UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, DC 20549
FORM 8-K
CURRENT REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): June 25, 2014
(June 25, 2014)
PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC.
(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)
DELAWARE
(State or Other Jurisdiction of Incorporation)
000-25699 |
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94-3008334 |
(Commission File Number) |
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(I.R.S. Employer Identification No.) |
870 W. Maude Avenue, Sunnyvale, California 94085
(Address of Principal Executive Offices) (Zip Code)
(408) 774-9060
(Registrants telephone number, including area code)
Not Applicable
(Former Name or Former Address, if Changed Since Last Report)
Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions (see General Instruction A.2. below):
o Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)
o Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)
o Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))
o Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))
Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure.
On June 25, 2014, June 26, 2014 and July 3, 2014, respectively, three complaints were filed in the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, against PLX Technology, Inc. (PLX), its directors and certain officers, and Avago Technologies Limited (Avago), Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc., a Delaware corporation and wholly owned subsidiary of Avago (Avago Wireless), and Pluto Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Avago Wireless (Pluto and collectively with Avago and Avago Wireless, the Avago Entities). Additionally, on June 27, 2014, two complaints were filed, and on July 2, 2014, a third complaint was filed, in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware against PLX, its directors and certain officers, and the Avago Entities. The six cases are putative class actions brought by purported stockholders alleging, among other things, that the PLX Board of Directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of June 23, 2014, between Avago Wireless, Pluto and PLX, and that PLX and the Avago Entities aided and abetted these alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. All six complaints seek, among other things, either to enjoin the proposed transaction or to rescind it should it be consummated, as well as money damages.
Copies of the complaints are furnished as exhibits 99.1, 99.2, 99.3, 99.4, 99.5 and 99.6 to this Current Report on Form 8-K and the contents therein are incorporated by reference in this Item 7.01.
The information in this Item 7.01 and the related exhibits shall be deemed furnished, and not filed, with the Securities and Exchange Commission and accordingly shall not be subject to Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, nor shall it be deemed incorporated by reference in any filings of PLX under the Securities Act of 1933, unless specifically identified as being incorporated therein by reference.
Item 9.01 Financial Statements and Exhibits.
(d) Exhibits.
The following exhibits are being furnished with this Current Report on Form 8-K:
Exhibit Number |
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Description |
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99.1 |
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Complaint captioned Deborah Cox v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 1-14-CV-267079, filed June 25, 2014. |
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99.2 |
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Complaint captioned Andrew Ellis v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 1-14-CV-267171, filed June 26, 2014. |
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99.3 |
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Complaint captioned Boby Varghese v. PLX Technology, Inc., et. al., Case No. 9837 (Del. Ch.), filed June 27, 2014. |
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99.4 |
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Complaint captioned Roberta Feinstein v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 9839 (Del. Ch.), filed June 27, 2014. |
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99.5 |
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Complaint captioned David L. Price v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 9853 (Del. Ch.), filed July 2, 2014. |
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99.6 |
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Complaint captioned Clarence Golden v. PLX Technology, Inc. et al., Case No. 1-14-CV-267531, filed July 3, 2014. |
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, the Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned hereunto duly authorized.
PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC. |
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(the Registrant) |
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By: |
/s/ ARTHUR WHIPPLE |
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Arthur Whipple |
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Chief Financial Officer |
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Dated: July 8, 2014 |
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EXHIBIT INDEX
Exhibit Number |
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Description |
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99.1 |
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Complaint captioned Deborah Cox v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 1-14-CV-267079, filed June 25, 2014. |
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99.2 |
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Complaint captioned Andrew Ellis v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 1-14-CV-267171, filed June 26, 2014. |
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99.3 |
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Complaint captioned Boby Varghese v. PLX Technology, Inc., et. al., Case No. 9837 (Del. Ch.), filed June 27, 2014. |
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99.4 |
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Complaint captioned Roberta Feinstein v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 9839 (Del. Ch.), filed June 27, 2014. |
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99.5 |
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Complaint captioned David L. Price v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al., Case No. 9853 (Del. Ch.), filed July 2, 2014. |
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99.6 |
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Complaint captioned Clarence Golden v. PLX Technology, Inc. et al., Case No. 1-14-CV-267531, filed July 3, 2014. |
Exhibit 99.1
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Exhibit 99.1 SUM-100 SUMMONS (CITACION JUDICIAL) FOR COURT USE ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE) NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (AVISO AL DEMANDADO): PLX Technology, Inc. et al. (Additional Parties Attachment form is attached.) YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (LO ESTÁ DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE): Deborah Cox, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you wihout you being heard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information below. You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court. There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association. Tiene 30 DÍAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacer que se entregua una copia al demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte Es posible que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de Ia corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/espanol/), en Ia biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en Ia corte que le quede más cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de Ia corte que le dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y Ia corte le podrá quitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sm más advertencia Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogado immediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines de Iucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de Iucro en el sitlo web de California Legal Services, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/espanol/) o poniéndose en contacto con la corte o el colegio de abogados locales. The name and address of the court is: (El nombre y dirección de la corte es): 191 N. First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Downtown Superior Court CASE NUMBER: (Número del Caso): 114CV267079 The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiffs attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is: (El nombre, la dirección y el número de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es): Johnson & Weaver, LLP, Frank Johnson, Nathan Hamler, 110 W. A St. #750, SD CA 92101 (619) 230-0063 DATE: (Fecha) June 25, 2014 Clerk, by , Deputy (Secretario) , (Adjunto) (For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).) (Para prueba de entrega de esta citatión use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)). [SEAL] NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served 1. as an individual defendant. 2. as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify): 3. On behalf of (specify): under CCP 416.10 (corporation) CCP 416.60 (minor) CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) CCP 416.70 (conservatee) CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) CCP 416.90 (authorized person) other (specify): 4. By personal delivery on (date): Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUM-100 [Rev. January 1, 2004] SUMMONS Code of Civil Procedure §§ 412.20, 465 American LegalNet, Inc. www.USCourtForms.com Page 1 of 1 |
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SUM-200(A) SHORT TITLE: Cox v. PLX Technology, Inc. et al. CASE NUMBER: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE This form may be used as an attachment to any summons if space does not permit the listing of all parties on the summons. If this attachment is used, insert the following statement in the plaintiff or defendant box on the summons: Additional Parties Attachment form is attached. List additional parties (Check only one box. Use a separate page for each type of party): Plaintiff Defendant Cross-Complainant Cross-Defendant David Raun, Michael J. Salameh, Martin Colombatto, Stephen Domenik, John H. Hart, Ralph Schmitt, Eric Singer, Patrick Verderico, Avago Technologies Limited, Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc., and Pluto Merger Sub, Inc. Form Adopted by Rule 982(a)(9)(A) Judicial Council of California982(a)(9)(A) (New January 1, 1993) ADDITIONAL PARTIES ATTACHMENT Attachment to Summons Page 1 of 1 |
JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP |
FRANK J. JOHNSON (174882) |
frankj@johnsonandweaver.com |
NATHAN R. HAMLER (227765) |
nathanh@johnsonandweaver.com |
SHAWN E. FIELDS (255267) |
shawnf@johnsonandweaver.com |
110 West A Street, Suite 750 |
San Diego, CA 92101 |
Telephone: (619) 230-0063 |
Facsimile: (619) 255-1856 |
[Additional counsel listed on signature page.]
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
DEBORAH COX, on behalf of herself and |
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CASE NO. | ||
all others similarly situated, |
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114CV267079 | |
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Plaintiff, |
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT | ||
vs. |
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL | ||
PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC., DAVID |
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RAUN, MICHAEL J. SALAMEH, MARTIN |
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COLOMBATTO, STEPHEN DOMENIK, |
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JOHN H. HART, RALPH SCHMITT, ERIC |
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SINGER, PATRICK VERDERICO, |
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AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED |
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AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES WIRELESS |
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(U.S.A) MANUFACTURING INC. and |
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PLUTO MERGER SUB, INC., |
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Defendants. |
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Plaintiff Deborah Cox (Plaintiff), by her attorneys, alleges the following on information and belief; except as to the allegations specifically pertaining to Plaintiff, which are based on personal knowledge.
NATURE AND SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1. This is a class action brought on behalf of the public stockholders of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLX or the Company) against members of PLXs board of directors (the Board or the Director Defendants), alleging breaches of fiduciary duties in connection with the proposed acquisition (the Acquisition), announced on June 23, 2014, of PLX by Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc. (together, with Defendant Avago Technologies Limited, Avago or Parent).
2. PLX designs, develops, manufactures, and sells integrated circuits worldwide. The Companys products are focused on Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) Express and Ethernet technologies.
3. In April 2012, following pressure from Balch Hill Capital, LLC (Balch Hill), who at the time owned approximately 9.7% of the outstanding shares of PLX, the then-board of directors of PLX agreed to be acquired by Integrated Device Technology, Inc. (IDT) for approximately $7.00 per share in a cash and stock transaction which valued PLX at $330 million (the IDT Transaction).
4. The IDT Transaction failed to close, however, after IDT withdrew its offer to purchase the remaining shares of PLX it did not own after U.S. antitrust regulators challenged the proposed $330 million deal.
5. Balch Hill sold its shares following the announcement of the IDT Transaction.
6. Then, in January 2013, shortly after the IDT Transaction fell through, Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P.(1) announced that it, along with its affiliates, had purchased a 5.1% stake in PLX.
(1) Hereinafter, Potomac refers to, collectively, Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P. and its affiliates. Potomac is currently the largest stockholder of PLX.
7. Potomac immediately picked up where Balch Hill(2) left off, publicly criticizing the PLX Board and calling for the then-board to review all strategic alternatives, stating that PLX should not remain an independent public company and that it was an attractive acquisition target for potential buyers.
8. Indeed, shortly after announcing its newly acquired stake in January 2013, Potomac stated that PLXs operations and outlook were far stronger than they were in April 2012 (at the time of the $7.00 per share failed IDT Transaction) and that a deal involving PLX should fetch an even higher price.
9. Following months of wrangling, in December 2013, Potomac waged a successful proxy contest, the result of which landed three Potomac nominees on the PLX Board.
10. Then, just six months after three Potomac-backed nominees were elected to the PLX Board, on June 23, 2014, PLX, Avago, and an affiliated entity announced that they had entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger (the Merger Agreement), pursuant to which Avago will commence a tender offer for all outstanding shares of PLX for $6.50 per share in cash.
11. Provided at least a majority of shares of the Companys outstanding stock have been validly tendered before the expiration of Avagos tender offer, PLX will be merged with and into Pluto Merger Sub, Inc. (Merger Sub), Merger Sub will cease to exist, and the Company will become a wholly owned subsidiary of Avago. The Acquisition values PLX at approximately $309 million, or $293 million net of cash and debt acquired.
12. Of course, Potomac - along with certain of the other Defendants - have entered into Tender and Support Agreements to tender their stock more than 14%, collectively, in connection with the Acquisition. This, despite the fact that Potomac had previously touted the strength of PLX and called for a price in excess of the $7.00 per share PLX stockholders were slated to receive in connection with the ill-fated IDT Transaction.
(2) In early 2013, Balch Hill and Potomac teamed up in successfully pressuring the Board of Directors of sTec, Inc. (sTec) to consider strategic alternatives which eventually led to sTec being sold to Western Digital Corp.
13. As is detailed herein, the Director Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to PLX stockholders by agreeing to the Acquisition for inadequate consideration following a flawed process littered with conflict. In particular, within the past year, PLX stock has traded at prices exceeding $6.50 per share, and industry analysts have established price targets that exceed the price the Board accepted.
14. The Director Defendants further breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to overly restrictive deal protection measures. In particular, the Merger Agreement includes a no solicitation provision, a provision giving Avago the right to review any superior proposals and adjust its offer accordingly to make the superior proposal cease to be considered a superior proposal, and a termination fee of $10.85 million that PLX will have to pay Avago to enter into a competing transaction agreement.
15. The Director Defendants owe fiduciary duties to the public stockholders of the Company but have breached these duties in connection with the proposed Acquisition. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the proposed Acquisition or, alternatively, to rescind the proposed Acquisition, in the event that it is consummated, and recover damages.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
16. This Court has jurisdiction over each Defendant because Defendants conduct business in California, including, but not limited to, the conduct here at issue, the unfair proposed Acquisition, and because they have sufficient minimum contacts with California to render the exercise of jurisdiction by California courts permissible under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. This action is not removable.
17. Venue is proper in this Court because the conduct at issue took place and has effect in this County. The Companys headquarters and principal place of business is located at 870 West Maude Avenue, Sunnyvale, California 94085.
THE PARTIES
18. Plaintiff is, and has been at all relevant times, the owner of shares of PLX common stock.
19. Defendant PLX (NASDAQ: PLXT) is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in Sunnyvale, California. According to PLX, it is the industry-leading global provider of semiconductor-based PCI Express connectivity solutions primarily targeting enterprise data center markets and it develops innovative software-enriched silicon that enables product differentiation, reliable interoperability and superior performance.
20. Defendant David Raun (Raun) has been President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of PLX since December 2012 and has served on the Board since that time.
21. Defendant Michael J. Salameh (Salameh) co-founded PLX in May 1986 and served as the Companys CEO and as a Board member from that time until his retirement as CEO in November 2008, although he continues to serve on the Board. Since January 2014, Salameh has served as Chairman of the Board. Salameh is a member of the Companys Audit and Nominating Committees.
22. Defendant Martin Colombatto (Colombatto) has been a member of the Board since December 2013, when he was voted in as a director in a contested election after being nominated by Potomac, who along with its affiliates is the largest stockholder of PLX. Colombatto is a member of the Companys Compensation Committee.
23. Defendant Stephen Domenik (Domenik) has been a member of the Board since December 2013, when he was voted in as a director in a contested election after being nominated by Potomac, who along with its affiliates is the largest stockholder of PLX. Domenik is a member of the Audit Committee.
24. Defendant John H. Hart (Hart) has been a member of the Board since April 1999. Hart is the Chairperson of the Companys Compensation Committee and a member of the Nominating Committee.
25. Defendant Ralph Schmitt (Schmitt) served as the Companys President and CEO from November 2008 until his resignation in October 2012. He has served as a director since November 2008.
26. Defendant Eric Singer (Singer) has been a member of the Board since December 2013, when he was voted in as a director in a contested election after being nominated by Potomac, who along with its affiliates is the largest stockholder of PLX. Singer is the co-managing member of both Potomac Management II and Potomac Management III which, in connection with the Acquisition, entered into a Tender and Support Agreement along with certain members of PLX senior management and the other Director Defendants agreeing to, among other things, tender all of their shares in connection with the planned tender offer. Singer is the direct beneficial owner of 181,234 PLX shares and may be deemed to beneficially own more than 3.5 million PLX shares owned by Potomac. Singer is the Chairman of the Nominating Committee and a member of the Compensation Committee.
27. Defendant Patrick Verderico (Verderico) has been a member of the Board since November 2004. Verderico is the Chairman of the Companys Audit Committee and is a member of the Compensation Committee.
28. Defendant Avago Technologies Limited describes itself as a leading designer, developer and global supplier of a broad range of analog semiconductor devices with a focus on III-V based products and complex digital and mixed signal CMOS based devices. According to Avago, its product portfolio is extensive and includes thousands of products in four primary target markets: enterprise storage, wired infrastructure, wireless communications and industrial & other. Avago is based in Singapore.
29. Defendant Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Avago Technologies Limited and is a Delaware corporation based in San Jose, California.
30. Defendant Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Avago that was formed for the sole purpose of effectuating the Acquisition.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
31. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 382 on behalf of all public stockholders of the Company, excluding Defendants
and their affiliates (the Class). This action is properly maintainable as a class action for the following reasons.
32. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As set forth in the Merger Agreement, as of June 20, 2014, there were approximately 45.9 million shares of the Companys common stock issued and outstanding, owned by hundreds, if not thousands, of persons.
33. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class including, inter alia:
a. Whether the Director Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Class in connection with the proposed Acquisition;
b. Whether other Defendants have aided and abetted the Boards breaches; and
c. Whether as a result of the Director Defendants breaches, the Class will suffer irreparable harm.
34. Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the rest of the Class, and Plaintiff is not subject to any atypical defenses.
35. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because she is not subject to any conflicts of interest, is committed to prosecuting this action, and has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature.
36. A class action is superior because the prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of (a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class or (b) adjudications with respect to individual Class members that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
37. Moreover, Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class as a whole, and are thereby causing injury to the entire Class. Therefore, final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief on behalf of the Class is appropriate.
SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS
Overview of PLX and Its Positioning for Future Growth
38. PLX was founded in May 1986 by, among others, Defendant Salameh. PLX has been developing 1/O(3) interconnect silicon and complimentary software since 1994. The Company went public on April 6, 1999 and currently trades on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol PLXT.
39. According to the Company, it is the technology and market share leader in PCI Express switches, and bridges, with additional leadership USB controllers, legacy PCI bridges, and consumer storage controllers. These serial technologies have become mainstream, and PLX has been able to offer innovative differentiated products based on these interconnect standards while providing scalability and performance at a lower cost.
40. The Company maintains corporate offices in Sunnyvale, California with additional technical offices located throughout North America and around the world including in China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Europe.
41. The Company has been experiencing substantial growth recently and with that growth, its stock price has skyrocketed. Indeed, PLX stock has risen from $3.81 per share on January 2, 2013 to $6.37 per share as recently as June 10, 2014, hitting a 52 week high of $6.91 per share on January 17, 2014.
42. PLXs most recent earnings release dated April 21, 2014, released after market close, (discussing the Companys Q1 2014 financial results) confirms the Companys upward trajectory touting its fifth straight profitable quarter.
43. In discussing the Companys positioning for growth in the April 21, 2014 earnings release, Defendant Raun noted, in pertinent part, that:
[D]emand for our products remains solid. Based on current backlog, forecasts from customers, and resolution of the assembly issues, we expect all of our market segments to be up in O2, driven primarily by Gen2 and Gen3 shipments. We are beginning to see an increasing number of Gen3 design wins go into volume
(3) I/O means input and/or output.
production and we believe that this ramp will fuel our growth this year and in years to come[.] (Emphasis added.)
44. For Q1 2014, the Company reported $0.07 earnings per share, easily beating analysts consensus estimate of $0.02 per share by $0.05 per share.
45. Following the Companys Q1 2014 earnings release, analysts at TheStreet and Zacks upgraded PLX from hold to buy ratings on April 23, 2014 and April 29, 2014, respectively.
46. Following the April 21, 2014 earnings release, the price of PLX stock climbed $0.49 per share from its opening price of $5.78 per share on April 21, 2014 to close at $6.27 per share, an increase of approximately 8%, on April 22, 2014 hitting a high on April 22, 2014 of $6.35 during intra-day trading.
47. In short, PLX positioned itself for long-term and sustained growth. Nonetheless, as discussed below, the Director Defendants - ceding to pressure from its largest shareholder - elected to approve the Acquisition to sell PLX at an inadequate price and through a flawed process.
The PLX Board Faces Pressure To Sell the Company
48. PLX is no stranger to receiving pressure from (and acquiescing to) the whims of activist shareholders.
49. In April 2012, following pressure from Balch Hill, who at the time owned approximately 9.7% of the outstanding shares of PLX, the then-board of PLX caved and agreed to be acquired by IDT for approximately $7.00 per share in a cash and stock transaction which valued PLX at $330 million. Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. (Deutsche Bank) was the financial advisor for PLX for the IDT Transaction.
50. In late December 2012, however, after U.S. antitrust regulators moved to challenge the proposed $330 million deal over the combined companies share of the market for integrated computer circuit switch technology, the IDT Transaction fell through.
51. Shortly after IDT and PLX announced that they would not proceed with the IDT Transaction, in January 2013, Potomac announced that it had purchased a 5.1% stake in PLX.
52. Almost immediately, Potomac began criticizing the PLX Board questioning, among other things, the Boards objectivity to fully explore opportunities to unlock value.
53. Potomac called for the then-PLX board to conduct a fair and thorough review of all strategic alternatives stating that PLX should not remain an independent public company and that it was an attractive acquisition target for potential buyers.
54. Indeed, shortly after announcing its newly acquired stake in PLX in January 2013, Potomac stated that PLXs operations and outlook were far stronger than they were in April 2012 (at the time the $7.00 per share failed IDT Transaction was announced) and that a deal involving PLX should fetch an even higher price.
55. Following months of wrangling, in December 2013, Potomac waged a successful proxy contest the result of which landed three Potomac nominees Defendants Singer, Colombatto, and Domenik (collectively, the Potomac Directors) - on the PLX Board.
The Proposed Acquisition of PLX by Avago
56. Following months of pressure from Potomac, and with the Potomac Directors now on the PLX Board, on June 23, 2014, the PLX Board again ceded to the pressure of an activist shareholder and caused PLX to enter into the Merger Agreement with Avago and Merger Sub pursuant to which - provided a majority of Company shares are validly tendered PLX stockholders will receive $6.50 per share in cash for each share held.
57. The Merger Agreement was unanimously approved by the Board, which caused PLX to enter into the Merger Agreement.
58. In connection with the Acquisition, Potomac and, among others, certain Director Defendants and members of PLX senior management, have entered into Tender and Support Agreements to tender their stock more than 14%, collectively in connection with the Acquisition.
59. The Acquisition, which is expected to close during Q4 of Avagos fiscal year ending November 3, 2014 (subject to a majority of outstanding shares being validly tendered), values PLX at approximately $309 million, or $293 million net of cash and debt acquired.
60. Deutsche Bank the very bank that served as PLXs financial advisor for the failed IDT Transaction - served as the financial advisor to PLX in connection with the Acquisition.
The Process Leadinz Up to the Acquisition Was Pla.ued by Conflicts of Interest
61. The Boards decision to enter into the Merger Agreement was the product of a flawed process that was plagued by various conflicts of interest.
62. Indeed, as noted above, the Acquisition represents an eighteen-month long battle waged by Potomac to see to it that PLX was sold.
63. In the process, Potomac led a successful proxy contest which landed the Potomac Directors on the Board. A mere six months later, the Acquisition was announced.
64. In connection with the Acquisition, certain senior members of the PLX management team and certain of the Director Defendants entered into Tender and Support Agreements with Avago pursuant to which they agreed to, among other things, tender all of their shares in the planned tender offer. This group, in the aggregate, represents 14.7% of the outstanding shares of PLX.
65. Included in this group is Defendant Singer who is the co-managing member of Potomac, PLXs largest stockholder. Singer is the direct beneficial owner of 181,234 PLX shares and may be deemed to beneficially own more than 3.5 million PLX shares owned by Potomac.
66. Even though PLX stock traded as high as $6.91 per share as recently as January 17, 2014, and despite that fact that Potomac once touted the strength of PLX and called for a price in excess of the $7.00 per share PLX stockholders were slated to receive in connection with the ill-fated IDT Transaction - the Board accepted the inadequate price of $6.50 per share.
67. Aside from Potomac, others stand to gain as well. Indeed, senior management and the Board are in a position to reap financial benefits through a sale of the Company.
68. Specifically, certain of PLXs senior management, including Defendant Raun, are protected financially by the PLX Severance Plan for Executive Management (Severance Plan) and the Executive Officer Retention Agreements (Retention Agreements) they entered into with the Company.
69. Under the terms of the Severance Plan, certain benefits will be payable to certain executive officers including Defendant Raun if there is a change in control of PLX (which the Acquisition will be considered if completed) and if within one year after the change in control (plus any applicable cure period), the participants employment is terminated (a) by the participants employer other than for cause, or (b) by the participant for good reason, as defined by the Severance Plan.
70. The Retention Agreements of which Defendant Raun is also a beneficiary call for each person subject to the Retention Agreements to be paid for each unvested option held by them as of immediately prior to the effective time of the Acquisition on the earliest to occur of (a) January 2, 2015 (or the first anniversary of the Closing (as defined in the Merger Agreement) for Defendant Raun) (in each case, subject to continued employment) or (b) the date such individuals employment is terminated without Cause (as defined in the Severance Plan), for Good Reason (as defined in the Severance Plan) or by reason of death or permanent disability.
71. Additionally, under the Retention Agreements, Defendant Raun will also receive a retention bonus (as long as he remains employed as of the first anniversary of the Closing) equal to (a) the sum of (i) 150% of his base salary plus (ii) his target bonus under the variable compensation plan then in effect. The payment of the retention bonus will also be triggered if Defendant Raun is terminated by the Company other than for Cause, by such individual for Good Reason or by reason of death or permanent disability, prior to the applicable payment date.
72. Aside from Defendant Raun, certain of the other Director Defendants have a substantial financial interest in the Acquisition since the change-of-control will trigger the vesting of stock owned by the Director Defendants payable immediately upon the consummation of the Acquisition.
The Proposed Acquisition Represents Inadequate Consideration to PLX Stockholders
73. The Acquisition undervalues PLX to the detriment of Plaintiff and the Class.
74. The $6.50 price to be paid to PLX stockholders is woefully inadequate given the Companys positioning for growth and recent stock price which exceeded the deal price.
75. Indeed, as recently as January 17, 2014, PLX stock traded at $6.91 per share.
76. Further, analyst price targets substantially exceed the $6.50 per share consideration offered through the Acquisition. Specifically, the mean target for PLX is $8.00 per share - $1.50 per share or more than is being offered to stockholders through the Acquisition.
77. Potomac which has three representatives on the PLX Board noted in its run up to the successful proxy battle it waged that PLXs operations and outlook were far stronger than they were in April 2012 (at the time of the failed $7.00 per share IDT Transaction) and that a deal involving PLX should fetch an even higher price since it was an attractive acquisition target for potential buyers.
78. Further, at least two analysts have maintained a buy rating on PLX for at least the last three months.
79. Another analyst noted that from Avagos perspective, the Acquisition appears to be favorable since it will strengthen Avagos data center and storage offerings and predicted that the Acquisition should raise Avagos earnings per share and gross margins.
The Board Agreed to Various Unreasonably Preclusive Deal Protection Devices
80. As part of the Merger Agreement, the Director Defendants agreed to certain onerous and unreasonable deal protection devices that operate conjunctively to make the Acquisition a fait accompli and preclude competing offers from emerging for the Company.
81. Further, should an unsolicited bidder submit a competing proposal, the Company must notify Avago of the bidders identity and the terms of the bidders offer. Thereafter, should the Board determine to enter into a superior competing proposal, the Merger Agreement requires the Board to let Avago make a counter-offer so that the competing offer no longer constitutes a superior proposal.
82. Section 7.2 of the Merger Agreement also provides that PLX must pay Avago a $10.85 million termination fee if the Company decides to pursue the competing offer, thereby essentially requiring that the competing bidder agree to pay a naked premium for the right to provide the stockholders with a superior offer.
83. These deal protection provisions unreasonably restrain the Boards ability to maximize stockholder value by restricting the Board from soliciting better deals or engaging in communications with potentially interested parties. Indeed, under the circumstances surrounding the Acquisition, the limited instances in which the Board can respond to an entreaty are too narrowly circumscribed to provide an effective fiduciary out for the Director Defendants.
84. In pursuing an unlawful plan to sell the Company for less than fair value, Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care, independence, good faith, and fair dealing, and/or have aided and abetted such breaches.
85. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent the irreparable injury that Company stockholders will continue to suffer absent judicial intervention.
CAUSES OF ACTION
COUNT I
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
(Against the Director Defendants)
86. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein.
87. As members of the Companys Board, the Director Defendants have fiduciary obligations to:
a. undertake an appropriate evaluation of PLXs net worth as a merger/acquisition candidate;
b. take all appropriate steps to enhance PLXs value and attractiveness as a merger/acquisition candidate;
c. act independently to protect the interests of the Companys public stockholders;
d. adequately ensure that no conflicts of interest exist between the Director Defendants own interests and their fiduciary obligations, and, if such conflicts exist, to ensure that all conflicts are resolved in the best interests of PLXs public stockholders;
e. evaluate the Acquisition and engage in a meaningful auction with third parties in an attempt to obtain the best value on any sale of PLX; and
f. disclose all material information to the Companys stockholders.
88. The Director Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the Class.
89. As alleged herein, the Director Defendants have initiated a process to sell PLX that undervalues the Company. In addition, by agreeing to the Acquisition, the Director Defendants have capped the price of PLX at a price that does not adequately reflect the Companys true value. The Director Defendants also failed to sufficiently inform themselves of PLXs value, or disregarded the true value of the Company. Furthermore, any alternate acquirer will be faced with engaging in discussions with a management team and Board that are committed to the Acquisition.
90. As such, unless the Director Defendants conduct is enjoined by the Court, they will continue to breach their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and will further a process that inhibits the maximization of stockholder value.
91. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law.
COUNT II
Aiding and Abetting
(Against All Defendants)
92. Plaintiff repeats all previous allegations as if set forth in full herein.
93. As alleged in more detail above, Defendants have aided and abetted the Director Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties.
94. As a result, Plaintiff and the Class are being harmed irreparably.
95. Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the Class, prays for the following judgment and relief:
A. Certifying this action as a class action and certifying Plaintiff as the Class representative and her counsel as Class counsel;
B. Enjoining, preliminarily and permanently, the proposed Acquisition;
C. To the extent, if any, that the proposed Acquisition is consummated prior to the entry of this Courts final judgment, rescinding it, or granting the Class damages;
D. Directing that Defendants account to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class for all damages caused to them and account for all profits and any special benefits obtained as a result of their unlawful conduct;
E. Awarding punitive or exemplary damages in an amount according to proof;
F. Awarding Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including a reasonable allowance for the fees and expenses of her attorneys and experts; and
G. Granting Plaintiff and the other members of the Class such other and further relief as may be just and proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all claims and issues so triable.
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Respectfully submitted, | |
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DATED: June 25, 2014 |
JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP | |
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FRANK J. JOHNSON | |
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NATHAN R. HAMLER | |
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SHAWN E. FIELDS | |
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/s/ Nathan R. Hamler | |
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NATHAN R. HAMLER | |
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100 West A Street, Suite 750 | |
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San Diego, CA 92101 | |
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Telephone: (619) 230-0063 | |
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Facsimile: (619) 255-1856 | |
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frankj@johnsonandweaver.com | |
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nathanh@johnsonandweaver.com | |
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shawnf@johnsonandweaver.com | |
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JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP | |
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W. SCOTT HOLLEMAN (pro hac vice pending) | |
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99 Madison Avenue, 5th Floor | |
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New York, NY 10016 | |
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Telephone: (212) 802-1486 | |
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Facsimile: (212) 602-1592 | |
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scotth@johnsonandweaver.com | |
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Attorneys for Plaintiff | |
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY JOHNSON & WEAVER, LLP Frank J. Johnson (174882)/Nathan R. Hamler (227765)/Shawn E. Fields (255267) 100 West A Street, Suite 750 San Diego, CA 92101 TELEPHONE NO.: (619) 230-0063 FAX NO.: (619) 255-1856 ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Plaintiff Deborah Cox SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Santa Clara STREET ADDRESS: 191 N. 1st Street MAILING ADDRESS: 191 N. 1st Street CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Jose, CA 95113 BRANCH NAME: Downtown Superior Court CASE NAME: Deborah Cox v. PLX Technology, Inc. et al. CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Complex Case Designation CASE NUMBER: 114CV267079 þ Unlimited (Amount demanded exceeds $25,000) 0 Limited (Amount demanded is $25,000 or less) 0 Counter 0 Joinder Filed with first appearance by defendant (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402) JUDGE: DEPT: Items 16 below must be completed (see instructions on page 2). 1. Check one box below for the case type that best describes this case: Auto Tort 0 Auto (22) 0 Uninsured motorist (46) Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort 0 Asbestos (04) 0 Product liability (24) 0 Medical malpractice (45) 0 Other PI/PD/WD (23) Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort 0 Business tort/unfair business practice (07) 0 Civil rights (08) 0 Defamation (13) 0 Fraud (16) 0 Intellectual property (19) 0 Professional negligence (25) 0 Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (35) Employment 0 wrongful termination (36) 0 Other employment (15) Contract 0 Breach of contract/warranty (06) 0 Rule 3.740 collections (09) 0 Other collections (09) 0 Insurance coverage (18) 0 Other contract (37) Real Property 0 Eminent domain/Inverse condemnation (14) 0 Wrongful eviction (33) 0 Other real property (26) Unlawful Detainer 0 Commercial (31) 0 Residential (32) 0 Drugs (38) Judicial Review 0 Asset forfeiture (05) 0 Petition re: arbitration award (11) 0 Writ of mandate (02) 0 Other judicial review (39) Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.4003.403) 0 Antitrust/Trade regulation (03) 0 Construction defect (10) 0 Mass tort (40) þ Securities litigation (28) 0 Environmental/Toxic tort (30) 0 Insurance coverage claims arising from the above listed provisionally complex case types (41) Enforcement of Judgment 0 Enforcement of judgment (20) Miscellaneous Civil Complaint 0 RICO (27) 0 Other complaint (not specified above) (42) Miscellaneous Civil Petition 0 Partnership and corporate governance (21) 0 Other petition (not specified above) (43) 2. This case þ is is not complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the factors requiring exceptional judicial management: a. 0 Large number of separately represented parties b. þ Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel issues that will be time-consuming to resolve c. þ Substantial amount of documentary evidence d. Large number of witnesses e. 0 Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court f. 0 Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision 3. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a. þ monetary b. þ nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief c. 0 punitive 4. Number of causes of action (specify): 2 5. This case þ is 0 is not a class action suit. 6. If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (You may use form CM-015.) Date: June 25, 2014 Nathan R. Hamler u (TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY) NOTICE Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result in sanctions. File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule. If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all other parties to the action or proceeding. Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only. Page 1 of 2 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California CM-010 [Rev. July 1, 2007] CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.30, 3.220, 3.4003.403, 3.740; Cal. Standards of Judicial Administration, std. 3.10 www.courtinfo.ca.gov Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California CM-010 [Rev. July 1, 2007] CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.30, 3.220, 3.4003.403, 3.740; Cal. Standards of Judicial Administration, std. 3.10 www.courtinfo.ca.gov |
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CM-010 INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO COMPLETE THE COVER SHEET To Plaintiffs and Others Filing First Papers. If you are filing a first paper (for example, a complaint) in a civil case, you must complete and file, along with your first paper, the Civil Case Cover Sheet contained on page 1. This information will be used to compile statistics about the types and numbers of cases filed. You must complete items 1 through 6 on the sheet. In item 1, you must check one box for the case type that best describes the case. If the case fits both a general and a more specific type of case listed in item 1, check the more specific one. If the case has multiple causes of action, check the box that best indicates the primary cause of action. To assist you in completing the sheet, examples of the cases that belong under each case type in item 1 are provided below. A cover sheet must be filed only with your initial paper. Failure to file a cover sheet with the first paper filed in a civil case may subject a party, its counsel, or both to sanctions under rules 2.30 and 3.220 of the California Rules of Court. To Parties in Rule 3.740 Collections Cases. A "collections case" under rule 3.740 is defined as an action for recovery of money owed in a sum stated to be certain that is not more than $25,000, exclusive of interest and attorney's fees, arising from a transaction in which property, services, or money was acquired on credit. A collections case does not include an action seeking the following: (1) tort damages, (2) punitive damages, (3) recovery of real property, (4) recovery of personal property, or (5) a prejudgment writ of attachment. The identification of a case as a rule 3.740 collections case on this form means that it will be exempt from the general time-for-service requirements and case management rules, unless a defendant files a responsive pleading. A rule 3.740 collections case will be subject to the requirements for service and obtaining a judgment in rule 3.740. To Parties in Complex Cases. In complex cases only, parties must also use the Civil Case Cover Sheet to designate whether the case is complex. If a plaintiff believes the case is complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court, this must be indicated by completing the appropriate boxes in items 1 and 2. If a plaintiff designates a case as complex, the cover sheet must be served with the complaint on all parties to the action. A defendant may file and serve no later than the time of its first appearance a joinder in the plaintiff's designation, a counter-designation that the case is not complex, or, if the plaintiff has made no designation, a designation that the case is complex. CASE TYPES AND EXAMPLES Auto Tort Auto (22)Personal Injury/Property Damage/ Wrongful Death Uninsured Motorist (46) (if the case involves an uninsured motorist claim subject to arbitration, check this item instead of Auto) Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/ Property Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort Asbestos (04) Asbestos Property Damage Asbestos Personal Injury/ Wrongful Death Product Liability (not asbestos or toxic/environmental) (24) Medical Malpractice (45) Medical Malpractice Physicians & Surgeons Other Professional Health Care Malpractice Other PI/PD/WD (23) Premises Liability (e.g., slip and fall) Intentional Bodily Injury/PD/WD (e.g., assault, vandalism) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Other PI/PD/WD Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort Business Tort/Unfair Business Practice (07) Civil Rights (e.g., discrimination, false arrest) (not civil harassment) (08) Defamation (e.g., slander, libel) (13) Fraud (16) Intellectual Property (19) Professional Negligence (25) Legal Malpractice Other Professional Malpractice (not medical or legal) Other Non-PI/PD/WD Tort (35) Employment Wrongful Termination (36) Other Employment (15) Contract Breach of Contract/Warranty (06) Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) Contract/Warranty BreachSeller Plaintiff (not fraud or negligence) Negligent Breach of Contract/ Warranty Other Breach of Contract/Warranty Collections (e.g., money owed, open book accounts) (09) Collection CaseSeller Plaintiff Other Promissory Note/Collections Case Insurance Coverage (not provisionally complex) (18) Auto Subrogation Other Coverage Other Contract (37) Contractual Fraud Other Contract Dispute Real Property Eminent Domain/Inverse Condemnation (14) Wrongful Eviction (33) Other Real Property (e.g., quiet title) (26) Writ of Possession of Real Property Mortgage Foreclosure Quiet Title Other Real Property (not eminent domain, landlord/tenant, or foreclosure) Unlawful Detainer Commercial (31) Residential (32) Drugs (38) (if the case involves illegal drugs, check this item; otherwise, report as Commercial or Residential) Judicial Review Asset Forfeiture (05) Petition Re: Arbitration Award (11) Writ of Mandate (02) WritAdministrative Mandamus WritMandamus on Limited Court Case Matter WritOther Limited Court Case Review Other Judicial Review (39) Review of Health Officer Order Notice of AppealLabor Commissioner Appeals Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court Rules 3.4003.403) Antitrust/Trade Regulation (03) Construction Defect (10) Claims Involving Mass Tort (40) Securities Litigation (28) Environmental/Toxic Tort (30) Insurance Coverage Claims (arising from provisionally complex case type listed above) (41) Enforcement of Judgment Enforcement of Judgment (20) Abstract of Judgment (Out of County) Confession of Judgment (non-domestic relations) Sister State Judgment Administrative Agency Award (not unpaid taxes) Petition/Certification of Entry of Judgment on Unpaid Taxes Other Enforcement of Judgment Case Miscellaneous Civil Complaint RICO (27) Other Complaint (not specified above) (42) Declaratory Relief Only Injunctive Relief Only (non-harassment) Mechanics Lien Other Commercial Complaint Case (non-tort/non-complex) Other Civil Complaint (non-tort/non-complex) Miscellaneous Civil Petition Partnership and Corporate Governance (21) Other Petition (not specified above) (43) Civil Harassment Workplace Violence Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse Election Contest Petition for Name Change Petition for Relief From Late Claim Other Civil Petition CM-010 [Rev. July 1, 2007] CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Page 2 of 2 |
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ATTACHMENT CV-5012 CIVIL LAWSUIT NOTICE Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara 191 N. First St., San Jose, CA 95113 CASE NUMBER: 114CV267079 PLEASE READ THIS ENTIRE FORM PLAINTIFF (the person suing): Within 60 days after filing the lawsuit, you must serve each Defendant with the Complaint, Summons, an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information Sheet, and a copy of this Civil Lawsuit Notice, and you must file written proof of such service. DEFENDANT (The person sued): You must do each of the following to protect your rights: 1. You must file a written response to the Complaint, using the proper legal form or format, in the Clerk's Office of the Court, within 30 days of the date you were served with the Summons and Complaint; 2. You must serve by mail a copy of your written response on the Plaintiffs attorney or on the Plaintiff if Plaintiff has no attorney (to "serve by mail" means to have an adult other than yourself mail a copy); and 3. You must attend the first Case Management Conference. Warning: If you, as the Defendant, do not follow these instructions, you may automatically lose this case. RULES AND FORMS: You must follow the California Rules of Court and the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara Local Civil Rules and use proper forms. You can obtain legal information, view the rules and receive forms, free of charge, from the Self-Help Center at 99 Notre Dame Avenue, San Jose (408-882-2900 x-2926), www.scselfservice.org (Select "Civil") or from: § State Rules and Judicial Council Forms: www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms and www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules § Local Rules and Forms: http://www.sccsuperiorcourt.org/civil/rule1toc.htm CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE (CMC): You must meet with the other parties and discuss the case, in person or by telephone, at least 30 calendar days before the CMC. You must also fill out, file and serve a Case Management Statement (Judicial Council form CM-110) at least 15 calendar days before the CMC. You or your attorney must appear at the CMC. You may ask to appear by telephone see Local Civil Rule 8. Your Case Management Judge is: Peter Kirwan Department: 1 The 1st CMC is scheduled for: (Completed by Clerk of Court) Date: 10/24/14 Time: 10:00am in Department: 1 The next CMC is scheduled for: (Completed by party if the 1st CMC was continued or has passed) Date: Time: in Department: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): If all parties have appeared and filed a completed ADR Stipulation Form (local form CV-5008) at least 15 days before the CMC, the Court will cancel the CMC and mail notice of an ADR Status Conference. Visit the Court's website at www.sccsuperiorcourt.org/civil/ADR/ or call the ADR Administrator (408-882-2100 x-2530) for a list of ADR providers and their qualifications, services, and fees. WARNING: Sanctions may be imposed if you do not follow the California Rules of Court or the Local Rules of Court. Form CV-5012 REV 7/01/08 CIVIL LAWSUIT NOTICE Page 1 of 1 |
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SUMMONS (CITACION JUDICIAL) FOR COURT USE ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE) NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (AVISO AL DEMANDADO): PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC. (additional defendants appear on summons addendum) YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (LO ESTÁ DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE): ANDREW ELLIS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court. There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association. Tiene 30 DÍAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacer que se entregua una copia al demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte Es posible que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de Ia corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/espanol/), en Ia biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en Ia corte que le quede más cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de Ia corte que le dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y Ia corte le podrá quitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sm más advertencia Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogado immediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines de Iucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de Iucro en el sitlo web de California Legal Services, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/espanol/) o poniéndose en contacto con la corte o el colegio de abogados locales. The name and address of the court is: (El nombre y dirección de la corte es): 191 N. First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Downtown Superior Court CASE NUMBER: (Número del Caso): 114CV267171 The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiffs attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is: (El nombre, la dirección y el número de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es): Evan J. Smith (SBN 242352), Brodsky & Smith, LLC, 9595 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 00, Beverly Hill 90212 (877) 354-2590/ (310) 247-0160 DATE: (Fecha) June 26, 2014 Clerk, by , Deputy (Secretario) , (Adjunto) (For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).) (Para prueba de entrega de esta citatión use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)). [SEAL] NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served 1. as an individual defendant. 2. as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify): 3. On behalf of (specify): under CCP 416.10 (corporation) CCP 416.60 (minor) CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) CCP 416.70 (conservatee) CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) CCP 416.90 (authorized person) other (specify): 4. By personal delivery on (date): Form adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUM-100 [Rev. January 1, 2004] SUMMONS Code of Civil Procedure 412.20, 465 American LegalNet, Inc. www.USCourtForms.com Page 1 of 1 |
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SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER: Ellis v. PLX Technologies, Inc. et. al. INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE This form may be used as an attachment to any summons if space does not permit the listing of all parties on the summons. If this attachment is used, insert the following statement in the plaintiff or defendant box on the summons: Additional Parties Attachment form is attached. List additional parties (Check only one box. Use a separate page for each type of party): Plaintiff Defendant Cross-Complainant Cross-Defendant Defendants. Form Adopted by Rule SHORT TITLE: Ellis v. PLX Technologies, Inc. et. al. CASE NUMBER: Form adopted by Rule 982(a)(9)(A) Judicial Council of California 982(a)(9)(A) (New January 1, 1993) ADDITIONAL PARTIES ATTACHMENT Attachment to Summons American LegalNet, Inc. www.USCourtForms.co Page of |
Evan J. Smith, Esquire (SBN 242352)
BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC
9595 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 900
Beverly Hills, CA 90212
Telephone: (877) 534-2590
Facsimile: (310) 247-0160
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
SANTA CLARA COUNTY
ANDREW ELLIS, on behalf of himself |
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CASE NO. 114CV267171 | ||
and all others similarly situated, |
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JUDGE: | ||
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Plaintiff, |
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DEPT: | ||
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PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC., MICHAEL J. |
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CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR: | ||
SALAMEH, MATIN COLOMBATTO, |
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STEPHEN DOMENIK, JOHN H. HART, |
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DAVID K. RAUN, RALPH SCHMITT, |
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(1) BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY | ||
ERIC SINGER, PATRICK VERDERICO, |
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AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES WIRELESS |
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(2) AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH | ||
PLUTO MERGER SUB, INC., |
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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED | ||
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Defendants. |
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Plaintiff, by his attorneys, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated, files this action against the defendants, and alleges upon information and belief, except for those allegations that pertain to him, which are alleged upon personal knowledge, as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1. Plaintiff brings this shareholder class action on behalf of himself and all other public shareholders of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLX or the Company), against PLX, the Companys Board of Directors (the Board or the Individual Defendants), Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc. (Avago) and Pluto Merger Sub, Inc, (the Merger Sub)
(collectively, the Defendants), arising out of a transaction in which Avago will acquire each share of common stock of PLX in an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $309 million, or $6.50 per share (the Proposed Acquisition or Merger). The transaction will be effected through a tender offer and is expected to close in the fourth quarter of Avagos fiscal year ending November 3, 2014.
2. In approving the Proposed Acquisition, however, the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, due care and disclosure by, inter alia, (i) agreeing to sell PLX without first taking steps to ensure that Plaintiff and Class members (defined below) would obtain adequate, fair and maximum consideration under the circumstances; and (ii) engineering the Proposed Acquisition to benefit themselves and/or Avago without regard for PLX public shareholders. Accordingly, this action seeks to enjoin the Proposed Acquisition and compel the Individual Defendants to properly exercise their fiduciary duties to PLX shareholders.
3. Absent judicial intervention, the merger will be consummated, resulting in irreparable injury to Plaintiff and the Class. This action seeks to enjoin the unreasonable steps taken by Defendants in entering into the merger agreement without attempting to maximize shareholder value in order to obtain millions of dollars in benefits for themselves. Immediate judicial intervention is warranted here to rectify existing and future irreparable harm to the Companys shareholders. Plaintiff, on behalf of the Class, seeks only to level the playing field and to ensure that if shareholders are to be ultimately stripped of their respective equity interests through the Proposed Acquisition, that the Proposed Acquisition is conducted in a manner that is not overtly improper, unfair and illegal, and that all material information concerning the Proposed Acquisition is disclosed to the PLX shareholders so that they are able to make informed decisions as to whether to vote in favor or against the Proposed Acquisition or to seek appraisal of their shares.
PARTIES
4. Plaintiff is an individual. Plaintiff is, and at all times relevant hereto, has been a PLX shareholder.
5. Defendant PLX (NASDAQ: PLXT) is the industry-leading global provider of
semiconductor-based PCI Express connectivity solutions primarily targeting enterprise data center markets. The company develops innovative software-enriched silicon that enables product differentiation, reliable interoperability and superior performance. Its principal executive offices are located at 870 W Maude Ave., Sunnyvale, CA 94085.
6. Defendant Michael J. Salameh (Salameh) co-founded PLX and served as Chief Executive Officer and member of the Board of Directors from PLXs inception in May 1986. He retired from his position as CEO in November 2008, continued to serve as a director, and became Chairman of the Board in January 2014. Concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Salameh entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which he agreed, among other things, to tender all of his shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated.
7. Defendant Martin Colombatto (Colombatto) was elected to serve on the Board of Directors at PLX Technology in December 2013. Colombatto is a Potomac Capital Management II, L.L,C. (Potomac) director appointee. Significantly, Potomac is the largest shareholder of PLX stock. Concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Colombatto entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which he agreed, among other things, to tender all of his shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated.
8. Defendant Stephen Domenik (Domenik) was elected to serve on the Board of Directors at PLX Technology in December 2013. Domenik is a Potomac director appointee. Significantly, Potomac is the largest shareholder of PLX stock. Concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Domenik entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which he agreed, among other things, to tender all of his shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated.
9. Defendant John H. Hart (Hart) has been a director of PLX since April 1999. Concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Hart entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which he agreed, among other things, to tender all of his shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated.
10. Defendant David K. Raun (Raun) was appointed President and CEO in December
2012. Raun joined PLX Technology in November 2004 as Vice President, Marketing. In May 2007 Rauns role was expanded to include VP of Business Development. In March 2012 Raun was promoted to Sr. EVP & General Manager. On June 22, 2014, the Compensation Committee of the PLX Board of Directors amended and restated the PLX Severance Plan for Executive Management and approved entering into an Executive Officer Retention Agreement with Raun pursuant to which Raun will be entitled to a golden parachute payment equal to 150% of his base salary plus an amount equal to the prorated portion of the target bonus for the annual performance period then in effect, in addition to 18 months of full benefits and 100% accelerated vesting of equity awards should his employment be terminated within one year following a change in control as is contemplated by the Proposed Acquisition. Should defendant Raun still be employed by the combined company on the one year anniversary of the Proposed Acquisition closing, pursuant to the Retention Agreement Raun will receive a retention bonus equal to 150% of his base salary plus his target bonus under the variable compensation plan then in effect. Moreover, concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Raun entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which he agreed, among other things, to tender all of his shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated.
11. Defendant Ralph Schmitt (Schmitt) served as PLXs President and Chief Executive Officer, and has been a member of the Companys Board of Directors, since November 2008. He resigned from his position as CEO in October 2012 and continues to serve as a director. Concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Schmitt entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which he agreed, among other things, to tender all of his shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated.
12. Defendant Eric Singer (Singer) was elected to serve on the Board of Directors at PLX Technology in December 2013. Defendant Singer is the Co-Managing partner of Potomac, the Companys largest stockholder. Concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Singer entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which he agreed, among other things, to tender all of his shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated.
13. Defendant Patrick Verderico (Verderico) has been a director of PLX since
November 2004. Concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Verderico entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which he agreed, among other things, to tender all of his shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated.
14. Defendants in ¶¶ 6-13 are collectively referred to as the Individual Defendants. By reason of their positions as officers and/or directors of the Company, the Individual Defendants are in a fiduciary relationship with plaintiff and the other PLX public shareholders, and owe plaintiff and PLXs other shareholders the highest obligations of loyalty, good faith, fair dealing, due care, and full and fair disclosure.
15. Defendant Avago is a leading designer, developer and global supplier of a broad range of analog semiconductor devices with a focus on III-V based products and complex digital and mixed signal CMOS based devices. Avagos product portfolio is extensive and includes thousands of products in four primary target markets: enterprise storage, wired infrastructure, wireless communications and industrial & other.
16. Defendant Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Avago.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
17. This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants inasmuch as Defendants principal place of business is in California, directly or by agents transact business in California, caused tortious injury in California and by an act or omission outside the State while regularly doing and/or soliciting business, engaging in other persistent course of conduct in the State, and/or deriving substantial revenue from goods or manufactured products used or consumed in California.
18. Venue is proper in this Court inasmuch as Defendants principal place of business is in this County and it regularly transacts business in this County and there are multiple defendants with no single venue applicable, and thus can be sued for damages in this County.
SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS
19. On June 23, 2014, PLX and Avago jointly issued a press release announcing the Proposed Acquisition. The press release stated in relevant parts:
SUNNYVALE, CA and SINGAPORE June 23, 2014 Avago Technologies Limited (NASDAQ: AVGO) and PLX Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: PLX) today announced that they have entered into a definitive agreement under which Avago will acquire PLX, a leader in PCI Express silicon and software connectivity solutions, in an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $309 million, or $293 million net of cash and debt acquired. Under the terms of the agreement, which was approved by the Boards of Directors of both companies, a subsidiary of Avago will commence a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock for $6.50 per share in cash. Avago expects to fund the transaction with cash available on its balance sheet.
The core PLX PCIe silicon business fits very well with the Avago business model and broadens Avagos portfolio serving the enterprise storage and networking end markets, stated Hock Tan, President and Chief Executive Officer of Avago. Following the closing of the transaction, we are excited to welcome the PLX team to Avago, and we are committed to continue to invest in the PLX PCI Express platform.
Once closed, this transaction will provide immediate value to our stockholders and offers new growth opportunities for our employees to develop leading-edge solutions for our customers, said David Raun, President and Chief Executive Officer of PLX. Following the closing of the transaction, we believe the combination with Avago is an excellent match for our leading PCI Express portfolio supporting next generation data center architectures.
The transaction is expected to be immediately accretive to Avagos non-GAAP earnings per share. Avago currently anticipates driving the PLX business model to a level consistent with Avagos long term business model by the end of fiscal year 2015, the first full fiscal year after closing.
Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P., which is the largest stockholder of PLX, certain senior members of the PLX management team and all of the directors of PLX, collectively owning approximately 14.7% of shares outstanding on fully diluted basis have executed a Tender and Support Agreement in support of the transaction. Discovery Group I, LLC, the second largest stockholder of PLX, has informed PLX that it supports the transaction.
The transaction is subject to customary closing conditions, including the tender into the offer by PLX stockholders of shares representing at least a majority of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock on a fully diluted basis, and the receipt of relevant regulatory approvals, including the expiration or termination of the applicable waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act and relevant foreign antitrust laws. It is expected that the transaction will close in the fourth quarter of Avagos fiscal year ending November 3, 2014.
20. On June 23, 2014, PLX also filed a Form 8-K with the SEC, disclosing its Agreement and Plan of Merger for the Proposed Acquisition (the Merger Agreement).
21. The genesis of the Proposed Acquisition began with appointment of defendants Colombatto, Domenik and Singer to the PLX Board. For much of the year 2013, Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P. (Potomac), who beneficially owns, together with its affiliates, approximately
9.8% of the outstanding common stock of PLX, had made public its dissatisfaction with the Companys Board for its failure to explore strategic acquisitions. On October 25, 2013, Potomac sent an open letter to PLX stockholders expressing this disappointment, and much more. The full text of the letter is as follows:
October 25, 2013
Dear Fellow PLX Stockholders,
Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P., together with its affiliates (Potomac), is the largest stockholder of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLX or the Company), beneficially owning approximately 9.8% of the outstanding shares of common stock of the Company. We have nominated a slate of five highly qualified directors for election to the Board of Directors (the Board) at the Companys 2013 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the 2013 Annual Meeting) because we do not believe the Board as currently constituted is acting in the best interests of stockholders. In several public letters and private communications with certain members of management and the Board, we have clearly articulated our concerns with the Company, relating to, among other things, the Companys historically weak operating performance and the Boards failed acquisition strategy, resulting in substantial dilution of stockholders. In response, the Board has failed to address the issues we have identified and appears resistant to any meaningful reconstitution of the Board, let alone a resolution that involves any incumbent Board member not standing for re-election at the Annual Meeting.
Over the past nine months, we have tried to engage with management and the Board in the hopes of avoiding a disruptive and costly election contest. In April 2013, for example, we made a special, cross-country trip to PLXs headquarters with the clear understanding that the purpose of our trip was to discuss our very reasonable settlement proposal of two Board seats, the formation of a strategic review committee, and the adoption of a mandatory retirement policy, which would have resulted in two directors retiring from the Board at the 2013 Annual Meeting. When we arrived, however, we were asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement and there was no meaningful discussion about our settlement proposal, showing us their lack of interest in proactively addressing the situation. In October 2013, with the window narrowing for the Company to schedule the 2013 Annual Meeting, we reached out again to PLX. After several verbal discussions, in which we expressed our strong belief that the Board must be reconstituted through additions and deletions of Board members, the Company proposed terms of settlement which included the addition of two of our director nominees but all incumbent directors standing for re-election at the Annual Meeting. In response, we proposed the addition of three of our director nominees with two incumbent directors agreeing not to stand for re-election at the 2013 Annual Meeting. Once again, the Company would not accept any settlement that involved any incumbent Board member not standing for re-election.
With an average tenure of over 14 years and the fact that the Board lacks any significant ownership of PLX, we are deeply frustrated by this Boards readiness to spend stockholder capital to engage in a protracted proxy fight, rather than communicate credibly with its largest stockholder. Based on our review of the Companys public filings, only two of the Boards six independent directors own any PLX common stock and of these two directors, they own, in the aggregate, less
than one percent (1%) of the outstanding shares of the Company, making this Board unvested stewards of stockholder capital. What is worse is that of the two independent directors that own any stock, one has cashed in much more of his stock than his current ownership position, reaping millions of dollars in profits. With no real investment dollars at risk, we are concerned that the Boards interests may not be aligned with stockholders. We question whether they may be more focused on self-preservation instead of reaching an agreement in the best interests of stockholders.
We are resolute in our determination to ensure the Company is governed for the benefit of its stockholders. Our interactions with the Board have left us with serious doubt as to whether minority representation on the Board is sufficient to influence critical decisions and unbind the decades-long ties that exist amongst the existing members of the Board. We therefore intend to exercise our rights on behalf of all stockholders and are committed to take any and all actions necessary in order to unlock stockholder value.
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Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P. |
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By: Potomac Capital Management II, L.L.C. |
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General Partner |
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/s/ Eric Singer |
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Name: Eric Singer |
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Title: Co-Managing Member |
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22. In a November 13, 2013 letter to PLX stockholders, the Company strongly disagreed with Potomacs assertions, pointed to the most profitable first nine months of any year in the Companys history, and encouraged each PLX stockholder to make [their] voice heard, and vote FOR all of you Boards director nominees. The relevant text of the Companys November 13, 2013 letter in response to Potomac is as follows:
November 13, 2013
Dear Stockholder:
We are writing to you today regarding PLX Technologys upcoming Annual Meeting of Stockholders, which will be held on December 18, 2013. At this meeting, you will be asked to make an important decision regarding the composition of the Board of Directors and, by extension, the future of PLX Technology. As you may be aware, Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P. (Potomac Capital), which has been a PLX Technology stockholder for roughly one year, is seeking to replace three members of your Board of Directors with three of their own nominees. We question whether their nominees, if elected, would place Potomac Capitals interests ahead of the interests of all PLX Technology stockholders.
We are always open to listening to the views of our stockholders and engaging in a meaningful, constructive dialogue. Over the last several months, we have met with Potomac Capital numerous times to discuss their suggestions as described in the
proxy. Despite our best efforts, including our offer to replace two of our existing Board members with two of their nominees, Potomac Capital has been unwilling to agree to a reasonable settlement and now insists on running a costly proxy contest at the expense of all PLX Technology stockholders.
Potomac Capital has consistently expressed its desire to have the Company sold immediately. Recent history shows that we are not at all opposed to a sale of the Company in April 2012, your Board approved a definitive agreement for the combination of PLX Technology with Integrated Device Technology, Inc. (IDTI). Unfortunately for all of us, this transaction was ultimately blocked by the Federal Trade Commission. Contrary to statements by Potomac Capital, your Board and management team have been and remain committed to exploring ways to maximize value for all PLX Technology stockholders, including through a sale of the Company.
Mindful of the need to continue to enhance stockholder value, the Board and management team has executed multiple steps over the last year to produce the most profitable first nine months of any year in the Companys history. We believe it is in stockholders best interest to maintain the current Board that is familiar with the Companys markets, products, employees, customers and strategy so we can continue to execute without disruption. This is a critical point in the execution of the Companys strategy and potential instability at any level would be counterproductive.
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Your vote is very important. We encourage you to make your voice heard by voting online, by telephone, or by signing and dating the enclosed WHITE proxy card and returning it in the postage paid envelope provided.
YOUR BOARD IS EXECUTING ON A STRATEGIC PLAN THAT IS DELIVERING VALUE FOR ALL STOCKHOLDERS
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In the face of recent challenges, including the economic recession and the temporary disruption of the terminated combination with IDTI, your Board and management team have delivered three consecutive profitable quarters in 2013 and the highest year-to-date profits in the Companys 27 year history. This has been achieved by focusing and expanding the Companys market position in PCIe, and by significantly reducing operating expenses, while increasing stockholder equity by almost 20 percent in the process. Combined with record profits, PLX Technology has paid down debt and increased our cash levels to provide additional balance sheet strength. During this period, we have continued to invest in our market-leading switch products while also expanding our addressable market with new innovative solutions to serve PCIe Solid State Drives (SSD) and network fabrics (PLXs ExpressFabric) within the cloud and data center to provide additional organic growth for years to come.
We believe the combination of a record design win pipe to fuel growth combined with further leveraging of the PCIe-focused operating model can produce increased profitability over the coming years. While we are confident in the outlook for PCIe, its growth may not always be linear. Four years ago the design activity pipeline, which creates future growth as programs go into production, with the previous PCIe Gen2 technology, resulted in PCIe revenues more than doubling from 2009 to 2012.
Today, our overall design activity pipeline is greater than three times the size it was in 2009, but now with Gen3 driving the activity. Therefore, we believe this puts PLX Technology in an excellent position to see similar or better results over the next three years as our design pipeline goes to production serving this growing market.
Your Board and management team are focused on execution and optimization, as well as market-leading product design. PLX Technology is gaining greater market share, expanding our business and achieving growth through a robust pipeline and portfolio.
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Through the continued execution of our operational and strategic initiatives, the Company is delivering solid and improving performance.
YOUR BOARDS DIRECTOR NOMINEES ARE INDEPENDENT AND HAVE THE RIGHT EXPERTISE TO MAXIMIZE VALUE FOR ALL PLX TECHNOLOGY STOCKHOLDERS
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We strongly believe the leadership and continuity of your Board is critical to the success of PLX Technologys ongoing delivery of profitable growth and stockholder value.
YOUR BOARD HAS BEEN REASONABLE AND OPEN TO A RESOLUTION WITH POTOMAC CAPITAL
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Your Board believes Potomac Capitals actions demonstrate that it is only interested in its self-serving agenda at any cost to the Company and irrespective of the cost to all other PLX Technology stockholders.
PROTECT YOUR INVESTMENT - VOTE THE WHITE PROXY CARD TODAY
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/D. James Guzy/ |
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D. James Guzy |
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Independent Chairman of the Board of Directors |
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/David Raun/ |
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David Raun |
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President, Chief Executive Officer and Director |
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23. On November 25, 2013, PLX filed with the SEC a secondary investor presentation urging the Companys stockholders to elect the Boards nominees for a number of reasons, most notably, that Potomac was a self-interested investor focused only on affecting a sale of the Company so it could realize profit in the short-term at the expense of PLX common shareholders.
The highlights of this Company presentation include the following:
· Under the PLX Technology Boards direction, the Company is executing a multiyear strategy to maximize stockholder value that has already delivered results. Through the first three quarters of 2013, the Company has delivered record profits and PCI Express revenues. Both represent the highest returns in the Companys history. In addition, PLX Technology has eliminated over $20 million in operating expenses and has significantly strengthened the balance sheet by paying down debt and building cash, all while increasing stockholder equity. With a record design win pipeline, 70 percent market share, an improving competitive landscape with high barriers to entry, a market leading customer base and an expanding addressable market including ExpressFabric, the Company is well-positioned for continued growth in revenues and profits. Over the last one, three, and five year periods, PLX Technology stockholders saw their investment outperform the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000.
· The PLX Technology Board is engaged, highly qualified, responsive to stockholder input and committed to protecting the rights of all stockholders to achieve high returns. The Board comprises business leaders who possess deep knowledge of the Company and its end-markets. This includes over 200 years of combined experience and 20 different represented companies from the semiconductor device and IP industry. As a result, the Board has a proven track record of capturing growth through new technology waves, including its oversight of PCI Express growth into a market leading position at a compounded annual growth rate of greater than 25 percent from 2006 to 2012. The Board has reduced spending, increased stockholder equity, implemented initiatives to increase margins, and focused the company to achieve growth organically. The Board continues to explore all options to maximize value for all stockholders, including a sale of the Company under the right circumstances, as evidenced by the IDTI transaction last year.
· Potomac Capital is a self-interested activist investor that is focused on short-term gains at the expense of other PLX Technology stockholders. Potomac Capitals agenda appears self-serving and transparent its primary goal is to force a quick sale of the Company in order to realize a short-term gain on its investment, to fulfill the demands of its own investors, and to transition capital to its next target, without regard for the best interests of all PLX Technology stockholders. The PLX Technology Board, in an effort to avoid a costly and disruptive proxy contest at the Annual Meeting, offered reasonable settlements to Potomac Capital, which included: the appointment of two Potomac Capital director candidates to the PLX Technology Board, including representation by these directors on Board committees; the removal of two existing directors; the appointment of a third, mutually agreed upon director; and customary standstill provisions. Potomac Capital rejected the Boards reasonable settlement offers by refusing to agree to a customary standstill provision.
· Potomac Capitals nominees do not diversify or add experience to the PLX Technology Board. Eric Singer, principal at Potomac Capital and a nominee, lacks any substantial operating experience in the industry and is solely interested in selling the Company. In addition, Potomac Capitals two other nominees appear only to have knowledge of the semiconductor industry that PLX Technology board members already possess. The experience and track record of the three targeted PLX Board members far exceed the three Potomac Capital nominees
24. On December 18, 2013, PLX announced the additions of Potomac nominees -
defendants Singer, Colombatto and Domenik - to the PLX Board. Six months later, the Company entered into the Proposed Acquisition for grossly inadequate consideration.
25. The Companys synergistic value to Avago in a strategic transaction, recent financial performance, historical trading prices, analyst opinion and comparable transactions all establish the inadequacy of the Merger consideration.
26. According to Zaks Equity Research, the Proposed Acquisition is a strategic move that is aimed to complement Avagos existing server storage connectivity and networking ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) products that serve the enterprise and data center market. This, in turn, will augment Avagos revenues, as the industry braces for more consolidation amid a challenging macroeconomic environment.
27. Added Sterne Agees Vijay Rakesh, the deal will enable Avago to acquire market share, particularly in light of a trend toward cloud computing and so-called hyperscale data centers.
28. PLX is a premier manufacturer of semiconductor-based PCI Express (PCIe) connectivity solutions that provide more bandwidth and is compatible with other existing operating systems. Based on the PCIe Gen3 standard, PLXs ExpressFabric offers a wide range of new enterprise storage and other key data center applications. It creates a universal interconnect that significantly improves the existing architecture and builds a powerful, cost-efficient PCIe interconnect that enables I/O-sharing applications.
29. The core PLX business is a strategic fit for Avago, further adding a new dimension to next generation data center architectures. In addition to cost synergies from a combined resource pool as the cost of designing and building semiconductors rises, Zaks Equity Research posits that the Proposed Acquisition will improve the operating margin of the combined company, creating greater scale to further drive innovation into the datacenter. The acquisition is expected to be immediately accretive to Avagos non-GAAP earnings.
30. The Boards decision to sell PLX at all, let alone for such a scant premium, is puzzling given the fact that PLX just reported its most profitable year in Company history. For example, on January 27, 2014; PLX announced fourth quarter revenues of $25.7 million and GAAP income of $1.0 million. For full year 2013, PLX reported revenue of $104.5 million and GAAP
income of $7.3 million, or $0.15 per share. Stated defendant Raun in the press release:
Our ongoing commitment to controlling costs and focusing on our market-leading PCI Express products resulted in our most profitable year in company history. PCI Express revenues were up 2 percent over Q3 and 13 percent annually. We Are pleased to see a number of Gen3 designs ramping to volume production and expect many more of our customers to launch their Gen3-enabled products in 2014. Design activity remains strong for both our Gen2 and Gen3 products, underscoring our market leadership and ongoing growth opportunity.
31. On April 21, 2014, PLX reported Q1 2014 financial results which saw increases to both revenue and net income when compared to Q4 2013. Higher gross profits in the first quarter, combined with lower expenses, drove increased income over Q4 and contributed to our fifth straight profitable quarter, said defendant Raun. In addition, we increased cash, saw strong bookings to support Q2 growth, and layered in another solid quarter of design wins.
32. The Companys historical trading prices, analyst opinion and comparable transactions also illuminate the inadequacy of the Merger consideration. For example, as recently as January 17, 2014, PLX shares traded as high as $6.91 per share and between November 25, 2013 and January 23, 2014 PLX shares traded above $6.48 per share in all but 3 trading days. Moreover at least one Yahoo! Finance analyst has set an $8 per share price target on PLX.
33. The Merger consideration also pales in comparison to like transactions. For example, in April 2014 Ametek, Inc. agreed to acquire Zygo Corporation for a purchase premium of approximately 31%; in November 2013 Tsinghua Unigroup agreed to acquire RDA Microelectronics for a purchase premium of approximately 33.3%, in August 2013 Maxim Integrated bought Volterra Semiconductor for a 55% purchase premium; and as recently as December 16, 2013 Avago agreed to acquire LSI Corporation for a 41% premium. Here, the PLX Board achieved a meager 9% premium for its shares. This premium is not even one third the premium that Avago paid to acquire LSI Corp, a short six months ago.
34. Finally, the proposed Merger consideration pales in comparison to alternative PLX negotiated sales. This is not the first instance that PLX has explored a transaction that would result in a change of control of the Company. On April 30 2012, PLX and Integrated Device Technology, Inc. (IDT) signed a definitive merger agreement whereby IDT was to acquire each outstanding share of PX stock for a combination of IDT stock and cash valued at approximately $7.00 per PLX
share.(1) That proposed transaction had an approximate value of $330 million, $37 million more than the Proposed Acquisition. At the time the IDT/PLX merger was announced, PLX shares were trading for $3.97 per share. Thus, the premium PLX had negotiated in that deal was approximately 75%. Here, shareholders will receive less than a 10% premium and less money per share.
35. It appears that the Board and the Companys executives may have been motivated by their own self interests in agreeing to the Proposed Acquisition. For example, on June 22, 2014, the Compensation Committee of the PLX Board of Directors amended and restated the PLX Severance Plan for Executive Management and approved entering into an Executive Officer Retention Agreement with defendant Raun pursuant to which defendant Raun will be entitled to a golden parachute payment equal to 150% of his base salary plus an amount equal to the prorated portion of the target bonus for the annual performance period then in effect, in addition to 18 months of full benefits and 100% accelerated vesting of equity awards should his employment be terminated within one year following a change in control as is contemplated by the Proposed Acquisition. Should defendant Raun still be employed by the combined company on the one year anniversary of the Proposed Acquisition closing, pursuant to the Retention Agreement, defendant Raun will receive a retention bonus equal to 150% of his base salary plus his target bonus under the variable compensation plan then in effect.
36. In addition, Arthur O. Whipple, Gene Schaeffer, Vijay Meduri, Michael Grubisich and Larry Chisvin, all named executive officers at PLX, also executed similarly structured Retention Agreements concurrently with the execution of the Merger Agreement.
37. Moreover, concurrently with entering into the Merger Agreement, Potomac, certain senior members of the PLX management team and all of the directors of PLX, entered into a Tender and Support Agreement with Avago pursuant to which they agreed to tender all of their shares in the Offer, unless the Merger Agreement is terminated. In aggregate, such persons own
(1) On December 20, 2012, IDT and PLX announced that they mutually agreed to terminate their merger agreement in response to a determination by the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to file an administrative complaint challenging IDTs proposed acquisition of PLX and the absence of a clear path for the parties to complete the proposed transaction.
approximately 14.7% of the outstanding shares of PLX. For months, Potomac has been urging a sale of the Company in order to recognize a short term gain on their investment. Following the appointment of defendants Singer, Colombatto and Domenik to the Companys Board, Potomac has successfully used its clout and influence to accomplish same at the expense of the Companys long term goals and the maximization of shareholder value.
38. As such, the Proposed Acquisition will allow Avago to purchase PLX at an unfairly low price while availing itself of PLX significant value and upside or long-term potential.
PRECLUSIVE DEAL MECHANISMS
39. Moreover, the Merger Agreement contains certain provisions that unduly benefit Avago by making an alternative transaction either prohibitively expensive or otherwise impossible. For example, the Merger Agreement contains a termination fee provision that requires PLX to pay $10.85 million to Avago in the event the Merger Agreement is terminated under certain circumstances. Under one circumstance, PLX must pay this fee even if it consummates any Competing Proposal within 12 months after the Merger Agreement is terminated.
40. The Merger Agreement does not contemplate that Avago will have to pay a reverse termination fee under any circumstances.
41. This termination fee provision will make the Company that much more expensive to acquire for potential purchasers while resulting in a corresponding decline in interest from other potential acquirors.
42. The Merger Agreement also contains a No Solicitation provision that restricts PLX from considering alternative acquisition proposals by, inter alia, constraining PLX ability to solicit or communicate with potential acquirers or consider their proposals. Specifically, the provision prohibits the Company from directly or indirectly soliciting, initiating, proposing or inducing any alternative proposal, but permits the Board to consider a bona fide written Competing Proposal if it constitutes or is reasonably calculated to lead to a Superior Proposal as defined in the Merger Agreement.
43. Moreover, the Agreement further reduces the possibility of a topping offer from an unsolicited purchaser. Here, Defendants agreed to provide Avago information in order to match
any other offer, thus providing Avago access to the unsolicited bidders financial information and giving Avago the ability to top the superior offer. Thus, a rival bidder is not likely to emerge with the cards stacked so much in favor of Avago.
44. The termination fee in combination with the preclusive deal protection devices will all but ensure that no competing offer will be forthcoming. Accordingly, the Companys true value is compromised by the consideration offered in the Proposed Acquisition and the Proposed Acquisition is the product of the Boards breaches of fiduciary duty, aided and abetted by Avago.
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FIDUCIARY DUTIES
45. In any situation where the directors of a publicly traded corporation undertake a transaction that will result in either a change in corporate control or a break-up of the corporations assets, the directors have an affirmative fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the companys shareholders, including the duty to obtain maximum value under the circumstances. To diligently comply with these duties, the directors may not take any action that:
a. adversely affects the value provided to the corporations shareholders;
b. will discourage or inhibit alternative offers to purchase control of the corporation or its assets;
c. contractually prohibits them from complying with their fiduciary duties; and/or
d. will provide the directors, executives or other insiders with preferential treatment at the expense of, or separate from, the public shareholders, and place their own pecuniary interests above those of the interests of the company and its shareholders.
46. In accordance with their duties of loyalty and good faith, the Individual Defendants, as directors and/or officers of PLX, are obligated to refrain from:
a. participating in any transaction where the directors or officers loyalties are divided;
b. participating in any transaction where the directors or officers are entitled to receive a personal financial benefit not equally shared by the public shareholders of the corporation; and/or
c. unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the public shareholders.
47. Plaintiff alleges herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in connection with the Proposed Acquisition, violated, and are violating, the fiduciary duties they owe to Plaintiff and the other public shareholders of PLX, including their duties of loyalty, good faith, candor, and due care. As a result of the Individual Defendants divided loyalties, Plaintiff and Class members will not receive adequate, fair or maximum value for their PLX common stock in the Proposed Acquisition.
48. As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duty, the Companys public shareholders will not receive adequate or fair value for their common stock in the Proposed Acquisition.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
49. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action individually and on behalf of all holders of PLX common stock who are being and will be banned by the Individual Defendants actions, described herein (the Class). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and any person, firm, trust, corporation or other entity related to or affiliated with any Defendant.
50. Class actions are certified when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 382. The California Supreme Court has stated that a class should be certified when the party seeking certification has demonstrated the existence of a well-defined community of interest among the members of the proposed class. Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 29 Cal.3d 462, 470 (1981); see also Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 (1967).
51. Class actions are especially valuable in a context such as this one, in which individual damages may be modest. It is well settled that a plaintiff need not prove the merits of the action at the class certification stage.
52. Rather, the decision of whether to certify a class is essentially a procedural one and the appropriate analysis is whether, assuming the merits of the claims, they are suitable for resolution on a class-wide basis:
As the focus in a certification dispute is on what types of questions common or individual are likely to arise in the action, rather than on the merits of the case, in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support a trial courts certification order, we consider whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.
Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.4th 319, 327 (2004) (citations omitted).
53. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because, inter alia:
a. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. PLX stock is publicly traded on the Nasdaq and Plaintiff believes that there are approximately 45.9 million holders of such shares. Moreover, the holders of these shares are geographically dispersed throughout the United States;
b. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. These common questions include, inter alia: (i) whether the Individual Defendants have engaged in self-dealing, to the detriment of PLX public shareholders; (ii) whether the Proposed Acquisition is unfair to the Class, in that the price is inadequate and is not the fair value that could be obtained under the circumstances; (iii) whether PLX aided and abetted the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duty; and (iv) whether the Class is entitled to injunctive relief and/or damages as a result of the wrongful conduct committed by Defendants;
c. Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class;
d. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would,
as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; and
e. Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to, and causing injury to, the Class and, therefore, preliminary and final injunctive relief on behalf of the Class as a whole is appropriate.
FIRST COUNT
Breach of Fiduciary Duty against the Individual Defendants
54. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein.
55. As alleged herein, Defendants have initiated a process to sell PLX that undervalues the Company and vests them with benefits that are not shared equally by PLX public shareholders. Moreover, Defendants failed to sufficiently inform themselves of PLX value, or disregarded the true value of the Company, in an effort to benefit themselves. Furthermore, any alternate acquirer will be faced with engaging in discussions with a management team and board that is committed to the Proposed Acquisition.
56. As such, unless the Individual Defendants conduct is enjoined by the Court, they will continue to breach their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and will further a process that inhibits the maximization of shareholder value and the disclosure of material information.
57. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law.
SECOND COUNT
Aiding and Abetting the Boards Breaches of Fiduciary Duty
Against Defendants PLX, Avago and Merger Sub
58. Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth herein.
59. Defendants PLX, Avago and Merger Sub knowingly assisted the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the Proposed Acquisition, which, without such aid, would not have occurred.
60. As a result of this conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been and will be damaged in that they have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their shares.
61. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands injunctive relief, in his favor and in favor of the Class, and against the Defendants, as follows:
A. Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a class action, certifying Plaintiff as Class representative and certifying his counsel as class counsel;
B. Declaring and decreeing that the Proposed Acquisition was entered into in breach of the fiduciary duties of the Individual Defendants and is therefore unlawful and unenforceable, and rescinding and invalidating any merger agreement or other agreements that Defendants entered into in connection with, or in furtherance of, the Proposed Acquisition;
C. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants, their agents, counsel, employees and all persons acting in concert with them from consummating the Proposed Acquisition;
D. Directing the Individual Defendants to exercise their fiduciary duties to obtain a transaction that is in the best interests of PLX shareholders;
E. Imposing a constructive trust, in favor of Plaintiff and the Class, upon any benefits improperly received by Defendants as a result of their wrongful conduct;
F. Awarding Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable attorneys and experts fees; and
G. Granting such other and further equitable relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands a jury on all issues which can be heard by a jury.
Dated: June 26, 2014 |
BRODSKY & SMITH, LLC | ||
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/s/ Evan J. Smith | |
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Evan J. Smith (SBN242352) | ||
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9595 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 900 | ||
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Beverly Hills, CA 90212 | ||
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Telephone: |
(877) 534-2590 | |
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(310) 247-0160 | |
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Attorneys for Plaintiff | ||
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CM-010 ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY Evan J. Smith (SBN242352) Brodsky & Smith, LLC 9595 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 900 Beverly Hills, CA 90212 TELEPHONE NO.: 877-534-2590 FAX NO.: 310-247-0160 ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Andrew Ellis SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Santa Clara STREET ADDRESS: 191 N. 1st Street MAILING ADDRESS: CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Jose, CA 95113 BRANCH NAME: CASE NAME: Ellis v. PLX Technology, Inc. et al. CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Complex Case Designation CASE NUMBER: 114CV26717 Unlimited (Amount demanded exceeds $25,000) Limited (Amount demanded is $25,000 or less) Counter Joinder Filed with first appearance by defendant (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402) JUDGE: DEPT: Items 16 below must be completed (see instructions on page 2). 1. Check one box below for the case type that best describes this case: Auto Tort Auto (22) Uninsured motorist (46) Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort Asbestos (04) Product liability (24) Medical malpractice (45) Other PI/PD/WD (23) Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort Business tort/unfair business practice (07) Civil rights (08) Defamation (13) Fraud (16) Intellectual property (19) Professional negligence (25) Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (35) Employment wrongful termination (36) Other employment (15) Contract Breach of contract/warranty (06) Rule 3.740 collections (09) Other collections (09) Insurance coverage (18) Other contract (37) Real Property Eminent domain/Inverse condemnation (14) Wrongful eviction (33) Other real property (26) Unlawful Detainer Commercial (31) Residential (32) Drugs (38) Judicial Review Asset forfeiture (05) Petition re: arbitration award (11) Writ of mandate (02) Other judicial review (39) Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.4003.403) Antitrust/Trade regulation (03) Construction defect (10) Mass tort (40) Securities litigation (28) Environmental/Toxic tort (30) Insurance coverage claims arising from the above listed provisionally complex case types (41) Enforcement of Judgment Enforcement of judgment (20) Miscellaneous Civil Complaint RICO (27) Other complaint (not specified above) (42) Miscellaneous Civil Petition Partnership and corporate governance (21) Other petition (not specified above) (43) 2. This case is is not complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the factors requiring exceptional judicial management: a. Large number of separately represented parties b. Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel issues that will be time-consuming to resolve c. Substantial amount of documentary evidence d. Large number of witnesses e. Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court f. Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision 3. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a. monetary b. nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief c. punitive 4. Number of causes of action (specify): 2 5. This case is is not a class action suit. 6. If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (You may use form CM-015.) Date: June 26, 2014 Evan J. Smith (SBN 242352) (TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY) NOTICE Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result in sanctions. File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule. If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all other parties to the action or proceeding. Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only. Page 1 of 2 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California CM-010 [Rev. July 1, 2007] CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.30, 3.220, 3.4003.403, 3.740; Cal. Standards of Judicial Administration, std. 3.10 www.courtinfo.ca.gov 2008 (c) American LegalNet, Inc. |
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CM-010 INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO COMPLETE THE COVER SHEET To Plaintiffs and Others Filing First Papers. If you are filing a first paper (for example, a complaint) in a civil case, you must complete and file, along with your first paper, the Civil Case Cover Sheet contained on page 1. This information will be used to compile statistics about the types and numbers of cases filed. You must complete items 1 through 6 on the sheet. In item 1, you must check one box for the case type that best describes the case. If the case fits both a general and a more specific type of case listed in item 1, check the more specific one. If the case has multiple causes of action, check the box that best indicates the primary cause of action. To assist you in completing the sheet, examples of the cases that belong under each case type in item 1 are provided below. A cover sheet must be filed only with your initial paper. Failure to file a cover sheet with the first paper filed in a civil case may subject a party, its counsel, or both to sanctions under rules 2.30 and 3.220 of the California Rules of Court. To Parties in Rule 3.740 Collections Cases. A collections case under rule 3.740 is defined as an action for recovery of money owed in a sum stated to be certain that is not more than $25,000, exclusive of interest and attorneys fees, arising from a transaction in which property, services, or money was acquired on credit. A collections case does not include an action seeking the following: (1) tort damages, (2) punitive damages, (3) recovery of real property, (4) recovery of personal property, or (5) a prejudgment writ of attachment. The identification of a case as a rule 3.740 collections case on this form means that it will be exempt from the general time-for-service requirements and case management rules, unless a defendant files a responsive pleading. A rule 3.740 collections case will be subject to the requirements for service and obtaining a judgment in rule 3.740. To Parties in Complex Cases. In complex cases only, parties must also use the Civil Case Cover Sheet to designate whether the case is complex. If a plaintiff believes the case is complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court, this must be indicated by completing the appropriate boxes in items 1 and 2. If a plaintiff designates a case as complex, the cover sheet must be served with the complaint on all parties to the action. A defendant may file and serve no later than the time of its first appearance a joinder in the plaintiffs designation, a counter-designation that the case is not complex, or, if the plaintiff has made no designation, a designation that the case is complex. CASE TYPES AND EXAMPLES Auto Tort Auto (22)Personal Injury/Property Damage/ Wrongful Death Uninsured Motorist (46) (if the case involves an uninsured motorist claim subject to arbitration, check this item instead of Auto) Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/ Property Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort Asbestos (04) Asbestos Property Damage Asbestos Personal Injury/ Wrongful Death Product Liability (not asbestos or toxic/environmental) (24) Medical Malpractice (45) Medical Malpractice Physicians & Surgeons Other Professional Health Care Malpractice Other PI/PD/WD (23) Premises Liability (e.g., slip and fall) Intentional Bodily Injury/PD/WD (e.g., assault, vandalism) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Other PI/PD/WD Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort Business Tort/Unfair Business Practice (07) Civil Rights (e.g., discrimination, false arrest) (not civil harassment) (08) Defamation (e.g., slander, libel) (13) Fraud (16) Intellectual Property (19) Professional Negligence (25) Legal Malpractice Other Professional Malpractice (not medical or legal) Other Non-PI/PD/WD Tort (35) Employment Wrongful Termination (36) Other Employment (15) Contract Breach of Contract/Warranty (06) Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) Contract/Warranty BreachSeller Plaintiff (not fraud or negligence) Negligent Breach of Contract/ Warranty Other Breach of Contract/Warranty Collections (e.g., money owed, open book accounts) (09) Collection CaseSeller Plaintiff Other Promissory Note/Collections Case Insurance Coverage (not provisionally complex) (18) Auto Subrogation Other Coverage Other Contract (37) Contractual Fraud Other Contract Dispute Real Property Eminent Domain/Inverse Condemnation (14) Wrongful Eviction (33) Other Real Property (e.g., quiet title) (26) Writ of Possession of Real Property Mortgage Foreclosure Quiet Title Other Real Property (not eminent domain, landlord/tenant, or foreclosure) Unlawful Detainer Commercial (31) Residential (32) Drugs (38) (if the case involves illegal drugs, check this item; otherwise, report as Commercial or Residential) Judicial Review Asset Forfeiture (05) Petition Re: Arbitration Award (11) Writ of Mandate (02) WritAdministrative Mandamus WritMandamus on Limited Court Case Matter WritOther Limited Court Case Review Other Judicial Review (39) Review of Health Officer Order Notice of AppealLabor Commissioner Appeals Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court Rules 3.4003.403) Antitrust/Trade Regulation (03) Construction Defect (10) Claims Involving Mass Tort (40) Securities Litigation (28) Environmental/Toxic Tort (30) Insurance Coverage Claims (arising from provisionally complex case type listed above) (41) Enforcement of Judgment Enforcement of Judgment (20) Abstract of Judgment (Out of County) Confession of Judgment (non-domestic relations) Sister State Judgment Administrative Agency Award (not unpaid taxes) Petition/Certification of Entry of Judgment on Unpaid Taxes Other Enforcement of Judgment Case Miscellaneous Civil Complaint RICO (27) Other Complaint (not specified above) (42) Declaratory Relief Only Injunctive Relief Only (non-harassment) Mechanics Lien Other Commercial Complaint Case (non-tort/non-complex) Other Civil Complaint (non-tort/non-complex) Miscellaneous Civil Petition Partnership and Corporate Governance (21) Other Petition (not specified above) (43) Civil Harassment Workplace Violence Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse Election Contest Petition for Name Change Petition for Relief From Late Claim Other Civil Petition CM-010 [Rev. July 1, 2007] CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Page 2 of 2 |
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ATTACHMENT CV-5012 CIVIL LAWSUIT NOTICE Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara 191 N. First St., San Jose, CA 95113 CASE NUMBER: 114CV267171 PLEASE READ THIS ENTIRE FORM PLAINTIFF (the person suing): Within 60 days after filing the lawsuit, you must serve each Defendant with the Complaint, Summons, an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information Sheet, and a copy of this Civil Lawsuit Notice, and you must file written proof of such service. DEFENDANT (The person sued): You must do each of the following to protect your rights: 1. You must file a written response to the Complaint, using the proper legal form or format, in the Clerks Office of the Court, within 30 days of the date you were served with the Summons and Complaint; 2. You must serve by mail a copy of your written response on the Plaintiffs attorney or on the Plaintiff if Plaintiff has no attorney (to serve by mail means to have an adult other than yourself mail a copy); and 3. You must attend the first Case Management Conference. Warning: If you, as the Defendant, do not follow these instructions, you may automatically lose this case. RULES AND FORMS: You must follow the California Rules of Court and the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara Local Civil Rules and use proper forms. You can obtain legal information, view the rules and receive forms, free of charge, from the Self-Help Center at 99 Notre Dame Avenue, San Jose (408-882-2900 x-2926), www.scselfservice.org (Select Civil) or from: § State Rules and Judicial Council Forms: www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms and www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules § Local Rules and Forms: http://www.sccsuperiorcourt.org/civil/rule1toc.htm CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE (CMC): You must meet with the other parties and discuss the case, in person or by telephone, at least 30 calendar days before the CMC. You must also fill out, file and serve a Case Management Statement (Judicial Council form CM-110) at least 15 calendar days before the CMC. You or your attorney must appear at the CMC. You may ask to appear by telephone see Local Civil Rule 8. Your Case Management Judge is: Peter Kirwan Department: 1 The 1st CMC is scheduled for: (Completed by Clerk of Court) Date: 10/24/14 Time: 10:00am in Department: 1 The next CMC is scheduled for: (Completed by party if the 1st CMC was continued or has passed) Date: Time: in Department: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): If all parties have appeared and filed a completed ADR Stipulation Form (local form CV-5008) at least 15 days before the CMC, the Court will cancel the CMC and mail notice of an ADR Status Conference. Visit the Courts website at www.sccsuperiorcourt.org/civil/ADR/ or call the ADR Administrator (408-882-2100 x-2530) for a list of ADR providers and their qualifications, services, and fees. WARNING: Sanctions may be imposed if you do not follow the California Rules of Court or the Local Rules of Court. Form CV-5012 REV 7/01/08 CIVIL LAWSUIT NOTICE Page 1 of 1 |
Exhibit 99.3
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BOBY VARGHESE, Individually And On Behalf Of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
Defendants. |
) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) |
Civil Action No.
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VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Boby Varghese (Plaintiff), on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, by and through the undersigned counsel, alleges the following upon information and belief, including the investigation of counsel and review of publicly-available information, except as to those allegations pertaining to Plaintiff, which are alleged upon personal knowledge:
SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1. Plaintiff brings this stockholder class action on behalf of himself and the other public stockholders of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLXT or the Company), other than Defendants (defined below) and their affiliates, against PLXT, certain officers and members of PLXTs board of directors (the Board or the Individual Defendants), Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc. (Avago), and Pluto Merger Sub, Inc. (Merger Sub),
arising from the Individual Defendants breaches of their fiduciary duties in connection with Avagos proposed acquisition of all of the outstanding stock of PLXT (the Proposed Transaction).
2. PLXT is headquartered in Sunnyvale, California, and is the industry-leading global provider of semiconductor-based PCI Express connectivity solutions primarily targeting enterprise data center markets. The Company develops innovative software-enriched silicon that enables product differentiation, reliable interoperability and superior performance.
3. On June 23, 2014, PLXT and Avago jointly announced that they had reached a definitive agreement and plan of merger (Merger Agreement), whereby Avago, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Merger Sub, will acquire PLXT in a merger via a tender offer in a deal worth roughly $309 million, or $293 million net of cash and debt acquired. As a result of the Proposed Transaction, PLXT shareholders are only anticipated to receive $6.50 per share in cash in exchange for each share of PLXT they own (the Merger Consideration).
4. The Merger Agreement provides that upon approval of a majority of PLXT stockholders, Merger Sub will merge with and into PLXT, with PLXT continuing as the surviving corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Avago. The Proposed Transaction is expected to close in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2014.
5. The Proposed Transaction undervalues PLXTs prospects and is the result of an unfair sales process. The $6.50 per share Merger Consideration represents a premium of just 9.4% based on PLXTs $5.94 closing price on June 20, 2014. This premium is well below the average one day premium of over 25% for comparable transactions in the last three years. During the last 52 weeks, PLXT traded as high as $6.91, 5.9% higher than the Merger Consideration, and at least one analyst set a price target of $8.00 per share of PLXT for the most
recent quarter. Additionally, PLXT has seen substantial recent growth as its share price skyrocketed from $3.81 per share on January 2, 2013 to $6.28 per share on June 10, 2014. Moreover, PLXT projects 22.50% annual earnings growth for the next five years and reported strong financial metrics including a current ratio of 3.70 and debt to equity ratio of 0.08, which is currently below the industry average and demonstrates that the Company has successfully managed its debt levels. Each of the figures above only serves to underscore the inadequacy of the buying price.
6. The premium offered in the Proposed Transaction is particularly inadequate given the significant benefits Avago will reap if the Proposed Transaction is consummated. Avagos Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Hock Tan (Tan), recently stated that PLXTs core business fits very well with the Avago business model and broadens Avagos portfolio serving the enterprise storage and networking end markets. Tan added that the Proposed Transaction would help Avago expand operations in storage hardware and other products sold in data centers. Recognizing that PLXT was an easy acquisition target, Avago seeks to acquire PLXT at a significant discount when compared to the Companys inherent value.
7. The Street Ratings Team, as of June 23, 2014, rates PLXT as a buy and added that its rating:
is driven by multiple strengths, which we believe should have a greater impact than any weaknesses, and should give investors a better performance opportunity than most stocks we cover. The companys strengths can be seen in multiple areas, such as its largely solid financial position with reasonable debt levels by most measures, good cash flow from operations, solid stock price performance, expanding profit margins and notable return on equity. We feel these strengths outweigh the fact that the company has had sub par growth in net income.
8. Additionally, the Companys net operating cash flow has significantly increased by 127.60% to $1.04 million when compared to the same quarter last year. PLXT has vastly
surpassed the industry average cash flow growth rate of 3.29%. Compared to its closing price of one year ago, PLXTs share price has jumped by 26.58%, exceeding the performance of the broader market during that same time frame. Looking ahead, the stocks sharp rise over the last year has already helped drive it to a level that is relatively expensive compared to the rest of its industry. The Street Ratings Team has stated that the strengths PLXT displays justify the higher price levels. As the figures above show, the Merger Consideration is inadequate, offering little or no return for PLXT stockholders.
9. Moreover, the sales and negotiation process leading up to the consummation of the Merger Agreement was fundamentally flawed. It appears that PLXT did not establish a special committee of independent directors to evaluate the Proposed Transaction. In addition, Defendants agreed to unreasonable deal-protection devices that unfairly favor Avago and discourage potential bidders from submitting a superior offer for the Company. These preclusive devices include: (i) a non-solicitation provision that restricts the Board from soliciting other potentially superior offers; (ii) an information rights provision, which provides Avago with unfettered access to information about other potential proposals, gives Avago four business days to negotiate a new deal with PLXT in the event a competing offer emerges, and provides Avago with the perpetual right to attempt to beat any superior bid; and (iii) an unreasonably high termination fee of up to $10.85 million, which is over 3.5% of the estimated deal value.
10. The process facilitating the Proposed Transaction is also flawed because of significant conflicts of interest and self-dealing that infiltrated the sales process. PLXT insiders and their affiliates own significant quantities of PLXT stock, and will receive millions of dollars as part of change of control arrangements, and therefore unduly influenced a sale of PLXT not
necessarily in the best interest of non-insider shareholders. PLXTs largest shareholder, Potomac Capital Partners II L.P., as well as certain senior members of the PLXT management team and all of the directors of PLXT, some of which will stay with the new company, have executed a tender and support agreement in support of the deal. Collectively, those groups own 14.7% of PLXTs shares outstanding, rendering the deal fait accompli. The Individual Defendants facilitated the Proposed Transaction via an unfair and inadequate negotiation process and placed their own personal financial interests ahead of PLXT public stockholders.
11. As alleged in further detail below, both the consideration PLXT stockholders stand to receive through the Proposed Transaction and the process by which Defendants propose to consummate the Proposed Transaction are fundamentally unfair to Plaintiff and the other public stockholders of the Company.
12. The Individual Defendants conduct constitutes a breach of their fiduciary duties owed to PLXT public stockholders, and a violation of applicable legal standards governing the Individual Defendants conduct.
13. For these reasons and as set forth in detail herein, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from taking any steps to consummate the Proposed Transaction or, in the event the Proposed Transaction is consummated, to recover damages resulting from the Individual Defendants violations of their fiduciary duties.
THE PARTIES
14. Plaintiff is, and at all relevant times was, a stockholder of PLXT since prior to the wrongs complained of herein.
15. PLXT is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, with its principal executive offices located at 870 W. Maude Avenue, Sunnyvale, California 94085. PLXT is the industry-leading global provider of semiconductor-based PCI Express connectivity
solutions primarily targeting enterprise data center markets. The Company develops innovative software-enriched silicon that enables product differentiation, reliable interoperability and superior performance. The Companys common stock is traded on the NASDAQ under the symbol PLXT.
16. Defendant Michael J. Salameh (Salameh) has served as a Chairman of the Board since January 2014. Salameh co-founded PLXT and served as CEO and member of the Board from PLXTs inception in May 1986. He retired from his position as CEO in November 2008 and continued to serve as a director until becoming Chairman.
17. Defendant Martin Colombatto (Colombatto) has served as a director since December 2013.
18. Defendant Stephen Domenik (Domenik) has served as a director since December 2013.
19. Defendant John H. Hart (Hart) has served as a director since April 1999.
20. Defendant David Raun (Raun) has served as a director since December 2012.
21. Defendant Ralph Schmitt (Schmitt) has served as a director since November 2008. Schmitt is also President and CEO of the Company.
22. Defendant Eric Singer (Singer) has served as a director since December 2013.
23. Defendant Patrick Verderico (Verderico) has served as a director since November 2004.
24. Defendants Salameh, Colombatto, Domenik, Hart, Raun, Schmitt, Singer, and Verderico are collectively referred to herein as the Board or the Individual Defendants.
25. Defendant Avago is a Delaware corporation and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Avago Technologies Finance Pte. Ltd. Avagos principal executive offices are
located at 350 West Trimble Road, Building 90, San Jose California 95131 and at 1 Yishun Avenue 7, Milpitas, Singapore 768923. Avago is a leading designer, developer, and global supplier of a broad range of analog semiconductor devices with a focus on III-V based products and complex digital and mixed signal CMOS based devices. Avagos product portfolio is extensive and includes thousands of products in four primary target markets: enterprise storage, wired infrastructure, wireless communications, and industrial & other. Avagos common stock is traded on the NASDAQ under the symbol AVGO.
26. Defendant Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Avago, and was created for the purposes of effectuating the Proposed Transaction.
27. Collectively, PLXT, the Individual Defendants, Avago, and Merger Sub are referred to herein as the Defendants.
THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
28. By reason of the Individual Defendants positions with the Company as officers and/or directors, said individuals are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the other stockholders of PLXT and owe Plaintiff and the other members of the Class (defined herein) the duties of good faith, care, and loyalty.
29. By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of PLXT, the Individual Defendants, at all relevant times, had the power to control and influence, and did control and influence and cause PLXT to engage in the practices complained of herein.
30. Each of the Individual Defendants is required to act in good faith, in the best interests of the Companys stockholders and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as would be expected of an ordinarily prudent person. In a situation where the directors of a publicly traded company undertake a transaction that may result in a change in corporate control, the directors must take all steps reasonably required to maximize the value stockholders will
receive rather than use a change of control to benefit themselves. To diligently comply with this duty, the directors of a corporation may not take any action that:
(a) adversely affects the value provided to the corporations stockholders;
(b) contractually prohibits them from complying with or carrying out their fiduciary duties;
(c) discourages or inhibits alternative offers to purchase control of the corporation or its assets;
(d) will otherwise adversely affect their duty to search for and secure the best value reasonably available under the circumstances for the corporations stockholders; or
(e) will provide the directors and/or officers with preferential treatment at the expense of, or separate from, the public stockholders.
31. Plaintiff alleges herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in connection with the Proposed Transaction, violated duties owed to Plaintiff and the other stockholders of PLXT, including their duties of loyalty, good faith, and due care, insofar as they, inter alia, failed to obtain the best price possible under the circumstances before entering into the Proposed Transaction, and engaged in self-dealing and obtained for themselves personal benefits, including personal financial benefits, not shared equally by Plaintiff or the other stockholders of PLXT common stock.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
32. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the other stockholders of PLXT common stock as of June 23, 2014 (the Class). The Class specifically excludes Defendants herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation or other entity related to, or affiliated with, any of the Defendants.
33. This action is properly maintainable as a class action because:
(a) The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of March 31, 2014 there were 45,899,775 shares of PLXT common stock issued and outstanding. The actual number of public stockholders of PLXT will be ascertained through discovery;
(b) There are questions of law and fact that are common to the Class, including inter alia, the following:
(i) Whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty or due care with respect to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction;
(ii) Whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty to secure and obtain the best price reasonable under the circumstances for the benefit of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; and
(iii) Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would suffer irreparable injury were the Proposed Transaction complained of herein consummated.
(c) Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class, has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class;
(d) Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and Plaintiff does not have any interests adverse to the Class;
(e) The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class; and
(f) Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect to the matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with respect to the Class as a whole.
SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS
A. Background
34. Since its 1986 incorporation, PLXT has been developing leading I/O interconnect silicon and complimentary software. The Company is the technology and market share leader in PCI Express switches and bridges, with additional leadership USB controllers, legacy PCI bridges, and consumer storage controllers. These serial technologies have become mainstream, and PLXT has been able to offer innovative differentiated products based on these interconnect standards while providing scalability and performance at a lower cost. PLXT offers a complete solution consisting of semiconductor devices, software development kits, hardware design kits, operating system ports, and firmware solutions that enable added-value features in PLXT products.
35. While always a marker leader, recent financial results strongly indicate that the growth potential and long term value for PLXT shareholders remains good. On April 22, 2013, in announcing its 2013 first quarter financial results, the Company reported first quarter revenues of $26.2 million and net income of $2.6 million. Individual Defendant Raun, PLXTs President and CEO, stated that our record PCI Express sales, lower expenses and higher margins
produced one of the most profitable quarters in years. PLXT experienced a 12% growth over 2012 fourth quarter.
36. Raun also expressed optimism about the Companys prospects:
As we look ahead, demand for our flagship PCI Express products remains strong and is projected to grow in Q2, driven mostly by enterprise data center equipment. Our much smaller legacy connectivity product line will continue to decrease over time. Overall, our business model continues to strengthen. We paid down $6 million in liabilities in Q1 and expect continued tight cost controls combined with revenue increases in PCI Express products to allow solid results throughout 2013.
37. On the Q1 2013 Earnings Conference Call held on April 22, 2013, Arthur O. Whipple (Whipple), Company Chief Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer, Vice President of Finance and Secretary, commented:
Net revenues for the first quarter were $26.2 million, up 12% from $23.4 million last quarter. PCI Express revenues increased by 14.8% to $18.6 million, a new record. Connectivity revenues increased by 6% to $7.6 million.
38. Raun also added:
We are excited by the PCI Express market opportunity and continue to execute against our plan. The record design wins achieved in 2011 and 2012, with the market leaders in the growing data center space, are ramping in production this year and next. We anticipate solid revenue and earnings for years to come from our in-the-box switch solutions. Our highest-ever PCI Express switch market share, now more than 70%, combined with winning nearly all the Gen 3 designs, helps ensure this growth.
PLX is uniquely positioned as the top supplier of PCI Express switching to the market leaders throughout the fast-growing data center. Our strong design activity, increased market share and dominant Gen 3 portfolio should fuel our growth for years to come. The entire organization is focused on PCI Express. Expenses are in control, innovative new products are in development and continued growth in PCI Express is expected.
39. The strong financial results continued in the 2013 second quarter. On July 22, 2013, the Company announced second quarter revenues of $26.8 million and net income of $1.7 million. With respect to this news, Raun commented:
Our ongoing commitment to controlling costs and focusing on our growing leadership in PCI Express has resulted in consecutive profitable quarters. Although we still have much to do, these two quarters combined produced the most profitable first six months of any year in the companys history. PCI Express grew eight percent, led by Gen3 growth setting a new record and producing our first $20 million PCI Express quarter. PCI Express is now 75 percent of our sales, up from 67 percent one year ago.
Our leadership position in PCI Express, along with innovative products in development, is driving growth and new opportunities in the enterprise data center and cloud. Networking and enterprise storage are leading the way on the design win front with strong activity around PCIe SSD platforms. We believe PLX won every significant switch design opportunity this past quarter.
We estimate that the PCI Express market will grow by 15 to 25 percent in 2013. As we discussed last quarter, our continued revenue increases in PCI Express are expected to be somewhat offset through this year by declines in sales of our legacy connectivity products. However, we expect to exit 2013 with less than 20 percent of revenue from connectivity. Market growth, market share gains, solid design activity, and declining impact from connectivity products, should position PLX for greater growth in future quarters.
40. On the Q2 2013 Earnings Call held on July 22, 2013, Whipple commented:
Net revenues for the second quarter were $26.8 million, up 2.4% from $26.2 million last quarter. PCI Express revenues increased by 7.8% to $20.1 million, a new record. Compared with the second quarter of 2012, PCI Express revenues increased by 16.9% from $17.2 million and now represents 75% of revenues.
41. Raun also added:
We continue to stay laser-focused on our market-leading PCI Express product lines. This includes our in-the-box standard switch families in production today as well as our market expanding out-of-box ExpressFabric product line in development.
Our 8% PCI Express growth in Q2 produced our first $20 million quarter for this key product line. This growth was driven by record sales with our new Gen 3 families as well as our Gen 2 switches. The continued growth at Gen 2 products, which were introduced in 2007, demonstrate the long life of these products. We estimate that the PCI Express market will grow about 15% to 25% in 2013.
I believe this quarter was another step in the right direction. The entire organization is focused on PCI Express, keeping spending and control and bringing new innovative products to market.
PLX is uniquely positioned as the top supplier of PCI Express switching to the market leaders throughout the fast-growing data center. Our strong design activity, increased market share, dominant Gen 3 portfolio and a market-expanding ExpressFabric products in development should fuel our growth and profits for years to come.
42. On October 21, 2013, in announcing its 2013 third quarter financial results, the Company declared its third consecutive profitable quarter along with record year-to-date profits and designs wins. PLXTs third quarter revenues reached $25.7 million, with a net income of $2.0 million. Raun commented on these results:
Our focus on key cost control measures has resulted in three consecutive profitable quarters and record profits year-to-date allowing us to build our cash position and pay down debt. Record PCI Express design wins dominated by higher ASP Gen3 products signal a healthy pipeline. Market share gains in PCI Express, no significant design win losses over the past two quarters, and production of new higher lane count parts in Q4 highlights additional opportunities for the company.
Enterprise storage and networking markets continue to dominate design win activity, and our market-leading technology backed by strong customer relationships position us for continued design win success. We also garnered significant industry interest in the quarter with the companys first public demonstration of PLXs ExpressFabric® technology housed in a data center rack at the Intel Developer Forum (I DF).
Our overall design activity pipe which measures the potential annual revenue for each program is in the hundreds of millions of dollars and is greater than three times the size that it was four years ago when our main focus was Gen2. All five of our PCI Express end market segments produced greater design wins than last quarter, and we are confident about our growth potential for years to come.
43. On the Q3 2013 Earnings Call held on October 21, 2013, Raun added:
Were excited about our growth prospects for the coming year and in the years ahead. Our PCI Express Gen 3 switches are ramping rapidly with a record design win pipeline to drive significant growth in all our target markets, including new developing high-volume opportunities like PCI Express SSD drives or solid state drives, blade servers and some high-end PCs.
44. On January 27, 2014, in announcing its 2013 fourth quarter financial results, the Company declared record annual GAAP net income, PCI express revenues, and design wins.
PLXTs fourth quarter revenues reached $25.7 million, with a GAAP income of $1.0 million. Additionally, for 2013, PLXT reported revenue of $104.5 million and GAAP income of $7.3 million. Raun commented on these results:
Our ongoing commitment to controlling costs and focusing on our market-leading PCI Express products resulted in our most profitable year in company history. PCI Express revenues were up 2 percent over Q3 and 13 percent annually. We are pleased to see a number of Gen3 designs ramping to volume production and expect many more of our customers to launch their Gen3-enabled products in 2014. Design activity remains strong for both our Gen2 and Gen3 products, underscoring our market leadership and ongoing growth opportunity.
Our balance sheet in the quarter continued to improve as we paid down our bank debt and increased our cash and investments to $20.4 million, while increasing shareholder equity 24 percent over the course of the year. As we look to 2014, we anticipate growth in revenues and profits, driven by a robust design win pipeline and a strong focus on improving gross margins and controlling costs.
45. During the Q4 2013 Earnings Call held on January 27, 2014, Raun commented on the results:
2013 was a year of transition for the company where we believe significant progress was made. We went from heavy losses in 2012 and decreasing revenues to four consecutive quarters of profitability in 2013, setting a new profitability record as well as growing the top line revenue for the first time in several years
With tight control on expenses and exclusive focus on our market-leading PCI Express product line, PLX improved its balance sheet on a number of fronts. We increased cash and investments by 22%, decreased bank debt by 38% and increased shareholder equity by 24%.
We are excited about our growth prospects for the coming year and in the years ahead. Gen 2 sales continue to be healthy and we believe that the weakness we have seen in the storage market will correct itself in the coming quarters. Further, we expect to see many more PCIe Gen 3 designs going into production in the coming year which will be a key driver for our growth.
Connectivity products will continue to be a headwind for PLX as they are expected to continue to decline at approximately the same rate as 2013, but with each year become a smaller and smaller part of our business. PLX is becoming more and more a pure play PCI Express company driven by leading edge technologies. The combination of higher PCI Express revenues offset by smaller and smaller contributions by connectivity will allow PLXs top line revenue to grow at a greater rate each year.
With growth in our revenues coupled with improving margins over time and continued tight express control, we believe that we will continue to deliver enhanced profitability and shareholder value.
46. The Company announced its 2014 first quarter financial results on April 21, 2014. PLXTs first quarter revenues reached $24.8 million, with a GAAP income of $2.2 million. Raun commented on these results:
Higher gross profits in the first quarter, combined with lower expenses, drove increased income over Q4 and contributed to our fifth straight profitable quarter. In addition, we increased cash, saw strong bookings to support Q2 growth, and layered in another solid quarter of design wins.
The demand for our products remains solid. Based on current backlog, forecasts from customers, and resolution of the assembly issues, we expect all of our market segments to be up in Q2, driven primarily by Gen2 and Gen3 shipments. We are beginning to see an increasing number of Gen3 design wins go into volume production and we believe that this ramp will fuel our growth this year and in years to come.
47. During the Q1 2014 Earnings Conference Call held on April 21, 2014, Raun added:
The combination of higher PCI Express revenues offset by smaller and smaller contributions of connectivity should have allowed PLXs top line revenue to grow at a greater rate each year. With growth in our revenues, coupled with improving margins overtime and continued tight expense control, we believe that we can continue to deliver enhanced profitability and shareholder value.
48. As reflected in the Companys recent financial results and concurrent press releases and statements, PLXT has made significant infrastructure investments that have begun to, and are expected to continue to, yield returns for the Company and improvements in its service.
49. However, despite the financial strength of the Company, its excellent organic growth prospects, and the anticipated benefits of its recent investments, the Individual Defendants entered into the Merger Agreement with Avago, thereby depriving PLXT stockholders from sharing in the Companys future success.
B. The Proposed Transaction Undervalues PLXT Shares
50. On June 23, 2014, PLXT and Avago issued a joint press release announcing the Proposed Transaction which stated in relevant part:
SUNNYVALE, CA and SINGAPORE June 23, 2014 Avago Technologies Limited (NASDAQ: AVGO) and PLX Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: PLXT) today announced that they have entered into a definitive agreement under which Avago will acquire PLX, a leader in PCI Express silicon and software connectivity solutions, in an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $309 million, or $293 million net of cash and debt acquired. Under the terms of the agreement, which was approved by the Boards of Directors of both companies, a subsidiary of Avago will commence a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock for $6.50 per share in cash. Avago expects to fund the transaction with cash available on its balance sheet.
The core PLX PCIe silicon business fits very well with the Avago business model and broadens Avagos portfolio serving the enterprise storage and networking end markets, stated Hock Tan, President and Chief Executive Officer of Avago. Following the closing of the transaction, we are excited to welcome the PLX team to Avago, and we are committed to continue to invest in the PLX PCI Express platform.
Once closed, this transaction will provide immediate value to our stockholders and offers new growth opportunities for our employees to develop leading-edge solutions for our customers, said David Raun, President and Chief Executive Officer of PLX. Following the closing of the transaction, we believe the combination with Avago is an excellent match for our leading PCI Express portfolio supporting next generation data center architectures.
The transaction is expected to be immediately accretive to Avagos non-GAAP earnings per share. Avago currently anticipates driving the PLX business model to a level consistent with Avagos long term business model by the end of fiscal year 2015, the first full fiscal year after closing.
Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P., which is the largest stockholder of PLX, certain senior members of the PLX management team and all of the directors of PLX, collectively owning approximately 14.7% of shares outstanding on fully diluted basis have executed a Tender and Support Agreement in support of the transaction. Discovery Group I, LLC, the second largest stockholder of PLX, has informed PLX that it supports the transaction.
The transaction is subject to customary closing conditions, including the tender into the offer by PLX stockholders of shares representing at least a majority of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock on a fully diluted basis, and the receipt of relevant regulatory approvals, including the expiration or termination
of the applicable waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act and relevant foreign antitrust laws. It is expected that the transaction will close in the fourth quarter of Avagos fiscal year ending November 3, 2014.
51. The Proposed Transaction undervalues PLXTs prospects and is the result of an unfair sales process. The $6.50 per share Merger Consideration represents a premium of just 9.4% based on PLXTs $5.94 closing price on June 20, 2014. This premium is well below the average one day premium of over 25% for comparable transactions in the last three years. During the last 52 weeks PLXT traded as high as $6.91 per share, 5.9% higher than the Merger Consideration, and at least one analyst set a price target of $8.00 per share of PLXT for the most recent quarter. Additionally, PLXT has seen substantial recent growth as its share price skyrocketed from $3.81 per share on January 2, 2013 to $6.28 per share on June 10, 2014. Moreover, PLXT projects 22.50% annual earnings growth for the next five years and reported strong financial metrics including a current ratio of 3.70 and debt to equity ratio of 0.08, which is currently below that of the industry average and implies that there has been very successful management of debt levels. Each of the figures above only serves to underscore the inadequacy of the buying price.
52. The 6.50 per share offer is insufficient, as it fails to account for PLXTs significant future earnings potential and provides the Companys stockholders with inadequate consideration when factoring in the tremendous benefits Avago stands to reap if the deal is completed.
53. The Proposed Transaction is a strategic move by Avago aimed to complement Avagos existing server storage connectivity and networking ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) products that serve the enterprise and data center market. This, in turn, is expected to augment Avagos revenues, as the industry braces for more consolidation amid a
challenging macroeconomic environment. The core PLXT business is a strategic fit for Avago, further adding a new dimension to next generation data center architectures. In addition to cost synergies from a combined resource pool as the cost of designing and building semiconductors rises, the acquisition is likely to improve the operating margin of the combined company, creating greater scale to further drive innovation into the datacenter. The acquisition is expected to be immediately accretive to Avagos non-GAAP earnings. The core PLX PCIe silicon business fits very well with the Avago business model and broadens Avagos portfolio serving the enterprise storage and networking end markets, stated Tan, Avagos President and CEO. Analysts at Sterne Agee have stated that the deal will strengthen Avagos data center and storage offerings, and should raise Avagos EPS and gross margins.
54. This Merger Consideration undervalues PLXT, especially given the significant benefits Avago will enjoy should the Proposed Transaction be permitted to close. Moreover, the Company is poised to enjoy a lengthy period of significant growth and the Proposed Transaction stands to prevent PLXTs stockholders from attaining fair value for their shares. Having failed to maximize the sale price for the Company, Individual Defendants breached the fiduciary duties they owe to the Companys public stockholders because the Company has been improperly valued and stockholders will not likely receive adequate or fair value for their PLXT common stock in the Proposed Transaction.
C. Defendant Robison Used the Sales Process to Obtain Personal Financial Gain
55. In the June 23, 2014 press release announcing the Proposed Transaction, PLXT stated that its Board had unanimously approved the deal.
However, there was no mention of a special committee of independent Board members to evaluate and recommend the Proposed Transaction. Thus, it appears that the negotiations
leading up to the consummation of the Merger Agreement were driven primarily by potentially conflicted directors, including Individual Defendant Robison.
56. PLXT insiders and their affiliates own significant stock of PLXT, and will receive millions of dollars as part of change of control arrangements, and therefore can unduly influence a sale of PLXT not necessarily in the best interest of non-insider shareholders. Each of the Individual Defendants own hundreds of thousands of shares. As of April 29, 2014, Individual Defendant Singer owned 3,756,195 shares, all of which will vest upon completion of the deal. The Individual Defendants facilitated the Proposed Transaction through an unfair and inadequate negotiation process and placed their own personal financial interests ahead of PLXT public stockholders.
57. Additionally PLXTs largest shareholder, Potomac Capital Partners II L.P., as well as certain senior members of the PLXT management team and all of the directors of PLXT, some of which will stay with the new company, have executed a tender and support agreement in support of the deal. Collectively, those groups own 14.7% of PLXTs shares outstanding, all but ensuring the success of the Proposed Transaction.
58. In sum, it appears that the Individual Defendants voted to approve the Proposed Transaction without any guidance from a special committee, and their decisions may have been influenced by the personal financial interests of the Boards Chairman and Company CEO, Individual Defendant Robison.
D. The Preclusive Deal Protection Devices
59. The Individual Defendants agreed to certain deal protection devices that operate conjunctively to lock-up the Proposed Transaction and effectively deter competing offers for the Company.
60. First, the Merger Agreement provides for an onerous no solicitation provision that prohibits the Company or the Individual Defendants from taking any affirmative action to comply with their fiduciary duties to obtain the best price possible under the circumstances.
61. Section 5.3(a) of the Merger Agreement states that the Company (and its subsidiaries) shall immediately:
cease and cause to be terminated any solicitation, encouragement, discussions or negotiations with any Persons that may be ongoing with respect to a Competing Proposal or Competing Inquiry and (ii) request, and thereafter use best efforts to cause, each Person that has previously executed a confidentiality agreement in connection with such Persons consideration of a Competing Proposal to return to the Company or destroy any non-public information previously furnished to such Person or to any Persons Representatives by or on behalf of the Company or any Company Subsidiary.
62. Additionally, Section 5.3(b) of the Merger Agreement includes a no solicitation provision that states that the Company and the Individual Defendants shall not directly or indirectly:
(i) solicit, initiate, knowingly facilitate or encourage (including by way of furnishing non-public information) any Competing Proposal or Competing Inquiry;
(ii) engage in, continue or otherwise participate in any discussions or negotiations regarding, or furnish to any other Person any non-public information in connection with or for the purpose of encouraging or facilitating, a Competing Proposal or Competing Inquiry;
(iii) approve, endorse, recommend, execute or enter into, or publicly propose to approve, endorse, recommend, execute or enter into any letter of intent, memorandum of understanding, agreement in principle, acquisition agreement, merger agreement or similar definitive Contract with respect to any Competing Proposal;
(iv) take any action to make the provisions of any Takeover Statute (including Section 203 of the DGCL) or any applicable anti-takeover provision in the Companys organizational documents inapplicable to any transactions contemplated by a Competing Proposal;
(v) terminate, amend, release, modify or knowingly fail to enforce any provision of, of grant any permission, waiver or request under, any standstill,
confidentiality of similar contract entered into by the Company in respect of or in contemplation of a Competing Proposal; or
(vi) propose, resolve or agree to do any of the foregoing.
63. Furthermore, Section 5.3(d) of the Merger Agreement grants Avago recurring and unlimited matching rights, which gives PLXT twenty four (24) hours to provide unfettered access to confidential, non-public information about competing proposals from third parties which Avago can use to prepare a matching bid. Additionally, Sections 5.3 (e) and (f) grant Avago four (4) business days to negotiate with PLXT, amend the terms of the Merger Agreement, and make a counter-offer in the event a superior offer is received.
64. This matching rights provision essentially ensures that no superior bidder will emerge, as any potential suitor will be unlikely to expend the time, cost, and effort to perform due diligence and make a superior proposal while knowing that Avago will know of its bid and can easily top it. As a result, the matching rights provision unreasonably favors Avago, to the detriment of PLXT stockholders.
65. Lastly, Section 7.2(b) of the Merger Agreement provides for a $10,850,000 termination fee, which at 3.5% of the estimated deal value, is an unreasonable amount specifically designed to deter a competing bid from business entities that would have been most likely to provide the Companys stockholders with a superior offer. This exorbitant termination fee will ensure that no competing offer will appear, as any competing bidder would essentially have to pay a substantial premium one that benefits Avago, not PLXT for the right to provide PLXT stockholders with a superior offer.
66. Ultimately, these deal protection provisions collectively hamper the Companys ability to solicit or negotiate a better proposal to acquire all or a significant interest in the Company.
67. By failing to engage in a reasonable and fair sales process, the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties owed to PLXT stockholders. The Board failed to adequately test the market or shop the Company before entering into the Proposed Transaction, failed to obtain a reasonable price for PLXT, agreed to onerous deal protection devices that are designed to prevent the emergence of a superior offer, and put their personal interests ahead of PLXT stockholders while negotiating the terms of the Proposed Transaction.
68. The Boards actions have prevented Plaintiff and the Class from receiving adequate compensation for their PLXT shares. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent the irreparable injury that Company stockholders will continue to suffer absent judicial intervention.
COUNT I
Claim For Breach Of Fiduciary
Duties Against The Individual Defendants
69. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.
70. The Individual Defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith owed to the public stockholders of PLXT.
71. By the acts, transactions, and courses of conduct alleged herein, the Individual Defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to unfairly deprive Plaintiff and other members of the Class of the true value of their investment in PLXT.
72. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, and independence owed to the stockholders of PLXT because, among other reasons, they failed to take reasonable
steps to obtain and/or ensure that PLXT stockholders receive adequate and fair value for their shares.
73. The Individual Defendants dominate and control the business and corporate affairs of PLXT both through their positions within the Company and on the Board, and are in possession of private corporate information concerning PLXT assets, business and future prospects. Thus, there exists an imbalance and disparity of knowledge and economic power between them and the public stockholders of PLXT which makes it inherently unfair for them to benefit their own interests to the exclusion of maximizing stockholder value.
74. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices and course of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.
75. As a result of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair portion of the value of PLXT assets and businesses and have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their common stock.
76. Unless the Individual Defendants are enjoined by the Court, they will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, all to the irreparable harm of the members of the Class.
77. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Courts equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which the Individual Defendants actions threaten to inflict.
COUNT II
On Behalf Of Plaintiff And The Class
Against PLXT, Avago And Merger Sub For Aiding And Abetting The
Individual Defendants Breaches Of Fiduciary Duty
78. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above, as though fully set forth herein.
79. PLXT, Avago, and Merger Sub have acted and are acting with knowledge of, or with reckless disregard to, the fact that the Individual Defendants are in breach of their fiduciary duties to PLXT public stockholders, and have participated in such breaches of fiduciary duties.
80. Moreover, PLXT, Avago, and Merger Sub knowingly aided and abetted the Individual Defendants wrongdoing alleged herein. In so doing, they rendered substantial assistance in order to effectuate the Individual Defendants plan to consummate the Proposed Transaction in breach of their fiduciary duties.
81. As a result of the unlawful actions of PLXT, Avago, and Merger Sub, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class will be irreparably harmed in that they will not receive the true value for PLXT assets and business. Unless their actions are enjoined by the Court, PLXT, Avago, and Merger Sub will continue to aid and abet the Individual Defendants breaches of their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class.
82. As a result of PLXT, Avago, and Merger Subs conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been and will be damaged in that they have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair and reasonable price for their PLXT shares.
83. Plaintiff and other members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands injunctive relief in his favor and in favor of the Class and against Defendants as follows:
A. Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a class action and certifying Plaintiff as Class representative;
B. Preliminarily and permanently enjoining Defendants and their counsel, agents, employees and all persons acting under, in concert with, or for them, from proceeding with, consummating, or closing the Proposed Transaction, unless and until the Company adopts and implements a procedure or process to obtain an agreement providing fair and reasonable terms and consideration to Plaintiff and the Class;
C. Rescinding, to the extent already implemented, the Merger Agreement or any of the terms thereof, or granting Plaintiff and the Class rescissory damages;
D. Directing the Individual Defendants to account to Plaintiff and the Class for all damages suffered as a result of the Individual Defendants wrongdoing;
E. Awarding Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable attorneys and experts fees; and
F. Granting such other and further equitable relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
Dated: June 27, 2014 |
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RIGRODSKY & LONG, P.A. |
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By: |
/s/ Brian D. Long |
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Seth D. Rigrodsky (#3147) |
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Brian D. Long (#4347) |
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Gina M. Serra (#5387) |
OF COUNSEL: |
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2 Righter Parkway, Suite 120 |
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Wilmington, DE 19803 |
MILBERG LLP |
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(302) 295-5310 |
Kent A. Bronson |
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Todd Kammerman |
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Attorneys for Plaintiff |
Christopher Schuyuler |
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One Pennsylvania Plaza |
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New York, NY 10110 |
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(212) 592-5300 |
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Exhibit 99.4
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
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ROBERTA FEINSTEIN, Individually and |
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on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, |
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C.A. No. | |
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Plaintiff, |
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vs. |
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PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC., DAVID |
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RAUN, MICHAEL J. SALAMEH, RALPH |
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SCHMITT, MARTIN COLUMBATTO, |
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STEPHEN DOMENIK, JOHN H. HART, |
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ERIC SINGER, PATRICK VERDERICO, |
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AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES LTD., |
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AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES WIRELESS |
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(U.S.A.) MANUFACTURING INC., and |
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PLUTO MERGER SUB, INC., |
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VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Roberta Feinstein (Plaintiff), by her attorneys, alleges upon information and belief, except for her own acts, which are alleged on knowledge as follows:
SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1. This is a stockholder class action brought by Plaintiff, a holder of common stock of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLX or the Company), against PLXs Board of Directors (the Board), the Avago Technologies Ltd. and its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc. (Avago Wireless) and Pluto Merger Sub, Inc. (Pluto or collectively,
Avago). This action seeks to enjoin a proposed transaction announced on June 23, 2014, pursuant to which Avago will acquire the outstanding shares of PLX in a deal valued at approximately $309 million, with each PLX stockholder receiving $6.50 per share (net to the seller in cash, without interest) of Company stock (the Proposed Transaction) upon consummation of the merger. In pursuing the Proposed Transaction, each member of the Board violated applicable law by directly breaching and/or aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, due care, and candor owed to Plaintiff and the proposed class.
2. Under the terms of the Agreement and Plan of Merger (Merger Agreement), Pluto will commence the tender offer within ten (10) business days of the date of the Merger Agreement. The initial expiration date of the tender offer is the 25th business day after the commencement of the tender offer, unless extended pursuant to the terms and conditions contained in the Merger Agreement.
3. In particular, the June 23, 2014 Merger Agreement provides that:
[Pluto] has agreed to commence a tender offer (the Offer) to acquire all of the outstanding shares of common stock, par value $0.001 per share, of [PLX] (the Shares), at a price per Share of $6.50 in cash (such amount, or any different amount per Share that may be paid pursuant to the Offer in accordance with this Agreement, the Offer Price), without interest following the acceptance for payment of Shares pursuant to the Offer, upon the terms and subject to conditions set forth in this Agreement, [Pluto] will be merged with and into [PLX], with [PLX] continuing as the Surviving Corporation (the Merger) the parties intend that the Merger shall be governed by Section 253 or Section 251(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the DGCL) and shall be effected as soon as practicable following consummation of the Offer upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in this Agreement.
4. As described herein, the Proposed Transaction, which has been approved by unanimous votes of the Boards of PLX and Avago, is the product of a flawed process that is designed to ensure the sale of PLX to Avago on terms preferential to Avago, but detrimental to Plaintiff and the other public stockholders of PLX.
5. PLX is the industry-leading global provider of semiconductor-based PCI Express connectivity solutions primarily targeting enterprise data center markets. The Company develops innovative software-enriched silicon that enables product differentiation, reliable interoperability and superior performance.
6. PLX has reported steady growth over the last several quarters. Most recently, commenting on first quarter results, ending on March 31, 2014, PLXs President and CEO, David Raun (Raun), stated that he was encouraged about the Companys future growth prospects.
7. Yet, if the Proposed Transaction closes, PLX investors such as Plaintiff will be denied the growth opportunity the Company has been touting. As described further herein, the $6.50 offer price fails to adequately value the Company or compensate the Companys stockholders.
8. The Proposed Transaction is also subject to unfair deal protection provisions which have been agreed to by the Board that deny stockholders the opportunity of a better price. Specifically, the Merger Agreement provides for: (i) a no-solicitation provision prohibiting the Company from properly shopping itself; (ii) a four (4) business-day matching rights period during which Avago can fully evaluate and match any superior proposal received by the Company; and
(iii) a termination fee of $10.85 million payable to Avago if the Company terminates the Merger Agreement to pursue another offer. In agreeing to these provisions, each member of PLXs Board violated applicable law by directly breaching and/or aiding and abetting the other Defendants breaches of their fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, due care, and candor.
9. To remedy Defendants breaches of fiduciary duty and other misconduct, Plaintiff seeks, inter alia: (i) injunctive relief preventing consummation of the Proposed Transaction; (ii) a directive to the members of the Board that they exercise their fiduciary duties to obtain a transaction which is in the best interests of PLX stockholders; and (iii) rescission of, to the extent already implemented, the Merger Agreement, or any of the terms thereof.
PARTIES
10. Plaintiff has been a stockholder at all times relevant hereto and is a stockholder of PLX.
11. Defendant PLX is a Delaware corporation with principal executive offices located at 870 W. Maude Avenue, Sunnyvale, California 94085. Upon completion of the Proposed Transaction, PLX will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Avago.
12. Defendant Raun has been a member of the Companys Board of Directors since December 2012 and has served as the Companys President and CEO since October 2012. Prior to that, he was the Companys Senior Executive Vice President and General Manager of Product Lines since March 2012, having served as the Vice President, Marketing and Business Development since May
2007, and the Vice President, Marketing since November 2004. From January 2002 to November 2004, Raun was Vice President of Marketing at Pericom Semiconductor. From April 2001 to September 2001, Raun was Executive Vice President & General Manager at Actovate, a technology-based marketing company. From September 1989 to November 2000, Raun worked at Waferscale Integration, Inc., where his last position was Vice President of PSD & Memory Products. From 1985 to 1989, Raun held various sales, sales management, and marketing positions at AMD. Raun received a B.S. in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the University of California, Santa Barbara.
13. Defendant Michael Salameh (Salameh) currently, and at all relevant times, served as Independent Chairman of the Board of PLX. He co-founded PLX and served as the Companys CEO and as a member of the Board of Directors from PLXs inception in May 1986. He retired from his position as CEO in November 2008 and continues to serve as a Director. In addition to serving as PLXs CEO for 22 years, he personally participated in many of the key Company functions including sales, marketing, engineering, accounting, quality assurance, operations and compensation. He is familiar with the Companys critical business processes, the key people and the business landscape including customers, markets, suppliers and competition. Salameh currently performs management consulting for private technology companies. He has more than 25 years of chief executive and marketing experience in the semiconductor industry. From 1980 through 1986, Salameh was employed in various marketing management positions with Hewlett-
Packard Company. Salameh received a B.S. in Engineering and Applied Science from Yale University and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School.
14. Defendant Ralph Schmitt (Schmitt) has been a member of the Companys Board of Directors since November 3, 2008. He resigned from his position as CEO in October 2012 and continues to serve as a Director. He has been involved in the semiconductor industry for more than 25 years in various diversified areas such as design, application, sales, marketing and general management. Schmitt has served on multiple semiconductor boards and has run four different semiconductor companies. In October 2012, Schmitt was appointed CEO of OCZ Technology group, which designs, manufactures, and distributes solid state drives and computer components. In April 2011, he joined the board of OCZ Technology Group. He chaired the Global Semiconductor Alliance (GSA) Emerging Company Council from 2010 to 2012 and was on the GSA board in 2012. Prior to joining the Company, Schmitt consulted with a variety of venture capitalists, as well as acted as CEO of Legend Silicon, a privately funded Chinese terrestrial digital TV semiconductor company. From June 2005 to August 2007, Schmitt served as the CEO of Sipex, an analog semiconductor company, which merged with Exar Corporation in August 2007. Upon the completion of the merger, he was appointed CEO and a Director of Exar, positions he held until the end of 2007. From 1999 to 2005, Schmitt was the Executive Vice President of Sales, Marketing and Business Development for Cypress Semiconductor, a seller of a broad range of semiconductor products to global markets. He has also served
on the boards at Cypress subsidiaries and other privately held semiconductor and systems companies. Schmitt received his BSEE from Rutgers University.
15. Defendant Martin Colombatto (Colombatto) has been an Independent Director of the Companys Board since December 2013. Colombatto is an experienced semiconductor industry executive with 30 years of experience in the semiconductor and electronics industry with combined expertise in engineering, product development, sales and marketing, general management, and mergers and acquisitions. Colombatto was formerly Chairman and CEO of Staccato Communications (ultra wideband), as well as Vice President and General Manager of Broadcoms Networking Business Unit where he led the acquisition of five companies which formed the technology and product foundation for future revenue growth. He is also a Director at Luxtera (Silicon Photonics), as well as ClariPhy (Telecom), and has held various management positions at LSI Logic Corporation, Texas Instruments and Reliance Electric. Colombatto holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electronic Engineering Technology from California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, where he currently serves on the Deans Leadership Board for the School of Engineering.
16. Defendant Stephen Domenik (Domenik) has been an Independent Director of the Companys Board since 2013. Domenik has been a General Partner with Sevin Rosen Funds, a venture capital firm, since 1995. Domenik has served on the Boards of Directors of Pixelworks, Inc. since August 2012, MoSys, Inc. since June 212, Emcore Corporation since December 2013 and Meru Networks since January 2014, as well as a number of private companies. Domenik
previously served on the Board of Directors of NetLogic Microsystems, Inc. from January 2001 until it was acquired by Broadcom Corporation in February 2012. During his tenure at Sevin Rosen Funds, Domenik has led numerous investments in private companies. He holds an A.B. in Physics and an M.S.E.E. from the University of California at Berkeley.
17. Defendant John Hart (Hart) has been an Independent Director of the Companys Board since April 1999. He is a former Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer of 3Com. At 3Com, Hart was responsible for the overall strategic direction of the company during the 10 year period from 1990 to 2000 in which it grew annual revenue from $400 million to almost $6 billion. He architected and led 3Coms Fast, Cheap and Simple (FCS) first/last mile networking strategy and was responsible for 3Coms Advanced Development Lab which pioneered Ethernet adapter and switch solutions, 802.11 solutions, and cable modems/low cost routers. Prior to 3Com, Hart was Vice President of Engineering at Vitalink Communications Corporation where he led the group that invented, patented and shipped the industrys first Ethernet switching products. He has experience in determining successful strategic directions. Hart currently serves on the board of Plantronics Inc. since 2006, and previously served on the boards of Coherent Inc. from 2000-2010, and Clearspeed Technology PLC from 2002-2008. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics from the University of Georgia.
18. Defendant Eric Singer (Singer) has been an Independent Director of the Companys Board since December 18, 2013. He has over 17 years of experience as an investor in the semiconductor industry and has served as a co-
managing member of Potomac Capital Management III, L.L.C., the general partner of Potomac Capital Partners III, L.P., since March 2012. Since May 2009, Singer has served as an advisor to Potomac Management and its related entities, and has been a member of Potomac Capital Management II, L.L.C. since January 2012. From August 2008 until its sale in February 2010, Singer served as a Director of Zilog Corporation, a public semiconductor company. Singer was previously a senior investment analyst at Riley Investment Management and also managed private portfolios for Alpine Resources LLC. Singer holds a BA from Brandeis University.
19. Defendant Patrick Verderico (Verderico) has been an Independent Director of the Companys Board since November 2004. He is an operations and financial executive with more than 25 years of industry and consulting experience with high technology companies. Verderico has extensive line experience in manufacturing, finance, planning, and international operations with service as a corporate officer in seven high technology companies in manufacturing, finance and executive management. Verdericos international experience includes expatriate assignments in Latin America and Asia. He has served on the Board of Directors of three publicly traded semiconductor companies before joining the Board of PLX. Verderico is a certified public accountant and has both audit and compensation board committee experience. From 1992 to 2008, Verderico served as a Director of Micro Component Technology, Inc., a semiconductor test equipment manufacturer. He also previously served on the Board of Directors of OSE USA, Inc., a semiconductor-packaging foundry, from 1997-2006 and Catalyst
Semiconductor, a programmable integrated circuit manufacturer, from 1996-2000. From January 2001 to January 2003, he was Chief Financial Officer of Ubicom, an Internet processor and software company. From April 1997 to November 2000, he worked at OSE USA, Inc. where his last position was President and CEO. Prior to 1997, Verderico held executive positions with Maxtor as Chief Operating Officer, Creative Technology as Chief Financial Officer, Cypress Semiconductor as Chief Financial Officer, Philips Semiconductors as Vice President of Assembly Operations, National Semiconductor as Corporate Controller, and a former partner of Coopers & Lybrand. Verderico received a B.A. from the University of Akron and a Masters of Public Administration (M.P.A.) from Pennsylvania State University.
20. Defendants set forth in paragraphs 12 to 19 above are referred to herein as the Board or the Individual Defendants.
21. Defendant Avago Technologies Ltd. is a Delaware corporation with principal executive offices located at 1 Yishun Avenue 7, Singapore, 768923.
22. Defendant Avago Wireless is a Delaware corporation and operates as a wholly-owned as a subsidiary of Avago Technologies Ltd.
23. Defendant Pluto is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Avago Wireless. Upon completion of the Proposed Transaction, Pluto will merge with and into PLX and cease its separate corporate existence.
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FIDUCIARY DUTIES
24. Under Delaware law, the officers and directors of a publicly traded corporation have fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to stockholders. To diligently comply with these duties, neither the officers nor the directors may take any action that:
(a) adversely affects the value provided to the corporations stockholders;
(b) will discourage, inhibit, or deter alternative offers to purchase control of the corporation or its assets;
(c) contractually prohibits themselves from complying with their fiduciary duties;
(d) will otherwise adversely affect their duty to secure the best value reasonably available under the circumstances for the corporations stockholders; and/or
(e) will provide the officers and/or directors with preferential treatment at the expense of, or separate from, the public stockholders.
25. In accordance with the Boards duties of loyalty, the Individual Defendants, as officers and/or directors of PLX, are obligated under Delaware law to refrain from:
(a) participating in any transaction where the officers or directors loyalties are divided;
(b) participating in any transaction where the officers or directors receive, or are entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit not equally shared by the public stockholders of the corporation; and/or
(c) unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the public stockholders.
26. Defendants, separately and together, in connection with the Proposed Transaction, are knowingly or recklessly violating their fiduciary duties and aiding and abetting such breaches, including their duties of loyalty, due care, and candor owed to Plaintiff and other public stockholders of PLX.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
PLXs Background and Growth Potential
27. PLX was founded in 1986 and trades on Nasdaq under the ticker symbol PLXT.
28. PLX designs, develops, manufactures, and sells integrated circuits worldwide. The company offers PCI Express switches that facilitate the aggregation of multi-channel Ethernet, fiber channel, graphics, and serial attached SCSI cards to the host; and PCI Express bridges, which facilitate devices with other standards to be used in systems that need to interoperate with PCI Express. PLX also provides universal serial bus (USB) interface chips used by computer peripherals and consumer products to interoperate through an external cabled connection; PCI Bridges, including general purpose bridges that translate and extend the PCI bus; and direct attached storage devices, which facilitate external storage peripherals to be connected to a personal computer (PC) through either a USB or external Serial ATA connection.
29. The Companys semiconductor devices accelerate and manage the transfer of data in microprocessor-based systems, including networking and
telecommunications, enterprise storage, servers, PCs, PC peripherals, consumer electronics, imaging, and industrial products. PLX markets its products primarily to electronics manufacturers through direct and indirect sales channels, manufacturer representatives, and distributors. The company was founded in 1986 and has been developing leading I/O interconnect silicon and complimentary software since 1994. The Company is headquartered in Sunnyvale, California.
30. PLX has reported steady growth over the last several quarters. On July 22, 2013, PLX announced its financial results for the second quarter of 2013. The Company again saw increased financial results. In commenting on the positive results, the Companys President and CEO, Raun, stated:
Our ongoing commitment to controlling costs and focusing on our growing leadership in PCI Express has resulted in consecutive profitable quarters. Although we still have much work to do, these two quarters combined produced the most profitable first six months of any year in the companys history. PCI Express grew eight percent, led by Gen3 growth setting a new record and producing our first $20 million PCI Express quarter. PCI Express is now 75 percent of our sales, up from 67 percent one year ago.
31. In the July 22, 2013 press release, Raun also stated:
Our leadership position in PCI Express, along with innovative products in development, is driving growth and new opportunities in the enterprise data center and cloud. Networking and enterprise storage are leading the way on the design win front with strong activity around PCIe SSD platforms. We believe PLX won every significant switch design opportunity this past quarter.
32. On October 21, 2013, PLX announced its financial results for the third quarter of 2013. The Company again saw increased financial results. In commenting on the favorable results, Raun stated:
Our focus on key cost control measures has resulted in three consecutive profitable quarters and record profits year-to-date allowing us to build our cash position and pay down debt. Record PCIe design wins dominated by higher ASP Gen3 products signal a healthy pipeline. Market share gains in PCIe, no significant design win losses over the past two quarters, and production of new higher lane count parts in Q4 highlights additional opportunities for the company.
33. Further commenting on the third quarter 2013 results, Raun stated:
Enterprise storage and networking markets continue to dominate design win activity, and our market-leading technology backed by strong customer relationships position us for continued design win success. We also garnered significant industry interest in the quarter with the companys first public demonstration of PLXs ExpressFabric technology housed in a data center rack at the Intel Developer Forum.
Our overall design activity pipe which measures the potential annual revenue for each program is in the hundreds of millions of dollars and is greater than three times the size that it was four years ago when our main focus was Gen2. All five of our PCIe end market segments produced greater design wins than last quarter, and we are confident about our growth potential for years to come.
34. On January 27, 2014, PLX announced its financial results for the fourth quarter of 2013. In commenting on the results, Raun stated:
Our ongoing commitment to controlling costs and focusing on our market-leading PCIe products resulted in our most profitable year in company history. PCIe revenues were up 2% over Q3 and 13% annually. We are pleased to see a number of Gen3 designs ramping to volume production and expect many more of our customers to launch their Gen3-enabled products in 2014. Design activity remains strong for both our Gen2 and Gen3 products, underscoring our market leadership and ongoing growth opportunity.
35. Further commenting on the fourth quarter 2013 results, Raun stated:
Our balance sheet in the quarter continued to improve as we paid down our bank debt and increased our cash and investments to $20.4 million, while increasing shareholder equity 24% over the course of
the year. As we look to 2014, we anticipate growth in revenues and profits, driven by a robust design win pipeline and a strong focus on improving gross margins and controlling costs.
36. PLX has continued to report steady growth into the first quarter of 2014. In the April 21, 2014 press release announcing first quarter 2014 results, Raun commented, stating:
Higher gross profits in the first quarter, combined with lower expenses, drove increased income over Q4 and contributed to our fifth straight profitable quarter. In addition, we increased cash, saw strong bookings to support Q2 growth, and layered in another solid quarter of design wins.
37. In announcing the quarterly results for the first quarter of 2014, Raun stated:
Based on current backlog, forecasts from customers, and resolution of the assembly issues, we expect all of our market segments to be up in Q2, driven primarily by Gen2 and Gen3 shipments. We are beginning to see an increasing number of Gen3 design wins go into volume production and we believe that this ramp will fuel our growth this year and in years to come.
38. At the end of the first quarter of 2014, PLX touted its great growth potential and expectations for second quarter. In the April 21, 2014 press release, the Company reported that it expected net revenues for the second quarter ending June 30, 2014 to increase by 16.94% to 8.87% to be between $27 million to $29 million.
The Proposed Transaction
39. On June 23, 2014, Avago and PLX announced that they entered into the Merger Agreement, pursuant to which Avago would acquire all the outstanding
shares of PLX for $6.50 per share in cash, for a total value of approximately $309 million.
40. The June 23, 2014 press release stated in relevant part that:
SUNNYVALE, CA and SINGAPORE June 23, 2014 Avago Technologies Limited (NASDAQ: AVGO) and PLX Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: PLXT) today announced that they have entered into a definitive agreement under which Avago will acquire PLX, a leader in PCI Express silicon and software connectivity solutions, in an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $309 million, or $293 million net of cash and debt acquired. Under the terms of the agreement, which was approved by the Boards of Directors of both companies, a subsidiary of Avago will commence a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock for $6.50 per share in cash. Avago expects to fund the transaction with cash available on its balance sheet.
* * *
The transaction is expected to be immediately accretive to Avagos non-GAAP earnings per share. Avago currently anticipates driving the PLX business model to a level consistent with Avagos long term business model by the end of fiscal year 2015, the first full fiscal year after closing.
Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P., which is the largest stockholder of PLX, certain senior members of the PLX management team and all of the directors of PLX, collectively owning approximately 14.7% of shares outstanding on fully diluted basis have executed a Tender and Support Agreement in support of the transaction. Discovery Group I, LLC, the second largest stockholder of PLX, has informed PLX that it supports the transaction.
The transaction is subject to customary closing conditions, including the tender into the offer by PLX stockholders of shares representing at least a majority of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock on a fully diluted basis, and the receipt of relevant regulatory approvals, including the expiration or termination of the applicable waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act and relevant foreign antitrust laws. It is expected that the transaction will close in the fourth quarter of Avagos fiscal year ending November 3, 2014.
41. Avagos President and CEO, Hock Tan (Tan), commented:
The core PLX PCIe silicon business fits very well with the Avago business model and broadens Avagos portfolio serving the enterprise storage and networking end markets. Following the closing of the transaction, we are excited to welcome the PLX team to Avago, and we are committed to continue to invest in the PLX PCI Express platform.
42. Defendant Raun added:
Once closed, this transaction will provide immediate value to our stockholders and offers new growth opportunities for our employees to develop leading-edge solutions for our customers. Following the closing of the transaction, we believe the combination with Avago is an excellent match for our leading PCI Express portfolio supporting next generation data center architectures.
43. The offer price of $6.50 set forth in the Merger Agreement substantially undervalues PLX and harms its stockholders. Defendant Raun has consistently boasted about the positive growth rate of the Company and the many future opportunities for substantial growth, both domestically and internationally, PLX was prepared to undertake and of which it was poised to take advantage.
44. Avago is expecting to see a positive impact from the Proposed Transaction in the near term, as it expects the PLX acquisition to be accretive to its non-GAAP Earnings per share for 2014.
45. Having failed to maximize the sale price for the Company, members of the Board breached the fiduciary duties they owe to the Companys public stockholders because the Company has been improperly valued and stockholders will not likely receive adequate or fair value for their PLX common stock in the Proposed Transaction.
The Merger Agreement Is Improperly Structured
46. Furthermore, and in violation of the duty of the members of PLXs Board to maximize stockholder value, the Merger Agreement contains terms designed to favor the Proposed Transaction and deter alternative bids.
47. For example, §5.3 of the Merger Agreement includes a no solicitation provision which states that (a) [t]he Company shall and shall cause each of the Company Subsidiaries and its Representatives to immediately (i) cease and cause to be terminated any solicitation, encouragement, discussions or negotiations with any Persons that may be ongoing with respect to a Competing Proposal or Competing Inquiry.
48. Moreover, §5.5(b) of the no solicitation provision states that the Company shall not directly or indirectly: (i) solicit, initiate, or knowingly facilitate or encourage (including by way of furnishing non-public information) any Competing Proposal or Competing Inquiry; (ii) engage in, continue or otherwise participate in any discussions or negotiations regarding, or furnish to any other Person any non-public information in connection with or for the purpose of encouraging or facilitating, a Competing Proposal or Competing Inquiry; (iii) approve, endorse, recommend, execute or enter into, or publicly propose to approve, endorse, recommend, execute or enter into any letter of intent, memorandum of understanding, agreement in principle, acquisition agreement, merger agreement or similar definitive Contract with respect to any Competing Proposal.
49. In addition, pursuant to §5.3(f) of the Merger Agreement, should an unsolicited bidder appear, the Company must notify Avago of the competing offer promptly, but in no event later than within twenty four (24) hours after receiving the alternative proposal.
50. Further, §5.3(f) of the Merger Agreement severally limits the Boards ability to recommend stockholders approve any competing bid and provides that Avago has four (4) businesses days to submit a superior offer. Avago is thus able to match the unsolicited offer because it is granted unfettered access to the unsolicited offer, in its entirety, including the identity of the third-party bidder, eliminating any leverage that the Company has in receiving the unsolicited offer, and significantly deterring an alternative offer from coming forward.
51. The Merger Agreement gives Avago access to any rival bidders information and provides Avago with a superior bargaining position to any competitive bidder. Accordingly, no rival bidder is likely to emerge because the Merger Agreement unfairly ensures that any auction will favor Avago and piggy-back upon the due diligence (and financial outlay) of the foreclosed second bidder.
52. Moreover, pursuant to the Merger Agreement, the Company has agreed to pay an improper termination fee of $10.85 million payable to Avago in certain circumstances, including if the Company terminates the Merger Agreement because the Board has determined to pursue another alternative superior offer.
53. Finally, the Individual Defendants chose to structure the deal as a Tender Offer. This structure greatly increases the chances of consummating the
Proposed Transaction and leaves stockholders with minimal time to effectively challenge the deal.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
54. Plaintiff brings this action for herself and on behalf of all holders of PLX common stock which have been or will be harmed by the conduct described herein (the Class). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and any individual or entity affiliated with any defendant.
55. This action is properly maintainable as a class action.
56. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to the Companys U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, there were more than 45.9 million shares of PLX common stock outstanding(1) as of the close of business on June 20, 2014.
57. There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. The common questions include the following:
(a) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of undivided loyalty, due care, good faith, and candor with respect to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction;
(1) As well as 5,000,000 shares of preferred stock.
(b) whether the Individual Defendants misrepresented and omitted material facts in violation of the fiduciary duty of candor owed by them to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class;
(c) whether the Individual Defendants have breached any of their other fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction, including their duty of candor;
(d) whether the Individual Defendants, in bad faith and for improper motives, impeded or erected barriers designed to discourage other potentially interested parties from making an offer to acquire the Company or its assets;
(e) whether PLX aided and abetted any of the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction;
(f) whether Avago aided and abetted any of the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Transaction; and
(g) whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class would suffer irreparable injury were the Proposed Transaction consummated without the actions complained of herein being corrected.
58. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and Plaintiff does not have any interests adverse to the Class.
59. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature and will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class.
60. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class.
61. Plaintiff anticipates that there will be no difficulty in the management of this litigation. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.
62. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect to the matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with respect to the Class as a whole.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Claim for Breach of Fiduciary
Duties Against the Individual Defendants
63. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein.
64. The Individual Defendants have violated the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and independence owed to the public stockholders of PLX and have acted to put their personal interests ahead of the interests of PLX stockholders.
65. By the acts, transactions, and course of conduct alleged herein, defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, are attempting to
unfairly deprive Plaintiff and other members of the Class of the true value inherent in and arising from PLX.
66. The Individual Defendants have violated their fiduciary duties by entering PLX into the Proposed Transaction without regard to the effects of the Proposed Transaction on PLX stockholders.
67. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty and care owed to the stockholders of PLX by entering into the merger through the unfair process exemplified by the Merger Agreement.
68. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices, and course of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.
69. As a result of the Individual Defendants unlawful actions, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class will be irreparably harmed in that they will not receive their fair portion of the value of PLXs assets and operations. Unless the Tender Offer is enjoined by the Court, the Individual Defendants will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, will not engage in arms-length negotiations on the Merger Agreement terms, and may consummate the Tender Offer, all to the irreparable harm of the members of the Class.
70. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Courts equitable powers can Plaintiff and
the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which defendants actions threaten to inflict.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Claim for Aiding and Abetting Breaches of
Fiduciary Duty Against PLX and Avago
71. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation contained above as though fully set forth herein.
72. The Individual Defendants owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class certain fiduciary duties as fully set out herein.
73. By committing the acts alleged herein, the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class.
74. Defendants PLX, Avago and its wholly-owned subsidiary Pluto colluded in or aided and abetted the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties, and were active and knowing participants in the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class.
75. Defendants PLX, Avago and Pluto participated in the breach of the fiduciary duties by the Individual Defendants for the purpose of advancing their own interests. Defendants PLX, Avago and Pluto obtained and will obtain both direct and indirect benefits from colluding in or aiding and abetting the Individual Defendants breaches. Defendants PLX, Avago and Pluto will benefit from the acquisition of the Company at an inadequate and unfair price if the Proposed Transaction is consummated.
76. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Courts equitable powers can Plaintiff and
the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which Defendants actions threaten to inflict.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands injunctive relief, in her favor and in favor of the Class and against Defendants as follows:
A. Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a class action;
B. Declaring and decreeing that the Merger Agreement was agreed to in breach of the fiduciary duties of the Individual Defendants and is therefore unlawful and unenforceable;
C. Rescinding, to the extent already implemented, the Merger Agreement;
D. Enjoining Defendants, their agents, counsel, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them from consummating the Proposed Transaction, unless and until the Company adopts and implements a procedure or process reasonably designed to enter into a merger agreement providing the best possible value for stockholders;
E. Directing the Individual Defendants to exercise their fiduciary duties to commence a sale process that is reasonably designed to secure the best possible consideration for PLX and obtain a transaction which is in the best interests of PLX stockholders;
F. Imposition of a constructive trust, in favor of Plaintiff and members of the Class, upon any benefits improperly received by Defendants as a result of their wrongful conduct;
G. Awarding Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action,
including reasonable attorneys and experts fees; and
H. Granting such other and further equitable relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
Dated: June 27, 2014 |
Respectfully submitted, | |
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FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP | |
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By: |
/s/ James R. Banko |
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James R. Banko (Del. Bar No. 4518) | |
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20 Montchanin Road, Suite 145 | |
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Wilmington, DE 19807 | |
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Tel: (302) 482-3182 | |
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Fax: (302) 482-3612 | |
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Roberta Feinstein | |
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OF COUNSEL: |
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FARUQI & FARUQI, LLP |
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Juan E. Monteverde |
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Innessa S. Melamed |
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369 Lexington Avenue, 10th Fl. |
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New York, NY 10017 |
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Tel.: (212) 983-9330 |
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Fax: (212) 983-9331 |
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Attorneys for Plaintiff Roberta Feinstein |
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Exhibit 99.5
IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
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DAVID L. PRICE, on Behalf of Himself |
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C.A. No.: - | ||||
and All Others Similarly Situated, |
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Plaintiff, |
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PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC., MICHAEL J. |
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SALAMEH, MARTIN COLUMBATTO, |
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STEPHEN DOMENIK, JOHN H. HART, |
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DAVID K. RAUN, RALPH SCHMITT, |
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ERIC SINGER, PATRICK VERDERICO, |
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AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES WIRELESS |
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(U.S.A.) MANUFACTURING INC., and |
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PLUTO MERGER SUB, INC., |
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Defendants. |
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VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
Plaintiff David L. Price (Plaintiff), by his attorneys, brings the following Verified Class Action Complaint (Complaint) on his own behalf and on behalf all stockholders of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLX or the Company) (the Class), other than Defendants (as defined below) and their affiliates, against PLX, PLXs board of directors (the Board or the Individual Defendants), Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc. (Avago) and its wholly owned subsidiary Pluto Merger Sub, Inc. (Merger Sub) (collectively, PLX, the Individual Defendants, Avago, and Merger Sub, are the Defendants) for breaching their fiduciary duties and/or aiding and abetting those breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with Avagos offer (the
Tender Offer or Offer) to acquire all of the Companys outstanding shares of stock. The allegations in this Complaint are based upon Plaintiffs personal knowledge as to himself, and upon information and belief and investigation of counsel as to all other allegations herein, as follows:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1. This action arises out of the Agreement and Plan of Merger (the Merger Agreement) between the Company and Avago pursuant to which Avago has agreed to acquire all the outstanding shares of the Company through the Offer. According to the Merger Agreement, Merger Sub will commence an Offer within 10 business days to acquire all the outstanding shares of the Company pursuant to Delaware General Corporation Law Sections 253 and 251(h).
2. PLX designs, develops, manufactures and sells integrated circuits that perform critical system connectivity functions. The Company provides a range of connectivity bridges that allow various systems to communicate with each other and offers a full complement of semiconductor devices, software development kits, hardware design kits, software drivers, and firmware solutions.
3. On June 23, 2014, the Company and Avago issued a joint press release announcing that they had entered into the Merger Agreement. Pursuant to the terms in the Merger Agreement, Avago, will commence the Offer to purchase any and all of the outstanding shares of the Companys common stock for a total transaction value of $309 million or $6.50 per share in cash (the Proposed Transaction). The Proposed
Transaction is expected to close in the fourth quarter of Avagos fiscal year ending on November 3, 2014.
4. The value offered to PLXs public stockholders contemplated in the Proposed Transaction is unfair for numerous reasons. Since April 2009, when the Company initiated its initial public offering (IPO) at $9.00 per share, the Companys stock price has declined following mismanagement and botched strategic acquisitions by the Companys management and Board. Based on the $6.50 per share consideration, investors who purchased stock in the initial public offering could lose $2.50 or 38.5% of their initial investment if the Offer closes on the proposed terms. The proposed consideration, which falls well-below Craig-Hallum Capital Group LLCs and ROTH Capital Partners, LLCs price indications of $8.00 per share, strongly suggests that the Board failed institute a process designed to maximize stockholder value.
5. The Board further breached its fiduciary duties to the Companys stockholders by agreeing to several unfair deal protection terms meant to discourage competing bids, including a no-solicitation provision, unlimited matching rights, and a large $10.9 million termination fee.
6. As set forth in more detail below, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from taking steps to consummate the Proposed Transaction or, in the event the Proposed Transaction closes, to recover damages in favor of Plaintiff and all other stockholders of the Company resulting from the Individual Defendants violations of their fiduciary duties.
THE PARTIES
7. Plaintiff is and was, at all times relevant hereto, a holder of PLX common stock.
8. Defendant PLX is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive offices located at 870 W. Maude Avenue, Sunnyvale, California 94085. PLX designs, develops, manufactures, and sells integrated circuits that perform critical system connectivity functions. The Companys common stock trades on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol PLXT.
9. Defendant Michael J. Salameh (Salameh) is the Companys co-founder and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and has been a member of the Board since May 1986. Salameh retired from his position as CEO in November 2008 and became Chairman of the Board in January 2014.
10. Defendant Martin Colombatto (Colombatto) has been a member of the Board since December 2013. Colombatto participated in a 2012 insurgency campaign orchestrated by Balch Hill Capital, LLC (Balch Capital) that caused the Company to enter into a proposed transaction with Integrated Device Technology, Inc. (IDTI). Colombatto became a Board member in December 2013 after Potomac Capital Partners III, L.P. won a proxy fight against the Companys directors.
11. Defendant Stephen Domenik (Domenik) has been a member of the Board since December 2013. Domenik, in addition to his role as a Board member, serves as General Partner with Sevin Rosen Funds, a venture capital firm. Domenik was also
named to the Board in December of 2013 after Potomac Capital Partners III, L.P. was successful in the proxy fight against the Companys directors.
12. Defendant John H. Hart has been a member of the Board since April 1999.
13. Defendant David K. Raun (Raun) has been a member of the Board since December 2012. Raun became the President and CEO in December 2012, after the Company failed to secure regulatory approval from the Federal Trade Commission for its proposed transaction with IDTI.
14. Defendant Ralph Schmitt (Schmitt) has been a member of the Board since November 2008. Schmitt has also served as the Companys President and CEO from November 2008 through October 2012.
15. Defendant Eric Singer (Singer) has been a member of the Board since December 2013. Singer is also a co-managing member of Potomac Capital Management III, LLC (Potomac Capital LLC) and, since March 2012, general partner of Potomac Capital Partners III, LP (collectively with Potomac Capital LLC, Potomac Capital). Singer is largely credited with causing the Company to commence an immediate sale of the Company.
16. Defendant Patrick Verderico (Verderico) has been a member of the Board since November 2004.
17. Defendant Avago is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Avago Technologies Limited, a Singapore corporation with principal executive offices located at 1 Yishun Avenue, 7 Singapore 768923. Avago is a leading designer, developer, and global
supplier of analog, digital, mixed signal, and optoelectronics components and subsystems and specializes in III-V compound semiconductor design and processing. Avagos common stock trades on the NASDAQ Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol AVGO.
18. Defendant Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Avago. Upon information and belief, Merger Sub was created for the sole purpose of closing the Proposed Transaction and has not engaged in any other business activities prior to the announcement of the Proposed Transaction.
SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS
A. Background of the Company
19. PLX is a Delaware corporation established in 1986 with substantial business operations in California. PLX designs, develops, manufactures and sells integrated circuits that perform critical system connectivity functions. The Company markets its products to customers that sell electronic systems in the enterprise, consumer, server, storage, communications, personal computer (PC), peripheral and embedded markets. The Company also offers connectivity bridges that allow various systems to communicate with each other and enable customer field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) with non-standard interfaces to connect to the mainstream interconnects. In addition, the Company manufactures and sells semiconductor devices, software development kits, hardware design kits, software drivers, and firmware solutions.
20. PLX initiated its IPO in April 1999 at $9.00 per share. For more than a decade, the Company has sustained losses as a result of botched strategic acquisitions by the Companys executive management and Board. For example, in or around 2009, the Company acquired Oxford Semiconductor, Inc. (Oxford) by issuing approximately 9 million shares or 32% of the Companys outstanding stock, valued at approximately $16.4 million. In 2012, the Company sold the bulk of Oxfords assets for $2.2 million, which resulted in a loss of $14.2 million dollars for the Company and its stockholders. Similarly, in 2010, the Company acquired Teranetics, Inc. for cash and stock valued at over $54 million, but sold the company less than two years later for only $12 million.
21. As a result of these botched acquisitions and other ill-advised Board initiatives, the Company failed to achieve its maximum potential as a standalone company. Indeed, the Company faced serious challenges in the past, including a transaction with IDTI that was never consummated because the Company failed to secure regulatory approval from the Federal Trade Commission for the deal.
22. When Raun assumed leadership as the Companys President and CEO, however, he created a new vision for the Company, placing it on strong financial footing by divesting non-core businesses and exposing the Companys products to new and expanded markets.
23. The Company has not only benefitted from Rauns leadership, but also from the increased appetite for cloud-based computing within the past two years. Because cloud-based computing offers a less expensive and relatively reliable alternative to traditional land storage systems, the Companys opportunities for expansion in the
switch and bridge business have increased. Data centers that use cloud-based computing are aggressively pursuing open architectures for all types of off-the-shelf equipment and software.
24. As a result of this trend, the Company has established itself as a market leader in PCI Express switches and bridges.
25. While the Company has proven capable of weathering tough times and recently providing increasing returns to its stockholders, the Board has acquiesced to the demands of the Companys single, largest investor to sell the Company.
B. Stockholder Activism Causes The Company To Sell To IDTI
26. In addition to the Companys financial challenges, the Companys Board has faced a series of challenges from activist investors during the past several years. Faced with the decision to fight the activist investors and adopt a strategic vision to maximize stockholder value or sell the Company for the benefit of only the activist investor, the Board has chosen the latter.
27. On March 7, 2012, Balch initiated a joint filing and solicitation agreement (the Solicitation Agreement) challenging the Companys sitting Board and expressing its desire to nominate a series of alternative members of the Board with the sole purpose of effecting a sale of the Company. Following this announcement, Balch wrote the following letter to the Board:
Dear Members of the Board,
Balch Hill Partners, L.P. currently owns 4,312,870 shares of PLX Technologies, Inc. (PLX or the Company), constituting approximately 9.7% of the outstanding common stock of PLX. As one of the largest stockholders of the Company, we are deeply troubled by the Companys
disappointing operating performance and loss of stockholder value. We believe that the Boards ill-advised and poorly executed acquisition strategy is directly responsible for destroying stockholder value and believe that urgent change is needed at the Board level.
Instead of focusing the Companys resources on its one valuable business, the Companys PCI Express business, the Board has undertaken a series of acquisitions which have not only had a dilutive effect for stockholders but have also caused a significant decline in the Companys share price and substantially weakened the Companys financial performance.
In January 2009, PLX acquired Oxford Semiconductor, Inc. by issuing 9 million shares or approximately 32% of the Companys then outstanding common stock. If valued today, the consideration to acquire Oxford would be in excess of $30 million. Yet, PLX recently sold its UK design team and certain other assets, comprising what we believe to be the bulk of what was originally acquired from Oxford Semiconductor, for $2.2 million.
In October 2010, PLX acquired Teranetics, Inc. PLX paid a total consideration of $54 million comprised of cash, stock, and assumed debt for this 10 Gigabit Ethernet business with negligible revenues. This was at a time when PLXs entire market capitalization was approximately $134 million immediately prior to the acquisition. Today, the 10 Gigabit Ethernet business is underperforming and consumes essentially all of PLXs profits and cash flow.
Together, these two acquisitions have led to major equity dilution, increasing the Companys share count from approximately 28 million to over 44 million shares, an increase of approximately 57%. We estimate these acquisitions also consumed well in excess of $40 million in cash consideration, acquisition of debt, and operating losses.
PLXs search for acquisition targets has also been a clear distraction to management, as has been the integration process following any such acquisitions. This Board should immediately cease all potential acquisition activities. We believe the Company must instead focus on improving PLXs truly valuable business, the Companys PCI Express business.
We believe immediate change at the Board level is necessary to end the erosion of stockholder value and to realize full value for the Companys core assets. We believe a reconstituted Board focused on reviewing all strategic options for the Company, including a sale of the Company is the best option for creating value for all stockholders of the Company.
Accordingly, Balch Hill Partners has nominated a slate of nominees for election to the Board at the Companys 2012 Annual Meeting of Stockholders. We believe our nominees have the broad range of relevant expertise and experience necessary to address the challenges currently facing the Company and to evaluate all strategic alternatives to improve
stockholder value. However, we believe it is in the best interests of stockholders to avoid the disruption and expense of a protracted proxy fight. Therefore, we urge the Board to continue discussions with us regarding the composition of the Board in hopes of ultimately reaching a mutually agreeable resolution that will serve the best interests of all stockholders. (emphasis added)
28. Less than one month later, on April 30, 2012, the Board announced that it found a buyer and agreed to sell the Company to IDTI in a cash and stock transaction valued at $7.00 per share. The proposed transaction would have closed, but for the Federal Trade Commissions (FTC) announcement on December 12, 2012 that the FTC planned to bring an administrative complaint challenging IDTIs proposed acquisition of the Company.(1) Thereafter, on December 19, 2012, the Company and IDTI jointly announced that they had agreed to mutually terminate the merger transaction.
C. After the Botched Takeover, Raun is Appointed President and CEO of the Company
29. On December 21, 2012, the Board formally announced the selection and appointment of Raun to serve as the Companys next President and CEO and serve on the Board. Since Rauns appointment, the Company has adopted a strategic plan to divest the Company of all non-core businesses and focus on the Companys truly valuable PCI Express business.
D. Potomac Capital Management II, LLC Joins The Fight To Sell the Company
30. Rauns campaign to launch a Company turnaround was soon thwarted. On January 25, 2013, Potomac Capital announced that it had acquired 3.1% or 1,381,957 shares of the Companys outstanding common stock. Potomac Capital typically
(1) See Form 8-K filed by the Company with the SEC on December 19, 2012.
acquires large positions in companies and then leverages its position as a large stockholder to effect an immediate sale. For example, in 2013, Potomac Capital and Balch, acting together, caused sTec, Inc. and its board of directors to sell sTec, which ultimately with sTec announcing a merger with Western Digital Corporation one week before the annual stockholder meeting was to have taken place. Similarly, after significant pressure from Potomac Capital, Mesmic Inc. (Mesmic) announced on April 23, 2013 that it had agreed to be acquired by IDG-Accel China Capital II, L.P. rather than engage in a proxy contest at Mesmics annual stockholder meeting.
31. On January 25, 2013, the very same day Potomac Capital announced that it acquired 3% of the Companys stock, Potomac Capital wrote a letter to the Board clearly outlining its plan to sell the Company. The letter states, in relevant part:
Dear Members of the Board,
Potomac Capital Management II, LLC, together with its affiliates (Potomac), is a significant shareholder of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLX or the Company). We have carefully studied and analyzed PLXs business, history and prospects. We invested in the Company because we believe the stock represents compelling value. However, for that value to be realized, PLX must pursue a strategic direction that maximizes value for shareholders. We believe that in the current context, in order to maximize value the Board of Directors (the Board) and management must immediately commence a process of a thorough review of all strategic alternatives available to the Company and we do not believe that PLX should remain an independent public company.
We believe that shareholder value can best be created by capitalizing on the historic interest in PLX from potential acquirers, while leveraging the improved operating model of the Company. However, action must be taken urgently and decisively. Following the collapse of the Companys contemplated transaction with Integrated Device Technology, Inc. (IDTI), pursuant to which IDTI would have acquired PLX, credible alternatives to the current unhealthy limbo can only come from a fair and thorough review of all strategic alternatives.
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The Companys strengthened focus and technology leadership in its core PCI Express business, $20 million annual operating expense reduction, attractive margin profile, intellectual property and undervaluation in the public market make it an attractive target of both strategic and financial interest. It is imperative that the Board and management translate this interest into a value-maximizing transaction.
It is no secret that even prior to the announcement of the potential transaction with IDTI, PLX was losing money and under the auspices of the majority of the current Board embarked on a failed acquisition strategy that destroyed enormous shareholder value. PLX was also facing pressure from its shareholders to sell itself. Fellow shareholders had made the case that the combination of the emergence of PCI Express as the dominant high speed inter-connect, the strategic value of PLXs dominant position in PCI Express switches, and the cost synergies a large acquirer could recognize, would enable the Company to achieve an acquisition value substantially higher than what the Company could achieve as a standalone business. The IDTI transaction further demonstrated that strategic buyers could generate significant synergies from a combination with PLX.
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All indications are that a robust and thorough evaluation of available strategic alternatives would help PLX identify far superior ways to enhance shareholder value than it could achieve as a standalone company. Accordingly, we are puzzled by recent statements by David Raun, upon his appointment as a permanent President and CEO, that he is very excited about PLXs prospects as an independent company. If it is indeed the case that the pursuit of this stated strategy of the Company as a standalone business is the optimal course to realizing and delivering value for shareholders, then the Board and management owe it to shareholders to explain how so. We demand that the directors and management of PLX disclose details of their deliberations regarding any offers that the Company has received in the recent past, including interest in PLX expressed during the go-shop period, their assessment of the strategic alternatives available to the Company and their rationale for concluding that a rejection of such offers maximizes value for shareholders. The Board and management must defend and explain their position why re- initiating a robust process of strategic review would not unlock maximum value for the owners of the Company.
Now, more than ever, PLX represents an attractive acquisition target for potential buyers. Much of the work that was necessary to address issues with the Companys bloated cost structure and failure to utilize its technological leadership position have been completed in the context of the now-abandoned IDTI transaction. Efforts to pursue a prudent strategy by divesting of non-core businesses and streamlining expenses should help to increase PLXs appeal to potential buyers. The divestiture of these unprofitable businesses has had only minimal impact on revenue while helping achieve reduced annual operating expenses by about $20 million,
according to Mr. Rauns public remarks. Mr. Raun has projected that [a]ll significant remaining costs associated with these divested products lines will be eliminated by the end of the current quarter. We believe that the infusion of cash from the Entropic and Aquantia transactions has further strengthened the Companys balance sheet and has made PLX a cleaner more attractive acquisition candidate today than during the go-shop period of the IDTI transaction. Accordingly, it is imperative and urgent that the Board and management immediately engage a nationally recognized investment bank and commence a robust process of exploration and evaluation of all available strategic options and value-maximizing opportunities. (emphasis added)
32. In response to Potomac Capitals letter, the Board immediately passed amendments to the Companys Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation. Specifically, the Board adopted three protective measures to insulate themselves from the insurgence of Potomac Capital, including: (i) permitting only the Companys Chairman, President, or Board of Directors to call a special meeting of stockholders; (ii) instituting tighter deadlines for stockholders who want to make proposals at the Companys annual meeting; and (iii) mandating onerous disclosure requirements regarding any stockholder led proposals.
33. Thereafter, on March 6, 2013, a group of stockholders, including Potomac Capital and Individual Defendnats, Singer, Colombatto, and Domenik, filed a joint filing and solicitation agreement (the Potomac Solicitation Agreement) with the SEC making known their intent to seek representation on the Board at the 2013 annual stockholder meeting. In response, the Board announced that it would revise the Companys Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation yet again set[ting] forth certain procedural and information disclosure requirements for stockholders seeking approval for corporate action. Undeterred, Potomac Capital announced on April 17, 2013 that
it increased its holdings of all the Companys outstanding shares of stock from 3.4% to 4.3%. By Fall 2013, Potomac Capital and its affiliated entities in the Company swelled to 9.8% of all outstanding shares of the Companys common stock.
E. Potomac Capital Pressures The Companys Board To Sell The Company Or Risk A Proxy Contest
34. Holding almost 10% of all outstanding shares in the Company and realizing that momentum was on its side, Potomac Capital wrote an open letter to its stockholders in in the fall of 2013 regarding its plans to sell the Company:
Dear Fellow PLX Stockholders,
Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P., together with its affiliates (Potomac), is the largest stockholder of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLX or the Company), beneficially owning approximately 9.8% of the outstanding shares of common stock of the Company. We have nominated a slate of five highly qualified directors for election to the Board of Directors (the Board) at the Companys 2013 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the 2013 Annual Meeting) because we do not believe the Board as currently constituted is acting in the best interests of stockholders. In several public letters and private communications with certain members of management and the Board, we have clearly articulated our concerns with the Company, relating to, among other things, the Companys historically weak operating performance and the Boards failed acquisition strategy, resulting in substantial dilution of stockholders. In response, the Board has failed to address the issues we have identified and appears resistant to any meaningful reconstitution of the Board, let alone a resolution that involves any incumbent Board member not standing for re-election at the Annual Meeting.
Over the past nine months, we have tried to engage with management and the Board in the hopes of avoiding a disruptive and costly election contest. In April 2013, for example, we made a special, cross-country trip to PLXs headquarters with the clear understanding that the purpose of our trip was to discuss our very reasonable settlement proposal of two Board seats, the formation of a strategic review committee, and the adoption of a mandatory retirement policy, which would have resulted in two directors retiring from the Board at the 2013 Annual Meeting. When we arrived, however, we were asked to sign a non-disclosure agreement and there was no meaningful discussion about our settlement proposal, showing us their lack of interest in proactively addressing the situation. In October 2013, with the window narrowing for the Company to schedule the 2013 Annual Meeting, we reached out again to PLX. After several verbal discussions, in
which we expressed our strong belief that the Board must be reconstituted through additions and deletions of Board members, the Company proposed terms of settlement, which included the addition of two of our director nominees but all incumbent directors standing for re-election at the Annual Meeting. In response, we proposed the addition of three of our director nominees with two incumbent directors agreeing not to stand for re-election at the 2013 Annual Meeting. Once again, the Company would not accept any settlement that involved any incumbent Board member not standing for re-election.
With an average tenure of over 14 years and the fact that the Board lacks any significant ownership of PLX, we are deeply frustrated by this Boards readiness to spend stockholder capital to engage in a protracted proxy fight, rather than communicate credibly with its largest stockholder. Based on our review of the Companys public filings, only two of the Boards six independent directors own any PLX common stock and of these two directors, they own, in the aggregate, less than one percent (1%) of the outstanding shares of the Company, making this Board unvested stewards of stockholder capital. What is worse is that of the two independent directors that own any stock, one has cashed in much more of his stock than his current ownership position, reaping millions of dollars in profits. With no real investment dollars at risk, we are concerned that the Boards interests may not be aligned with stockholders. We question whether they may be more focused on self-preservation instead of reaching an agreement in the best interests of stockholders.
We are resolute in our determination to ensure the Company is governed for the benefit of its stockholders. Our interactions with the Board have left us with serious doubt as to whether minority representation on the Board is sufficient to influence critical decisions and unbind the decades-long ties that exist amongst the existing members of the Board. We therefore intend to exercise our rights on behalf of all stockholders and are committed to take any and all actions necessary in order to unlock stockholder value.
35. Potomac Capital was thus determined to sell the Company or nominate directors of its own choosing at the annual stockholder meeting to be held on December 13, 2013 (the 2013 Stockholder Meeting) who would ensure that its agenda would be put into action.
F. Potomac Capital Gains Seats on The Board At The 2013 Stockholder Meeting
36. On December 13, 2013, the Company held the 2013 Stockholder Meeting. At the 2013 Stockholder Meeting, stockholders were asked to make a choice between the Boards nominees and Potomac Capitals nominees. While several members of the existing Board did get reelected, all three of Potomac Capitals nominees were elected also, including Individual Defendants, Colombatto, Domenik, and Singer. Following the election of Potomac Capitals nominees to the Board, a sale of the Company began in earnest.
37. Rather than working to ensure that the Company would gain market share by expanding the Companys business and client portfolios and achieving growth through a robust pipeline and portfolio of products, the Board instead acquiesced to the demands of its largest stockholder, Potomac Capital and agreed to commence an immediate sale of the Company.
G. The Individual Defendants Agree To The Proposed Transaction
38. On June 23, 2014, the Company and Avago issued a joint press release announcing that Avago and PLX:
Entered into a definitive agreement under which Avago will acquire PLX, a leader in PCI Express silicon and software connectivity solutions, in an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $309 million, or $293 million net of cash and debt acquired. Under the terms of the agreement, which was approved by the Boards of Directors of both companies, a subsidiary of Avago will commence a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock for $6.50 per share in cash. Avago expects to fund the transaction with cash available on its balance sheet.
The core PLX PCIe silicon business fits very well with the Avago business model and broadens Avagos portfolio serving the enterprise storage and networking end markets, stated Hock Tan, President and Chief Executive Officer of Avago. Following the closing of the transaction, we are excited to welcome the PLX team to Avago, and we are committed to continue to invest in the PLX PCI Express platform.
Once closed, this transaction will provide immediate value to our stockholders and offers new growth opportunities for our employees to develop leading-edge solutions for our customers, said David Raun, President and Chief Executive Officer of PLX. Following the closing of the transaction, we believe the combination with Avago is an excellent match for our leading PCI Express portfolio supporting next generation data center architectures.
The transaction is expected to be immediately accretive to Avagos non-GAAP earnings per share. Avago currently anticipates driving the PLX business model to a level consistent with Avagos long term business model by the end of fiscal year 2015, the first full fiscal year after closing.
Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P., which is the largest stockholder of PLX, certain senior members of the PLX management team and all of the directors of PLX, collectively owning approximately 14.7% of shares outstanding on fully diluted basis have executed a Tender and Support Agreement in support of the transaction. Discovery Group I, LLC, the second largest stockholder of PLX, has informed PLX that it supports the transaction.
The transaction is subject to customary closing conditions, including the tender into the offer by PLX stockholders of shares representing at least a majority of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock on a fully diluted basis, and the receipt of relevant regulatory approvals, including the expiration or termination of the applicable waiting period under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act and relevant foreign antitrust laws. It is expected that the transaction will close in the fourth quarter of Avagos fiscal year ending November 3, 2014
39. While the Companys stockholders will receive inadequate consideration for their holdings, management, and the Individual Defendants in particular, will reap substantial profits from this transaction. For example, the executive officers of the Company have entered into separate Executive Retention Agreements and will be retained by Avago upon consummation of the Proposed Transaction. Moreover, because the Proposed Transaction represents a change- in-control, the Companys current executive officers will receive large golden parachute compensation packages. In other words, while stockholders lose their holdings and the opportunity to enjoy the potential upside of the combined company, the Companys executive officers along with
the Individual Defendants stand to reap huge financial benefits as well as the chance to participate in the future upside of the Company.
40. The joint press release announcing the Merger Agreement also notes Potomac Capital, who is represented on the Board by Singer, Colombatto, and Domenik along with the Companys senior management and directors have signed Tender and Support Agreements collectively agreeing to tender almost 14% of the Companys shares in the Tender Offer.
H. The Proposed Transaction Undervalues The Company
41. Rather than allowing the Companys public stockholders to share in the benefits of the Companys promising growth prospects, the Individual Defendants have acted in their own interest and to the detriment of the Companys stockholders by entering into the Proposed Transaction. In so doing, the Individual Defendants have agreed to a transaction that places a cap on the Companys corporate value at a time when the Company has only begun divesting its non-core businesses and is squarely focused on expanding the market and potential clients for the Companys truly valuable PCI Express business. In fact, the Company has not yet reported a quarter with these changes fully implemented.
42. The $6.50 per share consideration also undervalues the Company. Prior to the Proposed Transactions announcement, analysts were bullish on the Companys projected stock value. For example, Craig-Hallum Capital Group LLC and ROTH Capital Partners, LLC both rated the Companys stock as a buy and set price indications for the Companys stock as high as $8.00 per share, 23% higher than the
$6.50 proposed per share consideration now being offered to stockholders. More recently, on January 17, 2014, the Companys stock price traded as high as $6.91, $0.41 or 6% higher than the proposed consideration now offered to stockholders. Thus, any argument by the Board that it acted reasonably and maximized stockholder value is untenable.
I. The Companys Board Impermissibly Locked-Up The Proposed Transaction
43. In addition to the Board agreeing to an inadequate price, the Board has impermissibly locked-up the Proposed Transaction by agreeing to several unfair deal protection devices to ensure that Avago will acquire the Company without impediment.
44. First, the Board has agreed to a prohibitive no-solicitation provision. Under the no-solicitation provision, PLXs management and Board are prohibited from soliciting, initiating, or knowingly facilitating or encouraging an Competing Proposal(2)
(2) Competing Proposal is defined in the Merger Agreement to mean any proposal or offer from a Third Party relating to (i) a merger, reorganization, sale of assets, share exchange, consolidation, business combination, recapitalization, dissolution, liquidation, joint venture or similar transaction involving the Company or any of the Company Subsidiaries whose assets, individually or in the aggregate, constitute 15% or more of the consolidated assets of the Company and the Company Subsidiaries, as determined on a book-value or fair-market-value basis, (ii) the acquisition (whether by merger, consolidation, equity investment, joint venture or otherwise) or license by any Person of 15% or more of the consolidated assets of the Company and the Company Subsidiaries, as determined on a book- value or fair-market-value basis, (iii) the purchase or acquisition, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by any Person of 15% or more of the issued and outstanding shares of Company Common Stock or any other Equity Interests in the Company, (iv) any purchase, acquisition, tender offer or exchange offer that, if consummated, would result in any Person beneficially owning 15% or more of the shares of Company Common Stock or any other Equity Interests of the Company or any of the Company Subsidiaries whose assets, individually or in the aggregate, constitute 15% or more of the consolidated assets of the Company and the Company.
or Competing Inquiry(3), and within 4 business days from the announcement of the Merger Agreement, must demand the return of, or destruction of, confidential information the Company had previously given to any potential bidder.
45. Second, concurrently with the no-solicitation provision, the Board has agreed to a broad information rights provision. Under this provision, Avago is entitled to know the identity, material terms, and conditions of any Competing Proposal or Competing Inquiry before having to submit a matching bid. The Board is further obligated to provide any written materials it has received by a third-party bidder within 24 hours of receipt of such materials. See Merger Agreement ¶ 5.3(c).
46. Third, the Board also provided Avago with unlimited matching rights, granting Avago the luxury of 4 business days to revise its proposal or persuade the Board not to change its recommendation for the Proposed Transaction if an alternative bidder submits a Superior Proposal(4). This grace period to match an offer creates a
(3) Competing Inquiry is defined in the Merger Agreement to mean any inquiry, indication of interest or request for information (other than an inquiry, indication of interest or request for information made or submitted by Parent or any of its Subsidiaries) that may reasonably be expected to lead to a Competing Proposal.
(4) Superior Proposal is defined in the Merger Agreement to mean any unsolicited bona fide written Competing Proposal (except the references therein to 15% shall be replaced by 85%) made by a Third Party which was not solicited by the Company , any Company Subsidiary or any of their respective Representatives and which, in the good faith judgment of the Company Board, after consultation with its independent financial advisors and outside legal counsel, taking into account the various legal, financial and regulatory aspects of the Competing Proposal, including the financing terms thereof, if any, and the Third Party making such Competing Proposal, (i) if accepted, is reasonably capable of being consummated and (ii) if consummated would in the good faith judgment of the Company Board, after consultation with the Companys Financial Advisor, result in a transaction that is more favorable to the Companys stockholders, from a financial point of view, than the Offer and the Merger (after giving effect to all adjustments to the terms thereof which may have been offered in writing by Parent, including pursuant to Section 5.3(f)).
significant advantage for Avago to formulate a revised bid and discourage further competing bids from emerging in the first place.
47. These matching rights dissuade interested parties who have not received any confidential information from PLX from making an offer for the Company because a third-party bidder must: (i) first make an offer the Board deems superior and be willing to enter into a transaction without any due diligence; (ii) acquiesce to having its bid undermined by the Board disclosing the same information to Avago for the purpose of matching the Superior Proposal; (iii) in the event that Avago matches the third-party proposal, the third party must then formulate a Superior Proposal without having the proprietary information regarding Avagos alternative bid; and (iv) the third-party can only win the bidding war if Avago gives up.
48. The Board has further reduced the likelihood of maximizing stockholder value by agreeing to a large termination fee. The Merger Agreement provides that, upon termination of the Merger Agreement by the Company, the Company will be required to pay Avago a termination fee of $10,850,000, which essentially requires the alternative bidder to agree to pay an exorbitant premium for the right to provide the stockholders with a superior offer.
49. Concurrently with the signing of the Merger Agreement, Avago obtained the support of the Companys directors, executive officers, and Potomac Capital. The Companys directors, executive officers, and Potomac Capital have signed Tender and Support Agreements pursuant to which they will tender their shares in the Tender Offer.
The Tender and Supporting Agreements represent approximately 14% of all the Companys outstanding shares of stock. In addition, Avago obtained the support of the Companys then-second-largest shareholder, Discovery Group I, LLC, which held approximately 8.1% of the Companys outstanding shares.(5) Thus, because almost 22.8% of the Companys outstanding shares were committed to the Offer, it was highly improbable that any alternative bids would emerge to challenge Avagos inadequate offer.
50. Ultimately, these deal protection devices restrain the Companys ability to solicit or engage in negotiations with any third party regarding a proposal to acquire all or a significant interest in the Company. The circumstances under which the Board may respond to an unsolicited alternative acquisition proposal are too narrowly circumscribed to provide an effective fiduciary out under the circumstances. Likewise, these provisions will foreclose the new bidder from providing the needed market check on Avagos inadequate offer.
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS FIDUCIARY DUTIES
51. By reason of the Individual Defendants positions with the Company as directors and/or officers, said individuals are in a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff and the other public stockholders of the Company and owe Plaintiff and the other members of the Class the duties of loyalty, due care, and good faith.
(5) Discovery Group I, LLC sold all of its Company shares pursuant to an Amendment to a Schedule 13D filed on June 23, 2014.
52. By virtue of their positions as directors and/or officers of the Company, the Individual Defendants, at all relevant times, had the power to control and influence, and did control and influence and cause the Company to engage in the practices complained of herein.
53. Each of the Individual Defendants is required to act in good faith, in the best interests of the Companys stockholders and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as would be expected of an ordinary prudent person. In a situation where the directors of a publicly traded company undertake a transaction that may result in a change-in-control, the directors must take all steps reasonably required to obtain the best value for stockholders rather than use a change-in-control to benefit their own interests. To diligently comply with this duty, the directors of a corporation may not take any action that:
a. Adversely affects the value provided to the corporations stockholders;
b. Contractually prohibits them from complying with or carrying out their fiduciary duties;
c. Discourages or inhibits alternative offers to purchase control of the corporation or its assets;
d. Adversely affected their duty to search for and secure the best value reasonably available under the circumstances for the corporations stockholders; or
e. Provide the Individual Defendants with preferential treatment at the expense of, or separate from, the public stockholders.
54. In accordance with their duties of loyalty and good faith, the Individual Defendants were obligated to refrain from:
a. Participating in any transaction where the Individual Defendants loyalties are divided;
b. Participating in any transaction where the Individual Defendants receive, or are entitled to receive, a personal financial benefit not equally shared by the public stockholders of the corporation;
c. Participating in any transaction where the Individual Defendants receive, or are entitle to receive, a personal financial benefit not equally shared by the public stockholders of the corporation; and or
d. Unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the public stockholders.
55. As discussed supra, Plaintiff alleges herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in connection with the Proposed Transaction, are knowingly or recklessly violating their fiduciary duties, including their duties of loyalty, due care, and good faith owed to Plaintiff and other public stockholders of PLX.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
56. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the holders of the common stock of the Company, who have been and/or will be harmed as a result of the wrongful conduct alleged herein. The Class excludes Defendants herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation or other entity related to, or affiliated with, any of the Defendants.
57. This action is properly maintainable as a class action.
58. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. As of June 20, 2014, the Company had over 45,938,899 million shares of common stock outstanding. Members of the Class are scattered geographically and are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before this Court.
59. Questions of law and fact exist that are common to the Class, including, among others:
a. Whether the Individual Defendants have fulfilled, and are capable of fulfilling, their fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and due care owed to Plaintiff and the Class;
b. Whether the Individual Defendants have acted in a reasonable manner designed to maximized stockholder value;
c. Whether the Individual Defendants are acting in furtherance of their own self-interest to the detriment of the Class;
d. Whether the Individual Defendants, in bad faith and for improper motives, have impeded or erected barriers to discourage other offers for the Company or its assets;
e. Whether Avago and/or Merger Sub have aided/abetted the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duty; and
f. Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class will be irreparably harmed if Defendants are not enjoined from continuing the conduct described herein.
60. Plaintiff is committed to prosecuting this action and have retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and Plaintiff has the same interests as the other members of the Class. Accordingly, Plaintiff is an adequate representative for the Class and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.
61. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants, or adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
62. Therefore, preliminary and final injunctive relief on behalf of the Class as a whole is entirely appropriate because Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable and causing injury to the Class.
COUNT I
Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties Against the Individual Defendants
63. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth herein.
64. The Individual Defendants have violated the fiduciary duties owed to the public stockholders of PLX and have acted to put their personal interests ahead of the interests of PLXs public stockholders or acquiesced in those actions by fellow
Defendants. These Defendants have failed to take adequate measures to ensure that the interests of PLXs stockholders are properly protected and have embarked on a process that fails to maximize stockholder value.
65. By the acts, transactions, and courses of conduct alleged herein, these Defendants, individually and acting as a part of a common plan, will unfairly deprive Plaintiff and other members of the Class of the true value of their PLX investment. Plaintiff and other members of the Class will suffer irreparable harm unless the actions of these Defendants are enjoined and a fair process is substituted.
66. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices, and courses of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise loyalty, due care, and good faith in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.
67. As a result of the actions of the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class have been, and will be, irreparably harmed in that they have not, and will not, receive their fair portion of the value of their PLX stock and businesses, and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for their common stock.
68. Unless enjoined by this Court, the Individual Defendants will continue to breach the fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the Class and may consummate the Proposed Transaction to the disadvantage of the public stockholders.
69. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Courts equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class
be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury that these actions threaten to inflict.
COUNT II
Claim Against Avago and Merger Sub for Aiding Abetting the
Individual Defendants Breaches of Fiduciary Duties
70. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth herein.
71. The Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Companys public stockholders by the wrongful actions alleged herein.
72. Such breaches of fiduciary duties could not, and would not, have occurred but for the conduct of Avago and Merger Sub, which, therefore, aided and abetted such breaches of fiduciary duty through entering into the Proposed Transaction.
73. Avago and Merger Sub had knowledge that they were aiding and abetting the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties to PLXs public stockholders.
74. Avago and Merger Sub rendered substantial assistance to the Individual Defendants in their breaches of their fiduciary duties to PLXs stockholders.
75. As a result of PLXs and Merger Subs conduct of aiding and abetting the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have been, and will be, damaged in that they have been, and will be, prevented from obtaining a fair price for their shares.
76. As a result of the unlawful actions of Avago and Merger Sub, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class will be irreparably harmed in that they will be prevented
from obtaining the fair value of their equity ownership in the Company. Unless enjoined by the Court, Avago and Merger Sub will continue to aid and abet the Individual Defendants breaches of their fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, and will aid and abet a process that inhibits the maximization of stockholder value.
77. Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Courts equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from immediate and irreparable injury that Defendants actions threaten to inflict.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment and relief, including injunctive relief, in his favor and in favor of the Class, and against the defendants as follows:
A. Certifying this case as a class action, certifying Plaintiff as Class representative and his counsel as Class counsel;
B. Enjoining the Defendants and all those acting in concert with them from consummating the Proposed Transaction;
C. To the extent that the Proposed Transaction is consummated before this Courts entry of final judgment, rescinding it and setting it aside or awarding rescissory damages;
D. Enjoining the Individual Defendants from initiating any defensive measures that would inhibit their ability to maximize value for PLXs public stockholders;
E. Directing defendants to account to Plaintiff and the Class for all damages suffered by them as a result of Defendants wrongful conduct alleged herein;
F. Awarding Plaintiff the costs, expenses, and disbursements of this action, including any attorneys and experts fees and expenses and, if applicable, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest; and
G. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class such other relief as this Court deems just, equitable, and proper.
Dated: July 2, 2014 |
ANDREWS & SPRINGER, LLC | |
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/s/ Peter B. Andrews |
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Peter B. Andrews (# 4623) |
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Craig J. Springer (# 5529) |
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3801 Kennett Pike |
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Building C, Suite 305 |
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Wilmington, DE 19807 |
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Tel.: (302) 504-4957 |
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Fax: (302) 397-2681 |
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Counsel for Plaintiff David L. Price |
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Of Counsel: |
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WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER |
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FREEMAN & HERZ LLP |
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Gregory M. Nespole |
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Benjamin Y. Kaufman |
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270 Madison Avenue |
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New York, NY 10016 |
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Tel.: (212) 545-4600 |
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Fax: (212) 545-4653 |
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Counsel for Plaintiff David L. Price |
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Exhibit 99.6
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ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY David T. Wissbroecker (243867) Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 TELEPHONE NO.: 619/231-1058 FAX NO. (Optional): 619/231-7423 E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional): dwissbroecker@rgrdlaw.com ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Plaintiff Clarence Golden SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF Santa Clara STREET ADDRESS: 191 North First Street MAILING ADDRESS: CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Jose, CA 95113 BRANCH NAME: Civil Division PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Clarence Golden CASE NUMBER: 114CV267531 DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: PLX Technology, Inc., et al. JUDICIAL OFFICER: NOTICE OF RELATED CASE DEPT.: Identify, in chronological order according to date of filing, all cases related to the case referenced above. 1. a. Title: Cox v. PLX Technology, Inc., et al. b. Case number: 1:14-cv-267079 c. Court: 1 same as above 0 other state or federal court (name and address): d. Department: e. Case type: 0 limited civil 1 unlimited civil 0 probate 0 family law 0 other (specify): f. Filing date: g. Has this case been designated or determined as "complex?" 1 Yes 0 No h. Relationship of this case to the case referenced above (check all that apply): 1 involves the same parties and is based on the same or similar claims. 1 arises from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact. 0 involves claims against, title to, possession of, or damages to the same property. 1 is likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges. 0 Additional explanation is attached in attachment 1h i. Status of case: 1 pending 0 dismissed 0 with 0 without prejudice 0 disposed of by judgment 2. a. Title: Ellis V. PLX Technology, Inc., et al. b. Case number: 1:14-cv-267171 c. Court: 1 same as above 0 other state or federal court (name and address): d. Department: Page 1 of 3 Form Approved for Optional Use Judicial Council of California CM-015 [Rev. July 1, 2007] NOTICE OF RELATED CASE Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.300 www.courtinfo.ca.gov |
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CM-015 PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Clarence Golden CASE NUMBER: DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: PLX Technology, Inc., et al. 2. (continued) e. Case type: 0 limited civil 1 unlimited civil 0 probate 0 family law 0 other (specify): f. Filing date: June 26, 2014 g. Has this case been designated or determined as "complex?" 1 Yes 0 No h. Relationship of this case to the case referenced above (check all that apply): 1 involves the same parties and is based on the same or similar claims. 1 arises from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact. 0 involves claims against, title to, possession of, or damages to the same property. 1 is likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges. 0 Additional explanation is attached in attachment 2h i. Status of case: 1 pending 0 dismissed 0 with 0 without prejudice 0 disposed of by judgment 3. a. Title: b. Case number: c. Court: 0 same as above 0 other state or federal court (name and address): d. Department: e. Case type: 0 limited civil 0 unlimited civil 0 probate 0 family law 0 other (specify): f. Filing date: g. Has this case been designated or determined as "complex?" 0 Yes 0 No h. Relationship of this case to the case referenced above (check all that apply): 0 involves the same parties and is based on the same or similar claims. 0 arises from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact. 0 involves claims against, title to, possession of, or damages to the same property. 0 is likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges. 0 Additional explanation is attached in attachment 3h i. Status of case: 0 pending 0 dismissed 0 with 0 without prejudice 0 disposed of by judgment 4. 0 Additional related cases are described in Attachment 4. Number of pages attached: Date: July 3, 2014 David T. Wissbroecker 4 (TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY) (SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY) CM-015 CM-015 [Rev. July 1, 2007] NOTICE OF RELATED CASE Page 2 of 3 |
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CM-015 PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Clarence Golden CASE NUMBER: DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: PLX Technology, Inc., et al. PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL NOTICE OF RELATED CASE (NOTE: You cannot serve the Notice of Related Case if you are a party in the action. The person who served the notice must complete this proof of service. The notice must be served on all known parties in each related action or proceeding.) 1. I am at least 18 years old and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed In the county where the mailing took place, and my residence or business address is (specify): 2. | served a copy of the Notice of Related Case by enclosing it in a sealed envelope with first-class postage fully prepaid and (check one): a. 0 deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service. b. 0 placed the sealed envelope for collection and processing for mailing, following this business's usual practices, with which I am readily familiar. On the same day correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service. 3. The Notice of Related Case was mailed: a. on (date): b. from (city and state): 4. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows: a. Name of person served: c. Name of person served: Street address: Street address: City: City: State and zip code: State and zip code: b. Name of person served: d. Name of person served: Street address: Street address: City: City: State and zip code: State and zip code: 0 Names and addresses of additional persons served are attached. (You may use form POS-030(P).) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Date: 4 (TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF DECLARANT) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT) COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW CM-015 [Rev. July 1, 2007] NOTICE OF RELATED CASE Page 3 of 3 |
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SUM-100 SUMMONS (CITACION JUDICIAL) FOR COURT USE ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE) NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (AVISO AL DEMANDADO): PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC., (Additional Parties Attachment form is attached) YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (LO ESTÁ DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE): CLARENCE GOLDEN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information below. You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court. There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association. NOTE: The court has a statutory lien for waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of $10,000 or more in a civil case. The court's lien must be paid before the court will dismiss the case. ¡AVISO! Lo han demandado. Si no responde dentro de 30 días, la corte puede decidir en su contra sin escuchar su versión. Lea la información a continuación. Tiene 30 DÍAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacer que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucorte.ca.gov), en la biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en la corte que le quede más cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de la corte que le dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y la corte le podrá quitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sin más advertencia. Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitio web de California Legal Services, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.sucorte.ca.gov) o poniéndose en contacto con la corte o el colegio de abogados locales. AVISO: Por ley, la corte tiene derecho a reclamar las cuotas y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobre cualquier recuperación de $10,000 ó más de valor recibida mediante un acuerdo o una concesión de arbitraje en un caso de derecho civil. Tiene que pagar el gravamen de la corte antes de que la corte pueda desechar el caso. The name and address of the court is: (El nombre y dirección de la corte es): CA Superior Court, Santa Clara County 191 North First Street San Jose, CA 95113 CASE NUMBER: (Número del Caso): 114 CV267531 The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiff's attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is: (El nombre, la dirección y el número de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es): David T. Wissbroecker, Robbins Geller, et al., 655 Broadway #1900, San Diego, CA 92101-619261-1058 DATE: July 3, 2014 (Fecha) Clerk, by (Secretario) , Deputy (Adjunto) (For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).) (Para prueba de entrega de esta citatión use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)). [SEAL] NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served 1. 0 as an individual defendant. 2. 0 as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify): 3. 0 on behalf of (specify): under: 0 CCP 416.10 (corporation) 0 CCP 416.60 (minor) 0 CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) 0 CCP 416.70 (conservatee) 0 CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) 0 CCP 416.90 (authorized person) 0 other (specify): 4. 0 by personal delivery on (date): Page 1 of 1 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUM-100 [Rev. July 1, 2009] SUMMONS Code of Civil Procedure §§ 412.20, 465 www.courtinfo.ca.gov |
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SUM-200(A) SHORT TITLE: Golden v. PLX Technology, Inc, et al. CASE NUMBER: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE ¢ This form may be used as an attachment to any summons if space does not permit the listing of all parties on the summons. ¢ If this attachment is used, insert the following statement in the plaintiff or defendant box on the summons: "Additional Parties Attachment form is attached." List additional parties (Check only one box. Use a separate page for each type of party.): 0 Plaintiff 1 Defendant 0 Cross-Complainant 0 Cross-Defendant AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES WIRELESS (U.S.A.) MANUFACTURING INC., PLUTO MERGER SUB, INC., MICHAEL J. SALAMEH, DAVID K. RAUN, RALPH SCHMITT, ERIC SINGER, STEPHEN DOMENIK, JOHN H. HART, MARTIN COLOMBATTO, PATRICK VERDERICO and DOES 1-25, inclusive Page 1 of 1 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California SUM-200(A) [Rev. January 1, 2007] ADDITIONAL PARTIES ATTACHMENT Attachment to Summons |
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ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP RANDALL J. BARON (150796) A. RICK ATWOOD, JR. (156529) DAVID T. WISSBROECKER (243867) EDWARD M. GERGOSIAN (105679) 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax) Attorneys for Plaintiff [Additional counsel appear on signature page.] SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA CLARENCE GOLDEN, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff, vs. PLX TECHNOLOGY, INC., AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES WIRELESS (U.S.A.) MANUFACTURING INC., PLUTO MERGER SUB, INC., MICHAEL J. SALAMEH, DAVID K. RAUN, RALPH SCHMITT, ERIC SINGER, STEPHEN DOMENIK, JOHN H. HART, MARTIN COLOMBATTO, PATRICK VERDERICO and DOES 1-25, inclusive, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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SUMMARY OF THE ACTION 1. This is a stockholder class action brought by plaintiff on behalf of the holders of PLX Technology, Inc. (PLXT or the Company) common stock against PLXT, the members of PLXTs Board of Directors (the Board), Avago Technologies Wireless (U.S.A.) Manufacturing Inc., a Delaware corporation (Parent), Pluto Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent (Merger Sub, and with Parent, Avago), arising out of their breaches of fiduciary duty and/or the aiding and abetting of such breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the proposed acquisition of PLXT by Avago through an unfair process and at an unfair price (the Proposed Acquisition). 2. Based in Sunnyvale, California, PLXT designs, develops, manufactures and sells integrated circuits worldwide. On June 23, 2014, the Company announced that PLXT and Avago had entered into a definitive agreement (the Merger Agreement) pursuant to which Avago will acquire the Company for just $6.50 per share. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, Avago will soon (by July 8, 2014) commence a tender offer to acquire all of the outstanding shares of the Companys common stock for $6.50 per share in cash (Tender Offer). Defendants are working quickly to consummate the deal; absent judicial intervention, the Tender Offer will expire in early August 2014. 3. The Proposed Acquisition is the product of a hopelessly flawed process that is designed to ensure the sale of PLXT to Avago on terms preferential to defendants and other PLXT insiders and to subvert the interests of plaintiff and the other public stockholders of the Company. The Proposed Acquisition is being driven entirely by PLXTs largest shareholder Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P. (PCP II) and the Board and Company management, who collectively own 14.7% of PLXTs outstanding stock and seek liquidity for their illiquid holdings in PLXT stock. If the Proposed Acquisition closes, PCP II and the Board and Company management will receive over $43.8 million from the sale of their illiquid holdings. Thus, the Board is conflicted and serving its own financial interests rather than those of PLXTs other shareholders. 4. From the Proposed Acquisition, PLXTs officers and directors will receive millions of dollars in special payments not being made to ordinary shareholders for currently unvested stock options, performance units, and restricted shares, all of which shall, upon the mergers closing, 1 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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become fully vested and exercisable. The Companys senior management is also entitled to receive from the Proposed Acquisition millions of dollars in change-of-control payments. Moreover, the Companys management appears to be staying on board for the long term after the Proposed Acquisition. 5. The proposed Tender Offer price of $6.50 per share drastically undervalues the Companys assets and prospects. The $6.50 per share consideration represents a premium of just 9.4% based on PLXTs closing price on June 20, 2014, the last trading day before the Proposed Acquisition was announced. This premium is significantly below the median one-day premium of nearly 62% for comparable transactions in the past three years. Further, at least one analyst set a price target of $8.00 per share for PLXT common stock. In addition, PLXT has traded above the merger consideration price as recently as January 17, 2014, when the Companys common stock reached a high of $6.91 per share. 6. As further evidence of the unfairness of the $6.50 per share Tender Offer price, on April 21, 2014, PLXT released its financial results for the Companys first quarter ended March 31, 2014, reporting the Companys fifth straight profitable quarter. Specifically, PLXT reported higher gross profits and increased operating income over the previous quarter. In announcing the quarterly results, PLXTs President and CEO, defendant David Raun (Raun), stated, Based on current backlog, forecasts from customers, and resolution of the assembly issues, we expect all of our market segments to be up in Q2, driven primarily by Gen2 and Gen3 shipments. We are beginning to see an increasing number of Gen3 design wins go into volume production and we believe that this ramp will fuel our growth this year and in years to come . . . 7. Defendants agreed to the Proposed Acquisition in breach of their fiduciary duties to PLXTs public shareholders, which they brought about through an unfair sales process. Rather than undertake a full and fair sales process designed to maximize shareholder value as their fiduciary duties require, the Board catered to its own liquidity goals, as well as to the interests of Avago. 8. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, Avago will commence the Tender Offer shortly, and no later than July 8, 2014. The initial offer period of the Tender Offer will expire as soon as 25 business days after the commencement of the offer. The closing of the merger is subject only to tender by the holders of a simple majority of the Companys common stock, and 14.7% of the Companys 2 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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shares are controlled by PCP II and the Board and members of Company management, all of whom signed an agreement to tender their shares in support of the Merger Agreement. PLXT and Avago have announced their intent to effect the merger, pursuant to recently enacted §251(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, as a short-form merger to cash out any shareholders who do not tender ¬without so much as a shareholder vote. Thus, just over 35% of the Companys outstanding shares need to be tendered in order for the merger to close. 9. To protect against the threat of alternate bidders out-bidding Avago after the announcement, defendants implemented preclusive deal protection devices to guarantee that Avago will not lose its preferred position. These deal protection devices effectively preclude any competing bids for PLXT. 10. Those deal protection devices will preclude a fair sales process for the Company and lock out competing bidders, and include: (i) a no-shop clause that will preclude the Company from soliciting potential competing bidders; (ii) a matching rights provision that would require the Company to disclose confidential information about competing bids to Avago and allow Avago to match any competing proposal; and (iii) a termination and expense fee provision that would require the Company to pay Avago $10.85 million if the Proposed Acquisition is terminated in favor of a superior proposal. 11. In pursuing the unlawful plan to sell the Company for less than fair value and pursuant to an unfair process, defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care, independence, candor, good faith and fair dealing, and/or have aided and abetted such breaches. Defendants are moving quickly to consummate the Proposed Acquisition. According to the defendants, the Tender Offer will commence shortly and close in about one month. Consequently, immediate judicial intervention is warranted here to rectify existing and future irreparable harm to the Companys shareholders. Plaintiff seeks equitable relief only to enjoin the Proposed Acquisition or, alternatively, rescind the Proposed Acquisition in the event it is consummated. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 12. This Court has jurisdiction over the causes of action asserted herein pursuant to the California Constitution, art, VI, §10, because this case is a cause not given by statute to other trial courts. 3 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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13. This Court has jurisdiction over PLXT because PLXT is a citizen of California and Delaware as it is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business at 870 W. Maude Avenue, Sunnyvale, California 94085. This action is not removable. 14. Venue is proper in this Court because the conduct at issue took place and had an effect in this County. THE PARTIES 15. Plaintiff Clarence Golden is, and at all times relevant hereto was, a shareholder of PLXT. 16. Defendant PLXT is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Sunnyvale, California. Defendant PLXT is sued herein as an aider and abettor. 17. Defendant Parent is a Delaware corporation with headquarters in San Jose, California and Singapore. Defendant Parent is sued herein as an aider and abettor. 18. Defendant Merger Sub is a Delaware corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parent. Defendant Merger Sub is sued herein as an aider and abettor. 19. Defendant Michael J. Salameh is and has been at all relevant times PLXTs Chairman and a member of the Board. Salamaeh co-founded PLXT and previously served as the Companys CEO. 20. Defendant Raun is and has been at all relevant times PLXTs President and CEO and a member of the Board. 21. Defendant Ralph Schmitt is and has been at all relevant times a member of the Board. Schmitt previously served as the Companys President and CEO. 22. Defendant Eric Singer is and has been at all relevant times a member of the Board. Singer is a co-managing member of Potomac Capital Management HI, L.L.C., an affiliate of PCP II, the Companys largest shareholder. 23. Defendant Stephen Domenik is and has been at all relevant times a member of the Board. 24. Defendant John H. Hart is and has been at all relevant times a member of the Board. 25. Defendant Martin Colombatto is and has been at all relevant times a member of the Board. 26. Defendant Patrick Verderico is and has been at all relevant times a member of the Board. 4 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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27. The defendants named above in ¶¶19-26 are sometimes collectively referred to herein as the Individual Defendants. 28. The true names and capacities of defendants sued herein under California Code of Civil Procedure §474 as Does 1 through 25, inclusive, are presently not known to plaintiff, who therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will seek to amend this Complaint and include these Doe defendants true names and capacities when they are ascertained. Each of the fictitiously named defendants is responsible in some manner for the conduct alleged herein and for the injuries suffered by the Class CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 29. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §382 on behalf of all holders of PLXT stock who are being and will be harmed by defendants actions described below (the Class). Excluded from the Class are defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with any defendants. 30. This action is properly maintainable as a class action. 31. The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. According to PLXTs SEC filings, as of March 31, 2014, there were more than 45.8 million shares of PLXT common stock outstanding, held by hundreds if not thousands of shareholders geographically dispersed across the country. 32. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member. The common questions include, inter alia, the following: (a) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of undivided loyalty, independence, or due care with respect to plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Acquisition; (b) whether defendants are engaging in self-dealing in connection with the Proposed Acquisition; (c) whether the Individual Defendants have breached their fiduciary duty to secure and obtain the best value reasonable under the circumstances for the benefit of plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Acquisition; 5 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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(d) whether defendants are unjustly enriching themselves and other insiders or affiliates of PLXT or Avago; (e) whether the Individual Defendants have breached any of their other fiduciary duties to plaintiff and the other members of the Class in connection with the Proposed Acquisition, including the duties of good faith, diligence, honesty and fair dealing; (f) whether the defendants, in bad faith and for improper motives, have impeded or erected barriers to discourage other offers for the Company or its assets; (g) whether the Proposed Acquisition compensation payable to plaintiff and the Class is unfair and inadequate; and (h) whether plaintiff and the other members of the Class would suffer irreparable injury unless defendants conduct is enjoined. 33. Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class and plaintiff does not have any interests adverse to the Class. 34. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class, has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature, and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 35. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the Class. 36. Plaintiff anticipates that there will be no difficulty in the management of this litigation. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. 37. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class with respect to the matters complained of herein, thereby making appropriate the relief sought herein with respect to the Class as a whole. DEFENDANTS FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE ENTIRE FAIRNESS STANDARD 38. Under Delaware law, in any situation where the directors of a publicly traded corporation undertake a transaction that will result in either (i) a change in corporate control or (ii) a break-up of the 6 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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corporations assets, the directors have an affirmative fiduciary obligation to obtain the highest value reasonably available for the corporations shareholders, and if such transaction will result in a change of corporate control, the shareholders are entitled to receive a significant premium. To diligently comply with these duties, the directors may not take any action that: (a) adversely affects the value provided to the corporations shareholders; (b) will discourage or inhibit alternative offers to purchase control of the corporation or its assets; (c) contractually prohibits them from complying with their fiduciary duties; (d) will otherwise adversely affect their duty to search and secure the best value reasonably available under the circumstances for the corporations shareholders; and/or (e) will provide the directors with preferential treatment at the expense of, or separate from, the public shareholders. 39. In accordance with their duties of loyalty and good faith, the Individual Defendants, as directors and/or officers of PLXT are obligated to refrain from: (a) participating in any transaction where the directors or officers loyalties are divided; (b) participating in any transaction where the directors or officers receive or are entitled to receive a personal financial benefit not equally shared by the public shareholders of the corporation; and/or (c) unjustly enriching themselves at the expense or to the detriment of the public shareholders. 40. Plaintiff alleges herein that the Individual Defendants, separately and together, in connection with the Proposed Acquisition, violated the fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff and the other public shareholders of PLXT, including their duties of loyalty, good faith, candor, due care and independence, insofar as they stood on both sides of the transaction and engaged in self-dealing and obtained for themselves personal benefits, including personal financial benefits, not shared equally by plaintiff or the Class. As a result of the Individual Defendants self-dealing and divided loyalties, neither plaintiff nor the Class will receive adequate or fair value for their PLXT common stock in the Proposed Acquisition. 41. Because the Individual Defendants have breached their duties of due care, loyalty and good faith in connection with the Proposed Acquisition, the burden of proving the inherent or entire fairness of the Proposed Acquisition, including all aspects of its negotiation, structure, price and terms, is placed upon the Individual Defendants as a matter of law. 7 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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CONSPIRACY, AIDING AND ABETTING, AND CONCERTED ACTION 42. In committing the wrongful acts alleged herein, defendants have pursued, or joined in the pursuit of, a common course of conduct, and acted in concert with and conspired with one another, in furtherance of their common plan or design. In addition to the wrongful conduct herein alleged as giving rise to primary liability, defendants further aided and abetted and/or assisted each other in breach of their respective duties as herein alleged. 43. Each of the defendants herein aided and abetted and rendered substantial assistance in the wrongs complained of herein. In taking such actions, as particularized herein, to substantially assist the commission of the wrongdoing complained of, each defendant acted with knowledge of the primary wrongdoing, substantially assisted the accomplishment of that wrongdoing, and was aware of his overall contribution to, and furtherance of, the wrongdoing. The defendants acts of aiding and abetting included, inter alia, the acts each of them are alleged to have committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, common enterprise and common course of conduct complained of herein. THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION 44. PLXT is the industry-leading global provider of semiconductor-based PCI Express connectivity solutions primarily targeting enterprise data center markets. The Company develops innovative software-enriched silicon that enables product differentiation, reliable interoperability and superior performance. 45. On April 21, 2014, PLXT released its financial results for the Companys first quarter ended March 31, 2014, reporting the Companys fifth straight profitable quarter. Specifically, PLXT reported higher gross profits and increased operating income over the previous quarter. In announcing , the quarterly results, PLXTs President and CEO, defendant Raun, stated, Based on current backlog, forecasts from customers, and resolution of the assembly issues, we expect all of our market segments to be up in Q2, driven primarily by Gen2 and Gen3 shipments. We are beginning to see an increasing number of Gen3 design wins go into volume production and we believe that this ramp will fuel our growth this year and in years to come . . . . 46. Despite PLXTs excellent financial results, increasing number of Gen3 design wins and expectations that all Company segments will be up in the Companys 2014 second quarter, on June 23, 8 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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2014, the Company announced that the Board had decided to sell the Company, reporting that PLXT and Avago had entered into the Merger Agreement pursuant to which Avago will acquire the Company for just $6.50 per share. On or before July 8, 2014, Avagi will commence the cash Tender Offer of $6.50 per share. Defendants are working quickly to consummate the deal; absent judicial intervention, the Tender Offer will close in about one month from now. 47. The press release announcing the Proposed Acquisition states in pertinent part: Avago Technologies Limited to Acquire PLX Technology, Inc. for $6.50 per Share in Cash PLX PCI Express products complement Avago s server storage connectivity and networking ASIC products serving enterprise and data center Immediately accretive to Avago s EPS, on a non-GAAP basis . . . Avago Technologies Limited and PLX Technology, Inc. today announced that they have entered into a definitive agreement under which Avago will acquire PLX, a leader in PCI Express silicon and software connectivity solutions, in an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $309 million, or $293 million net of cash and debt acquired. Under the terms of the agreement, which was approved by the Boards of Directors of both companies, a subsidiary of Avago will commence a tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of PLX common stock for $6.50 per share in cash. Avago expects to fund the transaction with cash available on its balance sheet. The core PLX PCIe silicon business fits very well with the Avago business model and broadens Avagos portfolio serving the enterprise storage and networking end markets, stated Hock Tan, President and Chief Executive Officer of Avago. Following the closing of the transaction, we are excited to welcome the PLX team to Avago, and we are committed to continue to invest in the PLX PCI Express platform, Once closed, this transaction will provide immediate value to our stockholders and offers new growth opportunities for our employees to develop leading-edge solutions for our customers, said David Raun, President and Chief Executive Officer of PLX. Following the closing of the transaction, we believe the combination with Avago is an excellent match for our leading PCI Express portfolio supporting next generation data center architectures. The transaction is expected to be immediately accretive to Avagos non-GAAP earnings per share. Avago currently anticipates driving the PLX business model to a level consistent with Avagos long term business model by the end of fiscal year 2015, the first full fiscal year after closing. Potomac Capital Partners II, L.P., which is the largest stockholder of PLX, certain senior members of the PLX management team and all of the directors of PLX, collectively owning approximately 14.7% of shares outstanding on fully diluted basis have executed a Tender and Support Agreement in support of the transaction. 9 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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48. The Proposed Acquisition is the product of a hopelessly flawed process that is designed to ensure the sale of PLXT to Avago on terms preferential to defendants and other PLXT insiders and to subvert the interests of plaintiff and the other public stockholders of the Company. The Proposed Acquisition is being driven entirely by PLXTs largest shareholder, PCP II, and the Board and Company management, who collectively own 14.7% of PLXTs outstanding stock and seek liquidity for their illiquid holdings in PLXT stock. If the Proposed Acquisition closes, PCP II and the Board and Company management will receive over $43.8 million from the sale of their illiquid holdings. Thus, the Board is conflicted and serving its own financial interests rather than those of PLXTs other shareholders. 49. From the Proposed Acquisition, PLXTs officers and directors will receive millions of dollars in special payments not being made to ordinary shareholders for currently unvested stock options, performance units, and restricted shares, all of which shall, upon the mergers closing, become fully vested and exercisable. The Companys senior management is also entitled to receive from the Proposed Acquisition millions of dollars in change-of-control payments. Moreover, the Companys management appears to be staying on board for the long term after the Proposed Acquisition. 50. The proposed Tender Offer price of $6.50 per share drastically undervalues the Companys assets and prospects. The $6.50 per share consideration represents a premium of just 9.4% based on PLXTs closing price on June 20, 2014, the last trading day before the Proposed Acquisition was announced. This premium is significantly below the median one-day premium of nearly 62% for comparable transactions in the past three years. Further, at least one analyst set a price target of $8.00 per share for PLXT common stock. In addition, PLX has traded above the merger consideration as recently as January 17, 2014, when the Companys common stock reached a high of $6.91 per share. 51. As further evidence of the unfairness of the $6.50 per share Tender Offer price, as noted above, on April 21, 2014, PLXT released its financial results for the Companys first quarter ended March 31, 2014, reporting the Companys fifth straight profitable quarter, higher gross profits and increased operating income over the previous quarter, Company expectations that all of PLXTs market 10 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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segments will be up in the second quarter of 2014 and an increasing number of Gen3 design wins going into volume production to fuel PLXTs growth. 52. Defendants agreed to the Proposed Acquisition in breach of their fiduciary duties to PLXTs public shareholders, which they brought about through an unfair sales process. Rather than undertake a full and fair sales process designed to maximize shareholder value as their fiduciary duties require, the Board catered to its own liquidity goals, as well as to the interests of Avago. 53. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, Avago will commence the Tender Offer shortly, and no later than July 8, 2014. The initial offer period of the Tender Offer will expire as soon as 25 business days after the commencement of the offer. The closing of the merger is subject only to tender by the holders of a simple majority of the Companys common stock, and 14.7% of the Companys shares are controlled by PCP II and the Board and members of Company management, all of whom signed an agreement to tender their shares in support of the Merger Agreement. PLXT and Avago have announced their intent to effect the merger, pursuant to recently enacted §251(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, as a short-form merger to cash out any shareholders who do not tender ¬without so much as a shareholder vote. Thus, just over 35% of the Companys outstanding shares need to be tendered in order for the merger to close. 54. To protect against the threat of alternate bidders out-bidding Avago after the announcement, defendants implemented preclusive deal protection devices to guarantee that Avago will not lose its preferred position. These deal protection devices effectively preclude any competing bids for PLXT. 55. Those deal protection devices will preclude a fair sales process for the Company and lock out competing bidders, and include: (i) a no-shop clause that will preclude the Company from soliciting potential competing bidders; (ii) a matching rights provision that would require the Company to disclose confidential information about competing bids to Avago and allow Avago to match any competing proposal; and (iii) a termination and expense fee provision that would require the Company to pay Avago $10.85 million if the Proposed Acquisition is terminated in favor of a superior proposal. 56. In pursuing the unlawful plan to sell the Company for less than fair value and pursuant to an unfair process, defendants have breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care, independence, 11 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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candor, good faith and fair dealing, and/or have aided and abetted such breaches. Defendants are moving quickly to consummate the Proposed Acquisition. According to the defendants, the Tender Offer will commence shortly and close in about one month. Consequently, immediate judicial intervention is warranted here to rectify existing and future irreparable harm to the Companys shareholders. Plaintiff seeks equitable relief only to enjoin the Proposed Acquisition or, alternatively, rescind the Proposed Acquisition in the event it is consummated. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against the Individual Defendants 57. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation set forth herein. 58. The Individual Defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, candor, and independence owed under applicable law to the public shareholders of PLXT and have acted to put their personal interests ahead of the interests of PLXT s shareholders. 59. By the acts, transactions and courses of conduct alleged herein, defendants, individually and acting as a part of a, common plan, are attempting to advance their interests at the expense of plaintiff and other members of the Class. 60. The Individual Defendants have violated and continue to violate their fiduciary duties by attempting to enter into a transaction without regard to the fairness of the transaction to PLXTs shareholders. Defendants PLXT and Avago directly breached and/or aided and abetted the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff and the other holders of PLXTs stock. 61. As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, candor and independence owed to the shareholders of PLXT because, among other reasons: (a) they failed to properly value PLXT; and (b) they ignored or did not protect against the numerous conflicts of interest resulting from their own interrelationships or connection with the Proposed Acquisition. 62. Because the Individual Defendants dominate and control the business and corporate affairs of PLXT, and are in possession of private corporate information concerning PLXTs assets, 12 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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business and future prospects, there exists an imbalance and disparity of knowledge and economic power between them and the public shareholders of PLXT which makes it inherently unfair for them to pursue any proposed transaction wherein they will reap disproportionate benefits to the detriment of shareholders. 63. By reason of the foregoing acts, practices and course of conduct, the Individual Defendants have failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary obligations toward plaintiff and the other members of the Class. 64. As a result of the actions of defendants, plaintiff and the Class will suffer irreparable injury as a result of defendants self-dealing. 65. Unless enjoined by this Court, the Individual Defendants will continue to breach their fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff and the Class and may consummate the Proposed Acquisition. 66. The Individual Defendants are engaging in self-dealing, are not acting in good faith toward plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and have breached and are breaching their fiduciary duties to the members of the Class. 67. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have no adequate remedy at law. Only through the exercise of this Courts equitable powers can plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate and irreparable injury which defendants actions threaten to inflict. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Claim for Aiding and Abetting Breaches of Fiduciary Duty Against Defendants PLXT, Parent and Merger Sub 68. Plaintiff repeats and realleges every allegation set forth herein. 69. Defendants PLXT, Parent and Merger Sub aided and abetted the Individual Defendants in breaching their fiduciary duties owed to the public shareholders of PLXT, including plaintiff and the members of the Class. 70. The Individual Defendants owed to plaintiff and the members of the Class certain fiduciary duties as fully set out herein. 71. By committing the acts alleged herein, the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff and the members of the Class. 13 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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72. PLXT, Parent and Merger Sub colluded in or aided and abetted the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties, and were active and knowing participants in the Individual Defendants breaches of fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff and the members of the Class. 73. Plaintiff and the members of the Class shall be irreparably injured as a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands injunctive relief against defendants as follows: A. Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a class action; B. Enjoining defendants, their agents, counsel, employees and all persons acting in concert with them from consummating the Proposed Acquisition, unless and until the Individual Defendants adopt and implement a fair procedure or process to sell the Company; C. Directing the Individual Defendants to exercise their fiduciary duties to obtain a transaction which is in the best interests of PLXTs shareholders; D. Rescinding, to the extent already implemented, the Merger Agreement or any of the terms thereof; E. Awarding plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable attorneys and experts fees; and F. Granting such other and further equitable and/or injunctive relief as this Court may deem just and proper. DATED: July 3, 2014 ROBBINS GELLER RUDMAN & DOWD LLP RANDALL J. BARON A. RICK ATWOOD, JR. DAVID T. WISSBROECKER EDWARD M. GERGOSIAN DAVID T. WISSBROECKER 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619/231-1058 619/231-7423 (fax) 14 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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LAW OFFICES OF MARC S. HENZEL MARC S. HENZEL 431 Montgomery Avenue, Suite B Merion Station, PA 19066 Telephone: 610/660-8000 (fax) Attorneys for Plaintiff 15 COMPLAINT FOR BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND VIOLATIONS OF STATE LAW |
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CM-010 2008 (c) American LegalNet, Inc. ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): FOR COURT USE ONLY David T. Wissbroecker Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP 655 West Broadway, Suite 1900 San San Diego, CA 92101 TELEPHONE NO.: 619/231-1058 FAX NO.: 619/231-7423 ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Plaintiff Clarence Golden SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF STREET ADDRESS: 191 North First Street MAILING ADDRESS: CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Jose, CA 95113 BRANCH NAME: Civil Division CASE NAME: Golden v. PLX Technology, Inc. et al. CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Complex Case Designation CASE NUMBER: 114CV267531 1 Unlimited (Amount demanded exceeds $25,000) 0 Limited (Amount demanded is $25,000 or less) 0 Counter 0 Joinder Filed with first appearance by defendant (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.402) JUDGE: DEPT: Items 16 below must be completed (see instructions on page 2). 1. Check one box below for the case type that best describes this case: Auto Tort 0 Auto (22) 0 Uninsured motorist (46) Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort 0 Asbestos (04) 0 Product liability (24) 0 Medical malpractice (45) 0 Other PI/PD/WD (23) Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort 1 Business tort/unfair business practice (07) 0 Civil rights (08) 0 Defamation (13) 0 Fraud (16) 0 Intellectual property (19) 0 Professional negligence (25) 0 Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (35) Employment 0 wrongful termination (36) 0 Other employment (15) Contract 0 Breach of contract/warranty (06) 0 Rule 3.740 collections (09) 0 Other collections (09) 0 Insurance coverage (18) 0 Other contract (37) Real Property 0 Eminent domain/Inverse condemnation (14) 0 Wrongful eviction (33) 0 Other real property (26) Unlawful Detainer 0 Commercial (31) 0 Residential (32) 0 Drugs (38) Judicial Review 0 Asset forfeiture (05) 0 Petition re: arbitration award (11) 0 Writ of mandate (02) 0 Other judicial review (39) Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.4003.403) 0 Antitrust/Trade regulation (03) 0 Construction defect (10) 0 Mass tort (40) 0 Securities litigation (28) 0 Environmental/Toxic tort (30) 0 Insurance coverage claims arising from the above listed provisionally complex case types (41) Enforcement of Judgment 0 Enforcement of judgment (20) Miscellaneous Civil Complaint 0 RICO (27) 0 Other complaint (not specified above) (42) Miscellaneous Civil Petition 0 Partnership and corporate governance (21) 0 Other petition (not specified above) (43) 2. This case 1 is 0 is not complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court. If the case is complex, mark the factors requiring exceptional judicial management: a. 1 Large number of separately represented parties b. 1 Extensive motion practice raising difficult or novel issues that will be time-consuming to resolve c. 1 Substantial amount of documentary evidence d. 1 Large number of witnesses e. 0 Coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or countries, or in a federal court f. 0 Substantial postjudgment judicial supervision 3. Remedies sought (check all that apply): a. 0 monetary b. 1 nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief c. 0 punitive 4. Number of causes of action (specify): Two 5. This case 1 is 0 is not a class action suit. 6. If there are any known related cases, file and serve a notice of related case. (You may use form CM-015.) Date: July 3, 2014 David T. Wissbroecker u (TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY)- NOTICE Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the first paper filed in the action or proceeding (except small claims cases or cases filed under the Probate Code, Family Code, or Welfare and Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.220.) Failure to file may result in sanctions. File this cover sheet in addition to any cover sheet required by local court rule. If this case is complex under rule 3.400 et seq. of the California Rules of Court, you must serve a copy of this cover sheet on all other parties to the action or proceeding. Unless this is a collections case under rule 3.740 or a complex case, this cover sheet will be used for statistical purposes only. Page 1 of 2 Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Judicial Council of California CM-010 [Rev. July 1, 2009] CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.30, 3.220, 3.4003.403, 3.740; Cal. Standards of Judicial Administration, std. 3.10 www.courtinfo.ca.gov |
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CM-010 INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO COMPLETE THE COVER SHEET To Plaintiffs and Others Filing First Papers. If you are filing a first paper (for example, a complaint) in a civil case, you must complete and file, along with your first paper, the Civil Case Cover Sheet contained on page 1. This information will be used to compile statistics about the types and numbers of cases filed. You must complete items 1 through 6 on the sheet. In item 1, you must check one box for the case type that best describes the case. If the case fits both a general and a more specific type of case listed in item 1, check the more specific one. If the case has multiple causes of action, check the box that best indicates the primary cause of action. To assist you in completing the sheet, examples of the cases that belong under each case type in item 1 are provided below. A cover sheet must be filed only with your initial paper. Failure to file a cover sheet with the first paper filed in a civil case may subject a party, its counsel, or both to sanctions under rules 2.30 and 3.220 of the California Rules of Court. To Parties in Rule 3.740 Collections Cases. A "collections case" under rule 3.740 is defined as an action for recovery of money owed in a sum stated to be certain that is not more than $25,000, exclusive of interest and attorney's fees, arising from a transaction in which property, services, or money was acquired on credit. A collections case does not include an action seeking the following: (1) tort damages, (2) punitive damages, (3) recovery of real property, (4) recovery of personal property, or (5) a prejudgment writ of attachment. The identification of a case as a rule 3.740 collections case on this form means that it will be exempt from the general time-for-service requirements and case management rules, unless a defendant files a responsive pleading. A rule 3.740 collections case will be subject to the requirements for service and obtaining a judgment in rule 3.740. To Parties in Complex Cases. In complex cases only, parties must also use the Civil Case Cover Sheet to designate whether the case is complex. If a plaintiff believes the case is complex under rule 3.400 of the California Rules of Court, this must be indicated by completing the appropriate boxes in items 1 and 2. If a plaintiff designates a case as complex, the cover sheet must be served with the complaint on all parties to the action. A defendant may file and serve no later than the time of its first appearance a joinder in the plaintiff's designation, a counter-designation that the case is not complex, or, if the plaintiff has made no designation, a designation that the case is complex. CASE TYPES AND EXAMPLES Auto Tort Auto (22)Personal Injury/Property Damage/Wrongful Death Uninsured Motorist (46) (if the case involves an uninsured motorist claim subject to arbitration, check this item instead of Auto) Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/ Property Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort Asbestos (04) Asbestos Property Damage Asbestos Personal Injury/ Wrongful Death Product Liability (not asbestos or toxic/environmental) (24) Medical Malpractice (45) Medical Malpractice Physicians & Surgeons Other Professional Health Care Malpractice Other PI/PD/WD (23) Premises Liability (e.g., slip and fall) Intentional Bodily Injury/PD/WD (e.g., assault, vandalism) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Other PI/PD/WD Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort Business Tort/Unfair Business Practice (07) Civil Rights (e.g., discrimination, false arrest) (not civil harassment) (08) Defamation (e.g., slander, libel) (13) Fraud (16) Intellectual Property (19) Professional Negligence (25) Legal Malpractice Other Professional Malpractice (not medical or legal) Other Non-PI/PD/WD Tort (35) Employment Wrongful Termination (36) Other Employment (15) Contract Breach of Contract/Warranty (06) Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) Contract/Warranty BreachSeller Plaintiff (not fraud or negligence) Negligent Breach of Contract/ Warranty Other Breach of Contract/Warranty Collections (e.g., money owed, open book accounts) (09) Collection CaseSeller Plaintiff Other Promissory Note/Collections Case Insurance Coverage (not provisionally complex) (18) Auto Subrogation Other Coverage Other Contract (37) Contractual Fraud Other Contract Dispute Real Property Eminent Domain/Inverse Condemnation (14) Wrongful Eviction (33) Other Real Property (e.g., quiet title) (26) Writ of Possession of Real Property Mortgage Foreclosure Quiet Title Other Real Property (not eminent domain, landlord/tenant, or foreclosure) Unlawful Detainer Commercial (31) Residential (32) Drugs (38) (if the case involves illegal drugs, check this item; otherwise, report as Commercial or Residential) Judicial Review Asset Forfeiture (05) Petition Re: Arbitration Award (11) Writ of Mandate (02) WritAdministrative Mandamus WritMandamus on Limited Court Case Matter WritOther Limited Court Case Review Other Judicial Review (39) Review of Health Officer Order Notice of AppealLabor Commissioner Appeals Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation (Cal. Rules of Court Rules 3.4003.403) Antitrust/Trade Regulation (03) Construction Defect (10) Claims Involving Mass Tort (40) Securities Litigation (28) Environmental/Toxic Tort (30) Insurance Coverage Claims (arising from provisionally complex case type listed above) (41) Enforcement of Judgment Enforcement of Judgment (20) Abstract of Judgment (Out of County) Confession of Judgment (non-domestic relations) Sister State Judgment Administrative Agency Award (not unpaid taxes) Petition/Certification of Entry of Judgment on Unpaid Taxes Other Enforcement of Judgment Case Miscellaneous Civil Complaint RICO (27) Other Complaint (not specified above) (42) Declaratory Relief Only Injunctive Relief Only (non-harassment) Mechanics Lien Other Commercial Complaint Case (non-tort/non-complex) Other Civil Complaint (non-tort/non-complex) Miscellaneous Civil Petition Partnership and Corporate Governance (21) Other Petition (not specified above) (43) Civil Harassment Workplace Violence Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse Election Contest Petition for Name Change Petition for Relief From Late Claim Other Civil Petition CM-010 [Rev. July 1, 2007] CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET Page 2 of 2 |
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CM-010 ATTACHMENT CV-5012 CIVIL LAWSUIT NOTICE Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara 191 N. First St., San Jose, CA 95113 CASE NUMBER: PLEASE READ THIS ENTIRE FORM PLAINTIFF (the person suing): Within 60 days after filing the lawsuit, you must serve each Defendant with the Complaint, Summons, an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Information Sheet, and a copy of this Civil Lawsuit Notice, and you must file written proof of such service. DEFENDANT (The person sued): You must do each of the following to protect your rights: 1. You must file a written response to the Complaint, using the proper legal form or format, in the Clerk's Office of the Court, within 30 days of the date you were served with the Summons and Complaint; 2. You must serve by mail a copy of your written response on the Plaintiffs attorney or on the Plaintiff if Plaintiff has no attorney (to "serve by mail" means to have an adult other than yourself mail a copy); and 3. You must attend the first Case Management Conference. Warning: If you, as the Defendant, do not follow these instructions, you may automatically lose this case. RULES AND FORMS: You must follow the California Rules of Court and the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara Local Civil Rules and use proper forms. You can obtain legal information, view the rules and receive forms, free of charge, from the Self-Help Center at 99 Notre Dame Avenue, San Jose (408-882-2900 x-2926), www.scselfservice.org (Select "Civil") or from: § State Rules and Judicial Council Forms: www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms and www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules § Local Rules and Forms: http://www.sccsuperiorcourt.org/civil/rule1toc.htm CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE (CMC): You must meet with the other parties and discuss the case, in person or by telephone, at least 30 calendar days before the CMC. You must also fill out, file and serve a Case Management Statement (Judicial Council form CM-110) at least 15 calendar days before the CMC. You or your attorney must appear at the CMC. You may ask to appear by telephone see Local Civil Rule 8. Your Case Management Judge is: Peter Kirwan Department: 1 The 1st CMC is scheduled for: (Completed by Clerk of Court) Date: October 31, 2014 Time: 10:00 am in Department: 1 The next CMC is scheduled for: (Completed by party if the 1st CMC was continued or has passed) Date: Time: in Department: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): If all parties have appeared and filed a completed ADR Stipulation Form (local form CV-5008) at least 15 days before the CMC, the Court will cancel the CMC and mail notice of an ADR Status Conference. Visit the Court's website at www.sccsuperiorcourt.org/civil/ADR/ or call the ADR Administrator (408-882-2100 x-2530) for a list of ADR providers and their qualifications, services, and fees. WARNING: Sanctions may be imposed if you do not follow the California Rules of Court or the Local Rules of Court. CM-5012 [Rev. 7/01/08] CIVIL LAWSUIT NOTICE Page 1 of 1 |
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