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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
SCHWAB MUNICIPAL MONEY FUNDS
Schwab Municipal Money Fund™
Schwab California Municipal Money Fund™
Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™
Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™
Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™
Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™
Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™
Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™
April 30, 2009
As amended March 12, 2010
The Statement of Additional Information (SAI) is not a prospectus. It should be read in conjunction with each fund’s prospectus dated April 30, 2009 (as amended from time to time).
To obtain a free copy of any of the prospectuses, please contact Schwab Funds® at 1-800-435-4000. For TDD service call 1-800-345-2550. The prospectuses also may be available on the Internet at: http://www.schwab.com/prospectus.
Each fund is a series of The Charles Schwab Family of Funds (the “Trust” or “CSFF”). The Trust and Schwab Investments, Schwab Capital Trust and Schwab Annuity Portfolios are collectively referred to as the “Schwab Funds®.”
The funds’ audited financial statements from the funds’ annual reports for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, are incorporated by reference into this SAI. A copy of a fund’s 2008 annual report is delivered with the SAI.
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INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES, SECURITIES, RISKS AND LIMITATIONS
Investment Objectives
Schwab Municipal Money Fund™ seeks the highest current income that is consistent with stability of capital and liquidity, and that is exempt from federal income tax.
Schwab California Municipal Money Fund™ seeks the highest current income that is consistent with stability of capital and liquidity, and that is exempt from federal and California personal income tax.
Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ seeks the highest current income that is consistent with stability of capital and liquidity, and that is exempt from federal and New York State and local income tax.
Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ seeks the highest current income that is consistent with stability of capital and liquidity, and that is exempt from federal and New Jersey gross income tax.
Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™ seeks the highest current income that is consistent with stability of capital and liquidity, and that is exempt from federal and Pennsylvania personal income tax.
Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund seeks the highest current income exempt from federal income tax that is consistent with stability of capital and liquidity.
Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ seeks the highest current income that is consistent with stability of capital and liquidity, and that is exempt from federal and Massachusetts personal income tax.
Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ seeks the highest current income exempt from federal and California personal income tax that is consistent with stability of capital and liquidity.
Each fund’s investment objective may be changed only by a vote of a majority of its outstanding voting shares. A majority of the outstanding voting shares of a fund means the affirmative vote of the lesser of: (a) 67% or more of the voting shares represented at the meeting, if more than 50% of the outstanding voting shares of a fund are represented at the meeting; or (b) more than 50% of the outstanding voting shares of a fund. There is no guarantee the funds will achieve their objectives.
The funds operate as money market funds and seek to comply with the requirements of Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”), as that Rule may be amended from time to time. The Rule’s key provisions govern the maturity, quality and diversification of money market fund investments. For example, with respect to maturity, Rule 2a-7 currently provides that money funds limit their investments to securities with remaining maturities of 397 days or less, and maintain dollar-weighted average maturities of 90 days or less, both calculated as described in the Rule. In addition, money funds may only invest in high quality securities. The funds are also subject to strict diversification requirements under Rule 2a-7.
The following investment strategies, securities, risks and limitations supplement those set forth in the prospectus and may be changed without shareholder approval unless otherwise noted. Also, policies and limitations that state a maximum percentage of assets that may be invested in a security or other asset, or that set forth a quality standard, shall be measured immediately after and as a result of a fund’s acquisition of such security or asset unless otherwise noted. Additionally, for purposes of

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calculating any restriction, an issuer shall be the entity deemed to be ultimately responsible for payments of interest and principal on the security pursuant to Rule 2a-7 under the 1940 Act unless otherwise noted.
Investment Strategies
Schwab Municipal Money Fund™ (a national municipal money fund) seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in municipal money market securities. Under normal circumstances, the fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets in municipal money market securities the interest from which is exempt from federal income tax. This policy may only be changed with shareholder approval. These investments may include securities that pay income that is subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT securities). The fund will count AMT securities toward satisfaction of the 80% basket in accordance with Rule 35d-1 under the 1940 Act. Also, for purposes of this policy, net assets mean net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes.
Schwab California Municipal Money Fund™ (a state-specific municipal money fund) seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in money market securities from California issuers and from municipal agencies, U.S. territories and possessions. Under normal circumstances, the fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets in municipal money market securities the interest from which is exempt from federal and California personal income tax. This policy may only be changed with shareholder approval. These investments may include securities that pay income that is subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT securities). The fund will count AMT securities toward satisfaction of the 80% basket in accordance with Rule 35d-1 under the 1940 Act. Also, for purposes of this policy, net assets mean net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes.
Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ (a state-specific municipal money fund) seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in money market securities from New York issuers and from municipal agencies, U.S. territories and possessions. Under normal circumstances, the fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets in municipal money market securities the interest from which is exempt from federal and New York State personal income tax, including the federal alternative minimum tax (“AMT”). This policy may only be changed with shareholder approval. Also, for purposes of this policy, net assets mean net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes.
Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ (a state-specific municipal money fund) seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in money market securities from New Jersey issuers and from municipal agencies, U.S. territories and possessions. Under normal circumstances, the fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets in municipal money market securities the interest from which is exempt from federal and New Jersey personal income tax, including the AMT. The fund does not currently intend to invest in any securities whose interest is subject to AMT. This policy may only be changed with shareholder approval. Also, for purposes of this policy, net assets mean net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes.
Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™ (a state-specific municipal money fund) seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in money market securities from Pennsylvania issuers and from municipal agencies, U.S. territories and possessions. Under normal circumstances, the fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets in municipal money market securities the interest from which is exempt from federal and Pennsylvania personal income tax. This policy may only be changed with shareholder approval. These investments may include securities that pay income that is subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT securities). The fund will count AMT securities toward satisfaction of the 80% basket in accordance with Rule 35d-1 under the 1940 Act. Also, for purposes of this policy, net assets mean net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes.

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Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ (a national municipal money fund) seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in money market securities from states and municipal agencies around the country and from U.S. territories and possessions. Under normal circumstances, the fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets in municipal money market securities whose interest is exempt from federal income tax, including the AMT. This policy may only be changed with shareholder approval. Also, for purposes of this policy, net assets means net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes. The fund does not currently intend to invest in any securities whose interest is subject to AMT.
Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ (a state-specific municipal money fund) seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in money market securities from Massachusetts issuers and from municipal agencies, U.S. territories and possessions. Under normal circumstances, the fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets in municipal money market securities the interest from which is exempt from federal and Massachusetts personal income tax, including the AMT. The fund does not currently intend to invest in any securities whose interest is subject to AMT. This policy may only be changed with shareholder approval. Also, for purposes of this policy, net assets mean net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes.
Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ (a state-specific municipal money fund) seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in money market securities from California issuers and from municipal agencies, U.S. territories and possessions. Under normal circumstances, the fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets in municipal money market securities whose interest is exempt from federal income tax, including the AMT, and California personal income tax. This policy may only be changed with shareholder approval. For purposes of this policy, net assets means net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes. The fund does not currently intend to invest in any securities whose interest is subject to AMT.
Investment Securities and Risks
Not all investment securities or techniques discussed below are eligible investments for each fund. A fund will invest in securities or engage in techniques that are intended to help achieve its investment objective.
Borrowing may subject a fund to interest costs, which may exceed the interest received on the securities purchased with the borrowed funds. A fund normally may borrow at times to meet redemption requests rather than sell portfolio securities to raise the necessary cash. Borrowing can involve leveraging when securities are purchased with the borrowed money. To avoid this, a fund will not purchase securities while borrowings are outstanding or will earmark or segregate assets to cover such borrowings in accordance with positions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Commercial Paper consists of short-term, promissory notes issued by banks, corporations and other entities to finance short-term credit needs. These securities generally are discounted but sometimes may be interest bearing. Commercial paper, which also may be unsecured, is subject to credit risk.
Concentration means that substantial amounts of assets are invested in a particular industry or group of industries. Concentration increases investment exposure to industry risk. For example, the automobile industry may have a greater exposure to a single factor, such as an increase in the price of oil, which may adversely affect the sale of automobiles and, as a result, the value of the industry’s securities. Each fund may invest more than 25% of its total assets in private activity bonds and municipal securities financing similar projects such as those relating to education, health care,

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transportation, utilities, industrial development and housing. To the extent a fund invests a substantial portion of its assets in private activity bond and municipal securities financing similar projects, the fund may be more sensitive to adverse economic, business or political developments. A change that affects one project, such as proposed legislation on the financing of the project, a shortage of the materials needed for the project, or a declining need for the project, would likely affect all similar projects and the overall municipal risk.
Credit and Liquidity Supports or enhancements may be employed by issuers to reduce the credit risk of their securities. Credit supports include letters of credit, insurance and guarantees provided by foreign and domestic entities as well as moral obligations, which are sometimes issued with municipal securities. Liquidity supports include puts, demand features, and lines of credit. Most of these arrangements move the credit risk of an investment from the issuer of the security to the support provider. Changes in the credit quality of a support provider could cause losses to a fund.
Debt Securities are obligations issued by domestic and foreign entities, including governments and corporations, in order to raise money. They are basically “IOUs,” but are commonly referred to as bonds or money market securities. These securities normally require the issuer to pay a fixed, variable or floating rate of interest on the amount of money borrowed (the “principal”) until it is paid back upon maturity.
Debt securities experience price changes when interest rates change. For example, when interest rates fall, the prices of debt securities generally rise. Issuers tend to pre-pay their outstanding debts and issue new ones paying lower interest rates. Conversely, in a rising interest rate environment, prepayment on outstanding debt securities generally will not occur. This is known as extension risk and may cause the value of debt securities to depreciate as a result of the higher market interest rates. Typically, longer-maturity securities react to interest rate changes more severely than shorter-term securities (all things being equal), but generally offer greater rates of interest. Debt securities also are subject to the risk that the issuers will not make timely interest and/or principal payments or fail to make them at all.
Delayed-Delivery Transactions include purchasing and selling securities on a delayed-delivery or when-issued basis. These transactions involve a commitment to buy or sell specific securities at a predetermined price or yield, with payment and delivery taking place after the customary settlement period for that type of security. When purchasing securities on a delayed-delivery basis, a fund assumes the rights and risks of ownership, including the risk of price and yield fluctuations. Typically, no interest will accrue to a fund until the security is delivered. A fund will earmark or segregate appropriate liquid assets to cover its delayed-delivery purchase obligations. When a fund sells a security on a delayed-delivery basis, the fund does not participate in further gains or losses with respect to that security. If the other party to a delayed-delivery transaction fails to deliver or pay for the securities, a fund could suffer losses.
Diversification involves investing in a wide range of securities and thereby spreading and reducing the risks of investment. Each fund, except the Schwab Municipal Money Fund™, Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ and the Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, is a non-diversified mutual fund. Each fund follows the regulations set forth by the SEC in Rule 2a-7 that dictate the diversification requirements for money market mutual funds, as such regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time. The Schwab Municipal Money Fund™ and Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund may invest up to 25% of their assets in “first tier” securities of a single issuer for a period of up to three business days.

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Foreign Securities involve additional risks, because they are issued by foreign entities, including foreign governments, banks and corporations or because they are traded principally overseas. Credit and liquidity supports also may be provided by foreign entities. Foreign securities in which a fund may invest include foreign entities that are not subject to uniform accounting, auditing and financial reporting standards, practices and requirements comparable to those applicable to U.S. corporations. In addition, there may be less publicly available information about foreign entities. Foreign economic, political and legal developments, and withholding taxes, could have more dramatic effects on the value of foreign securities. For example, conditions within and around foreign countries, such as the possibility of expropriation or confiscatory taxation, political or social instability, diplomatic developments, change of government or war could affect the value of foreign investments. Moreover, individual foreign economies may differ favorably or unfavorably from the U.S. economy in such respects as growth of gross national product, rate of inflation, capital reinvestment, resource self-sufficiency and balance of payments position.
Foreign securities typically have less volume and are generally less liquid and more volatile than securities of U.S. companies. Fixed commissions on foreign securities exchanges are generally higher than negotiated commissions on U.S. exchanges, although a fund will endeavor to achieve the most favorable overall results on portfolio transactions. There is generally less government supervision and regulation of foreign securities exchanges, brokers, dealers and listed companies than in the United States, thus increasing the risk of delayed settlements of portfolio transactions or loss of certificates for portfolio securities. There may be difficulties in obtaining or enforcing judgments against foreign issuers as well. These factors and others may increase the risks with respect to the liquidity of a fund, and its ability to meet a large number of shareholder redemption requests.
Foreign markets also have different clearance and settlement procedures and, in certain markets, there have been times when settlements have been unable to keep pace with the volume of securities transactions, making it difficult to conduct such transactions. Such delays in settlement could result in temporary periods when a portion of the assets of a fund is uninvested and no return is earned thereon. The inability to make intended security purchases due to settlement problems could cause a fund to miss attractive investment opportunities. Losses to a fund arising out of the inability to fulfill a contract to sell such securities also could result in potential liability for a fund.
Illiquid Securities generally are any securities that cannot be disposed of promptly and in the ordinary course of business at approximately the amount at which a fund has valued the instruments. The liquidity of a fund’s investments is monitored under the supervision and direction of the Board of Trustees. Investments currently not considered liquid include repurchase agreements not maturing within seven days and certain restricted securities.
Interfund Borrowing and Lending. The SEC has granted an exemption to the Schwab Funds® that permits the funds to borrow money from and/or lend money to other Schwab Funds. All loans are for temporary or emergency purposes and the interest rates to be charged will be the average of the overnight repurchase agreement rate and the short-term bank loan rate. All loans are subject to numerous conditions designed to ensure fair and equitable treatment of all participating funds. The interfund lending facility is subject to the oversight and periodic review of the Board of Trustees of the Schwab Funds®.
Money Market Securities are high-quality, short-term debt securities that may be issued by entities such as the U.S. government, municipalities, corporations and financial institutions (like banks). Money market securities include commercial paper, promissory notes, certificates of deposit, banker’s acceptances, notes and time deposits.

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Money market securities pay fixed, variable or floating rates of interest and are generally subject to credit and interest rate risks. The maturity date or price of and financial assets collateralizing a security may be structured in order to make it qualify as or act like a money market security. These securities may be subject to greater credit and interest rate risks than other money market securities because of their structure. Money market securities may be issued with puts or these can be sold separately.
Municipal Leases are obligations issued to finance the construction or acquisition of equipment or facilities. These obligations may take the form of a lease, an installment purchase contract, a conditional sales contract or a participation interest in any of these obligations. Municipal leases may be considered illiquid investments. Additionally, municipal leases are generally subject to “nonappropriation risk,” which is the risk that the municipality may terminate the lease because funds have not been allocated to make the necessary lease payments. The lessor would then be entitled to repossess the property, but the value of the property may be less to private sector entities than it would be to the municipality.
Municipal Securities are debt securities issued by a state, its counties, municipalities, authorities and other subdivisions, or the territories and possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia, including their subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities and corporations (“municipal issuers”). These securities may be issued to obtain money for various public purposes, including the construction of a wide range of public facilities such as airports, bridges, highways, housing, hospitals, mass transportation, public utilities, schools, streets, and water and sewer works. Other public purposes include refunding outstanding obligations, obtaining funds for general operating expenses and obtaining funds to loan to other public institutions and facilities.
Municipal securities also may be issued to finance various private activities, including certain types of private activity bonds (“industrial development bonds” under prior law). These securities may be issued by or on behalf of public authorities to obtain funds to provide certain privately owned or operated facilities. The funds may not be desirable investments for “substantial users” of facilities financed by private activity bonds or industrial development bonds or for “related persons” of substantial users because distributions from the funds attributable to interest on such bonds may not be tax exempt. The funds may also acquire and hold “conduit securities,” which are securities issued by a municipal issuer involving an arrangement or agreement with a person other than a municipal issuer to provide for, or secure repayment of, the securities. Shareholders should consult their own tax advisors regarding the potential effect on them (if any) of any investment in these funds.
Municipal securities may be owned directly or through participation interests, and include general obligation or revenue securities, tax-exempt commercial paper, notes and leases. The maturity date or price of and financial assets collateralizing a municipal money market security may be structured in order to make it qualify as or act like a municipal money market security. These securities may be subject to greater credit and interest rate risks than other municipal money market securities because of their structure.
Municipal securities generally are classified as “general obligation” or “revenue” and may be purchased directly or through participation interests. General obligation securities typically are secured by the issuer’s pledge of its full faith and credit and taxing power for the payment of principal and interest. Revenue securities typically are payable only from the revenues derived from a particular facility or class of facilities or, in some cases, from the proceeds of a special tax or other specific revenue source. Private activity bonds and industrial development bonds are, in most cases, revenue bonds and generally do not constitute the pledge of the credit of the issuer of such bonds.

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The credit quality of private activity bonds is frequently related to the credit standing of private corporations or other entities.
Examples of municipal securities that are issued with original maturities of 397 days or less are short-term tax anticipation notes, bond anticipation notes, revenue anticipation notes, construction loan notes, pre-refunded municipal bonds and tax-free commercial paper. Tax anticipation notes typically are sold to finance working capital needs of municipalities in anticipation of the receipt of property taxes on a future date. Bond anticipation notes are sold on an interim basis in anticipation of a municipality’s issuance of a longer-term bond in the future. Revenue anticipation notes are issued in expectation of the receipt of other types of revenue, such as that available under the Federal Revenue Sharing Program. Construction loan notes are instruments insured by the Federal Housing Administration with permanent financing by Fannie Mae or “Ginnie Mae” (the Government National Mortgage Association) at the end of the project construction period. Pre-refunded municipal bonds are bonds that are not yet refundable, but for which securities have been placed in escrow to refund an original municipal bond issue when it becomes refundable. Tax-free commercial paper is an unsecured promissory obligation issued or guaranteed by a municipal issuer. The funds may purchase other municipal securities similar to the foregoing that are or may become available, including securities issued to pre-refund other outstanding obligations of municipal issuers.
The funds also may invest in moral obligation securities, which are normally issued by special purpose public authorities. If the issuer of a moral obligation security is unable to meet its obligation from current revenues, it may draw on a reserve fund. The state or municipality that created the entity has only a moral commitment, not a legal obligation, to restore the reserve fund.
The value of municipal securities may be affected by uncertainties with respect to the rights of holders of municipal securities in the event of bankruptcy or the taxation of municipal securities as a result of legislation or litigation. For example, under federal law, certain issuers of municipal securities may be authorized in certain circumstances to initiate bankruptcy proceedings without prior notice to or the consent of creditors. Such action could result in material adverse changes in the rights of holders of the securities. In addition, litigation challenging the validity under the state constitutions of present systems of financing public education has been initiated or adjudicated in a number of states, and legislation has been introduced to effect changes in public school finances in some states. In other instances, there has been litigation challenging the issuance of pollution control revenue bonds or the validity of their issuance under state or federal law, which ultimately could affect the validity of those municipal securities or the tax-free nature of the interest thereon.
Municipal securities pay fixed, variable or floating rates of interest, which is meant to be exempt from federal income tax, and, typically personal income tax of a state or locality.
The investment adviser relies on the opinion of the issuer’s counsel, which is rendered at the time the security is issued, to determine whether the security is eligible, with respect to its validity and tax status, to be purchased by a fund.
The funds may purchase certain variable rate demand securities issued by closed-end municipal bond funds, which, in turn, invest primarily in portfolios of tax-exempt municipal bonds. The funds may invest in securities issued by single state or national closed-end municipal bond funds. It is anticipated that the interest on the variable rate demand securities will be exempt from federal income tax and, with respect to any such securities issued by single state municipal bond funds, exempt from the applicable state’s income tax. The Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money™, Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money™, Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money™, Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money™ and the Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ will invest in variable

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rate demand securities issued by single state or national closed-end municipal bond funds only if it is anticipated that the interest on such securities will be exempt from the AMT. The variable rate demand securities will pay a variable dividend rate, determined weekly, typically through a remarketing process, and include a demand feature that provides a fund with a contractual right to tender the securities to a liquidity provider on at least seven (7) days notice. The funds will have the right to seek to enforce the liquidity provider’s contractual obligation to purchase the securities, but the funds could lose money if the liquidity provider fails to honor its obligation. The funds have no right to put the securities back to the closed-end municipal bond funds or demand payment or redemption directly from the closed-end municipal bond funds. Further, the variable rate demand securities are not freely transferable and, therefore, the funds may only transfer the securities to another investor in compliance with certain exemptions under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”), including Rule 144A.
A fund’s purchase of variable rate demand securities issued by closed-end municipal bond funds will be subject to the restrictions set forth in the 1940 Act regarding investments in other investment companies. Variable rate demand securities issued by closed-end municipal bond funds are considered “municipal money market securities” for purposes of each of the fund’s investment policy to invest at least 80% of its net assets in “municipal money market securities.”
Puts, sometimes called demand features or guarantees, are agreements that allow the buyer of the put to sell a security at a specified price and time to the seller or “put provider.” When a fund buys a security with a put feature, losses could occur if the put provider does not perform as agreed. Standby commitments are types of puts.
Quality of Investments. Each fund follows regulations set forth by the SEC that dictate the quality requirements for investments by money market mutual funds as such regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time. These regulations require the funds to invest exclusively in high-quality securities. Generally, high-quality securities are securities that present minimal credit risks and are rated in one of the two highest rating categories by two nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs), or by one if only one NRSRO has rated the securities, or, if unrated, determined to be of comparable quality by the investment adviser pursuant to guidelines adopted by the Board of Trustees. High-quality securities may be “first tier” or “second tier” securities. First tier securities may be rated within the highest category or determined to be of comparable quality by the investment adviser. Money market fund shares and U.S. government securities also are first tier securities. Second tier securities generally are rated within the second-highest category.
Should a security’s high-quality rating change after purchase by a fund, the investment adviser would take such action, including no action, as determined to be in the best interest of the fund and as required by Rule 2a-7. For more information about the ratings assigned by some NRSROs, refer to the Appendix section of the SAI.
Restricted Securities are securities that are subject to legal restrictions on their sale. For example, tender option bonds, commercial paper and other promissory notes may be issued under Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act and may be sold only to qualified institutional buyers, such as the funds, under Securities Act Rule 144A.
Restricted securities may be deemed liquid or illiquid. In order to be deemed liquid, a fund must be able to dispose of the security in the ordinary course of business at approximately the amount the fund has valued the security. In addition, the investment adviser must determine that an institutional or other market exists for these securities. In making this determination, the investment adviser may take into account any liquidity support associated with the security. It is not possible to predict with

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assurance whether the market for any restricted security will continue. Therefore, the investment adviser monitors a fund’s investments in these securities, focusing on factors, such as valuation, liquidity and availability of information. To the extent a fund invests in restricted securities that are deemed liquid, the general level of illiquidity in a fund’s portfolio may increase if buyers in that market become unwilling to purchase the securities.
Securities of Other Investment Companies. Investment companies generally offer investors the advantages of diversification and professional investment management, by combining shareholders’ money and investing it in securities such as stocks, bonds and money market instruments. The risks of investing in a particular investment company will generally reflect the risks of the securities in which it invests and the investment techniques it employs. Because investment companies employ investment advisers and other service providers, investments by a fund into another investment company may cause shareholders to pay duplicative fees and incur expenses.
Federal law restricts the ability of one registered investment company to invest in another. As a result, the extent to which a fund may invest in another investment company may be limited. With respect to investments in other mutual funds, the SEC has granted the Schwab Funds® an exemption from the limitations of the 1940 Act that restrict the amount of securities of underlying mutual funds a Schwab Fund may hold, provided that certain conditions are met. The conditions imposed by the SEC were designed to address certain abuses perceived to be associated with “funds of funds”, including unnecessary costs (such as sales loads, advisory fees and administrative costs), and undue influence by the investing fund over the underlying fund. The conditions apply only when a Schwab fund and its affiliates in the aggregate own more than 3% of the outstanding shares of any one underlying fund.
State-Specific Municipal Money Funds are municipal money market funds that invest at least 80% of their net assets in securities that pay income that is exempt from federal taxes and the taxes of a particular state. These funds may invest primarily and generally predominately in municipal money market securities issued by or on behalf of one state or one state’s counties, municipalities, authorities or other subdivisions. They also may invest in securities issued by certain U.S. territories and possessions, such as Puerto Rico, that pay income that is exempt from federal and state income tax.
Securities of state-specific municipal funds are subject to the same general risks associated with other municipal funds’ securities. The ability of a state or its municipalities to meet their obligations will depend on the availability of tax and other revenues; economic, political and demographic conditions within the state; and the underlying fiscal condition of the state and its municipalities. For example, the ability of issuers to pay interest on, and repay principal of, municipal securities of a given state may be affected by: (1) amendments to the state’s Constitution and related statutes that limit the taxing and spending authority of the state’s government entities; (2) voter initiatives; (3) civil actions; (4) a wide variety of state laws and regulations; and (5) the general financial condition of the state. Accordingly, a fund that invests primarily in securities issued by a single state and its political subdivisions provides a greater level of risk than a fund that is diversified across numerous states and municipal entities.
Municipal securities that are payable only from the revenues derived from a particular facility may be adversely affected by a state’s laws or regulations that make it more difficult for the particular facility to generate revenues sufficient to pay such interest and principal. For example, laws and regulations that limit the amount of fees, rates or other charges that may be imposed for use of the facility or that increase competition among facilities of that type or that limit or otherwise have the effect of reducing the use of such facilities may have the effect of reducing the revenues generated by the particular facility. Municipal securities, the payment of interest and principal on which is insured, in

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whole or in part, by a state governmentally created fund, may be adversely affected by state laws or regulations that restrict the aggregate proceeds available for payment of principal and interest in the event of a default on such municipal securities. Because of the diverse nature of such laws and regulations and the impossibility of predicting (a) which specific municipal securities a state-specific municipal fund will invest in from time to time; and (b) the nature or extent of future changes in existing laws or regulations or the future enactment or adoption of additional laws or regulations in a given state, it is not presently possible to determine the impact of such laws and regulations on the securities in which a state-specific municipal fund may invest or on the shares of the state-specific municipal fund.
In addition, the Trust cannot predict what legislation, if any, may be proposed in a state’s legislature in regards to the state personal income tax status of the interest on such obligations, or which proposals, if any, might be enacted. Such proposals, if enacted, might materially adversely affect the availability of municipal securities for investment by a fund and the value of the fund’s investments.
These funds are not suitable for investors who would not benefit from the tax-exempt character of each fund’s investments, such as holders of IRAs, qualified retirement plans or other tax-exempt entities.
Stripped Securities are securities whose income and principal components are detached and sold separately. While the risks associated with stripped securities are similar to other money market securities, stripped securities are typically subject to greater changes in value. U.S. Treasury securities that have been stripped by the Federal Reserve Bank are obligations of the U.S. Treasury. Privately stripped government securities are created when a dealer deposits a U.S. Treasury security or other U.S. Government security with a custodian for safekeeping; the custodian issues separate receipts for the coupon payments and the principal payment, which the dealer then sells. There are two types of stripped securities: coupon strips, which refer to the zero coupon bonds that are backed by the coupon payments; and principal strips, which are backed by the final repayments of principal. Unlike coupon strips, principal strips do not accrue a coupon payment. They are sold at a discounted price and accrete up to par. An investor in a principal strip would only need to pay capital gains tax on the principal strip.
The funds may invest in U.S. Treasury bonds that have been stripped of their unmatured interest coupons, the coupons themselves, and receipts or certificates representing interests in such stripped debt obligations and coupons. Interest on zero coupon bonds is accrued and paid at maturity rather than during the term of the security. Such obligations have greater price volatility than coupon obligations and other normal interest-paying securities, and the value of zero coupon securities reacts more quickly to changes in interest rates than do coupon bonds. Because dividend income is accrued throughout the term of the zero coupon obligation, but it is not actually received until maturity, a fund may have to sell other securities to pay accrued dividends prior to the maturity of the zero coupon obligation.
Unlike regular U.S. Treasury bonds which pay semi-annual interest, U.S. Treasury zero coupon bonds do not generate semi-annual coupon payments. Instead, zero coupon bonds are purchased at a substantial discount from the maturity of such securities. The discount reflects the current value of the deferred interest and is amortized as interest income over the life of the securities; it is taxable even though there is no cash return until maturity.
Zero coupon U.S. Treasury issues originally were created by government bond dealers who bought U.S. Treasury bonds and issued receipts representing an ownership interest in the interest coupons or the principal portion of the bonds. Subsequently, the U.S. Treasury began directly issuing zero coupon bonds with the introduction of the Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of

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Securities (“STRIPS”) program. Under the STRIPS program, the principal and interest components are separately issued by the U.S. Treasury at the request of depository financial institutions, which then trade the component parts separately.
While zero coupon bonds eliminate the reinvestment risk of regular coupon issues, i.e., the risk of subsequently investing the periodic interest payments at a lower rate than that of the security currently held, zero coupon bonds fluctuate much more sharply than regular coupon-bearing bonds. Thus, when interest rates rise, the value of zero coupon bonds will decrease to a greater extent than will the value of regular bonds having the same interest rate.
Temporary Defensive Investments. Under normal conditions, each fund does not intend to invest more than 20% of its net assets in securities whose interest is subject to federal income tax. With respect to the state-specific municipal money funds, the funds do not intend to invest, under normal conditions, more than 20% of their net assets in securities whose interest is subject to the respective state’s income taxes. Accordingly, each fund may invest a portion of its assets in securities that generate income that is not exempt from federal or state income tax. In addition, from time to time, as a defensive measure or under abnormal market conditions, the funds may make temporary investments in securities, the interest on which is subject to federal income and/or state and local personal income taxes. For the Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ and the Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, under normal conditions, the funds do not currently intend to invest in any municipal securities whose interest is subject to the AMT. However, from time to time, as a temporary defensive measure or under abnormal market conditions, the funds may make temporary investments in securities whose interest is subject to federal income tax and in municipal securities whose interest is subject to the AMT.
U.S. Government Securities. Many U.S. government securities are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, which means they are neither issued nor guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury. Securities such as those issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) maintain limited lines of credit with the U.S. Treasury. Others, such as obligations issued by the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation (FFCB), are supported solely by the credit of the issuer. There can be no assurance that the U.S. government will provide financial support to securities of its agencies and instrumentalities if it is not obligated to do so under law. Also, any government guarantees on securities that a fund owns do not extend to shares of the fund itself. Although the risk of default with U.S. government securities is considered unlikely, any default on the part of a portfolio investment could cause a fund’s share price or yield to fall.
On September 7, 2008, the U.S. Treasury announced a federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, placing the two federal instrumentalities in conservatorship. Under the takeover, the U.S. Treasury agreed to acquire $1 billion of senior preferred stock of each instrumentality and obtained warrants for the purchase of common stock of each instrumentality. Under this agreement, the U.S. Treasury has pledged to provide up to $100 billion per instrumentality as needed, including the contribution of cash capital to the instrumentalities in the event their liabilities exceed their assets. This is intended to ensure that the instrumentalities maintain a positive net worth and meet their financial obligations preventing mandatory triggering of receivership. Additionally, the U.S. Treasury has implemented a temporary program to purchase new mortgage-backed securities issued by the instrumentalities. This is intended to create more affordable mortgage rates for homeowners, enhance the liquidity of the mortgage market and potentially maintain or increase the value of existing mortgage-backed securities. The program expires in December 2009. No assurance can be given that the U.S. Treasury initiatives will be successful.

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U.S. Treasury Securities are obligations of the U.S. Treasury and include bills, notes and bonds. U.S. Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government.
Variable and Floating Rate Debt Securities pay an interest rate, which is adjusted either periodically or at specific intervals or which floats continuously according to a formula or benchmark. Although these structures generally are intended to minimize the fluctuations in value that occur when interest rates rise and fall, some structures may be linked to a benchmark in such a way as to cause greater volatility to the security’s value.
Some variable rate securities may be combined with a put or demand feature (variable rate demand securities) that entitles the holder to the right to demand repayment in full or to resell at a specific price and/or time. While the demand feature is intended to reduce credit risks, it is not always unconditional and may be subject to termination if the issuer’s credit rating falls below investment grade or if the issuer fails to make payments on other debt. While most variable-rate demand securities allow a fund to exercise its demand rights at any time, some such securities may only allow a fund to exercise its demand rights at certain times, which reduces the liquidity usually associated with this type of security. A fund could suffer losses in the event that the demand feature provider, usually a bank, fails to meet its obligation to pay the demand.
Synthetic variable or floating rate securities include tender option bond receipts. Tender option bond receipts are derived from fixed-rate municipal bonds that are placed in a trust that also contains a liquidity facility. The trust issues two classes of receipts, one of which is a synthetic variable-rate demand obligation and one of which is an inverse-rate long-term obligation; each obligation represents a proportionate interest in the underlying bonds. The remarketing agent for the trust sets a floating or variable rate on typically a weekly basis. The synthetic variable-rate demand obligations, or floater receipts, grant the investors (floater holders) the right to require the liquidity provider to purchase the receipts at par, on a periodic (e.g., daily, weekly or monthly) basis. The trust receives the interest income paid by the issuer of the underlying bonds and, after paying fees to the trustee, remarketing agent and liquidity provider, the remaining income is paid to the floater holders based on the prevailing market rate set by the remarketing agent and the remaining (or inverse) amount is paid to the long-term investor. The trust is collapsed prior to the maturity of the bonds and the receipts holders may participate in any gain realized from the sale of the bonds at that time. In the event of certain defaults or a significant downgrading in the credit rating assigned to the issuer of the bond, the liquidity facility provider may not be obligated to accept tendered floater receipts. In this event, the underlying bonds in the trust are priced for sale in the market and the proceeds are used to repay the floater and inverse receipt holders. If the receipts holders cannot be repaid in full from the sale of the underlying bonds then the bonds will be distributed to the receipts holders on a pro-rata basis, in which case the holders would anticipate a loss. Tender option bonds may be considered derivatives and are subject to the risk thereof.
The funds may invest in tender option bonds the interest on which will, in the opinion of bond counsel or counsel for the issuer of interests therein, be exempt from regular federal income tax. Tender option bond trust receipts generally are structured as private placements and, accordingly, may be deemed to be restricted securities for purposes of a fund’s investment limitations.
Investment Limitations
The following investment limitations may be changed only by vote of a majority of each fund’s outstanding voting shares.

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Each of Schwab Municipal Money Fund™, Schwab California Municipal Money Fundand Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ may not:
(1)   Concentrate investments in a particular industry or group of industries, as concentration is defined under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
 
(2)   Purchase or sell commodities or real estate, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
 
(3)   Lend or borrow money, except to the extent permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(4)   Underwrite securities issued by other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
 
(5)   Pledge, mortgage or hypothecate any of its assets, except to the extent as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(6)   Issue senior securities, except to the extent as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(7)   Purchase securities or make investments other than in accordance with investment objectives and policies.
Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ may not:
(1)   Concentrate investments in a particular industry or group of industries, as concentration is defined under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
 
(2)   Purchase or sell commodities or real estate, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
 
(3)   Lend or borrow money, except to the extent permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(4)   Underwrite securities issued by other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
 
(5)   Pledge, mortgage or hypothecate any of its assets, except to the extent as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.

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(6)   Issue senior securities, except to the extent as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
Schwab Municipal Money Fund™ and Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund may not:
(1)   Purchase securities of any issuer unless consistent with the maintenance of its status as a diversified company under the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
Each of Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™, Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ and Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ may not:
(1)   Concentrate investments in a particular industry or group of industries, as concentration is defined under the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(2)   Purchase or sell commodities, commodities contracts, futures contracts, or real estate, except as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(3)   Lend or borrow money, except as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(4)   Underwrite securities, except as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(5)   Pledge, mortgage or hypothecate any of its assets, except as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
 
(6)   Issue senior securities, except as permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ may not:
(1)   Purchase securities of any issuer unless consistent with the maintenance of its status as a diversified company under the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time, provided, however, that the fund may invest up to 25% of its total assets without regard to this restriction as permitted by Rule 2a-7 under the 1940 Act.
The following descriptions of the 1940 Act may assist investors in understanding the above policies and restrictions.
Diversification. Under the 1940 Act, a diversified fund, with respect to 75% of its total assets, may not purchase securities (other than U.S. government securities or securities of other investment companies) if, as a result, more than 5% of its total assets would be invested in the securities of such

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issuer or it would own more than 10% of such issuer’s outstanding voting securities. Money market funds that satisfy the applicable diversification requirements of Rule 2a-7 of the 1940 Act are deemed to satisfy the diversification requirements set forth above.
Borrowing. The 1940 Act presently restricts a fund from borrowing (including pledging, mortgaging or hypothecating assets) in excess of 33 1/3% of its total assets (not including temporary borrowings not in excess of 5% of its total assets).
Lending. Under the 1940 Act, a fund may only make loans if expressly permitted by its investment policies.
Concentration. The SEC presently defines concentration as investing 25% or more of a fund’s net assets in an industry or group of industries, with certain exceptions. Municipal securities are not deemed to be issued by an issuer from a single industry or group of industries.
Underwriting. Under the 1940 Act, underwriting securities involves a fund purchasing securities directly from an issuer for the purpose of selling (distributing) them or participating in any such activity either directly or indirectly. Under the 1940 Act, a diversified fund may not make any commitment as underwriter, if immediately thereafter the amount of its outstanding underwriting commitments, plus the value of its investments in securities of issuers (other than investment companies) of which it owns more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities, exceeds 25% of the value of its total assets. The foregoing restriction does not apply to non-diversified funds.
Senior Securities. Senior securities may include any obligation or instrument issued by a fund evidencing indebtedness. The 1940 Act generally prohibits funds from issuing senior securities, although it provides allowances for certain borrowings and certain other investments, such as short sales, reverse repurchase agreements, firm commitment agreements and standby commitments, with appropriate earmarking or segregation of assets to cover such obligations.
Real Estate. The 1940 Act does not directly restrict a fund’s ability to invest in real estate, but does require that every fund have a fundamental investment policy governing such investments. The funds have adopted a fundamental policy that would permit direct investment in real estate. However, the funds have a non-fundamental investment limitation that prohibits them from investing directly in real estate. This non-fundamental policy may be changed only by vote of the funds’ Board of Trustees.
The following are non-fundamental investment policies and restrictions, and may be changed by the Board of Trustees.
Each fund may not:
(1)   Purchase securities of other investment companies, except as permitted by the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
 
(2)   Lend any security or make any other loan if, as a result, more than 33 1/3% of its total assets would be lent to other parties (this restriction does not apply to purchases of debt securities or repurchase agreements).
 
(3)   Borrow money except that the fund may (i) borrow money from banks or through an interfund lending facility, if any, only for temporary or emergency purposes (and not for leveraging) and (ii) engage in reverse repurchase agreements with any party; provided that (i) and (ii) in

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    combination do not exceed 33 1/3% of its total assets (any borrowings that come to exceed this amount will be reduced to the extent necessary to comply with the limitation within three business days).
 
(4)   Sell securities short unless it owns the security or the right to obtain the security or equivalent securities, or unless it covers such short sale as required by current SEC rules and interpretations (transactions in futures contracts, options and other derivative instruments are not considered selling securities short).
 
(5)   Purchase or sell commodities, commodity contracts or real estate, including interests in real estate limited partnerships, provided that the fund may (i) purchase securities of companies that deal in real estate or interests therein (including REITs), (ii) purchase or sell futures contracts, options contracts, equity index participations and index participation contracts, and (iii) purchase securities of companies that deal in precious metals or interests therein.
 
(6)   Invest more than 10% of its net assets in illiquid securities.
 
(7)   Purchase securities on margin, except such short-term credits as may be necessary for the clearance of purchases and sales of securities and provided that margin deposits in connection with futures contracts, options on futures or other derivative instruments shall not constitute purchasing securities on margin.
Schwab Municipal Money Fund™ may not:
(1)   Purchase securities (other than securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies or instrumentalities) if, as a result of such purchase, 25% or more of the value of its total assets would be invested in any industry, group of industries or in any one state (although securities issued by government or political subdivisions of governments are not considered to be securities subject to this industry concentration restriction).
Schwab California Municipal Money Fund™, Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™, Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ , Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ and Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ may not:
(1)   Purchase securities (other than securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies or instrumentalities) if, as a result of such purchase, 25% or more of the value of its total assets would be invested in any industry or group of industries (although securities issued by government or political subdivisions of governments are not considered to be securities subject to this industry concentration restriction).
Policies and investment limitations that state a maximum percentage of assets that may be invested in a security or other asset, or that set forth a quality standard shall be measured immediately after and as a result of the fund’s acquisition of such security or asset, unless otherwise noted. Except with respect to limitations on borrowing, any subsequent change in net assets or other circumstances does not require a fund to sell an investment if it could not then make the same investment. With respect to the limitation on illiquid securities, in the event that a subsequent change in net assets or other circumstances causes a fund to exceed its limitation, the fund will take steps to bring the aggregate amount of illiquid instruments back within the limitations as soon as reasonably practicable.

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MANAGEMENT OF THE FUNDS
The funds are overseen by a Board of Trustees. The trustees are responsible for protecting shareholder interests. The trustees regularly meet to review the investment activities, contractual arrangements and the investment performance of each fund. The trustees met 11 times during the most recent fiscal year.
Certain trustees are “interested persons.” A trustee is considered an interested person of the Trust under the 1940 Act if he or she is an officer, director, or an employee of Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (“CSIM”) or Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (“Schwab”). A trustee also may be considered an interested person of the Trust under the 1940 Act if he or she owns stock of The Charles Schwab Corporation, a publicly traded company and the parent company of the funds’ investment adviser and distributor.
Each of the officers and/or trustees also serves in the same capacity as described for the Trust, for Schwab Investments, Schwab Capital Trust and Schwab Annuity Portfolios (collectively referred to herein as the “Family of Investment Companies”), which as of December 31, 2008, included 69 funds.
The tables below provide information about the trustees and officers for the Trust, which includes funds in this SAI. The “Fund Complex” includes The Charles Schwab Family of Funds, Schwab Investments, Schwab Capital Trust, Schwab Annuity Portfolios, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust. As of December 31, 2008, the Fund Complex included 84 funds. The address of each individual is 101 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, California 94104.
Each officer’s and trustee’s principal occupations during the past five years, other current directorships and affiliations, if any, with The Charles Schwab Corporation, Schwab and CSIM are as follows:
Each officer’s and trustee’s principal occupations during the past five years, other current directorships and affiliations, if any, with The Charles Schwab Corporation, Schwab and CSIM are as follows:
                 
NAME, YEAR OF            
BIRTH, AND            
POSITION(S) WITH       NUMBER OF    
THE TRUST;       PORTFOLIOS IN    
(TERM OF OFFICE   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS   FUND COMPLEX    
AND LENGTH OF   DURING THE PAST FIVE   OVERSEEN BY    
TIME SERVED1)   YEARS   THE TRUSTEE   OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS
Independent Trustees
               
 
               
Mariann Byerwalter
1960
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2000.)
  Chairman of JDN Corporate Advisory LLC.     84     Board 1 – Director, Redwood Trust, Inc.

Board 2 – Director, PMI Group, Inc.

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NAME, YEAR OF            
BIRTH, AND            
POSITION(S) WITH       NUMBER OF    
THE TRUST;       PORTFOLIOS IN    
(TERM OF OFFICE   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS   FUND COMPLEX    
AND LENGTH OF   DURING THE PAST FIVE   OVERSEEN BY    
TIME SERVED1)   YEARS   THE TRUSTEE   OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS
John F. Cogan
1947
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2008.)
  Senior Fellow: The Hoover Institution at Stanford University; Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research; Professor of Public Policy, Stanford University     69     Board 1 – Director, Gilead Sciences, Inc.

Board 2 – Director, Monaco Coach Corporation

Board 3 – Director, Venture Lending and Leasing, Inc.
 
               
William A. Hasler
1941
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2000.)
  Dean Emeritus, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. Until February 2004, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Aphton Corp. (bio-pharmaceuticals). Prior to August 1998, Dean of the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley (higher education).     84     Board 1 – Director, Mission West Properties.

Board 2 – Director, TOUSA.

Board 3 – Director, Harris-Stratex Networks.

Board 4 – Director, Genitope Corp.

Board 5 – Director, Ditech Networks.

Board 6 – Rubicon Limited
 
               
Gerald B. Smith
1950
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2000.)
  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and founder of Smith Graham & Co. (investment advisors).     69     Board 1 – Lead Independent Director, Board of Cooper Industries.

Board 2 – Chairman of the Audit Committee of Oneok Partners LP.
 
               
Donald R. Stephens
1938
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 1989.)
  Managing Partner, D.R. Stephens & Company (investments). Prior to 1996, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of North American Trust (real estate investment trust).     69     Not Applicable.
 
               
Joseph H. Wender
1944
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2008.)
  Senior Managing Director, Chairman of the Finance Committee, GSC Group, until December 2007; General Partner, Goldman Sachs & Co., until June 2005     69     Board 1 – Board Member and Chairman of the Audit Committee, Isis Pharmaceuticals
 
               

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NAME, YEAR OF            
BIRTH, AND            
POSITION(S) WITH       NUMBER OF    
THE TRUST;       PORTFOLIOS IN    
(TERM OF OFFICE   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS   FUND COMPLEX    
AND LENGTH OF   DURING THE PAST FIVE   OVERSEEN BY    
TIME SERVED1)   YEARS   THE TRUSTEE   OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS
Michael W. Wilsey
1943
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 1989.)
  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Wilsey Bennett, Inc. (real estate investment and management, and other investments).     69     Not Applicable.
 
               
Interested Trustees
               
 
               
Charles R. Schwab2
1937
Chairman and Trustee
(Chairman and Trustee of CSFF since 1989.)
  Founded Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. in 1971 and became Chairman in 1978. Since 1986, Chairman and Director, The Charles Schwab Corporation.

Since 1989, Director, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc., and appointed as Chairman in 1991. Since 1996, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Schwab (SIS) Holdings Inc. I and Schwab International Holdings, Inc. Since 1999, Director and Chief Executive Officer, Schwab Holdings, Inc. Since 2003, Chairman, Charles Schwab Bank, N. A.;

Through June 2007, Director, U.S. Trust Company, N. A., U.S. Trust Corporation, United States Trust Company of New York. Until October 2008, Chief Executive Officer, The Charles Schwab Corporation, and the Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
    69     Not Applicable.
 
               
Walter W. Bettinger II2
1960
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2008.)
  As of October 2008, President and Chief Executive Officer, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and The Charles Schwab Corporation. Since October 2008, Director, The Charles Schwab Corporation. Since May 2008, Director, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and Schwab Holdings, Inc. Since 2006, Director, Charles Schwab Bank.

From 2004 through 2007, Executive Vice President and President, Schwab Investor Services. From 2004 through 2005, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating
    69     Not Applicable.

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NAME, YEAR OF            
BIRTH, AND            
POSITION(S) WITH       NUMBER OF    
THE TRUST;       PORTFOLIOS IN    
(TERM OF OFFICE   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS   FUND COMPLEX    
AND LENGTH OF   DURING THE PAST FIVE   OVERSEEN BY    
TIME SERVED1)   YEARS   THE TRUSTEE   OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS
 
  Officer, Individual Investor Enterprise, and from 2002 through 2004, Executive Vice President, Corporate Services.

Until October 2008, President and Chief Operating Officer, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and The Charles Schwab Corporation.
           
     
NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, AND    
POSITION(S) WITH THE TRUST;    
(TERM OF OFFICE AND LENGTH OF TIME   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS DURING THE PAST FIVE
SERVED3)   YEARS
OFFICERS
   
 
   
Randall W. Merk
1954
President and Chief Executive Officer
(Officer of CSFF since 2007.)
  Executive Vice President and President, Investment Management Services, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.; Executive Vice President, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (2002 – present); President and Chief Executive Officer, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (2007-present); Director, Charles Schwab Asset Management (Ireland) Limited and Charles Schwab Worldwide Funds PLC. From September 2002 to July 2004, Chief Executive Officer and President, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. and Executive Vice President, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
 
   
George Pereira
1964
Treasurer and Principal Financial Officer
(Officer of CSFF since 2004.)
  Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc.; Chief Financial Officer, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust; Director, Charles Schwab Worldwide Fund, PLC and Charles Schwab Asset Management (Ireland) Limited. Through June 2007, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer, Excelsior Funds Inc., Excelsior Tax-Exempt Funds, Inc., and Excelsior Funds Trust; Chief Financial Officer, Mutual Fund Division, UST Advisers, Inc. From December 1999 to November 2004, Sr. Vice President, Financial Reporting, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
 
   
Koji E. Felton
1961
Secretary and Chief Legal Officer
(Officer of CSFF since 1998.)
  Senior Vice President, Chief Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc.; Senior Vice President and Deputy General Counsel, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. Until 2006, Chief Legal Officer, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust. Through June 2007, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary, Excelsior Funds Inc., Excelsior Tax-Exempt Funds, Inc., and Excelsior Funds Trust.

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NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, AND    
POSITION(S) WITH THE TRUST;    
(TERM OF OFFICE AND LENGTH OF TIME   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS DURING THE PAST FIVE
SERVED3)   YEARS
Bari Havlik
1961
Chief Compliance Officer
(Officer of CSFF since 2009.)
  Senior Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer for Charles Schwab & Co. Inc. and head of Global Compliance for the Charles Schwab Corporation since 2004. Chief Compliance Officer for Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc since 2009.
 
   
Jeffrey M. Mortimer
1963
Senior Vice President and Chief Investment
Officer – Equities and Fixed Income
(Officer of CSFF since 2004.)
  Senior Vice President and Chief Investment Officer – Equities & Fixed Income, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc.; President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust.
 
   
Catherine MacGregor
1964
Vice President
(Officer of CSFF since 2005
  Vice President, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc., and Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust. Since 2006, Chief Counsel, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust. Until July 2005, Senior Associate, Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker LLP.
 
   
Michael Haydel
1972
Vice President
(Officer of CSFF since 2006
  Vice President, Asset Management Client Services, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.; Vice President and AML Officer, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust. Until March 2004, Director, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
 
1   Trustees remain in office until they resign, retire or are removed by shareholder vote. The Schwab Funds® retirement policy requires that independent trustees elected after January 1, 2000 retire at age 72 or after twenty years as a trustee, whichever comes first. Independent trustees elected prior to January 1, 2000 will retire on the following schedule: Messrs. Stephens and Wilsey will retire on December 31, 2010.
 
2   Mr. Schwab and Mr. Bettinger are Interested Trustees because they are employees of Schwab and/or the adviser. In addition to their employment with the investment adviser and the distributor, Messrs. Schwab and Bettinger also own stock of The Charles Schwab Corporation.
 
3   The President, Treasurer and Secretary hold office until their respective successors are chosen and qualified or until he or she sooner dies, resigns, is removed or becomes disqualified. Each of the other officers serves at the pleasure of the Board.
Trustee Committees
The Board of Trustees has established certain committees and adopted Committee charters with respect to those committees, each as described below:
      The Audit and Compliance Committee (formerly the Audit/Portfolio Compliance Committee) has oversight responsibility for the integrity of the Trust’s financial reporting processes and compliance policies, procedures and processes, and for the Trust’s overall system of internal controls. This Committee is comprised of at least three Independent Trustees. Currently, Messrs. Hasler and Cogan and Ms. Byerwalter are members of this Committee. The charter directs that the Committee must meet four times annually, with additional meetings as

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the Committee deems appropriate. The Committee met 4 times during the most recent fiscal year.
      The primary purpose of the Governance Committee is to review and make recommendations to the Board regarding Trust governance-related matters, including but not limited to Board compensation practices, retirement policies and term limits, Board self-evaluations, the effectiveness and allocation of assignments and functions by the Board, the composition of committees of the Board, and the training of Trustees. The Committee is also responsible for selecting and nominating candidates to serve as trustees. There are no specific procedures in place to consider nominees recommended by shareholders, but such nominees would be considered if such nominations were submitted in accordance with Rule 14a-8 of the 1934 Act in conjunction with a shareholder meeting to consider the election of Trustees. This Committee is comprised of at least four Independent Trustees. Currently, Messrs. Hasler, Cogan and Wilsey and Ms. Byerwalter are members of this Committee. The charter directs that the Committee meets at such times and with such frequency as is deemed necessary or appropriate by the Committee. The Committee met 3 times during the most recent fiscal year.
      The primary purpose of the Investment Oversight Committee is to oversee the investment activities of the Trust. This Committee is comprised of at least four Independent Trustees. Currently, Messrs. Smith, Wilsey, Wender and Stephens are members of this Committee. The charter directs that the Committee meets at such times and with such frequency as is deemed necessary or appropriate by the Committee. The committee met 4 times during the most recent fiscal year.
      The primary purposes of the Marketing, Distribution and Shareholder Servicing Committee are to review matters relating to the marketing of the funds’ shares; to oversee the quality and cost of shareholder services provided to the Trust and its shareholders pursuant to the shareholder servicing and/or administrative service plans; and to oversee the Trust’s distribution-related arrangements, including the distribution-related services provided to the Trust and its shareholders. This Committee is comprised of at least three Independent Trustees. Currently, Messrs. Smith, Stephens and Wender are members of this Committee. The charter directs that the Committee meets at such times and with such frequency as is deemed necessary or appropriate by the Committee. The committee met 4 times during the most recent fiscal year.
Trustee Compensation
The following table provides trustee compensation for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2008. Certain of this information is for the Fund Complex, which included 84 funds as of December 31, 2008.
                         
    ($)   Pension or Retirement Benefits   ($)
    Aggregate   Accrued as Part of Fund   Total Compensation from Fund
Name of Trustee   Compensation   Expenses   Complex
 
Interested Trustees
                       
Charles R. Schwab
    0       N/A       0  
Walter Bettinger
    0       N/A       0  
Independent Trustees
                       
Mariann Byerwalter
  $ 129,895       N/A     $ 295,000  
William A. Hasler
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 297,000  

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    ($)   Pension or Retirement Benefits   ($)
    Aggregate   Accrued as Part of Fund   Total Compensation from Fund
Name of Trustee   Compensation   Expenses   Complex
 
Gerald B. Smith
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
Donald R. Stephens
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
Michael W. Wilsey
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
John F. Cogan
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
Joseph H. Wender
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
For the fiscal year ending December 31, 2008, the Trust and Fund Complex paid consulting fees of $54,129 and $100,000, respectively, to each of Robert G. Holmes and Donald F. Dorward, former Trustees of the Trust. Messrs. Holmes and Dorward retired from the Board of Trustees on December 31, 2007.
Securities Beneficially Owned by Each Trustee
The following tables provide each Trustee’s equity ownership of a fund and ownership of all registered investment companies overseen by each Trustee in the Family of Investment Companies as of December 31, 2008. As of December 31, 2008, the Family of Investment Companies included 68 funds.
                     
    Dollar Range of Trustee    
    Ownership of the Fund:    
    Schwab   Schwab   Schwab New   Schwab New    
    Municipal   California   York AMT Tax-   Jersey AMT   Aggregate Dollar Range of
    Money   Municipal   Free Money   Tax-Free Money   Trustee Ownership in the Family
Name of Trustee   Fund™   Money Fund™   Fund™   Fund™   of Investment Companies
 
Interested Trustees
                   
Charles R. Schwab
  None   Over $100,000   None   None   Over $100,000
Walter W. Bettinger II
  $50,001-$100,000   None   None   None   Over $100,000
Independent Trustees
                   
Mariann Byerwalter
  None   None   None   None   $10,001-$50,000
William A. Hasler
  None   None   None   None   Over $100,000
Gerald B. Smith
  Over $100,000   None   None   None   Over $100,000
Donald R. Stephens
  None   None   None   None   Over $100,000
Michael W. Wilsey
  None   None   None   None   Over $100,000
John F. Cogan
  None   None   None   None   None
Joseph H. Wender
  None   None   None   None   None

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    Dollar Range of Trustee    
    Ownership of the Fund:    
    Schwab       Schwab       Aggregate Dollar Range of
    Pennsylvania   Schwab AMT   Massachusetts   Schwab California   Trustee Ownership in the
    Municipal Money   Tax-Free Money   AMT Tax-Free   AMT Tax-Free   Family of Investment
Name of Trustee   Fund™   Fund™   Money Fund™   Money Fund™   Companies
 
Interested Trustees
                   
Charles R. Schwab
  None   None   None   $10,001-$50,000   Over $100,000
Walter W. Bettinger II
  None   None   None   None   Over $100,000
Independent Trustees
                   
Mariann Byerwalter
  None   None   None   None   $10,001-$50,000
William A. Hasler
  None   None   None   None   Over $100,000
Gerald B. Smith
  None   None   None   None   Over $100,000
Donald R. Stephens
  None   None   None   None   Over $100,000
Michael W. Wilsey
  None   None   None   None   Over $100,000
John F. Cogan
  None   None   None   None   None
Joseph H. Wender
  None   None   None   None   None
Deferred Compensation Plan
Independent Trustees may enter into a fee deferral plan. Under this plan, deferred fees will be credited to an account established by the Trust as of the date that such fees would have been paid to the trustee. The value of this account will equal the value that the account would have if the fees credited to the account had been invested in the shares of Schwab Funds® selected by the trustee. Currently, none of the Independent Trustees has elected to participate in this plan.
Code of Ethics
The funds, their investment adviser and Schwab have adopted a Code of Ethics (“Code”) as required under the 1940 Act. Subject to certain conditions or restrictions, the Code permits the trustees, directors, officers or advisory representatives of the funds or the investment adviser or the directors or officers of Schwab to buy or sell directly or indirectly securities for their own accounts. This includes securities that may be purchased or held by the funds. Securities transactions by some of these individuals may be subject to prior approval of the investment adviser’s Chief Compliance Officer or alternate. Most securities transactions are subject to quarterly reporting and review requirements.
CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES
As of April 14, 2009, the officers and trustees of the Trust, as a group, owned of record or beneficially, less than 1% of the outstanding voting securities of any class of each fund.
As of April 1, 2009, no person or entity owned, of record or beneficially, more than 5% of the outstanding voting securities of any fund.

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INVESTMENT ADVISORY AND OTHER SERVICES
Investment Adviser
Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (“CSIM” or the “investment adviser”), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Charles Schwab Corporation, 101 Montgomery Street, San Francisco, CA 94104, serves as the funds’ investment adviser and administrator pursuant to an Investment Advisory and Administration Agreement (“Advisory Agreement”) between it and the Trust. Schwab is an affiliate of the investment adviser and is the Trust’s distributor, shareholder services agent and transfer agent. Charles R. Schwab is the founder, Chairman and Director of The Charles Schwab Corporation. As a result of his ownership of and interests in The Charles Schwab Corporation, Mr. Schwab may be deemed to be a controlling person of the investment adviser and Schwab.
Advisory Agreement
The continuation of a fund’s Advisory Agreement must be specifically approved at least annually (1) by the vote of the trustees or by a vote of the shareholders of the fund, and (2) by the vote of a majority of the trustees who are not parties to the investment advisory agreement or “interested persons” of any party (the “Independent Trustees”), cast in person at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such approval.
Each year, the Board of Trustees calls and holds a meeting to decide whether to renew the Advisory Agreement between the Trust and CSIM with respect to existing funds in the Trust. In preparation for the meeting, the Board requests and reviews a wide variety of materials provided by the funds’ investment adviser, as well as extensive data provided by third parties, and the Independent Trustees receive advice from counsel to the Independent Trustees.
For its advisory and administrative services to each fund, the investment adviser is entitled to receive a graduated annual fee payable monthly based on each fund’s average daily net assets as described below.
First $1 billion – 0.35%
More than $1 billion but not exceeding $10 billion – 0.32%
More than $10 billion but not exceeding $20 billion – 0.30%
More than $20 billion but not exceeding $40 billion – 0.27%
More than $40 billion – 0.25%
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Municipal Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $28,110,000 (fees were reduced by $17,980,000), $32,093,000 (fees were reduced by $13,769,000) and $39,793,000 (fees were reduced by $15,880,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab California Municipal Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $17,423,000 (fees were reduced by $10,843,000), $24,991,000 (fees were reduced by $5,605,000) and $26,158,000 (fees were reduced by $8,066,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $4,282,000 (fees were reduced by $3,185,000), $7,194,000 (fees were reduced by $1,351,000) and $8,718,000 (fees were reduced by $1,563,000), respectively.

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For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $730,000 (fees were reduced by $1,123,000), $1,519,000 (fees were reduced by $644,000) and $2,164,000 (fees were reduced by $642,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $553,000 (fees were reduced by $938,000), $968,000 (fees were reduced by $529,000) and $1,429,000 (fees were reduced by $486,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $1,843,000 (fees were reduced by $2,442,000), $4,105,000 (fees were reduced by $2,416,000) and $7,506,000 (fees were reduced by $3,382,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $477,000 (fees were reduced by $935,000), $989,000 (fees were reduced by $551,000) and $1,385,000 (fees were reduced by $473,000), respectively.
From November 16, 2007 to December 31, 2007 and for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $19,000 (fees were reduced by $61,000) and $938,000 (fees were reduced by $775,000), respectively.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit each of the Sweep Shares of the Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund, the Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund, the Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund and the Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.65%, respectively, for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the funds’ Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit each of the Value Advantage Shares® of the Schwab Municipal Money Fund’s™, Schwab California Municipal Money Fund’s™, Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund, Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund and Schwab California AMT Tax Free Money Fund “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.45%, respectively, for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the funds’ Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Municipal Money Fund’s Institutional Shares and Select Shares® “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.24% and 0.35%, respectively, through April 29, 2011.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Municipal Money Fund’s Sweep Shares “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.62%

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for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund’s Sweep Shares “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.62% for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab California Municipal Money Fund’s Sweep Shares “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.60% for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees
An expense cap, where applicable, is not intended to cover all fund expenses, and a fund’s expenses may exceed the expense cap. For example, the expense cap does not cover investment-related expenses, such as brokerage commissions, interest and taxes and the fees and expenses of pooled investment vehicles, such as other investment companies, nor does it cover extraordinary or non-routine expenses, if any, such as shareholder meeting costs.
In addition, Schwab and the investment adviser also may waive and/or reimburse expenses in excess of their current fee waivers and reimbursement commitments to the extent necessary to maintain each fund’s and/or share class’s net yield at a certain level as determined by Schwab and the investment adviser. Under an agreement with the funds, Schwab and the investment adviser may recapture from the fund’s and/or share class’s net assets any of these expenses or fees they have waived and/or reimbursed until the third anniversary of the end of the fiscal year in which such waiver and/or reimbursement occurs, subject to certain limitations. These reimbursement payments by the fund to Schwab and/or the investment adviser are considered “non-routine expenses” and are not subject to any net operating expense limitations in effect at the time of such payment.
Distributor
Pursuant to an Amended and Restated Distribution Agreement between Schwab and the Trust, Schwab is the principal underwriter for shares of the funds and is the Trust’s agent for the purpose of the continuous offering of the funds’ shares. The funds pay for prospectuses and shareholder reports to be prepared and delivered to existing shareholders. Schwab pays such costs when the described materials are used in connection with the offering of shares to prospective investors and for supplemental sales literature and advertising. Schwab receives no fee under the Distribution Agreement.
Shareholder Servicing and Sweep Administration Plan
The Trust’s Board of Trustees has adopted a Shareholder Servicing Plan (the “Plan”) on behalf of certain funds of the Trust. The Plan enables these funds, directly or indirectly through Schwab, to bear expenses relating to the provision by service providers, including Schwab, of certain shareholder services to the current shareholders of the funds (or classes of such funds). The Trust has appointed Schwab to act as its shareholder servicing fee paying agent under the Plan for the purpose of making payments to the service providers (other than Schwab) under the Plan. Pursuant to the Plan, each of the funds is subject to an annual shareholder servicing fee, as set forth below:

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    Shareholder   Sweep
    Servicing   Administration
Fund*   Fee   Fee
Schwab Municipal Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.10 %
Schwab Municipal Money Fund – Select Shares
    0.22 %     n/a  
Schwab Municipal Money Fund – Value Advantage Shares
    0.22 %     n/a  
Schwab Municipal Money Fund – Institutional Shares
    0.22 %     n/a  
Schwab California Municipal Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.10 %
Schwab California Municipal Money Fund – Value Advantage Shares
    0.22 %     n/a  
Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.10 %
Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund – Value Advantage Shares
    0.22 %     n/a  
Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.10 %
Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.10 %
Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.10 %
Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund – Value Advantage Shares
    0.22 %     n/a  
Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.10 %
Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund – Value Advantage Shares
    0.22 %     n/a  
Pursuant to the Plan, the funds (or Schwab as paying agent) may pay Schwab or service providers that, pursuant to written agreements with Schwab, provide certain account maintenance, customer liaison and shareholder services to fund shareholders. Schwab and the other service providers may provide fund shareholders with the following shareholder services, among other shareholder services: (i) maintaining records for shareholders that hold shares of a fund; (ii) communicating with shareholders, including the mailing of regular statements and confirmation statements, distributing fund-related materials, mailing prospectuses and reports to shareholders, and responding to shareholder inquiries; (iii) communicating and processing shareholder purchase, redemption and exchange orders; (iv) communicating mergers, splits or other reorganization activities to fund shareholders; and (v) preparing and filing tax information, returns and reports.
The shareholder servicing fee paid to a particular service provider is calculated at the annual rate set forth in the chart above and is based on the average daily net asset value of the fund (or class) shares owned by shareholders holding shares through such service provider. Payments under the Plan are made as described above regardless of Schwab’s or the service provider’s actual cost of providing the services. If the cost of providing the services under the Plan is less than the payments received, the unexpended portion of the fees may be retained as profit by Schwab or the service provider.
Pursuant to the Plan, the funds may pay Schwab for certain administration services it provides to fund shareholders invested in the Sweep Shares and Premier Sweep Shares of the funds. Schwab may provide fund shareholders with the following sweep administration services, among other sweep administration services: processing of automatic purchase and redemptions.
The sweep administration fee paid to Schwab is calculated at the annual rate set forth in the chart above and is based on the average daily net asset value of the fund (or class) shares owned by shareholders holding shares through Schwab. Payments under the Plan are made as described above regardless of Schwab’s actual cost of providing the services. If the cost of providing the services

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under the Plan is less than the payments received, the unexpended portion of the fees may be retained as profit by Schwab.
The Plan shall continue in effect for a fund for so long as its continuance is specifically approved at least annually by a vote of the majority of both (i) the Board of Trustees of the Trust and (ii) the Trustees of the Trust who are not interested persons of the Trust and who have no direct or indirect financial interest in the operation of the Plan or any agreements related to it (the “Qualified Trustees”). The Plan requires that Schwab or any person authorized to direct the disposition of monies paid or payable by the funds pursuant to the Plan furnish quarterly written reports of amounts spent under the Plan and the purposes of such expenditures to the Board of Trustees of the Trust for review. All material amendments to the Plan must be approved by votes of the majority of both (i) the Board of Trustees and (ii) the Qualified Trustees.
Transfer Agent
Boston Financial Data Services, Inc., Two Heritage Drive, Quincy, Massachusetts 02171, serves as the funds’ transfer agent. As part of these services, the firm maintains records pertaining to the sale, redemption and transfer of the funds’ shares.
Custodian and Fund Accountant
State Street Bank and Trust Company, One Lincoln Street, Boston, MA, 02111, serves as custodian and fund accountant for the funds.
The custodian is responsible for the daily safekeeping of securities and cash held or sold by the funds. The fund accountant maintains the books and records related to each fund’s transactions.
Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
The funds’ independent registered public accounting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, audits and reports on the annual financial statements of each series of the Trust and reviews certain regulatory reports and each fund’s federal income tax return. They also perform other professional accounting, auditing, tax and advisory services when the Trust engages them to do so. Their address is Three Embarcadero Center, San Francisco, CA 94111-4004. Each fund’s audited financial statements for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, are included in the fund’s annual report that is supplied with the SAI.
Legal Counsel
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP serves as counsel to the Trust.
Other Expenses
The funds pay other expenses that typically are connected with the Trust’s operations, and include legal, audit and custodian fees, as well as the costs of accounting and registration of the funds. Expenses not directly attributable to a particular fund will generally be allocated among the funds in the Trust on the basis of each fund’s relative net assets at the time the expense is incurred.

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BROKERAGE ALLOCATION AND OTHER PRACTICES
Portfolio Turnover
Because securities with maturities of less than one year are excluded from required portfolio turnover rate calculations, the funds’ portfolio turnover rate for reporting purposes is expected to be near zero.
Portfolio Holdings Disclosure
The funds’ Board of Trustees has approved policies and procedures that govern the timing and circumstances regarding the disclosure of fund portfolio holdings information to shareholders and third parties. These policies and procedures are designed to ensure that disclosure of information regarding the funds’ portfolio securities is in the best interests of fund shareholders, and include procedures to address conflicts between the interests of the funds’ shareholders, on the one hand, and those of the funds’ investment adviser, principal underwriter or any affiliated person of the funds, its investment adviser, or its principal underwriter, on the other. Pursuant to such procedures, the Board has authorized the president of the funds to authorize the release of the funds’ portfolio holdings, as necessary, in conformity with the foregoing principles.
The Board exercises on-going oversight of the disclosure of fund portfolio holdings by overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the fund’s policies and procedures by the Chief Compliance Officer and by considering reports and recommendations by the Chief Compliance Officer concerning any material compliance matters. The Board will receive periodic updates, at least annually, regarding entities which were authorized to be provided “early disclosure” (as defined below) of the fund’s portfolio holdings information.
A complete list of each fund’s portfolio holdings is published on the Schwab Funds® website at www.schwab.com/prospectus, under “Prospectus and Reports”, typically 60-80 days after the end of each fund’s fiscal quarter. The portfolio holdings information available on the Schwab Funds’ website is the same that is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form N-Q or Form N-CSR. The information on the website is publicly available to all categories of persons.
From time to time, a fund may disclose its full portfolio holdings, the concentration of its portfolio holdings, a sampling of select portfolio holdings, or the fund’s assets under management on the SchwabFunds’ website at www.Schwab.com/moneyfunds website. A fund will disclose such information to the extent that the fund deems the information to be of interest to fund shareholders in light of developments in the financial markets or otherwise. This information will be made publicly available on the website to all categories of persons, and is typically disclosed subject to a 2 to 3 business day lag. Shareholders are advised to check the SchwabFunds’ website at www.Schwab.com/moneyfunds website from time to time to access this information as it is made available.
Each fund may disclose portfolio holdings information to certain persons and entities prior to and more frequently than the public disclosure of such information (“early disclosure”). The president may authorize early disclosure of portfolio holdings information to such parties at differing times and/or with different lag times provided that (a) the president of the funds determines that the disclosure is in the best interests of the funds and that there are no conflicts of interest between the fund’s shareholders and fund’s adviser and distributor; and (b) the recipient is, either by contractual agreement or otherwise by law, required to maintain the confidentiality of the information.

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In addition, the funds’ service providers including, without limitation, the investment adviser, distributor, the custodian, fund accountant, transfer agent, auditor, proxy voting service providers, pricing information venders, publisher, printer and mailing agent may receive early disclosure of portfolio holdings information as frequently as daily in connection with the services they perform for the funds. Service providers will be subject to a duty of confidentiality with respect to any portfolio holdings information whether imposed by the provisions of the service provider’s contract with the trust or by the nature of its relationship with the trust.
The funds have an ongoing arrangement to make available information about the funds’ portfolio holdings and information derived from the funds’ portfolio holdings to iMoneyNet, a rating and ranking organization. Under its arrangement with the funds, iMoneyNet receives information concerning the funds’ net assets, yields, maturities and portfolio compositions on a weekly basis, subject to a 1 business day lag. In addition, iMoneyNet receives monthly dividend reports summarizing the previous 13 months of fund dividends and monthly expense and asset reports, each subject to a 1 month lag.
iMoneyNet receives this information for disclosure to its subscribers subject to a confidentiality agreement, which imposes the following conditions on iMoneyNet’s use of such information: (i) iMoneyNet, or any of its employees, must not trade on the non-public information iMoneyNet receives; (ii) iMoneyNet must safeguard, protect and keep secret the non-public information; (iii) iMoneyNet is limited in the information that it may disclose to third parties prior to public disclosure of the information; and (iv) iMoneyNet must notify the funds or CSIM in writing of any unauthorized, negligent or inadvertent use or disclosure of the information.
The funds’ policies and procedures prohibit the funds, the funds’ investment adviser or any related party from receiving any compensation or other consideration in connection with the disclosure of portfolio holdings information.
The funds may disclose non-material information including commentary and aggregate information about the characteristics of a fund in connection with or relating to a fund or its portfolio securities to any person if such disclosure is for a legitimate business purpose, such disclosure does not effectively result in the disclosure of the complete portfolio securities of any fund (which can only be disclosed in accordance with the above requirements), and such information does not constitute material non-public information. Such disclosure does not fall within the portfolio securities disclosure requirements outlined above.
Whether the information constitutes material non-public information will be made on a good faith determination, which involves an assessment of the particular facts and circumstances. In most cases commentary or analysis would be immaterial and would not convey any advantage to a recipient in making a decision concerning a fund. Commentary and analysis includes, but is not limited to, the allocation of a fund’s portfolio securities and other investments among various asset classes, sectors, industries, and countries, the characteristics of the stock components and other investments of a fund, the attribution of fund returns by asset class, sector, industry and country, and the volatility characteristics of a fund.
Portfolio Transactions
Each of the funds paid no brokerage commissions during the last three fiscal years.
The investment adviser makes decisions with respect to the purchase and sale of portfolio securities on behalf of a fund. The investment adviser is responsible for implementing these decisions, including the negotiation of commissions and the allocation of principal business and portfolio brokerage. Purchases and sales of securities on a stock exchange or certain riskless principal

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transactions placed on NASDAQ are typically effected through brokers who charge a commission for their services. Purchases and sales of fixed income securities may be transacted with the issuer, the issuer’s underwriter, or a dealer. A fund does not usually pay brokerage commissions on purchases and sales of fixed income securities, although the price of the securities generally includes compensation, in the form of a spread or a mark-up or mark-down, which is not disclosed separately. The prices a fund pays to underwriters of newly-issued securities usually include a commission paid by the issuer to the underwriter. Transactions placed through dealers who are serving as primary market makers reflect the spread between the bid and asked prices. The money market securities in which the funds invest are traded primarily in the over-the-counter market and or purchased directly from the issuer or an underwriter or market maker. Purchases from underwriters will include a commission or concession paid by the issuer to the underwriter, and purchases from dealers serving as market makers will include the spread between the bid and asked price. It is expected that the cost of executing portfolio securities transactions of the funds will primarily consist of dealer spreads and underwriting commissions.
The investment adviser seeks to obtain the best overall execution in executing portfolio transactions. The investment adviser may take a number of factors into account in selecting brokers or dealers to execute these transactions. Such factors may include, without limitation, the following: execution price; brokerage commission or dealer spread; size or type of the transaction; nature or character of the markets; clearance or settlement capability; reputation; financial strength and stability of the broker or dealer; efficiency of execution and error resolution; block trading capabilities; willingness to execute related or unrelated difficult transactions in the future; order of call; or provision of additional brokerage or research services or products.
The investment adviser may cause a fund to pay a higher commission than otherwise obtainable from other brokers or dealers in return for brokerage or research services or products if the investment adviser believes that such commission is reasonable in relation to the services provided. In addition to agency transactions, the investment adviser may receive brokerage and research services or products in connection with certain riskless principal transactions, in accordance with applicable SEC and other regulatory guidelines. In both instances, these services or products may include: company financial data and economic data (e.g., unemployment, inflation rates and GDP figures), stock quotes, last sale prices and trading volumes, research reports analyzing the performance of a particular company or stock, narrowly distributed trade magazines or technical journals covering specific industries, products, or issuers, seminars or conferences registration fees which provide substantive content relating to eligible research, quantitative analytical software and software that provides analyses of securities portfolios, trading strategies and pre/post trade analytics, discussions with research analysts or meetings with corporate executives which provide a means of obtaining oral advice on securities, markets or particular issuers, short-term custody related to effecting particular transactions and clearance and settlement of those trades, lines between the broker-dealer and order management systems operated by a third party vendor, dedicated lines between the broker-dealer and the investment adviser’s order management system, dedicated lines providing direct dial-up service between the investment adviser and the trading desk at the broker-dealer, message services used to transmit orders to broker-dealers for execution, electronic communication of allocation instructions between institutions and broker-dealers, comparison services required by the SEC or another regulator (e.g., use of electronic confirmation and affirmation of institutional trades), exchange of messages among brokerage dealers, custodians, and institutions related to a trade, post-trade matching of trade information, routing settlement instructions to custodian banks and broker-dealers’ clearing agents, software that provides algorithmic trading strategies, and trading software operated by a broker-dealer to route orders to market centers or direct market access systems. The investment adviser may use research services furnished by brokers or dealers in servicing all client accounts, and

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not all services may necessarily be used in connection with the account that paid commissions or spreads to the broker or dealer providing such services.
The investment adviser may receive a service from a broker or dealer that has both a “research” and a “non-research” use. When this occurs, the investment adviser will make a good faith allocation, under all the circumstances, between the research and non-research uses of the service. The percentage of the service that is used for research purposes may be paid for with client commissions or spreads, while the investment adviser will use its own funds to pay for the percentage of the service that is used for non-research purposes. In making this good faith allocation, the investment adviser faces a potential conflict of interest, but the investment adviser and sub-advisers believe that the costs of such services may be appropriately allocated to their anticipated research and non-research uses.
A fund may purchase new issues of securities for clients in a fixed price offering. In these situations, the seller may be a member of the selling group that will, in addition to selling securities, provide the investment adviser with research services. The NASD has adopted rules expressly permitting these types of arrangements under certain circumstances.
The investment adviser may place orders with electronic communications networks or other alternative trading systems. Placing orders with electronic communications networks or other alternative trading systems may enable a fund to trade directly with other institutional holders. At times, this may allow a fund to trade larger blocks than would be possible trading through a single market maker.
The investment adviser may aggregate securities sales or purchases among two or more clients. The investment adviser will not aggregate transactions unless it believes such aggregation is consistent with its duty to seek best execution for each affected client and is consistent with the terms of the investment advisory agreement for such client. In any single transaction in which purchases and/or sales of securities of any issuer for the account of a fund are aggregated with other accounts managed by the investment adviser, the actual prices applicable to the transaction will be averaged among the accounts for which the transaction is effected, including the account of the fund.
In determining when and to what extent to use Schwab or any other affiliated broker-dealer as its broker for executing orders for the funds on securities exchanges, the investment adviser follows procedures, adopted by the Board of Trustees, that are designed to ensure that affiliated brokerage commissions (if relevant) are reasonable and fair in comparison to unaffiliated brokerage commissions for comparable transactions. The Board reviews the procedures annually and approves and reviews transactions involving affiliated brokers quarterly.
Proxy Voting
The Board of Trustees of the Trust has delegated the responsibility for voting proxies to CSIM through its Advisory Agreement. The Trustees have adopted CSIM’s Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures with respect to proxies voted on behalf of the various Schwab Funds portfolios. A description of CSIM’s Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures is included in Appendix B.
The Trust is required to disclose annually a fund’s complete proxy voting record on Form N-PX. A fund’s proxy voting record for the most recent 12 month period ended June 30th is available by visiting the Schwab Funds’ website at www.schwab.com/schwabfunds. A fund’s Form N-PX is also available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.

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Regular Broker-Dealers
Each fund’s regular broker-dealers during its most recent fiscal year are: (1) the ten broker-dealers that received the greatest dollar amount of brokerage commissions from the fund; (2) the ten broker-dealers that engaged as principal in the largest dollar amount of portfolio transactions; and (3) the ten broker-dealers that sold the largest dollar amount of the fund’s shares. As of December 31, 2008, no fund held securities issued by its regular broker-dealers.
DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST
Each fund is a series of The Charles Schwab Family of Funds, an open-end investment management company organized as a Massachusetts business trust on October 20, 1989.
The funds may hold special meetings of shareholders, which may cause the funds to incur non-routine expenses. These meetings may be called for purposes such as electing trustees, changing fundamental policies and amending management contracts. Shareholders are entitled to one vote for each share owned and may vote by proxy or in person. Proxy materials will be mailed to shareholders prior to any meetings, and will include a voting card and information explaining the matters to be voted upon.
The bylaws of the Trust provide that a majority of shares entitled to vote shall be a quorum for the transaction of business at a shareholders’ meeting, except that where any provision of law, or of the Declaration of Trust or of the bylaws permits or requires that (1) holders of any series shall vote as a series, then a majority of the aggregate number of shares of that series entitled to vote shall be necessary to constitute a quorum for the transaction of business by that series, or (2) holders of any class shall vote as a class, then a majority of the aggregate number of shares of that class entitled to vote shall be necessary to constitute a quorum for the transaction of business by that class. Any lesser number shall be sufficient for adjournments. Any adjourned session or sessions may be held, within a reasonable time after the date set for the original meeting, without the necessity of further notice. The Declaration of Trust specifically authorizes the Board of Trustees to terminate the Trust (or any of its investment portfolios) by notice to the shareholders without shareholder approval.
Under Massachusetts law, shareholders of a Massachusetts business trust could, under certain circumstances, be held personally liable for the Trust’s obligations. The Declaration of Trust, however, disclaims shareholder liability for the Trust’s acts or obligations and requires that notice of such disclaimer be given in each agreement, obligation or instrument entered into or executed by the Trust or the trustees. In addition, the Declaration of Trust provides for indemnification out of the property of an investment portfolio in which a shareholder owns or owned shares for all losses and expenses of such shareholder or former shareholder if he or she is held personally liable for the obligations of the Trust solely by reason of being or having been a shareholder. Moreover, the Trust will be covered by insurance which the trustees consider adequate to cover foreseeable tort claims. Thus, the risk of a shareholder incurring financial loss on account of shareholder liability is considered remote, because it is limited to circumstances in which a disclaimer is inoperative and the Trust itself is unable to meet its obligations. There is a remote possibility that a fund could become liable for a misstatement in the prospectus or SAI about another fund.
As more fully described in the Declaration of Trust, the trustees may each year, or more frequently, distribute to the shareholders of each series accrued income less accrued expenses and any net realized capital gains less accrued expenses. Distributions of each year’s income of each series shall be distributed pro rata to shareholders in proportion to the number of shares of each series held by

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each of them. Distributions will be paid in cash or shares or a combination thereof as determined by the trustees. Distributions paid in shares will be paid at the net asset value per share as determined in accordance with the bylaws.
Any series of the Trust may reorganize or merge with one or more other series of the Trust or of another investment company. Any such reorganization or merger shall be pursuant to the terms and conditions specified in an agreement and plan of reorganization authorized and approved by the Trustees and entered into by the relevant series in connection therewith. In addition, such reorganization or merger may be authorized by vote of a majority of the Trustees then in office and, to the extent permitted by applicable law, without the approval of shareholders of any series.
PURCHASE, REDEMPTION AND PRICING OF SHARES AND DELIVERY OF
SHAREHOLDER DOCUMENTS
Purchasing and Redeeming Shares of the Funds
The funds are open for business each day, except for days on which the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is closed and the following federal holiday observances: Columbus Day and Veterans Day. The NYSE’s trading session is normally conducted from 9:30 a.m. Eastern time until 4:00 p.m. Eastern time, Monday through Friday, although some days, such as in advance of and following holidays, the NYSE’s trading sessions close early. The following NYSE holiday closings are currently scheduled for 2009: New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King Jr.’s Birthday (observed), Presidents’ Day, Good Friday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day. On any day that the NYSE closes early, the funds reserve the right to advance the time by which purchase, redemption and exchange orders must be received by the funds’ transfer agent.
As long as the funds or Schwab follow reasonable procedures to confirm that your telephone or Internet order is genuine, they will not be liable for any losses an investor may experience due to unauthorized or fraudulent instructions. These procedures may include requiring a form of personal identification or confirmation before acting upon any telephone or Internet order, providing written confirmation of telephone or Internet orders and tape recording all telephone orders.
Share certificates will not be issued in order to avoid additional administrative costs, however, share ownership records are maintained by Schwab.
The Declaration of Trust provides that shares may be automatically redeemed if held by a shareholder in an amount less than the minimum required by each fund or share class. Each fund’s minimum initial and additional investments and minimum balance requirements, if any, are set forth in the prospectus. The minimums may be changed without prior notice.
Each fund has made an election with the SEC to pay in cash all redemptions requested by any shareholder of record limited in amount during any 90-day period to the lesser of $250,000 or 1% of its net assets at the beginning of such period. This election is irrevocable without the SEC’s prior approval. Redemption requests in excess of these limits may be paid, in whole or in part, in investment securities or in cash, as the Board of Trustees may deem advisable. Payment will be made wholly in cash unless the Board of Trustees believes that economic or market conditions exist that would make such payment a detriment to the best interests of a fund. If redemption proceeds are paid in investment securities, such securities will be valued as set forth in “Pricing of Shares”. A redeeming shareholder would normally incur transaction costs if he or she were to convert the securities to cash.

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Each of the Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™, Schwab Massachusetts AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ and Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™ offer one share class, Sweep Shares. Each of Schwab California Municipal Money Fund™, Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ and Schwab AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ is composed of two classes of shares, Sweep Shares and Value Advantage Shares®. The Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund offers one share class, Value Advantage Shares. Schwab Municipal Money Fund™ is composed of four share classes, Sweep Shares, Value Advantage Shares, Select Shares® and Institutional Shares. Each fund’s share classes share a common investment portfolio and objective but have different minimum investment requirements and different expenses. The Sweep Shares are designed to provide convenience through automatic investment of uninvested cash balances and automatic redemptions for transactions in your Schwab account. The Value Advantage, Select and Institutional Shares do not have a sweep feature.
Exchanging Shares of the Funds
Shares of any Schwab Funds®, including any class of shares, may be sold and the shares of any other Schwab Fund or class purchased, provided the minimum investment and any other requirement of the fund or class purchased are satisfied, including any investor eligibility requirements. Without limiting this privilege, “an exchange order,” which is a simultaneous order to sell shares of one fund or class and automatically invest the proceeds in another fund or class, may not be executed between shares of Sweep Investments® and shares of non-Sweep Investments. Shares of Sweep Investments may be bought and sold automatically pursuant to the terms and conditions of your Schwab account agreement.
The funds and Schwab reserve certain rights with regard to exchanging shares of the funds. These rights include the right to: (i) refuse any purchase or exchange order that may negatively impact the fund’s operations; (ii) refuse orders that appear to be associated with short-term trading activities; and (iii) materially modify or terminate the exchange privilege upon 60 days’ written notice to shareholders.
Pricing of Shares
Each fund values its portfolio instruments at amortized cost, which means they are valued at their acquisition cost, as adjusted for amortization of premium or discount, rather than at current market value. Calculations are made to compare the value of a fund’s investments at amortized cost with market values. Such values are required to be determined in one of two ways: securities for which market quotations are readily available are required to be valued at current market value; and securities for which market quotations are not readily available are required to be valued at fair value using procedures approved by the Board of Trustees. The funds use approved pricing services to provide values for their portfolio securities. Securities may be fair valued pursuant to procedures approved by the funds’ Board of Trustees when approved pricing services do not provide a value for a security, a furnished price appears manifestly incorrect or events occur prior to the close of the NYSE that materially affect the furnished price. The Board of Trustees regularly reviews fair value determinations made by the funds pursuant to the procedures.
The amortized cost method of valuation seeks to maintain a stable net asset value per share (NAV) of $1.00, even where there are fluctuations in interest rates that affect the value of portfolio instruments. Accordingly, this method of valuation can in certain circumstances lead to a dilution of a shareholder’s interest.

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If a deviation of 1/2 of 1% or more were to occur between the NAV calculated using market values and a fund’s $1.00 NAV calculated using amortized cost or if there were any other deviation that the Board of Trustees believed would result in a material dilution to shareholders or purchasers, the Board of Trustees would promptly consider what action, if any, should be initiated.
If a fund’s NAV calculated using market values declined, or was expected to decline, below a fund’s $1.00 NAV calculated using amortized cost, the Board of Trustees might temporarily reduce or suspend dividend payments in an effort to maintain a fund’s $1.00 NAV. As a result of such reduction or suspension of dividends or other action by the Board of Trustees, an investor would receive less income during a given period than if such a reduction or suspension had not taken place. Such action could result in investors receiving no dividend for the period during which they hold their shares and receiving, upon redemption, a price per share lower than that which they paid. On the other hand, if a fund’s NAV (calculated using market values) were to increase, or were anticipated to increase above a fund’s $1.00 NAV (calculated using amortized cost), the Board of Trustees might supplement dividends in an effort to maintain a fund’s $1.00 NAV.
Delivery of Shareholder Documents
Typically once a year, an updated prospectus will be mailed to shareholders describing each fund’s investment strategies, risks and shareholder policies. Twice a year, financial reports will be mailed to shareholders describing each fund’s performance and investment holdings. In order to eliminate duplicate mailings of shareholder documents, each household may receive one copy of these documents, under certain conditions. This practice is commonly called “householding.” If you want to receive multiple copies, you may write or call your fund at the address or telephone number on the front of this SAI. Your instructions will be effective within 30 days of receipt by Schwab.
TAXATION
Federal Tax Information for the Funds
This discussion of federal income tax consequences is based on the Code and the regulations issued thereunder as in effect on the date of this Statement of Additional Information. New legislation, as well as administrative changes or court decisions, may significantly change the conclusions expressed herein, and may have a retroactive effect with respect to the transactions contemplated herein.
It is each fund’s policy to qualify for taxation as a “regulated investment company” (RIC) by meeting the requirements of Subchapter M of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code). By qualifying as a RIC, each fund expects to eliminate or reduce to a nominal amount the federal income tax to which it is subject. If a fund does not qualify as a RIC under the Code, it will be subject to federal income tax, at regular corporate rates on its net income, including any net realized capital gains.
The fund is treated as a separate entity for federal income tax purposes and is not combined with the trust’s other funds. The fund intends to qualify as a RIC so that it will be relieved of federal income tax on that part of its income that is distributed to shareholders. In order to qualify for treatment as a RIC, the fund must distribute annually to its shareholders at least 90% of its investment company taxable income (generally, net investment income plus the excess, if any, of net short-term capital gain over net long-term capital losses) and also must meet several additional requirements. Among these requirements are the following: (i) at least 90% of a fund’s gross income each taxable year must be derived from dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans, and gains from the sale or other disposition of stock, securities or foreign currencies, or other income derived with respect to

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its business of investing in such stock or securities or currencies and net income derived from an interest in a qualified publicly traded partnership; (ii) at the close of each quarter of a fund’s taxable year, at least 50% of the value of its total assets must be represented by cash and cash items, U.S. Government securities, securities of other RICs and other securities, with such other securities limited, in respect of any one issuer, to an amount that does not exceed 5% of the value of a fund’s assets and that does not represent more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer; and (iii) at the close of each quarter of a fund’s taxable year, not more than 25% of the value of its assets may be invested in securities (other than U.S. Government securities or the securities of other RICs) of any one issuer or of two or more issuers which the fund controls and which are engaged in the same, similar, or related trades or businesses, or the securities of one or more qualified publicly traded partnerships.
The Code imposes a non-deductible excise tax on RICs that do not distribute in a calendar year (regardless of whether they otherwise have a non-calendar taxable year) an amount equal to 98% of their “ordinary income” (as defined in the Code) for the calendar year plus 98% of their net capital gain for the one-year period ending on October 31 of such calendar year, plus any undistributed amounts from prior years. The non-deductible excise tax is equal to 4% of the deficiency. For the foregoing purposes, a fund is treated as having distributed any amount on which it is subject to income tax for any taxable year ending in such calendar year. The fund may in certain circumstances be required to liquidate fund investments in order to make sufficient distributions to avoid federal excise tax liability at a time when the investment adviser might not otherwise have chosen to do so, and liquidation of investments in such circumstances may affect the ability of the fund to satisfy the requirements for qualification as a RIC.
A fund’s transactions in futures contracts, options and certain other investment activities may be restricted by the Code and are subject to special tax rules. In a given case, these rules may accelerate income to a fund, defer its losses, cause adjustments in the holding periods of a fund’s assets, convert short-term capital losses into long-term capital losses or otherwise affect the character of a fund’s income. These rules could therefore affect the amount, timing and character of distributions to shareholders. A fund will endeavor to make any available elections pertaining to these transactions in a manner believed to be in the best interest of a fund and its shareholders.
Federal Income Tax Information for Shareholders
The discussion of federal income taxation presented below supplements the discussion in the funds’ prospectuses and only summarizes some of the important federal tax considerations generally affecting shareholders of the funds. Accordingly, prospective investors (particularly those not residing or domiciled in the United States) should consult their own tax advisors regarding the consequences of investing in a fund.
On each business day that the NAV of a fund is determined, such fund’s net investment income will be declared as of the close of the fund (normally 4:00 p.m. Eastern time) as a daily dividend to shareholders of record. Your daily dividend is calculated each business day by applying the daily dividend rate by the number of shares owned, and is rounded to the nearest penny. The daily dividend is accrued each business day, and the sum of the daily dividends is paid monthly. For each fund, dividends will normally be reinvested monthly in shares of the fund at the NAV on the 15th day of each month, if a business day, otherwise on the next business day, except in December when dividends are reinvested on the last business day of December. If cash payment is requested, checks will normally be mailed on the business day following the reinvestment date. Each fund will pay shareholders, who redeem all of their shares, all dividends accrued to the time of the redemption within 7 days.

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Each fund calculates its dividends based on its daily net investment income. For this purpose, the net investment income of a fund generally consists of: (1) accrued interest income, plus or minus amortized discount or premium, minus (2) accrued expenses allocated to that fund. If a fund realizes any capital gains, they will be distributed at least once during the year as determined by the Board of Trustees.
Any dividends declared by a fund in October, November or December and paid the following January are treated, for tax purposes, as if they were received by shareholders on December 31 of the year in which they were declared. A fund may adjust its schedule for the reinvestment of distributions for the month of December to assist in complying with the reporting and minimum distribution requirements of the Code.
The funds do not expect to realize any long-term capital gains. However, long-term capital gains distributions are taxable as long-term capital gains, regardless of how long you have held your shares. If you receive a long-term capital gains distribution with respect to fund shares held for six months or less, any loss on the sale or exchange of those shares shall, to the extent of the long-term capital gains distribution, be treated as a long-term capital loss. Distributions by a fund also may be subject to state, local and foreign taxes, and its treatment under applicable tax laws may differ from the federal income tax treatment.
Each fund may engage in investment techniques that may alter the timing and character of its income. Each fund may be restricted in its use of these techniques by rules relating to its qualification as a regulated investment company.
Because the taxable portion of a fund’s investment income consists primarily of interest, none of its dividends are expected to qualify under the Code for the dividends received deduction for corporations or as qualified dividend income eligible for reduced tax rates.
Each fund will be required in certain cases to withhold at the applicable withholding rate and remit to the U.S. Treasury, the withheld amount of taxable dividends paid to any shareholder who (1) fails to provide a correct taxpayer identification number certified under penalty of perjury; (2) is subject to withholding by the Internal Revenue Service for failure to properly report all payments of interest or dividends; (3) fails to provide a certified statement that he or she is not subject to “backup withholding;” or (4) fails to provide a certified statement that he or she is a U.S. person (including a U.S. resident alien). Backup withholding is not an additional tax and any amounts withheld may be credited against the shareholder’s ultimate U.S. tax liability.
Foreign shareholders (i.e., nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations, partnerships, trusts and estates) are generally subject to U.S. withholding tax at the rate of 30% (or a lower tax treaty rate) on distributions derived from net investment income and short-term capital gains; provided, however, that dividends with respect to a fund’s taxable year beginning after December 31, 2004 and not beginning after December 31, 2009 are not subject to U.S. withholding tax, if, subject to certain exceptions, such dividends qualify as interest related dividends or as short-term capital gain dividends. Distributions to foreign shareholders of such short-term capital gain dividends, of long-term capital gains and any gains from the sale or other disposition of shares of the funds generally are not subject to U.S. taxation, unless the recipient is an individual who either (1) meets the Code’s definition of “resident alien” or (2) who is physically present in the U.S. for 183 days or more per year as determined under certain IRS rules. Different tax consequences may result if the foreign shareholder is engaged in a trade or business within the United States. In addition, the tax consequences to a foreign shareholder entitled to claim the benefits of a tax treaty may be different than those described above.

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If, at the close of each quarter of its taxable year, at least 50% of the value of a fund’s assets consist of obligations the interest on which is excludable from gross income, the fund may pay “exempt-interest dividends” to its shareholders. Those dividends constitute the portion of the aggregate dividends as designated by the fund, equal to the excess of the excludable interest over certain amounts disallowed as deductions. Exempt-interest dividends are excludable from a shareholder’s gross income for federal income tax purposes.
Tax-exempt income, including exempt interest dividends paid by a fund, are taken into account in determining whether a portion of a shareholder’s social security or railroad retirement benefits will be subject to federal income.
Exempt-interest dividends may nevertheless be subject to the federal alternative minimum tax (AMT) imposed by Section 55 of the Code. The AMT is imposed at rates of 26% and 28%, in the case of non-corporate taxpayers, and at the rate of 20%, in the case of corporate taxpayers, to the extent it exceeds the taxpayer’s federal income tax liability. The AMT may be imposed in the following two circumstances. First, exempt-interest dividends derived from certain private activity bonds issued after August 7, 1986, will generally be an item of tax preference (and, therefore, potentially subject to AMT) for both corporate and non-corporate taxpayers. Second, in the case of exempt-interest dividends received by corporate shareholders, all exempt-interest dividends, regardless of when the bonds from which they are derived were issued or whether they are derived from private activity bonds, will be included in the corporation’s “adjusted current earnings,” as defined in Section 56(g) of the Code, in calculating the corporations’ alternative minimum taxable income for purposes of determining the AMT.
Current federal law limits the types and volume of bonds qualifying for the federal income tax exemption of interest that may have an effect on the ability of a fund to purchase sufficient amounts of tax-exempt securities to satisfy the Code’s requirements for the payment of “exempt-interest dividends.”
Interest on indebtedness incurred or continued by a shareholder in order to purchase or carry shares of the funds is not deductible for federal income tax purposes. Furthermore, these funds may not be an appropriate investment for persons (including corporations and other business entities) who are “substantial users” (or persons related to “substantial users”) of facilities financed by industrial development private activity bonds. Such persons should consult their tax advisors before purchasing shares. A “substantial user” is defined generally to include “certain persons” who regularly use in their trade or business a part of a facility financed from the proceeds of such bonds.
Because the taxable portion of a fund’s investment income consists primarily of interest, none of its dividends, whether or not treated as exempt-interest dividends, are expected to qualify under the Code for the dividends received deduction for corporations or as qualified dividend income eligible for reduced tax rates.
The redemption or exchange of the shares of a fund may result in capital gain or loss to the shareholders. Generally, if a shareholder holds the shares as a capital asset, any gain or loss will be long-term gain or loss if the shares have been held for more than one year. Capital gains of corporate shareholders are subject to regular corporate tax rates. For non-corporate taxpayers, gain on the sale of shares held for more than 12 months will generally be taxed at the rate applicable to long-term capital gains, while gain on the sale of shares held for one year or less will generally be taxed at ordinary income rates.

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State Tax Considerations
The following tax discussion summarizes general state tax laws which are currently in effect and are subject to change by legislative or administrative action; any such changes may be retroactive with respect to the applicable fund’s transactions. Investors should consult a tax advisor for more detailed information about state taxes to which they may be subject.
California Tax Considerations
The Schwab California Municipal Money Fund™ and Schwab California AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ intend to qualify to pay dividends to shareholders that are exempt from California personal income tax (“California exempt-interest dividends”). The funds will qualify to pay California exempt-interest dividends if (1) at the close of each quarter of a fund’s taxable year, at least 50% of the value of the fund’s total assets consists of obligations the interest on which would be exempt from California personal income tax if the obligations were held by an individual (“California Tax Exempt Obligations”) and (2) a fund continues to qualify as a regulated investment company.
If a fund qualifies to pay California exempt-interest dividends to shareholders, dividends distributed to shareholders will be considered California exempt-interest dividends (1) if they are designated as exempt-interest dividends by the fund in a written notice to shareholders mailed within 60 days of the close of the fund’s taxable year and (2) to the extent the interest received by the fund during the year on California Tax Exempt Obligations exceeds expenses of the fund that would be disallowed under California personal income tax law as allocable to tax exempt interest if the fund were an individual. If the aggregate dividends so designated exceed the amount that may be treated as California exempt-interest dividends, only that percentage of each dividend distribution equal to the ratio of aggregate California exempt-interest dividends to aggregate dividends so designated will be treated as a California exempt-interest dividend. A fund will notify its shareholders of the amount of exempt-interest dividends each year.
Corporations subject to California franchise tax that invest in a fund may not be entitled to exclude California exempt-interest dividends from income.
Dividend distributions that do not qualify for treatment as California exempt-interest dividends (including those dividend distributions to shareholders taxable as long-term capital gains for federal income tax purposes) will be taxable to shareholders at ordinary income tax rates for California personal income tax purposes to the extent of a fund’s earnings and profits.
Interest on indebtedness incurred or continued by a shareholder in connection with the purchase of shares of a fund will not be deductible for California personal income tax purposes if the fund distributes California exempt-interest dividends.
New York Tax Considerations
Dividends paid by the Schwab New York AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ that are derived from interest on municipal securities issued by New York State and its political subdivisions or any agency or instrumentality thereof which interest would be exempt under federal law if held by an individual, will be exempt from New York State and New York City personal income and unincorporated business taxes, but not corporate franchise taxes. Dividends paid by the fund that are derived from interest on municipal securities issued by New York and its political subdivisions or any agency or instrumentality thereof will be subject to the New York State corporate franchise tax and the New

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York City general corporation tax only if the entity receiving the dividends has a sufficient nexus with New York State or New York City.
Other dividends and distributions from other state’s municipal securities, U.S. government obligations, taxable income and capital gains that are not exempt from state taxation under federal law and distributions attributable to capital gains, will be subject to New York State personal income tax and New York City personal income tax. Gain from the sale, exchange or other disposition of shares will be subject to the New York State personal income and franchise taxes and the New York City personal income, unincorporated business and general corporation taxes. In addition, interest or indebtedness incurred by a shareholder to purchase or carry shares of the fund is not deductible for New York personal income tax purposes to the extent that it relates to New York exempt-interest dividends distributed to a shareholder during the taxable year.
New Jersey Tax Considerations
Under current law, investors in the Schwab New Jersey AMT Tax-Free Money Fund™ will not be subject to the New Jersey Gross Income Tax on distributions from the fund attributable to interest income from (and net gain, if any, from the fund’s disposition of) New Jersey Municipal Securities or obligations of the United States, its territories and possessions and certain of its agencies and instrumentalities (“Federal Securities”) held by the fund, either when received by the fund or when credited or distributed to the investors, provided that the fund meets the requirements for a qualified investment fund by: (1) maintaining its registration as a registered investment company with the SEC; (2) investing at least 80% of the aggregate principal amount of the fund’s investments, excluding financial options, futures, forward contracts, or other similar financial instruments relating to interest-bearing obligations, obligations issued at a discount or bond indexes related thereto to the extent such instruments are authorized under the regulated investment company rules under the Code, cash and cash items, which cash items shall include receivables, in New Jersey municipal securities or federal securities at the close of each quarter of the tax year; (3) investing 100% of its assets in interest-bearing obligations, discount obligations, cash and cash items, including receivables, financial options, futures forward contracts, or other similar financial instruments relating to interest-bearing obligations, discount obligations or bond indexes related thereto; and (4) complying with certain continuing reporting requirements.
However, in Colonial Trust III and Investment Company Institute v. Director, Division of Taxation, DKT No. 009777-93 (NJ Tax Court, Feb. 21, 1997) the New Jersey Tax Court nullified the New Jersey threshold requirements stated above. The court ruled that New Jersey could not impose its gross income tax on shareholder distributions attributable to interest paid on obligations of the United States government from a mutual fund that did not meet the requirements to be a qualified investment fund. The state of New Jersey indicates that its existing statutes and regulation are under review.
For New Jersey Gross Income Tax purposes, net income or gains and distributions derived from investments in other than New Jersey municipal securities and federal securities, and distributions from net realized capital gains in respect of such investments, will be taxable.
Gain on the disposition of shares is not subject to New Jersey Gross Income Tax, provided that the fund meets the requirements for a qualified investment fund set forth above.
Pennsylvania Tax Considerations
For purposes of the Pennsylvania Personal Income Tax and the Philadelphia School District Investment Net Income Tax, distributions which are attributable to interest received by the Schwab

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Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™ from its investments in Pennsylvania Municipal Securities or obligations of the United States, its territories and possessions and certain of its agencies and instrumentalities (Federal Securities) are not taxable. Distributions by the fund to a Pennsylvania resident that are attributable to most other sources may be subject to the Pennsylvania Personal Income Tax and (for residents of Philadelphia) to the Philadelphia School District Investment Net Income Tax.
Distributions paid by the fund, which are excludable as exempt income for federal tax purposes, are not subject to the Pennsylvania corporate net income tax. An additional deduction from Pennsylvania taxable income is permitted for the amount of distributions paid by the fund attributable to interest received by the fund from its investments in Pennsylvania municipal securities and federal securities to the extent included in federal taxable income, but such a deduction is reduced by any interest on indebtedness incurred to carry the securities and other expenses incurred in the production of such interest income, including expenses deducted on the federal income tax return that would not have been allowed under the Code if the interest were exempt from federal income tax. Distributions by the fund attributable to most other sources may be subject to the Pennsylvania corporate net income tax. It is the current position of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue that fund shares are considered exempt assets (with a pro rata exclusion based on the value of the fund attributable to its investments in Pennsylvania municipal securities and federal securities) for purposes of determining a corporation’s stock value subject to the Commonwealth’s capital stock tax or franchise tax.
The fund intends to invest primarily in obligations which produce interest exempt from federal and Pennsylvania taxes. If the fund invests in obligations that are not exempt for Pennsylvania purposes but are exempt for federal purposes, a portion of the fund’s distributions will be subject to Pennsylvania personal income tax.
Shares of the Schwab Pennsylvania Municipal Money Fund™ may be subject to the Pennsylvania inheritance tax and the Pennsylvania estate tax if held by a Pennsylvania decedent at the time of death.
Massachusetts Tax Considerations
Under current law, investors in the fund will not be subject to the Massachusetts personal income tax on distributions from the fund attributable to interest income from Massachusetts municipal securities or obligations of the United States, its territories and possessions and certain of its agencies and instrumentalities. Massachusetts requires that the fund properly designate such dividends in a written notice mailed to the fund’s shareholders not later than sixty days after the close of the fund’s taxable year.
Distributions which qualify as capital gain dividends for federal income tax purposes also are exempt from Massachusetts personal income taxation, to the extent that the distributions are attributable to gains from the sale or exchange of certain Massachusetts obligations, and are properly designated as such in a written notice mailed to the fund’s shareholders not later than sixty days after the close of the fund’s tax year.
Distributions from investment income and capital gains, including exempt-interest dividends, may be subject to Massachusetts corporate excise tax.

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APPENDIX A – RATINGS OF INVESTMENT SECURITIES
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Moody’s Investors Service
Prime-1 is the highest commercial paper rating assigned by Moody’s. Issuers (or related supporting institutions) of commercial paper with this rating are considered to have a superior ability to repay short-term promissory obligations. Issuers (or related supporting institutions) of securities rated Prime-2 are viewed as having a strong capacity to repay short-term promissory obligations. This capacity will normally be evidenced by many of the characteristics of issuers whose commercial paper is rated Prime-1 but to a lesser degree.
Standard & Poor’s Corporation
An S&P A-1 commercial paper rating indicates a strong degree of safety regarding timely payment of principal and interest. Issues determined to possess overwhelming safety characteristics are denoted A-1+. Capacity for timely payment on commercial paper rated A-2 is satisfactory, but the relative degree of safety is not as high as for issues designated A-1.
Fitch, Inc.
F1+ is the highest category, and indicates the strongest degree of assurance for timely payment. Issues rated F1 reflect an assurance of timely payment only slightly less than issues rated F1+. Issues assigned an F2 rating have a satisfactory degree of assurance for timely payment, but the margin of safety is not as great as for issues in the first two rating categories.
SHORT-TERM NOTES AND VARIABLE RATE DEMAND OBLIGATIONS
Moody’s Investors Service
Short-term notes/variable rate demand obligations bearing the designations MIG-1/VMIG-1 are considered to be of the best quality, enjoying strong protection from established cash flows, superior liquidity support or demonstrated broad-based access to the market for refinancing. Obligations rated MIG-2/VMIG-2 are of high quality and enjoy ample margins of protection although not as large as those of the top rated securities.
Standard & Poor’s Corporation
An S&P SP-1 rating indicates that the subject securities’ issuer has a very strong capacity to pay principal and interest. Issues determined to possess very strong safety characteristics are given a plus (+) designation. S&P’s determination that an issuer has a strong capacity to pay principal and interest is denoted by an SP-2 rating.

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Appendix B
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APPENDIX B — DESCRIPTION OF PROXY VOTING POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc.
The Charles Schwab Family of Funds
Schwab Investments
Schwab Capital Trust
Schwab Annuity Portfolios
Laudus Trust
Laudus Institutional Trust
Schwab Strategic Trust
Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures
As of February 2010
Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (“CSIM”), as an investment adviser, is generally responsible for voting proxies with respect to the securities held in accounts of investment companies and other clients for which it provides discretionary investment management services. CSIM’s Proxy Committee exercises and documents CSIM’s responsibility with regard to voting of client proxies (the “Proxy Committee”). The Proxy Committee is composed of representatives of CSIM’s Fund Administration, Legal, and Portfolio Management Departments, and chaired by CSIM’s Deputy Chief Investment Officer. The Proxy Committee reviews and, as necessary, may amend periodically these Procedures to address new or revised proxy voting policies or procedures. The policies stated in these Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures (the “CSIM Proxy Procedures”) pertain to all of CSIM’s clients.
The Boards of Trustees (the “Trustees”) of The Charles Schwab Family of Funds, Schwab Investments, Schwab Capital Trust, and Schwab Annuity Portfolios ( “Schwab Funds”) have delegated the responsibility for voting proxies to CSIM through their respective Investment Advisory and Administration Agreements. In addition, the Boards of Trustees (the “Trustees”) of Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust (“Laudus Funds”) and the Schwab Strategic Trust (“Schwab ETFs”; collectively, the Schwab Funds, the Laudus Funds and the Schwab ETFs are the “Funds”) have delegated the responsibility for voting proxies to CSIM through their respective Investment Advisory and Administration Agreements. The Trustees have adopted these Proxy Procedures with respect to proxies voted on behalf of the various Schwab Funds, Laudus Funds, and Schwab ETFs portfolios. CSIM will present amendments to the Trustees for approval. However, there may be circumstances where the Proxy Committee deems it advisable to amend the Proxy Procedures between regular Schwab Funds, Laudus Funds and Schwab ETFs Board meetings. In such cases, the Trustees will be asked to ratify any changes at the next regular meeting of the Board.
To assist CSIM in its responsibility for voting proxies and the overall proxy voting process, CSIM has retained Glass Lewis & Co. (“Glass Lewis”) as an expert in the proxy voting and corporate governance area. The services provided by Glass Lewis include in-depth research,

 


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global issuer analysis, and voting recommendations as well as vote execution, reporting and record keeping.
Proxy Voting Policy
For investment companies and other clients for which CSIM exercises its responsibility for voting proxies, it is CSIM’s policy to vote proxies in the manner that CSIM and the Proxy Committee determine will maximize the economic benefit to CSIM’s clients. In furtherance of this policy, the Proxy Committee has received and reviewed Glass Lewis’ written proxy voting policies and procedures (“Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures”) and has determined that Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures, with the exceptions noted below, are consistent with the CSIM Proxy Procedures and CSIM’s fiduciary duty with respect to its clients. The Proxy Committee will review any material amendments to Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures to determine whether such procedures continue to be consistent with the CSIM Proxy Voting Procedures, and CSIM’s fiduciary duty with respect to its clients.
Except under each of the circumstances described below, the Proxy Committee will delegate to Glass Lewis responsibility for voting proxies, including timely submission of votes, on behalf of CSIM’s clients in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures.
For proxy issues, that are determined by the Proxy Committee or the applicable portfolio manager or other relevant portfolio management staff to raise significant concerns with respect to the accounts of CSIM clients, the Proxy Committee will review the analysis and recommendation of Glass Lewis. Examples of factors that could cause a matter to raise significant concerns include, but are not limited to: issues whose outcome has the potential to materially affect the company’s industry, or regional or national economy, and matters which involve broad public policy developments which may similarly materially affect the environment in which the company operates. The Proxy Committee also will solicit input from the assigned portfolio manager and other relevant portfolio management staff for the particular portfolio security. After evaluating all such recommendations, the Proxy Committee will decide how to vote the shares and will instruct Glass Lewis to vote consistent with its decision. The Proxy Committee has the ultimate responsibility for making the determination of how to vote the shares in order to maximize the value of that particular holding.
With respect to proxies of an affiliated mutual fund, the Proxy Committee will vote such proxies in the same proportion as the vote of all other shareholders of the fund (i.e., “echo vote”), unless otherwise required by law. When required by law, the Proxy Committee will also “echo vote” proxies of an unaffiliated mutual fund. For example, certain exemptive orders issued to the Schwab Funds by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Section 12(d)(1)(F) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, require the Schwab Funds, under certain circumstances, to “echo vote” proxies of registered investment companies that serve as underlying investments of the Schwab Funds. When not required to “echo vote,” the Proxy Committee will delegate to Glass Lewis responsibility for voting proxies of an unaffiliated mutual fund in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures.

 


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In addition, with respect to holdings of The Charles Schwab Corporation (“CSC”) (ticker symbol: SCHW), the Proxy Committee will vote such proxies in the same proportion as the vote of all other shareholders of CSC (i.e., “echo vote”), unless otherwise required by law.
Exceptions from Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures: The Proxy Committee has reviewed the particular policies set forth in Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures and has determined that the implementation of the following custom policies is consistent with CSIM’s fiduciary duty with respect to its clients:
    Independent Chairman: With respect to shareholder proposals requiring that a company chairman’s position be filled by an independent director, the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote against such proposals unless the company does not meet the applicable minimum total shareholder return threshold, as calculated below. In cases where a company fails to meet the threshold, the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote the shareholder proposals requiring that the chairman’s position be filled by an independent director in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures. Additionally, with respect to the election of a director who serves as the governance committee chair (or, in the absence of a governance committee, the chair of the nominating committee), the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote for the director in cases where the company chairman’s position is not filled by an independent director and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.
 
    Classified Boards: With respect to shareholder proposals declassifying a staggered board in favor of the annual election of directors, the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote against such proposals unless the company does not meet the applicable minimum total shareholder return threshold, as calculated below. In cases where a company fails to meet the threshold, the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote the shareholder proposals declassifying a staggered board in favor of the annual election of directors in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures.
Glass Lewis uses a three-year total return performance methodology to calculate the applicable minimum total shareholder return threshold. For Russell 3000 Index constituents, if a company’s total annual shareholder return is in the bottom 25% of Russell 3000 constituent companies’ total annual shareholder returns for three consecutive years, the company will be deemed not to have met the threshold. For companies not in the Russell 3000 Index, the universe of companies used for the minimum total shareholder return threshold calculation is all Glass Lewis covered companies outside of the Russell 3000 Index.
There may be circumstances in which Glass Lewis does not provide an analysis or recommendation for voting a security’s proxy. In that event, and when the criteria set forth below are met, two members of the Proxy Committee, including at least one representative from equity Portfolio Management, may decide how to vote such proxy in order to maximize the value of that particular holding. The following criteria must be met: (1) For each Fund that holds the security in its portfolio, the value of the security must represent less than one tenth of one cent in the Fund’s NAV, and (2) the security’s value must equal less than $50,000 in the aggregate

 


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across all of the Funds and separate accounts that hold this security. Any voting decision made under these circumstances will be reported to the Proxy Committee at its next scheduled meeting. If the criteria are not met, the Proxy Committee may meet to decide how to vote such proxy.
Conflicts of Interest. Except as described above for proxies of mutual funds, CSC and exceptions to Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures, where proxy issues present material conflicts of interest between CSIM, and/or any of its affiliates, and CSIM’s clients, CSIM will delegate to Glass Lewis responsibility for voting such proxies in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures. The CSIM Legal Department is responsible for developing procedures to identify material conflicts of interest.
Voting Foreign Proxies. CSIM has arrangements with Glass Lewis for voting proxies. However, voting proxies with respect to shares of foreign securities may involve significantly greater effort and corresponding cost than voting proxies with respect to domestic securities, due to the variety of regulatory schemes and corporate practices in foreign countries with respect to proxy voting. Problems voting foreign proxies may include the following:
o   proxy statements and ballots written in a foreign language;
o   untimely and/or inadequate notice of shareholder meetings;
o   restrictions of foreigner’s ability to exercise votes;
o   requirements to vote proxies in person;
o   requirements to provide local agents with power of attorney to facilitate CSIM’s voting instructions.
In consideration of the foregoing issues, Glass Lewis uses its best-efforts to vote foreign proxies. As part of its ongoing oversight, the Proxy Committee will monitor the voting of foreign proxies to determine whether all reasonable steps are taken to vote foreign proxies. If the Proxy Committee determines that the cost associated with the attempt to vote outweighs the potential benefits clients may derive from voting, the Proxy Committee may decide not to attempt to vote. In addition, certain foreign countries impose restrictions on the sale of securities for a period of time in proximity to the shareholder meeting. To avoid these trading restrictions, the Proxy Committee instructs Glass Lewis not to vote such foreign proxies.
Securities Lending Programs. Certain of the Funds enter into securities lending arrangements with lending agents to generate additional revenue for their portfolios. In securities lending arrangements, any voting rights that accompany the loaned securities generally pass to the borrower of the securities, but the lender retains the right to recall a security and may then exercise the security’s voting rights. In order to vote the proxies of securities out on loan, the securities must be recalled prior to the established record date. CSIM will use its best efforts to recall a Fund’s securities on loan and vote such securities’ proxies if (a) the proxy relates to a special meeting of shareholders of the issuer (as opposed to the issuer’s annual meeting of shareholders), or (b) the Fund owns more than 5% of the outstanding shares of the issuer. Further, it is CSIM’s policy to use its best efforts to recall securities on loan and vote such securities’ proxies if CSIM determines that the proxies involve a material event affecting the loaned securities. CSIM may utilize third-party service providers to assist it in identifying and

 


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evaluating whether an event is material. CSIM may also recall securities on loan and vote such securities’ proxies in its discretion.
Sub-Advisory Relationships. For investment companies or other clients that CSIM has delegated day-to-day investment management responsibilities to an investment adviser, CSIM may delegate its responsibility to vote proxies with respect to such investment companies’ or other clients’ securities. Each Sub-adviser to whom proxy voting responsibility has been delegated will be required to review all proxy solicitation material and to exercise the voting rights associated with the securities it has been allocated in the best interest of each investment company and its shareholders, or other client. Prior to delegating the proxy voting responsibility, CSIM will review each sub-adviser’s proxy voting policy to ensure that each Sub-adviser’s proxy voting policy is generally consistent with the maximization of economic benefits to the investment company or other client.
Reporting and Record Retention
CSIM will maintain, or cause Glass Lewis to maintain, records that identify the manner in which proxies have been voted (or not voted) on behalf of CSIM clients. CSIM will comply with all applicable rules and regulations regarding disclosure of its or its clients proxy voting records and procedures.
CSIM will retain all proxy voting materials and supporting documentation as required under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the rules and regulations thereunder.

 


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I. A Board of Directors That
Serves the Interests of Shareholders
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS
The purpose of Glass Lewis’ proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that boards working to protect and enhance the best interests of shareholders are independent, have directors with diverse backgrounds, have a record of positive performance, and have members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience.
Independence
The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director’s service track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.
We look at each director nominee to examine the director’s relationships with the company, the company’s executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director’s decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders’ interests above the director’s or the related party’s interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board and, in particular, the audit committee.
Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:
Independent Director – An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years1 before the inquiry are usually considered “current” for purposes of this test.
In our view, a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of his/her resignation or departure from the interim management position. Glass Lewis applies a
 
1   NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look-back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.

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three-year look back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look back.
Affiliated Director – An affiliated director has a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.2 This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the company.3 In addition, we view a director who owns or controls 20% or more of the company’s voting stock as an affiliate.
We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.
Inside Director – An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a chairman of the board who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director’s own best interests. Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.
Definition of “Material”: A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds: (i) $50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services; or (ii) $120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm where the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services. This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;4 and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director’s firm; or (iii) 1% of either company’s consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).
Definition of “Familial”: Familial relationships include a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person’s home. A director is an affiliate if the director has a family member who is employed by the company and who receives compensation of $120,000 or more per year or the compensation is not disclosed.
Definition of “Company”: A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.
 
2   If a company classifies one of its non-employee directors as non-independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an affiliate.
 
3   We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of “material.”
 
4   We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company’s size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director’s role at the charity.

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Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Board Independence
Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders’ interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically5 recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.6
In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chairman’s presence.
In addition, we scrutinize avowedly “independent” chairmen and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent or the company should not tout them as such.
Committee Independence
We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company’s audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.7 We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.
Independent Chairman
Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chairman creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chairman position. An executive manages the business according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals the board set. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chairman presumably will have a significant influence over the board.
It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/ chairman controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.
A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board’s approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO’s vision for accomplishing the board’s objectives. Failure to achieve the board’s objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.
 
5   With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence.
 
6   Where a director serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an investment firm with greater than 20% ownership, we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated but will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.
 
7   We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is comprised of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.

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Likewise, an independent chairman can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.
Further, it is the board’s responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.
We recognize that empirical evidence regarding the separation of these two roles remains inconclusive. However, Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chairman is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chairman fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior management.
We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically encourage our clients to support separating the roles of chairman and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.
Performance
The most crucial test of a board’s commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.
Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Performance
We disfavor directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:
1. A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of the board meetings or 75% of the total of applicable committee meetings and board meetings.8
2. A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late filing was the director’s fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).
3. A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements.
4. A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed).
5. All directors who served on the board if, for the last three years, the company’s performance has been in the bottom quartile of the sector and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.
 
8   However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.

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Audit Committees and Performance
Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because “[v]ibrant and stable capital markets depend on, among other things, reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. The vital oversight role audit committees play in the process of producing financial information has never been more important.”9
When assessing an audit committee’s performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:
A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting – the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors – form a ‘three legged stool’ that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be ‘first among equals’ in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.
Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee
For an audit committee to function effectively on investors’ behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said “members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters.”10
We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller or similar experience. While we will not necessarily vote against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to vote against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.
Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.
 
9   Audit Committee Effectiveness – What Works Best.” PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation. 2005.
 
10   Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.

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When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and would vote in favor of its members, but we would recommend voting against the following members under the following circumstances:11
1. All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.
2. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee’s financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies.
3. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least 4 times during the year.
4. The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members.
5. Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member’s attendance at all board and committee meetings.
6. All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor.
7. The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor).
8. All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are now prohibited by the PCAOB.
9. All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions.
10. All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
11. The audit committee chair12 if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee.
 
11   Where the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against the members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern with regard to the committee chair.
 
12   In all cases, if the chair of the committee is not specified, we recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest.

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12. All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A13 letter has been issued.
13. All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the company.
14. All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:
    The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders;
 
    The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation;
 
    The restatement involves revenue recognition;
 
    The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or
 
     The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities.
15. All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last 5 quarters.
16. All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
17. All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.
18. All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed.
19. All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor’s liability to the company for damages.14
20. All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company’s last annual meeting, and when, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected, or, when the company has an ongoing material weakness from a prior year that has not yet been corrected.
We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, we take into consideration, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee, the transparency of the audit committee report.
Compensation Committee Performance
 
13   Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.
 
14   The Council of Institutional Investors. “Corporate Governance Policies,” p. 4, April 5, 2006; and “Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to the AICPA,” November 8, 2006.

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Compensation committees have the final say in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business’s long-term shareholders returns.
Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.
Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. Lax controls can and have contributed to conflicting information being obtained, for example through the use of nonobjective consultants. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring-loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.
Central to understanding the actions of a compensation committee is a careful review of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) report included in each company’s proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as management-submitted advisory compensation vote proposals, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company’s top executives.
In our evaluation of the CD&A, we examine, among other factors, the following:
1. The extent to which the company uses appropriate performance goals and metrics in determining overall compensation as an indication that pay is tied to performance.
2. How clearly the company discloses performance metrics and goals so that shareholders may make an independent determination that goals were met.
3. The extent to which the performance metrics, targets and goals are implemented to enhance company performance and encourage prudent risk-taking.
4. The selected peer group(s) so that shareholders can make a comparison of pay and performance across the appropriate peer group.
5. The extent to which the company benchmarks compensation levels at a specific percentile of its peer group along with the rationale for selecting such a benchmark.
6. The amount of discretion granted management or the compensation committee to deviate from defined performance metrics and goals in making awards, as well as the appropriateness of the use of such discretion.

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We provide an overall evaluation of the quality and content of a company’s executive compensation policies and procedures as disclosed in a CD&A as either good, fair or poor.
We evaluate compensation committee members on the basis of their performance while serving on the compensation committee in question, not for actions taken solely by prior committee members who are not currently serving on the committee. At companies that provide shareholders with non-binding advisory votes on executive compensation (“Say-on-Pay”), we will use the Say-on-Pay proposal as the initial, primary means to express dissatisfaction with the company’s compensation polices and practices rather than recommending voting against members of the compensation committee (except in the most egregious cases).
When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will recommend voting against for the following:15
1. All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served at the time of poor pay-for-performance (e.g., a company receives an F grade in our pay- for-performance analysis) when shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation.16
2. Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that received F grades in our pay-for-performance model and who is also suspect at the company in question.
3. The compensation committee chair if the company received two D grades in consecutive years in our pay-for-performance analysis, and if during the past year the Company performed the same as or worse than its peers.17
4. All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements.
5. All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained.
6. All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits were allowed.
 
15   Where the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair and the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern with regard to the committee chair.
 
16   Where there are multiple CEOs in one year, we will consider not recommending against the compensation committee but will defer judgment on compensation policies and practices until the next year or a full year after arrival of the new CEO. In addition, if a company provides shareholders with a Say-on-Pay proposal and receives an F grade in our pay-for- performance model, we will recommend that shareholders only vote against the Say-on-Pay proposal rather than the members of the compensation committee, unless the company exhibits egregious practices. However, if the company receives successive F grades, we will then recommend against the members of the compensation committee in addition to recommending voting against the Say-on-Pay proposal.
 
17   In cases where the company received two D grades in consecutive years, but during the past year the company performed better than its peers or improved from a D to an F grade year over year, we refrain from recommending to vote against the compensation chair. In addition, if a company provides shareholders with a Say-on-Pay proposal in this instance, we will consider voting against the advisory vote rather than the compensation committee chair unless the company exhibits unquestionably egregious practices.

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7. The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year, but should have (e.g., because executive compensation was restructured or a new executive was hired).
8. All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options within the past two years and we would not have supported the repricing (e.g., officers and directors were allowed to participate).
9. All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated or when fully vested options are granted.
10. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in option backdating.
11. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information.
12. All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud.
13. The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets.
14. All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.18
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance
The nominating and governance committee, as an agency for the shareholders, is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the board is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote.
Regarding the nominating and or governance committee, we will recommend voting against the following:19
1. All members of the governance committee20 during whose tenure the board failed to implement a shareholder proposal with a direct and substantial impact on shareholders and
 
18   In all other instances (i.e. a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.
 
19   Where we would recommend to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern regarding the committee chair.
 
20   If the board does not have a governance committee (or a committee that serves such a purpose), we recommend voting against the entire board on this basis.

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their rights — i.e., where the proposal received enough shareholder votes (at least a majority) to allow the board to implement or begin to implement that proposal.21 Examples of these types of shareholder proposals are majority vote to elect directors and to declassify the board.
2. The governance committee chair,22 when the chairman is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.23 We note that each of the Business Roundtable, The Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent.
3. In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are less than five or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.
4. The governance committee chair, when the committee fails to meet at all during the year.
5. The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be “inadequate” related party transaction disclosure (i.e. the nature of such transactions and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing an average shareholder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock-exchange listing requirements).
Regarding the nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the following:24
1. All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.
2. The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year, but should have (i.e., because new directors were nominated or appointed since the time of the last annual meeting).
3. In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair25 when the chairman is not independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.26
 
21   Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.
 
22   If the committee chair is not specified, we recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest. If the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, we will recommend voting against the longest- serving board member serving on the committee.
 
23   We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against as if there were no lead or presiding director.
 
24   Where we would recommend is to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern regarding the committee chair.
 
25   If the committee chair is not specified, we will recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest. If the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, we will recommend voting against the longest-serving board member on the committee.
 
26   In the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the board on this basis.

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4. The nominating committee chair, when there are less than five or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.27
5. The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.28
Board-level Risk Management Oversight
Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firm have significant hedging or trading strategies, including financial and non-financial derivatives, those firms should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.
When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company’s board-level risk committee contributed to the loss through poor oversight, we would recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise)29, we will consider recommending to vote against the chairman of the board on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chairman/CEO except in egregious cases.
Experience
We find that a director’s past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred appearing at companies that follow these same patterns. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of every officer and director serving at 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.
Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Director Experience
We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight,
 
27   In the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the board on this basis.
 
28   Considering that shareholder discontent clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the validity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern, followup on such matters, and only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 25% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.
 
29   A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, or another board committee, usually the audit committee but occasionally the finance committee, depending on a given company’s board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.

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overcompensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders.30
Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.
Other Considerations
In addition to the three key characteristics – independence, performance, experience – that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues in making voting recommendations.
Conflicts of Interest
We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of affiliated or inside directors:
1. A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Because of the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it.
2. A director who is on an excessive number of boards: We will typically recommend voting against a director who serves as an executive officer of any public company while serving on more than two other public company boards and any other director who serves on more than six public company boards typically receives an against recommendation from Glass Lewis. Academic literature suggests that one board takes up approximately 200 hours per year of each member’s time. We believe this limits the number of boards on which directors can effectively serve, especially executives at other companies.31 Further, we note a recent study has shown that the average number of outside board seats held by CEOs of S&P 500 companies is 0.7, down from 0.9 in 2004 and 1.6 in 1999.32
3. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, providing consulting or other material professional services to the company: These services may include legal, consulting, or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company’s decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company’s directors.
4. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting
 
30   We typically apply a three-year look-back to such issues and also research to see whether the responsible directors have been up for election since the time of the failure, and if so, we take into account the percentage of support they received from shareholders.
 
31   Our guidelines are similar to the standards set forth by the NACD in its “Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism,” 2001 Edition, pp. 14-15 (also cited approvingly by the Conference Board in its “Corporate Governance Best Practices: A Blueprint for the Post-Enron Era,” 2002, p. 17), which suggested that CEOs should not serve on more than 2 additional boards, persons with full-time work should not serve on more than 4 additional boards, and others should not serve on more than six boards.
 
32   Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2009, p. 19

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to more than $50,000: Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests.
5. Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other’s boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.33
6. All board members who served at a time when a poison pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.
Size of the Board of Directors
While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimum board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of “too many cooks in the kitchen” and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.
To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chairman of the nominating committee at a board with fewer than five directors. With boards consisting of more than 20 directors, we typically recommend voting against all members of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee).34
Controlled Companies
Controlled companies present an exception to our independence recommendations. The board’s function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual or entity owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.
Independence Exceptions
The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:
1. We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.
2. The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors.
 
33   There is no look-back period for this situation. This only applies to public companies and we only footnote it for the non-insider.
 
34   The Conference Board, at p. 23 in its report “Corporate Governance Best Practices, Id.,” quotes one of its roundtable participants as stating, “[w]hen you’ve got a 20 or 30 person corporate board, it’s one way of assuring that nothing is ever going to happen that the CEO doesn’t want to happen.”

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a. We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company’s shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant.
b. Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choice for approving and monitoring senior executives’ pay, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. As such, we believe that having affiliated directors on a controlled company’s compensation committee is acceptable. However, given that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee.
3. Controlled companies do not need an independent chairman or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board – such as chairman or presiding director – can best carry out the board’s duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests.
4. Where an individual or entity owns more than 50% of a company’s voting power but the company is not a “controlled” company as defined by relevant listing standards, we apply a lower independence requirement of a majority of the board but keep all other standards in place. Similarly, where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company’s voting power, but the company is not “controlled” and there is not a “majority” owner, we will allow for proportional representation on the board based on the individual or entity’s percentage of ownership.
Size of the Board of Directors
We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.
Audit Committee Independence
    We believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company’s controlled status, the interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company’s financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.
Mutual Fund Boards
Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund’s adviser are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.
The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:
1. Size of the board of directors: The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.

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2. The CFO on the board: Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund’s registered investment adviser should serve on the board.
3. Independence of the audit committee: The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors.
4. Audit committee financial expert: At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert.
The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:
1. Independence of the board: We believe that three-fourths of an investment company’s board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into “proposed rule” status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.
2. When the auditor is not up for ratification: We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification because, due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.
3. Non-independent chairman: The SEC has proposed that the chairman of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund’s chairman and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chairman of an investment company’s nominating committee as well as the chairman of the board if the chairman and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chairman and we agree with them that “an independent board chairman would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of fund shareholders than would a chairman who is an executive of the adviser.” (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/ s70304-179.pdf)
DECLASSIFIED BOARDS
Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.
Empirical studies have shown: (i) companies with staggered boards reduce a firm’s value; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.
In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Research shows that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction. A study by a group of Harvard Law professors concluded that companies whose staggered boards prevented a takeover “reduced shareholder returns for targets ... on the order of eight to ten

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percent in the nine months after a hostile bid was announced.”35 When a staggered board negotiates a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premiums occurs.36
During a March 2004 Glass Lewis Proxy Talk on staggered boards, the proponents of staggered boards could not identify research showing that staggered boards increase shareholder value. The opponents of such a structure marshaled significant support for the proposition that, holding everything else constant, classified boards reduce shareholder value. Lucian Bebchuk, a Harvard Law professor who studies corporate governance issues, concluded that charter-based staggered boards “reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization” and that “staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value.”37
Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2008 only 40% of U.S. companies had a classified board structure, down from approximately 60% of companies in 2004. Clearly, more shareholders have supported the repeal of classified boards. Resolutions relating to the repeal of staggered boards garnered on average over 70% support among shareholders in 2008, whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.
Given the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company’s value and the increasing shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.
MANDATORY DIRECTOR RETIREMENT PROVISIONS
Director Term and Age Limits
Glass Lewis believes that director age and term limits typically are not in shareholders’ best interests. Too often age and term limits are used by boards as a crutch to remove board members who have served for an extended period of time. When used in that fashion, they are indicative of a board that has a difficult time making “tough decisions.”
Academic literature suggests that there is no evidence of a correlation between either length of tenure or age and director performance. On occasion, term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and to enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change when boards are unwilling to do so.
While we understand age limits can be a way to force change where boards are unwilling to make changes on their own, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. Further, age limits unfairly imply that older (or, in rare cases, younger) directors cannot contribute to company oversight. A director’s experience can be valuable to shareholders because directors navigate complex and critical issues when serving on a board.
In our view, a director’s experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. However, we support periodic director rotation to ensure a fresh perspective in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. We believe the board should implement such rotation instead of relying on arbitrary limits. When necessary, shareholders can address the issue of director rotation through director elections.
 
35   Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates, Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,” December 2002, page 1.
 
36   Id. at 2 (“Examining a sample of seventy-three negotiated transactions from 2000 to 2002, we find no systematic benefits in terms of higher premia to boards that have [staggered structures].”).
 
37   Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards” (2004).

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We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board’s approach to corporate governance and the board’s stewardship of company performance rather than imposing inflexible rules that don’t necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.
However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. If the board waives its term/age limits, Glass Lewis will consider recommending shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committees, unless the rule was waived with sufficient explanation, such as consummation of a corporate transaction like a merger.
REQUIRING TWO OR MORE NOMINEES PER BOARD SEAT
In an attempt to address lack of access to the ballot, shareholders sometimes propose that the board give shareholders a choice of directors for each open board seat in every election. However, we feel that policies requiring a selection of multiple nominees for each board seat would discourage prospective directors from accepting nominations. A prospective director could not be confident either that he or she is the board’s clear choice or that he or she would be elected. Therefore, Glass Lewis generally will vote against such proposals.
SHAREHOLDER ACCESS
The SEC proposal: Shareholders have continuously sought a way to have a voice in director elections in recent years. Most of these efforts have centered on regulatory change at the SEC over the past several years. In July of 2007, the SEC responded by issuing two proposed rules, one to allow certain shareholders to submit director nominations for inclusion on management’s proxy and the second to disallow shareholder access proposals from being submitted by shareholders. The former rule did not pass but the latter rule was subsequently approved by the SEC in November of 2007, allowing companies to exclude shareholder access proposals from their proxy statements, in effect reverting to the SEC position prior to AFSCME’s challenge, ultimately upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, of the SEC’s decision to allow AIG to exclude the group’s access proposal.
During this window of opportunity prior to the SEC’s final rulemaking in November, three companies faced access proposals in 2007. The proposals received considerable votes in favor, garnering nearly 40% support at Hewlett Packard, 42% support at UnitedHealth and passing with 51% of the votes at Cryo-Cell International.
More recently, in June 2009 the SEC released proposed Rule 14a-11, which, if adopted would require most companies to include shareholder nominees for directors in company proxy materials under certain circumstances—namely if the shareholder(s) seeking to nominate directors beneficially owned shares in the company for at least one year, as well as met an ownership threshold based on a sliding scale depending on the company’s size. Since the release of proposed Rule 14a-11, the SEC has reviewed over 500 public comment letters regarding the rule and has therefore deferred voting on the proposed rule until early 2010. As a result, it is unlikely shareholders will have the opportunity to vote on access proposals in 2010.
MAJORITY VOTE FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS
In stark contrast to the failure of shareholder access to gain acceptance, majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the de facto standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.

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While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.
During 2009 Glass Lewis tracked 46 proposals to require a majority vote to elect directors at annual meetings in the U.S., up from 24 such proposals in 2008, but down from 54 proposals during 2007 and 147 proposals during 2006. The general decline in the number of proposals being submitted was a result of many companies adopting some form of majority voting, including well over 2/3 of companies in the S&P 500 index. During 2009 these proposals received on average 59% shareholder support (based on for and against votes), up from 54% in 2008.
The plurality vote standard
Today, most US companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including himself, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee “wins” the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard was the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in “failed elections.” This was of particular concern during the 1980s, an era of frequent takeovers and contests for control of companies.
Advantages of a majority vote standard
If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. We think that this minimal amount of protection for shareholders is reasonable and will not upset the corporate structure nor reduce the willingness of qualified shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future.
We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Occasional use of this power will likely prevent the election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests in favor of other interests that conflict with those of investors. Glass Lewis will generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote except for use in contested director elections.
In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (e.g., Ashland Inc.) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors (e.g., Intel).
We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director’s replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.

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II. Transparency and Integrity of Financial Reporting
AUDITOR RATIFICATION
The auditor’s role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company’s books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company’s financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company’s fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:
“The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence.”
As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor’s interests and the public’s interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor’s performance and to annually ratify a board’s auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that “to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability ... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement.”38
Voting Recommendations on Auditor Ratification
We generally support management’s choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor’s independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chairman. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weakness in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.
Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:
1. When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.
 
38   “Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.” p. VIII:20, October 6, 2008.

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2. Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in the reporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.39
3. When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.
4. When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
5. When the company has aggressive accounting policies.
6. When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements.
7. Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures.
8. We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the auditor’s interests and shareholder interests.
We typically support audit-related proposals regarding mandatory auditor rotation when the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years).
PENSION ACCOUNTING ISSUES
A pension accounting question often raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company’s net income. This issue often arises in the executive-compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.
Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company’s discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company’s performance.
 
39   An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.

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III. The Link Between
Compensation and Performance
Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives. We believe that this is an important area in which the board’s priorities are revealed. However, as a general rule, Glass Lewis does not believe shareholders should be involved in the design, negotiation, management or approval of compensation packages. Such matters should be left to the compensation committee, which can be held accountable for its decisions through their election.
However, Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. Glass Lewis has a proprietary pay-for-performance model that evaluates the pay of the top five executives at US companies. Our model benchmarks these executives’ pay against their performance using four peer groups for each company: an industry peer group, a smaller sector peer group, a group of similar size companies and a geographic peer group. Using a forced curve and a school letter-grade system, we rank companies according to their pay-for-performance and recommend voting against compensation committees of companies failing our pay-for-performance analysis.
We use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on each of the compensation issues that arise on the ballot. Likewise, we use this analysis in our evaluation of the compensation committee’s performance.
Full Disclosure of Executive Compensation
Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which the pay is keeping pace with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. Performance metrics vary and may include items such as revenue growth, targets, or human resources issues.
However, we are concerned when a proposal goes too far in the level of detail that it requests for executives other than the most high-ranking leaders of the company. Shareholders are unlikely to need or be able to use compensation information for employees below the level of the most senior corporate officers.
Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders’ interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. While we favor full disclosure for senior executives and we view pay disclosure at the aggregate level (e.g., the number of employees being paid over a certain amount or in certain categories) as potentially useful, we do not believe shareholders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives.
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say-on-Pay”)
The practice of approving a company’s compensation reports is standard practice in many non-US countries, and has been a requirement for companies in the United Kingdom since 2002 and in Australia since 2005. More recently, such proposals have been gaining traction in the United States. Beginning with AFLAC in 2008, over a dozen US companies began to voluntarily provide shareholders with an advisory vote prior to 2009. However, in February of 2009 the U.S. government implemented the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which required all companies that participated in the

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Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”) under the US Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) to provide shareholders with a separate shareholder vote to approve executive compensation. Glass Lewis reviewed over 280 of these Say-on-Pay proposals in 2009. As the US Treasury Department, the SEC and Congress contemplate proposed federal regulation in 2010 that would mandate advisory votes at all US public companies, shareholders should anticipate Say-on-Pay becoming a routine item at annual meetings in the years ahead.
Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. Not only can the specific resolutions vary from company to company, but we believe the compensation-related disclosure must be examined in the context of each company’s distinct industry as well as its historic pay-for-performance practices. Although Say-on-Pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of “against” or “abstain” votes demonstrate a lack of shareholder confidence in a company’s compensation policies and procedures. Therefore, after determining the specific aspects of disclosure actually being voted on (i.e., the CD&A, the summary compensation tables, and/or any related material), we focus on the following main factors when reviewing Say-on-Pay proposals:
The overall design and structure of the Company’s executive compensation program;
The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the Company’s current and past pay-for-performance grades;
The quality and content of the Company’s CD&A disclosure and
Any significant changes or modifications made to the Company’s compensation structure or award amounts, including base salaries.
In cases where our analysis reveals a compensation structure in drastic need of reform, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the Say-on-Pay proposal. Generally such instances include evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (i.e., deficient or failing pay for performance grades), unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (i.e., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.), questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (i.e., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or other egregious compensation practices.
Limits on Executive Compensation
Generally, Glass Lewis believes shareholders should not be directly involved in setting executive pay. Such matters should be left to the compensation committee. We view the election of compensation committee members as the appropriate mechanism for shareholders to express their disapproval or support of board policy on executive pay. Further, we believe that companies whose pay-for-performance is in line with their peers should be able to pay their executives in a way that drives growth and profit, without destroying ethical values, giving consideration to their peers’ comparable size and performance.
However, Glass Lewis favors performance-based compensation as an effective way to motivate executives to act in shareholders’ best interests. Performance-based pay may be limited if CEO pay is capped at a low level rather than flexibly tied to company performance.
Limits on Executive Stock Options
Stock options are a common form of executive compensation. Making options a part of compensation may be an effective way to attract and retain experienced executives and other key employees. Tying a portion of an executive’s pay to company performance also provides a good incentive for executives to

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maximize share value. Thus, we typically recommend that our clients oppose caps on executive stock options. However, stock option plans should prohibit re-pricing or vesting acceleration of the options.
Equity-Based Compensation Plans
Glass Lewis evaluates option- and other equity-based compensation plans using a detailed model and analyst review. We believe that equity compensation awards are useful, when not abused, for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance.
Equity-based compensation programs have important differences from cash compensation plans and bonus programs. Accordingly, our model and analysis takes into account factors such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions.
Our analysis is quantitative and focused on the plan’s cost as compared with the business’s operating metrics. We run twenty different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company’s financial performance. Each of the twenty analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.
In our analysis, we compare the program’s expected annual expense with the business’s operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the option plan’s expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers and directors of the firm create enterprise value and not necessarily market capitalization (the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because we believe that academic literature proves that some absolute limits are warranted.
We evaluate option plans based on ten overarching principles:
1. Companies should seek more shares only when needed.
2. Plans should be small enough that companies need shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently).
3. If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members.
4. Annual net share count and voting power dilution should be limited.
5. Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group.
6. The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business’s value.
7. The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business’s financial results.
8. Plans should deliver value on a per-employee basis when compared with programs at peer companies.
9. Plans should not permit re-pricing of stock options.
10. Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms.

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Option Exchanges
Glass Lewis views option repricing plans and option exchange programs with great skepticism. Shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock and we believe that the employees, officers, and directors who receive stock options should be similarly situated to align their interests with shareholder interests.
We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be “rescued” from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option’s value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.
In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck. Re-pricing is tantamount to re-trading.
There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program is acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends cause a stock’s value to decline dramatically, rather than specific company issues, and repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original “bargain” was struck. In such a circumstance, we will support a repricing only if the following conditions are true:
(i) officers and board members do not participate in the program;
(ii) the stock decline mirrors the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and approximates the decline in magnitude;
(iii) the exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders with very conservative assumptions and with a recognition of the adverse selection problems inherent in voluntary programs; and
(iv) management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market.
Performance-Based Options
Shareholders commonly ask boards to adopt policies requiring that a significant portion of future stock option grants to senior executives be based on performance. Performance-based options are options where the exercise price is linked to an industry peer group’s stock-performance index.
Glass Lewis believes in performance-based equity compensation plans for senior executives. We feel that executives should be compensated with equity when their performance and the company’s performance warrants such rewards. While we do not believe that equity-based pay plans for all employees should be based on overall company performance, we do support such limitations for equity grants to senior executives (although some equity-based compensation of senior executives without performance criteria is acceptable, such as in the case of moderate incentive grants made in an initial offer of employment or in emerging industries).
Boards often argue that basing option grants on performance would hinder them in attracting talent. We believe that boards can develop a consistent, reliable approach to attract executives with the ability to guide the company toward its targets. If the board believes in performance-based pay for executives, then these proposals requiring the same should not hamper the board’s ability to create equity-based compensation plans.
We generally recommend that shareholders vote in favor of performance-based option requirements.

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Option Backdating, Spring-Loading, and Bullet-Dodging
Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to re-pricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return. Backdating an option is the act of changing an option’s grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. Glass Lewis has identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.
Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock’s price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.
The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.
A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company’s compensation and governance practices.40
Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have breached their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders.
Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company’s financial reports.
When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.
162(m) Plans
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code allows companies to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO,
 
40   Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. “LUCKY CEOs.” November, 2006.

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upon shareholder approval of the excess compensation. Glass Lewis recognizes the value of executive incentive programs and the tax benefit of shareholder-approved incentive plans.
We believe the best practice for companies is to provide reasonable disclosure to shareholders so that they can make sound judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that these proposals include: specific performance goals, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company’s peers.
We typically recommend against a 162(m) plan where: a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; a company fails to provide one of either a total pool or an individual maximum; or the proposed plan is excessive when compared with the plans of the company’s peers.
The company’s record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for-performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of reasonable pay relative to business performance, we are not typically inclined to recommend against a plan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.
As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders’ best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards, it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.
Director Compensation Plans
Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. In particular, we support compensation plans that include option grants or other equity-based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. Director fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals. But excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and threaten to compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. Therefore, a balance is required.
Glass Lewis uses a proprietary model and analyst review to evaluate the costs of those plans compared to the plans of peer companies with similar market capitalizations. We use the results of this model to assist in making our voting recommendations on director compensation plans.

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IV. Governance Structure
and the Shareholder Franchise
ANTI-TAKEOVER MEASURES
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)
Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders’ best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.
We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company’s course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders’ financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan’s implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.
In certain circumstances, we will support a limited poison pill to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes the following attributes: (i) The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction; (ii) the offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days; (iii) the offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms; (iv) there is no fairness opinion requirement; and (v) there is a low to no premium requirement. Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.
NOL Poison Pills
Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the unique event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies’ ability to use NOLs in the event of a “change of ownership.”41 In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill (“NOL pill”) in order to prevent an inadvertent change of ownership by multiple investors purchasing small chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.
Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis taking into consideration, among other factors, the value of the NOLs to the company, the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holding and the nature of the larger shareholders, the trigger threshold and whether the term of
 
41   Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a “change of ownership” of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the “trafficking” of net operating losses.

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the plan is limited in duration (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable “sunset” provision) or is subject to periodic board review and/or shareholder ratification. However, we will recommend that shareholders vote against a proposal to adopt or amend a pill to include NOL protective provisions if the company has adopted a more narrowly tailored means of preventing a change in control to preserve its NOLs. For example, a company may limit share transfers in its charter to prevent a change of ownership from occurring.
Furthermore, we believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.
Fair Price Provisions
Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation’s common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority stockholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of “continuing directors” and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.
The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an “interested stockholder” by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested stockholder. An interested stockholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company’s outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.
Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested stockholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger or other transaction at a later time.
Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.
REINCORPORATION
In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. When examining a management proposal to reincorporate to a different state or country, we review the relevant financial benefits, generally related to improved corporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, resulting from the change in domicile. Where the financial benefits are de minimis and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, we will recommend voting against the transaction.

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However, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways would the Company benefit from shifting jurisdictions including the following:
1. Is the board sufficiently independent?
2. Does the Company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place?
3. Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)?
4. Do shareholders have the right to call special meetings of shareholders?
5. Are there other material governance issues at the Company?
6. Has the Company’s performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years?
7. How has the Company ranked in Glass Lewis’ pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years?
8. Does the company have an independent chairman?
We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company’s place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.
AUTHORIZED SHARES
Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company’s operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:
(i) Stock Split — We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company’s most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.
(ii) Shareholder Defenses — Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a “poison pill.” Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional             shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses.
(iii) Financing for Acquisitions — We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy.
(iv) Financing for Operations — We review the company’s cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company’s history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital.

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Issuing additional shares can dilute existing holders in limited circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares.
While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.
ADVANCE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
FOR SHAREHOLDER BALLOT PROPOSALS
We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.
These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.
We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.
VOTING STRUCTURE
Cumulative Voting
We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company’s governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.
Cumulative voting is a process that maximizes minority shareholders’ ability to ensure representation of their views on the board. It can be important when a board is controlled by insiders or affiliates and where the company’s ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.
Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of large holders.
Academic literature indicates that where a highly independent board is in place and the company has a shareholder-friendly governance structure, shareholders may be better off without cumulative voting. The analysis underlying this literature indicates that shareholder returns at firms with good governance

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structures are lower and that boards can become factionalized and prone to evaluating the needs of special interests over the general interests of shareholders collectively.
Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted antitakeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.
Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.
Supermajority Vote Requirements
Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover, we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.
TRANSACTION OF OTHER BUSINESS
AT AN ANNUAL OR SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS
We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before the annual meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.
ANTI-GREENMAIL PROPOSALS
Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.
MUTUAL FUNDS: INVESTMENT POLICIES AND ADVISORY AGREEMENTS
Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund’s structure and/or a fund’s relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:
    The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement;

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    Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and
 
    Any material changes to the fund’s investment objective or strategy.
We generally support amendments to a fund’s investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund’s advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.
In matters pertaining to a fund’s investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund’s objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments to a fund’s investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally contemplated, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors’ diversification strategies.

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V. Environmental, Social and
Governance Shareholder Initiatives
Glass Lewis evaluates shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis. We generally recommend supporting shareholder proposals calling for the elimination or removal of, as well as to require shareholder approval of, antitakeover devices such as poison pills and classified boards, both discussed in detail above. We generally recommend supporting proposals likely to increase or protect shareholder value and/or promote the furtherance of shareholder rights. In addition, we also generally recommend supporting proposals seeking to promote director accountability and to improve compensation practices especially those promoting a closer link between compensation and performance.
However, we typically prefer to leave decisions regarding day-to-day management and policy decisions, including those related to social, environmental or political issues, to management and the board except when there is a clear link between the proposal and economic or financial value enhancement or risk mitigation for the firm. We feel strongly that shareholders should not attempt to micromanage the company, its businesses or its executives through the shareholder initiative process.
Rather, we believe shareholders should use their influence to push for governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability, including majority voting for director elections, and then put in place a board they can trust to make informed and careful decisions that are in the best interests of the business and its owners. We believe shareholders should hold directors accountable for management and policy decisions through director elections. However, we recognize that support of appropriately crafted shareholder initiatives that provide shareholders with increased information, and that allow the board sufficient flexibility can, in some cases, serve to promote or protect shareholder value. The following is a discussion of Glass Lewis’ approach to certain common shareholder resolution proposals. We note that the following is not an exhaustive list of all shareholder proposals analyzed or expected.
GOVERNANCE
Right of Shareholders to Call a Special Meeting
Glass Lewis strongly supports the right of shareholders to call special meetings. Thus we believe in certain circumstances shareholders should have the ability to call meetings of shareholders between annual meetings to consider matters that require prompt attention. However, in order to prevent abuse and waste of corporate resources by a small minority of shareholders, we believe that shareholders representing at least a sizable minority of shares must support such a meeting prior to its calling. Should the threshold be set too low, companies might frequently be subjected to meetings whose effect could be the disruption of normal business operations in order to focus on the interests of only a small minority of owners. Typically we believe this threshold should not fall below 10-15% of shares, depending on company size.
In our evaluation whether to recommend supporting such proposals, we consider the following:
Company size
Shareholder base in both percentage of ownership and type of shareholder (e.g., hedge fund, activist investor, mutual fund, pension fund, etc.)

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Responsiveness of board and management to shareholders evidenced by progressive shareholder rights policies (e.g., majority voting, declassifying boards, etc.) and reaction to shareholder proposals
Company performance and steps taken to improve bad performance (e.g., new executives/ directors, spin offs, etc.)
Existence of anti-takeover protections or other entrenchment devices
Opportunities for shareholder action (e.g., ability to act by written consent)
Existing ability for shareholders to call a special meeting
Right of Shareholders to Act by Written Consent
Glass Lewis strongly supports shareholders’ right to act by written consent. As with the right to call special meetings, we believe such rights should be limited to, again depending on company size, a minimum of 10-15% of the shareholders requesting action by written consent, to prevent abuse and waste of corporate resources. Again, we believe a lower threshold may leave companies subject to meetings that may disrupt business operations to focus on the interests of a minority of owners. But we will support proposals to allow shareholders to act by written consent without a minimum threshold because shareholders are better off with this right than without it, and the benefit to shareholders outweighs the potential for abuse.
Board Composition
Glass Lewis believes the selection and screening process for identifying suitably qualified candidates for a company’s board of directors is one which requires the judgment of many factors, including the balance of skills and talents, as well as the breadth and diversity of experience of candidates and existing board members.
The diversity of skills, abilities and points of view can foster the development of a more creative and effective board. In general, however, we do not believe that it is in the best interests of shareholders for firms to be beholden to arbitrary rules regarding its board composition. We believe such matters should be left to a board’s nominating committee, which is generally responsible for establishing and implementing policies regarding the composition of the board, and which can be held accountable through their election.
Reimbursement of Solicitation Expenses
Glass Lewis feels that in some circumstances, replacing some or all directors on a company’s board is warranted where the incumbent director or directors have failed in their oversight of management by failing to address continuously poor performance. Where a dissident shareholder is seeking reimbursement for his or her expenses and has received the support of a majority of shareholders, Glass Lewis generally will recommend in favor of reimbursing the dissident for expenses incurred in waging the contest.
In those rare cases where a shareholder has put the shareholder’s own time and money into a successful campaign to unseat a poorly performing director, we feel that the dissident should be entitled to reimbursement of expenses by the company. In such a situation, other shareholders express their agreement by virtue of their majority vote for the dissident and will share in the improved company performance.

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Since contests are expensive and distracting to the management and the board, to avoid encouraging nuisance or agenda-driven contests, we only support the reimbursement of expenses where the dissident has convinced at least a majority of shareholders to support a certain candidate(s).
COMPENSATION
Severance Agreements
As a general rule, Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should not be involved in the approval of individual severance plans. Such matters should be left to the board’s compensation committee, which can be held accountable for its decisions through the election of its director members.
However, when proposals are crafted to only require approval if the benefit exceeds 2.99 times the amount of the executive’s base salary plus bonus, Glass Lewis typically supports such requests. Above this threshold, based on the executive’s average annual compensation for the most recent five years, the company can no longer deduct severance payments as an expense, and thus shareholders are deprived of a valuable benefit. We believe that shareholders should be consulted before relinquishing such a right, and that implementing such policies would still leave companies with sufficient freedom to enter into the vast majority of severance arrangements.
Additionally, investors should monitor severance agreements when they are initially put in place. If shareholders initially approved of a severance agreement, it is inappropriate to vote against the compensation committee later on when the severance agreement goes into effect. However, in the absence of a shareholder vote on severance agreements, Glass Lewis will evaluate the role of the compensation committee when the agreement was adopted.
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say-on-Pay”)
As noted above, Glass Lewis does not believe shareholders should be involved in the design, negotiation, management or approval of compensation packages. Such matters should be left to the compensation committee, which can be held accountable for its decisions through their election.
In the case of advisory votes on compensation, however, proposals are typically crafted to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the company’s executive officers’ compensation and policies. Glass Lewis believes that the advisory vote therefore provides an effective mechanism for enhancing transparency in setting executive pay, improving accountability to shareholders, and providing for a more effective link between pay and performance. Where shareholders believe compensation packages are inappropriately structured, a high negative vote could compel the board to reexamine its compensation practices and act accordingly. While a vote to approve the report will not directly affect the board’s ability to set compensation policy, it will allow shareholders to register their opinions regarding the company’s compensation practices.
While still somewhat nascent, empirical research regarding the effects of advisory votes in certain non-US markets paints a broadly positive picture of the impact of such votes. In particular, a 2004 study for the British Department of Trade and Industry found that the advisory voting requirement has resulted in “a number of well publicized situations where [compensation] committees have changed their policy or practice as a result of direct shareholder voting.” (“Report on the Impact of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations.” Deloitte & Touche. 2004). The study also found that the extent to which companies consulted shareholders about compensation practices has greatly increased over the past two years.
Further empirical evidence suggests that CEO compensation in the UK has been more sensitive to negative operating metrics following the introduction of the remuneration report vote than in prior

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periods, indicating a decrease in “rewards for failure”. (Fabrizio Ferri and David Maber. “Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK.” SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1169446. June 30, 2008.)
We recognize that criticism has been raised with respect to shareholder advisory votes, such as injecting shareholders too far into compensation decisions and limiting the flexibility of companies to uniquely tailor their compensation policies as they strive to conform to external guidelines. (Laraine S. Rothenberg and Todd S. McCafferty. “‘Say on Pay’: Linking Executive Pay to Performance”. New York Law Journal. September 24, 2008). However, we do not believe these arguments are persuasive since shareholders are already, and increasingly, reviewing all aspects of compensation irrespective of an opportunity to cast an advisory vote on compensation. Indeed, a growing number of institutional investors vote against compensation committee members as a means to express concern or dissatisfaction with companies’ compensation practices. As a result, some of these institutions do not feel the adoption of advisory votes is necessary since they will vote against compensation committee members directly.
Glass Lewis does, however, recognize that the use of advisory compensation votes does not necessarily reduce executive compensation. One recent study that found that executive remuneration in the UK has continued to rise at the same rate as prior to the adoption of say on pay, indicating a general failure to curb executive compensation. (Jeffrey Gordon. “‘Say on Pay’: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Muddling Through.” Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 336. SSRN: http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1262867. September 3, 2008). We, however, do not believe that the purpose of an advisory vote on compensation is to “rein in” executive pay. Rather it is to ensure that the remuneration paid to executives is firmly tied to the creation and advancement of long-term shareholder value.
Bonus Recoupments (“Clawbacks”)
Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives and we believe that senior executives of a company should never receive compensation for performance that was not achieved by the company.
We believe shareholders would be well-served by requiring the board to adopt a more detailed and stringent policy on recouping unearned bonuses, rather than relying on regulatory action such as requirements under Sarbanes Oxley. When examining proposals that require companies to recoup executives’ bonuses paid as a result of faulty accounting, Glass Lewis will first look to see if the company has already adopted a policy to recoup bonuses awarded to senior executives during a restatement, and whether that policy is included in the CEO’s contract. When the board has already committed to a proper course, in our opinion, and their current policy covers the major tenets of the proposal at hand while giving the board adequate flexibility to exercise discretion over these matters, we see no need for further action.
In some instances, shareholder proposals call for board action that may contravene the board’s legal obligations under existing employment agreements with executives. In addition, the board’s ability to exercise its judgment and reasonable discretion on this issue may be excessively limited under such proposals, which may not be warranted, depending on the specific situation of the company in question. We believe it is reasonable that a recoupment policy should only affect senior executives and those directly responsible for the company’s accounting errors.
Where a company is giving a new contract to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company has had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the responsible members of the compensation committee. Compensation committee members have an obligation to build in reasonable controls to executive contracts to prevent payments in the case of inappropriate behavior.

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Linking Executive Pay to Social Criteria
We recognize that companies’ involvement in environmentally sensitive and labor-intensive industries influences the degree to which a firm’s overall strategy must weigh environmental and social concerns. However, we also understand that the value generated by incentivizing executives to prioritize environmental and social issues is difficult to quantify and therefore measure, and necessarily varies among industries and companies.
When reviewing such proposals seeking to tie executive compensation to environmental or social practices, we will review the target firm’s compliance with (or violation of) applicable laws and regulations, and examine any history of environmental and social related concerns including those resulting in material investigations, lawsuits, fines and settlements. We will also review the firm’s current compensation policies and practice. However, with respect to executive compensation, Glass Lewis generally believes that such policies should be left to the compensation committee. We view the election of directors, specifically those who sit on the compensation committee, as the appropriate mechanism for shareholders to express their disapproval of board policy on this issue.
ENVIRONMENT
When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should hold directors accountable when they face reelection. We believe it is prudent for management to assess its potential exposure to all risks, including environmental and regulations pertaining thereto and incorporate this information into its overall business risk profile.
Glass Lewis recognizes the significant financial, legal and reputational risks to companies resulting from poor environmental practices or negligent oversight thereof. We believe part of the board’s role is to ensure that management conducts a complete risk analysis of company operations, including those that have environmental implications. Further, directors should monitor management’s performance in mitigating the environmental risks attendant with relevant operations in order to eliminate or minimize the risks to the company and shareholders.
While Glass Lewis recognizes that most environmental concerns are best addressed via avenues other than proxy proposals, when a substantial environmental risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against responsible members of the governance committee. In some cases, we may recommend voting against all directors who were on the board when the substantial risk arose, was ignored, or was not mitigated.
Climate Change and Green House Gas Emission Disclosure Proposals
Glass Lewis will consider recommending a vote in favor of a reasonable shareholder proposal to disclose a company’s climate change and/or green house gas emission approaches when (i) a company has encountered problems such as lawsuits and/or government investigations or investors have established a link to impact on shareholder value from climate change and/or green house gas emission regulations, and (ii) the company has failed to adequately disclose how it has addressed these problems. We will examine such proposals in light of requests made to the company for additional information, its response and whether there is a reasonable case as to the negative implications to shareholders and the company.

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With respect to climate risk, Glass Lewis believes companies should actively consider their exposure to:
Direct environmental risk: Companies should evaluate their financial exposure to a potential rise in sea levels, increased wildfires and extreme weather, reduced air quality, water availability and public health problems brought on by higher temperatures.
Risk due to legislation/regulation: We believe companies, and particularly those operating in carbon-intensive industries, should evaluate their exposure to a potential increase or shift in environmental regulation with respect to their operations.
Legal and reputational risk: As has been seen relating to other environmental, social and governance matters, failure to take action may carry the risk of damaging negative publicity and potentially costly litigation.
As such, Glass Lewis will consider recommending a vote in favor of a reasonable proposal to disclose a company’s climate change and/or greenhouse gas emission strategies when (i) a company has suffered financial impact from reputational damage, lawsuits and/or government investigations, (ii) there is a strong link between climate change and/or its resultant regulation and shareholder value at the firm, and (iii) the company has failed to adequately disclose how it has addressed these risks.
Sustainability
With respect to shareholder proposals requesting that a firm produce a sustainability report, when evaluating these requests we will consider, among other things:
    The financial risk to the company from the firm’s environmental practices and/or regulation;
 
    The relevant company’s current level of disclosure;
 
    The level of sustainability information disclosed by the firm’s peers;
 
    The industry in which the firm operates;
 
    The level and type of sustainability concerns/controversies at the relevant firm, if any;
 
    The time frame within which the relevant report is to be produced; and
 
    The level of flexibility granted to the board in the implementation of the proposal.
Sustainable Forestry
Sustainable forestry provides for the long-term sustainable management and use of trees and other non-timber forest products. Retaining the economic viability of forests is one of the tenets of sustainable forestry, along with encouraging more responsible corporate use of forests. Sustainable land use and the effective management of land are viewed by some shareholders as important in light of the impact of climate change. Forestry certification has emerged as a way that corporations can address prudent forest management. There are currently several primary certification schemes such as the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (“SFI”) and the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”).
There are nine main principles that comprise the SFI: (i) sustainable forestry; (ii) responsible practices; (iii) reforestation and productive capacity; (iv) forest health and productivity; (v) long-term forest and soil productivity; (vi) protection of water resources; (vii) protection of special sites and biodiversity; (viii) legal compliance; and (ix) continual improvement.
The FSC adheres to ten basic principles: (i) compliance with laws and FSC principles; (ii) tenure and use rights and responsibilities; (iii) indigenous peoples’ rights; (iv) community relations and workers’ rights;

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(v) benefits from the forest; (vi) environmental impact; (vii) management plan; (viii) monitoring and assessment; (ix) maintenance of high conservation value forests; and (x) plantations.
Shareholder proposals regarding sustainable forestry have typically requested that the firm comply with the above SFI or FSC principles as well as to assess the feasibility of phasing out the use of uncertified fiber and increasing the use of certified fiber. We will evaluate target firms’ current mix of certified and uncertified paper and the firms’ general approach to sustainable forestry practices, both absolutely and relative to its peers but will only support proposals of this nature when we believe that the proponent has clearly demonstrated that the implementation of this proposal is clearly linked to an increase in shareholder value.
SOCIAL ISSUES
Non-Discrimination Policies
Where there is clear evidence of employment practices resulting in significant negative economic exposure to the company, Glass Lewis will support shareholder proposals that seek to address labor policies, such as shareholder proposals calling for increased disclosure of labor policies and of steps a company has taken to mitigate the risks associated with those policies.
Glass Lewis recognizes that companies with a record of poor labor relations or treatment of its workers can face risks, such as employee lawsuits, poor employee work performance and turnover, and regulatory investigations. Glass Lewis will hold directors accountable for company decisions related to labor and employment problems.
As risk associated with sensitive issues such as EEO policies and investigations of discrimination have the potential to directly affect shareholder value, we believe shareholders should closely monitor the company’s policies regarding these issues. As an increasing number of peer companies adopt inclusive EEO policies, companies without comprehensive policies may face damaging recruitment, reputational and, potentially, legal risks. We recognize that the theoretical increase in, or protection of, shareholder value resulting from inclusive employment policies may be difficult, if not impossible, to identify or measure.
However, we believe that a pattern of making financial settlements as a result of lawsuits based on discrimination could indicate exposure to findings of discriminatory employment practices. As such, shareholders could, in some instances, benefit from codifying nondiscriminatory policies.
MacBride Principles
To promote peace, justice and equality regarding employment in Northern Ireland, Dr. Sean MacBride, founder of Amnesty International and Nobel Peace laureate, proposed the following equal opportunity employment principles:
1. Increasing the representation of individuals from underrepresented religious groups in the workforce including managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs;
2. Adequate security for the protection of minority employees both at the workplace and while traveling to and from work;
3. The banning of provocative religious or political emblems from the workplace;
4. All job openings should be publicly advertised and special recruitment efforts should be made to attract applicants from underrepresented religious groups;

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5. Layoff, recall, and termination procedures should not, in practice, favor particular religious groupings;
6. The abolition of job reservations, apprenticeship restrictions, and differential employment criteria, which discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic origin;
7. The development of training programs that will prepare substantial numbers of current minority employees for skilled jobs, including the expansion of existing programs and the creation of new programs to train, upgrade, and improve the skills of minority employees;
8. The establishment of procedures to assess, identify and actively recruit minority employees with potential for further advancement; and
9. The appointment of senior management staff member to oversee the company’s affirmative action efforts and setting up of timetables to carry out affirmative action principles.
Proposals requesting the implementation of the above principles are typically proposed at firms that operate, or maintain subsidiaries that operate, in Northern Ireland. In each case, we will examine the company’s current equal employment opportunity policy and the extent to which the company has been subject to protests, fines, or litigation regarding discrimination in the workplace, if any. Further, we will examine any evidence of the firm’s specific record of labor concerns in Northern Ireland.
Human Rights
Glass Lewis believes explicit policies set out by companies’ boards of directors on human rights provides shareholders with the means to evaluate whether the company has taken steps to mitigate risks from its human rights practices. As such, we believe that it is prudent for firms to actively evaluate risks to shareholder value stemming from global activities and human rights practices along entire supply chains. Findings and investigations of human rights abuses can inflict, at a minimum, reputational damage on targeted companies and have the potential to dramatically reduce shareholder value. This is particularly true for companies operating in emerging market countries in extractive industries and in politically unstable regions.
As such, while we typically rely on the expertise of the board on these important policy issues, we recognize that, in some instances, shareholders could benefit from increased reporting or further codification of human rights policies.
Military and US Government Business Policies
Glass Lewis believes that disclosure to shareholders of information on key company endeavors is important. However, we generally do not support resolutions that call for shareholder approval of policy statements for or against government programs, most of which are subject to thorough review by the federal government and elected officials at the national level. We also do not support proposals favoring disclosure of information where such disclosure is already mandated by law, unless circumstances exist that warrant the extra disclosure.
Foreign Government Business Policies
Where a corporation operates in a foreign country, Glass Lewis believes that the company and board should maintain sufficient controls to prevent illegal or egregious conduct with the potential to decrease shareholder value, examples of which include bribery, money laundering, severe environmental violations or proven human rights violations. We believe that shareholders should hold board members, and in particular members of the audit committee and CEO, accountable for these issues when they face reelection, as these concerns may subject the company to financial risk such as fines for violating

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the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In some instances, we will support appropriately crafted shareholder proposals specifically addressing concerns with the target firm’s actions outside its home jurisdiction.
Health Care Reform Principles
Health care reform in the United States has long been a contentious political issue and Glass Lewis therefore believes firms must evaluate and mitigate the level of risk to which they may be exposed regarding potential changes in health care legislation. In 2009, Glass Lewis reviewed multiple shareholder proposals requesting that boards adopt principles for comprehensive health reform, such as the following based upon principles reported by the Institute of Medicine:
Health care coverage should be universal;
Health care coverage should be continuous;
Health care coverage should be affordable to individuals and families;
The health insurance strategy should be affordable and sustainable for society; and
Health insurance should enhance health and well-being by promoting access to high-quality care that is effective, efficient, safe, timely, patient-centered and equitable.
Given the current national debate regarding health care, we typically believe that individual board rooms are not the appropriate forum in which to address evolving and contentious national policy issues. The adoption of a narrow set of principles could limit the board’s ability to comply with new regulation or to appropriately and flexibly respond to health care issues as they arise. As such, barring a compelling reason to the contrary, we typically do not support the implementation of national health care reform principles at the company level.
Tobacco
Glass Lewis recognizes the contentious nature of the production, procurement, marketing and selling of tobacco. However, we typically do not support proposals requesting that firms shift away from, or significantly alter, the legal production or marketing of core products. We also recognize that tobacco companies are particularly susceptible to reputational and regulatory risk due to the nature of its operations. As such, we will consider supporting uniquely tailored and appropriately crafted shareholder proposals requesting increased information or the implementation of suitably broad policies at target firms on a case-by-case basis.
Reporting Contributions and Political Spending
Glass Lewis believes that disclosure of how a company uses its funds is an important component of corporate accountability to shareholders. In our view, a rigorous oversight process can minimize a company’s exposure to legal, reputational and financial risk by ensuring that corporate assets are used to enhance shareholder value in accordance with federal and state law, consistent with a company’s stated values, and the long-term interests of the company.
While corporate contributions to national political parties and committees controlled by federal officeholders are prohibited under federal law, corporations can legally donate to state and local candidates, organizations registered under 26 USC Sec. 527 of the Internal Revenue Code and state-level political committees. There is, however, no standardized manner in which companies must disclose this information. As such, shareholders often must search through numerous campaign finance reports and detailed tax documents to ascertain even limited information. Corporations also frequently join trade associations, generally paying dues to do so, as a means for corporate political action. However,

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trade associations are neither required to report funds they receive for nor spend on political activity. Therefore, the tracking of corporate expenditures to political causes through trade associations can be impossible, often leaving corporations unable to determine for themselves which causes or campaigns their dues or donations have gone to support. Since not all donations to trade organizations are used strictly for political purposes, we question how corporations are able to assess the efficacy of such donations or determine the effect of such expenditure on long-term shareholder value.
Further, the empirical evidence regarding the benefit to shareholders of corporate political contributions remains unclear. In one study of firm-level contributions to U.S. political campaigns from 1979 to 2004, researchers found that measures of support to candidates were positively and significantly correlated with a cross-section of future returns. This was especially the case when those contributions went to a large number of candidates in the same state as the contributing firm (Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen and Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov. “Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns.” SSRN. September 26, 2008). However, in a separate study of political contributions from 1991 to 2004, researchers found donations to be negatively correlated with future excess returns with only limited support for the contention that political donations represent an investment in political capital (Rajash K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke and Tracy Yue Wang. “Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency?” SSRN. August 11, 2008).
Given that political donations are strategic decisions intended to increase shareholder value and have the potential to negatively affect the company, we believe the board should either implement processes and procedures to ensure the proper use of the funds or closely evaluate the process and procedures used by management. At least one study found that close board oversight of lobbying strategies may minimize instances of the company contributing to causes that are not in shareholders best interests (Robert Repetto. “Best Practice in Internal Oversight of Lobbying Practice”. Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy. September 1, 2006).
When evaluating whether the report requested would benefit shareholders, Glass Lewis seeks answers to the following three key questions:
      Is the Company’s disclosure comprehensive and readily accessible?
      How does the Company’s political expenditure policy and disclosure compare to its peers?
      What is the Company’s current level of oversight?
Glass Lewis will consider supporting a proposal seeking increased disclosure of corporate political expenditure and contributions if the firm’s current disclosure is insufficient, is lacking compared to its peers, and where there is inadequate board oversight, evidenced by some evidence or credible allegation that the Company is mismanaging corporate funds through political donations or has a record of doing so. We will, in each case, consider the merits of the proposal in the context of relevant company. If Glass Lewis discovers particularly egregious actions by the company, we will consider recommending voting against the governance committee members or other responsible directors.
Animal Welfare
Glass Lewis believes that it is prudent for management to assess potential exposure to regulatory, legal and reputational risks associated with all business practices including those related to animal welfare; failure to take action on certain issues may carry the risk of fines and damaging negative publicity. A high profile campaign launched against a company could result in shareholder action, a reduced customer base, protests and potentially costly litigation.

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However, in general, we believe that the board and management are in the best position to determine policies relating to the care and use of animals. As such, we will typically vote against proposals seeking to eliminate or limit board discretion regarding animal welfare unless there is a clear and documented link between the board’s policies and the degradation of shareholder value.

For more information about
Glass Lewis’ policies
or approach to proxy analysis,

please visit
www.glasslewis.com

or contact
Chief Policy Officer
Robert McCormick at +1415 678-4228

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Please direct general inquiries to info@glasslewis.com


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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
     
Schwab Investor Money Fund®
  Schwab Money Market Fund™
 
   
Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund®
  Schwab Government Money Fund™
 
   
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund®
  Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund™
 
   
Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves®
  Schwab Cash Reserves
April 30, 2009
As amended March 12, 2010
The Statement of Additional Information (SAI) is not a prospectus. It should be read in conjunction with each fund’s prospectus dated April 30, 2009 (as amended from time to time).
To obtain a free copy of any of the prospectuses, please contact Schwab Funds® at 1-800-435-4000. For TDD service call 1-800-345-2550. The prospectuses also may be available on the Internet at: http://www.schwab.com/prospectus.
Each fund is a series of The Charles Schwab Family of Funds (the “Trust”). The Trust, Schwab Investments, Schwab Capital Trust and Schwab Annuity Portfolios are collectively referred to as the “Schwab Funds®”.
The funds’ audited financial statements from the funds’ annual reports for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, are incorporated by reference into this SAI. A copy of a fund’s 2008 annual report is delivered with the SAI.
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REG38770 – 09

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INVESTMENT OBJECTIVES, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES,
SECURITIES, RISKS AND LIMITATIONS
Investment Objectives
Each of the Schwab Government Money Fund™, Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund™, Schwab Money Market Fund™, Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund®, Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund®, Schwab Investor Money Fund®, Schwab Cash Reserves™ and Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves® seeks the highest current income consistent with stability of capital and liquidity.
Each fund’s investment objective may be changed only by vote of a majority of its outstanding voting shares. There is no guarantee the funds will achieve their objectives.
A majority of the outstanding voting shares of a fund means the affirmative vote of the lesser of: (a) 67% or more of the voting shares represented at the meeting, if more than 50% of the outstanding voting shares of a fund are represented at the meeting; or (b) more than 50% of the outstanding voting shares of a fund.
The funds operate as money market funds and seek to comply with the requirements of Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”), as that Rule may be amended from time to time. The Rule’s key provisions govern the maturity, quality and diversification of its money market fund investments. For example, with respect to maturity, Rule 2a-7 currently provides that money funds limit their investments to securities with remaining maturities of 397 days or less, and maintain dollar-weighted average maturities of 90 days or less, both calculated as described in the Rule. In addition, money funds may only invest in high quality securities. The funds are also subject to strict diversification requirements under Rule 2a-7.
The following investment strategies, securities, risks and limitations supplement those set forth in the prospectuses and may be changed without shareholder approval unless otherwise noted. Also, policies and limitations that state a maximum percentage of assets that may be invested in a security or other asset, or that set forth a quality standard, shall be measured immediately after and as a result of a fund’s acquisition of such security or asset unless otherwise noted. Additionally, for purposes of calculating any restriction, an issuer shall be the entity deemed to be ultimately responsible for payments of interest and principal on the security pursuant to Rule 2a-7 under the 1940 Act unless otherwise noted.
Investment Strategies
Under normal circumstances, the Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund™ will invest at least 80% of its net assets in U.S. Treasury securities; including bills and notes. The fund will notify its shareholders at least 60 days before changing this policy. Also, for purposes of this policy, net assets means net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes.
Under normal circumstances, the Schwab Government Money Fund™ will invest at least 80% of its net assets in U.S. government securities including repurchase agreements that are fully collateralized by U.S. government securities. The fund will notify its shareholders at least 60 days before changing this policy. Also, for purposes of the policy, net assets means net assets plus any borrowings for investment purposes.
Each of the Schwab Money Market Fund™, Schwab Value Advantage Money FundÒ, Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund®, Schwab Investor Money Fund®, Schwab Cash Reserves™

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and Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves® seeks to achieve its investment objective by investing in high-quality, U.S. dollar-denominated money market securities, including U.S. government securities and repurchase agreements for these securities.
Not all investment securities or techniques discussed below are eligible investments for each fund. A fund will invest in securities or engage in techniques that are intended to help achieve its investment objective.
Investment Securities and Risks
Asset-Backed Securities are securities that are backed by the loans or accounts receivables of an entity, such as a bank or credit card company. These securities are obligations which the issuer intends to repay using the assets backing them (once collected). Therefore, repayment depends largely on the cash flows generated by the assets backing the securities. The rate of principal payments on asset-backed securities generally depends on the rate of principal payments received on the underlying assets, which in turn may be affected by a variety of economic and other factors. As a result, the yield on any asset-backed security is difficult to predict with precision, and actual yield to maturity may be more or less than the anticipated yield to maturity.
Sometimes the credit quality of these securities is limited to the support provided by the underlying assets, but, in other cases, additional credit support also may be provided by a third party via a letter of credit or insurance guarantee. Such credit support falls into two classes: liquidity protection and protection against ultimate default on the underlying assets. Liquidity protection refers to the provision of advances, generally by the entity administering the pool of assets, to ensure that scheduled payments on the underlying pool are made in a timely fashion. Protection against ultimate default ensures payment on at least a portion of the assets in the pool. Such protection may be provided through guarantees, insurance policies or letters of credit obtained from third parties, through various means of structuring the transaction or through a combination of such approaches.
The degree of credit support provided on each issue is based generally on historical information respecting the level of credit risk associated with such payments. Delinquency or loss in excess of that anticipated could adversely affect the return on an investment in an asset-backed security.
For purposes of a fund’s concentration policy, the fund will determine the industry classification of asset-backed securities based upon the investment adviser’s evaluation of the risks associated with an investment in the underlying assets. For example, asset-backed securities whose underlying assets share similar economic characteristics because, for example, they are funded (or supported) primarily from a single or similar source or revenue stream will be classified in the same industry sector. In contrast, asset-backed securities whose underlying assets represent a diverse mix of industries, business sectors and/or revenue streams will be classified into distinct industries based on their underlying credit and liquidity structures. A fund will limit its investments in each identified industry to less than 25% of its net assets.
Borrowing may subject a fund to interest costs, which may exceed the interest received on the securities purchased with the borrowed funds. A fund normally may borrow at times to meet redemption requests rather than sell portfolio securities to raise the necessary cash. Borrowing can involve leveraging when securities are purchased with the borrowed money. A fund will earmark or segregate assets to cover such borrowings in accordance with positions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

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Certificates of Deposit or time deposits are issued against funds deposited in a banking institution for a specified period of time at a specified interest rate. A fund will invest only in certificates of deposit, including time deposits, of banks that have capital, surplus and undivided profits in excess of $100 million.
Commercial Paper consists of short-term, promissory notes issued by banks, corporations and other entities to finance short-term credit needs. These securities generally are discounted but sometimes may be interest bearing. Commercial paper, which also may be unsecured, is subject to credit risk.
Concentration means that substantial amounts of assets are invested in a particular industry or group of industries. Concentration increases investment exposure to industry risk. For example, the automobile industry may have a greater exposure to a single factor, such as an increase in the price of oil, which may adversely affect the sale of automobiles and, as a result, the value of the industry’s securities. Based on the primary characteristics of non-U.S. (foreign) banks, the funds have identified each foreign country as a separate bank industry for purposes of a fund’s concentration policy. A fund will limit its investments in securities issued by foreign banks in each country to less than 25% of its net assets. However, the funds, except for the Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund™ and Schwab Government Money Fund™, reserve the freedom of action to invest up to 100% of their assets in certificates of deposit or bankers’ acceptances issued by domestic branches of U.S. banks and U.S. branches of foreign banks (which the funds have determined to be subject to the same regulation as U.S. banks).
Credit and Liquidity Supports or enhancements may be employed by issuers to reduce the credit risk of their securities. Credit supports include letters of credit, insurance and guarantees provided by foreign and domestic entities. Liquidity supports include puts, demand features, and lines of credit. Most of these arrangements move the credit risk of an investment from the issuer of the security to the support provider. Changes in the credit quality of a support provider could cause losses to a fund.
Debt Securities are obligations issued by domestic and foreign entities, including governments and corporations, in order to raise money. They are basically “IOUs,” but are commonly referred to as bonds or money market securities. These securities normally require the issuer to pay a fixed, variable or floating rate of interest on the amount of money borrowed (the “principal”) until it is paid back upon maturity.
Debt securities experience price changes when interest rates change. For example, when interest rates fall, the prices of debt securities generally rise. Issuers tend to pre-pay their outstanding debts and issue new ones paying lower interest rates. Conversely, in a rising interest rate environment, prepayment on outstanding debt securities generally will not occur. This is known as extension risk and may cause the value of debt securities to depreciate as a result of the higher market interest rates. Typically, longer-maturity securities react to interest rate changes more severely than shorter-term securities (all things being equal), but generally offer greater rates of interest. Debt securities also are subject to the risk that the issuers will not make timely interest and/or principal payments or fail to make them at all.
Delayed-Delivery Transactions include purchasing and selling securities on a delayed-delivery or when-issued basis. These transactions involve a commitment to buy or sell specific securities at a predetermined price or yield, with payment and delivery taking place after the customary settlement period for that type of security. When purchasing securities on a delayed-delivery basis, a fund assumes the rights and risks of ownership, including the risk of price and yield fluctuations. Typically, no interest will accrue to a fund until the security is delivered. A fund will earmark or segregate appropriate liquid assets to cover its delayed-delivery purchase obligations. When a fund sells a

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security on a delayed-delivery basis, the fund does not participate in further gains or losses with respect to that security. If the other party to a delayed-delivery transaction fails to deliver or pay for the securities, a fund could suffer losses.
Diversification involves investing in a wide range of securities and thereby spreading and reducing the risks of investment. Each fund is a diversified mutual fund. Each fund also follows the regulations set forth by the SEC that dictate the diversification requirements for money market mutual funds, as such regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time. Each fund may invest up to 25% of its assets in “first tier” securities of a single issuer for a period of up to three business days.
Foreign Securities involve additional risks, because they are issued by foreign entities, including foreign governments, banks and corporations or because they are traded principally overseas. Credit and liquidity supports also may be provided by foreign entities. Foreign securities in which a fund may invest include foreign entities that are not subject to uniform accounting, auditing and financial reporting standards, practices and requirements comparable to those applicable to U.S. corporations. In addition, there may be less publicly available information about foreign entities. Foreign economic, political and legal developments, and withholding taxes, could have more dramatic effects on the value of foreign securities. For example, conditions within and around foreign countries, such as the possibility of expropriation or confiscatory taxation, political or social instability, diplomatic developments, change of government or war could affect the value of foreign investments. Moreover, individual foreign economies may differ favorably or unfavorably from the U.S. economy in such respects as growth of gross national product, rate of inflation, capital reinvestment, resource self-sufficiency and balance of payments position.
Foreign securities typically have less volume and are generally less liquid and more volatile than securities of U.S. companies. Fixed commissions on foreign securities exchanges are generally higher than negotiated commissions on U.S. exchanges, although a fund will endeavor to achieve the most favorable overall results on portfolio transactions. There is generally less government supervision and regulation of foreign securities exchanges, brokers, dealers and listed companies than in the United States, thus increasing the risk of delayed settlements of portfolio transactions or loss of certificates for portfolio securities. There may be difficulties in obtaining or enforcing judgments against foreign issuers as well. These factors and others may increase the risks with respect to the liquidity of a fund, and its ability to meet a large number of shareholder redemption requests.
Foreign markets also have different clearance and settlement procedures and, in certain markets, there have been times when settlements have been unable to keep pace with the volume of securities transactions, making it difficult to conduct such transactions. Such delays in settlement could result in temporary periods when a portion of the assets of a fund is uninvested and no return is earned thereon. The inability to make intended security purchases due to settlement problems could cause a fund to miss attractive investment opportunities. Losses to a fund arising out of the inability to fulfill a contract to sell such securities also could result in potential liability for a fund.
Illiquid Securities generally are any securities that cannot be disposed of promptly and in the ordinary course of business at approximately the amount at which a fund has valued the instruments. The liquidity of a fund’s investments is monitored under the supervision and direction of the Board of Trustees. Investments currently not considered liquid include repurchase agreements not maturing within seven days and certain restricted securities.
Interfund Borrowing and Lending. The SEC has granted an exemption to the Schwab Funds® that permits the funds to borrow money from and/or lend money to other Schwab Funds. All loans are for temporary or emergency purposes and the interest rates to be charged will be the average of the

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overnight repurchase agreement rate and the short-term bank loan rate. All loans are subject to numerous conditions designed to ensure fair and equitable treatment of all participating funds. The interfund lending facility is subject to the oversight and periodic review of the Board of Trustees of the Schwab Funds®.
Lending of portfolio securities is a common practice in the securities industry. A fund will engage in security lending arrangements with the primary objective of increasing its income. For example, a fund may receive cash collateral and it may invest in short-term, interest-bearing obligations, but will do so only to the extent that it will not lose the tax treatment available to regulated investment companies. Lending portfolio securities involve risks that the borrower may fail to return the securities or provide additional collateral. Also, voting rights with respect to the loaned securities may pass with the lending of the securities.
A fund may lend portfolio securities to qualified broker-dealers or other institutional investors provided that: (1) the loan is secured continuously by collateral consisting of U.S. government securities, letters of credit, cash or cash equivalents or other appropriate instruments maintained on a daily marked-to-market basis in an amount at least equal to the current market value of the securities loaned; (2) a fund may at any time call the loan and obtain the return of the securities loaned; (3) a fund will receive any interest or dividends paid on the loaned securities; and (4) the aggregate market value of securities loaned will not at any time exceed one-third of the total assets of a fund, including collateral received from the loan (at market value computed at the time of the loan).
Money Market Securities are high-quality, short-term debt securities that may be issued by entities such as the U.S. government, municipalities, corporations and financial institutions (like banks). Money market securities include commercial paper, promissory notes, certificates of deposit, bankers’ acceptances, notes and time deposits.
Money market securities pay fixed, variable or floating rates of interest and are generally subject to credit and interest rate risks. The maturity date or price of and financial assets collateralizing a security may be structured in order to make it qualify as or act like a money market security. These securities may be subject to greater credit and interest rate risks than other money market securities because of their structure. Money market securities may be issued with puts or these can be sold separately.
Promissory Notes are written agreements committing the maker or issuer to pay the payee a specified amount either on demand or at a fixed date in the future, with or without interest. These are sometimes called negotiable notes or instruments and are subject to credit risk. Bank notes are notes used to represent obligations issued by banks in large denominations.
Puts, sometimes called demand features or guarantees, are agreements that allow the buyer of the put to sell a security at a specified price and time to the seller or “put provider.” When a fund buys a security with a put feature, losses could occur if the put provider does not perform as agreed. Standby commitments are types of puts.
Quality of Investments. Each fund follows regulations set forth by the SEC that dictate the quality requirements for investments made by money market mutual funds, as such regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time. These regulations require the funds to invest exclusively in high-quality securities. Generally, high-quality securities are securities that present minimal credit risks and are rated in one of the two highest rating categories by two nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs), or by one if only one NRSRO has rated the securities, or, if unrated, determined to be of comparable quality by the investment adviser pursuant to guidelines adopted by

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the Board of Trustees. High-quality securities may be “first tier” or “second tier” securities. First tier securities may be rated within the highest category or determined to be of comparable quality by the investment adviser. Money market fund shares and U.S. government securities also are first tier securities. Second tier securities generally are rated within the second-highest category.
Should a security’s high-quality rating change after purchase by a fund, the investment adviser would take such action, including no action, as determined to be in the best interest of the fund and as required by Rule 2a-7. For more information about the ratings assigned by some NRSROs, refer to the Appendix section of the SAI.
Repurchase Agreements involve a fund buying securities from a seller and simultaneously agreeing to sell them back at an agreed-upon price (usually higher) and time. There are risks that losses will result if the seller does not perform as agreed. The repurchase agreements entered into by a fund will provide that the underlying collateral, which may be in the form of cash, U.S. government securities, fixed income securities, equity securities or other types of securities, shall at all times have a value at least equal to 100% of the resale price stated in the agreement. Repurchase agreements collateralized entirely by cash or U.S. government securities may be deemed to be collateralized fully pursuant to Rule 2a-7 and may be deemed to be investments in the cash or U.S. government securities.
Restricted Securities are securities that are subject to legal restrictions on their sale. For example, tender option bonds, commercial paper and other promissory notes may be issued under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and may be sold only to qualified institutional buyers, such as the funds, under Securities Act Rule 144A.
Restricted securities may be deemed liquid or illiquid. In order to be deemed liquid, a fund must be able to dispose of the security in the ordinary course of business at approximately the amount the fund has valued the security. In addition, the investment adviser must determine that an institutional or other market exists for these securities. In making this determination, the investment adviser may take into account any liquidity support associated with the security. It is not possible to predict with assurance whether the market for any restricted security will continue. Therefore, the investment adviser monitors a fund’s investments in these securities, focusing on factors, such as valuation, liquidity and availability of information. To the extent a fund invests in restricted securities that are deemed liquid, the general level of illiquidity in a fund’s portfolio may increase if buyers in that market become unwilling to purchase the securities.
Reverse Repurchase Agreements. In a reverse repurchase agreement, a fund would sell a security in exchange for cash and enter into an agreement to repurchase the security at a specified future date and price. A fund generally retains the right to interest and principal payments on the security. If a fund uses the cash it obtains to invest in other securities, this may be considered a form of leverage and may expose the fund to greater risk. Leverage tends to magnify the effect of any decrease or increase in the value of the fund’s portfolio securities.
Securities of Other Investment Companies. Investment companies generally offer investors the advantages of diversification and professional investment management by combining shareholders’ money and investing it in securities such as stocks, bonds and money market instruments. The risks of investing in a particular investment company will generally reflect the risks of the securities in which it invests and the investment techniques it employs. Because investment companies employ investment advisers and other service providers, investments by a fund into another investment company may cause shareholders to pay duplicative fees and incur expenses.

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Federal law restricts the ability of one registered investment company to invest in another. As a result, the extent to which a fund may invest in another investment company may be limited. With respect to investments in other mutual funds, the SEC has granted the Schwab Funds® an exemption from the limitations of the 1940 Act that restrict the amount of securities of underlying mutual funds a Schwab Fund may hold, provided that certain conditions are met. The conditions imposed by the SEC were designed to address certain abuses perceived to be associated with “funds of funds”, including unnecessary costs (such as sales loads, advisory fees and administrative costs), and undue influence by the investing fund over the underlying fund. The conditions apply only when a Schwab fund and its affiliates in the aggregate own more than 3% of the outstanding shares of any one underlying fund.
Stripped Securities are securities whose income and principal components are detached and sold separately. While the risks associated with stripped securities are similar to other money market securities, stripped securities are typically subject to greater changes in value. U.S. Treasury securities that have been stripped by the Federal Reserve Bank are obligations of the U.S. Treasury. Privately stripped government securities are created when a dealer deposits a U.S. Treasury security or other U.S. Government security with a custodian for safekeeping; the custodian issues separate receipts for the coupon payments and the principal payment, which the dealer then sells. There are two types of stripped securities: coupon strips, which refer to the zero coupon bonds that are backed by the coupon payments; and principal strips, which are backed by the final repayments of principal. Unlike coupon strips, principal strips do not accrue a coupon payment. They are sold at a discounted price and accrete up to par. An investor in a principal strip would only need to pay capital gains tax on the principal strip.
The funds may invest in U.S. Treasury bonds that have been stripped of their unmatured interest coupons, the coupons themselves, and receipts or certificates representing interests in such stripped debt obligations and coupons. Interest on zero coupon bonds is accrued and paid at maturity rather than during the term of the security. Such obligations have greater price volatility than coupon obligations and other normal interest-paying securities, and the value of zero coupon securities reacts more quickly to changes in interest rates than do coupon bonds. Because dividend income is accrued throughout the term of the zero coupon obligation, but it is not actually received until maturity, a fund may have to sell other securities to pay accrued dividends prior to the maturity of the zero coupon obligation.
Unlike regular U.S. Treasury bonds which pay semi-annual interest, U.S. Treasury zero coupon bonds do not generate semi-annual coupon payments. Instead, zero coupon bonds are purchased at a substantial discount from the maturity of such securities. The discount reflects the current value of the deferred interest and is amortized as interest income over the life of the securities; it is taxable even though there is no cash return until maturity.
Zero coupon U.S. Treasury issues originally were created by government bond dealers who bought U.S. Treasury bonds and issued receipts representing an ownership interest in the interest coupons or the principal portion of the bonds. Subsequently, the U.S. Treasury began directly issuing zero coupon bonds with the introduction of the Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities (“STRIPS”) program. Under the STRIPS program, the principal and interest components are separately issued by the U.S. Treasury at the request of depository financial institutions, which then trade the component parts separately.
While zero coupon bonds eliminate the reinvestment risk of regular coupon issues, i.e., the risk of subsequently investing the periodic interest payments at a lower rate than that of the security currently held, zero coupon bonds fluctuate much more sharply than regular coupon-bearing bonds. Thus,

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when interest rates rise, the value of zero coupon bonds will decrease to a greater extent than will the value of regular bonds having the same interest rate.
Temporary Defensive Investments. During unusual market conditions, the Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund™ may make investments that are not exempt from state and local income taxes as a temporary defensive measure.
U.S. Government Securities. Many U.S. government securities are not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, which means they are neither issued nor guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury. Securities such as those issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) are supported by limited lines of credit their issuers maintain with the U.S. Treasury. Others, such as obligations issued by the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation (FFCB), are supported solely by the credit of the issuer. There can be no assurance that the U.S. government will provide financial support to securities of its agencies and instrumentalities if it is not obligated to do so under law. Also, any government guarantees on securities that a fund owns do not extend to shares of the fund itself. Although the risk of default with U.S. government securities is considered unlikely, any default on the part of a portfolio investment could cause fund’s share price or yield to fall.
On September 7, 2008, the U.S. Treasury announced a federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, placing the two federal instrumentalities in conservatorship. Under the takeover, the U.S. Treasury agreed to acquire $1 billion of senior preferred stock of each instrumentality and obtained warrants for the purchase of common stock of each instrumentality. Under this agreement, the U.S. Treasury has pledged to provide up to $100 billion per instrumentality as needed, including the contribution of cash capital to the instrumentalities in the event their liabilities exceed their assets. This is intended to ensure that the instrumentalities maintain a positive net worth and meet their financial obligations preventing mandatory triggering of receivership. Additionally, the U.S. Treasury has implemented a temporary program to purchase new mortgage-backed securities issued by the instrumentalities. This is intended to create more affordable mortgage rates for homeowners, enhance the liquidity of the mortgage market and potentially maintain or increase the value of existing mortgage-backed securities. The program expires in December 2009. No assurance can be given that the U.S. Treasury initiatives will be successful.
U.S. Treasury Securities are obligations of the U.S. Treasury and include bills, notes and bonds. U.S. Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government.
Variable and Floating Rate Debt Securities pay an interest rate, which is adjusted either periodically or at specific intervals or which floats continuously according to a formula or benchmark. Although these structures generally are intended to minimize the fluctuations in value that occur when interest rates rise and fall, some structures may be linked to a benchmark in such a way as to cause greater volatility to the security’s value.
Some variable rate securities may be combined with a put or demand feature (variable rate demand securities) that entitles the holder to the right to demand repayment in full or to resell at a specific price and/or time. While the demand feature is intended to reduce credit risks, it is not always unconditional and may be subject to termination if the issuer’s credit rating falls below investment grade or if the issuer fails to make payments on other debt. While most variable-rate demand securities allow a fund to exercise its demand rights at any time, some such securities may only allow a fund to exercise its demand rights at certain times, which reduces the liquidity usually associated with this type of security. A fund could suffer losses in the event that the demand feature provider, usually a bank, fails to meet its obligation to pay the demand.

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Synthetic variable or floating rate securities include tender option bond receipts. Tender option bond receipts are derived from fixed-rate municipal bonds that are placed in a trust that also contains a liquidity facility. The trust issues two classes of receipts, one of which is a synthetic variable-rate demand obligation and one of which is an inverse-rate long-term obligation; each obligation represents a proportionate interest in the underlying bonds. The remarketing agent for the trust sets a floating or variable rate on typically a weekly basis. The synthetic variable-rate demand obligations, or floater receipts, grant the investors (floater holders) the right to require the liquidity provider to purchase the receipts at par, on a periodic (e.g., daily, weekly or monthly) basis. The trust receives the interest income paid by the issuer of the underlying bonds and, after paying fees to the trustee, remarketing agent and liquidity provider, the remaining income is paid to the floater holders based on the prevailing market rate set by the remarketing agent and the remaining (or inverse) amount is paid to the long-term investor. The trust is collapsed prior to the maturity of the bonds and the receipts holders may participate in any gain realized from the sale of the bonds at that time. In the event of certain defaults or a significant downgrading in the credit rating assigned to the issuer of the bond, the liquidity facility provider may not be obligated to accept tendered floater receipts. In this event, the underlying bonds in the trust are priced for sale in the market and the proceeds are used to repay the floater and inverse receipt holders. If the receipts holders cannot be repaid in full from the sale of the underlying bonds then the bonds will be distributed to the receipts holders on a pro-rata basis, in which case the holders would anticipate a loss. Tender option bonds may be considered derivatives and are subject to the risk thereof.
The funds may invest in tender option bonds the interest on which will, in the opinion of bond counsel or counsel for the issuer of interests therein, be exempt from regular federal income tax. Tender option bond trust receipts generally are structured as private placements and, accordingly, may be deemed to be restricted securities for purposes of a fund’s investment limitations.
Investment Limitations
The following investment limitations may be changed only by a vote of a majority of each fund’s outstanding shares.
Schwab Money Market Fund, Schwab Government Money Fund, Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund® and Schwab Investor Money Fund® may not:
(1)   Purchase securities of an issuer, except as consistent with the maintenance of its status as an open-end diversified company under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(2)   Concentrate investments in a particular industry or group of industries, as concentration is defined under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(3)   Purchase or sell commodities or real estate, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(4)   Make loans to other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.

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(5)   Borrow money, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(6)   Underwrite securities issued by other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(7)   Issue senior securities, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(8)   Purchase securities or make investments other than in accordance with its investment objectives and policies.
Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund, Schwab Cash Reservesand Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves® may not:
(1)   Purchase securities of an issuer, except as consistent with the maintenance of its status as an open-end diversified company under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(2)   Concentrate investments in a particular industry or group of industries, as concentration is defined under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(3)   Purchase or sell commodities or real estate, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(4)   Make loans to other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(5)   Borrow money, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(6)   Underwrite securities issued by other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(7)   Issue senior securities, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® may not:

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(1)   Underwrite securities issued by other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(2)   Purchase or sell commodities or real estate, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(3)   Concentrate investments in a particular industry or group of industries, as concentration is defined under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(4)   Make loans to other persons, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(5)   Issue senior securities, except to the extent permitted under the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(6)   Purchase securities of any issuer unless consistent with the maintenance of its status as a diversified company under the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
(7)   Borrow money, except to the extent permitted by the 1940 Act or the rules or regulations thereunder, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended from time to time.
The following descriptions of the 1940 Act may assist investors in understanding the above fundamental policies and restrictions.
Diversification. Under the 1940 Act, a diversified fund, with respect to 75% of its total assets, may not purchase securities (other than U.S. government securities or securities of other investment companies) if, as a result, more than 5% of its total assets would be invested in the securities of such issuer or it would own more than 10% of such issuer’s outstanding voting securities. Money market funds that satisfy the applicable diversification requirements of Rule 2a-7 of the 1940 Act are deemed to satisfy the diversification requirements set forth above.
Borrowing. The 1940 Act presently restricts a fund from borrowing (including pledging, mortgaging or hypothecating assets) in excess of 33 1/3% of its total assets (not including temporary borrowings not in excess of 5% of its total assets).
Lending. Under the 1940 Act, a fund may only make loans if expressly permitted by its investment policies.
Concentration. The SEC presently defines concentration as investing 25% or more of a fund’s net assets in an industry or group of industries, with certain exceptions. Municipal securities are not deemed to be issued by an issuer from a single industry or group of industries.
Underwriting. Under the 1940 Act, underwriting securities involves a fund purchasing securities directly from an issuer for the purpose of selling (distributing) them or participating in any such activity either directly or indirectly. Under the 1940 Act, a diversified fund may not make any

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commitment as underwriter, if immediately thereafter the amount of its outstanding underwriting commitments, plus the value of its investments in securities of issuers (other than investment companies) of which it owns more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities, exceeds 25% of the value of its total assets.
Senior Securities. Senior securities may include any obligation or instrument issued by a fund evidencing indebtedness. The 1940 Act generally prohibits funds from issuing senior securities, although it provides allowances for certain borrowings and certain other investments, such as short sales, reverse repurchase agreements, firm commitment agreements and standby commitments, with appropriate earmarking or segregation of assets to cover such obligations.
Real Estate. The 1940 Act does not directly restrict a fund’s ability to invest in real estate, but does require that every fund have a fundamental investment policy governing such investments. The funds have adopted a fundamental policy that would permit direct investment in real estate. However, the funds have a non-fundamental investment limitation that prohibits them from investing directly in real estate. This non-fundamental policy may be changed only by vote of the funds’ Board of Trustees.
The following are non-fundamental investment policies and restrictions, and may be changed by the Board of Trustees.
Each fund may not:
(1)   Purchase securities (other than securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies or instrumentalities) if, as a result of such purchase, 25% or more of the value of its total assets would be invested in any industry or group of industries.
(2)   Purchase or sell commodities, commodity contracts or real estate, including interests in real estate limited partnerships, provided that the fund may (i) purchase securities of companies that deal in real estate or interests therein (including REITs), (ii) purchase or sell futures contracts, options contracts, equity index participations and index participation contracts, and (iii) purchase securities of companies that deal in precious metals or interests therein.
(3)   Invest more than 10% of its net assets in illiquid securities.
(4)   Purchase securities of other investment companies, except as permitted by the 1940 Act, the rules or regulations thereunder or any exemption therefrom, as such statute, rules or regulations may be amended or interpreted from time to time.
(5)   Lend any security or make any other loan if, as a result, more than 33 1/3% of its total assets would be lent to other parties (this restriction does not apply to purchases of debt securities or repurchase agreements).
(6)   Borrow money except that the fund may (i) borrow money from banks or through an interfund lending facility, if any, only for temporary or emergency purposes (and not for leveraging) and (ii) engage in reverse repurchase agreements with any party; provided that (i) and (ii) in combination do not exceed 33 1/3% of its total assets (any borrowings that come to exceed this amount will be reduced to the extent necessary to comply with the limitation within three business days).
(7)   Sell securities short unless it owns the security or the right to obtain the security or equivalent securities, or unless it covers such short sale as required by current SEC rules and

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     interpretations (transactions in futures contracts, options and other derivative instruments are not considered selling securities short).
(8)   Purchase securities on margin, except such short-term credits as may be necessary for the clearance of purchases and sales of securities and provided that margin deposits in connection with futures contracts, options on futures or other derivative instruments shall not constitute purchasing securities on margin.
Policies and investment limitations that state a maximum percentage of assets that may be invested in a security or other asset, or that set forth a quality standard shall be measured immediately after and as a result of the fund’s acquisition of such security or asset, unless otherwise noted. Except with respect to limitations on borrowing, any subsequent change in net assets or other circumstances does not require a fund to sell an investment if it could not then make the same investment. With respect to the limitation on illiquid securities, in the event that a subsequent change in net assets or other circumstances cause a fund to exceed its limitation, the fund will take steps to bring the aggregate amount of illiquid instruments back within the limitations as soon as reasonably practicable.
MANAGEMENT OF THE FUNDS
The funds are overseen by a Board of Trustees. The trustees are responsible for protecting shareholder interests. The trustees regularly meet to review the investment activities, contractual arrangements and the investment performance of each fund. The trustees met 11 times during the most recent fiscal year.
Certain trustees are “interested persons.” A trustee is considered an interested person of the Trust under the 1940 Act if he or she is an officer, director, or an employee of Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (“CSIM”) or Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (“Schwab”). A trustee also may be considered an interested person of the Trust under the 1940 Act if he or she owns stock of The Charles Schwab Corporation, a publicly traded company and the parent company of the funds’ investment adviser and distributor.
Each of the officers and/or trustees also serves in the same capacity as described for the Trust, for Schwab Investments, Schwab Capital Trust and Schwab Annuity Portfolios (collectively referred to herein as the “Family of Investment Companies”), which as of December 31, 2008, included 69 funds.
The tables below provide information about the trustees and officers for the Trust, which includes funds in this SAI. The “Fund Complex” includes The Charles Schwab Family of Funds, Schwab Investments, Schwab Capital Trust, Schwab Annuity Portfolios, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust. As of December 31, 2008, the Fund Complex included 84 funds. The address of each individual is 211 Main Street, San Francisco, California 94105.

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Each officer’s and trustee’s principal occupations during the past five years, other current directorships and affiliations, if any, with The Charles Schwab Corporation, Schwab and CSIM are as follows:
                 
NAME, YEAR OF            
BIRTH, AND            
POSITION(S) WITH       NUMBER OF    
THE TRUST;       PORTFOLIOS IN    
(TERM OF OFFICE   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS   FUND COMPLEX    
AND LENGTH OF   DURING THE PAST FIVE   OVERSEEN BY    
TIME SERVED1)   YEARS   THE TRUSTEE   OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS
Independent Trustees
               
 
Mariann Byerwalter
1960
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2000.)
  Chairman of JDN Corporate Advisory LLC.     84     Board 1 – Director, Redwood Trust, Inc.
 
               
John F. Cogan
1947
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2008.)
  Senior Fellow: The Hoover Institution at Stanford University; Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research; Professor of Public Policy, Stanford University     69     Board 1 – Director, Gilead Sciences, Inc.

Board 2 – Director, Venture Lending and Leasing, Inc.
 
               
William A. Hasler
1941
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2000.)
  Dean Emeritus, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. Until February 2004, Co-Chief Executive Officer, Aphton Corp. (bio-pharmaceuticals). Prior to August 1998, Dean of the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley (higher education).     84     Board 1 – Director, Mission West Properties.

Board 2 – Director, TOUSA.

Board 3 – Director, Harris-Stratex Networks.

Board 4 – Director, Genitope Corp.

Board 5 – Director, Ditech Networks.

Board 6 – Rubicon Limited
 
               
Gerald B. Smith
1950
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2000.)
  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and founder of Smith Graham & Co. (investment advisors).     69     Board 1 – Lead Independent Director, Board of Cooper Industries.

Board 2 – Chairman of the Audit Committee of Oneok Partners LP.
 
               
Donald R. Stephens
1938
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 1989.)
  Managing Partner, D.R. Stephens & Company (investments). Prior to 1996, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of North American Trust (real estate investment trust).     69     Not Applicable.

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NAME, YEAR OF            
BIRTH, AND            
POSITION(S) WITH       NUMBER OF    
THE TRUST;       PORTFOLIOS IN    
(TERM OF OFFICE   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS   FUND COMPLEX    
AND LENGTH OF   DURING THE PAST FIVE   OVERSEEN BY    
TIME SERVED1)   YEARS   THE TRUSTEE   OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS
Joseph H. Wender
1944
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2008.)
  Senior Managing Director, Chairman of the Finance Committee, GSC Group, until December 2007.     69     Board 1 – Board Member and Chairman of the Audit Committee, Isis Pharmaceuticals
 
               
Michael W. Wilsey
1943
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 1989.)
  Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Wilsey Bennett, Inc. (real estate investment and management, and other investments).     69     Not Applicable.
 
               
Interested Trustees
               
 
               
Charles R. Schwab2
1937
Chairman and Trustee
(Chairman and Trustee of CSFF since 1989.)
  Founded Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. in 1971 and became Chairman in 1978. Since 1986, Chairman and Director, The Charles Schwab Corporation.     69     Not Applicable.
 
               
 
  Since 1989, Director, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc., and appointed as Chairman in 1991. Since 1996, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Schwab (SIS) Holdings Inc. I and Schwab International Holdings, Inc. Since 1999, Director and Chief Executive Officer, Schwab Holdings, Inc. Since 2003, Chairman, Charles Schwab Bank, N. A.;            
 
               
 
  Through June 2007, Director, U.S. Trust Company, N. A., U.S. Trust Corporation, United States Trust Company of New York. Until October 2008, Chief Executive Officer, The Charles Schwab Corporation, and the Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.            
 
Walter W. Bettinger II2
1960
Trustee
(Trustee of CSFF since 2008.)
  As of October 2008, President and Chief Executive Officer, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., principal underwriter to the Funds, and The Charles Schwab Corporation. Since October 2008, Director, The Charles Schwab Corporation. Since May 2008, Director, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and Schwab Holdings, Inc. Since 2006, Director, Charles Schwab Bank.     69     Not Applicable.

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NAME, YEAR OF            
BIRTH, AND            
POSITION(S) WITH       NUMBER OF    
THE TRUST;       PORTFOLIOS IN    
(TERM OF OFFICE   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS   FUND COMPLEX    
AND LENGTH OF   DURING THE PAST FIVE   OVERSEEN BY    
TIME SERVED1)   YEARS   THE TRUSTEE   OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS
 
  From 2004 through 2007, Executive Vice President and President, Schwab Investor Services. From 2004 through 2005, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Individual Investor Enterprise, and from 2002 through 2004, Executive Vice President, Corporate Services.            
 
               
 
  Until October 2008, President and Chief Operating Officer, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. and The Charles Schwab Corporation.            
     
NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, AND    
POSITION(S) WITH THE TRUST;    
(TERM OF OFFICE AND LENGTH OF TIME   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS DURING THE PAST FIVE
SERVED3)   YEARS
OFFICERS
   
 
   
Randall W. Merk
1954
President and Chief Executive Officer
(Officer of CSFF since 2007.)
  Executive Vice President and President, Investment Management Services, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.; Executive Vice President, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (2002 – present); President and Chief Executive Officer, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (2007-present); Director, Charles Schwab Asset Management (Ireland) Limited and Charles Schwab Worldwide Funds PLC.
 
   
George Pereira
1964
Treasurer and Principal Financial Officer
(Officer of CSFF since 2004.)
  Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc.; Chief Financial Officer, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust; Director, Charles Schwab Worldwide Fund, PLC and Charles Schwab Asset Management (Ireland) Limited. Through June 2007, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer, Excelsior Funds Inc., Excelsior Tax-Exempt Funds, Inc., and Excelsior Funds Trust; Chief Financial Officer, Mutual Fund Division, UST Advisers, Inc. From December 1999 to November 2004, Sr. Vice President, Financial Reporting, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.

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NAME, YEAR OF BIRTH, AND    
POSITION(S) WITH THE TRUST;    
(TERM OF OFFICE AND LENGTH OF TIME   PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS DURING THE PAST FIVE
SERVED3)   YEARS
Koji E. Felton
1961
Secretary and Chief Legal Officer
(Officer of CSFF since 1998.)
  Senior Vice President, Chief Counsel and Corporate Secretary, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc.; Senior Vice President and Deputy General Counsel, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. Until 2006, Chief Legal Officer, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust. Through June 2007, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary, Excelsior Funds Inc., Excelsior Tax-Exempt Funds, Inc., and Excelsior Funds Trust.
 
   
Jeffrey M. Mortimer
1963
Senior Vice President and Chief Investment
Officer – Equities and Fixed Income
(Officer of CSFF since 2004.)
  Senior Vice President and Chief Investment Officer – Equities & Fixed Income, Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc.; President, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust.
 
   
Catherine MacGregor
1964
Vice President
(Officer of CSFF since 2005
  Vice President, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc., and Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust. Since 2006, Chief Counsel, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust.
 
   
Michael Haydel
1972
Vice President
(Officer of CSFF since 2006
  Vice President, Asset Management Client Services, Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.; Vice President and AML Officer, Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust.
 
1   Trustees remain in office until they resign, retire or are removed by shareholder vote. The Schwab Funds® retirement policy requires that independent trustees elected after January 1, 2000 retire at age 72 or after twenty years as a trustee, whichever comes first. Independent trustees elected prior to January 1, 2000 will retire on the following schedule: Messrs. Stephens and Wilsey will retire on December 31, 2010.
 
2   Mr. Schwab and Mr. Bettinger are Interested Trustees because they are employees of Schwab and/or the adviser. In addition to their employment with the investment adviser and the distributor, Messrs. Schwab and Bettinger also own stock of The Charles Schwab Corporation.
 
3   The President, Treasurer and Secretary hold office until their respective successors are chosen and qualified or until he or she sooner dies, resigns, is removed or becomes disqualified. Each of the other officers serves at the pleasure of the Board.
Trustee Committees
The Board of Trustees has established certain committees and adopted Committee charters with respect to those committees, each as described below:
      The Audit and Compliance Committee (formerly the Audit/Portfolio Compliance Committee) has oversight responsibility for the integrity of the Trust’s financial reporting processes and compliance policies, procedures and processes, and for the Trust’s overall system of internal controls. This Committee is comprised of at least three Independent Trustees. Currently, Messrs. Hasler and Cogan and Ms. Byerwalter are members of this Committee. The charter directs that the Committee must meet four times annually, with additional meetings as

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the Committee deems appropriate. The Committee met 4 times during the most recent fiscal year.
      The primary purpose of the Governance Committee is to review and make recommendations to the Board regarding Trust governance-related matters, including but not limited to Board compensation practices, retirement policies and term limits, Board self-evaluations, the effectiveness and allocation of assignments and functions by the Board, the composition of committees of the Board, and the training of Trustees. The Committee is also responsible for selecting and nominating candidates to serve as trustees. There are no specific procedures in place to consider nominees recommended by shareholders, but such nominees would be considered if such nominations were submitted in accordance with Rule 14a-8 of the 1934 Act in conjunction with a shareholder meeting to consider the election of Trustees. This Committee is comprised of at least four Independent Trustees. Currently, Messrs. Hasler, Cogan and Wilsey and Ms. Byerwalter are members of this Committee. The charter directs that the Committee meets at such times and with such frequency as is deemed necessary or appropriate by the Committee. The Committee met 3 times during the most recent fiscal year.
      The primary purpose of the Investment Oversight Committee is to oversee the investment activities of the Trust. This Committee is comprised of at least four Independent Trustees. Currently, Messrs. Smith, Wilsey, Wender and Stephens are members of this Committee. The charter directs that the Committee meets at such times and with such frequency as is deemed necessary or appropriate by the Committee. The committee met 4 times during the most recent fiscal year.
      The primary purposes of the Marketing, Distribution and Shareholder Servicing Committee are to review matters relating to the marketing of the funds’ shares; to oversee the quality and cost of shareholder services provided to the Trust and its shareholders pursuant to the shareholder servicing and/or administrative service plans; and to oversee the Trust’s distribution-related arrangements, including the distribution-related services provided to the Trust and its shareholders. This Committee is comprised of at least three Independent Trustees. Currently, Messrs. Smith, Stephens and Wender are members of this Committee. The charter directs that the Committee meets at such times and with such frequency as is deemed necessary or appropriate by the Committee. The committee met 4 times during the most recent fiscal year.

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Trustee Compensation
The following table provides trustee compensation for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2008. Certain of this information is for the Fund Complex, which included 84 funds as of December 31, 2008.
                         
    ($)   Pension or Retirement Benefits   ($)
    Aggregate   Accrued as Part of Fund   Total Compensation from Fund
Name of Trustee   Compensation   Expenses   Complex
Interested Trustees
                       
Charles R. Schwab
    0       N/A       0  
Walter Bettinger
    0       N/A       0  
Independent Trustees
                       
Mariann Byerwalter
  $ 129,895       N/A     $ 295,000  
William A. Hasler
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 297,000  
Gerald B. Smith
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
Donald R. Stephens
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
Michael W. Wilsey
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
John F. Cogan
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
Joseph H. Wender
  $ 130,978       N/A     $ 242,000  
For the fiscal year ending December 31, 2008, the Trust and Fund Complex paid consulting fees of $54,129 and $100,000, respectively, to each of Robert G. Holmes and Donald F. Dorward, former Trustees of the Trust. Messrs. Holmes and Dorward retired from the Board of Trustees on December 31, 2007.
Securities Beneficially Owned by Each Trustee
The following tables provide each Trustee’s equity ownership of a fund and ownership of all registered investment companies overseen by each Trustee in the Family of Investment Companies as of December 31, 2008. As of December 31, 2008, the Family of Investment Companies included 68 funds.
                                 
    Dollar Range of Trustee    
    Ownership of the Fund:   Aggregate Dollar Range
    Schwab   Schwab   Schwab   of Trustee Ownership in
    Money Market   Government   U.S. Treasury   the Family of Investment
Name of Trustee   Fund™   Money Fund™   Money Fund™   Companies
Interested Trustees
                               
Charles R. Schwab
  Over $100,000   $10,001-$50,000     Over $100,000   Over $100,000
Walter W. Bettinger II
  None   $1-$10,000     None   Over $100,000

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    Dollar Range of Trustee    
    Ownership of the Fund:   Aggregate Dollar Range
    Schwab   Schwab   Schwab   of Trustee Ownership in
    Money Market   Government   U.S. Treasury   the Family of Investment
Name of Trustee   Fund™   Money Fund™   Money Fund™   Companies
Independent Trustees
                               
Mariann Byerwalter
  $1-$10,000     None   None   $10,001-$50,000
William A. Hasler
  None   $ 1-$10,000     None   Over $100,000
Gerald B. Smith
  None   None   None   Over $100,000
Donald R. Stephens
  $ 10,001-$50,000     None   None   Over $100,000
Michael W. Wilsey
  None   None   Over $100,000   Over $100,000
John F. Cogan
  None   None   None   None
Joseph H. Wender
  None   None   None   None
                                 
    Dollar Range of Trustee    
    Ownership of the Fund:    
                    Schwab   Aggregate Dollar Range of
            Schwab Value   Retirement   Trustee Ownership in the
    Schwab Investor   Advantage Money   Advantage   Family of Investment
Name of Trustee   Money Fund®   Fund®   Money Fund®   Companies
Interested Trustees
                               
Charles R. Schwab
  None   Over $100,000   None   Over $100,000
Walter W. Bettinger II
  None   None   None   Over $100,000
Independent Trustees
                               
Mariann Byerwalter
  None   None   None   $10,001-$50,000
William A. Hasler
  None   Over $100,000   None   Over $100,000
Gerald B. Smith
  None   None   None   Over $100,000
Donald R. Stephens
  None   None   None   Over $100,000
Michael W. Wilsey
  None   None   None   Over $100,000
John F. Cogan
  None   None   None   None
Joseph H. Wender
  None   None   None   None

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    Dollar Range of Trustee   Aggregate Dollar Range
    Ownership of the Fund:   of Trustee Ownership in
    Schwab Advisor   Schwab Cash           the Family of Investment
Name of Trustee   Cash Reserves®   Reserves™           Companies
Interested Trustees
                               
Charles R. Schwab
  Over $100,000   Over $100,000   None   Over $100,000
Walter W. Bettinger II
  None   $50,001-$100,000   None   Over $100,000
Independent Trustees
                               
Mariann Byerwalter
  None   None   None   $10,001-$50,000
William A. Hasler
  None   None   None   Over $100,000
Gerald B. Smith
  None   $50,001-$100,000   None   Over $100,000
Donald R. Stephens
  None   Over $100,000   None   Over $100,000
Michael W. Wilsey
  None   None   None   Over $100,000
John F. Cogan
  None   None   None   None
Joseph H. Wender
  None   None   None   None
Deferred Compensation Plan
Independent Trustees may enter into a fee deferral plan. Under this plan, deferred fees will be credited to an account established by the Trust as of the date that such fees would have been paid to the trustee. The value of this account will equal the value that the account would have if the fees credited to the account had been invested in the shares of Schwab Funds® selected by the trustee. Currently, none of the Independent Trustees has elected to participate in this plan.
Code of Ethics
The funds, their investment adviser and Schwab have adopted a Code of Ethics (“Code”) as required under the 1940 Act. Subject to certain conditions or restrictions, the Code permits the trustees, directors, officers or advisory representatives of the funds or the investment adviser or the directors or officers of Schwab to buy or sell directly or indirectly securities for their own accounts. This includes securities that may be purchased or held by the funds. Securities transactions by some of these individuals may be subject to prior approval of the investment adviser’s Chief Compliance Officer or alternate. Most securities transactions are subject to quarterly reporting and review requirements.
CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES
As of April 1, 2009, the officers and trustees of the Trust, as a group, owned of record or beneficially, more than 1% of the outstanding voting securities of the Schwab Value Advantage – Institutional Shares. Mr. Schwab owned 1.21% of the Schwab Value Advantage – Institutional Shares.
Persons who owned of record or beneficially more than 25% of a fund’s outstanding shares may be deemed to control the fund within the meaning of the 1940 Act. Shareholders controlling the fund

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could have the ability to vote a majority of the shares of the fund on any matter requiring the approval of shareholders of the fund.
As of April 1, 2008, the following represents persons or entities that owned more than 5% of the outstanding voting securities of any class of each fund:
         
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® — Institutional Prime Shares™
    7.70 %
Charles Schwab Trust DCC&S
Omnibus Account
215 Fremont Street, FL 6
San Francisco, CA 94105
       
 
       
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® — Institutional Prime Shares™
    10.59 %
Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe
Future Security Account
7070 East Broadway
Mount Pleasant, MI 48858
       
 
       
Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund™
    87.83 %
Charles Schwab Trust DCC&S
Omnibus Account
215 Fremont Street, FL 6
San Francisco, CA 94105
       
 
       
Schwab Investor Money Fund™
    24.92 %
Charles Schwab Trust DCC&S
Omnibus Account
215 Fremont Street, FL 6
San Francisco, CA 94105
       
 
       
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® — Institutional Shares
    12.67 %
Charles Schwab Trust DCC&S
Omnibus Account
215 Fremont Street, FL 6
San Francisco, CA 94105
       
 
       
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® — Institutional Shares
    5.38 %
Schwab Charitable Fund
SCF/Money Market Pool
101 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94104
       
INVESTMENT ADVISORY AND OTHER SERVICES
Investment Adviser
Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (“CSIM” or the “investment adviser”), a wholly owned subsidiary of The Charles Schwab Corporation, 211 Main Street, San Francisco, CA 94105, serves as the funds’ investment adviser and administrator pursuant to an Investment Advisory and Administration

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Agreement (“Advisory Agreement”) between it and the Trust. Schwab is an affiliate of the investment adviser and is the Trust’s distributor, shareholder services agent and transfer agent. Charles R. Schwab is the founder, Chairman and Director of The Charles Schwab Corporation. As a result of his ownership of and interests in The Charles Schwab Corporation, Mr. Schwab may be deemed to be a controlling person of the investment adviser and Schwab.
Advisory Agreement
The continuation of a fund’s Advisory Agreement must be specifically approved at least annually (1) by the vote of the trustees or by a vote of the shareholders of the fund, and (2) by the vote of a majority of the trustees who are not parties to the investment advisory agreement or “interested persons” of any party (the “Independent Trustees”), cast in person at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such approval.
Each year, the Board of Trustees calls and holds a meeting to decide whether to renew the Advisory Agreement between the Trust and CSIM with respect to existing funds in the Trust. In preparation for the meeting, the Board requests and reviews a wide variety of materials provided by the funds’ investment adviser, as well as extensive data provided by third parties, and the Independent Trustees receive advice from counsel to the Independent Trustees.
For its advisory and administrative services to the funds, the investment adviser is entitled to receive a graduated annual fee payable monthly based on each fund’s average daily net assets as described below.
First $1 billion – 0.35%
More than $1 billion but not exceeding $10 billion – 0.32%
More than $10 billion but not exceeding $20 billion – 0.30%
More than $20 billion but not exceeding $40 billion – 0.27%
More than $40 billion – 0.25%
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® paid net investment advisory fees of $73,057,000 (fees were reduced by $41,607,000), $92,485,000 (fees were reduced by $51,035,000) and $108,186,000 (fees were reduced by $55,625,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, the Schwab Money Market Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $86,015,000 (fees were reduced by $16,081,000), $61,083,000 (fees were reduced by $1,271,000) and $44,486,000 (fees were reduced by $6,699,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Government Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $7,558,000 (fees were reduced by $2,483,000), $15,420,000 (fees were reduced by $347,000) and $31,269,000 (fees were reduced by $2,643,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund™ paid net investment advisory fees of $5,219,000 (fees were reduced by $7,057,000), $9,155,000 (fees were reduced by $8,078,000) and $29,560,000 (fees were reduced by $28,275,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund® paid net investment advisory fees of $1,495,000 (fees were reduced by $1,007,000), $1,680,000 (fees were reduced by $1,083,000) and $1,951,000 (fees were reduced by $1,120,000), respectively.

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For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Investor Money Fund® paid net investment advisory fees of $3,567,000 (fees were reduced by $0), $5,741,000 (fees were reduced by $86,000) and $7,322,000 (fees were reduced by $595,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Cash Reserves™ paid net investment advisory fees of $22,036,000 (fees were reduced by $13,911,000), $50,462,000 (fees were reduced by $12,825,000) and $63,801,000 (fees were reduced by $22,051,000), respectively.
For the fiscal years ended December 31, 2006, 2007 and 2008, Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves® paid net investment advisory fees of $16,973,000 (fees were reduced by $14,423,000), $38,227,000 (fees were reduced by $17,383,000) and $45,416,000 (fees were reduced by $23,320,000), respectively.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Money Market Fund’s “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.71% for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Government Money Fund’s “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.75% for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund’s “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.60% for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund’s “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.49% through April 29, 2011.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® – Investor Shares’ “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.45% for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® - Select Shares’ “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.35% through April 29, 2011.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund - Institutional Shares’ “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.24% through April 29, 2011.

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Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund- Institutional Prime Shares’ “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.21% through April 29, 2011.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves® – Sweep Shares’ and Premier Sweep Shares’ “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.66% and 0.59%, respectively, for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees.
Schwab and the investment adviser have agreed to limit the Schwab Cash Reserves “net operating expenses” (excluding interest, taxes, costs of participating in the U.S. Treasury Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds and certain non-routine expenses) to 0.66% for so long as the investment adviser serves as the adviser to the fund. This agreement may only be amended or terminated with the approval of the fund’s Board of Trustees.
An expense cap, where applicable, is not intended to cover all fund expenses, and a fund’s expenses may exceed the expense cap. For example, the expense cap does not cover investment-related expenses, such as brokerage commissions, interest and taxes and the fees and expenses of pooled investment vehicles, such as other investment companies, nor does it cover extraordinary or non-routine expenses, if any, such as shareholder meeting costs.
In addition, Schwab and the investment adviser also may waive and/or reimburse expenses in excess of their current fee waivers and reimbursement commitments, if applicable, to the extent necessary to maintain each fund’s and/or share class’s net yield at a certain level as determined by Schwab and the investment adviser. Under an agreement with the funds, Schwab and the investment adviser may recapture from the fund’s and/or share class’s net assets any of these expenses or fees they have waived and/or reimbursed until the third anniversary of the end of the fiscal year in which such waiver and/or reimbursement occurs, subject to certain limitations. These reimbursement payments by the fund to Schwab and/or the investment adviser are considered “non-routine expenses” and are not subject to any net operating expense limitations in effect at the time of such payment.
Distributor
Pursuant to an Amended and Restated Distribution Agreement between Schwab and the Trust, Schwab is the principal underwriter for shares of the funds and is the Trust’s agent for the purpose of the continuous offering of the funds’ shares. The funds pay for prospectuses and shareholder reports to be prepared and delivered to existing shareholders. Schwab pays such costs when the described materials are used in connection with the offering of shares to prospective investors and for supplemental sales literature and advertising. Schwab receives no fee under the Distribution Agreement.
Shareholder Servicing and Sweep Administration Plan
The Trust’s Board of Trustees has adopted a Shareholder Servicing Plan (the “Plan”) on behalf of certain funds of the Trust. The Plan enables these funds, directly or indirectly through Schwab, to bear expenses relating to the provision by service providers, including Schwab, of certain shareholder services to the current shareholders of the funds (or classes of such funds). The Trust has appointed

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Schwab to act as its shareholder servicing fee paying agent under the Plan for the purpose of making payments to the service providers (other than Schwab) under the Plan. Pursuant to the Plan, each of the funds is subject to an annual shareholder servicing fee, as set forth below:
                 
    Shareholder   Sweep
Administration
Fund*   Servicing Fee   Fee
Schwab Investor Money Fund
    0.25 %     n/a  
Schwab Money Market Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.15 %
Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund
    0.22 %     n/a  
Schwab Government Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.15 %
Schwab U.S. Treasury Money Fund – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.15 %
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund – Investor Shares
    0.25 %     n/a  
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund – Select Shares
    0.15 %     n/a  
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund – Institutional Shares
    0.04 %     n/a  
Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund – Institutional Prime Shares
    0.02 %     n/a  
Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.15 %
Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves – Premier Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.15 %
Schwab Cash Reserves – Sweep Shares
    0.25 %     0.15 %
Pursuant to the Plan, the funds (or Schwab as paying agent) may pay Schwab or service providers that, pursuant to written agreements with Schwab, provide certain account maintenance, customer liaison and shareholder services to fund shareholders. Schwab and the other service providers may provide fund shareholders with the following shareholder services, among other shareholder services: (i) maintaining records for shareholders that hold shares of a fund; (ii) communicating with shareholders, including the mailing of regular statements and confirmation statements, distributing fund-related materials, mailing prospectuses and reports to shareholders, and responding to shareholder inquiries; (iii) communicating and processing shareholder purchase, redemption and exchange orders; (iv) communicating mergers, splits or other reorganization activities to fund shareholders; and (v) preparing and filing tax information, returns and reports.
The shareholder servicing fee paid to a particular service provider is calculated at the annual rate set forth in the chart above and is based on the average daily net asset value of the fund (or class) shares owned by shareholders holding shares through such service provider. Payments under the Plan are made as described above regardless of Schwab’s or the service provider’s actual cost of providing the services. If the cost of providing the services under the Plan is less than the payments received, the unexpended portion of the fees may be retained as profit by Schwab or the service provider.
Pursuant to the Plan, the funds may pay Schwab for certain administration services it provides to fund shareholders invested in the Sweep Shares and Premier Sweep Shares of the funds. Schwab may provide fund shareholders with the following sweep administration services, among other sweep administration services: processing of automatic purchase and redemptions.
The sweep administration fee paid to Schwab is calculated at the annual rate set forth in the chart above and is based on the average daily net asset value of the fund (or class) shares owned by shareholders holding shares through Schwab. Payments under the Plan are made as described above regardless of Schwab’s actual cost of providing the services. If the cost of providing the services under the Plan is less than the payments received, the unexpended portion of the fees may be retained as profit by Schwab.

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The Plan shall continue in effect for a fund for so long as its continuance is specifically approved at least annually by a vote of the majority of both (i) the Board of Trustees of the Trust and (ii) the Trustees of the Trust who are not interested persons of the Trust and who have no direct or indirect financial interest in the operation of the Plan or any agreements related to it (the “Qualified Trustees”). The Plan requires that Schwab or any person authorized to direct the disposition of monies paid or payable by the funds pursuant to the Plan furnish quarterly written reports of amounts spent under the Plan and the purposes of such expenditures to the Board of Trustees of the Trust for review. All material amendments to the Plan must be approved by votes of the majority of both (i) the Board of Trustees and (ii) the Qualified Trustees.
Transfer Agent
Boston Financial Data Services, Inc., Two Heritage Drive, Quincy, Massachusetts 02171, serves as the funds’ transfer agent. As part of these services, the firm maintains records pertaining to the sale, redemption and transfer of the funds’ shares.
Custodian and Fund Accountant
State Street Bank and Trust Company, One Lincoln Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02111, serves as custodian and fund accountant for the funds.
The custodian is responsible for the daily safekeeping of securities and cash held or sold by the funds. The fund accountant maintains the books and records related to each fund’s transactions.
Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
The funds’ independent registered public accounting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, audits and reports on the annual financial statements of each series of the Trust and reviews certain regulatory reports and each fund’s federal income tax return. They also perform other professional accounting, auditing, tax and advisory services when the Trust engages them to do so. Their address is Three Embarcadero Center, San Francisco, CA 94111-4004. Each fund’s audited financial statements for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, are included in the fund’s annual report that is supplied with the SAI.
Legal Counsel
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP serves as counsel to the Trust.
Other Expenses
The funds pay other expenses that typically are connected with the Trust’s operations, and include legal, audit and custodian fees, as well as the costs of accounting and registration of the funds. Expenses not directly attributable to a particular fund will generally be allocated among the funds in the Trust on the basis of each fund’s relative net assets at the time the expense is incurred.
BROKERAGE ALLOCATION AND OTHER PRACTICES
Portfolio Turnover
Because securities with maturities of less than one year are excluded from required portfolio turnover rate calculations, the funds’ portfolio turnover rate for reporting purposes is expected to be near zero.

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Portfolio Holdings Disclosure
The funds’ Board of Trustees has approved policies and procedures that govern the timing and circumstances regarding the disclosure of fund portfolio holdings information to shareholders and third parties. These policies and procedures are designed to ensure that disclosure of information regarding the funds’ portfolio securities is in the best interests of fund shareholders, and include procedures to address conflicts between the interests of the funds’ shareholders, on the one hand, and those of the funds’ investment adviser, principal underwriter or any affiliated person of the funds, its investment adviser, or its principal underwriter, on the other. Pursuant to such procedures, the Board has authorized the president of the funds to authorize the release of the funds’ portfolio holdings, as necessary, in conformity with the foregoing principles.
The Board exercises on-going oversight of the disclosure of fund portfolio holdings by overseeing the implementation and enforcement of the fund’s policies and procedures by the Chief Compliance Officer and by considering reports and recommendations by the Chief Compliance Officer concerning any material compliance matters. The Board will receive periodic updates, at least annually, regarding entities which were authorized to be provided “early disclosure” (as defined below) of the fund’s portfolio holdings information.
A complete list of each fund’s portfolio holdings is published on the Schwab Funds® website at www.schwab.com/prospectus, under “Prospectus and Reports”, typically 60-80 days after the end of each fund’s fiscal quarter. The portfolio holdings information available on the Schwab Funds’ website is the same that is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on Form N-Q or Form N-CSR. The information on the website is publicly available to all categories of persons.
From time to time, a fund may disclose its full portfolio holdings, the concentration of its portfolio holdings, a sampling of select portfolio holdings, or the fund’s assets under management on the SchwabFunds’ website at www.Schwab.com/moneyfunds website. A fund will disclose such information to the extent that the fund deems the information to be of interest to fund shareholders in light of developments in the financial markets or otherwise. This information will be made publicly available on the website to all categories of persons, and is typically disclosed subject to a 2 to 3 business day lag. Shareholders are advised to check the SchwabFunds’ website at www.Schwab.com/moneyfunds website from time to time to access this information as it is made available.
Each fund may disclose portfolio holdings information to certain persons and entities prior to and more frequently than the public disclosure of such information (“early disclosure”). The president may authorize early disclosure of portfolio holdings information to such parties at differing times and/or with different lag times provided that (a) the president of the funds determines that the disclosure is in the best interests of the funds and that there are no conflicts of interest between the fund’s shareholders and fund’s adviser and distributor; and (b) the recipient is, either by contractual agreement or otherwise by law, required to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
In addition, the funds’ service providers including, without limitation, the investment adviser, distributor, the custodian, fund accountant, transfer agent, auditor, proxy voting service provider, pricing information venders, publisher, printer and mailing agent may receive early disclosure of portfolio holdings information as frequently as daily in connection with the services they perform for the funds. Service providers will be subject to a duty of confidentiality with respect to any portfolio holdings information whether imposed by the provisions of the service provider’s contract with the trust or by the nature of its relationship with the trust.

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The funds have an ongoing arrangement to make available information about the funds’ portfolio holdings and information derived from the funds’ portfolio holdings to iMoneyNet, a rating and ranking organization. Under its arrangement with the funds, iMoneyNet receives information concerning the funds’ net assets, yields, maturities and portfolio compositions on a weekly basis, subject to a 1 business day lag. In addition, iMoneyNet receives monthly dividend reports summarizing the previous 13 months of fund dividends and monthly expense and asset reports, each subject to a 1 month lag.
iMoneyNet receives this information for disclosure to its subscribers subject to a confidentiality agreement, which imposes the following conditions on iMoneyNet’s use of such information: (i) iMoneyNet, or any of its employees, must not trade on the non-public information iMoneyNet receives; (ii) iMoneyNet must safeguard, protect and keep secret the non-public information; (iii) iMoneyNet is limited in the information that it may disclose to third parties prior to public disclosure of the information; and (iv) iMoneyNet must notify the funds or CSIM in writing of any unauthorized, negligent or inadvertent use or disclosure of the information.
The funds’ policies and procedures prohibit the funds, the funds’ investment adviser or any related party from receiving any compensation or other consideration in connection with the disclosure of portfolio holdings information.
The funds may disclose non-material information including commentary and aggregate information about the characteristics of a fund in connection with or relating to a fund or its portfolio securities to any person if such disclosure is for a legitimate business purpose, such disclosure does not effectively result in the disclosure of the complete portfolio securities of any fund (which can only be disclosed in accordance with the above requirements), and such information does not constitute material non-public information. Such disclosure does not fall within the portfolio securities disclosure requirements outlined above.
Whether the information constitutes material non-public information will be made on a good faith determination, which involves an assessment of the particular facts and circumstances. In most cases commentary or analysis would be immaterial and would not convey any advantage to a recipient in making a decision concerning a fund. Commentary and analysis includes, but is not limited to, the allocation of a fund’s portfolio securities and other investments among various asset classes, sectors, industries, and countries, the characteristics of the stock components and other investments of a fund, the attribution of fund returns by asset class, sector, industry and country, and the volatility characteristics of a fund.
Portfolio Transactions
Each of the funds paid no brokerage commissions during the last three fiscal years.
The investment adviser makes decisions with respect to the purchase and sale of portfolio securities on behalf of a fund. The investment adviser is responsible for implementing these decisions, including the negotiation of commissions and the allocation of principal business and portfolio brokerage. Purchases and sales of securities on a stock exchange or certain riskless principal transactions placed on NASDAQ are typically effected through brokers who charge a commission for their services. Purchases and sales of fixed income securities may be transacted with the issuer, the issuer’s underwriter, or a dealer. A fund does not usually pay brokerage commissions on purchases and sales of fixed income securities, although the price of the securities generally includes compensation, in the form of a spread or a mark-up or mark-down, which is not disclosed separately. The prices a fund pays to underwriters of newly-issued securities usually include a commission paid by the issuer to the underwriter. Transactions placed through dealers who are serving as primary

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market makers reflect the spread between the bid and asked prices. The money market securities in which the funds invest are traded primarily in the over-the-counter market and/or purchased directly from the issuer or an underwriter or market maker. Purchases from underwriters will include a commission or concession paid by the issuer to the underwriter, and purchases from dealers serving as market makers will include the spread between the bid and asked price. It is expected that the cost of executing portfolio securities transactions of the funds will primarily consist of dealer spreads and underwriting commissions.
The investment adviser seeks to obtain the best overall execution in executing portfolio transactions. The investment adviser may take a number of factors into account in selecting brokers or dealers to execute these transactions. Such factors may include, without limitation, the following: execution price; brokerage commission or dealer spread; size or type of the transaction; nature or character of the markets; clearance or settlement capability; reputation; financial strength and stability of the broker or dealer; efficiency of execution and error resolution; block trading capabilities; willingness to execute related or unrelated difficult transactions in the future; order of call; or provision of additional brokerage or research services or products.
The investment adviser may cause a fund to pay a higher commission than otherwise obtainable from other brokers or dealers in return for brokerage or research services or products if the investment adviser believes that such commission is reasonable in relation to the services provided. In addition to agency transactions, the investment adviser may receive brokerage and research services or products in connection with certain riskless principal transactions, in accordance with applicable SEC and other regulatory guidelines. In both instances, these services or products may include: company financial data and economic data (e.g., unemployment, inflation rates and GDP figures), stock quotes, last sale prices and trading volumes, research reports analyzing the performance of a particular company or stock, narrowly distributed trade magazines or technical journals covering specific industries, products, or issuers, seminars or conferences registration fees which provide substantive content relating to eligible research, quantitative analytical software and software that provides analyses of securities portfolios, trading strategies and pre/post trade analytics, discussions with research analysts or meetings with corporate executives which provide a means of obtaining oral advice on securities, markets or particular issuers, short-term custody related to effecting particular transactions and clearance and settlement of those trades, lines between the broker-dealer and order management systems operated by a third party vendor, dedicated lines between the broker-dealer and the investment adviser’s order management system, dedicated lines providing direct dial-up service between the investment adviser and the trading desk at the broker-dealer, message services used to transmit orders to broker-dealers for execution, electronic communication of allocation instructions between institutions and broker-dealers, comparison services required by the SEC or another regulator (e.g., use of electronic confirmation and affirmation of institutional trades), exchange of messages among brokerage dealers, custodians, and institutions related to a trade, post-trade matching of trade information, routing settlement instructions to custodian banks and broker-dealers’ clearing agents, software that provides algorithmic trading strategies, and trading software operated by a broker-dealer to route orders to market centers or direct market access systems. The investment adviser may use research services furnished by brokers or dealers in servicing all client accounts, and not all services may necessarily be used in connection with the account that paid commissions or spreads to the broker or dealer providing such services.
The investment adviser may receive a service from a broker or dealer that has both a “research” and a “non-research” use. When this occurs, the investment adviser will make a good faith allocation, under all the circumstances, between the research and non-research uses of the service. The percentage of the service that is used for research purposes may be paid for with client commissions or spreads, while the investment adviser will use its own funds to pay for the percentage of the service

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that is used for non-research purposes. In making this good faith allocation, the investment adviser faces a potential conflict of interest, but the investment adviser and sub-advisers believe that the costs of such services may be appropriately allocated to their anticipated research and non-research uses.
A fund may purchase new issues of securities for clients in a fixed price offering. In these situations, the seller may be a member of the selling group that will, in addition to selling securities, provide the investment adviser with research services. The NASD has adopted rules expressly permitting these types of arrangements under certain circumstances.
The investment adviser may place orders with electronic communications networks or other alternative trading systems. Placing orders with electronic communications networks or other alternative trading systems may enable a fund to trade directly with other institutional holders. At times, this may allow a fund to trade larger blocks than would be possible trading through a single market maker.
The investment adviser may aggregate securities sales or purchases among two or more clients. The investment adviser will not aggregate transactions unless it believes such aggregation is consistent with its duty to seek best execution for each affected client and is consistent with the terms of the investment advisory agreement for such client. In any single transaction in which purchases and/or sales of securities of any issuer for the account of a fund are aggregated with other accounts managed by the investment adviser, the actual prices applicable to the transaction will be averaged among the accounts for which the transaction is effected, including the account of the fund.
In determining when and to what extent to use Schwab or any other affiliated broker-dealer as its broker for executing orders for the funds on securities exchanges, the investment adviser follows procedures, adopted by the Board of Trustees, that are designed to ensure that affiliated brokerage commissions (if relevant) are reasonable and fair in comparison to unaffiliated brokerage commissions for comparable transactions. The Board reviews the procedures annually and approves and reviews transactions involving affiliated brokers quarterly.
Proxy Voting
The Board of Trustees of the Trust has delegated the responsibility for voting proxies to CSIM through its Advisory Agreement. The Trustees have adopted CSIM’s Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures with respect to proxies voted on behalf of the various Schwab Funds® portfolios. A description of CSIM’s Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures is included in Appendix B.
The Trust is required to disclose annually a fund’s complete proxy voting record on Form N-PX. A fund’s proxy voting record for the most recent 12 month period ended June 30th is available by visiting the Schwab Funds’ website at www.schwab.com/schwabfunds. A fund’s Form N-PX is also available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.
Regular Broker-Dealers
Each fund’s regular broker-dealers during its most recent fiscal year are: (1) the ten broker-dealers that received the greatest dollar amount of brokerage commissions from the fund; (2) the ten broker-dealers that engaged as principal in the largest dollar amount of portfolio transactions; and (3) the ten broker-dealers that sold the largest dollar amount of the fund’s shares. During the fiscal year ended December 31, 2008, certain of the funds purchased securities issued by their respective regular broker-dealers, as indicated below:

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Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund®
         
    Value of Fund’s Holdings as of
Regular Broker-Dealer   December 31, 2008
 
Banc of America Securities LLC
  $ 2,117,809,000  
JPMorgan Chase Securities LLC
  $ 2,066,857,000  
Barclays Global Investor Services
  $ 649,000,000  
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
  $ 427,581,000  
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
  $ 386,000,000  
Goldman Sachs & Co.
  $ 222,000,000  
Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.
  $ 200,000,000  
Schwab Investor Money Fund®
         
    Value of Fund’s Holdings as of
Regular Broker-Dealer   December 31, 2008
 
Banc of America Securities LLC
  $ 81,839,000  
J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.
  $ 80,875,000  
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
  $ 19,980,000  
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
  $ 17,000,000  
Barclays Global Investors Services
  $ 15,000,000  
Goldman Sachs & Co.
  $ 8,000,000  
Schwab Retirement Advantage Money Fund®
         
    Value of Fund’s Holdings as of
Regular Broker-Dealer   December 31, 2008
 
Banc of America Securities LLC
  $ 29,996,000  
J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.
  $ 18,984,000  
Barclays Global Investor Services
  $ 17,000,000  
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
  $ 7,992,000  
Goldman Sachs & Co.
  $ 5,000,000  
Schwab Cash ReservesTM
         
    Value of Fund’s Holdings as of
Regular Broker-Dealer   December 31, 2008
 
Banc of America Securities LLC
  $ 1,486,709,000  
J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.
  $ 979,273,000  
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.
  $ 824,026,000  
Barclays Global Investors Services
  $ 400,774,000  
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
  $ 238,766,000  
Goldman Sachs & Co.
  $ 125,000,000  
Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.
  $ 100,000,000  
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
  $ 25,000,000  

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Schwab Advisor Cash Reserves®
         
    Value of Fund’s Holdings as of
Regular Broker-Dealer   December 31, 2008
 
Banc of America Securities LLC
  $ 1,442,033,000  
J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.
  $ 773,676,000  
Barclays Global Investor Services
  $ 200,000,000  
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
  $ 184,819,000  
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
  $ 135,000,000  
Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc.
  $ 100,000,000  
Goldman Sachs & Co.
  $ 100,000,000  
Schwab Money Market FundTM
         
    Value of Fund’s Holdings as of
Regular Broker-Dealer   December 31, 2008
 
Banc of America Securities LLC
  $ 812,714,000  
J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc.
  $ 478,813,000  
Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
  $ 270,692,000  
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.
  $ 119,883,000  
Barclays Global Investor Services
  $ 107,000,000  
Goldman Sachs & Co.
  $ 65,000,000  
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
  $ 20,000,000  
DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST
Each fund is a series of The Charles Schwab Family of Funds, an open-end investment management company organized as a Massachusetts business trust on October 20, 1989.
The funds may hold special meetings of shareholders, which may cause the funds to incur non-routine expenses. These meetings may be called for purposes such as electing trustees, changing fundamental policies and amending management contracts. Shareholders are entitled to one vote for each share owned and may vote by proxy or in person. Proxy materials will be mailed to shareholders prior to any meetings, and will include a voting card and information explaining the matters to be voted upon.
The bylaws of the Trust provide that a majority of shares entitled to vote shall be a quorum for the transaction of business at a shareholders’ meeting, except that where any provision of law, or of the Declaration of Trust or of the bylaws permits or requires that (1) holders of any series shall vote as a series, then a majority of the aggregate number of shares of that series entitled to vote shall be necessary to constitute a quorum for the transaction of business by that series, or (2) holders of any class shall vote as a class, then a majority of the aggregate number of shares of that class entitled to vote shall be necessary to constitute a quorum for the transaction of business by that class. Any lesser number shall be sufficient for adjournments. Any adjourned session or sessions may be held, within a reasonable time after the date set for the original meeting, without the necessity of further notice. The Declaration of Trust specifically authorizes the Board of Trustees to terminate the Trust (or any of its investment portfolios) by notice to the shareholders without shareholder approval.

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Under Massachusetts law, shareholders of a Massachusetts business trust could, under certain circumstances, be held personally liable for the Trust’s obligations. The Declaration of Trust, however, disclaims shareholder liability for the Trust’s acts or obligations and requires that notice of such disclaimer be given in each agreement, obligation or instrument entered into or executed by the Trust or the trustees. In addition, the Declaration of Trust provides for indemnification out of the property of an investment portfolio in which a shareholder owns or owned shares for all losses and expenses of such shareholder or former shareholder if he or she is held personally liable for the obligations of the Trust solely by reason of being or having been a shareholder. Moreover, the Trust will be covered by insurance which the trustees consider adequate to cover foreseeable tort claims. Thus, the risk of a shareholder incurring financial loss on account of shareholder liability is considered remote, because it is limited to circumstances in which a disclaimer is inoperative and the Trust itself is unable to meet its obligations. There is a remote possibility that a fund could become liable for a misstatement in the prospectus or SAI about another fund.
As more fully described in the Declaration of Trust, the trustees may each year, or more frequently, distribute to the shareholders of each series accrued income less accrued expenses and any net realized capital gains less accrued expenses. Distributions of each year’s income of each series shall be distributed pro rata to shareholders in proportion to the number of shares of each series held by each of them. Distributions will be paid in cash or shares or a combination thereof as determined by the trustees. Distributions paid in shares will be paid at the net asset value per share as determined in accordance with the bylaws.
Any series of the Trust may reorganize or merge with one or more other series of the Trust or of another investment company. Any such reorganization or merger shall be pursuant to the terms and conditions specified in an agreement and plan of reorganization authorized and approved by the Trustees and entered into by the relevant series in connection therewith. In addition, such reorganization or merger may be authorized by vote of a majority of the Trustees then in office and, to the extent permitted by applicable law, without the approval of shareholders of any series.
PURCHASE, REDEMPTION AND PRICING OF SHARES AND DELIVERY OF
SHAREHOLDER DOCUMENTS
Purchasing and Redeeming Shares of the Funds
The funds are open for business each day, except for days on which the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is closed and the following federal holiday observances: Columbus Day and Veterans Day. The NYSE’s trading session is normally conducted from 9:30 a.m. Eastern time until 4:00 p.m. Eastern time, Monday through Friday, although some days, such as in advance of and following holidays, the NYSE’s trading sessions close early. The following NYSE holiday closings are currently scheduled for 2009: New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King Jr.’s Birthday (observed), Presidents’ Day, Good Friday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day. On any day that the NYSE closes early, the funds reserve the right to advance the time by which purchase, redemption and exchange orders must be received by the funds’ transfer agent.
As long as the funds or Schwab follow reasonable procedures to confirm that your telephone or Internet order is genuine, they will not be liable for any losses an investor may experience due to unauthorized or fraudulent instructions. These procedures may include requiring a form of personal identification or confirmation before acting upon any telephone or Internet order, providing written confirmation of telephone or Internet orders and tape recording all telephone orders.

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Share certificates will not be issued in order to avoid additional administrative costs, however, share ownership records are maintained by Schwab.
The Declaration of Trust provides that shares may be automatically redeemed if held by a shareholder in an amount less than the minimum required by each fund or share class. Each fund’s minimum initial and additional investments and minimum balance requirements, if any, are set forth in the prospectus. The minimums may be changed without prior notice.
Each fund has made an election with the SEC to pay in cash all redemptions requested by any shareholder of record limited in amount during any 90-day period to the lesser of $250,000 or 1% of its net assets at the beginning of such period. This election is irrevocable without the SEC’s prior approval. Redemption requests in excess of these limits may be paid, in whole or in part, in investment securities or in cash, as the Board of Trustees may deem advisable. Payment will be made wholly in cash unless the Board of Trustees believes that economic or market conditions exist that would make such payment a detriment to the best interests of a fund. If redemption proceeds are paid in investment securities, such securities will be valued as set forth in “Pricing of Shares.” A redeeming shareholder would normally incur transaction costs if he or she were to convert the securities to cash.
Exchanging Shares of the Funds
Shares of any Schwab Funds®, including any class of shares, may be sold and the shares of any other Schwab Funds or class purchased, provided the minimum investment and any other requirement of the fund or class purchased are satisfied. Without limiting this privilege, “an exchange order,” which is a simultaneous order to sell shares of one fund or class and automatically invest the proceeds in another fund or class, may not be executed between shares of Sweep Investments and shares of non-Sweep Investments. Shares of Sweep Investments may be bought and sold automatically pursuant to the terms and conditions of your Schwab account agreement. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, there are no exchange privileges for Schwab Value Advantage Money Fund® – Institutional Prime Shares® purchased directly from the fund.
The funds and Schwab reserve certain rights with regard to exchanging shares of the funds. These rights include the right to: (i) refuse any purchase or exchange order that may negatively impact the fund’s operations; (ii) refuse orders that appear to be associated with short-term trading activities; and (iii) materially modify or terminate the exchange privilege upon 60 days’ written notice to shareholders.
Pricing of Shares
Each fund values its portfolio instruments at amortized cost, which means they are valued at their acquisition cost, as adjusted for amortization of premium or discount, rather than at current market value. Calculations are made to compare the value of a fund’s investments at amortized cost with market values. Such values are required to be determined in one of two ways: securities for which market quotations are readily available are required to be valued at current market value; and securities for which market quotations are not readily available are required to be valued at fair value using procedures approved by the Board of Trustees. The funds use approved pricing services to provide values for their portfolio securities. Securities may be fair valued pursuant to procedures approved by the funds’ Board of Trustees when approved pricing services do not provide a value for a security, a furnished price appears manifestly incorrect or events occur prior to the close of the NYSE that materially affect the furnished price. The Board of Trustees regularly reviews fair value determinations made by the funds pursuant to the procedures.

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The amortized cost method of valuation seeks to maintain a stable net asset value per share (NAV) of $1.00, even where there are fluctuations in interest rates that affect the value of portfolio instruments. Accordingly, this method of valuation can in certain circumstances lead to a dilution of a shareholder’s interest.
If a deviation of 1/2 of 1% or more were to occur between the NAV calculated using market values and a fund’s $1.00 NAV calculated using amortized cost or if there were any other deviation that the Board of Trustees believed would result in a material dilution to shareholders or purchasers, the Board of Trustees would promptly consider what action, if any, should be initiated.
If a fund’s NAV calculated using market values declined, or was expected to decline, below a fund’s $1.00 NAV calculated using amortized cost, the Board of Trustees might temporarily reduce or suspend dividend payments in an effort to maintain a fund’s $1.00 NAV. As a result of such reduction or suspension of dividends or other action by the Board of Trustees, an investor would receive less income during a given period than if such a reduction or suspension had not taken place. Such action could result in investors receiving no dividend for the period during which they hold their shares and receiving, upon redemption, a price per share lower than that which they paid. On the other hand, if a fund’s NAV calculated using market values were to increase, or were anticipated to increase above a fund’s $1.00 NAV calculated using amortized cost, the Board of Trustees might supplement dividends in an effort to maintain a fund’s $1.00 NAV.
Delivery of Shareholder Documents
Typically once a year, an updated prospectus will be mailed to shareholders describing each fund’s investment strategies, risks and shareholder policies. Twice a year, financial reports will be mailed to shareholders describing each fund’s performance and investment holdings. In order to eliminate duplicate mailings of shareholder documents, each household may receive one copy of these documents, under certain conditions. This practice is commonly called “householding.” If you want to receive multiple copies, you may write or call your fund at the address or telephone number on the front of this SAI. Your instructions will be effective within 30 days of receipt by Schwab.
TAXATION
Federal Tax Information for the Funds
This discussion of federal income tax consequences is based on the Code and the regulations issued thereunder as in effect on the date of this Statement of Additional Information. New legislation, as well as administrative changes or court decisions, may significantly change the conclusions expressed herein, and may have a retroactive effect with respect to the transactions contemplated herein.
It is each fund’s policy to qualify for taxation as a “regulated investment company” (RIC) by meeting the requirements of Subchapter M of the Code. By qualifying as a RIC, each fund expects to eliminate or reduce to a nominal amount the federal income tax to which it is subject. If a fund does not qualify as a RIC under the Code, it will be subject to federal income tax on its net investment income and any net realized capital gains.
Each fund is treated as a separate entity for federal income tax purposes and is not combined with the trust’s other funds. Each fund intends to qualify as a RIC so that it will be relieved of federal income tax on that part of its income that is distributed to shareholders. In order to qualify for treatment as a RIC, a fund must distribute annually to its shareholders at least 90% of its investment company

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taxable income (generally, net investment income plus the excess, if any, of net short-term capital gain over net long-term capital losses) and also must meet several additional requirements. Among these requirements are the following: (i) at least 90% of a fund’s gross income each taxable year must be derived from dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans, and gains from the sale or other disposition of stock, securities or foreign currencies, or other income derived with respect to its business of investing in such stock or securities or currencies and net income derived from an interest in a qualified publicly traded partnership; (ii) at the close of each quarter of a fund’s taxable year, at least 50% of the value of its total assets must be represented by cash and cash items, U.S. Government securities, securities of other RICs and other securities, with such other securities limited, in respect of any one issuer, to an amount that does not exceed 5% of the value of a Fund’s assets and that does not represent more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer; and (iii) at the close of each quarter of a fund’s taxable year, not more than 25% of the value of its assets may be invested in securities (other than U.S. Government securities or the securities of other RICs) of any one issuer or of two or more issuers and which are engaged in the same, similar, or related trades or businesses if the fund owns at least 20% of the voting power of such issuers, or the securities of one or more qualified publicly traded partnerships.
The Code imposes a non-deductible excise tax on RICs that do not distribute in a calendar year (regardless of whether they otherwise have a non-calendar taxable year) an amount equal to 98% of their “ordinary income” (as defined in the Code) for the calendar year plus 98% of their net capital gain for the one-year period ending on October 31 of such calendar year, plus any undistributed amounts from prior years. The non-deductible excise tax is equal to 4% of the deficiency. For the foregoing purposes, a fund is treated as having distributed any amount on which it is subject to income tax for any taxable year ending in such calendar year. A fund may in certain circumstances be required to liquidate fund investments in order to make sufficient distributions to avoid federal excise tax liability at a time when the investment adviser might not otherwise have chosen to do so, and liquidation of investments in such circumstances may affect the ability of a fund to satisfy the requirements for qualification as a RIC.
A fund’s transactions in futures contracts, forward contracts, foreign currency exchange transactions, options and certain other investment and hedging activities may be restricted by the Code and are subject to special tax rules. In a given case, these rules may accelerate income to a fund, defer its losses, cause adjustments in the holding periods of a fund’s assets, convert short-term capital losses into long-term capital losses or otherwise affect the character of a fund’s income. These rules could therefore affect the amount, timing and character of distributions to shareholders. Each fund will endeavor to make any available elections pertaining to these transactions in a manner believed to be in the best interest of a fund and its shareholders.
With respect to investments in zero coupon securities which are sold at original issue discount and thus do not make periodic cash interest payments, a fund will be required to include as part of its current income the imputed interest on such obligations even though the fund has not received any interest payments on such obligations during that period. Because each fund distributes all of its net investment income to its shareholders, a fund may have to sell fund securities to distribute such imputed income which may occur at a time when the adviser would not have chosen to sell such securities and which may result in taxable gain or loss.
Federal Income Tax Information for Shareholders
The discussion of federal income taxation presented below supplements the discussion in the funds’ prospectuses and only summarizes some of the important federal tax considerations generally affecting shareholders of the funds. Accordingly, prospective investors (particularly those not

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residing or domiciled in the United States) should consult their own tax advisors regarding the consequences of investing in a fund.
On each business day that the NAV of a fund is determined, such fund’s net investment income will be declared as of the close of the fund (normally 4:00 p.m. Eastern time) as a daily dividend to shareholders of record. Your daily dividend is calculated each business day by applying the daily dividend rate by the number of shares owned, and is rounded to the nearest penny. The daily dividend is accrued each business day, and the sum of the daily dividends is paid monthly. For each fund, dividends will normally be reinvested monthly in shares of the fund at the NAV on the 15th day of each month, if a business day, otherwise on the next business day, except in December when dividends are reinvested on the last business day of December. If cash payment is requested, checks will normally be mailed on the business day following the reinvestment date. Each fund will pay shareholders, who redeem all of their shares, all dividends accrued to the time of the redemption within 7 days.
Each fund calculates its dividends based on its daily net investment income. For this purpose, the net investment income of a fund generally consists of: (1) accrued interest income, plus or minus amortized discount or premium, minus (2) accrued expenses allocated to that fund. If a fund realizes any capital gains, they will be distributed at least once during the year as determined by the Board of Trustees. Any realized capital losses, to the extent not offset by realized capital gains, will be carried forward.
Any dividends declared by a fund in October, November or December and paid the following January are treated, for tax purposes, as if they were received by shareholders on December 31 of the year in which they were declared. A fund may adjust its schedule for the reinvestment of distributions for the month of December to assist in complying with the reporting and minimum distribution requirements of the Code.
The funds do not expect to realize any long-term capital gains. However, long-term capital gains distributions are taxable as long-term capital gains, regardless of how long you have held your shares. If you receive a long-term capital gains distribution with respect to fund shares held for six months or less, any loss on the sale or exchange of those shares shall, to the extent of the long-term capital gains distribution, be treated as a long-term capital loss. Distributions by a fund also may be subject to state, local and foreign taxes, and its treatment under applicable tax laws may differ from the federal income tax treatment. Note that most states grant tax-exempt status to distributions paid to shareholders from earnings received on direct investment on U.S. government securities, subject to certain restrictions. For example, some states do not extend this exemption to distributions paid to shareholders from earning on certain U.S. government agencies, such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
A fund may engage in techniques that may alter the timing and character of its income. A fund may be restricted in its use of these techniques by rules relating to its qualification as a regulated investment company.
Because the taxable portion of a fund’s investment income consists primarily of interest, none of its dividends are expected to qualify under the Code for the dividends received deduction for corporations or as qualified dividend income eligible for reduced tax rates.
The redemption or exchange of the shares of a fund may result in capital gain or loss to the shareholders. Generally, if a shareholder holds the shares as a capital asset, any gain or loss will be long-term gain or loss if the shares have been held for more than one year. Capital gains of corporate shareholders are subject to regular corporate tax rates. For non-corporate taxpayers, gain on the sales

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of shares held for more than 12 months will generally be taxed at the rate applicable to long-term capital gains, while gain on the sale of shares held for one year or less will generally be taxed at ordinary income rates.
Each fund will be required in certain cases to withhold at the applicable withholding rate and remit to the U.S. Treasury, the withheld amount of taxable dividends paid to any shareholder who (1) fails to provide a correct taxpayer identification number certified under penalty of perjury; (2) is subject to withholding by the Internal Revenue Service for failure to properly report all payments of interest or dividends; (3) fails to provide a certified statement that he or she is not subject to “backup withholding;” or (4) fails to provide a certified statement that he or she is a U.S. person (including a U.S. resident alien). Backup withholding is not an additional tax and any amounts withheld may be credited against the shareholder’s ultimate U.S. tax liability.
Foreign shareholders (i.e., nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations, partnerships, trusts and estates) are generally subject to U.S. withholding tax at the rate of 30% (or a lower tax treaty rate) on distributions derived from net investment income and short-term capital gains; provided, however, that dividends with respect to a fund’s taxable year beginning after December 31, 2004 and not beginning after December 31, 2009 are not subject to U.S. withholding tax if, subject to certain exceptions, such dividends qualify as interest-related dividends or as short-term capital gain dividends. Distributions to foreign shareholders of such short-term capital gain dividends, of long-term capital gains and any gains from the sale or other disposition of shares of the funds generally are not subject to U.S. taxation, unless the recipient is an individual who either (1) meets the Code’s definition of “resident alien” or (2) who is physically present in the U.S. for 183 days or more per year as determined under certain IRS rules. Different tax consequences may result if the foreign shareholder is engaged in a trade or business within the United States. In addition, the tax consequences to a foreign shareholder entitled to claim the benefits of a tax treaty may be different than those described above.

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APPENDIX A – RATINGS OF INVESTMENT SECURITIES
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Moody’s Investors Service
Prime-1 is the highest commercial paper rating assigned by Moody’s. Issuers (or related supporting institutions) of commercial paper with this rating are considered to have a superior ability to repay short-term promissory obligations. Issuers (or related supporting institutions) of securities rated Prime-2 are viewed as having a strong capacity to repay short-term promissory obligations. This capacity will normally be evidenced by many of the characteristics of issuers whose commercial paper is rated Prime-1 but to a lesser degree.
Standard & Poor’s Corporation
An S&P A-1 commercial paper rating indicates a strong degree of safety regarding timely payment of principal and interest. Issues determined to possess overwhelming safety characteristics are denoted A-1+. Capacity for timely payment on commercial paper rated A-2 is satisfactory, but the relative degree of safety is not as high as for issues designated A-1.
Fitch, Inc.
F1+ is the highest category, and indicates the strongest degree of assurance for timely payment. Issues rated F1 reflect an assurance of timely payment only slightly less than issues rated F1+. Issues assigned an F2 rating have a satisfactory degree of assurance for timely payment, but the margin of safety is not as great as for issues in the first two rating categories.
SHORT-TERM NOTES AND VARIABLE RATE DEMAND OBLIGATIONS
Moody’s Investors Service
Short-term notes/variable rate demand obligations bearing the designations MIG-1/VMIG-1 are considered to be of the best quality, enjoying strong protection from established cash flows, superior liquidity support or demonstrated broad-based access to the market for refinancing. Obligations rated MIG-2/VMIG-2 are of high quality and enjoy ample margins of protection although not as large as those of the top rated securities.
Standard & Poor’s Corporation
An S&P SP-1 rating indicates that the subject securities’ issuer has a very strong capacity to pay principal and interest. Issues determined to possess very strong safety characteristics are given a plus (+) designation. S&P’s determination that an issuer has a strong capacity to pay principal and interest is denoted by an SP-2 rating.

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APPENDIX B — DESCRIPTION OF PROXY VOTING POLICY AND PROCEDURES
Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc.
The Charles Schwab Family of Funds
Schwab Investments
Schwab Capital Trust
Schwab Annuity Portfolios
Laudus Trust
Laudus Institutional Trust
Schwab Strategic Trust
Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures
As of February 2010
Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. (“CSIM”), as an investment adviser, is generally responsible for voting proxies with respect to the securities held in accounts of investment companies and other clients for which it provides discretionary investment management services. CSIM’s Proxy Committee exercises and documents CSIM’s responsibility with regard to voting of client proxies (the “Proxy Committee”). The Proxy Committee is composed of representatives of CSIM’s Fund Administration, Legal, and Portfolio Management Departments, and chaired by CSIM’s Deputy Chief Investment Officer. The Proxy Committee reviews and, as necessary, may amend periodically these Procedures to address new or revised proxy voting policies or procedures. The policies stated in these Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures (the “CSIM Proxy Procedures”) pertain to all of CSIM’s clients.
The Boards of Trustees (the “Trustees”) of The Charles Schwab Family of Funds, Schwab Investments, Schwab Capital Trust, and Schwab Annuity Portfolios ( “Schwab Funds”) have delegated the responsibility for voting proxies to CSIM through their respective Investment Advisory and Administration Agreements. In addition, the Boards of Trustees (the “Trustees”) of Laudus Trust and Laudus Institutional Trust (“Laudus Funds”) and the Schwab Strategic Trust (“Schwab ETFs”; collectively, the Schwab Funds, the Laudus Funds and the Schwab ETFs are the “Funds”) have delegated the responsibility for voting proxies to CSIM through their respective Investment Advisory and Administration Agreements. The Trustees have adopted these Proxy Procedures with respect to proxies voted on behalf of the various Schwab Funds, Laudus Funds, and Schwab ETFs portfolios. CSIM will present amendments to the Trustees for approval. However, there may be circumstances where the Proxy Committee deems it advisable to amend the Proxy Procedures between regular Schwab Funds, Laudus Funds and Schwab ETFs Board meetings. In such cases, the Trustees will be asked to ratify any changes at the next regular meeting of the Board.
To assist CSIM in its responsibility for voting proxies and the overall proxy voting process, CSIM has retained Glass Lewis & Co. (“Glass Lewis”) as an expert in the proxy voting and corporate governance area. The services provided by Glass Lewis include in-depth research,

 


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global issuer analysis, and voting recommendations as well as vote execution, reporting and record keeping.
Proxy Voting Policy
For investment companies and other clients for which CSIM exercises its responsibility for voting proxies, it is CSIM’s policy to vote proxies in the manner that CSIM and the Proxy Committee determine will maximize the economic benefit to CSIM’s clients. In furtherance of this policy, the Proxy Committee has received and reviewed Glass Lewis’ written proxy voting policies and procedures (“Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures”) and has determined that Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures, with the exceptions noted below, are consistent with the CSIM Proxy Procedures and CSIM’s fiduciary duty with respect to its clients. The Proxy Committee will review any material amendments to Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures to determine whether such procedures continue to be consistent with the CSIM Proxy Voting Procedures, and CSIM’s fiduciary duty with respect to its clients.
Except under each of the circumstances described below, the Proxy Committee will delegate to Glass Lewis responsibility for voting proxies, including timely submission of votes, on behalf of CSIM’s clients in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures.
For proxy issues, that are determined by the Proxy Committee or the applicable portfolio manager or other relevant portfolio management staff to raise significant concerns with respect to the accounts of CSIM clients, the Proxy Committee will review the analysis and recommendation of Glass Lewis. Examples of factors that could cause a matter to raise significant concerns include, but are not limited to: issues whose outcome has the potential to materially affect the company’s industry, or regional or national economy, and matters which involve broad public policy developments which may similarly materially affect the environment in which the company operates. The Proxy Committee also will solicit input from the assigned portfolio manager and other relevant portfolio management staff for the particular portfolio security. After evaluating all such recommendations, the Proxy Committee will decide how to vote the shares and will instruct Glass Lewis to vote consistent with its decision. The Proxy Committee has the ultimate responsibility for making the determination of how to vote the shares in order to maximize the value of that particular holding.
With respect to proxies of an affiliated mutual fund, the Proxy Committee will vote such proxies in the same proportion as the vote of all other shareholders of the fund (i.e., “echo vote”), unless otherwise required by law. When required by law, the Proxy Committee will also “echo vote” proxies of an unaffiliated mutual fund. For example, certain exemptive orders issued to the Schwab Funds by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Section 12(d)(1)(F) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, require the Schwab Funds, under certain circumstances, to “echo vote” proxies of registered investment companies that serve as underlying investments of the Schwab Funds. When not required to “echo vote,” the Proxy Committee will delegate to Glass Lewis responsibility for voting proxies of an unaffiliated mutual fund in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures.

 


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In addition, with respect to holdings of The Charles Schwab Corporation (“CSC”) (ticker symbol: SCHW), the Proxy Committee will vote such proxies in the same proportion as the vote of all other shareholders of CSC (i.e., “echo vote”), unless otherwise required by law.
Exceptions from Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures: The Proxy Committee has reviewed the particular policies set forth in Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures and has determined that the implementation of the following custom policies is consistent with CSIM’s fiduciary duty with respect to its clients:
    Independent Chairman: With respect to shareholder proposals requiring that a company chairman’s position be filled by an independent director, the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote against such proposals unless the company does not meet the applicable minimum total shareholder return threshold, as calculated below. In cases where a company fails to meet the threshold, the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote the shareholder proposals requiring that the chairman’s position be filled by an independent director in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures. Additionally, with respect to the election of a director who serves as the governance committee chair (or, in the absence of a governance committee, the chair of the nominating committee), the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote for the director in cases where the company chairman’s position is not filled by an independent director and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.
 
    Classified Boards: With respect to shareholder proposals declassifying a staggered board in favor of the annual election of directors, the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote against such proposals unless the company does not meet the applicable minimum total shareholder return threshold, as calculated below. In cases where a company fails to meet the threshold, the Proxy Committee has instructed Glass Lewis to vote the shareholder proposals declassifying a staggered board in favor of the annual election of directors in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures.
Glass Lewis uses a three-year total return performance methodology to calculate the applicable minimum total shareholder return threshold. For Russell 3000 Index constituents, if a company’s total annual shareholder return is in the bottom 25% of Russell 3000 constituent companies’ total annual shareholder returns for three consecutive years, the company will be deemed not to have met the threshold. For companies not in the Russell 3000 Index, the universe of companies used for the minimum total shareholder return threshold calculation is all Glass Lewis covered companies outside of the Russell 3000 Index.
There may be circumstances in which Glass Lewis does not provide an analysis or recommendation for voting a security’s proxy. In that event, and when the criteria set forth below are met, two members of the Proxy Committee, including at least one representative from equity Portfolio Management, may decide how to vote such proxy in order to maximize the value of that particular holding. The following criteria must be met: (1) For each Fund that holds the security in its portfolio, the value of the security must represent less than one tenth of one cent in the Fund’s NAV, and (2) the security’s value must equal less than $50,000 in the aggregate

 


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across all of the Funds and separate accounts that hold this security. Any voting decision made under these circumstances will be reported to the Proxy Committee at its next scheduled meeting. If the criteria are not met, the Proxy Committee may meet to decide how to vote such proxy.
Conflicts of Interest. Except as described above for proxies of mutual funds, CSC and exceptions to Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures, where proxy issues present material conflicts of interest between CSIM, and/or any of its affiliates, and CSIM’s clients, CSIM will delegate to Glass Lewis responsibility for voting such proxies in accordance with Glass Lewis’ Proxy Procedures. The CSIM Legal Department is responsible for developing procedures to identify material conflicts of interest.
Voting Foreign Proxies. CSIM has arrangements with Glass Lewis for voting proxies. However, voting proxies with respect to shares of foreign securities may involve significantly greater effort and corresponding cost than voting proxies with respect to domestic securities, due to the variety of regulatory schemes and corporate practices in foreign countries with respect to proxy voting. Problems voting foreign proxies may include the following:
o   proxy statements and ballots written in a foreign language;
o   untimely and/or inadequate notice of shareholder meetings;
o   restrictions of foreigner’s ability to exercise votes;
o   requirements to vote proxies in person;
o   requirements to provide local agents with power of attorney to facilitate CSIM’s voting instructions.
In consideration of the foregoing issues, Glass Lewis uses its best-efforts to vote foreign proxies. As part of its ongoing oversight, the Proxy Committee will monitor the voting of foreign proxies to determine whether all reasonable steps are taken to vote foreign proxies. If the Proxy Committee determines that the cost associated with the attempt to vote outweighs the potential benefits clients may derive from voting, the Proxy Committee may decide not to attempt to vote. In addition, certain foreign countries impose restrictions on the sale of securities for a period of time in proximity to the shareholder meeting. To avoid these trading restrictions, the Proxy Committee instructs Glass Lewis not to vote such foreign proxies.
Securities Lending Programs. Certain of the Funds enter into securities lending arrangements with lending agents to generate additional revenue for their portfolios. In securities lending arrangements, any voting rights that accompany the loaned securities generally pass to the borrower of the securities, but the lender retains the right to recall a security and may then exercise the security’s voting rights. In order to vote the proxies of securities out on loan, the securities must be recalled prior to the established record date. CSIM will use its best efforts to recall a Fund’s securities on loan and vote such securities’ proxies if (a) the proxy relates to a special meeting of shareholders of the issuer (as opposed to the issuer’s annual meeting of shareholders), or (b) the Fund owns more than 5% of the outstanding shares of the issuer. Further, it is CSIM’s policy to use its best efforts to recall securities on loan and vote such securities’ proxies if CSIM determines that the proxies involve a material event affecting the loaned securities. CSIM may utilize third-party service providers to assist it in identifying and

 


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evaluating whether an event is material. CSIM may also recall securities on loan and vote such securities’ proxies in its discretion.
Sub-Advisory Relationships. For investment companies or other clients that CSIM has delegated day-to-day investment management responsibilities to an investment adviser, CSIM may delegate its responsibility to vote proxies with respect to such investment companies’ or other clients’ securities. Each Sub-adviser to whom proxy voting responsibility has been delegated will be required to review all proxy solicitation material and to exercise the voting rights associated with the securities it has been allocated in the best interest of each investment company and its shareholders, or other client. Prior to delegating the proxy voting responsibility, CSIM will review each sub-adviser’s proxy voting policy to ensure that each Sub-adviser’s proxy voting policy is generally consistent with the maximization of economic benefits to the investment company or other client.
Reporting and Record Retention
CSIM will maintain, or cause Glass Lewis to maintain, records that identify the manner in which proxies have been voted (or not voted) on behalf of CSIM clients. CSIM will comply with all applicable rules and regulations regarding disclosure of its or its clients proxy voting records and procedures.
CSIM will retain all proxy voting materials and supporting documentation as required under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the rules and regulations thereunder.

 


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I. A Board of Directors That
Serves the Interests of Shareholders
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS
The purpose of Glass Lewis’ proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that boards working to protect and enhance the best interests of shareholders are independent, have directors with diverse backgrounds, have a record of positive performance, and have members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience.
Independence
The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director’s service track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.
We look at each director nominee to examine the director’s relationships with the company, the company’s executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director’s decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders’ interests above the director’s or the related party’s interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board and, in particular, the audit committee.
Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:
Independent Director – An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years1 before the inquiry are usually considered “current” for purposes of this test.
In our view, a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of his/her resignation or departure from the interim management position. Glass Lewis applies a
 
1   NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look-back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.

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three-year look back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look back.
Affiliated Director – An affiliated director has a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.2 This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the company.3 In addition, we view a director who owns or controls 20% or more of the company’s voting stock as an affiliate.
We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.
Inside Director – An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a chairman of the board who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director’s own best interests. Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.
Definition of “Material”: A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds: (i) $50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services; or (ii) $120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm where the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services. This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;4 and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director’s firm; or (iii) 1% of either company’s consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).
Definition of “Familial”: Familial relationships include a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person’s home. A director is an affiliate if the director has a family member who is employed by the company and who receives compensation of $120,000 or more per year or the compensation is not disclosed.
Definition of “Company”: A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.
 
2   If a company classifies one of its non-employee directors as non-independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an affiliate.
 
3   We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of “material.”
 
4   We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company’s size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director’s role at the charity.

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Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Board Independence
Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders’ interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically5 recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.6
In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chairman’s presence.
In addition, we scrutinize avowedly “independent” chairmen and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent or the company should not tout them as such.
Committee Independence
We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company’s audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.7 We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.
Independent Chairman
Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chairman creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chairman position. An executive manages the business according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals the board set. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chairman presumably will have a significant influence over the board.
It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/ chairman controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.
A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board’s approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO’s vision for accomplishing the board’s objectives. Failure to achieve the board’s objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.
 
5   With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence.
 
6   Where a director serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an investment firm with greater than 20% ownership, we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated but will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.
 
7   We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is comprised of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.

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Likewise, an independent chairman can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.
Further, it is the board’s responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.
We recognize that empirical evidence regarding the separation of these two roles remains inconclusive. However, Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chairman is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chairman fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior management.
We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically encourage our clients to support separating the roles of chairman and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.
Performance
The most crucial test of a board’s commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.
Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Performance
We disfavor directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:
1. A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of the board meetings or 75% of the total of applicable committee meetings and board meetings.8
2. A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late filing was the director’s fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).
3. A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements.
4. A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed).
5. All directors who served on the board if, for the last three years, the company’s performance has been in the bottom quartile of the sector and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.
 
8   However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.

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Audit Committees and Performance
Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because “[v]ibrant and stable capital markets depend on, among other things, reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. The vital oversight role audit committees play in the process of producing financial information has never been more important.”9
When assessing an audit committee’s performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:
A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting – the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors – form a ‘three legged stool’ that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be ‘first among equals’ in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.
Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee
For an audit committee to function effectively on investors’ behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said “members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters.”10
We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller or similar experience. While we will not necessarily vote against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to vote against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.
Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.
 
9   Audit Committee Effectiveness – What Works Best.” PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation. 2005.
 
10   Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.

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When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and would vote in favor of its members, but we would recommend voting against the following members under the following circumstances:11
1. All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.
2. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee’s financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies.
3. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least 4 times during the year.
4. The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members.
5. Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member’s attendance at all board and committee meetings.
6. All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor.
7. The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor).
8. All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are now prohibited by the PCAOB.
9. All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions.
10. All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
11. The audit committee chair12 if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee.
 
11   Where the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against the members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern with regard to the committee chair.
 
12   In all cases, if the chair of the committee is not specified, we recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest.

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12. All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A13 letter has been issued.
13. All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the company.
14. All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:
    The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders;
 
    The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation;
 
    The restatement involves revenue recognition;
 
    The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or
 
     The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities.
15. All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last 5 quarters.
16. All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
17. All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.
18. All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed.
19. All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor’s liability to the company for damages.14
20. All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company’s last annual meeting, and when, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected, or, when the company has an ongoing material weakness from a prior year that has not yet been corrected.
We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, we take into consideration, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee, the transparency of the audit committee report.
Compensation Committee Performance
 
13   Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.
 
14   The Council of Institutional Investors. “Corporate Governance Policies,” p. 4, April 5, 2006; and “Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to the AICPA,” November 8, 2006.

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Compensation committees have the final say in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business’s long-term shareholders returns.
Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.
Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. Lax controls can and have contributed to conflicting information being obtained, for example through the use of nonobjective consultants. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring-loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.
Central to understanding the actions of a compensation committee is a careful review of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) report included in each company’s proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as management-submitted advisory compensation vote proposals, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company’s top executives.
In our evaluation of the CD&A, we examine, among other factors, the following:
1. The extent to which the company uses appropriate performance goals and metrics in determining overall compensation as an indication that pay is tied to performance.
2. How clearly the company discloses performance metrics and goals so that shareholders may make an independent determination that goals were met.
3. The extent to which the performance metrics, targets and goals are implemented to enhance company performance and encourage prudent risk-taking.
4. The selected peer group(s) so that shareholders can make a comparison of pay and performance across the appropriate peer group.
5. The extent to which the company benchmarks compensation levels at a specific percentile of its peer group along with the rationale for selecting such a benchmark.
6. The amount of discretion granted management or the compensation committee to deviate from defined performance metrics and goals in making awards, as well as the appropriateness of the use of such discretion.

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We provide an overall evaluation of the quality and content of a company’s executive compensation policies and procedures as disclosed in a CD&A as either good, fair or poor.
We evaluate compensation committee members on the basis of their performance while serving on the compensation committee in question, not for actions taken solely by prior committee members who are not currently serving on the committee. At companies that provide shareholders with non-binding advisory votes on executive compensation (“Say-on-Pay”), we will use the Say-on-Pay proposal as the initial, primary means to express dissatisfaction with the company’s compensation polices and practices rather than recommending voting against members of the compensation committee (except in the most egregious cases).
When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will recommend voting against for the following:15
1. All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served at the time of poor pay-for-performance (e.g., a company receives an F grade in our pay- for-performance analysis) when shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation.16
2. Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that received F grades in our pay-for-performance model and who is also suspect at the company in question.
3. The compensation committee chair if the company received two D grades in consecutive years in our pay-for-performance analysis, and if during the past year the Company performed the same as or worse than its peers.17
4. All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements.
5. All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained.
6. All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits were allowed.
 
15   Where the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair and the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern with regard to the committee chair.
 
16   Where there are multiple CEOs in one year, we will consider not recommending against the compensation committee but will defer judgment on compensation policies and practices until the next year or a full year after arrival of the new CEO. In addition, if a company provides shareholders with a Say-on-Pay proposal and receives an F grade in our pay-for- performance model, we will recommend that shareholders only vote against the Say-on-Pay proposal rather than the members of the compensation committee, unless the company exhibits egregious practices. However, if the company receives successive F grades, we will then recommend against the members of the compensation committee in addition to recommending voting against the Say-on-Pay proposal.
 
17   In cases where the company received two D grades in consecutive years, but during the past year the company performed better than its peers or improved from a D to an F grade year over year, we refrain from recommending to vote against the compensation chair. In addition, if a company provides shareholders with a Say-on-Pay proposal in this instance, we will consider voting against the advisory vote rather than the compensation committee chair unless the company exhibits unquestionably egregious practices.

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7. The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year, but should have (e.g., because executive compensation was restructured or a new executive was hired).
8. All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options within the past two years and we would not have supported the repricing (e.g., officers and directors were allowed to participate).
9. All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated or when fully vested options are granted.
10. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in option backdating.
11. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information.
12. All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud.
13. The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets.
14. All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.18
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance
The nominating and governance committee, as an agency for the shareholders, is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the board is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote.
Regarding the nominating and or governance committee, we will recommend voting against the following:19
1. All members of the governance committee20 during whose tenure the board failed to implement a shareholder proposal with a direct and substantial impact on shareholders and
 
18   In all other instances (i.e. a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.
 
19   Where we would recommend to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern regarding the committee chair.
 
20   If the board does not have a governance committee (or a committee that serves such a purpose), we recommend voting against the entire board on this basis.

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their rights — i.e., where the proposal received enough shareholder votes (at least a majority) to allow the board to implement or begin to implement that proposal.21 Examples of these types of shareholder proposals are majority vote to elect directors and to declassify the board.
2. The governance committee chair,22 when the chairman is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.23 We note that each of the Business Roundtable, The Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent.
3. In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are less than five or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.
4. The governance committee chair, when the committee fails to meet at all during the year.
5. The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be “inadequate” related party transaction disclosure (i.e. the nature of such transactions and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing an average shareholder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock-exchange listing requirements).
Regarding the nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the following:24
1. All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.
2. The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year, but should have (i.e., because new directors were nominated or appointed since the time of the last annual meeting).
3. In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair25 when the chairman is not independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.26
 
21   Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.
 
22   If the committee chair is not specified, we recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest. If the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, we will recommend voting against the longest- serving board member serving on the committee.
 
23   We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against as if there were no lead or presiding director.
 
24   Where we would recommend is to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will simply express our concern regarding the committee chair.
 
25   If the committee chair is not specified, we will recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest. If the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, we will recommend voting against the longest-serving board member on the committee.
 
26   In the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the board on this basis.

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4. The nominating committee chair, when there are less than five or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.27
5. The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.28
Board-level Risk Management Oversight
Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firm have significant hedging or trading strategies, including financial and non-financial derivatives, those firms should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.
When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company’s board-level risk committee contributed to the loss through poor oversight, we would recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise)29, we will consider recommending to vote against the chairman of the board on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chairman/CEO except in egregious cases.
Experience
We find that a director’s past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred appearing at companies that follow these same patterns. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of every officer and director serving at 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.
Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Director Experience
We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight,
 
27   In the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the board on this basis.
 
28   Considering that shareholder discontent clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the validity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern, followup on such matters, and only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 25% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.
 
29   A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, or another board committee, usually the audit committee but occasionally the finance committee, depending on a given company’s board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.

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overcompensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders.30
Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.
Other Considerations
In addition to the three key characteristics – independence, performance, experience – that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues in making voting recommendations.
Conflicts of Interest
We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of affiliated or inside directors:
1. A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Because of the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it.
2. A director who is on an excessive number of boards: We will typically recommend voting against a director who serves as an executive officer of any public company while serving on more than two other public company boards and any other director who serves on more than six public company boards typically receives an against recommendation from Glass Lewis. Academic literature suggests that one board takes up approximately 200 hours per year of each member’s time. We believe this limits the number of boards on which directors can effectively serve, especially executives at other companies.31 Further, we note a recent study has shown that the average number of outside board seats held by CEOs of S&P 500 companies is 0.7, down from 0.9 in 2004 and 1.6 in 1999.32
3. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, providing consulting or other material professional services to the company: These services may include legal, consulting, or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company’s decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company’s directors.
4. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting
 
30   We typically apply a three-year look-back to such issues and also research to see whether the responsible directors have been up for election since the time of the failure, and if so, we take into account the percentage of support they received from shareholders.
 
31   Our guidelines are similar to the standards set forth by the NACD in its “Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism,” 2001 Edition, pp. 14-15 (also cited approvingly by the Conference Board in its “Corporate Governance Best Practices: A Blueprint for the Post-Enron Era,” 2002, p. 17), which suggested that CEOs should not serve on more than 2 additional boards, persons with full-time work should not serve on more than 4 additional boards, and others should not serve on more than six boards.
 
32   Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2009, p. 19

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to more than $50,000: Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests.
5. Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other’s boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.33
6. All board members who served at a time when a poison pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.
Size of the Board of Directors
While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimum board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of “too many cooks in the kitchen” and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.
To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chairman of the nominating committee at a board with fewer than five directors. With boards consisting of more than 20 directors, we typically recommend voting against all members of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee).34
Controlled Companies
Controlled companies present an exception to our independence recommendations. The board’s function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual or entity owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.
Independence Exceptions
The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:
1. We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.
2. The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors.
 
33   There is no look-back period for this situation. This only applies to public companies and we only footnote it for the non-insider.
 
34   The Conference Board, at p. 23 in its report “Corporate Governance Best Practices, Id.,” quotes one of its roundtable participants as stating, “[w]hen you’ve got a 20 or 30 person corporate board, it’s one way of assuring that nothing is ever going to happen that the CEO doesn’t want to happen.”

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a. We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company’s shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant.
b. Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choice for approving and monitoring senior executives’ pay, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. As such, we believe that having affiliated directors on a controlled company’s compensation committee is acceptable. However, given that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee.
3. Controlled companies do not need an independent chairman or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board – such as chairman or presiding director – can best carry out the board’s duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests.
4. Where an individual or entity owns more than 50% of a company’s voting power but the company is not a “controlled” company as defined by relevant listing standards, we apply a lower independence requirement of a majority of the board but keep all other standards in place. Similarly, where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company’s voting power, but the company is not “controlled” and there is not a “majority” owner, we will allow for proportional representation on the board based on the individual or entity’s percentage of ownership.
Size of the Board of Directors
We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.
Audit Committee Independence
    We believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company’s controlled status, the interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company’s financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.
Mutual Fund Boards
Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund’s adviser are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.
The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:
1. Size of the board of directors: The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.

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2. The CFO on the board: Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund’s registered investment adviser should serve on the board.
3. Independence of the audit committee: The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors.
4. Audit committee financial expert: At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert.
The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:
1. Independence of the board: We believe that three-fourths of an investment company’s board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into “proposed rule” status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.
2. When the auditor is not up for ratification: We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification because, due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.
3. Non-independent chairman: The SEC has proposed that the chairman of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund’s chairman and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chairman of an investment company’s nominating committee as well as the chairman of the board if the chairman and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chairman and we agree with them that “an independent board chairman would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of fund shareholders than would a chairman who is an executive of the adviser.” (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/ s70304-179.pdf)
DECLASSIFIED BOARDS
Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.
Empirical studies have shown: (i) companies with staggered boards reduce a firm’s value; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.
In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Research shows that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction. A study by a group of Harvard Law professors concluded that companies whose staggered boards prevented a takeover “reduced shareholder returns for targets ... on the order of eight to ten

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percent in the nine months after a hostile bid was announced.”35 When a staggered board negotiates a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premiums occurs.36
During a March 2004 Glass Lewis Proxy Talk on staggered boards, the proponents of staggered boards could not identify research showing that staggered boards increase shareholder value. The opponents of such a structure marshaled significant support for the proposition that, holding everything else constant, classified boards reduce shareholder value. Lucian Bebchuk, a Harvard Law professor who studies corporate governance issues, concluded that charter-based staggered boards “reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization” and that “staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value.”37
Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2008 only 40% of U.S. companies had a classified board structure, down from approximately 60% of companies in 2004. Clearly, more shareholders have supported the repeal of classified boards. Resolutions relating to the repeal of staggered boards garnered on average over 70% support among shareholders in 2008, whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.
Given the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company’s value and the increasing shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.
MANDATORY DIRECTOR RETIREMENT PROVISIONS
Director Term and Age Limits
Glass Lewis believes that director age and term limits typically are not in shareholders’ best interests. Too often age and term limits are used by boards as a crutch to remove board members who have served for an extended period of time. When used in that fashion, they are indicative of a board that has a difficult time making “tough decisions.”
Academic literature suggests that there is no evidence of a correlation between either length of tenure or age and director performance. On occasion, term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and to enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change when boards are unwilling to do so.
While we understand age limits can be a way to force change where boards are unwilling to make changes on their own, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. Further, age limits unfairly imply that older (or, in rare cases, younger) directors cannot contribute to company oversight. A director’s experience can be valuable to shareholders because directors navigate complex and critical issues when serving on a board.
In our view, a director’s experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. However, we support periodic director rotation to ensure a fresh perspective in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. We believe the board should implement such rotation instead of relying on arbitrary limits. When necessary, shareholders can address the issue of director rotation through director elections.
 
35   Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates, Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,” December 2002, page 1.
 
36   Id. at 2 (“Examining a sample of seventy-three negotiated transactions from 2000 to 2002, we find no systematic benefits in terms of higher premia to boards that have [staggered structures].”).
 
37   Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards” (2004).

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We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board’s approach to corporate governance and the board’s stewardship of company performance rather than imposing inflexible rules that don’t necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.
However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. If the board waives its term/age limits, Glass Lewis will consider recommending shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committees, unless the rule was waived with sufficient explanation, such as consummation of a corporate transaction like a merger.
REQUIRING TWO OR MORE NOMINEES PER BOARD SEAT
In an attempt to address lack of access to the ballot, shareholders sometimes propose that the board give shareholders a choice of directors for each open board seat in every election. However, we feel that policies requiring a selection of multiple nominees for each board seat would discourage prospective directors from accepting nominations. A prospective director could not be confident either that he or she is the board’s clear choice or that he or she would be elected. Therefore, Glass Lewis generally will vote against such proposals.
SHAREHOLDER ACCESS
The SEC proposal: Shareholders have continuously sought a way to have a voice in director elections in recent years. Most of these efforts have centered on regulatory change at the SEC over the past several years. In July of 2007, the SEC responded by issuing two proposed rules, one to allow certain shareholders to submit director nominations for inclusion on management’s proxy and the second to disallow shareholder access proposals from being submitted by shareholders. The former rule did not pass but the latter rule was subsequently approved by the SEC in November of 2007, allowing companies to exclude shareholder access proposals from their proxy statements, in effect reverting to the SEC position prior to AFSCME’s challenge, ultimately upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, of the SEC’s decision to allow AIG to exclude the group’s access proposal.
During this window of opportunity prior to the SEC’s final rulemaking in November, three companies faced access proposals in 2007. The proposals received considerable votes in favor, garnering nearly 40% support at Hewlett Packard, 42% support at UnitedHealth and passing with 51% of the votes at Cryo-Cell International.
More recently, in June 2009 the SEC released proposed Rule 14a-11, which, if adopted would require most companies to include shareholder nominees for directors in company proxy materials under certain circumstances—namely if the shareholder(s) seeking to nominate directors beneficially owned shares in the company for at least one year, as well as met an ownership threshold based on a sliding scale depending on the company’s size. Since the release of proposed Rule 14a-11, the SEC has reviewed over 500 public comment letters regarding the rule and has therefore deferred voting on the proposed rule until early 2010. As a result, it is unlikely shareholders will have the opportunity to vote on access proposals in 2010.
MAJORITY VOTE FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS
In stark contrast to the failure of shareholder access to gain acceptance, majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the de facto standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.

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While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.
During 2009 Glass Lewis tracked 46 proposals to require a majority vote to elect directors at annual meetings in the U.S., up from 24 such proposals in 2008, but down from 54 proposals during 2007 and 147 proposals during 2006. The general decline in the number of proposals being submitted was a result of many companies adopting some form of majority voting, including well over 2/3 of companies in the S&P 500 index. During 2009 these proposals received on average 59% shareholder support (based on for and against votes), up from 54% in 2008.
The plurality vote standard
Today, most US companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including himself, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee “wins” the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard was the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in “failed elections.” This was of particular concern during the 1980s, an era of frequent takeovers and contests for control of companies.
Advantages of a majority vote standard
If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. We think that this minimal amount of protection for shareholders is reasonable and will not upset the corporate structure nor reduce the willingness of qualified shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future.
We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Occasional use of this power will likely prevent the election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests in favor of other interests that conflict with those of investors. Glass Lewis will generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote except for use in contested director elections.
In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (e.g., Ashland Inc.) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors (e.g., Intel).
We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director’s replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.

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II. Transparency and Integrity of Financial Reporting
AUDITOR RATIFICATION
The auditor’s role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company’s books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company’s financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company’s fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:
“The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence.”
As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor’s interests and the public’s interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor’s performance and to annually ratify a board’s auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that “to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability ... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement.”38
Voting Recommendations on Auditor Ratification
We generally support management’s choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor’s independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chairman. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weakness in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.
Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:
1. When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.
 
38   “Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.” p. VIII:20, October 6, 2008.

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2. Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in the reporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.39
3. When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.
4. When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
5. When the company has aggressive accounting policies.
6. When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements.
7. Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures.
8. We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the auditor’s interests and shareholder interests.
We typically support audit-related proposals regarding mandatory auditor rotation when the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years).
PENSION ACCOUNTING ISSUES
A pension accounting question often raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company’s net income. This issue often arises in the executive-compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.
Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company’s discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company’s performance.
 
39   An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.

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III. The Link Between
Compensation and Performance
Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives. We believe that this is an important area in which the board’s priorities are revealed. However, as a general rule, Glass Lewis does not believe shareholders should be involved in the design, negotiation, management or approval of compensation packages. Such matters should be left to the compensation committee, which can be held accountable for its decisions through their election.
However, Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. Glass Lewis has a proprietary pay-for-performance model that evaluates the pay of the top five executives at US companies. Our model benchmarks these executives’ pay against their performance using four peer groups for each company: an industry peer group, a smaller sector peer group, a group of similar size companies and a geographic peer group. Using a forced curve and a school letter-grade system, we rank companies according to their pay-for-performance and recommend voting against compensation committees of companies failing our pay-for-performance analysis.
We use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on each of the compensation issues that arise on the ballot. Likewise, we use this analysis in our evaluation of the compensation committee’s performance.
Full Disclosure of Executive Compensation
Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which the pay is keeping pace with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. Performance metrics vary and may include items such as revenue growth, targets, or human resources issues.
However, we are concerned when a proposal goes too far in the level of detail that it requests for executives other than the most high-ranking leaders of the company. Shareholders are unlikely to need or be able to use compensation information for employees below the level of the most senior corporate officers.
Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders’ interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. While we favor full disclosure for senior executives and we view pay disclosure at the aggregate level (e.g., the number of employees being paid over a certain amount or in certain categories) as potentially useful, we do not believe shareholders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives.
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say-on-Pay”)
The practice of approving a company’s compensation reports is standard practice in many non-US countries, and has been a requirement for companies in the United Kingdom since 2002 and in Australia since 2005. More recently, such proposals have been gaining traction in the United States. Beginning with AFLAC in 2008, over a dozen US companies began to voluntarily provide shareholders with an advisory vote prior to 2009. However, in February of 2009 the U.S. government implemented the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which required all companies that participated in the

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Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”) under the US Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) to provide shareholders with a separate shareholder vote to approve executive compensation. Glass Lewis reviewed over 280 of these Say-on-Pay proposals in 2009. As the US Treasury Department, the SEC and Congress contemplate proposed federal regulation in 2010 that would mandate advisory votes at all US public companies, shareholders should anticipate Say-on-Pay becoming a routine item at annual meetings in the years ahead.
Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. Not only can the specific resolutions vary from company to company, but we believe the compensation-related disclosure must be examined in the context of each company’s distinct industry as well as its historic pay-for-performance practices. Although Say-on-Pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of “against” or “abstain” votes demonstrate a lack of shareholder confidence in a company’s compensation policies and procedures. Therefore, after determining the specific aspects of disclosure actually being voted on (i.e., the CD&A, the summary compensation tables, and/or any related material), we focus on the following main factors when reviewing Say-on-Pay proposals:
The overall design and structure of the Company’s executive compensation program;
The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the Company’s current and past pay-for-performance grades;
The quality and content of the Company’s CD&A disclosure and
Any significant changes or modifications made to the Company’s compensation structure or award amounts, including base salaries.
In cases where our analysis reveals a compensation structure in drastic need of reform, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the Say-on-Pay proposal. Generally such instances include evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (i.e., deficient or failing pay for performance grades), unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (i.e., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.), questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (i.e., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or other egregious compensation practices.
Limits on Executive Compensation
Generally, Glass Lewis believes shareholders should not be directly involved in setting executive pay. Such matters should be left to the compensation committee. We view the election of compensation committee members as the appropriate mechanism for shareholders to express their disapproval or support of board policy on executive pay. Further, we believe that companies whose pay-for-performance is in line with their peers should be able to pay their executives in a way that drives growth and profit, without destroying ethical values, giving consideration to their peers’ comparable size and performance.
However, Glass Lewis favors performance-based compensation as an effective way to motivate executives to act in shareholders’ best interests. Performance-based pay may be limited if CEO pay is capped at a low level rather than flexibly tied to company performance.
Limits on Executive Stock Options
Stock options are a common form of executive compensation. Making options a part of compensation may be an effective way to attract and retain experienced executives and other key employees. Tying a portion of an executive’s pay to company performance also provides a good incentive for executives to

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maximize share value. Thus, we typically recommend that our clients oppose caps on executive stock options. However, stock option plans should prohibit re-pricing or vesting acceleration of the options.
Equity-Based Compensation Plans
Glass Lewis evaluates option- and other equity-based compensation plans using a detailed model and analyst review. We believe that equity compensation awards are useful, when not abused, for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance.
Equity-based compensation programs have important differences from cash compensation plans and bonus programs. Accordingly, our model and analysis takes into account factors such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions.
Our analysis is quantitative and focused on the plan’s cost as compared with the business’s operating metrics. We run twenty different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company’s financial performance. Each of the twenty analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.
In our analysis, we compare the program’s expected annual expense with the business’s operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the option plan’s expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers and directors of the firm create enterprise value and not necessarily market capitalization (the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because we believe that academic literature proves that some absolute limits are warranted.
We evaluate option plans based on ten overarching principles:
1. Companies should seek more shares only when needed.
2. Plans should be small enough that companies need shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently).
3. If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members.
4. Annual net share count and voting power dilution should be limited.
5. Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group.
6. The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business’s value.
7. The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business’s financial results.
8. Plans should deliver value on a per-employee basis when compared with programs at peer companies.
9. Plans should not permit re-pricing of stock options.
10. Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms.

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Option Exchanges
Glass Lewis views option repricing plans and option exchange programs with great skepticism. Shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock and we believe that the employees, officers, and directors who receive stock options should be similarly situated to align their interests with shareholder interests.
We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be “rescued” from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option’s value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.
In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck. Re-pricing is tantamount to re-trading.
There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program is acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends cause a stock’s value to decline dramatically, rather than specific company issues, and repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original “bargain” was struck. In such a circumstance, we will support a repricing only if the following conditions are true:
(i) officers and board members do not participate in the program;
(ii) the stock decline mirrors the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and approximates the decline in magnitude;
(iii) the exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders with very conservative assumptions and with a recognition of the adverse selection problems inherent in voluntary programs; and
(iv) management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market.
Performance-Based Options
Shareholders commonly ask boards to adopt policies requiring that a significant portion of future stock option grants to senior executives be based on performance. Performance-based options are options where the exercise price is linked to an industry peer group’s stock-performance index.
Glass Lewis believes in performance-based equity compensation plans for senior executives. We feel that executives should be compensated with equity when their performance and the company’s performance warrants such rewards. While we do not believe that equity-based pay plans for all employees should be based on overall company performance, we do support such limitations for equity grants to senior executives (although some equity-based compensation of senior executives without performance criteria is acceptable, such as in the case of moderate incentive grants made in an initial offer of employment or in emerging industries).
Boards often argue that basing option grants on performance would hinder them in attracting talent. We believe that boards can develop a consistent, reliable approach to attract executives with the ability to guide the company toward its targets. If the board believes in performance-based pay for executives, then these proposals requiring the same should not hamper the board’s ability to create equity-based compensation plans.
We generally recommend that shareholders vote in favor of performance-based option requirements.

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Option Backdating, Spring-Loading, and Bullet-Dodging
Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to re-pricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return. Backdating an option is the act of changing an option’s grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. Glass Lewis has identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.
Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock’s price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.
The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.
A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company’s compensation and governance practices.40
Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have breached their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders.
Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company’s financial reports.
When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.
162(m) Plans
Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code allows companies to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO,
 
40   Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. “LUCKY CEOs.” November, 2006.

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upon shareholder approval of the excess compensation. Glass Lewis recognizes the value of executive incentive programs and the tax benefit of shareholder-approved incentive plans.
We believe the best practice for companies is to provide reasonable disclosure to shareholders so that they can make sound judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that these proposals include: specific performance goals, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company’s peers.
We typically recommend against a 162(m) plan where: a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; a company fails to provide one of either a total pool or an individual maximum; or the proposed plan is excessive when compared with the plans of the company’s peers.
The company’s record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for-performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of reasonable pay relative to business performance, we are not typically inclined to recommend against a plan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.
As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders’ best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards, it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.
Director Compensation Plans
Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. In particular, we support compensation plans that include option grants or other equity-based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. Director fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals. But excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and threaten to compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. Therefore, a balance is required.
Glass Lewis uses a proprietary model and analyst review to evaluate the costs of those plans compared to the plans of peer companies with similar market capitalizations. We use the results of this model to assist in making our voting recommendations on director compensation plans.

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IV. Governance Structure
and the Shareholder Franchise
ANTI-TAKEOVER MEASURES
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)
Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders’ best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.
We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company’s course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders’ financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan’s implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.
In certain circumstances, we will support a limited poison pill to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes the following attributes: (i) The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction; (ii) the offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days; (iii) the offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms; (iv) there is no fairness opinion requirement; and (v) there is a low to no premium requirement. Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.
NOL Poison Pills
Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the unique event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies’ ability to use NOLs in the event of a “change of ownership.”41 In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill (“NOL pill”) in order to prevent an inadvertent change of ownership by multiple investors purchasing small chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.
Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis taking into consideration, among other factors, the value of the NOLs to the company, the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holding and the nature of the larger shareholders, the trigger threshold and whether the term of
 
41   Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a “change of ownership” of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the “trafficking” of net operating losses.

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the plan is limited in duration (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable “sunset” provision) or is subject to periodic board review and/or shareholder ratification. However, we will recommend that shareholders vote against a proposal to adopt or amend a pill to include NOL protective provisions if the company has adopted a more narrowly tailored means of preventing a change in control to preserve its NOLs. For example, a company may limit share transfers in its charter to prevent a change of ownership from occurring.
Furthermore, we believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.
Fair Price Provisions
Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation’s common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority stockholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of “continuing directors” and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.
The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an “interested stockholder” by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested stockholder. An interested stockholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company’s outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.
Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested stockholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger or other transaction at a later time.
Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.
REINCORPORATION
In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. When examining a management proposal to reincorporate to a different state or country, we review the relevant financial benefits, generally related to improved corporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, resulting from the change in domicile. Where the financial benefits are de minimis and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, we will recommend voting against the transaction.

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However, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways would the Company benefit from shifting jurisdictions including the following:
1. Is the board sufficiently independent?
2. Does the Company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place?
3. Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)?
4. Do shareholders have the right to call special meetings of shareholders?
5. Are there other material governance issues at the Company?
6. Has the Company’s performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years?
7. How has the Company ranked in Glass Lewis’ pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years?
8. Does the company have an independent chairman?
We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company’s place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.
AUTHORIZED SHARES
Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company’s operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:
(i) Stock Split — We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company’s most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.
(ii) Shareholder Defenses — Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a “poison pill.” Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional             shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses.
(iii) Financing for Acquisitions — We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy.
(iv) Financing for Operations — We review the company’s cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company’s history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital.

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Issuing additional shares can dilute existing holders in limited circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares.
While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.
ADVANCE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
FOR SHAREHOLDER BALLOT PROPOSALS
We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.
These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.
We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.
VOTING STRUCTURE
Cumulative Voting
We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company’s governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.
Cumulative voting is a process that maximizes minority shareholders’ ability to ensure representation of their views on the board. It can be important when a board is controlled by insiders or affiliates and where the company’s ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.
Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of large holders.
Academic literature indicates that where a highly independent board is in place and the company has a shareholder-friendly governance structure, shareholders may be better off without cumulative voting. The analysis underlying this literature indicates that shareholder returns at firms with good governance

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structures are lower and that boards can become factionalized and prone to evaluating the needs of special interests over the general interests of shareholders collectively.
Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted antitakeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.
Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.
Supermajority Vote Requirements
Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover, we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.
TRANSACTION OF OTHER BUSINESS
AT AN ANNUAL OR SPECIAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS
We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before the annual meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.
ANTI-GREENMAIL PROPOSALS
Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.
MUTUAL FUNDS: INVESTMENT POLICIES AND ADVISORY AGREEMENTS
Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund’s structure and/or a fund’s relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:
    The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement;

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    Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and
 
    Any material changes to the fund’s investment objective or strategy.
We generally support amendments to a fund’s investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund’s advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.
In matters pertaining to a fund’s investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund’s objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments to a fund’s investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally contemplated, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors’ diversification strategies.

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V. Environmental, Social and
Governance Shareholder Initiatives
Glass Lewis evaluates shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis. We generally recommend supporting shareholder proposals calling for the elimination or removal of, as well as to require shareholder approval of, antitakeover devices such as poison pills and classified boards, both discussed in detail above. We generally recommend supporting proposals likely to increase or protect shareholder value and/or promote the furtherance of shareholder rights. In addition, we also generally recommend supporting proposals seeking to promote director accountability and to improve compensation practices especially those promoting a closer link between compensation and performance.
However, we typically prefer to leave decisions regarding day-to-day management and policy decisions, including those related to social, environmental or political issues, to management and the board except when there is a clear link between the proposal and economic or financial value enhancement or risk mitigation for the firm. We feel strongly that shareholders should not attempt to micromanage the company, its businesses or its executives through the shareholder initiative process.
Rather, we believe shareholders should use their influence to push for governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability, including majority voting for director elections, and then put in place a board they can trust to make informed and careful decisions that are in the best interests of the business and its owners. We believe shareholders should hold directors accountable for management and policy decisions through director elections. However, we recognize that support of appropriately crafted shareholder initiatives that provide shareholders with increased information, and that allow the board sufficient flexibility can, in some cases, serve to promote or protect shareholder value. The following is a discussion of Glass Lewis’ approach to certain common shareholder resolution proposals. We note that the following is not an exhaustive list of all shareholder proposals analyzed or expected.
GOVERNANCE
Right of Shareholders to Call a Special Meeting
Glass Lewis strongly supports the right of shareholders to call special meetings. Thus we believe in certain circumstances shareholders should have the ability to call meetings of shareholders between annual meetings to consider matters that require prompt attention. However, in order to prevent abuse and waste of corporate resources by a small minority of shareholders, we believe that shareholders representing at least a sizable minority of shares must support such a meeting prior to its calling. Should the threshold be set too low, companies might frequently be subjected to meetings whose effect could be the disruption of normal business operations in order to focus on the interests of only a small minority of owners. Typically we believe this threshold should not fall below 10-15% of shares, depending on company size.
In our evaluation whether to recommend supporting such proposals, we consider the following:
Company size
Shareholder base in both percentage of ownership and type of shareholder (e.g., hedge fund, activist investor, mutual fund, pension fund, etc.)

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Responsiveness of board and management to shareholders evidenced by progressive shareholder rights policies (e.g., majority voting, declassifying boards, etc.) and reaction to shareholder proposals
Company performance and steps taken to improve bad performance (e.g., new executives/ directors, spin offs, etc.)
Existence of anti-takeover protections or other entrenchment devices
Opportunities for shareholder action (e.g., ability to act by written consent)
Existing ability for shareholders to call a special meeting
Right of Shareholders to Act by Written Consent
Glass Lewis strongly supports shareholders’ right to act by written consent. As with the right to call special meetings, we believe such rights should be limited to, again depending on company size, a minimum of 10-15% of the shareholders requesting action by written consent, to prevent abuse and waste of corporate resources. Again, we believe a lower threshold may leave companies subject to meetings that may disrupt business operations to focus on the interests of a minority of owners. But we will support proposals to allow shareholders to act by written consent without a minimum threshold because shareholders are better off with this right than without it, and the benefit to shareholders outweighs the potential for abuse.
Board Composition
Glass Lewis believes the selection and screening process for identifying suitably qualified candidates for a company’s board of directors is one which requires the judgment of many factors, including the balance of skills and talents, as well as the breadth and diversity of experience of candidates and existing board members.
The diversity of skills, abilities and points of view can foster the development of a more creative and effective board. In general, however, we do not believe that it is in the best interests of shareholders for firms to be beholden to arbitrary rules regarding its board composition. We believe such matters should be left to a board’s nominating committee, which is generally responsible for establishing and implementing policies regarding the composition of the board, and which can be held accountable through their election.
Reimbursement of Solicitation Expenses
Glass Lewis feels that in some circumstances, replacing some or all directors on a company’s board is warranted where the incumbent director or directors have failed in their oversight of management by failing to address continuously poor performance. Where a dissident shareholder is seeking reimbursement for his or her expenses and has received the support of a majority of shareholders, Glass Lewis generally will recommend in favor of reimbursing the dissident for expenses incurred in waging the contest.
In those rare cases where a shareholder has put the shareholder’s own time and money into a successful campaign to unseat a poorly performing director, we feel that the dissident should be entitled to reimbursement of expenses by the company. In such a situation, other shareholders express their agreement by virtue of their majority vote for the dissident and will share in the improved company performance.

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Since contests are expensive and distracting to the management and the board, to avoid encouraging nuisance or agenda-driven contests, we only support the reimbursement of expenses where the dissident has convinced at least a majority of shareholders to support a certain candidate(s).
COMPENSATION
Severance Agreements
As a general rule, Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should not be involved in the approval of individual severance plans. Such matters should be left to the board’s compensation committee, which can be held accountable for its decisions through the election of its director members.
However, when proposals are crafted to only require approval if the benefit exceeds 2.99 times the amount of the executive’s base salary plus bonus, Glass Lewis typically supports such requests. Above this threshold, based on the executive’s average annual compensation for the most recent five years, the company can no longer deduct severance payments as an expense, and thus shareholders are deprived of a valuable benefit. We believe that shareholders should be consulted before relinquishing such a right, and that implementing such policies would still leave companies with sufficient freedom to enter into the vast majority of severance arrangements.
Additionally, investors should monitor severance agreements when they are initially put in place. If shareholders initially approved of a severance agreement, it is inappropriate to vote against the compensation committee later on when the severance agreement goes into effect. However, in the absence of a shareholder vote on severance agreements, Glass Lewis will evaluate the role of the compensation committee when the agreement was adopted.
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say-on-Pay”)
As noted above, Glass Lewis does not believe shareholders should be involved in the design, negotiation, management or approval of compensation packages. Such matters should be left to the compensation committee, which can be held accountable for its decisions through their election.
In the case of advisory votes on compensation, however, proposals are typically crafted to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the company’s executive officers’ compensation and policies. Glass Lewis believes that the advisory vote therefore provides an effective mechanism for enhancing transparency in setting executive pay, improving accountability to shareholders, and providing for a more effective link between pay and performance. Where shareholders believe compensation packages are inappropriately structured, a high negative vote could compel the board to reexamine its compensation practices and act accordingly. While a vote to approve the report will not directly affect the board’s ability to set compensation policy, it will allow shareholders to register their opinions regarding the company’s compensation practices.
While still somewhat nascent, empirical research regarding the effects of advisory votes in certain non-US markets paints a broadly positive picture of the impact of such votes. In particular, a 2004 study for the British Department of Trade and Industry found that the advisory voting requirement has resulted in “a number of well publicized situations where [compensation] committees have changed their policy or practice as a result of direct shareholder voting.” (“Report on the Impact of the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations.” Deloitte & Touche. 2004). The study also found that the extent to which companies consulted shareholders about compensation practices has greatly increased over the past two years.
Further empirical evidence suggests that CEO compensation in the UK has been more sensitive to negative operating metrics following the introduction of the remuneration report vote than in prior

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periods, indicating a decrease in “rewards for failure”. (Fabrizio Ferri and David Maber. “Say on Pay Vote and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK.” SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1169446. June 30, 2008.)
We recognize that criticism has been raised with respect to shareholder advisory votes, such as injecting shareholders too far into compensation decisions and limiting the flexibility of companies to uniquely tailor their compensation policies as they strive to conform to external guidelines. (Laraine S. Rothenberg and Todd S. McCafferty. “‘Say on Pay’: Linking Executive Pay to Performance”. New York Law Journal. September 24, 2008). However, we do not believe these arguments are persuasive since shareholders are already, and increasingly, reviewing all aspects of compensation irrespective of an opportunity to cast an advisory vote on compensation. Indeed, a growing number of institutional investors vote against compensation committee members as a means to express concern or dissatisfaction with companies’ compensation practices. As a result, some of these institutions do not feel the adoption of advisory votes is necessary since they will vote against compensation committee members directly.
Glass Lewis does, however, recognize that the use of advisory compensation votes does not necessarily reduce executive compensation. One recent study that found that executive remuneration in the UK has continued to rise at the same rate as prior to the adoption of say on pay, indicating a general failure to curb executive compensation. (Jeffrey Gordon. “‘Say on Pay’: Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Muddling Through.” Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 336. SSRN: http:// ssrn.com/abstract=1262867. September 3, 2008). We, however, do not believe that the purpose of an advisory vote on compensation is to “rein in” executive pay. Rather it is to ensure that the remuneration paid to executives is firmly tied to the creation and advancement of long-term shareholder value.
Bonus Recoupments (“Clawbacks”)
Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives and we believe that senior executives of a company should never receive compensation for performance that was not achieved by the company.
We believe shareholders would be well-served by requiring the board to adopt a more detailed and stringent policy on recouping unearned bonuses, rather than relying on regulatory action such as requirements under Sarbanes Oxley. When examining proposals that require companies to recoup executives’ bonuses paid as a result of faulty accounting, Glass Lewis will first look to see if the company has already adopted a policy to recoup bonuses awarded to senior executives during a restatement, and whether that policy is included in the CEO’s contract. When the board has already committed to a proper course, in our opinion, and their current policy covers the major tenets of the proposal at hand while giving the board adequate flexibility to exercise discretion over these matters, we see no need for further action.
In some instances, shareholder proposals call for board action that may contravene the board’s legal obligations under existing employment agreements with executives. In addition, the board’s ability to exercise its judgment and reasonable discretion on this issue may be excessively limited under such proposals, which may not be warranted, depending on the specific situation of the company in question. We believe it is reasonable that a recoupment policy should only affect senior executives and those directly responsible for the company’s accounting errors.
Where a company is giving a new contract to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company has had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the responsible members of the compensation committee. Compensation committee members have an obligation to build in reasonable controls to executive contracts to prevent payments in the case of inappropriate behavior.

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Linking Executive Pay to Social Criteria
We recognize that companies’ involvement in environmentally sensitive and labor-intensive industries influences the degree to which a firm’s overall strategy must weigh environmental and social concerns. However, we also understand that the value generated by incentivizing executives to prioritize environmental and social issues is difficult to quantify and therefore measure, and necessarily varies among industries and companies.
When reviewing such proposals seeking to tie executive compensation to environmental or social practices, we will review the target firm’s compliance with (or violation of) applicable laws and regulations, and examine any history of environmental and social related concerns including those resulting in material investigations, lawsuits, fines and settlements. We will also review the firm’s current compensation policies and practice. However, with respect to executive compensation, Glass Lewis generally believes that such policies should be left to the compensation committee. We view the election of directors, specifically those who sit on the compensation committee, as the appropriate mechanism for shareholders to express their disapproval of board policy on this issue.
ENVIRONMENT
When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should hold directors accountable when they face reelection. We believe it is prudent for management to assess its potential exposure to all risks, including environmental and regulations pertaining thereto and incorporate this information into its overall business risk profile.
Glass Lewis recognizes the significant financial, legal and reputational risks to companies resulting from poor environmental practices or negligent oversight thereof. We believe part of the board’s role is to ensure that management conducts a complete risk analysis of company operations, including those that have environmental implications. Further, directors should monitor management’s performance in mitigating the environmental risks attendant with relevant operations in order to eliminate or minimize the risks to the company and shareholders.
While Glass Lewis recognizes that most environmental concerns are best addressed via avenues other than proxy proposals, when a substantial environmental risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against responsible members of the governance committee. In some cases, we may recommend voting against all directors who were on the board when the substantial risk arose, was ignored, or was not mitigated.
Climate Change and Green House Gas Emission Disclosure Proposals
Glass Lewis will consider recommending a vote in favor of a reasonable shareholder proposal to disclose a company’s climate change and/or green house gas emission approaches when (i) a company has encountered problems such as lawsuits and/or government investigations or investors have established a link to impact on shareholder value from climate change and/or green house gas emission regulations, and (ii) the company has failed to adequately disclose how it has addressed these problems. We will examine such proposals in light of requests made to the company for additional information, its response and whether there is a reasonable case as to the negative implications to shareholders and the company.

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With respect to climate risk, Glass Lewis believes companies should actively consider their exposure to:
Direct environmental risk: Companies should evaluate their financial exposure to a potential rise in sea levels, increased wildfires and extreme weather, reduced air quality, water availability and public health problems brought on by higher temperatures.
Risk due to legislation/regulation: We believe companies, and particularly those operating in carbon-intensive industries, should evaluate their exposure to a potential increase or shift in environmental regulation with respect to their operations.
Legal and reputational risk: As has been seen relating to other environmental, social and governance matters, failure to take action may carry the risk of damaging negative publicity and potentially costly litigation.
As such, Glass Lewis will consider recommending a vote in favor of a reasonable proposal to disclose a company’s climate change and/or greenhouse gas emission strategies when (i) a company has suffered financial impact from reputational damage, lawsuits and/or government investigations, (ii) there is a strong link between climate change and/or its resultant regulation and shareholder value at the firm, and (iii) the company has failed to adequately disclose how it has addressed these risks.
Sustainability
With respect to shareholder proposals requesting that a firm produce a sustainability report, when evaluating these requests we will consider, among other things:
    The financial risk to the company from the firm’s environmental practices and/or regulation;
 
    The relevant company’s current level of disclosure;
 
    The level of sustainability information disclosed by the firm’s peers;
 
    The industry in which the firm operates;
 
    The level and type of sustainability concerns/controversies at the relevant firm, if any;
 
    The time frame within which the relevant report is to be produced; and
 
    The level of flexibility granted to the board in the implementation of the proposal.
Sustainable Forestry
Sustainable forestry provides for the long-term sustainable management and use of trees and other non-timber forest products. Retaining the economic viability of forests is one of the tenets of sustainable forestry, along with encouraging more responsible corporate use of forests. Sustainable land use and the effective management of land are viewed by some shareholders as important in light of the impact of climate change. Forestry certification has emerged as a way that corporations can address prudent forest management. There are currently several primary certification schemes such as the Sustainable Forestry Initiative (“SFI”) and the Forest Stewardship Council (“FSC”).
There are nine main principles that comprise the SFI: (i) sustainable forestry; (ii) responsible practices; (iii) reforestation and productive capacity; (iv) forest health and productivity; (v) long-term forest and soil productivity; (vi) protection of water resources; (vii) protection of special sites and biodiversity; (viii) legal compliance; and (ix) continual improvement.
The FSC adheres to ten basic principles: (i) compliance with laws and FSC principles; (ii) tenure and use rights and responsibilities; (iii) indigenous peoples’ rights; (iv) community relations and workers’ rights;

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(v) benefits from the forest; (vi) environmental impact; (vii) management plan; (viii) monitoring and assessment; (ix) maintenance of high conservation value forests; and (x) plantations.
Shareholder proposals regarding sustainable forestry have typically requested that the firm comply with the above SFI or FSC principles as well as to assess the feasibility of phasing out the use of uncertified fiber and increasing the use of certified fiber. We will evaluate target firms’ current mix of certified and uncertified paper and the firms’ general approach to sustainable forestry practices, both absolutely and relative to its peers but will only support proposals of this nature when we believe that the proponent has clearly demonstrated that the implementation of this proposal is clearly linked to an increase in shareholder value.
SOCIAL ISSUES
Non-Discrimination Policies
Where there is clear evidence of employment practices resulting in significant negative economic exposure to the company, Glass Lewis will support shareholder proposals that seek to address labor policies, such as shareholder proposals calling for increased disclosure of labor policies and of steps a company has taken to mitigate the risks associated with those policies.
Glass Lewis recognizes that companies with a record of poor labor relations or treatment of its workers can face risks, such as employee lawsuits, poor employee work performance and turnover, and regulatory investigations. Glass Lewis will hold directors accountable for company decisions related to labor and employment problems.
As risk associated with sensitive issues such as EEO policies and investigations of discrimination have the potential to directly affect shareholder value, we believe shareholders should closely monitor the company’s policies regarding these issues. As an increasing number of peer companies adopt inclusive EEO policies, companies without comprehensive policies may face damaging recruitment, reputational and, potentially, legal risks. We recognize that the theoretical increase in, or protection of, shareholder value resulting from inclusive employment policies may be difficult, if not impossible, to identify or measure.
However, we believe that a pattern of making financial settlements as a result of lawsuits based on discrimination could indicate exposure to findings of discriminatory employment practices. As such, shareholders could, in some instances, benefit from codifying nondiscriminatory policies.
MacBride Principles
To promote peace, justice and equality regarding employment in Northern Ireland, Dr. Sean MacBride, founder of Amnesty International and Nobel Peace laureate, proposed the following equal opportunity employment principles:
1. Increasing the representation of individuals from underrepresented religious groups in the workforce including managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical and technical jobs;
2. Adequate security for the protection of minority employees both at the workplace and while traveling to and from work;
3. The banning of provocative religious or political emblems from the workplace;
4. All job openings should be publicly advertised and special recruitment efforts should be made to attract applicants from underrepresented religious groups;

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5. Layoff, recall, and termination procedures should not, in practice, favor particular religious groupings;
6. The abolition of job reservations, apprenticeship restrictions, and differential employment criteria, which discriminate on the basis of religion or ethnic origin;
7. The development of training programs that will prepare substantial numbers of current minority employees for skilled jobs, including the expansion of existing programs and the creation of new programs to train, upgrade, and improve the skills of minority employees;
8. The establishment of procedures to assess, identify and actively recruit minority employees with potential for further advancement; and
9. The appointment of senior management staff member to oversee the company’s affirmative action efforts and setting up of timetables to carry out affirmative action principles.
Proposals requesting the implementation of the above principles are typically proposed at firms that operate, or maintain subsidiaries that operate, in Northern Ireland. In each case, we will examine the company’s current equal employment opportunity policy and the extent to which the company has been subject to protests, fines, or litigation regarding discrimination in the workplace, if any. Further, we will examine any evidence of the firm’s specific record of labor concerns in Northern Ireland.
Human Rights
Glass Lewis believes explicit policies set out by companies’ boards of directors on human rights provides shareholders with the means to evaluate whether the company has taken steps to mitigate risks from its human rights practices. As such, we believe that it is prudent for firms to actively evaluate risks to shareholder value stemming from global activities and human rights practices along entire supply chains. Findings and investigations of human rights abuses can inflict, at a minimum, reputational damage on targeted companies and have the potential to dramatically reduce shareholder value. This is particularly true for companies operating in emerging market countries in extractive industries and in politically unstable regions.
As such, while we typically rely on the expertise of the board on these important policy issues, we recognize that, in some instances, shareholders could benefit from increased reporting or further codification of human rights policies.
Military and US Government Business Policies
Glass Lewis believes that disclosure to shareholders of information on key company endeavors is important. However, we generally do not support resolutions that call for shareholder approval of policy statements for or against government programs, most of which are subject to thorough review by the federal government and elected officials at the national level. We also do not support proposals favoring disclosure of information where such disclosure is already mandated by law, unless circumstances exist that warrant the extra disclosure.
Foreign Government Business Policies
Where a corporation operates in a foreign country, Glass Lewis believes that the company and board should maintain sufficient controls to prevent illegal or egregious conduct with the potential to decrease shareholder value, examples of which include bribery, money laundering, severe environmental violations or proven human rights violations. We believe that shareholders should hold board members, and in particular members of the audit committee and CEO, accountable for these issues when they face reelection, as these concerns may subject the company to financial risk such as fines for violating

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the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In some instances, we will support appropriately crafted shareholder proposals specifically addressing concerns with the target firm’s actions outside its home jurisdiction.
Health Care Reform Principles
Health care reform in the United States has long been a contentious political issue and Glass Lewis therefore believes firms must evaluate and mitigate the level of risk to which they may be exposed regarding potential changes in health care legislation. In 2009, Glass Lewis reviewed multiple shareholder proposals requesting that boards adopt principles for comprehensive health reform, such as the following based upon principles reported by the Institute of Medicine:
Health care coverage should be universal;
Health care coverage should be continuous;
Health care coverage should be affordable to individuals and families;
The health insurance strategy should be affordable and sustainable for society; and
Health insurance should enhance health and well-being by promoting access to high-quality care that is effective, efficient, safe, timely, patient-centered and equitable.
Given the current national debate regarding health care, we typically believe that individual board rooms are not the appropriate forum in which to address evolving and contentious national policy issues. The adoption of a narrow set of principles could limit the board’s ability to comply with new regulation or to appropriately and flexibly respond to health care issues as they arise. As such, barring a compelling reason to the contrary, we typically do not support the implementation of national health care reform principles at the company level.
Tobacco
Glass Lewis recognizes the contentious nature of the production, procurement, marketing and selling of tobacco. However, we typically do not support proposals requesting that firms shift away from, or significantly alter, the legal production or marketing of core products. We also recognize that tobacco companies are particularly susceptible to reputational and regulatory risk due to the nature of its operations. As such, we will consider supporting uniquely tailored and appropriately crafted shareholder proposals requesting increased information or the implementation of suitably broad policies at target firms on a case-by-case basis.
Reporting Contributions and Political Spending
Glass Lewis believes that disclosure of how a company uses its funds is an important component of corporate accountability to shareholders. In our view, a rigorous oversight process can minimize a company’s exposure to legal, reputational and financial risk by ensuring that corporate assets are used to enhance shareholder value in accordance with federal and state law, consistent with a company’s stated values, and the long-term interests of the company.
While corporate contributions to national political parties and committees controlled by federal officeholders are prohibited under federal law, corporations can legally donate to state and local candidates, organizations registered under 26 USC Sec. 527 of the Internal Revenue Code and state-level political committees. There is, however, no standardized manner in which companies must disclose this information. As such, shareholders often must search through numerous campaign finance reports and detailed tax documents to ascertain even limited information. Corporations also frequently join trade associations, generally paying dues to do so, as a means for corporate political action. However,

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trade associations are neither required to report funds they receive for nor spend on political activity. Therefore, the tracking of corporate expenditures to political causes through trade associations can be impossible, often leaving corporations unable to determine for themselves which causes or campaigns their dues or donations have gone to support. Since not all donations to trade organizations are used strictly for political purposes, we question how corporations are able to assess the efficacy of such donations or determine the effect of such expenditure on long-term shareholder value.
Further, the empirical evidence regarding the benefit to shareholders of corporate political contributions remains unclear. In one study of firm-level contributions to U.S. political campaigns from 1979 to 2004, researchers found that measures of support to candidates were positively and significantly correlated with a cross-section of future returns. This was especially the case when those contributions went to a large number of candidates in the same state as the contributing firm (Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen and Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov. “Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns.” SSRN. September 26, 2008). However, in a separate study of political contributions from 1991 to 2004, researchers found donations to be negatively correlated with future excess returns with only limited support for the contention that political donations represent an investment in political capital (Rajash K. Aggarwal, Felix Meschke and Tracy Yue Wang. “Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency?” SSRN. August 11, 2008).
Given that political donations are strategic decisions intended to increase shareholder value and have the potential to negatively affect the company, we believe the board should either implement processes and procedures to ensure the proper use of the funds or closely evaluate the process and procedures used by management. At least one study found that close board oversight of lobbying strategies may minimize instances of the company contributing to causes that are not in shareholders best interests (Robert Repetto. “Best Practice in Internal Oversight of Lobbying Practice”. Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy. September 1, 2006).
When evaluating whether the report requested would benefit shareholders, Glass Lewis seeks answers to the following three key questions:
      Is the Company’s disclosure comprehensive and readily accessible?
      How does the Company’s political expenditure policy and disclosure compare to its peers?
      What is the Company’s current level of oversight?
Glass Lewis will consider supporting a proposal seeking increased disclosure of corporate political expenditure and contributions if the firm’s current disclosure is insufficient, is lacking compared to its peers, and where there is inadequate board oversight, evidenced by some evidence or credible allegation that the Company is mismanaging corporate funds through political donations or has a record of doing so. We will, in each case, consider the merits of the proposal in the context of relevant company. If Glass Lewis discovers particularly egregious actions by the company, we will consider recommending voting against the governance committee members or other responsible directors.
Animal Welfare
Glass Lewis believes that it is prudent for management to assess potential exposure to regulatory, legal and reputational risks associated with all business practices including those related to animal welfare; failure to take action on certain issues may carry the risk of fines and damaging negative publicity. A high profile campaign launched against a company could result in shareholder action, a reduced customer base, protests and potentially costly litigation.

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However, in general, we believe that the board and management are in the best position to determine policies relating to the care and use of animals. As such, we will typically vote against proposals seeking to eliminate or limit board discretion regarding animal welfare unless there is a clear and documented link between the board’s policies and the degradation of shareholder value.

For more information about
Glass Lewis’ policies
or approach to proxy analysis,

please visit
www.glasslewis.com

or contact
Chief Policy Officer
Robert McCormick at +1415 678-4228

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Headquarters
Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC
One Sansome Street
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San Francisco, CA 94104
Tel: +1 415-678-4110
Tel: +1 888-800-7001
Fax: +1 415-357-0200
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