proposal.

Moreover, the Proponent has not provided any information that would constitute "good cause" for failing to so appear and present the proposal at the 2008 meeting. After the meeting started, DuPont received an e-mail from Mr. Phippen (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D) explaining that he would not be able to attend the meeting due to his wife's "*planned* [emphasis added] surgery with unexpected timing." The Staff has previously rejected health-related or medical issues as "good cause" for failure to appear. See Crown Holdings, Inc. (Jan. 9, 2008); The Coca-Cola Company (Dec. 27, 2007); J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (Feb. 13, 2004); Exxon Mobil Corporation (Dec. 14, 2004); and Merck & Co., Inc. (Dec. 14, 2004). Mr. Phippen did not arrange for a representative to appear in his absence and did not request that the Company appear on his behalf.

The Staff has consistently permitted companies to exclude shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-(h)(3) because a proponent or its qualified representative, without good cause, failed to appear to present a proposal. See, e.g, *E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company* (January 16, 2009, *Procter & Gamble Co.*, (Jul. 24, 2008); *Comcast Corporation* (Feb. 25, 2008); *Anthracite Capital, Inc.* (Feb. 5, 2008); *Intel Corporation* (Jan. 22, 2008); *Crown Holdings, Inc.* (Jan. 9, 2008); *Eastman Kodak Company* (Dec. 31, 2007); *Exxon Mobil Corporation* (Dec. 20, 2007); *Caterpillar Inc.* (Mar. 19, 2007); *Wm.*

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Wrigley Jr. Company (Dec. 5, 2006); Eastman Kodak Company (Jan. 30, 2006); Community Health Systems, Inc. (Jan. 25, 2006); The Coca-Cola Company (Jan. 23, 2006); Entergy Corporation (Jan. 10, 2006).

For the foregoing reason, DuPont respectfully requests that the Staff concur with DuPont's opinion that it may exclude the 2010 Proposal from its 2010 Proxy under Rule 14a-8(h)(3).

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (302) 774-0205 or my colleague, Mary Bowler, at (302) 774-5303.

Very Trafy Yours,

Erik T. Hoover Senior Counsel

ETH

Hoover, Erik/2010 PROXY STATEMENT SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL

cc: with attachment Clark Phippen

FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16

Fax (610) 254-4188 cphippen@enertechcapital.com

EXHIBIT A

CLARK PHIPPEN

DECEIVED 007:9208 BY:....

FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16

October 14, 2009

Ms. Mary E. Bowler Corporate Counsel and Corporate Secretary DuPont Company 1007 Market Street Wilmington, DE 19898

Dear Ms. Bowler:

As a DuPont retiree and shareholder, I would like to have the following included in the proxy material for the 2010 Annual Meeting:

"Shareholder Proposal Regarding Separation of the Positions of Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer"

RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors of the DuPont Company ("Company") analyze an report in an open and timely manner to the shareholders of the Company on the advisability of amending the Company by-laws to require that the Chairman of the Board of Directors shall not serve concurrently as Chief Executive Officer, and that whenever possible an independent Director shall serve of Chairman of the Board of Directors.

Supporting Statement:

The Board of Directors is elected by the shareholders with its Chairman providing leadership to the Board. The Business Roundtable has noted that "the paramount duty of the board of directors is to select a Chief Executive Officer and to oversee the CEO and other senior management...". The simplest application of logic says that a CEO while serving as Chairman of the Board cannot effectively oversee himself. The division of the Chairman and CEO roles will provide one more safeguard against the corporate scandals of recent years. However, even without the threat of corporate wrongdoing a truly independent board chairman can provide productive guidance, encouragement and incentive for a CEO to excel at the job of devising and implementing effective plans for Company growth and investor satisfaction. This is a widely adopted practice in Europe and is standard practice in the venture capital sector, America's true font of job creation and wealth.

We are not aware of definitive research that clearly proves separation of the chairman and CEO positions is either better or worse. We do know that The Conference Board recommended that corporations give careful it consideration. DuPont should do so.

We can be pleased that DuPont has not suffered from corporate scandals. No one can be pleased, however, that the Company has been drifting and withering for an extended

period. Over the past 5 years DuPont's stock price has declined about 40% while the Dow Jones Industrial Index is about at the same level that it was in October 2004. We shareholders hear much about the Company's Agriculture business sector – now about 26% of the company's total sales - and can easily believe that this is an area of great promise. Monsanto, the major competitor in this sector, is capturing this promise seeing its stock price steadily increase four-fold over the past 5 years. The market sees something about Monsanto that it does not see in DuPont. In fact, across the board today's generation hardly remembers the preeminent position DuPont once held in many areas of science.

The issue is leadership. Having an independent Chairman could inspire the CEO to get the job done or lead the effort to find one that can. This organizational change by itself could inspire the current and future management teams and board members to fully recognize what their roles are, and that the investors represented by the board and an independent chairman are their top responsibility.

This proposal simply asks that the Board of Directors formally review the issue of separation of the offices of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and report findings openly and publicly back to the shareholders. This proposal does not conflict with the objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or with the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ listing requirements, and does not conflict with the existing DuPont Company Bylaws.

One would hope that the Board could recognize that DuPont has seriously underperformed for many years and give this proposal serious consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16

cphippen@enertechcapital.com



DuPont Legal 1007 Market Street, D9058 Wilmington, DE 19898 Tel. (302) 774-5303; Fax (302) 774-4031 E-mail: Mary.E.Bowler@usa.dupont.com

October 29, 2009

Mr. Clark Phippen

FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16

Dear Mr. Phippen:

This is to confirm that DuPont has received your letter dated October 14, 2009, in which you request that the Company include in the proxy materials for the 2010 Annual Meeting a proposal related to separation of the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.

SEC Rules 14a-8(b) and (f), copies of which are enclosed, require proponents of shareholder proposals to provide documentary support for beneficial ownership of the Company's common stock. Please forward to me a brokerage statement or other documentation reflecting your ownership of DuPont stock, as required by the enclosed rules.

We will advise you in due course of management's position on your proposal.

Very truly yours,

Mary E. Bowler Corporate Secretary and Corporate Counsel

cc: Erik Hoover

enclosure

the dat shareh words.	 (1) If you are submitting your proposal for the company's annual meeting, you can in most cases find the deadline in last year's proxy statement. However, if the company did not hold an annual meeting last year, or has changed the date of its meeting for this year more than 30 days from last year's meeting, you can usually find the deadline in one of the company's quarterly reports on Form 10-Q or 10-QSB, or in shareholder reports of investment company Act of 1940. In order to avoid controversy, shareholders should submit their proposals by means, including electronic means, that permit them to prove the date of fellvery. (2) The deadline is calculated in the following manner if the proposal is submitted for a regularly scheduled annual meeting. The proposal must be received at the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's principal executive offices not less than 120 calendar days before the date of the company's provy statement released to shareholders in connection with the previous year's and the company's provest. 		and the second states and a second state of the second states and the se
Rule 14a-8. Sharehoider Proposals. This rule addresses when a company must include a shareholder's proposal in its proxy statement and identify the proposal in its form of proxy when the company holds an annial or special meeting of shareholders. In summary, in order to have your shareholder proposal included on a company's proxy card, and included on a company's proxy card, and included on a company's proxy card, and included on a company is proxy card, and included the analow of the analow of the proposal in its proxy statement, you must be eligible and follow cartain procedures. Under a few specific circumstances, the company is permitive to exclude this rule in a question-and-answer format so that it is easier to understand. The reletences to "you" are [directed] to a shareholder seeking to submit the proposal.	 (a) Question 1: What is a proposal? (a) Question 1: What is a proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the company and or directors take action, which you Intend to present at a meeting of the company's shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of action that you believe the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company should follow. If your proposal is placed on the company's proxy card, the company must also provide in the form of proxy means for shareholders to specify by hows a choice between approval, or abstention. Unless otherwise Indicated, the word 'proposal' as used in this rule refers both to your proposal, and to your corresponding slatement in support of your proposal (If any). (b) Question 2: Who is eligible to submit a proposal, and how do I demonstrate to the company that I am eligible? (1) In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have continuously held at test 22 00 in market value. or 1%, of the company's securities entitled to be voted on the context. 	proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal. You must continue to hold those securities through the date of the meeting. (2) If you are the registered holder of your securities, which means that your name appears in the company's records as a shareholder, the company with a written statement that you inlead to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders. However, if like many shareholder, or how many shares you own. In this case, at the time you is ubmit your proposal, you must prove your eligibility to the company in one of two ways: (i) The first way is to submit to the company a written statement from the "record" hade of your securities (usually a broker or bank) verifying that, at the time you submitted	your proposal, you continuously held the securities for at feast one year. You must also include your own written statement that you intend to continue to hold the securities through the date of the meeting of shareholders; or (ii) The second way to prove ownership applies only if you have filed a Schedule 13D. Subdule 13G, Form 3, Form 4 and/or Form 5, or amendments to those documents or updated forms, reflecting your ownership of the shares as of or before the date on which the owervar eligibility period begins. If you have filed one of these documents with the SEC, you way demonstrate your eligibility by submitting to the company: (A) A copy of the schedule and/or form, and any subsequent amendments reporting a change in your ownership level: (B) Your written statement that you continuously held the required number of shares but the ownership level:

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EXHIBIT B

CLARK PHIPPEN

FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16

October 22, 2007

Corporate Secretary DuPont Company 1007 Market Street Wilmington, DE 19898

Dear Sir:

As a DuPont retiree, shareholder, and options holder, I would like to propose the following for consideration at the 2008 DuPont Annual Meeting:

"Shareholder Proposal Regarding Separation of the Positions of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer"

RESOLVED, that the Board of Directors of the DuPont Company ("Company") analyze and report in an open and timely manner to the shareholders of the Company on the advisability of amending the Company by-laws to require that the Chairman of the Board of Directors shall not serve concurrently as Chief Executive Officer, and that whenever possible an independent Director shall serve as Chairman of the Board of Directors.

Supporting Statement:

The Board of Directors is elected by the shareholders with its Chairman providing leadership to the Board. The Business Roundtable has noted that "the paramount duty of the board of directors is to select a Chief Executive Officer and to oversee the CEO and other senior management...". The simplest application of logic says that a CEO while serving as Chairman of the Board cannot effectively oversee himself. The division of the Chairman and CEO roles will provide one more safeguard against the corporate scandals of recent years. However, even without the threat of corporate wrongdoing a truly independent board chairman can provide productive guidance, encouragement and incentive for a CEO to excel at the job of devising and implementing effective plans for Company growth and investor satisfaction. This is a widely adopted practice in Europe and is standard practice in the venture capital sector, America's true font of job creation and wealth.

We are not aware of definitive research that proves separation of the chairman and CEO positions is either better or worse. We do know that The Conference Board recommended that corporations give careful it consideration. DuPont should do so.

We can be pleased that DuPont has not suffered from corporate scandals. No one can be pleased, however, that over the past 10 years the Company has effectively drifted, and even withered. The stock price has declined about 33% while many other companies in

the chemicals, materials and related industries have made significant progress (Dow up 37%, 3M up 100% and even the Dow Jones average up 52%). Today's generation hardly remembers the preeminent position DuPont once held in the worlds of science and investment.

The issue is leadership. Having an independent Chairman could inspire the CEO to get the job done. The change by itself could inspire the current and future management teams and board members to fully recognize what their roles are, and that the investors represented by the board and an independent chairman are their top responsibility.

This proposal simply asks that the Board of Directors formally review the issue of separation of the offices of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and report findings back to the shareholders. This proposal does not conflict with the objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ listing requirements, and does not conflict with the existing DuPont Company Bylaws.

One would hope that the Board could recognize that DuPont has seriously underperformed for 10 years and give this proposal serious consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

Claret

Clark Phippen

FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16

cphippen@enertechcapital.com

EXHIBIT C

1	employees, both former and current, know
2	otherwise. No executive would ever be treated
3	the way employees are treated in a sale or a
4	closure situation. Just ask the employees at the
5	Louisville site who have seen their plant close
6	just in the last few months.
7	I ask you to support our proposal and
8	bring back a sense of fairness to the communities
9	where these plants are located and to the
10	employees who work at these plants. Thank you
11	very much.
12	MR. HOLLIDAY: Thank you for your
13	comments.
14	Other comments on this proposal?
15	Mary.
16	MS. BOWLER: Proposal No. 4 is
17	submitted by Mr. Clark Phippen and requests that
18	the board report to shareholders on amending the
19	company's bylaws to require separation of the
20	roles of chairman and chief executive officer.
21	The proposal begins on page 50 of the proxy
22	statement. The resolution included in the
23	proposal is before the meeting.
24	MR. HOLLIDAY: Mr. Phippen, would you

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1	\bigcap	care to comment on the proposal? Anyone like to
2		speak opposite this proposal?
3		MS. BOWLER: Proposal No. 5 is
4		submitted by the Free Enterprise Action Fund and
5		requests that the Board prepare a global warming
6		report. The proposal begins on page 52 of the
7		proxy statement. The resolution included in the
8		proposal is before the meeting.
9		MR. HOLLIDAY: Someone like to
10		introduce this proposal? Are there any comments
11		or questions from others about microphone No.
12		1.
13		MR. BAKER: Mr. Chairman, my name is
14		Joe Baker. I am the custodian for DuPont stock
15		for my seven grandchildren, and I'd like to speak
16		in opposition to Proposal 5.
17		I spent seven years supervising a
18		National Guard meteorology crew, and in the March
19		edition of "Mensa" magazine, there were a series
20		of articles concerning global warming and the
21		politics surrounding it. There's plenty of
22		political input.
23		If you analyze Al Gore's book, you'll
24	ł	find it long on political reasoning, very short

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EXHIBIT D



"Phippen, Clark" <CPhippen@enertechcapital. com> 04/30/2008 10:33 AM To Mary E Bowler/AE/DuPont@DuPont

bcc

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Subject Annual Meeting

Mary:

My wife had planned surgery with unexpected timing this morning – preventing me from attending the Annual Meeting. I am still deeply interested in seeing DuPont adopt a plan that could lead to separating the Chairman and CEO positions and will continue to pursue this issue. I note with interest that the Rockefeller family is pursuing the same with Exxon Mobil at that company's May 28 Annual Meeting.

Many thanks for your cooperation,

Clark

Clark Phippen EnerTech Capital 610-977-7609 Office ***FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16*** 610-254-4188 Office Fax 484-582-1089 Direct Fax