N-CSR

UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

FORM N-CSR

CERTIFIED SHAREHOLDER REPORT OF REGISTERED

MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES

Investment Company Act file number 811-05150

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.

(Exact name of registrant as specified in charter)

48 Wall Street, 22nd Floor, New York,  New York	10005
(Address of principal executive offices)	(Zip code)

Frank J. Maresca

AST Fund Solutions, LLC, 48 Wall Street, 22^nd Floor, New York,  New York 10005

(Name and address of agent for service)

Registrant's telephone number, including area code: (866) 668-6558

Date of fiscal year end: December 31, 2014

Date of reporting period: December 31, 2014

ITEM 1. REPORTS TO STOCKHOLDERS.

Cornerstone StrategicValue Fund, Inc.

Annual Report December 31, 2014

CONTENTS

Portfolio Summary	1
Schedule of Investments	2
Statement of Assets and Liabilities	8
Statement of Operations	9
Statement of Changes in Net Assets	10
Financial Highlights	11
Notes to Financial Statements	12
Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm	17
Results of Special Meeting of Stockholders	18
2014 Tax Information	19
Additional Information Regarding the Fund’s Directors and Corporate Officers	20
Description of Dividend Reinvestment Plan	22
Proxy Voting and Portfolio Holdings Information	24
Privacy Policy Notice	25
Summary of General Information	28
Stockholder Information	28

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.Portfolio Summary – as of December 31, 2014 (unaudited)

SECTOR ALLOCATION

Sector	Percent of Net Assets
Closed-End Funds	41.6
Information Technology	11.3
Financials	9.3
Health Care	8.2
Consumer Discretionary	6.9
Industrials	5.7
Consumer Staples	5.2
Energy	4.8
Materials	1.7
Telecommunication Services	1.5
Utilities	1.2
Exchange-Traded Funds	1.2
Other	1.4

TOP TEN HOLDINGS, BY ISSUER

	Holding	Sector	Percent of Net Assets
1.	BlackRock Resources & Commodities Strategy Trust	Closed-End Funds	4.6
2.	Apple Inc.	Information Technology	3.2
3.	ClearBridge Energy MLP Fund Inc.	Closed-End Funds	2.9
4.	CBRE Clarion Global Real Estate Income Fund	Closed-End Funds	2.8
5.	Exxon Mobil Corporation	Energy	2.2
6.	Cohen & Steers Quality Income Realty Fund, Inc.	Closed-End Funds	2.1
7.	Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.	Consumer Staples	2.0
8.	Alpine Global Premier Properties Fund	Closed-End Funds	1.6
9.	General Electric Company	Industrials	1.6
10.	Oracle Corporation	Information Technology	1.5

1

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Schedule of Investments – December 31, 2014

Description	No. of Shares		Value
EQUITY SECURITIES — 98.57%
CLOSED-END FUNDS — 41.54%
CORE — 1.37%
Adams Express Company (The)		39,756	$	543,862
Gabelli Equity Trust Inc.		72,907		471,708
General American Investors Company, Inc.		1,859		65,065
Guggenheim Enhanced Equity Strategy Fund		3,408		60,424
Liberty All-Star Equity Fund		162,917		974,244
Tri-Continental Corporation		8,553		183,120
				2,298,423
CORPORATE DEBT INVESTMENT GRADE-RATED — 0.10%
Transamerica Income Shares, Inc.		8,490		171,668
DEVELOPED MARKET — 0.85%
Aberdeen Australia Equity Fund, Inc.		129,666		889,509
Aberdeen Israel Fund, Inc.		2,700		44,307
Aberdeen Japan Equity Fund, Inc. (The)		23,892		161,749
Aberdeen Singapore Fund, Inc.		21,618		257,687
New Ireland Fund, Inc. (The)		1,400		17,668
Swiss Helvetia Fund, Inc. (The)		5,700		63,498
				1,434,418
EMERGING MARKETS — 2.32%
Mexico Fund, Inc. (The)		37,301		775,861
Morgan Stanley China A Share Fund, Inc.		60,100		1,825,237
Morgan Stanley Eastern Europe Fund, Inc.		3,971		54,760
Templeton Emerging Markets Fund		3,200		49,344
Description	No. of Shares		Value
EMERGING MARKETS (continued)
Voya Emerging Markets High Dividend Equity Fund		115,767	$	1,199,346
				3,904,548
EMERGING MARKETS DEBT — 1.21%
Global High Income Fund Inc.		70,031		617,673
Western Asset Emerging Markets Income Fund Inc.		111,805		1,224,265
Western Asset Worldwide Income Fund Inc.		17,096		195,065
				2,037,003
ENERGY MLP — 6.04%
ClearBridge Energy MLP Fund Inc.		177,611		4,902,064
ClearBridge Energy MLP Opportunity Fund Inc.		62,315		1,471,257
ClearBridge Energy MLP Total Return Fund Inc.		82,786		1,770,793
First Trust MLP and Energy Income Fund		93,535		2,015,679
				10,159,793
GENERAL & INSURED LEVERAGED — 0.96%
Invesco Municipal Opportunity Trust		101,199		1,301,419
Invesco Value Municipal Income Trust		0		6
Nuveen Dividend Advantage Municipal Fund 3		21,409		295,016
Nuveen Dividend Advantage Municipal Income Fund		1,302		18,371
				1,614,812
GENERAL BOND — 1.42%
Deutsche Multi-Market Income Trust		199,705		1,701,487
Deutsche Strategic Income Trust		58,724		678,849
				2,380,336

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

2

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Schedule of Investments – December 31, 2014 (Continued)

Description	No. of Shares		Value
GLOBAL — 2.01%
Alpine Global Dynamic Dividend Fund		18,851	$	185,494
Clough Global Allocation Fund		44,722		660,097
Clough Global Equity Fund		19,667		284,778
Clough Global Opportunities Fund		99,274		1,272,693
Delaware Enhanced Global Dividend and Income Fund		33,556		378,176
GDL Fund (The)		59,148		605,084
				3,386,322
HIGH CURRENT YIELD (LEVERAGED) — 2.34%
BlackRock Corporate High Yield Fund VI, Inc.		63,000		718,200
BlackRock Debt Strategies Fund, Inc.		232,600		865,272
Deutsche High Income Opportunities Fund, Inc.		65,888		924,409
Deutsche High Income Trust		18,298		159,925
First Trust Strategic High Income Fund II		16,705		242,222
Franklin Universal Trust		59,582		423,032
Neuberger Berman High Yield Strategies Fund Inc.		46,181		568,026
Prudential Short Duration High Yield Fund, Inc.		1,926		32,126
Western Asset Global Partners Income Fund Inc		927		9,085
				3,942,297
HIGH YIELD — 0.21%
Credit Suisse Asset Management Income Fund, Inc.		31,750		104,457
Description	No. of Shares		Value
HIGH YIELD (continued)
Western Asset High Yield Defined Opportunity Fund Inc.		12,000	$	189,240
Western Asset Managed High Income Fund Inc.		12,227		62,480
				356,177
HIGH YIELD MUNICIPAL DEBT — 0.02%
MFS High Income Municipal Trust		4,200		20,496
MFS Municipal Income Trust		2,777		18,439
				38,935
INCOME & PREFERRED STOCK — 0.02%
Nuveen Quality Preferred Income Fund 3		4,147		34,544
LOAN PARTICIPATION — 1.95%
Blackstone / GSO Senior Floating Rate Term Fund		16,900		282,906
Eaton Vance Floating-Rate Income Trust		31,100		431,979
Eaton Vance Senior Floating-Rate Trust		15,309		209,580
Eaton Vance Senior Income Trust		22,998		143,508
Invesco Senior Income Trust		325,459		1,484,093
Nuveen Credit Strategies Income Fund		27,092		237,597
Nuveen Floating Rate Income Opportunity Fund		21,172		238,608
Voya Prime Rate Trust		46,358		246,161
				3,274,432
NATURAL RESOURCES — 7.72%
BlackRock Resources & Commodities Strategy Trust		797,642		7,745,104

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

3

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Schedule of Investments – December 31, 2014 (Continued)

Description	No. of Shares		Value
NATURAL RESOURCES (continued)
First Trust Energy Income and Growth Fund		39,911	$	1,456,751
First Trust Energy Infrastructure Fund		99,811		2,373,506
Petroleum & Resources Corporation		59,335		1,414,546
				12,989,907
OPTION ARBITRAGE/OPTIONS STRATEGIES — 0.39%
BlackRock Global Opportunities Equity Trust		50,000		656,500
PACIFIC EX JAPAN — 0.01%
Aberdeen Greater China Fund, Inc.		1,013		10,049
REAL ESTATE — 12.08%
Alpine Global Premier Properties Fund		369,165		2,661,680
CBRE Clarion Global Real Estate Income Fund		524,536		4,715,579
Cohen & Steers Preferred Securities and Income Fund, Inc.		96,815		1,838,517
Cohen & Steers Quality Income Realty Fund, Inc.		287,186		3,500,797
Cohen & Steers Total Return Realty Fund, Inc.		191,017		2,521,424
LMP Real Estate Income Fund Inc.		88,934		1,116,122
Neuberger Berman Real Estate Securities Income Fund Inc.		379,693		2,008,576
Nuveen Real Estate Income Fund		55,172		634,478
Description	No. of Shares		Value
REAL ESTATE (continued)
RMR Real Estate Income Fund		63,887	$	1,330,127
				20,327,300
SECTOR EQUITY — 0.32%
Gabelli Healthcare & WellnessRx Trust (The)		3,503		36,501
John Hancock Financial Opportunities Fund		21,516		506,917
				543,418
U.S. MORTGAGE — 0.01%
First Trust Mortgage Income Fund		1,600		23,776
UTILITY — 0.16%
Gabelli Global Utility & Income Trust (The)		14,150		274,510
VALUE FUNDS — 0.03%
Nuveen Tax-Advantaged Total Return Strategy Fund		3,500		46,620
TOTAL CLOSED-END FUNDS				69,905,788
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY — 6.87%
CBS Corporation - Class B		5,000		276,700
Comcast Corporation - Class A		27,655		1,604,267
Delphi Automotive PLC		3,000		218,160
DIRECTV *		5,000		433,500
Ford Motor Company		40,000		620,000
Gap, Inc. (The)		4,000		168,440
Home Depot, Inc. (The)		19,600		2,057,412
Johnson Controls, Inc.		8,500		410,890
Lowe's Companies, Inc.		8,000		550,400
Macy's, Inc.		6,000		394,500
News Corporation - Class B *		1,250		18,850

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

4

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Schedule of Investments – December 31, 2014 (Continued)

Description	No. of Shares		Value
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY (continued)
Time Inc.		1,362	$	33,519
Time Warner Cable Inc.		2,000		304,120
Time Warner Inc.		10,900		931,078
TJX Companies, Inc. (The)		14,000		960,120
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc.		5,000		184,450
Viacom Inc. - Class B		3,950		297,238
Walt Disney Company (The)		22,200		2,091,018
				11,554,662
CONSUMER STAPLES — 5.20%
Altria Group, Inc.		8,800		433,576
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company		8,000		416,000
Costco Wholesale Corporation		5,000		708,750
CVS Caremark Corporation		10,430		1,004,513
Kellogg Company		5,000		327,200
Kraft Foods Group, Inc.		4,000		250,640
Kroger Co. (The)		7,000		449,470
Mondelēz International, Inc. - Class A		14,000		508,550
PepsiCo, Inc.		6,000		567,360
Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc.		10,000		762,000
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.		38,700		3,323,556
				8,751,615
ENERGY — 4.80%
ConocoPhillips		13,974		965,044
Devon Energy Corporation		7,000		428,470
EOG Resources, Inc.		7,000		644,490
Exxon Mobil Corporation		39,936		3,692,083
Phillips 66		7,487		536,818
Schlumberger Limited		18,000		1,537,380
Valero Energy Corporation		5,000		247,500
Description	No. of Shares		Value
ENERGY (continued)
WPX Energy, Inc. *		1,666	$	19,376
				8,071,161
EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS — 1.22%
iShares Core S&P 500 ETF		5,000		1,034,500
SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust		5,000		1,027,500
				2,062,000
FINANCIALS — 9.32%
AFLAC, Inc.		5,500		335,995
American International Group, Inc.		9,000		504,090
Aon plc		5,500		521,565
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. - Class B *		11,000		1,651,650
BlackRock, Inc. - Class A		1,500		536,340
Capital One Financial Corporation		4,500		371,475
Citigroup, Inc.		38,000		2,056,180
Fifth Third Bancorp		11,500		234,312
Franklin Resources, Inc.		5,000		276,850
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (The)		7,000		1,356,810
JPMorgan Chase & Co.		34,132		2,135,980
MetLife, Inc.		14,000		757,260
Morgan Stanley		23,000		892,400
PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. (The)		8,000		729,840
Principal Financial Group, Inc.		4,000		207,760
Prudential Financial, Inc.		6,000		542,760
SunTrust Banks, Inc.		6,000		251,400
Wells Fargo & Company		37,800		2,072,196
Weyerhaeuser Company		7,000		251,230
				15,686,093
HEALTH CARE — 8.21%
Abbott Laboratories		13,200		594,264
AbbVie Inc.		13,200		863,808
Actavis plc *		2,000		514,820

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

5

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Schedule of Investments – December 31, 2014 (Continued)

Description	No. of Shares		Value
HEALTH CARE (continued)
Aetna Inc.		5,000	$	444,150
Allergan, Inc.		4,500		956,655
Amgen Inc.		9,800		1,561,042
Anthem, Inc.		4,500		565,515
Baxter International Inc.		7,000		513,030
Biogen Idec Inc. *		2,000		678,900
Cigna Corporation		2,500		257,275
Express Scripts Holding Company *		6,000		508,020
Johnson & Johnson		20,000		2,091,400
McKesson Corporation		1,800		373,644
Merck & Company, Inc.		35,267		2,002,813
Pfizer Inc.		30,000		934,500
St. Jude Medical, Inc.		5,000		325,150
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.		5,000		626,450
				13,811,436
INDUSTRIALS — 5.73%
Caterpillar Inc.		8,000		732,240
CSX Corporation		12,000		434,760
Deere & Company		6,500		575,055
Delta Air Lines, Inc.		9,000		442,710
General Dynamics Corporation		3,000		412,860
General Electric Company		104,000		2,628,080
Honeywell International Inc.		10,000		999,200
Lockheed Martin Corporation		4,000		770,280
Norfolk Southern Corporation		3,000		328,830
Northrop Grumman Corporations		2,000		294,780
Precision Castparts Corporation		2,000		481,760
Union Pacific Corporation		13,000		1,548,690
				9,649,245
Description	No. of Shares		Value
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY — 11.25%
Apple Inc.		48,300	$	5,331,354
Cisco Systems, Inc.		60,000		1,668,900
Cognizant Technology Solutions Corporation *		10,000		526,600
eBay Inc. *		10,000		561,200
Facebook, Inc. *		25,000		1,950,500
Google Inc. - Class A *		2,000		1,061,320
Google Inc. - Class C *		2,000		1,052,800
Hewlett-Packard Company		12,000		481,560
Intel Corporation		46,000		1,669,340
International Business Machines Corporation		13,100		2,101,764
Oracle Corporation		56,272		2,530,552
				18,935,890
MATERIALS — 1.73%
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.		2,000		288,460
Dow Chemical Company (The)		15,000		684,150
Ecolab Inc.		2,500		261,300
International Paper Company		4,000		214,320
LyondellBasell Industries N.V.		4,000		317,560
Newmont Mining Corporation		5,000		94,500
PPG Industries, Inc.		2,000		462,300
Praxair, Inc.		4,500		583,020
				2,905,610
TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES — 1.47%
AT&T, Inc.		25,039		841,060
Verizon Communications, Inc.		35,000		1,637,300
				2,478,360
UTILITIES — 1.23%
AES Corporation (The)		8,000		110,160
American Electric Power Company, Inc.		4,000		242,880

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

6

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Schedule of Investments – December 31, 2014 (Concluded)

Description	No. of Shares		Value
UTILITIES (continued)
Exelon Corporation		10,000	$	370,800
PG&E Corporation		6,000		319,440
PPL Corporation		6,000		217,980
Public Service Enterprises Group, Inc.		6,500		269,165
Southern Company (The)		8,000		392,880
Xcel Energy Inc.		4,000		143,680
				2,066,985
TOTAL EQUITY SECURITIES
(cost - $137,832,910)				165,878,845
SHORT-TERM INVESTMENTS — 1.27%
MONEY MARKET FUNDS — 1.27%
Fidelity Institutional Money Market Government Portfolio - Class I, 0.01%^ (cost - $2,145,952)		2,145,952		2,145,952
TOTAL INVESTMENTS — 99.84%
(cost - $139,978,862)				168,024,797
OTHER ASSETS IN EXCESS OF LIABILITIES — 0.16%				262,534
NET ASSETS — 100.00%			$	168,287,331

* Non-income producing security.

^ The rate shown is the 7-day effective yield as of December 31, 2014.

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

7

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Statement of Assets and Liabilities – December 31, 2014

ASSETS
Investments, at value (cost – $139,978,862) (Notes B and C)	$	168,024,797
Receivables:
Investments sold		1,157,989
Dividends		318,681
Prepaid expenses		15,766
Total Assets		169,517,233
LIABILITIES
Payables:
Investments purchased		908,253
Investment management fees (Note D)		141,715
Directors’ fees and expenses		48,608
Administration fees (Note D)		10,169
Other accrued expenses		121,157
Total Liabilities		1,229,902
NET ASSETS (applicable to 8,194,717 shares of common stock)	$	168,287,331
NET ASSET VALUE PER SHARE ($168,287,331 ÷ 8,194,717)	$	20.54
NET ASSETS CONSISTS OF
Common stock, $0.001 par value; 8,194,717 shares issued and outstanding (100,000,000 shares authorized)	$	8,195
Paid-in capital		140,281,121
Accumulated net realized gain/(loss) on investments		(47,920	)
Net unrealized appreciation in value of investments		28,045,935
Net assets applicable to shares outstanding	$	168,287,331

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

8

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Statement of Operations – for the Year Ended December 31, 2014

INVESTMENT INCOME
Income:
Dividends	$	4,916,943
Expenses:
Investment management fees (Note D)		1,755,166
Administration fees (Note D)		131,638
Directors’ fees and expenses		116,764
Reverse stock split expenses		88,086
Accounting fees		49,354
Legal and audit fees		46,727
Printing		46,267
Custodian fees		40,891
Transfer agent fees		24,845
Stock exchange listing fees		10,789
Insurance		7,101
Miscellaneous		18,240
Total Expenses		2,335,868
Net Investment Income		2,581,075
NET REALIZED AND UNREALIZED GAIN ON INVESTMENTS
Net realized gain from investments		11,329,698
Capital gain distributions from regulated investment companies		978,775
Net change in unrealized appreciation in value of investments		4,601,426
Net realized and unrealized gain on investments		16,909,899
NET INCREASE IN NET ASSETS RESULTING FROM OPERATIONS	$	19,490,974

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

9

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Statement of Changes in Net Assets

	For the Years Ended December 31,
	2014			2013
INCREASE/(DECREASE) IN NET ASSETS
Operations:
Net investment income	$	2,581,075		$	1,869,677
Net realized gain from investments		12,308,473			8,732,115
Net change in unrealized appreciation in value of investments		4,601,426			10,911,290
Net increase in net assets resulting from operations		19,490,974			21,513,082
Dividends and distributions to stockholders (Note B):
Net investment income		(2,581,075	)		(1,869,677	)
Net realized gains		(12,356,393	)		(8,732,115	)
Return-of-capital		(22,273,549	)		(13,777,354	)
Total dividends and distributions to stockholders		(37,211,017	)		(24,379,146	)
Common stock transactions:*
Proceeds from rights offering of 0 and 3,158,284 shares of newly issued common stock, respectively		—			74,788,165
Offering expenses associated with rights offering		—			(91,545	)
Cash in lieu of 76 fractional shares from the reverse stock split		(1,539	)		—
Proceeds from 258,745 and 126,147 shares newly issued in reinvestment of dividends and distributions, respectively		5,636,862			2,837,329
Net increase in net assets from common stock transactions		5,635,323			77,533,949
Total increase/(decrease) in net assets		(12,084,720	)		74,667,885
NET ASSETS
Beginning of year		180,372,051			105,704,166
End of year	$	168,287,331		$	180,372,051

* Shares are adjusted for the one-for-four reverse stock split that was effective December 29, 2014.

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

10

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Financial Highlights

Contained below is per share operating performance data for a share of common stock outstanding, total investment return, ratios to average net assets and other supplemental data for each year indicated. This information has been derived from information provided in the financial statements and market price data for the Fund’s shares.

	For the Years Ended December 31,*
	2014			2013			2012			2011			2010
PER SHARE OPERATING PERFORMANCE
Net asset value, beginning of year	$	22.72		$	22.72		$	24.52		$	30.20		$	32.96
Net investment income #		0.32			0.40			0.44			0.28			0.24
Net realized and unrealized gain/(loss) on investments		2.10			3.80			2.76			(0.16	)		3.04
Net increase in net assets resulting from operations		2.42			4.20			3.20			0.12			3.28
Dividends and distributions to stockholders:
Net investment income		(0.32	)		(0.40	)		(1.48	)		(0.52	)		(0.28	)
Net realized capital gains		(1.52	)		(1.76	)		(0.76	)		—			—
Return-of-capital		(2.76	)		(2.76	)		(3.08	)		(5.60	)		(6.44	)
Total dividends and distributions to stockholders		(4.60	)		(4.92	)		(5.32	)		(6.12	)		(6.72	)
Common stock transactions:
Anti-dilutive effect due to shares issued:
Rights offering		—			0.72			0.32			0.20			0.52
Reinvestment of dividends and distributions		0.00	+		0.00	+		0.00	+		0.12			0.16
Total common stock transactions		0.00	+		0.72			0.32			0.32			0.68
Net asset value, end of year	$	20.54		$	22.72		$	22.72		$	24.52		$	30.20
Market value, end of year	$	20.02		$	26.40		$	24.00		$	26.36		$	35.36
Total investment return (a)		(6.29	)%		36.67	%		13.33	%		(11.11	)%		(10.19	)%
RATIOS/SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Net assets, end of year (000 omitted)	$	168,287		$	180,372		$	105,704		$	88,111		$	64,266
Ratio of expenses to average net assets, net of fee waivers and fees paid indirectly, if any (b)		1.33	%		1.33	%		1.40	%		1.55	%		1.73	%
Ratio of expenses to average net assets, excluding fee waivers and fees paid indirectly, if any (b)		1.33	%		1.33	%		1.40	%		1.55	%		1.74	%
Ratio of net investment income to average net assets (c)		1.47	%		1.69	%		1.83	%		0.98	%		0.77	%
Portfolio turnover rate		51.44	%		48.46	%		40.75	%		38.08	%		25.28	%

* Effective December 29, 2014, a reverse split of 1:4 occurred. All per share amounts have been restated according to the terms of the reverse split.

# Based on average shares outstanding.

+ Amount rounds to less than $0.01.

(a) Total investment return at market value is based on the changes in market price of a share during the period and assumes reinvestment of dividends and distributions, if any, at actual prices pursuant to the Fund’s dividend reinvestment plan. Total investment return does not reflect brokerage commissions.

(b) Expenses do not include expenses of investments companies in which the Fund invests.

(c) Recognition of net investment income by the Fund may be affected by the timing of the declaration of dividends, if any, by investment companies in which the Fund invests.

See accompanying notes to financial statements.

11

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. Notes to Financial Statements

NOTE A. ORGANIZATION

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. (the “Fund”) was incorporated in Maryland on May 1, 1987 and commenced investment operations on June 30, 1987. Its investment objective is to seek long-term capital appreciation through investment primarily in equity securities of U.S. and non-U.S. companies. The Fund is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, as a closed-end, diversified management investment company.

NOTE B. SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES

Management Estimates: The Fund is an investment company that applies the accounting and reporting guidance issued in Topic 946 by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board. The preparation of financial statements in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”) requires management to make certain estimates and assumptions that may affect the reported amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. Actual results could differ from those estimates.

Subsequent Events: The Fund has evaluated the need for additional disclosures and/or adjustments resulting from subsequent events through the date its financial statements were issued. Based on this evaluation, no additional disclosures or adjustments were required to such financial statements.

Portfolio Valuation: Investments are stated at value in the accompanying financial statements. Readily marketable portfolio securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) are valued, except as indicated below, at the last sale price reflected on the consolidated tape at the close of the NYSE on the business day as of which such value is being determined. If there has been no sale on such day, the securities are valued at the mean of the closing bid and asked prices on such day. If no bid or asked prices are quoted on such day or if market prices may be unreliable because of events occurring after the close of trading, then the security is valued by such method as the Board of Directors shall determine in good faith to reflect its fair market value. Readily marketable securities not listed on the NYSE but listed on other domestic or foreign securities exchanges are valued in a like manner. Portfolio securities traded on more than one securities exchange are valued at the last sale price on the business day as of which such value is being determined as reflected on the consolidated tape at the close of the exchange representing the principal market for such securities. Securities trading on the Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. (“NASDAQ”) are valued at the NASDAQ Official Closing Price.

Readily marketable securities traded in the over-the counter market, including listed securities whose primary market is believed by Cornerstone Advisors, Inc. (the “Investment Manager” or “Cornerstone”) to be over-the-counter, are valued at the mean of the current bid and asked prices as reported by the NASDAQ or, in the case of securities not reported by the NASDAQ or a comparable source, as the Board of Directors deem appropriate to reflect their fair market value. Where securities are traded on more than one exchange and also over-the-counter, the securities will generally be valued using the quotations the Board of Directors believes reflect most closely the value of such securities. At December 31, 2014, the Fund held no securities valued in good faith by the Board of Directors.

The net asset value per share of the Fund is calculated weekly and on the last business day of the month with the exception of those days on which the NYSE is closed.

The Fund is exposed to financial market risks, including the valuations of its investment portfolio. During the year ended December 31, 2014, the Fund did not invest in derivative instruments or engage in hedging activities.

Investment Transactions and Investment Income: Investment transactions are accounted for on the trade date. The cost of investments sold is determined by use of the specific identification method for both financial reporting and income tax purposes. Interest income is recorded on an accrual basis; dividend income is recorded on the ex-dividend date.

12

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.Notes to Financial Statements (continued)

Risks Associated with Investments in Other Closed-end Funds: Closed-end investment companies are subject to the risks of investing in the underlying securities. The Fund, as a holder of the securities of the closed-end investment company, will bear its pro rata portion of the closed-end investment company’s expenses, including advisory fees. These expenses are in addition to the direct expenses of the Fund’s own operations.

Taxes: No provision is made for U.S. federal income or excise taxes as it is the Fund’s intention to continue to qualify as a regulated investment company and to make the requisite distributions to its stockholders which will be sufficient to relieve it from all or substantially all U.S. federal income and excise taxes.

The Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes Topic of the FASB Accounting Standards Codification defines the threshold for recognizing the benefits of tax-return positions in the financial statements as “more-likely-than-not” to be sustained by the taxing authority and requires measurement of a tax position meeting the more-likely-than-not criterion, based on the largest benefit that is more than 50 percent likely to be realized. The Fund’s policy is to classify interest and penalties associated with underpayment of federal and state income taxes, if any, as income tax expense on its Statement of Operations. As of December 31, 2014, the Fund does not have any interest or penalties associated with the under-payment of any income taxes. Management reviewed any uncertain tax positions for open tax years 2011 through 2013, and for the year ended December 31, 2014. There was no material impact to the financial statements.

Distributions to Stockholders: Effective June 25, 2002, the Fund initiated a fixed, monthly distribution to stockholders. On November 29, 2006, this distribution policy was updated to provide for the annual resetting of the monthly distribution amount per share based on the Fund’s net asset value on the last business day in each October. The terms of the distribution policy will be reviewed and approved at least annually by the Fund’s Board of Directors and can be modified at their discretion. To the extent that these distributions exceed the current earnings of the Fund, the balance will be generated from sales of portfolio securities held by the Fund, which will either be short-term or long-term capital gains or a tax-free return-of-capital. To the extent these distributions are not represented by net investment income and capital gains, they will not represent yield or investment return on the Fund’s investment portfolio. The Fund plans to maintain this distribution policy even if regulatory requirements would make part of a return-of-capital, necessary to maintain the distribution, taxable to stockholders and to disclose that portion of the distribution that is classified as ordinary income. Although it has no current intention to do so, the Board may terminate this distribution policy at any time and such termination may have an adverse effect on the market price for the Fund’s common shares. The Fund determines annually whether to distribute any net realized long-term capital gains in excess of net realized short-term capital losses, including capital loss carryovers, if any. To the extent that the Fund’s taxable income in any calendar year exceeds the aggregate amount distributed pursuant to this distribution policy, an additional distribution may be made to avoid the payment of a 4% U.S. federal excise tax, and to the extent that the aggregate amount distributed in any calendar year exceeds the Fund’s taxable income, the amount of that excess may constitute a return-of-capital for tax purposes. A return-of-capital distribution reduces the cost basis of an investor’s shares in the Fund. Dividends and distributions to stockholders are recorded by the Fund on the ex-dividend date.

Managed Distribution Risk: Under the managed distribution policy, the Fund makes monthly distributions to stockholders at a rate that may include periodic distributions of its net income and net capital gains (“Net Earnings”), or from return-of-capital. If, for any fiscal year where total cash distributions exceeded Net Earnings (the “Excess”), the Excess would decrease the Fund’s total assets and, as a result, would have the likely effect of increasing the Fund’s expense ratio. There is a risk that the total Net Earnings from the Fund’s portfolio would not be great enough to offset the amount of cash distributions paid to Fund stockholders. If this were to be the case, the Fund’s assets would be depleted, and there is no guarantee that the Fund would be able to replace the assets. In addition, in order to make such distributions, the Fund may have to sell a portion of its investment portfolio at a time when independent investment judgment might not dictate such action. Furthermore, such assets used to make distributions will not be available for investment pursuant to the Fund’s investment objective.

13

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.Notes to Financial Statements (continued)

NOTE C. FAIR VALUE

As required by the Fair Value Measurement and Disclosures Topic of the FASB Accounting Standards Codification, the Fund has performed an analysis of all assets and liabilities measured at fair value to determine the significance and character of all inputs to their fair value determination.

The fair value hierarchy prioritizes the inputs to valuation techniques used to measure fair value into the following three broad categories.

• Level 1 – quoted unadjusted prices for identical instruments in active markets to which the Fund has access at the date of measurement.

• Level 2 – quoted prices for similar instruments in active markets; quoted prices for identical or similar instruments in markets that are not active; and model-derived valuations in which all significant inputs and significant value drivers are observable in active markets. Level 2 inputs are those in markets for which there are few transactions, the prices are not current, little public information exists or instances where prices vary substantially over time or among brokered market makers.

• Level 3 – model derived valuations in which one or more significant inputs or significant value drivers are unobservable. Unobservable inputs are those inputs that reflect the Fund’s own assumptions that market participants would use to price the asset or liability based on the best available information.

The following is a summary of the inputs used as of December 31, 2014 in valuing the Fund’s investments carried at value:

Valuation Inputs	Investments in Securities		OtherFinancial Instruments*
Level 1 – Quoted Prices
Equity Investments	$	165,878,845	$	—
Short-Term Investments		2,145,952		—
Level 2 – Other Significant Observable Inputs		—		—
Level 3 – Significant Unobservable Inputs		—		—
Total	$	168,024,797	$	—

* Other financial instruments include futures, forwards and swap contracts.

The breakdown of the Fund’s investments into major categories is disclosed in its Schedule of Investments.

During the year ended December 31, 2014 the Fund did not have any transfers in and out of any Level.

The Fund did not have any assets or liabilities that were measured at fair value on a recurring basis using significant unobservable inputs (Level 3) at December 31, 2014.

It is the Fund’s policy to recognize transfers into and out of any Level at the end of the reporting period.

14

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.Notes to Financial Statements (continued)

NOTE D. AGREEMENTS WITH AFFILIATES

At December 31, 2014, certain officers of the Fund are also officers of Cornerstone or AST Fund Solutions, LLC (“AFS”). Such officers are paid no fees by the Fund for serving as officers of the Fund.

Investment Management Agreement

Cornerstone serves as the Fund’s Investment Manager with respect to all investments. As compensation for its investment management services, Cornerstone receives from the Fund an annual fee, calculated weekly and paid monthly, equal to 1.00% of the Fund’s average weekly net assets. For the year ended December 31, 2014, Cornerstone earned $1,755,166 for investment management services.

Administration Agreement

Under the terms of the administration agreement, AFS supplies executive, administrative and regulatory services for the Fund. AFS supervises the preparation of reports to shareholders for the Fund, reports to and filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and materials for meetings of the Board of Directors. For these services, the Fund pays AFS a monthly fee at an annual rate of 0.075% of its average daily net assets, subject to an annual minimum fee of $50,000. For the year ended December 31, 2014, AFS earned $131,638 as administrator.

NOTE E. INVESTMENT IN SECURITIES

For the year ended December 31, 2014, purchases and sales of securities, other than short-term investments, were $89,290,358 and $103,045,827, respectively.

NOTE F. SHARES OF COMMON STOCK

The Fund has 100,000,000 shares of common stock authorized and 8,194,717 shares issued and outstanding at December 31, 2014. Transactions in common stock for the year ended December 31, 2014 were as follows⁺:

Shares at beginning of year	7,936,048
Shares newly issued in reinvestment of dividends and distributions	258,745
Shares paid cash in lieu of fractional shares from the reverse stock split	(76	)
Shares at end of year	8,194,717

⁺ Share amounts reflect the one-for-four reverse stock split that was effective December 29, 2014.

NOTE G. FEDERAL INCOME TAXES

Income and capital gains distributions are determined in accordance with federal income tax regulations, which may differ from GAAP. These differences are primarily due to differing treatments of losses deferred due to wash sales.

The tax character of dividends and distributions paid to stockholders during the years ended December 31, 2014 and December 31, 2013 was as follows:

	2014		2013
Ordinary Income	$	6,774,673	$	3,415,616
Long-Term Capital Gains		8,162,795		7,186,176
Return-of-Capital		22,273,549		13,777,354
Total Distributions	$	37,211,017	$	24,379,146

At December 31, 2014, the components of accumulated earnings on a tax basis for the Fund were as follows:

Net unrealized appreciation	$	27,998,015
Total accumulated earnings	$	27,998,015

15

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.Notes to Financial Statements (continued)

GAAP requires that certain components of net assets relating to permanent differences be reclassified between financial and tax reporting. These reclassifications have no effect on net assets or net asset value per share. For the year ended December 31, 2014, the Fund reclassified $22,273,549 of return-of-capital distribution against paid-in capital on the Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Under current tax law, certain capital losses realized after October 31 within a taxable year may be deferred and treated as occurring on the first day of the following tax year (“Post-October losses”). The Fund incurred no such losses during the year ended December 31, 2014.

Under the Regulated Investment Company Modernization Act of 2010 (the “Act”), net capital losses recognized after December 31, 2010 may be carried forward indefinitely, and their character is retained as short-term and/or long-term losses. Under the law in effect prior to the Act, pre-enactment net capital losses were carried forward for eight years and treated as short-term losses. As a transition rule, the Act requires that post-enactment net capital losses be used before pre-enactment net capital losses. Therefore, there may be a greater likelihood that all or a portion of the Funds’ pre-enactment capital loss carryovers may expire without being utilized.

The following information is computed on a tax basis for each item as of December 31, 2014:

Cost of portfolio investments	$	140,026,782
Gross unrealized appreciation	$	30,988,023
Gross unrealized depreciation		(2,990,009	)
Net unrealized appreciation	$	27,998,015

16

Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

To the Stockholders and Board of DirectorsCornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. New York, New York

We have audited the accompanying statement of assets and liabilities of the Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. (the “Fund”), including the schedule of investments as of December 31, 2014, and the related statement of operations for the year then ended, the statements of changes in net assets for each of the two years in the period then ended, and the financial highlights for each of the five years in the period then ended. These financial statements and financial highlights are the responsibility of the Fund’s management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements and financial highlights based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements and financial highlights are free of material misstatement. The Fund is not required to have, nor were we engaged to perform, an audit of its internal control over financial reporting. Our audits included consideration of internal control over financial reporting as a basis for designing audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the Fund’s internal control over financial reporting. Accordingly, we express no such opinion. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements, assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. Our procedures included confirmation of securities owned as of December 31, 2014, by correspondence with the custodian and brokers. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, the financial statements and financial highlights referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. as of December 31, 2014, the results of its operations for the year then ended, the changes in its net assets for each of the two years in the period then ended, and the financial highlights for each of the five years in the period then ended, in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America.

TAIT, WELLER & BAKER LLP

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania February 13, 2015

17

Results of Special Meeting of Stockholders (unaudited)

On December 16, 2014, a Special Meeting of Stockholders of Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. was held and the following matter was voted upon based on 32,659,069 shares of common stock outstanding on October 27, 2014:

(1) To approve one-for-four reverse stock split and related amendment to the Articles of Incorporation.

For	Withhold	Broker Non-Votes
21,881,900	5,336,616	603,326

18

2014 Tax Information (unaudited)

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. (the “Fund”) is providing this notice along with Form 1099-DIV to assist its stockholders in the preparation of their 2014 calendar year U.S. federal income tax returns. The $37,211,017 in dividends and distributions paid to stockholders in respect of such year is represented by $6,774,673 of ordinary income, $8,162,795 of long-term gains and $22,273,549 of return-of-capital.

As indicated in this notice, a portion of the Fund’s distributions for 2014 were comprised of a return-of- capital; accordingly these distributions do not represent yield or investment return on the Fund’s portfolio.

SOURCES OF DIVIDENDS AND DISTRIBUTIONS(Per Share Amounts)+
Payment Dates:	1/31/14		2/28/14		3/31/14		4/30/14		5/30/14		6/30/14
Ordinary Income(1)	$	0.0175	$	0.0175	$	0.0175	$	0.0175	$	0.0175	$	0.0175
Return-of-Capital(2)		0.0574		0.0574		0.0574		0.0574		0.0574		0.0574
Capital Gain(3)		0.0210		0.0210		0.0210		0.0210		0.0210		0.0210
Total	$	0.0959	$	0.0959	$	0.0959	$	0.0959	$	0.0959	$	0.0959
Payment Dates:	7/31/14		8/29/14		9/30/14		10/31/14		11/28/14		12/19/14
Ordinary Income(1)	$	0.0175	$	0.0175	$	0.0175	$	0.0175	$	0.0175	$	0.0175
Return-of-Capital(2)		0.0574		0.0574		0.0574		0.0574		0.0574		0.0574
Capital Gain(3)		0.0210		0.0210		0.0210		0.0210		0.0210		0.0210
Total	$	0.0959	$	0.0959	$	0.0959	$	0.0959	$	0.0959	$	0.0959

 ⁺ Per share amounts do not reflect the one-for-four reverse stock split that was effective December 29, 2014.

(1) Ordinary Income Dividends – This is the total per share amount of ordinary income dividends and short-term capital gain distributions (if applicable) included in the amount reported in Box 1a on Form 1099-DIV.

(2) Return-of-Capital – This is the per share amount of return-of-capital, or sometimes called nontaxable, distributions reported in Box 3 – under the title “Nondividend distributions” – on Form 1099-DIV. This amount should not be reported as taxable income on your current return. Rather, it should be treated as a reduction in the original cost basis of your investment in the Fund.

(3) Capital Gains Distributions – This is the total per share amount of capital gain distribution included in the amount reported in Box 2a on Form 1099-DIV.

The Fund has met the requirements to pass through 100% of its ordinary income dividends as qualified dividends, which are subject to a maximum federal tax rate of 23.8% (20% maximum rate plus 3.8% Medicare tax). This is reported in Box 1b on Form 1099-DIV. Ordinary income dividends should be reported as dividend income on Form 1040. Please note that to utilize the lower tax rate for qualifying dividend income, stockholders generally must have held their shares in the Fund for at least 61 days during the 121 day period beginning 60 days before the ex-dividend date.

Long-term capital gain distributions arise from gains on securities held by the Fund for more than one year. They are subject to a maximum federal rate of 20% (23.8%, reflecting 3.8% Medicare tax on income exceeding certain threshold amounts).

Foreign stockholders will generally be subject to U.S. withholding tax on the amount of the actual ordinary income dividend paid by the Fund.

In general, distributions received by tax-exempt recipients (e.g., IRA’s and Keoghs) need not be reported as taxable income for U.S. federal income tax purposes. However, some retirement trusts (e.g., corporate, Keogh and 403(b)(7) plans) may need this information for their annual information reporting. They will generally not be entitled to foreign tax credit or deduction for the withholding taxes paid by the Fund.

Stockholders are strongly advised to consult their own tax advisers with respect to the tax consequences of their investment in the Fund.

19

Additional Information Regarding the Fund’s Directors and Corporate Officers(unaudited)

Name andAddress* (Birth Date)	Position(s) Held with Fund	Principal Occupation over Last 5 Years	Position with Fund Since
Ralph W. Bradshaw** (Dec. 1950)	Chairman of the Board of Directors and President	President, Cornerstone Advisors, Inc.; Financial Consultant; President and Director of Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc.; President and Trustee of Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund.	1998
Robert E. Dean (Apr. 1951)	Director; Audit, Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Member	Director, National Bank Holdings Corp.; Director of Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc.; Trustee of Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund.	November 14, 2014
Edwin Meese III (Dec. 1931)	Director; Audit, Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Member	Distinguished Fellow, The Heritage Foundation Washington D.C.; Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Senior Adviser, Revelation L.P.; Director of Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc.; Trustee of Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund.	2001
Scott B. Rogers (July 1955)	Director; Audit, Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Member	Director, Board of Health Partners, Inc.; Chief Executive Officer, Asheville Buncombe Community Christian Ministry (“ABCCM”); President, ABCCM Doctor's Medical Clinic; Member of North Carolina Governor’s Council on Homelessness (from July 2014); Director of Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc.; Trustee of Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund.	2000
Andrew A. Strauss (Nov. 1953)	Director; Chairman of Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and Audit Committee Member	Attorney and senior member of Strauss & Associates, P.A., Attorneys; Director of Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc.; Trustee of Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund.	2000
Glenn W. Wilcox, Sr. (Dec. 1931)	Director; Chairman of Audit Committee, Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Member	Chairman of the Board of Tower Associates, Inc.; Chairman of the Board of Wilcox Travel Agency, Inc.; Director of Champion Industries, Inc.; Director of Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc.; Trustee of Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund.	2000

20

Additional Information Regarding the Fund’s Directors and Corporate Officers(unaudited) (concluded)

Name andAddress* (Birth Date)	Position(s) Held with Fund	Principal Occupation over Last 5 Years	Position with Fund Since
Gary A. Bentz (June 1956)	Chief Compliance Officer, Secretary, and Assistant Treasurer	Chairman and Chief Financial Officer of Cornerstone Advisors, Inc.; Financial Consultant, C.P.A., Chief Compliance Officer, Secretary, and Assistant Treasurer of Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc. and Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund.	2004, 2008, 2009
Frank J. Maresca (Oct. 1958)	Treasurer	Executive Vice President of AST Fund Solutions, LLC (since February 2012), Executive Vice President of Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC (from March 2009-February 2012) previous Executive Director, JP Morgan Chase & Co.; Previous President of Bear Stearns Funds Management Inc.; Previous Senior Managing Director of Bear Stearns & Co. Inc.; Treasurer of the Fund, Cornerstone Total Return Fund, nc. and Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund (from May 2009 through February 2012).	2013

* The mailing address of each Director and/or Officer with respect to the Fund’s operation is 48 Wall Street, 22nd floor, New York, NY 10005.

** Designates a director who is an “interested person” of the Fund as defined by the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. Mr. Bradshaw is an interested person of the Fund by virtue of his current position with the Investment Adviser of the Fund.

21

Description of Dividend Reinvestment Plan (unaudited)

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. (the “Fund”) operates a Dividend Reinvestment Plan (the “Plan”), administered by American Stock Transfer & Trust Company, LLC (the “Agent”), pursuant to which the Fund’s income dividends or capital gains or other distributions (each, a “Distribution” and collectively, “Distributions”), net of any applicable U.S. withholding tax, are reinvested in shares of the Fund.

Stockholders automatically participate in the Fund’s Plan, unless and until an election is made to withdraw from the Plan on behalf of such participating stockholder. Stockholders who do not wish to have Distributions automatically reinvested should so notify the Agent at P.O. Box 922, Wall Street Station, New York, New York 10269-0560. Under the Plan, the Fund’s Distributions to stockholders are reinvested in full and fractional shares as described below.

When the Fund declares a Distribution the Agent, on the stockholder’s behalf, will (i) receive additional authorized shares from the Fund either newly issued or repurchased from stockholders by the Fund and held as treasury stock (“Newly Issued Shares”) or (ii) purchase outstanding shares on the open market, on the NYSE MKT or elsewhere, with cash allocated to it by the Fund (“Open Market Purchases”).

The method for determining the number of Newly Issued Shares received when Distributions are reinvested will be determined by dividing the amount of the Distribution either by the Fund’s last reported net asset value per share or by a price equal to the average closing price of the Fund over the five trading days preceding the payment date of the Distribution, whichever is lower. However, if the last reported net asset value of the Fund’s shares is higher than the average closing price of the Fund over the five trading days preceding the payment date of the Distribution ice (i.e., the Fund is selling at a discount), shares may be acquired by the Agent in Open Market Purchases and allocated to the reinvesting stockholders based on the average cost of such Open Market Purchases. Upon notice from the Fund, the Agent will receive the distribution in cash and will purchase shares of common stock in the open market, on the NYSE MKT or elsewhere, for the participants’ accounts, except that the Agent will endeavor to terminate purchases in the open market and cause the Fund to issue the remaining shares if, following the commencement of the purchases, the market value of the shares, including brokerage commissions, exceeds the net asset value at the time of valuation. These remaining shares will be issued by the Fund at a price equal to the net asset value at the time of valuation.

In a case where the Agent has terminated open market purchases and caused the issuance of remaining shares by the Fund, the number of shares received by the participant in respect of the cash dividend or distribution will be based on the weighted average of prices paid for shares purchased in the open market, including brokerage commissions, and the price at which the Fund issues the remaining shares. To the extent that the Agent is unable to terminate purchases in the open market before the Agent has completed its purchases, or remaining shares cannot be issued by the Fund because the Fund declared a dividend or distribution payable only in cash, and the market price exceeds the net asset value of the shares, the average share purchase price paid by the Agent may exceed the net asset value of the shares, resulting in the acquisition of fewer shares than if the dividend or distribution had been paid in shares issued by the Fund.

Whenever the Fund declares a Distribution and the last reported net asset value of the Fund’s shares is higher than its market price, the Agent will apply the amount of such Distribution payable to Plan participants of the Fund in Fund shares (less such Plan participant’s pro rata share of brokerage commissions incurred with respect to Open Market Purchases in connection with the reinvestment of such Distribution) to the purchase on the open market of Fund shares for such Plan participant’s account. Such purchases will be made on or after the payable date for such Distribution, and in no event more than 30 days after such date except where temporary curtailment or suspension of purchase is necessary to comply with applicable provisions of federal securities laws. The Agent may aggregate a Plan participant’s purchases with the purchases of other Plan participants, and the average price (including brokerage commissions) of all shares purchased by the Agent shall be the price per share allocable to each Plan participant.

22

Description of Dividend Reinvestment Plan (unaudited) (concluded)

Registered stockholders who do not wish to have their Distributions automatically reinvested should so notify the Fund in writing. If a stockholder has not elected to receive cash Distributions and the Agent does not receive notice of an election to receive cash Distributions prior to the record date of any Distribution, the stockholder will automatically receive such Distributions in additional shares.

Participants in the Plan may withdraw from the Plan by providing written notice to the Agent at least 30 days prior to the applicable Distribution payment date. When a Participant withdraws from the Plan, or upon suspension or termination of the Plan at the sole discretion of the Fund’s Board of Directors, certificates for whole shares credited to his or her account under the Plan will, upon request, be issued. Whether or not a participant requests that certificates for whole shares be issued, a cash payment will be made for any fraction of a share credited to such account.

The Agent will maintain all stockholder accounts in the Plan and furnish written confirmations of all transactions in the accounts, including information needed by stockholders for personal and tax records The Agent will hold shares in the account of the Plan participant in non-certificated form in the name of the participant, and each stockholder’s proxy will include those shares purchased pursuant to the Plan. The Agent will distribute all proxy solicitation materials to participating stockholders.

In the case of stockholders, such as banks, brokers or nominees, that hold shares for others who are beneficial owners participating in the Plan, the Agent will administer the Plan on the basis of the number of shares certified from time to time by the record stockholder as representing the total amount of shares registered in the stockholder’s name and held for the account of beneficial owners participating in the Plan.

Neither the Agent nor the Fund shall have any responsibility or liability beyond the exercise of ordinary care for any action taken or omitted pursuant to the Plan, nor shall they have any duties, responsibilities or liabilities except such as expressly set forth herein. Neither shall they be liable hereunder for any act done in good faith or for any good faith omissions to act, including, without limitation, failure to terminate a participants account prior to receipt of written notice of his or her death or with respect to prices at which shares are purchased or sold for the participants account and the terms on which such purchases and sales are made, subject to applicable provisions of the federal securities laws.

The automatic reinvestment of Distributions will not relieve participants of any federal, state or local income tax that may be payable (or required to be withheld) on such Distributions. The Fund reserves the right to amend or terminate the Plan. There is no direct service charge to participants with regard to purchases in the Plan.

Participants may at any time sell some or all their shares though the Agent. Shares may be sold via the internet at www.amstock.com or through the toll free number.  Participants can also use the tear off portion attached to the bottom of their statement and mail the request to American Stock Transfer and Trust Company LLC, P.O Box 922 Wall Street Station, New York, N.Y. 10269-0560.  There is a fee of $15.00 per transaction and commission of $0.10 per share.

All correspondence concerning the Plan should be directed to the Agent at P.O. Box 922, Wall Street Station, New York, New York 10269-0560. Certain transactions can be performed online at www.amstock.com or by calling the toll-free number (866) 668-6558.

23

Proxy Voting and Portfolio Holdings Information (unaudited)

The policies and procedures that the Fund uses to determine how to vote proxies relating to its portfolio securities are available:

• without charge, upon request, by calling toll-free (866) 668-6558; and

• on the website of the Securities and Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov.

Information regarding how the Fund voted proxies relating to portfolio securities during the most recent period ended June 30 is available without charge, upon request, by calling toll-free (866) 668-6558, and on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov or on the Fund’s website at www.cornerstonestrategicvaluefund.com (See Form N-PX).

The Fund files a complete schedule of its portfolio holdings for the first and third quarters of its fiscal year with the SEC on Form N-Q. The Fund’s Forms N-Q are available on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov and may be reviewed and copied at the SEC’s Public Reference Room in Washington, DC. Information on the operation of the SEC’s Public Reference Room may be obtained by calling toll-free 1-800-SEC-0330.

24

Privacy Policy Notice (unaudited)

FACTS	WHAT DOES CORNERSTONE STRATEGIC VALUE FUND, INC. (THE “FUND”) DO WITH YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION?
Why?	Financial companies choose how they share your personal information. Federal law gives consumers the right to limit some but not all sharing. Federal law also requires us to tell you how we collect, share, and protect your personal information. Please read this notice carefully to understand what we do.
What?	The types of personal information we, and our service providers, on our behalf, collect and share depend on the product or service you have with us. This information can include: •Social Security number •account balances •account transactions •transaction history •wire transfer instructions •checking account information When you are no longer our customer, we continue to share your information as described in this notice.
How?	All financial companies need to share customers’ personal information to run their everyday business. In the section below, we list the reasons financial companies can share their customers’ personal information; the reasons the Fund, and our service providers, on our behalf, choose to share; and whether you can limit this sharing.

25

Privacy Policy Notice (unaudited) (continued)

Reasons we can share your personal information	Does the Fund share?	Can you limit this sharing?
For our everyday business purposes – such as to process your transactions, maintain your account(s), respond to court orders and legal investigations, or report to credit bureaus	Yes	No
For our marketing purposes – to offer our products and services to you	No	We don’t share
For joint marketing with other financial companies	No	We don’t share
For our affiliates’ everyday business purposes – information about your transactions and experiences	Yes	No
For our affiliates’ everyday business purposes – information about your creditworthiness	No	We don’t share
For our affiliates to market to you	No	We don’t share
For nonaffiliates to market to you	No	We don’t share

What we do
Who is providing this notice?	Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. (the “Fund”)
How does the Fund and the Fund’s service providers, on the Fund’s behalf protect my personal information?	To protect your personal information from unauthorized access and use, we and our service providers use security measures that comply with federal law. These measures include computer safeguards and secured files and buildings.
How does the Fund and the Fund’s service providers, on the Fund’s behalf collect my personal information?	We collect your personal information, for example, when you: •open an account •provide account information •give us your contact information •make a wire transfer We also collect your information from others, such as credit bureaus, affiliates, or other companies.

26

Privacy Policy Notice (unaudited) (concluded)

Why can’t I limit all sharing? Federal law gives you the right to limit only   •sharing for affiliates’ everyday business purposes –     information about your creditworthiness •affiliates from using your information to market to you •sharing for nonaffiliates to market to you   State laws and individual companies may give you additional rights to limit sharing.

Definitions
Affiliates	Companies related by common ownership or control. They can be financial and nonfinancial companies. •Cornerstone Advisors, Inc.
Nonaffiliates	Companies not related by common ownership or control. They can be financial and nonfinancial companies. •The Fund does not share with nonaffiliates so they can market to you.
Joint marketing	A formal agreement between nonaffiliated financial companies that together market financial products or services to you. •The Fund does not jointly market.

Questions? Call (866) 668-6558

27

Summary of General Information (unaudited)

Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. is a closed-end, diversified investment company whose shares trade on the NYSE MKT. Its investment objective is to seek long-term capital appreciation through investment in equity securities of U.S. and non-U.S. companies. The Fund is managed by Cornerstone Advisors, Inc.

Stockholder Information (unaudited)

The Fund is listed on the NYSE MKT (symbol “CLM”). The previous week’s net asset value per share, market price, and related premium or discount are available on the Fund’s website at www.cornerstonestrategicvaluefund.com.

Notice is hereby given in accordance with Section 23(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, that Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. may from time to time purchase shares of its common stock in the open market.

28

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Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.

ITEM 2. CODE OF ETHICS.

As of the end of the period covered by this report, the registrant has adopted a code of ethics that applies to the registrant's principal executive officer, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer or controller, or persons performing similar functions, regardless of whether these individuals are employed by the registrant or a third party. Pursuant to Item 12(a)(1), a copy of registrant's code of ethics is filed as an exhibit to this Form N-CSR. During the period covered by this report, the code of ethics has not been amended, and the registrant has not granted any waivers, including implicit waivers, from the provisions of the code of ethics.

ITEM 3. AUDIT COMMITTEE FINANCIAL EXPERT.

The registrant's board of directors has determined that the registrant does not have an audit committee financial expert serving on its audit committee. The audit committee determined that, although none of its members meet the technical definition of an audit committee financial expert, the experience provided by each member of the audit committee together offer the registrant adequate oversight for the registrant's current level of financial complexity.

ITEM 4. PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTANT FEES AND SERVICES.

(a) Audit Fees. The aggregate fees billed for professional services rendered by the principal accountant for the audit of the registrant's annual financial statements or for services that are normally provided by the accountant in connection with statutory and regulatory filings or engagements were $20,000 and $19,000 with respect to the registrant's fiscal years ended December 31, 2014 and 2013, respectively.

(b) Audit-Related Fees. No fees were billed in either of the last two fiscal years for assurance and related services by the principal accountant that are reasonably related to the performance of the audit of the registrant's financial statements and are not reported under paragraph (a) of this Item.

(c) Tax Fees. The aggregate fees billed for professional services rendered by the principal accountant for tax compliance, tax advice, and tax planning were $4,100 and $4,000 with respect to the registrant's fiscal years ended December 31, 2014 and 2013, respectively. The services comprising these fees are the preparation of the registrant's federal and state income and federal excise tax returns.

(d) All Other Fees. $1,550 and $1,550 in fees were billed in with respect to the registrant's fiscal years ended December 31, 2014 and 2013, respectively, related to the review of the registrant’s rights offering registration.

(e)(1) Before the principal accountant is engaged by the registrant to render (i) audit, audit-related or permissible non-audit services to the registrant or (ii) non-audit services to the registrant's investment adviser and any entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the adviser that provides ongoing services to the registrant, either (a) the audit committee shall pre-approve such engagement; or (b) such engagement shall be entered into pursuant to pre-approval policies and procedures established by the audit committee. Any such policies and procedures must be detailed as to the particular service and not involve any delegation of the audit committee's responsibilities to the registrant's investment adviser. The audit committee may delegate to one or more of its members the authority to grant pre-approvals. The pre-approval policies and procedures shall include the requirement that the decisions of any member to whom authority is delegated under this provision shall be presented to the full audit committee at its next scheduled meeting. Under certain limited circumstances, pre-approvals are not required if certain de minimus thresholds are not exceeded, as such thresholds are determined by the audit committee in accordance with applicable Commission regulations.

(e)(2) None of the services described in paragraph (b) through (d) of this Item were approved by the audit committee pursuant to paragraph (c)(7)(i)(C) of Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X.

(f) Less than 50% of hours expended on the principal accountant's engagement to audit the registrant's financial statements for the most recent fiscal year were attributed to work performed by persons other than the principal accountant's full-time, permanent employees.

(g) During the fiscal years ended December 31, 2014 and 2013, aggregate non-audit fees of $5,650 and $5,550, respectively, were billed by the registrant's principal accountant for services rendered to the registrant. No non-audit fees were billed in either of the last two fiscal years by the registrant's principal accountant for services rendered to the registrant's investment adviser (not including any sub-adviser whose role is primarily portfolio management and is subcontracted with or overseen by another investment adviser), and any entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the adviser that provides ongoing services to the registrant.

(h) The principal accountant has not provided any non-audit services to the registrant's investment adviser (not including any sub-adviser whose role is primarily portfolio management and is subcontracted with or overseen by another investment adviser), and any entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the investment adviser that provides ongoing services to the registrant.

ITEM 5. AUDIT COMMITTEE OF LISTED REGISTRANTS.

(a) The registrant has a separately-designated standing audit committee established in accordance with Section 3(a)(58)(A) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Robert E. Dean, Glenn W. Wilcox, Sr., (Chairman), Edwin Meese III, Andrew A. Strauss and Scott B. Rogers are the members of the registrant's audit committee.

(b) Not applicable

ITEM 6. SCHEDULE OF INVESTMENTS.

(a) Not required

ITEM 7. DISCLOSURE OF PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR CLOSED-END MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES.

The registrant and Cornerstone Advisors, Inc., the registrant's investment adviser, share the same proxy voting policies and procedures. The proxy voting policies and procedures of the registrant and Cornerstone Advisors, Inc. are attached as Exhibit 99.VOTEREG.

ITEM 8. PORTFOLIO MANAGERS OF CLOSED-END MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES.

(a)(1) All information included in this Item is as of the date of the filing of this Form N-CSR, unless otherwise noted. Ralph W. Bradshaw is the portfolio manager of the registrant. Mr. Bradshaw has acted as portfolio manager since 2002. Mr. Bradshaw is President and Chief Financial Officer of Cornerstone Advisors, Inc. and serves as President and Chairman of the Board of the registrant, Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. and Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.

(a)(2) Ralph W. Bradshaw manages two other closed-end registered investment companies: Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc. and Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund. As of December 31, 2014, net assets of Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc. were $83,677,638 and net assets of Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund were $261,342,276. Mr. Bradshaw manages no accounts except for the registrant, Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc. and Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund. Mr. Bradshaw manages no accounts where the advisory fee is based on the performance of the account. No material conflicts of interest exist in connection with the portfolio manager's management of the registrant's investments, on the one hand, and the investment of the other accounts included in response to this Item, on the other.

(a)(3) Compensation of Ralph W. Bradshaw includes a fixed salary paid by Cornerstone Advisors, Inc. plus his share of the profits of Cornerstone Advisors, Inc. The profitability of Cornerstone Advisors, Inc. is primarily dependent upon the value of the assets of the registrant and other managed accounts. However, compensation is not directly based upon the registrant's performance or on the value of the registrant's assets.

(a)(4) The dollar range of equity securities in the registrant beneficially owned by each portfolio manager as of December 31, 2014 is as follows: Ralph W. Bradshaw: $50,001-$100,000

ITEM 9. PURCHASES OF EQUITY SECURITIES BY CLOSED-END MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANY AND AFFILIATED PURCHASERS.

None

ITEM 10. SUBMISSION OF MATTERS TO A VOTE OF SECURITY HOLDERS.

There have been no material changes to the procedures by which shareholders may recommend nominees to the registrant's board of trustees that have been implemented after the registrant last provided disclosure in response to the requirements of Item 407(c)(2)(iv) of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.407) or this Item.

ITEM 11. CONTROLS AND PROCEDURES.

(a) Based on their evaluation of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Rule 30a-3(c) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) as of a date within 90 days of the filing date of this report, the registrant's principal executive officer and principal financial officer have concluded that such disclosure controls and procedures are reasonably designed and are operating effectively to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to them by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared, and that the information required in filings on Form N-CSR is recorded, processed, summarized, and reported on a timely basis.

(b) There were no changes in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Rule 30a-3(d) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) that occurred during the second fiscal quarter of the period covered by this report that have materially affected, or are reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

ITEM 12. EXHIBITS.

File the exhibits listed below as part of this Form. Letter or number the exhibits in the sequence indicated.

(a)(1) Any code of ethics, or amendment thereto, that is the subject of the disclosure required by Item 2, to the extent that the registrant intends to satisfy the Item 2 requirements through filing of an exhibit: Not required

(a)(2) A separate certification for each principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the registrant as required by Rule 30a-2(a) under the Act (17 CFR 270.30a-2(a)): Attached hereto

(a)(3) Any written solicitation to purchase securities under Rule 23c-1 under the Act (17 CFR 270.23c-1) sent or given during the period covered by the report by or on behalf of the registrant to 10 or more persons: Not applicable

(b) Certifications required by Rule 30a-2(b) under the Act (17 CFR 270.30a-2(b)): Attached hereto

Exhibit 99.CODE ETH Code of Ethics

Exhibit 99.VOTEREG Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures

Exhibit 99.CERT Certifications required by Rule 30a-2(a) under the Act

Exhibit 99.906CERT Certifications required by Rule 30a-2(b) under the Act

SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.

(Registrant) Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.

By (Signature and Title)*		/s/ Ralph W. Bradshaw
		Ralph W. Bradshaw, Chairman and President
		(Principal Executive Officer)
Date	February 24, 2015

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, this report has been signed below by the following persons on behalf of the registrant and in the capacities and on the dates indicated.

By (Signature and Title)*		/s/ Ralph W. Bradshaw
		Ralph W. Bradshaw, Chairman and President
		(Principal Executive Officer)
Date	February 24, 2015
By (Signature and Title)*		/s/ Frank J. Maresca
		Frank J. Maresca,  Treasurer
		(Principal Financial Officer)
Date	February 24, 2015

* Print the name and title of each signing officer under his or her signature.

EX-99.CODE ETH

CORNERSTONE STRATEGIC VALUE FUND, INC.

CORNERSTONE TOTAL RETURN FUND, INC.

CORNERSTONE PROGRESSIVE RETURN FUND

CODE OF ETHICS FOR SENIOR OFFICERS

PREAMBLE

Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 directs that rules be adopted disclosing whether a company has a code of ethics for senior financial officers. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has adopted rules requiring annual disclosure of an investment company’s code of ethics applicable to the company’s principal executive as well as principal financial officers, if such a code has been adopted. In response, Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc., Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc. and Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund (the “Funds”) have each adopted this Code of Ethics.

STATEMENT OF POLICY

It is the obligation of the senior officers of each Fund to provide full, fair, timely and comprehensible disclosure--financial and otherwise--to the Fund’s shareholders, regulatory authorities and the general public. In fulfilling that obligation, senior officers must act ethically, honestly and diligently. This Code is intended to enunciate guidelines to be followed by persons who serve each Fund in senior officer positions.  No Code of Ethics can address every situation that a senior officer might face; however, as a guiding  principle, senior officers should strive to implement the spirit as well as the  letter of applicable laws, rules and regulations, and to provide the type of clear and complete disclosure and information each Fund’s shareholders have a right to expect.

The purpose of this Code of Ethics (the “Code”) is to promote high standards of ethical conduct by Covered Persons (as defined below) in their capacities as officers of the Funds, to instruct them as to what is considered to be inappropriate and unacceptable conduct or activities for officers and to prohibit such conduct or activities. This Code supplements other policies that the Funds and its adviser have adopted or may adopt in the future with which Fund officers are also required to comply (e.g., code of ethics relating to  personal trading and conduct).

COVERED PERSONS

This Code applies to those persons appointed by the each Fund’s Board of Directors as Chief Executive Officer, President, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer, or persons performing similar functions.

PROMOTION OF HONEST AND ETHICAL CONDUCT

In serving as an officer of a Fund, each Covered Person must maintain high standards of honesty and ethical conduct and must encourage his colleagues who provide services to a Fund, whether directly or indirectly, to do the same.

Page 2 of 5

Each Covered Person understands that as an officer of a Fund, he has a duty to act in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders. The interests of the Covered Person’s personal interests should not be allowed to compromise the Covered Person from fulfilling his duties as an officer of the Fund.

If a Covered Person believes that his personal interests are likely to materially compromise his objectivity or his ability to perform the duties of his role as an officer of a Fund, he should consult with the Fund’s chief legal officer or outside counsel. Under appropriate circumstances, a Covered Person should also consider whether to present the matter to the Directors of a Fund or a committee thereof.

No Covered Person shall suggest that any person providing, or soliciting to be retained to provide, services to a Fund give a gift or an economic benefit of any kind to him in connection with the person’s retention or the provision of services.

PROMOTION OF FULL, FAIR, ACCURATE, TIMELY AND UNDERSTANDABLE DISCLOSURE

No Covered Person shall create or further the creation of false or misleading information in any SEC filing or report to Fund shareholders. No Covered Person shall conceal or fail to disclose information within the Covered Person’s possession legally required to be disclosed or necessary to make the disclosure made not misleading. If a Covered Person shall become aware that information filed with the SEC or made available to the public contains any false or misleading information or omits to disclose necessary information, he shall promptly report it to Fund counsel, who shall advise such Covered Person whether corrective action is necessary or appropriate.

Each Covered Person, consistent with his responsibilities, shall exercise appropriate supervision over, and shall assist, Fund service providers in developing financial information and other disclosure that complies with relevant law and presents information in a clear, comprehensible and complete manner. Each Covered Person shall use his best efforts within his area of expertise to assure that Fund reports reveal, rather than conceal, each Fund’s financial condition.

Each Covered Person shall seek to obtain additional resources if he believes that available resources are inadequate to enable the Fund to provide full, fair and accurate financial information and other disclosure to regulators and Fund shareholders.

Each Covered Person shall inquire of other Fund officers and service  providers, as appropriate, to assure that information provided is accurate and  complete and presented in an understandable format using comprehensible language.

Each Covered Person shall diligently perform his services to the Fund, so that information can be gathered and assessed early enough to facilitate timely filings and issuance of reports and required certifications.

Page 3 of 5

PROMOTION OF COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE GOVERNMENT LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS

Each Covered Person shall become and remain knowledgeable concerning the laws and regulations relating to each Fund and their operations and shall act with competence and due care in serving as an officer of a Fund. Each Covered Person with specific responsibility for financial statement disclosure will become and remain knowledgeable concerning relevant auditing standards, generally accepted accounting principles, FASB pronouncements and other accounting and tax literature and developments.

Each Covered Person shall devote sufficient time to fulfilling his responsibilities to the Funds.

Each Covered Person shall cooperate with each Fund’s independent auditors, regulatory agencies and internal auditors in their review or inspection of the Fund and its operations.

No Covered Person shall knowingly violate any law or regulation relating to a Fund or their operations or seek to illegally circumvent any such law or regulation.

No Covered Person shall engage in any conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation involving a Fund or its operations.

PROMOTING PROMPT INTERNAL REPORTING OF VIOLATIONS

Each Covered Person shall promptly report his own violations of this Code and violations by other Covered Persons of which he is aware to the Chairman of the Fund’s Audit Committee.

Any requests for a waiver from or an amendment to this Code shall be made to the Chairman of the Fund’s Audit Committee. All waivers and amendments shall be disclosed as required by law.

SANCTIONS

Failure to comply with this Code will subject the violator to appropriate sanctions, which will vary based on the nature and severity of the violation. Such sanctions may include censure, suspension or termination of position as an officer of the Fund. Sanctions shall be imposed by the Fund’s Audit Committee, subject to review by the entire Board of Directors of the Fund.

Each Covered Person shall be required to certify annually whether he has complied with this Code.

NO RIGHTS CREATED

This Code of Ethics is a statement of certain fundamental principles, policies and procedures that govern the Fund’s senior officers in the conduct of the Fund’s business. It is not intended to and does not create any rights in any employee, investor, supplier, competitor, shareholder or any other person or entity.

Page 4 of 5

RECORDKEEPING

Each Fund will maintain and preserve for a period of not less than six (6) years from the date such action is taken, the first two (2) years in an easily accessible place, a copy of the information or materials supplied to the Board (i) that provided the basis for any amendment or waiver to this Code and (ii) relating to any violation of the Code and sanctions imposed for such violation, together with a written record of the approval or action taken by the Board.

AMENDMENTS

The Directors will make and approve such changes to this Code of Ethics as they deem necessary or appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this Code.

Page 5 of 5

CODE OF ETHICS FOR SENIOR OFFICERS

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT:

(1) I have read and I understand the Code of Ethics for Senior Officers adopted by Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc., Cornerstone Total Return Fund, Inc and Cornerstone Progressive Return Fund (the “Code of Ethics”);

(2) I recognize that I am subject to the Code of Ethics;

(3) I have complied with the requirements of the Code of Ethics during the calendar year ending December 31, _____; and

(4) I have reported all violations of the Code of Ethics required to be reported pursuant to the requirements of the Code during the calendar year ending December 31, _____.

Set forth below exceptions to items (3) and (4), if any:

Signature:

Name:

Date:

EX-99

The following is a description of the policies and procedures that it uses to determine how to vote proxies relating to portfolio securities as contained in the following Glass Lewis' Proxy Paper Guidelines -- 2015 Proxy Season.

Where determined appropriate by the Adviser in order to comply with Federal securities regulations and the rules promulgated thereunder, the Fund reserves the right to shadow vote certain proxies received by it with respect to the annual or special meetings of shareholders for companies in which the Fund is invested.

Glass Lewis evaluates these guidelines on an ongoing basis and formally updates them on an annual basis. This year we’ve made noteworthy revisions in the following areas, which are summarized below but discussed in greater detail in the relevant section of this document:

SUMMARY OF CHANGES FOR THE 2015 UNITED STATES POLICY GUIDELINES

GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE

We have adopted a policy regarding instances where a board has amended the company’s governing documents to reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right, and has done so without shareholder approval. Examples of board actions that may cause such a recommendation include: the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent; an increase to the ownership threshold required for shareholders to call a special meeting; an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments; the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse—such as bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or that require shareholder plaintiffs to pay the company’s legal expenses in the absence of a court victory (i.e., “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws); the adoption of a classified board structure; and the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause. In these instances, depending on the circumstances, we may recommend that shareholders vote against the chairman of the governance committee, or the entire committee.

BOARD RESPONSIVENESS TO MAJORITY-APPROVED SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS

Glass Lewis will generally recommend that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee during whose tenure a shareholder proposal relating to important shareholder rights received support from a majority of the votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes) and the board failed to respond adequately. Examples of such shareholder proposals include those seeking a declassified board structure, a majority vote standard for director elections, or a right to call a special meeting. We have expanded this policy to specify that in determining whether a board has sufficiently implemented such a proposal, we will examine the quality of the right enacted or proffered by the board for any conditions that may unreasonably interfere with the shareholders’ ability to exercise the right (e.g., overly prescriptive procedural requirements for calling a special meeting).

VOTE RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING IPO

We have increased our scrutiny of provisions adopted in a company’s charter or bylaws prior to an initial public offering (“IPO”). While Glass Lewis will generally refrain from issuing voting recommendations on the basis of most corporate governance best practices (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.) during the one-year period following an IPO, we will scrutinize certain provisions adopted in the company’s charter or bylaws prior to the IPO. Specifically, we will consider recommending to vote against all members of the board who served at the time of the adoption of an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, if the provision is not put up for shareholder vote following the IPO. Additionally, consistent with our general approach to boards that adopt exclusive forum provisions or fee-shifting bylaws without shareholder approval, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the governance committee chair in thecase of an exclusive forum provision, and against the entire governance committee in the case of a provision limiting the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse (e.g., “fee-shifting” bylaws), if these provisions are not put up to shareholder vote following the IPO.

GLASS LEWIS STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING “MATERIAL” TRANSACTIONS WITH DIRECTORS

With regard to Glass Lewis’ $120,000 threshold for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm, where the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services, we have clarified that we may deem such a transaction to be immaterial where the amount represents less than 1% of the firm’s annual revenues and the board provides a compelling rationale as to why the director’s independence is not affected by the relationship.

ADVISORY VOTE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

We have added a discussion of our approach to analyzing one-off awards granted outside of existing incentive programs (see page 29). We have also provided clarification regarding our qualitative and quantitative approach to say-on-pay analysis.

EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLANS

We have added a discussion of our approach to analyzing employee stock purchase plans (see page 35).

I. A BOARD OF DIRECTORS THAT SERVES THE INTERESTS OF SHAREHOLDERS

ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

The purpose of Glass Lewis’ proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that a board can best protect and enhance the interests of shareholders if it is sufficiently independent, has a record of positive performance, and consists of individuals with diverse backgrounds and a breadth and depth of relevant experience.

INDEPENDENCE

The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director’s track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.

We look at each director nominee to examine the director’s relationships with the company, the company’s executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director’s decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders’ interests above the director’s or the related party’s interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board, and therefore believe such a director’s independence may be hampered, in particular when serving on the audit committee.

Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:

Independent Director – An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years¹ before the inquiry are usually considered “current” for purposes of this test.

Affiliated Director – An affiliated director has, (or within the past three years, had) a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.² This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the company.³ In addition, we view a director who either owns or controls 20% or more of the company’s voting stock, or is an employee or affiliate of an entity that controls such amount, as an affiliate.⁴

1 NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look-back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look-back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.

2 If a company does not consider a non-employee director to be independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an affiliate.

3 We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of “material.”

4 This includes a director who serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an investment firm with greater than 20% ownership. However, while we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated, we will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.

We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.

Glass Lewis applies a three-year look back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look back.

Definition of “Material”: A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds:

• $50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services; or

• $120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm and the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services.⁵ This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;⁶ and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director’s firm; or

• 1% of either company’s consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).⁷

Definition of “Familial”: Familial relationships include a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person’s home. A director is an affiliate if: i) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and receives more than $120,000 in annual compensation; or, ii) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and the company does not disclose this individual’s compensation.

Definition of “Company”: A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.

Inside Director – An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a chairman of the board who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director’s own best interests. Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.

Additionally, we believe a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of his/her resignation or departure from the interim management position.

5 We may deem such a transaction to be immaterial where the amount represents less than 1% of the firm’s annual revenues and the board provides a compelling rationale as to why the director’s independence is not affected by the relationship.

6 We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company’s size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director’s role at the charity. However, unlike for other types of related party transactions, Glass Lewis generally does not apply a look-back period to affiliated relationships involving charitable contributions; if the relationship between the director and the school or charity ceases, or if the company discontinues its donations to the entity, we will consider the director to be independent.

7 This includes cases where a director is employed by, or closely affiliated with, a private equity firm that profits from an acquisition made by the company. Unless disclosure suggests otherwise, we presume the director is affiliated.

VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BASIS OF BOARD INDEPENDENCE

Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders’ interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically⁸ recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.

In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chairman’s presence.

In addition, we scrutinize avowedly “independent” chairmen and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent or the company should not tout them as such.

COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE

We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company’s audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.⁹ We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.

Pursuant to Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require that boards apply enhanced standards of independence when making an affirmative determination of the independence of compensation committee members. Specifically, when making this determination, in addition to the factors considered when assessing general director independence, the board’s considerations must include: (i) the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the listed company to the director (the “Fees Factor”); and (ii) whether the director is affiliated with the listing company, its subsidiaries, or affiliates of its subsidiaries (the “Affiliation Factor”).

Glass Lewis believes it is important for boards to consider these enhanced independence factors when assessing compensation committee members. However, as discussed above in the section titled Independence, we apply our own standards when assessing the independence of directors, and these standards also take into account consulting and advisory fees paid to the director, as well as the director’s affiliations with the company and its subsidiaries and affiliates. We may recommend voting against compensation committee members who are not independent based on our standards.

INDEPENDENT CHAIRMAN

Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chairman creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chairman position. An executive manages the business according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals set by the board. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chairman presumably will have a significant influence over the board.

While many companies have an independent lead or presiding director who performs many of the same functions of an independent chairman (e.g., setting the board meeting agenda), we do not believe this alternate form of independent board leadership provides as robust protection for shareholders as an independent chairman.

8 With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the other affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence. However, we will consider recommending voting against the directors subject to our concern at their next election if the issue giving rise to the concern is not resolved.

9 We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is comprised of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.

It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/chairman controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.

A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board’s approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO’s vision for accomplishing the board’s objectives. Failure to achieve the board’s objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.

Likewise, an independent chairman can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.

Further, it is the board’s responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.

Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chairman is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chairman fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior management. Encouragingly, many companies appear to be moving in this direction—one study even indicates that less than 12 percent of incoming CEOs in 2009 were awarded the chairman title, versus 48 percent as recently as 2002.¹⁰ Another study finds that 45 percent of S&P 500 boards now separate the CEO and chairman roles, up from 23 percent in 2003, although the same study found that of those companies, only 25 percent have truly independent chairs.¹¹

We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically recommend that our clients support separating the roles of chairman and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.

Further, where the company has neither an independent chairman nor independent lead director, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.

PERFORMANCE

The most crucial test of a board’s commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.

We find that a director’s past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred serving on the boards of companies with similar problems. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of directors serving at over 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.

VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BASIS OF PERFORMANCE

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders. We will reevaluate such directors based on, among other factors, the length of time passed since the incident giving rise to the concern, shareholder support for the director, the severity of the issue, the director’s role (e.g., committee membership), director tenure at the subject company, whether ethical lapses accompanied the oversight lapse, and evidence of strong oversight at other companies.

10 Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary Neilson. “CEO Succession 2000-2009: A Decade of Convergence and Compression.” Booz & Company (from Strategy+Business, Issue 59, Summer 2010).

11 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2013, p. 5

Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.

We believe shareholders should avoid electing directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:

1. A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings, calculated in the aggregate.¹²

2. A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late filing was the director’s fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).

3. A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements.

4. A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed).

5. All directors who served on the board if, for the last three years, the company’s performance has been in the bottom quartile of the sector and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.

BOARD RESPONSIVENESS

Glass Lewis believes that any time 25% or more of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management, the board should, depending on the issue, demonstrate some level of responsiveness to address the concerns of shareholders. These include instances when 25% or more of shareholders (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes): WITHHOLD votes from (or vote AGAINST) a director nominee, vote AGAINST a management-sponsored proposal, or vote FOR a shareholder proposal. In our view, a 25% threshold is significant enough to warrant a close examination of the underlying issues and an evaluation of whether or not a board response was warranted and, if so, whether the board responded appropriately following the vote. While the 25% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote recommendation from Glass Lewis on a future proposal (e.g., to recommend against a director nominee, against a say-on-pay proposal, etc.), it may be a contributing factor to our recommendation to vote against management’s recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately.

As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of publicly available disclosures (e.g., the proxy statement, annual report, 8-Ks, company website, etc.) released following the date of the company’s last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most current Proxy Paper. Depending on the specific issue, our focus typically includes, but is not limited to, the following:

• At the board level, any changes in directorships, committee memberships, disclosure of related party transactions, meeting attendance, or other responsibilities;

12 However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.

• Any revisions made to the company’s articles of incorporation, bylaws or other governance documents;

• Any press or news releases indicating changes in, or the adoption of, new company policies, business practices or special reports; and

• Any modifications made to the design and structure of the company’s compensation program, as well as an assessment of the company’s engagement with shareholders on compensation issues as discussed in the CD&A, particularly following a material vote against a company’s say-on-pay.

Our Proxy Paper analysis will include a case-by-case assessment of the specific elements of board responsiveness that we examined along with an explanation of how that assessment impacts our current vote recommendations.

THE ROLE OF A COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

Glass Lewis believes that a designated committee chairman maintains primary responsibility for the actions of his or her respective committee. As such, many of our committee-specific vote recommendations are against the applicable committee chair rather than the entire committee (depending on the seriousness of the issue). However, in cases where we would ordinarily recommend voting against a committee chairman but the chair is not specified, we apply the following general rules, which apply throughout our guidelines:

• If there is no committee chair, we recommend voting against the longest-serving committee member or, if the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, the longest-serving board member serving on the committee (i.e., in either case, the “senior director”); and

• If there is no committee chair, but multiple senior directors serving on the committee, we recommend voting against both (or all) such senior directors.

In our view, companies should provide clear disclosure of which director is charged with overseeing each committee. In cases where that simple framework is ignored and a reasonable analysis cannot determine which committee member is the designated leader, we believe shareholder action against the longest serving committee member(s) is warranted. Again, this only applies if we would ordinarily recommend voting against the committee chair but there is either no such position or no designated director in such role.

On the contrary, in cases where there is a designated committee chair and the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair, but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will note the concern with regard to the committee chair.

AUDIT COMMITTEES AND PERFORMANCE

Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because “[v]ibrant and stable capital markets depend on, among other things, reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. The vital oversight role audit committees play in the process of producing financial information has never been more important.”¹³

When assessing an audit committee’s performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:

13 Audit Committee Effectiveness – What Works Best.” PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation. 2005.

A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting – the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors – form a ‘three legged stool’ that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be ‘first among equals’ in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.

STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING THE AUDIT COMMITTEE

For an audit committee to function effectively on investors’ behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said “members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters.”¹⁴

We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller, or similar experience. While we will not necessarily recommend voting against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to recommend voting against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.

Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.

When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and generally recommend voting in favor of its members. However, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:¹⁵

1. All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.

2. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee’s financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies.

3. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least four times during the year.

4. The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members.

5. Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member’s attendance at all board and committee meetings.¹⁶

14 Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.

15 As discussed under the section labeled “Committee Chairman,” where the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against the members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will note the concern with regard to the committee chair.

16 Glass Lewis may exempt certain audit committee members from the above threshold if, upon further analysis of relevant factors such as the director’s experience, the size, industry-mix and location of the companies involved and the director’s attendance at all the companies, we can reasonably determine that the audit committee member is likely not hindered by multiple audit committee commitments.

6. All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor.

7. The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor).

8. All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are prohibited by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).

9. All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions.

10. All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.

11. The audit committee chair17 if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

12. All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A18 letter has been issued.

13. All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the company.19

14. All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:

• The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders;

• The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation;

• The restatement involves revenue recognition;

• The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or

• The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities.

15. All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last 5 quarters.

16. All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

17. All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.

17 As discussed under the section labeled “Committee Chairman,” in all cases, if the chair of the committee is not specified, we recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest.

18 Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.

19 Research indicates that revenue fraud now accounts for over 60% of SEC fraud cases, and that companies that engage in fraud experience signifi-cant negative abnormal stock price declines—facing bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do non-fraud firms (Com-mittee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007.” May 2010).

18. All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed (e.g., the company receives an adverse opinion on its financial statements from the auditor).

19. All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor’s liability to the company for damages.²⁰

20. All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company’s last annual meeting, and when, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected, or, when the company has an ongoing material weakness from a prior year that has not yet been corrected.

We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, we take into consideration, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee, the transparency of the audit committee report.

COMPENSATION COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE

Compensation committees have a critical role in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business’s long-term shareholders returns.

Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the board’s compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.

Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. For example, the use of a compensation consultant who maintains a business relationship with company management may cause the committee to make decisions based on information that is compromised by the consultant’s conflict of interests. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring-loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.

Central to understanding the actions of a compensation committee is a careful review of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (“CD&A”) report included in each company’s proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as advisory votes on executive compensation, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company’s top executives.

20 The Council of Institutional Investors. “Corporate Governance Policies,” p. 4, April 5, 2006; and “Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to the AICPA,” November 8, 2006.

When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:²¹

1. All members of a compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to address shareholder concerns following majority shareholder rejection of the say-on-pay proposal in the previous year. Where the proposal was approved but there was a significant shareholder vote (i.e., greater than 25% of votes cast) against the say-on-pay proposal in the prior year, if the board did not respond sufficiently to the vote including actively engaging shareholders on this issue, we will also consider recommending voting against the chairman of the compensation committee or all members of the compensation committee, depending on the severity and history of the compensation problems and the level of shareholder opposition.

2. All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served when the company failed to align pay with performance (e.g., a company receives an F grade in our pay-for-performance analysis) if shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation at the annual meeting.²²

3. Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that have consistently failed to align pay with performance and whose oversight of compensation at the company in question is suspect.

4. The compensation committee chair if the company consistently has received deficient grades in our pay-for-performance analysis, and if during the past year the company performed the same as or worse than its peers.²³

5. All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements.

6. All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained.

7. All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits were allowed.

8. The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year.

9. All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options or completed a “self tender offer” without shareholder approval within the past two years.

10. All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated.

11. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in option backdating.

21 As discussed under the section labeled “Committee Chairman,” where the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair and the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will note the concern with regard to the committee chair.

22 Where there are multiple CEOs in one year, we will consider not recommending against the compensation committee but will defer judgment on compensation policies and practices until the next year or a full year after arrival of the new CEO. In addition, if a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal, we will initially only recommend voting against the company’s say-on-pay proposal and will not recommend voting against the members of the compensation committee unless there is a pattern of failing to align pay and performance and/or the company exhibits egregious compensation practices. However, if the company repeatedly fails to align pay and performance, we will then recommend against the members of the compensation committee in addition to recommending voting against the say-on-pay proposal.

23 In cases where a company has received two consecutive D grades, or if its grade improved from an F to a D in the most recent period, and during the most recent year the company performed better than its peers (based on our analysis), we refrain from recommending to vote against the compensation committee chair. In addition, if a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal in this instance, we will consider voting against the advisory vote rather than the compensation committee chair unless the company exhibits unquestionably egregious practices.

12. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information.

13. All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud.

14. The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets.

15. All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.²⁴

NOMINATING AND GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE PERFORMANCE

The nominating and governance committee, as an agent for the shareholders, is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the committee is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote. (At most companies, a single committee is charged with these oversight functions; at others, the governance and nominating responsibilities are apportioned among two separate committees.)

Consistent with Glass Lewis’ philosophy that boards should have diverse backgrounds and members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience, we believe that nominating and governance committees should consider diversity when making director nominations within the context of each specific company and its industry. In our view, shareholders are best served when boards make an effort to ensure a constituency that is not only reasonably diverse on the basis of age, race, gender and ethnicity, but also on the basis of geographic knowledge, industry experience, board tenure and culture.

Regarding the committee responsible for governance, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:²⁵

1. All members of the governance committee²⁶ during whose tenure a shareholder proposal relating to important shareholder rights received support from a majority of the votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes) and the board has not begun to implement or enact the proposal’s subject matter.²⁷ Examples of such shareholder proposals include those seeking a declassified board structure, a majority vote standard for director elections, or a right to call a special meeting. In determining whether a board has sufficiently implemented such a proposal, we will examine the quality of the right enacted or proffered by the board for any conditions that may unreasonably interfere with the shareholders’ ability to exercise the right (e.g., overly restrictive procedural requirements for calling a special meeting).

24 In all other instances (i.e., a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.

25 As discussed in the guidelines section labeled “Committee Chairman,” where we would recommend to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will note the concern with regard to the committee chair.

26 If the board does not have a committee responsible for governance oversight and the board did not implement a shareholder proposal that received the requisite support, we will recommend voting against the entire board. If the shareholder proposal at issue requested that the board adopt a declassified structure, we will recommend voting against all director nominees up for election.

27 Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.

2. The governance committee chair,²⁸ when the chairman is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.²⁹

3. In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are less than five or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.

4. The governance committee chair, when the committee fails to meet at all during the year.

5. The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be “inadequate” related party transaction disclosure (i.e., the nature of such transactions and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing a shareholder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock exchange listing requirements).

6. The governance committee chair, when during the past year the board adopted a forum selection clause (i.e., an exclusive forum provision)³⁰ without shareholder approval, or, if the board is currently seeking shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal.

7. All members of the governance committee during whose tenure the board adopted, without shareholder approval, provisions in its charter or bylaws that, through rules on director compensation, may inhibit the ability of shareholders to nominate directors.

In addition, we may recommend that shareholders vote against the chairman of the governance committee, or the entire committee, where the board has amended the company’s governing documents to reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right, and has done so without seeking shareholder approval. Examples of board actions that may cause such a recommendation include: the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent; an increase to the ownership threshold required for shareholders to call a special meeting; an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments; the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse—such as bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or that require shareholder plaintiffs to pay the company’s legal expenses in the absence of a court victory (i.e., “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws); the adoption of a classified board structure; and the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.

Regarding the nominating committee, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:³¹

1. All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.

28 As discussed in the guidelines section labeled “Committee Chairman,” if the committee chair is not specified, we recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest. If the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, we will recommend voting against the longest-serving board member serving on the committee.

29 We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against the governance committee chair as we believe the lack of fixed lead or presiding director means that, effectively, the board does not have an independent board leader.

30 A forum selection clause is a bylaw provision stipulating that a certain state, typically where the company is incorporated, which is most often Delaware, shall be the exclusive forum for all intra-corporate disputes (e.g., shareholder derivative actions, assertions of claims of a breach of fiduciary duty, etc.). Such a clause effectively limits a shareholder’s legal remedy regarding appropriate choice of venue and related relief offered under that state’s laws and rulings.

31 As discussed in the guidelines section labeled “Committee Chairman,” where we would recommend to vote against the committee chair but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered, we do not recommend voting against any members of the committee who are up for election; rather, we will note the concern with regard to the committee chair.

2. The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year.

3. In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair³² when the chairman is not independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.³³

4. The nominating committee chair, when there are less than five or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.³⁴

5. The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.³⁵

BOARD-LEVEL RISK MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT

Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firms have complex hedging or trading strategies, those firms should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.

Our views on risk oversight are consistent with those expressed by various regulatory bodies. In its December 2009 Final Rule release on Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, the SEC noted that risk oversight is a key competence of the board and that additional disclosures would improve investor and shareholder understanding of the role of the board in the organization’s risk management practices. The final rules, which became effective on February 28, 2010, now explicitly require companies and mutual funds to describe (while allowing for some degree of flexibility) the board’s role in the oversight of risk.

When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company’s board-level risk committee’s poor oversight contributed to the loss, we will recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise)³⁶, we will consider recommending to vote against the chairman of the board on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chairman/ CEO, except in egregious cases.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to the three key characteristics – independence, performance, experience – that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues as well as the size of the board of directors when making voting recommendations.

32 As discussed under the section labeled “Committee Chairman,” if the committee chair is not specified, we will recommend voting against the director who has been on the committee the longest. If the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, we will recommend voting against the longest-serving board member on the committee.

33 In the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the board on this basis, unless if the chairman also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the longest-serving director.

34 In the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the board on this basis, unless if the chairman also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the longest-serving director.

35 Considering that shareholder discontent clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the severity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern as well as company responsiveness to such matters, and will only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 25% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.

36 A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, the audit committee, or the finance committee, depending on a given company’s board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.

Conflicts of Interest

We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of directors:

1. A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Due to the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it.

2. A director who is on an excessive number of boards: We will typically recommend voting against a director who serves as an executive officer of any public company while serving on more than two other public company boards and any other director who serves on more than six public company boards.³⁷ Academic literature suggests that one board takes up approximately 200 hours per year of each member’s time. We believe this limits the number of boards on which directors can effectively serve, especially executives at other companies.³⁸ Further, we note a recent study has shown that the average number of outside board seats held by CEOs of S&P 500 companies is 0.6, down from 0.7 in 2008 and 1.0 in 2003.³⁹

3. A director who provides — or a director who has an immediate family member who provides — material consulting or other material professional services to the company. These services may include legal, consulting, or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company’s decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company’s directors.

4. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting to more than $50,000. Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests.

5. Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other’s boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.⁴⁰

6. All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.⁴¹ In the event a board is classified and shareholders are therefore unable to vote against all directors, we will recommend voting against the remaining directors the next year they are up for a shareholder vote. If a poison pill with a term of one year or less was adopted without shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee. If the board has, without seeking shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, extended the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the entire board.

37 Glass Lewis will not recommend voting against the director at the company where he or she serves as an executive officer, only at the other public companies where he or she serves on the board.

38 Our guidelines are similar to the standards set forth by the NACD in its “Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism,” 2001 Edition, pp. 14-15 (also cited approvingly by the Conference Board in its “Corporate Governance Best Practices: A Blueprint for the Post-Enron Era,” 2002, p. 17), which suggested that CEOs should not serve on more than 2 additional boards, persons with full-time work should not serve on more than 4 additional boards, and others should not serve on more than six boards.

39 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2013, p. 6.

40 We do not apply a look-back period for this situation. The interlock policy applies to both public and private companies. We will also evaluate multiple board interlocks among non-insiders (i.e., multiple directors serving on the same boards at other companies), for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

41 Refer to Section V. Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise for further discussion of our policies regarding anti-takeover measures, including poison pills.

Size of the Board of Directors

While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimum board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of “too many cooks in the kitchen” and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.

To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chairman of the nominating committee at a board with fewer than five directors. With boards consisting of more than 20 directors, we typically recommend voting against all members of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee).⁴²

CONTROLLED COMPANIES

We believe controlled companies warrant certain exceptions to our independence standards. The board’s function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual, entity (or group of shareholders party to a formal agreement) owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds board independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.

Independence Exceptions

The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:

1. We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.

2. The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors.

• We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company’s shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant.

• Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choicefor approvingand monitoring seniorexecutives’pay,controlled companiesserve a unique shareholder population whosevotingpowerensurestheprotection of itsinterests. As such, webelieve thathavingaffiliateddirectorsona controlled company’s compensation committee is acceptable. However, given that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee.

3. Controlled companies do not need an independent chairman or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board – such as chairman or presiding director – can best carry out the board’s duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests.

42 The Conference Board, at p. 23 in its May 2003 report “Corporate Governance Best Practices, Id.,” quotes one of its roundtable participants as stating, “[w]hen you’ve got a 20 or 30 person corporate board, it’s one way of assuring that nothing is ever going to happen that the CEO doesn’t want to happen.”

Size of the Board of Directors

We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.

Audit Committee Independence

Despite a controlled company’s status, unlike for the other key committees, we nevertheless believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company’s controlled status, the interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company’s financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.

SIGNIFICANT SHAREHOLDERS

Where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company’s voting power, we believe it is reasonable to allow proportional representation on the board and committees (excluding the audit committee) based on the individual or entity’s percentage of ownership.

EXCEPTIONS FOR RECENT IPOs

We believe companies that have recently completed an initial public offering (“IPO”) should be allowed adequate time to fully comply with marketplace listing requirements as well as to meet basic corporate governance standards. We believe a one-year grace period immediately following the date of a company’s IPO is sufficient time for most companies to comply with all relevant regulatory requirements and to meet such corporate governance standards. Except in egregious cases, Glass Lewis refrains from issuing voting recommendations on the basis of corporate governance best practices (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.) during the one-year period following an IPO.

However, two specific cases warrant strong shareholder action against the board of a company that completed an IPO within the past year:

1. Adoption of an anti-takeover provision such as a poison pill or classified board: In cases where a board adopts an anti-takeover provision preceding an IPO, we will consider recommending to vote against the members of the board who served when it was adopted if the board: (i) did not also commit to submit the anti-takeover provision to a shareholder vote within 12 months of the IPO; or (ii) did not provide a sound rationale for adopting the anti-takeover provision (such as a sunset for the pill of three years or less). In our view, adopting such an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest. This notion is strengthened when a board adopts a classified board with an infinite duration or a poison pill with a five to ten year term immediately prior to having a public shareholder base so as to insulate management for a substantial amount of time while postponing and/or avoiding allowing public shareholders the ability to vote on the anti-takeover provision adoption. Such instances are indicative of boards that may subvert shareholders’ best interests following their IPO.

2. Adoption of an exclusive forum provision or fee-shifting bylaw: Consistent with our general approach to boards that adopt exclusive forum provisions or fee-shifting bylaws without shareholder approval (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines), we believe shareholders should hold members of the governance committee responsible. In cases where a board adopts an exclusive forum provision for inclusion in a company’s charter or bylaws before the company’s IPO, we will recommend voting against the chairman of the governance committee, or, in the absence of such a committee, the chairman of the board, who served during the period of time when the provision was adopted. However given the even stronger impediment on shareholder legal recourse of a fee-shifting bylaw, in cases where a board adopts such a bylaw before the company’s IPO, we will recommend voting against the entire governance committee, or, in the absence of such a committee, the chairman of the board, who served during the period of time when the provision was adopted.

In addition, shareholders should also be wary of companies that adopt supermajority voting requirements before their IPO. Absent explicit provisions in the articles or bylaws stipulating that certain policies will be phased out over a certain period of time (e.g., a predetermined declassification of the board, a planned separation of the chairman and CEO, etc.) long-term shareholders could find themselves in the predicament of having to attain a supermajority vote to approve future proposals seeking to eliminate such policies.

DUAL-LISTED COMPANIES

For those companies whose shares trade on exchanges in multiple countries, and which may seek shareholder approval of proposals in accordance with varying exchange- and country-specific rules, we will apply the governance standards most relevant in each situation. We will consider a number of factors in determining which Glass Lewis country-specific policy to apply, including but not limited to: (i) the corporate governance structure and features of the company including whether the board structure is unique to a particular market; (ii) the nature of the proposals; (iii) the location of the company’s primary listing, if one can be determined; (iv) the regulatory/governance regime that the board is reporting against; and (v) the availability and completeness of the company’s SEC filings.

MUTUAL FUND BOARDS

Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund’s adviser are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.

The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:

1. Size of the board of directors: The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.

2. The CFO on the board: Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund’s registered investment adviser should serve on the board.

3. Independence of the audit committee: The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors.

4. Audit committee financial expert: At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert.

The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:

1. Independence of the board: We believe that three-fourths of an investment company’s board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into “proposed rule” status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.

2. When the auditor is not up for ratification: We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification. Due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.

3. Non-independent chairman: The SEC has proposed that the chairman of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund’s chairman and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chairman of an investment company’s nominating committee as well as the chairman of the board if the chairman and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chairman and we agree with them that “an independent board chairman would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of fund shareholders than would a chairman who is an executive of the adviser.” (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at http://www.sec.gov/news/ studies/indchair.pdf)

4. Multiple funds overseen by the same director: Unlike service on a public company board, mutual fund boards require much less of a time commitment. Mutual fund directors typically serve on dozens of other mutual fund boards, often within the same fund complex. The Investment Company Institute’s (“ICI”) Overview of Fund Governance Practices, 1994-2012, indicates that the average number of funds served by an independent director in 2012 was 53. Absent evidence that a specific director is hindered from being an effective board member at a fund due to service on other funds’ boards, we refrain from maintaining a cap on the number of outside mutual fund boards that we believe a director can serve on.

DECLASSIFIED BOARDS

Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.

Empirical studies have shown: (i) staggered boards are associated with a reduction in a firm’s valuation; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.

In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Some research has indicated that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction; further, when a staggered board negotiates a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premium occurs.⁴³ Additional research found that charter-based staggered boards “reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization” and that “staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value.”⁴⁴ A subsequent study reaffirmed that classified boards reduce shareholder value, finding “that the ongoing process of dismantling staggered boards, encouraged by institutional investors, could well contribute to increasing shareholder wealth.”⁴⁵

43 Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,” 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002).

44 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards” (2004).

45 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang, “Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806 (2010), p. 26.

Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2013, 91% of S&P 500 companies had declassified boards, up from approximately 40% a decade ago.⁴⁶ Management proposals to declassify boards are approved with near unanimity and shareholder proposals on the topic also receive strong shareholder support; in 2014, shareholder proposals requesting that companies declassify their boards received average support of 84% (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes), whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.⁴⁷ Further, a growing number of companies, nearly half of all those targeted by shareholder proposals requesting that all directors stand for election annually, either recommended shareholders support the proposal or made no recommendation, a departure from the more traditional management recommendation to vote against shareholder proposals.

Given our belief that declassified boards promote director accountability, the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company’s value and the established shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.

MANDATORY DIRECTOR TERM AND AGE LIMITS

Glass Lewis believes that director age and term limits typically are not in shareholders’ best interests. Too often age and term limits are used by boards as a crutch to remove board members who have served for an extended period of time. When used in that fashion, they are indicative of a board that has a difficult time making “tough decisions.”

Academic literature suggests that there is no evidence of a correlation between either length of tenure or age and director performance. On occasion, term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and to enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change when boards are unwilling to do so.

While we understand that age limits can be a way to force change where boards are unwilling to make changes on their own, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. Further, age limits unfairly imply that older (or, in rare cases, younger) directors cannot contribute to company oversight.

In our view, a director’s experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. However, we support routine director evaluation, preferably performed independently by an external firm, and periodic board refreshment to foster the sharing of new perspectives in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. Further, we believe the board should evaluate the need for changes to board composition based on an analysis of skills and experience necessary for the company, as well as the results of an independent board evaluation, instead of relying on arbitrary age or tenure limits. When necessary, shareholders can address concerns regarding proper board composition through director elections.

We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board’s approach to corporate governance and the board’s stewardship of company performance rather than imposing inflexible rules that don’t necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.

However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. If the board waives its term/age limits, Glass Lewis will consider recommending shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committees, unless the rule was waived with sufficient explanation, such as consummation of a corporate transaction like a merger.

46 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2013, p. 4

47 Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy”.

PROXY ACCESS

In lieu of running their own contested election, proxy access would not only allow certain shareholders to nominate directors to company boards but the shareholder nominees would be included on the company’s ballot, significantly enhancing the ability of shareholders to play a meaningful role in selecting their representatives. Glass Lewis generally supports affording shareholders the right to nominate director candidates to management’s proxy as a means to ensure that significant, long-term shareholders have an ability to nominate candidates to the board.

Companies generally seek shareholder approval to amend company bylaws to adopt proxy access in response to shareholder engagement or pressure, usually in the form of a shareholder proposal requesting proxy access, although some companies may adopt some elements of proxy access without prompting. Glass Lewis considers several factors when evaluating whether to support proposals for companies to adopt proxy access including the specified minimum ownership and holding requirement for shareholders to nominate one or more directors, as well as company size, performance and responsiveness to shareholders.

For a discussion of recent regulatory events in this area, along with a detailed overview of the Glass Lewis approach to Shareholder Proposals regarding Proxy Access, refer to Glass Lewis’ Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Initiatives, available at www.glasslewis.com.

MAJORITY VOTE FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS

In stark contrast to the failure of shareholder access to gain acceptance, majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the de facto standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.

While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.

During the first half of 2014, Glass Lewis tracked approximately 28 shareholder proposals seeking to require a majority vote to elect directors at annual meetings in the U.S. While this is roughly on par with what we have reviewed in each of the past several years, it is a sharp contrast to the 147 proposals tracked during all of 2006. This large drop in the number of proposals being submitted in recent years compared to 2006 is a result of many companies having already adopted some form of majority voting, including approximately 84% of companies in the S&P 500 Index, up from 56% in 2008.⁴⁸

Investors are also increasingly supporting this measure. During the 2014 proxy season, shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a majority voting standard for director elections received, on average, 59% shareholder support (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes). Further, nearly half of these resolutions received majority shareholder support and a number of companies either recommended shareholders vote in favor of or did not make a recommendation for how shareholders should vote on these proposals.

THE PLURALITY VOTE STANDARD

Today, most US companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including that director, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee “wins” the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard is the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in “failed elections.”

48 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2013, p. 13

ADVANTAGES OF A MAJORITY VOTE STANDARD

If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. Given that so few directors (less than 100 a year) do not receive majority support from shareholders, we think that a majority vote standard is reasonable since it will neither result in many failed director elections nor reduce the willingness of qualified, shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future. Further, most directors who fail to receive a majority shareholder vote in favor of their election do not step down, underscoring the need for true majority voting.

We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Although shareholders only rarely fail to support directors, the occasional majority vote against a director’s election will likely deter the election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests. Glass Lewis will therefore generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote, excepting contested director elections.

In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (i.e., a resignation policy) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors.

We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director’s replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.

II. TRANSPARENCY AND INTERGRITY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING

AUDITOR RATIFICATION

The auditor’s role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company’s books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company’s financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company’s fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:

“The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence.”

As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor’s interests and the public’s interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor’s performance and to annually ratify a board’s auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that “to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement.”⁴⁹

On August 16, 2011, the PCAOB issued a Concept Release seeking public comment on ways that auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism could be enhanced, with a specific emphasis on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB convened several public roundtable meetings during 2012 to further discuss such matters. Glass Lewis believes auditor rotation can ensure both the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the audit; we will typically recommend supporting proposals to require auditor rotation when the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years), particularly at companies with a history of accounting problems.

VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS ON AUDITOR RATIFICATION

We generally support management’s choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor’s independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chairman. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weaknesses in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:

1. When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.

2. Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in thereporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.⁵⁰

49 “Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.” p. VIII:20, October 6, 2008.

50 An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.

3. When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.

4. When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.

5. When the company has aggressive accounting policies.

6. When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements.

7. Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures without adequate justification.

8. We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the auditor’s interests and shareholder interests.

PENSION ACCOUNTING ISSUES

A pension accounting question occasionally raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company’s net income. This issue often arises in the executive-compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.

Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company’s discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company’s performance.

III. THE LINK BETWEEN COMPENSATION AND PERFORMANCE

Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives, as we believe that this is an important area in which the board’s priorities are revealed. Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. We believe the most effective compensation arrangements provide for an appropriate mix of performance-based short- and long-term incentives in addition to fixed pay elements while promoting a prudent and sustainable level of risk-taking.

Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which pay is aligned with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. We recognize performance metrics must necessarily vary depending on the company and industry, among other factors, and may include a wide variety of financial measures as well as industry-specific performance indicators. However, we believe companies should disclose why the specific performance metrics were selected and how the actions they are designed to incentivize will lead to better corporate performance.

Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders’ interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. While we favor full disclosure for senior executives and we view pay disclosure at the aggregate level (e.g., the number of employees being paid over a certain amount or in certain categories) as potentially useful, we do not believe share-holders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives.

ADVISORY VOTE ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (“SAY-ON-PAY”)

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) required companies to hold an advisory vote on executive compensation at the first shareholder meeting that occurs six months after enactment of the bill (January 21, 2011).

This practice of allowing shareholders a non-binding vote on a company’s compensation report is standard practice in many non-US countries, and has been a requirement for most companies in the United Kingdom since 2003 and in Australia since 2005. Although say-on-pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of “against” or “abstain” votes indicates substantial shareholder concern about a company’s compensation policies and procedures.

Given the complexity of most companies’ compensation programs, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. We review each company’s compensation on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that each company must be examined in the context of industry, size, maturity, performance, financial condition, its historic pay for performance practices, and any other relevant internal or external factors.

We believe that each company should design and apply specific compensation policies and practices that are appropriate to the circumstances of the company and, in particular, will attract and retain competent executives and other staff, while motivating them to grow the company’s long-term shareholder value.

Where we find those specific policies and practices serve to reasonably align compensation with performance, and such practices are adequately disclosed, Glass Lewis will recommend supportingthe company’s approach. If, however, those specific policies and practices fail to demonstrably link compensation with performance, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the say-on-pay proposal.

Glass Lewis reviews say-on-pay proposals on both a qualitative basis and a quantitative basis, with a focus on several main areas:

• The overall design and structure of the company’s executive compensation programs including selection and challenging nature of performance metrics;

• The implementation and effectiveness of the company’s executive compensation programs including pay mix and use of performance metrics in determining pay levels;

• The quality and content of the company’s disclosure;

• The quantum paid to executives; and

• The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the company’s current and past pay-for-performance grades.

We also review any significant changes or modifications, and rationale for such changes, made to the company’s compensation structure or award amounts, including base salaries.

SAY-ON-PAY VOTING RECOMMENDATIONS

In cases where we find deficiencies in a company’s compensation program’s design, implementation or management, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. Generally such instances include evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (i.e., deficient or failing pay for performance grades), unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.), questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or other egregious compensation practices.

Although not an exhaustive list, the following issues when weighed together may cause Glass Lewis to recommend voting against a say-on-pay vote:

• Inappropriate peer group and/or benchmarking issues;

• Inadequate or no rationale for changes to peer groups;

• Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments, including golden handshakes and golden parachutes;

• Problematic contractual payments, such as guaranteed bonuses;

• Targeting overall levels of compensation at higher than median without adequate justification;

• Performance targets not sufficiently challenging, and/or providing for high potential payouts;

• Performance targets lowered without justification;

• Discretionary bonuses paid when short- or long-term incentive plan targets were not met;

• Executive pay high relative to peers not justified by outstanding company performance; and

• The terms of the long-term incentive plans are inappropriate (please see “Long-Term Incentives” on page 29).

In instances where a company has simply failed to provide sufficient disclosure of its policies, we may recommend shareholders vote against this proposal solely on this basis, regardless of the appropriateness of compensation levels.

COMPANY RESPONSIVENESS

At companies that received a significant level of shareholder opposition (25% or greater) to their say-on-pay proposal at the previous annual meeting, we believe the board should demonstrate some level of engagement and responsiveness to the shareholder concerns behind the discontent, particularly in response to shareholder engagement. While we recognize that sweeping changes cannot be made to a compensation program without due consideration and that a majority of shareholders voted in favor of the proposal, given that the average approval rate for say-on-pay proposals is about 90% we believe the compensation committee should provide some level of response to a significant vote against, including engaging with large shareholders to identify their concerns. In the absence of any evidence that the board is actively engaging shareholders on these issues and responding accordingly, we may recommend holding compensation committee members accountable for failing to adequately respond to shareholder opposition, giving careful consideration to the level of shareholder protest and the severity and history of compensation problems.

Where we identify egregious compensation practices, we may also recommend voting against the compensation committee based on the practices or actions of its members during the year. Such practices may include: approving large one-off payments, the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion, or sustained poor pay for performance practices.

PAY FOR PERFORMANCE

Glass Lewis believes an integral part of a well-structured compensation package is a successful link between pay and performance. Our proprietary pay-for-performance model was developed to better evaluate the link between pay and performance of the top five executives at US companies. Our model benchmarks these executives’ pay and company performance against peers selected using Equilar’s market-based peer groups and across five performance metrics. By measuring the magnitude of the gap between two weighted-average percentile rankings (executive compensation and performance), we grade companies based on a school letter system: “A”, “B”, “F”, etc. The grades guide our evaluation of compensation committee effectiveness and we generally recommend voting against compensation committee of companies with a pattern of failing our pay-for-performance analysis.

We also use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on say-on-pay proposals. As such, if a company receives a failing grade from our proprietary model, we are more likely to recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. However, other qualitative factors such as an effective overall incentive structure, the relevance of selected performance metrics, significant forthcoming enhancements or reasonable long-term payout levels may give us cause to recommend in favor of a proposal even when we have identified a disconnect between pay and performance.

SHORT-TERM INCENTIVES

A short-term bonus or incentive (“STI”) should be demonstrably tied to performance. Whenever possible, we believe a mix of corporate and individual performance measures is appropriate. We would normally expect performance measures for STIs to be based on company-wide or divisional financial measures as well as non-financial factors such as those related to safety, environmental issues, and customer satisfaction. While we recognize that companies operating in different sectors or markets may seek to utilize a wide range of metrics, we expect such measures to be appropriately tied to a company’s business drivers.

Further, the target and potential maximum awards that can be achieved under STI awards should be disclosed. Shareholders should expect stretching performance targets for the maximum award to be achieved. Any increase in the potential maximum award should be clearly justified to shareholders.

Glass Lewis recognizes that disclosure of some measures may include commercially confidential information. Therefore, we believe it may be reasonable to exclude such information in some cases as long as the company provides sufficient justification for non-disclosure. However, where a short-termbonus has been paid, companies should disclose the extent to which performance has been achieved against relevant targets, including disclosure of the actual target achieved.

Where management has received significant STIs but short-term performance over the previous year prima facie appears to be poor or negative, we believe the company should provide a clear explanation of why these significant short-term payments were made.

LONG-TERM INCENTIVES

Glass Lewis recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs, which are often the primary long-term incentive for executives. When used appropriately, they can provide a vehicle for linking an executive’s pay to company performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation can be an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.

There are certain elements that Glass Lewis believes are common to most well-structured long-term incentive (“LTI”) plans. These include:

• No re-testing or lowering of performance conditions;

• Performance metrics that cannot be easily manipulated by management;

• Two or more performance metrics;

• At least one relative performance metric that compares the company’s performance to a relevant peer group or index;

• Performance periods of at least three years;

• Stretching metrics that incentivize executives to strive for outstanding performance while not encouraging excessive risk-taking; and

• Individual limits expressed as a percentage of base salary.

Performance measures should be carefully selected and should relate to the specific business/industry in which the company operates and, especially, the key value drivers of the company’s business.

While cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass Lewis generally believes that measuring a company’s performance with multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the company’s performance than a single metric; further, reliance on just one metric may focus too much management attention on a single target and is therefore more susceptible to manipulation. When utilized for relative measurements, external benchmarks such as a sector index or peer group should be disclosed and transparent. The rationale behind the selection of a specific index or peer group should also be disclosed. Internal benchmarks should also be disclosed and transparent, unless a cogent case for confidentiality is made and fully explained.

We also believe shareholders should evaluate the relative success of a company’s compensation programs, particularly with regard to existing equity-based incentive plans, in linking pay and performance when evaluating new LTI plans to determine the impact of additional stock awards. We will therefore review the company’s pay-for-performance grade (see below for more information) and specifically the proportion of total compensation that is stock-based.

ONE-OFF AWARDS

Glass Lewis believes shareholders should generally be wary of awards granted outside of the standard incentive schemes outlined above, as such awards have the potential to undermine the integrity of a company’s regular incentive plans, the link between pay and performance or both. We generally believe that if the existing incentive programs fail to provide adequate incentives to executives, companies should redesign their compensation programs rather than make additional grants.

However, we recognize that in certain circumstances, additional incentives may be appropriate. In these cases, companies should provide a thorough description of the awards, including a cogent andconvincing explanation of their necessity and why existing awards do not provide sufficient motivation. Further, such awards should be tied to future service and performance whenever possible.

Additionally, we believe companies making supplemental awards should also describe if and how the regular compensation arrangements will be affected by these supplemental awards. In reviewing a company’s use of supplemental awards, Glass Lewis will review the terms and size of the grants in the context of the company’s overall incentive strategy and granting practices, as well as the current operating environment.

RECOUPMENT PROVISIONS (“CLAWBACKS”)

We believe it is prudent for boards to adopt detailed and stringent bonus recoupment policies to prevent executives from retaining performance-based awards that were not truly earned. We believe such “clawback” policies should be triggered in the event of a restatement of financial results or similar revision of performance indicators upon which bonuses were based. Such policies would allow the board to review all performance-related bonuses and awards made to senior executives during the period covered by a restatement and would, to the extent feasible, allow the company to recoup such bonuses in the event that performance goals were not actually achieved. We further believe clawback policies should be subject to only limited discretion to ensure the integrity of such policies.

Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to create a rule requiring listed companies to adopt policies for recouping certain compensation during a three-year look-back period. The rule applies to incentive-based compensation paid to current or former executives if the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to erroneous data resulting from material non-compliance with any financial reporting requirements under the securities laws. However, the SEC has yet to finalize the relevant rules.

These recoupment provisions are more stringent than under Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in three respects: (i) the provisions extend to current or former executive officers rather than only to the CEO and CFO; (ii) it has a three-year look-back period (rather than a twelve-month look-back period); and (iii) it allows for recovery of compensation based upon a financial restatement due to erroneous data, and therefore does not require misconduct on the part of the executive or other employees.

HEDGING OF STOCK

Glass Lewis believes that the hedging of shares by executives in the shares of the companies where they are employed severs the alignment of interests of the executive with shareholders. We believe companies should adopt strict policies to prohibit executives from hedging the economic risk associated with their shareownership in the company.

PLEDGING OF STOCK

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should examine the facts and circumstances of each company rather than apply a one-size-fits-all policy regarding employee stock pledging. Glass Lewis believes that shareholders benefit when employees, particularly senior executives have “skin-in-the-game” and therefore recognizes the benefits of measures designed to encourage employees to both buy shares out of their own pocket and to retain shares they have been granted; blanket policies prohibiting stock pledging may discourage executives and employees from doing either.

However, we also recognize that the pledging of shares can present a risk that, depending on a host of factors, an executive with significant pledged shares and limited other assets may have an incentive to take steps to avoid a forced sale of shares in the face of a rapid stock price decline. Therefore, to avoid substantial losses from a forced sale to meet the terms of the loan, the executive may have an incentive to boost the stock price in the short term in a manner that is unsustainable, thus hurting shareholders in the long-term. We also recognize concerns regarding pledging may not apply to less senior employees, given the latter group’s significantly more limited influence over a company’s stockprice. Therefore, we believe that the issue of pledging shares should be reviewed in that context, as should polices that distinguish between the two groups.

Glass Lewis believes that the benefits of stock ownership by executives and employees may outweigh the risks of stock pledging, depending on many factors. As such, Glass Lewis reviews all relevant factors in evaluating proposed policies, limitations and prohibitions on pledging stock, including:

• The number of shares pledged;

• The percentage executives’ pledged shares are of outstanding shares;

• The percentage executives’ pledged shares are of each executive’s shares and total assets;

• Whether the pledged shares were purchased by the employee or granted by the company;

• Whether there are different policies for purchased and granted shares;

• Whether the granted shares were time-based or performance-based;

• The overall governance profile of the company;

• The volatility of the company’s stock (in order to determine the likelihood of a sudden stock price drop);

• The nature and cyclicality, if applicable, of the company’s industry;

• The participation and eligibility of executives and employees in pledging;

• The company’s current policies regarding pledging and any waiver from these policies for employees and executives; and

• Disclosure of the extent of any pledging, particularly among senior executives.

COMPENSATION CONSULTANT INDEPENDENCE

As mandated by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require compensation committees to consider six factors in assessing compensation advisor independence. These factors include: (1) provision of other services to the company; (2) fees paid by the company as a percentage of the advisor’s total annual revenue; (3) policies and procedures of the advisor to mitigate conflicts of interests; (4) any business or personal relationships of the consultant with any member of the compensation committee; (5) any company stock held by the consultant; and (6) any business or personal relationships of the consultant with any executive officer of the company. According to the SEC, “no one factor should be viewed as a determinative factor.” Glass Lewis believes this six-factor assessment is an important process for every compensation committee to undertake but believes companies employing a consultant for board compensation, consulting and other corporate services should provide clear disclosure beyond just a reference to examining the six points to allow shareholders to review the specific aspects of the various consultant relationships.

We believe compensation consultants are engaged to provide objective, disinterested, expert advice to the compensation committee. When the consultant or its affiliates receive substantial income from providing other services to the company, we believe the potential for a conflict of interest arises and the independence of the consultant may be jeopardized. Therefore, Glass Lewis will, when relevant, note the potential for a conflict of interest when the fees paid to the advisor or its affiliates for other services exceeds those paid for compensation consulting.

FREQUENCY OF SAY-ON-PAY

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes, i.e. every one, two or three years. Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires companies to hold such votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes at least once every six years.

We believe companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year. We believe that the time and financial burdens to a company with regard to an annual vote are relatively small and incremental and are outweighed by the benefits to shareholders through more frequent accountability. Implementing biannual or triennial votes on executive compensation limits shareholders’ ability to hold the board accountable for its compensation practices through means other than voting against the compensation committee. Unless a company provides a compelling rationale or unique circumstances for say-on-pay votes less frequent than annually, we will generally recommend that shareholders support annual votes on compensation.

VOTE ON GOLDEN PARACHUTE ARRANGEMENTS

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to provide shareholders with a separate non-binding vote on approval of golden parachute compensation arrangements in connection with certain change-in-control transactions. However, if the golden parachute arrangements have previously been subject to a say-on-pay vote which shareholders approved, then this required vote is waived.

Glass Lewis believes the narrative and tabular disclosure of golden parachute arrangements benefits all shareholders. Glass Lewis analyzes each golden parachute arrangement on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, among other items: the nature of the change-in-control transaction, the ultimate value of the payments particularly compared to the value of the transaction, the tenure and position of the executives in question before and after the transaction, any new or amended employment agreements entered into in connection with the transaction, and the type of triggers involved (i.e., single vs. double).

EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION PLAN PROPOSALS

We believe that equity compensation awards, when not abused, are useful for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance. Glass Lewis evaluates equity-based compensation plans using a detailed model and analytical review.

Equity-based compensation programs have important differences from cash compensation plans and bonus programs. Accordingly, our model and analysis takes into account factors such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions.

Our analysis is primarily quantitative and focused on the plan’s cost as compared with the business’s operating metrics. We run twenty different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company’s financial performance. Each of the twenty analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.

In our analysis, we compare the program’s expected annual expense with the business’s operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the plan’s expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers and directors of the firm contribute to the creation of enterprise value but not necessarily market capitalization (the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because, in addition to creeping averages serving to inflate compensation, we believe that some absolute limits are warranted.

We evaluate equity plans based on certain overarching principles:

• Companies should seek more shares only when needed;

• Requested share amounts should be small enough that companies seek shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently);

• If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members;

• Annual net share count and voting power dilution should be limited;

• Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group;

• The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business’s value;

• The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business’s financial results;

• Plans should deliver value on a per-employee basis when compared with programs at peer companies;

• Plans should not permit re-pricing of stock options;

• Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms;

• Plans should not count shares in ways that understate the potential dilution, or cost, to common shareholders. This refers to “inverse” full-value award multipliers;

• Selected performance metrics should be challenging and appropriate, and should be subject to relative performance measurements; and

• Stock grants should be subject to minimum vesting and/or holding periods sufficient to ensure sustainable performance and promote retention.

OPTION EXCHANGES

Glass Lewis views option repricing plans and option exchange programs with great skepticism. Shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock and we believe that the employees, officers, and directors who receive stock options should be similarly situated to align their interests with shareholder interests.

We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be “rescued” from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option’s value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.

In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck.

There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program may be acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends, rather than specific company issues, cause a stock’s value to decline dramatically and the repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original “bargain” was struck. In such a circumstance, we will recommend supporting a repricing only if the following conditions are true:

• Officers and board members cannot participate in the program;

• The stock decline mirrors the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and approximates the decline in magnitude;

• The exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders using very conservative assumptions and with a recognition of the adverse selection problems inherent in voluntary programs; and

• Management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market.

OPTION BACKDATING, SPRING-LOADING AND BULLET-DODGING

Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to re-pricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return.

Backdating an option is the act of changing an option’s grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. Since 2006, Glass Lewis has identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.

Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock’s price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.

The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.

A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company’s compensation and governance practices.⁵¹

Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have breached their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders.

Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company’s financial reports.

When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.

51 Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. “LUCKY CEOs.” November, 2006.

DIRECTOR COMPENSATION PLANS

Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive reasonable and appropriate compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. However, a balance is required. Fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals, but excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and potentially compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. We will consider recommending supporting compensation plans that include option grants or other equity-based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. However, equity grants to directors should not be performance-based to ensure directors are not incentivized in the same manner as executives but rather serve as a check on imprudent risk-taking in executive compensation plan design.

Glass Lewis uses a proprietary model and analyst review to evaluate the costs of equity plans compared to the plans of peer companies with similar market capitalizations. We use the results of this model to guide our voting recommendations on stock-based director compensation plans.

EMPLOYEE STOCK PURCHASE PLANS

Glass Lewis believes that employee stock purchase plans (“ESPPs”) can provide employees with a sense of ownership in their company and help strengthen the alignment between the interests of employees and shareholders. We use a quantitative model to estimate the cost of the plan by measuring the expected discount, purchase period, expected purchase activity (if previous activity has been disclosed) and whether the plan has a “lookback” feature, and then compare this cost to ESPPs at similar companies. Except for the most extreme cases, Glass Lewis will generally support these plans given the regulatory purchase limit of $25,000 per employee per year, which we believe is reasonable. We also look at the number of shares requested to see if a ESPP will significantly contribute to overall shareholder dilution or if shareholders will not have a chance to approve the program for an excessive period of time. As such, we will generally recommend against ESPPs that contain “evergreen” provisions that automatically increase the number of shares available under the ESPP each year.

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TAX DEDUCTIBILITY (IRS 162(M) COMPLIANCE)

Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code allows companies to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO, if the compensation is performance-based and is paid under shareholder-approved plans. Companies therefore submit incentive plans for shareholder approval to take of advantage of the tax deductibility afforded under 162(m) for certain types of compensation.

We believe the best practice for companies is to provide robust disclosure to shareholders so that they can make fully-informed judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that disclosure should include specific performance metrics, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company’s peers.

We typically recommend voting against a 162(m) proposal where: (i) a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; (ii) a company fails to provide one of either a total maximum or an individual maximum; or (iii) the proposed plan or individual maximum award limit is excessive when compared with the plans of the company’s peers.

The company’s record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for-performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of setting reasonable pay relative to business performance, we generally recommend voting in favor of aplan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.

As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders’ best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards; it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.

IV. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND THE SHAREHOLDER FRANCHISE

ANTI-TAKEOVER MEASURES

POISON PILLS (SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PLANS)

Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders’ best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.

We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company’s course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders’ financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan’s implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.

In certain circumstances, we will support a poison pill that is limited in scope to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes each of the following attributes:

• The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction;

• The offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days;

• The offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms;

• There is no fairness opinion requirement; and

• There is a low to no premium requirement.

Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.

NOL POISON PILLS

Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies’ ability to use NOLs in the event of a “change of ownership.”⁵² In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill (“NOL pill”) in order to prevent an inadvertent change of ownership by multiple investors purchasing small chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.

52 Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a “change of ownership” of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the “trafficking” of net operating losses.

Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis taking into consideration, among other factors, the value of the NOLs to the company, the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holding and the nature of the larger shareholders, the trigger threshold and whether the term of the plan is limited in duration (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable “sunset” provision) or is subject to periodic board review and/or shareholder ratification. However, we will recommend that shareholders vote against a proposal to adopt or amend a pill to include NOL protective provisions if the company has adopted a more narrowly tailored means of preventing a change in control to preserve its NOLs. For example, a company may limit share transfers in its charter to prevent a change of ownership from occurring.

Furthermore, we believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.

FAIR PRICE PROVISIONS

Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation’s common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority stockholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of ”continuing directors” and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.

The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an “interested stockholder” by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested stockholder. An interested stockholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company’s outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.

Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested stockholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger or other transaction at a later time.

Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.

REINCORPORATION

In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. When examining a management proposal to reincorporate to a different state or country, we review the relevant financial benefits, generally related to improved corporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially thoserelating to shareholder rights, resulting from the change in domicile. Where the financial benefits are de minimis and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, we will recommend voting against the transaction.

However, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways would the company benefit from shifting jurisdictions including the following:

• Is the board sufficiently independent?

• Does the company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place?

• Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)?

• Do shareholders have the right to call special meetings of shareholders?

• Are there other material governance issues of concern at the company?

• Has the company’s performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years?

• How has the company ranked in Glass Lewis’ pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years?

• Does the company have an independent chairman?

We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company’s place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.

EXCLUSIVE FORUM AND FEE-SHIFTING BYLAW PROVISIONS

Glass Lewis recognizes that companies may be subject to frivolous and opportunistic lawsuits, particularly in conjunction with a merger or acquisition, that are expensive and distracting. In response, companies have sought ways to prevent or limit the risk of such suits by adopting bylaws regarding where the suits must be brought or shifting the burden of the legal expenses to the plaintiff, if unsuccessful at trial.

Glass Lewis believes that charter or bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder’s choice of legal venue are not in the best interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of shareholder claims by increasing their associated costs and making them more difficult to pursue. As such, shareholders should be wary about approving any limitation on their legal recourse including limiting themselves to a single jurisdiction (e.g., Delaware) without compelling evidence that it will benefit shareholders.

For this reason, we recommend that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision unless the company: (i) provides a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders; (ii) provides evidence of abuse of legal process in other, non-favored jurisdictions; (iii) narrowly tailors such provision to the risks involved; and (iv) maintains a strong record of good corporate governance practices.

Moreover, in the event a board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, we will weigh the importance of the other bundled provisions when determining the vote recommendation on the proposal. We will nonetheless recommend voting against the chairman of the governance committee for bundling disparate proposals into a single proposal (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines).

Similarly, some companies have adopted bylaws requiring plaintiffs who sue the company and fail to receive a judgment in their favor pay the legal expenses of the company. These bylaws, also known as “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws, will likely have a chilling effect on even meritorious shareholder lawsuits as shareholders would face an strong financial disincentive not to sue a company. Glass Lewis therefore strongly opposes the adoption of such fee-shifting bylaws and, if adopted without shareholder approval, will recommend voting against the governance committee.

AUTHORIZED SHARES

Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company’s operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:

1. Stock Split – We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company’s most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.

2. Shareholder Defenses – Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses.

3. Financing for Acquisitions – We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy.

4. Financing for Operations – We review the company’s cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company’s history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital.

Issuing additional shares can dilute existing holders in limited circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares. Similar concerns may also lead us to recommend against a proposal to conduct a reverse stock split if the board does not state that it will reduce the number of authorized common shares in a ratio proportionate to the split.

While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.

ADVANCE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.

These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.

We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.

VOTING STRUCTURE

CUMULATIVE VOTING

Cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of the stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. As companies generally have multiple nominees up for election, cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. It can be important when a board is controlled by insiders or affiliates and where the company’s ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.

Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of large holders.

We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company’s governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.

Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted antitakeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.

Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.

SUPERMAJORITY VOTE REQUIREMENTS

Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover, we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.

TRANSACTION OF OTHER BUSINESS

We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before an annual or special meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.

ANTI-GREENMAIL PROPOSALS

Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.

MUTUAL FUNDS: INVESTMENT POLICIES AND ADVISORY AGREEMENTS

Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund’s structure and/or a fund’s relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:

• The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement;

• Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and

• Any material changes to the fund’s investment objective or strategy.

We generally support amendments to a fund’s investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund’s advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.

In matters pertaining to a fund’s investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund’s objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments to a fund’s investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally purchased, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors’ diversification strategies.

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS

The complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements of Real Estate Investment Trusts (“REITs”) provide for a unique shareholder evaluation. In simple terms, a REIT must have a minimum of 100 shareholders (the “100 Shareholder Test”) and no more than 50% of the value of its shares can be held by five or fewer individuals (the “5/50 Test”). At least 75% of a REITs’ assets must be in real estate, it must derive 75% of its gross income from rents or mortgage interest, and it must pay out 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends. In addition, as a publicly traded security listed on a stock exchange, a REIT must comply with the same general listing requirements as a publicly traded equity.

In order to comply with such requirements, REITs typically include percentage ownership limitations in their organizational documents, usually in the range of 5% to 10% of the REITs outstanding shares. Given the complexities of REITs as an asset class, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach in our evaluation of REIT proposals, especially regarding changes in authorized share capital, including preferred stock.

PREFERRED STOCK ISSUANCES AT REITS

Glass Lewis is generally against the authorization of preferred shares that allows the board to determine the preferences, limitations and rights of the preferred shares (known as “blank-check preferred stock”). We believe that granting such broad discretion should be of concern to common shareholders, since blank-check preferred stock could be used as an antitakeover device or in some other fashion that adversely affects the voting power or financial interests of common shareholders. However, given the requirement that a REIT must distribute 90% of its net income annually, it is inhibited from retaining capital to make investments in its business. As such, we recognize that equity financing likely plays a key role in a REIT’s growth and creation of shareholder value. Moreover, shareholder concern regarding the use of preferred stock as an anti-takeover mechanism may be allayed by the fact that most REITs maintain ownership limitations in their certificates of incorporation. For these reasons, along with the fact that REITs typically do not engage in private placements of preferred stock (which result in the rights of common shareholders being adversely impacted), we may support requests to authorize shares of blank-check preferred stock at REITs.

BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES

Business Development Companies (“BDCs”) were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980; they are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are taxed as regulated investment companies (“RICs”) under the Internal Revenue Code. BDCs typically operate as publicly traded private equity firms that invest in early stage to mature private companies as well as small public companies. BDCs realize operating income when their investments are sold off, and therefore maintain complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements that are similar to those of REITs—the most evident of which is that BDCs must distribute at least 90% of their taxable earnings as dividends.

AUTHORIZATION TO SELL SHARES AT A PRICE BELOW NET ASSET VALUE

Considering that BDCs are required to distribute nearly all their earnings to shareholders, they sometimes need to offer additional shares of common stock in the public markets to finance operations and acquisitions. However, shareholder approval is required in order for a BDC to sell shares of common stock at a price below Net Asset Value (“NAV”). Glass Lewis evaluates these proposals using a case-by-case approach, but will recommend supporting such requests if the following conditions are met:

• The authorization to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date of one year or less from the date that shareholders approve the underlying proposal (i.e. the meeting date);

• The proposed discount below NAV is minimal (ideally no greater than 20%);

• The board specifies that the issuance will have a minimal or modest dilutive effect (ideally no greater than 25% of the company’s then-outstanding common stock prior to the issuance); and

• A majority of the company’s independent directors who do not have a financial interest in the issuance approve the sale.

In short, we believe BDCs should demonstrate a responsible approach to issuing shares below NAV, by proactively addressing shareholder concerns regarding the potential dilution of the requested share issuance, and explaining if and how the company’s past below-NAV share issuances have benefitted the company.

V. COMPENSATION, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE SHAREHOLDER INITIATIVES OVERVIEW

Glass Lewis generally believes decisions regarding day-to-day management and policy decisions, including those related to social, environmental or political issues, are best left to management and the board as they in almost all cases have more and better information about company strategy and risk. However, when there is a clear link between the subject of a shareholder proposal and value enhancement or risk mitigation, Glass Lewis will recommend in favor of a reasonable, well-crafted shareholder proposal where the company has failed to or inadequately addressed the issue.

We believe that shareholders should not attempt to micromanage a company, its businesses or its executives through the shareholder initiative process. Rather, we believe shareholders should use their influence to push for governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability. Shareholders should then put in place a board they can trust to make informed decisions that are in the best interests of the business and its owners, and hold directors accountable for management and policy decisions through board elections. However, we recognize that support of appropriately crafted shareholder initiatives may at times serve to promote or protect shareholder value.

To this end, Glass Lewis evaluates shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis. We generally recommend supporting shareholder proposals calling for the elimination of, as well as to require shareholder approval of, antitakeover devices such as poison pills and classified boards. We generally recommend supporting proposals likely to increase and/or protect shareholder value and also those that promote the furtherance of shareholder rights. In addition, we also generally recommend supporting proposals that promote director accountability and those that seek to improve compensation practices, especially those promoting a closer link between compensation and performance, as well as those that promote more and better disclosure of relevant risk factors where such disclosure is lacking or inadequate.

For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social and governance shareholder initiatives, please refer to our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Initiatives, available at www.glasslewis.com.

EX-99.CERT

EX-99.CERT

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Ralph W. Bradshaw, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form N-CSR of Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations, changes in net assets, and cash flows (if the financial statements are required to include a statement of cash flows) of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Rule 30a-3(c) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Rule 30a-3(d) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this report based on such evaluation; and

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the second fiscal quarter of the period covered by this report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: February 24, 2015	/s/ Ralph W. Bradshaw
	Ralph W. Bradshaw, Chairman
	and President (Principal
	Executive Officer)

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Frank J. Maresca, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form N-CSR of Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations, changes in net assets, and cash flows (if the financial statements are required to include a statement of cash flows) of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Rule 30a-3(c) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Rule 30a-3(d) under the Investment Company Act of 1940) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this report based on such evaluation; and

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the second fiscal quarter of the period covered by this report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.

Date: February 24, 2015	/s/  Frank J. Maresca
	Frank J. Maresca, Treasurer
	(Principal Financial Officer)

EX-99.906 CERT

EX-99.906CERT

CERTIFICATIONS

Ralph W. Bradshaw, Principal Executive Officer, and Frank J. Maresca, Principal Financial Officer, of Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc. (the "Registrant"), each certify to the best of his knowledge that:

1. The Registrant's periodic report on Form N-CSR for the period ended December 31, 2014 (the "Form N-CSR") fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. The information contained in the Form N-CSR fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER	PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.	Cornerstone Strategic Value Fund, Inc.
/s/ Ralph W. Bradshaw	/s/ Frank J. Maresca
Ralph W. Bradshaw, President	Frank J. Maresca, Treasurer
Date: February 24, 2015	Date: February 24, 2015

A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906, OR OTHER DOCUMENT AUTHENTICATING, ACKNOWLEDGING OR OTHERWISE ADOPTING THE SIGNATURE THAT APPEARS IN TYPED FORM WITHIN THE ELECTRONIC VERSION OF THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906, HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO CORNERSTONE STRATEGIC VALUE FUND, INC. AND WILL BE RETAINED BY CORNERSTONE STRATEGIC VALUE FUND, INC. AND FURNISHED TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ITS STAFF UPON REQUEST.

This certification is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Form N-CSR filed with the Commission.