1. | We note your response to comment one of our letter dated February 26, 2013. Please describe for us the “best case” scenario and how you determined what the “best case” scenario would be (e.g., the most optimistic scenario based on probable outcomes, the best potential scenario based on the design of the entity, etc.). |
• | Highest Performance of the RSO investment portfolio - the RSO portfolio includes investments in collateralized loan obligation (“CLO”) and collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) issuers that it manages, which securitize corporate bank loans and commercial real estate. In the best case scenario approach, the Company utilized cash flow models from Intex Solutions, a third-party provider, in which the Company assumed that all of the collateral within the securitizations were performing and, as such, that there were no projected credit losses (a “zero default rate”). This would result in RSO receiving the maximum return on its investments, which correspondingly would maximize the potential incentive fees that the Company could earn. |
• | Successful Future Equity Raises - The base management fee, which is a direct function of RSO's equity, would increase as additional capital is raised. The capital raised is presumed to be primarily invested by RSO into securitized assets. As noted in our response above, the equity tranche RSO would acquire is the smallest component of the securitization structure, which inherently limits the potential revenues to RSO and, accordingly, limits the significance to RSO of the base management fees potentially to be earned by the Company. |
• | Maintaining Projected Dividends - historically, RSO has paid quarterly dividends, which have declined since 2006. For purposes of maximizing the returns to the Company, the dividend rate was projected to remain constant at the current $0.80 per share on an annual basis. The Company's analysis includes the dividends on the RSO common shares it owns. |
2. | Please tell us what effect qualitative factors, including but not limited to each of the factors noted in your response to our prior comment one, had on your analysis and conclusion. In this regard, we note that a quantitative analysis is not required and shall not be the sole determinant as to whether a reporting entity has the obligations or rights referred to in ASC 810-10-25-38A and that the probability of certain events occurring would generally not factor into an analysis of whether a financial interest could potentially be significant. |
• | the power to direct the activities of the VIE that most significantly impact the VIE's economic performance, and |
• | the obligation to absorb losses or the right to receive benefits that could potentially be significant to the VIE. |
• | The management fee it earns from RSO consists of two parts: (i) a base management fee that is a function of the amount of RSO's equity and not its operating results, and (ii) an incentive management fee that, although based in part upon RSO's net income, is also (as described to our response to comment one above) partially based upon RSO's equity and earned only if RSO's net income exceeds a specified return to RSO's shareholders. As a result, the Company's management fee is only partially tied to gains made by RSO. |
• | RSO was formed to provide outside stockholders the opportunity to participate in a professionally managed portfolio of real estate and commercial financing assets, and not as a financing vehicle for the Company. Stockholders bear the risk of loss in their investments if RSO is not successful, and obtain substantially all of the benefits (including dividends and capital appreciation of their holdings) if RSO is successful. |
• | The Company’s stock interest in RSO is very small relative to both RSO’s total capitalization and its total equity capitalization and, accordingly, does not absorb significant amounts of either RSO’s losses or gains. Moreover, its investment at the time of RSO’s initial private offering was not to absorb losses or receive gains significant to RSO but, rather, was principally for marketing purposes, as a demonstration to investors that the Company was confident in the potential for RSO’s success. The contractually required payment of 25% of the incentive management fee in RSO’s shares was intended to reinforce that demonstration of confidence and, as with the initial investments, was seen principally as a marketing tool. |
Very truly yours, | |
Ledgewood a professional corporation | |
By: /s/ J. Baur Whittlesey | |
J. Baur Whittlesey |
Very truly yours, | |
Resource America, Inc. | |
By: /s/ Thomas C. Elliott | |
Thomas C. Elliott | |
Title: Senior Vice President and Chief | |
Financial Officer | |
Dated: April 4, 2013 |