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
Ryerson Inc.


Discussion Materials

August 10, 2007

Majority of Ryerson's Growth was through Acquisitions not Organic Growth

- **Ryerson Claim:** Ryerson claims that their strategic programs have demonstrated strong sales growth
- **Fact:** According to Ryerson's 2005 10K, all of the Company's revenue growth in 2005 was attributable to acquisitions and an increased selling price
 - On a proforma basis, tons shipped for the combined company declined by 5% in 2005






What Ryerson Didn't Show You

Source: Company filings, management presentations

Discussion Materials



Source: Company filings

(1) At December 12, 2006, one day prior to Harbinger's 13D filing

Ryerson Underperformed the Market

Ryerson Claim: Ryerson's improving performance has also been reflected in Ryerson's stock price

- **Fact:** Ryerson's peer group for stock price performance <u>excluded</u> a number of companies that they included in the comparison of revenue and ROIC of public market service centers
 - Including these companies shows an underperformance of over 5,000 basis points for the three year period they chose
 - The underperformance is even more pronounced over the time period from 1998 to 2006 when Ryerson's stock **declined 16% relative to an increase of 267%** experienced by its public competitors



Source: FactSet

Note: Index starts on December 12, 2003, three years prior to Harbinger's 13-D filings on December 12, 2006

Steel Service Center Composite Index is weighted by market capitalization and includes AM Castle, EMJ (until 3/06), Metals USA (until 11/05), Novamerican, Olympic Steel, Reliance Steel, Russel Metals


2006 Product Mix

Ryerson Claim: Gross margin % is not a good comparable measure: competitors have different product and customer mix. EBITDA % is not a good comparable measure

Fact: Reliance is a highly comparable competitor

- Only two companies have revenue greater than \$5 billion
- Both companies use LIFO accounting
- Both companies have a nationwide foot print
- Both sell stainless steel and aluminum in addition to carbon steel

Why on every performance measure except for CEO compensation, are these true comparables so far apart?



Source: Company Filings (1) Adjusted for LIFO liquidation gain

Ryerson's Return on Invested Capital is Below its Cost of Capital, and Significantly Below its Closest Public Comparable, Reliance

- **Ryerson Claim:** Return on Invested Capital with comparable inventory accounting is the best measure of financial performance. On this measure, Ryerson outperforms most of the peer group selected by Harbinger
- **Fact:** Ryerson's claimed "best measure of financial performance" ROIC of 12% for the first half of 2007 is **less** than the average WACC they used in their DCF of 11.5% to 14.5%. This implies they destroy value for each dollar of invested capital
 - Further, Ryerson's ROIC is drastically lower than Reliance's (which we believe is the closest comparable to Ryerson):

	Return on Inv	Return on Invested Capital		
	Ryerson	Reliance		
Long-term Average	5.5%	15.8%		
2006	12.2%	20.9%		


Source: Ryerson DEFA14A, filed 8/8/07

Ryerson's Compensation Increased More Rapidly than its Public Competitors while its Stock Underperformed on a Relative Basis

- **Ryerson Claim:** Ryerson's board has insured that management incentive compensation is aligned with stockholders
- **Fact:** While Ryerson's CEO compensation is based upon achieving certain operating performance metrics, it is clearly not aligned with stock price performance

Since 1998, Ryerson's share price declined approximately by 16% while CEO total compensation increased by 277%, for a compounded annual growth rate of 18%

This compares with an average share price increase of 267% for Ryerson's comparable companies an increase in compensation of 241% (17% compounded annual growth rate)



Total Compensation vs. Share Price Performance (Ryerson vs. Industry)

Source: Company filings, FactSet

Select Service Center Index has been chosen to include companies where CEO compensation information is publicly available. Total compensation and total returns are calculated as a simple average of the Select Service Center Composite. Select Service Center Index include AM Castle, Reliance Steel, Russel Metals and Olympic Steel (does not include Novamerican, EM] and Metals USA due to limited publicly available CEO compensation information).

Ryerson's Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Understates Value

- **Ryerson Claim:** Ryerson's discounted cash flow analysis implies an equity value per share range of \$27 \$41 before considering execution risk
- **Facts:** > Stating that the value implied by the DCF analysis does not consider execution risk is confusing—a discounted cash flow accounts for the execution risk through the use of a discount rate higher than the risk free rate
 - > Ryerson's DCF analysis does not appear to account for the value of excess inventory sold in 2Q of approximately \$150 million, or approximately \$5 per share
 - > Ryerson's terminal multiple range is lower than the multiple being paid by Platinum. Is this because they believe that the multiple being paid is inflated due to underperformance?
 - If an exit multiple equal to the multiple of the proposed transaction with Platinum is used (9.6x Adjusted LTM EBITDA of \$197.7 million), the current per share value would be between \$63 and \$73

Ryerson's Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Understates Value

	Est. (1)		Projected			
Fiscal Year End 12/31	2H 2007	-	2008	2009	2010	2011
Revenues	\$3,622.0		\$6,371.0	\$6,580.0	\$6,908.0	\$7,711.0
			. ,	. ,	. ,	
EBITDA	162.8		302.0	320.0	346.0	410.0
Less: Depreciation	(20.3)	_	(40.0)	(40.0)	(40.0)	(40.0)
EBIT	142.5		262.0	280.0	306.0	370.0
Less: Income Taxes @ 37.1%	(52.9)	-	(97.2)	(103.9)	(113.5)	(137.3)
Unlevered After-Tax Income	89.6		164.8	176.1	192.5	232.7
Plus: Depreciation	20.3		40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0
Less: Capital Expenditures (2)	(25.7)		(45.0)	(45.0)	(45.0)	(45.0)
Less: Working Capital Investment (3)	98.1	_	48.9	38.5	(33.9)	(34.9)
Free Cash Flow	\$182.4	-	\$208.6	\$209.6	\$153.6	\$192.8

Equity Value Per Share	Discount Rate		
Based on Exit Multiple	11.5%	14.5%	
Exit Multiple in Year 4.5 (2011)			
5.5x EBITDA	\$40.55	\$34.26	
6.5x EBITDA	48.55	41.36	
8.5x EBITDA	64.55	55.56	
9.5x EBITDA	72.55	62.66	

Note: Dollars in millions, except per share data.

Source: Weighted Average Scenario, per Ryerson DEFA14A, filed 8/8/07.

⁽¹⁾ Ryerson 'Weighted Average Scenario' less first half actuals.

⁽²⁾ Consensus estimates for 2H 2007 - 2009. Constant expenditures thereafter.

⁽³⁾ Goldman research dated 8/2/07 for 2H 2007 - 2009. 2010 - 2011 assumes constant working capital statistics.

⁽⁴⁾ Source: 10Q filed 8/2/07--based on fully diluted share count of 31.4 million shares, including 3.5 million additional shares upon conversion of convertible debt, reflecting the in-the-money value above the face amount of the Senior Convertible Notes.

Value Lost in Selling Now

Ryerson Claim: Timing is appropriate to consider a sale as Ryerson is already performing better than most public companies

- **Fact:** Many operational efficiencies have yet to be achieved. Selling now eliminates the possibility for current shareholder to realize value from these improvements
 - "There will be an increased sense of urgency related to our financial performance. While our strategic direction will remain the same, there will be a growing emphasis on financial results."
 Neil Novich, Employee FAQ July 24, 2007
 - "In terms of the inventory, we just continue to improve the systems and reporting and so on...there's a whole punch list of better tools and better reports and processes and so on that -are being worked through, one by one, to continue to improve the process." – Neil Novich (Earnings Conference Call Q1 2007)
 - The Company has stated the following goals:
 - Complete conversion of all service centers to SAP and achieve targeted savings
 - Consistently achieve 5 inventory turns
 - Continue to implement Six Sigma program to offset inflation
 - Expand global metals trading to reduce purchased material costs
 - Improve performance at service centers lagging overall company performance
 - Value lost is selling now

6/30/2007 LTM EBITDA Margins (1)		Implied Value (in millions)		
Ryerson	Reliance	LTM Revenue Long-term Avg EBITDA Margin	\$6,234.0 9.0%	
		Implied EBITDA Multiple	\$561.1 5.4x	
2.20/	11.00/	TEV Less: 6/30/2007 Net Debt	\$3,029.72 <u>840.8</u>	
3.2%	3.2% 11.8%	Implied Equity Value Fully Diluted Shares	\$2,188.9 31.4	
		Implied Share Price Platinum Offer	\$69.71 34.50_	
	_	Potential Value Lost	\$35.21	

(1) Ryerson margin adjusted for LIFO Liquidation gain per Ryerson June 30, 2007 10Q

Implied Multiples with Improved Margins

If operational improvement are included Ryerson is selling for a much lower multiple >

		Ryerson LTM 3/31/07	50% of Reliance	100% of Reliance
Revenue		\$6,124.3		
EBITDA Margin	(1)	3.4%	5.9%	11.8%
EBITDA		\$208.2	\$361.3	\$722.7
Implied EBITDA Multiple	(2)	9.1x	5.2x	2.6x

		Ryerson LTM 6/30/07	50% of Reliance	100% of Reliance
Revenue		\$6,233.5		
EBITDA Margin	(1)	3.2%	5.9%	11.8%
EBITDA		\$197.6	\$367.8	\$735.6
Implied EBITDA Multiple	(2)	9.6x	5.1x	2.6x

Note: Dollars in millions

 ⁽¹⁾ EBITDA adjusted for LIFO liquidation gain
 (2) Based on enterprise value of \$1.9 billion (Platinum Equity's offer price and 6/30/2007 financial data)

Ryerson is Trading at a Large Discount to Reliance on both Price to Book Value and Tangible Book Value Basis

Price / Book and Tangible Book Value					
		Price /			
	Pook	Tangible			
Ryerson	Book	Book			
Reliance	1.2×	5.4x			
Implied Ryerson Price at	Reliance Boo (\$ in mil	-	alue Multiples		
Book Value	\$742.7	Tangible Book Value	\$683.0		
Reliance Multiple	1.9x	Reliance Multiple	5.4x		
Implied Equity	\$1,411.1	Implied Equity	\$3,688.2		
Price Per Share (1)	\$44.94	Price Per Share	(1) \$117.46		

Source: Company filings

(1) Based on fully diluted shares outstanding

Is Now the Right Time to Sell?

- > The financing markets are experiencing significant disruption
- > Go-shop and no-shop periods are ineffective as many of the potential competing bidders currently have no ability to secure committed financing
- > Extreme volatility in both the equity and debt markets make it more difficult for a competing bidder to emerge