Soliciting Materials

On August 8, 2007, representatives of Ryerson Inc. will deliver a presentation to Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”). A copy of material that will be used in the presentation to ISS is set forth below.

Safe Harbor Provision

During this presentation, we will make forward-looking statements

subject to known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause

actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by

such statements. Such risks and uncertainties include, but are not

limited to, the volatility in metals demand and prices, the cyclicality of

the various industries the company serves, and other risks described in

reports filed with the SEC. We assume no obligation to update the

information provided in this presentation.

Proxy Solicitation

Important Information

In connection with its proposed merger with an affiliate of Platinum Equity, LLC, Ryerson plans to

file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) a preliminary proxy statement and a

definitive proxy statement. The definitive proxy statement will be mailed to stockholders of Ryerson.

Stockholders of Ryerson are urged to read the proxy statement relating to the merger and other

relevant materials when they become available because they will contain important information

about the merger and Ryerson.

Security holders may obtain a free copy of the proxy statement and any other relevant documents

(when available) that Ryerson files with the SEC at the SEC’s web site at http://www.sec.gov. The

definitive proxy statement and these other documents may be accessed at www.ryerson.com or

obtained free from Ryerson by directing a request to Ryerson Inc., ATTN: Investor Relations, 2621

West 15th Place, Chicago, IL 60608.

Certain Information Regarding Participants

Ryerson, its directors and executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of

the Company’s security holders in connection with the proposed merger. Security holders may

obtain information regarding the names, affiliations and interests of such individuals in the

Company’s proxy statement in connection with its 2007 annual meeting of stockholders, which was

filed with the SEC on July 31, 2007. To the extent holdings of the Company’s equity securities have

changed since the amounts reflected in such proxy statement, such changes have been reflected

on Statements of Change in Ownership on Form 4 filed with the SEC.

Use of non-GAAP

Financial Information

The Company uses the LIFO method of inventory accounting in the

U.S., which results in a better matching of costs and revenues than

the FIFO method. To supplement its consolidated condensed financial

statements presented on a GAAP basis, the company has provided

certain non-GAAP financial measures, in some cases adjusted to

reflect

the

effects

valuing

inventory

FIFO

basis.

While

FIFO

an acceptable inventory valuation method under U.S. GAAP, the

presentation of FIFO basis financial information is considered non-

GAAP financial information as the company applies LIFO inventory

valuation for its financial reporting purposes. A reconciliation of the

adjustments from GAAP financial measures to non-GAAP financial

measures is contained in the addendum to this presentation and may

accessed

www.ryerson.com.

This

non-GAAP

financial

information

not

meant

considered

isolation

substitute for financial measures prepared in accordance with GAAP.

Ryerson believes that providing these non-GAAP financial measures

in addition to the related GAAP measures better enables investors to

understand the company’s operating performance and also facilitates

comparisons

Ryerson’s

operating

performance

with

the

performance of other companies in the industry, many of which value

inventories on a FIFO basis (in whole or part).

Background

•

Ryerson is party to a sale agreement with Platinum Equity,

anticipated to go to a stockholder vote in 4Q2007

•

The current Board, after an exhaustive and public auction

process, strongly supports this sale over any other option

available, including remaining independent

•

There is an election of Directors scheduled prior to the

stockholder vote on the merger

•

Harbinger seeks to gain control of a new board, effectively

changing control of the Board and the company for no premium

•

There is uncertainty regarding Harbinger’s position on the sale.

A Harbinger controlled Board could change its recommendation

allowing termination (by buyer or seller) of the deal and denying

stockholders the right to vote on the deal

Agenda

•

Overview of Metal Service Center Industry and Ryerson

–

Ryerson: Performance has been strong vs. competition

–

Harbinger: Operating criticisms are unfounded

•

Annual Election of Directors

–

Ryerson: Well governed by its independent directors and achieves

high

ISS governance ratings

–

Harbinger: Has not put forth their own strategic plan (supports

Ryerson’s), operating plan or management team and presents

unqualified directors

–

On a change in control, current financings accelerate; there is no

Harbinger plan to refinance in an uncertain credit market

•

Sale of Ryerson to Platinum Equity

–

Right time to sell given current financial performance and cyclical nature

of industry

–

Board’s process was thorough and unbiased in achieving the highest

available price

–

Price is a good and fair deal for stockholders compared to other

options

Role of the Metals Service Center Industry

~30%

OEM’S

•

Appliances

•

Transportation

•

Construction equipment

•

Office equipment

•

Agricultural equipment

Fabricators

Domestic

steel, ~80%

End users

Metals Service Center Industry

~70%

Imported

steel, ~20%

Market Size: $120 Billion (Purch. Mag.)

Products: Carbon, Stainless, Aluminum

Forms: Flat products, Plates, Bars, Tubing

Processes: Fabrication, Cutting to length,

slitting, burning, tolling

Fragmented

>3,000 North America participants

Integrated

metal mills

Mini mills

Ryerson is a market leader

2006 sales of $5.9 billion

1H07 sales of $3.3 billion

97 facilities/66 market areas

Post 1999

–

Strategic Actions Taken to

Improve Ryerson’s Performance

Cost Reductions

•

Reduced headcount and capacity by 1/3—closed or downsized 26 facilities

•

Centralized and streamlined back room

•

Radically flattened and streamlined organization

•

Froze pension plan

•

Outsourced logistics

Sourcing

•

Strategic sourcing to consolidate and leverage buy with most capable mills

Organizational Structure and Management Processes

•

Simplified many basic business practices

•

Implemented on-line account profitability system

•

Brought talented and experienced outsiders into key positions

•

Realigned incentive compensation system

•

Substantially upgraded all online information systems

•

Selected SAP as a new IT platform and began conversion process

Growth

•

Multiple acquisitions to build stronger competitive positions

Focus on operational efficiencies and building a platform for growth

2005: Acquisition and Integration of Integris

Further Improves Financial Performance and

Competitive Position

•

Closed January 4, 2005 for $644MM

–

Paid 6.3x LTM EBITDA for highly strategic acquisition

–

Immediately accretive

•

2004 sales of $2.0 Billion

•

By far the largest of a series of acquisitions focused on

improving competitive positions in key product lines

•

Annualized cost savings of $60MM by Y/E 2007

–

$50MM achieved by June 30, 2007

•

Strengthened resulting management team-best of the best from

both companies in all positions

Coupled with prior restructuring, creates a company with strong

competitive positions and superior financial performance

…And Has Steadily Improved Financial

Returns Relative to Competitors

Initiatives

$85mm Restructuring

$50mm of annualized

synergies from

Integris acquisition

Source: Company reports

Notes:

1 Calculated as tax-effected FIFO EBIT/average invested capital

2 Includes A.M. Castle, Central Steel & Wire, Earle M. Jorgensen, Gibraltar Industries, Olympic Steel, Metals USA, Novamerican, PNA Group, Reliance Steel & Aluminum,

Russel Metals, Samuel Manu-Tech, Shiloh Industries, Steel Technologies and Worthington Industries

Consolidated over 20 locations

Centralized shared services (credit, IT, accounting,

purchasing, HR)

Increased local accountability for customer service

Strategic sourcing

Created backbone for future acquisitions—J&F

Steel (2004), Integris Metals (2005) and Lancaster

Steel (2006)

Supplier leverage

Reduced overhead

Consolidated 5 service

centers

After

Tax

Return

Invested

Capital

(LIFO

companies

adjusted

FIFO)

Sale of Inland Steel

Acquired Thypin Steel,

Washington Specialty Metals

and Cardinal Metals

(7.0)

(4.0)

(1.0)

2.0

5.0

8.0

11.0

14.0

17.0

20.0

23.0

26.0

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

RYI

Peers²

Post-

Restructuring

Pre-

Restructuring

10.0

15.1

12.2

6.3

12.0

11.9

9.7

13.1

15.8

11.9

0.0

3.0

6.0

9.0

12.0

15.0

18.0

10-Year

5-Year

3-Year

1-Year

Average

RYI

Peers²

1H 2007

…And Financial Performance 1H07

Beats 75% of Public Competitors

After Tax ROIC 2006

1H 2007

Source: Company Reports

Note: Calculations are adjusted to FIFO when necessary. Reference set of companies based on Harbingers reference set, per 13D Filing

5.8

9.6

11.2

11.9

12.1

12.2

12.8

14.0

17.6

18.4

20.9

SHLO

ROCK

MUSA

SMT

WOR

RYI

TONS

ZEUS

RUS

CAS

4.4

5.5

8.2

8.4

8.8

10.3

10.5

11.1

12.0

16.4

20.2

SHLO

ROCK

WOR

TONS

SMT

MUSA

ZEUS

RUS

RYI

CAS

Harbinger’s Critique of Ryerson’s

Operating Performance is Flawed

Harbinger claims

•

Ryerson underperforms its competitors on 3 specific financial measures: gross margin %, EBITDA %

and inventory turns, however…

The facts are:

•

Gross margin % is not a good comparable measure: competitors have different product and customer

mix:

–

Product Mix –

a ton of stainless steel or aluminum sells for a multiple of a ton of carbon flat roll

steel; the mark-up gross margin percentage is lower, but the gross profit dollars per ton is much

higher for stainless and aluminum

–

Customer

Type

Program

account

versus

transactional

–

Ryerson

has

higher

proportion

large

OEM

program

account

customers

–

larger

orders,

gross

profit

dollars,

but

lower

percentage margin

–

Toll

processing

the

processor

paid

“toll”

process

the

material.

Low

sales

dollar,

but

material cost, and thus high gross margin percentage

•

EBITDA % is not a good comparable measure;

–

Ignores asset intensity and working capital management that differ across competitors

•

Harbinger

did

not

adjust

comparable

inventory

accounting

method

for

peers

LIFO

vs. FIFO generate very different results, particularly in a period of rapidly changing

prices

•

FIFO ROIC% adjusts for all these differences

Return on Invested Capital with comparable inventory accounting

is the best measure of financial performance. On this measure,

Ryerson outperforms most of the peers selected by Harbinger

Additionally, Harbinger’s Criticism of

Inventory Management is Not Supported

by the MSCI’s Inventory Turn Data…

Note:

1 Calculated as cost of goods sold (adjusted for LIFO impact) divided by average inventory over the period (adjusted for LIFO

reserve)

for

Ryerson;

MSCI

inventory

turns

calculated

shipments

divided

average

inventory

over

period;

see

addendum for detailed assumptions and reconciliation to GAAP results

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.8

4.0

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

5.0

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

YTD

(6 months)

Ryerson

Metal Service Center Institute

3.8

Average

3.7

Agenda: Annual Election of Directors

•

Overview of Metal Service Center Industry and Ryerson

–

Ryerson: Performance has been strong vs. competition

–

Harbinger: Operating criticisms are unfounded

•

Annual Election of Directors

–

Ryerson: Well governed by its independent directors and achieves

high ISS governance ratings

–

Harbinger: Has not put forth their own strategic plan (supports

Ryerson’s), operating plan or management team and presents

unqualified directors

–

On a change in control, current financings accelerate; there is no

Harbinger plan to refinance in an uncertain credit market

•

Sale of Ryerson to Platinum Equity

–

Right time to sell given current financial performance and cyclical nature

of industry

–

Board’s process was thorough and unbiased in achieving the highest

available price

–

Price is a good and fair deal for stockholders compared to other

options

Ryerson is Well-Governed by its

Independent Directors

•

Five of the ten independent board members were newly elected in

the last four years: Longer tenure directors understand historical

perspective, shorter tenure brings new insights, questions and

debate

•

Directors are accomplished executives with significant public board

and executive management experience

•

Board members have a variety of backgrounds in core areas

relevant to operations, including complex multi-location service

businesses, finance, marketing, technology, M&A and International

•

Board closely monitors implementation of strategy and operational

results

•

Compensation and Audit committees comprised solely of

independents

Ryerson is Well-Governed by its

Independent Directors (cont’d)

•

Lead Director works closely with management to set

Board agendas

•

Independent directors meet in executive session at

every meeting without management

•

Board is actively involved in guiding the direction of the

company: Integris acquisition, international expansion,

leadership development, etc.

•

On ISS Governance Rating, Ryerson outperformed

96.6% of the companies in the S&P 500 and 94.3%

the companies in the materials group

•

Individual directors’

biographies follow

JAMESON A. BAXTER

Director since 1999

•

President of Baxter Associates, Inc., since 1986.

•

Vice President and Principal of

Regency Group, Inc.,

1989 to 1992

•

Vice President of The First Boston Corporation,

1975 to 1986

•

Director of The Putnam Funds; Chairman of

Contract Committee and member of the Marketing

Committee, Brokerage Committee, Board Policy and

Nominating Committee, and Executive Committee.

•

Previously served on Boards of Directors of Banta

Corporation

and Avondale Financial Corp.

RICHARD G. CLINE

Director since 1996

•

Chairman of Hawthorne Investors, Inc., since 2000

•

Chairman of Hussmann International, Inc.,1998 to 2000.

•

Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of

NICOR,

Inc.,

1986

1995.

•

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Jewel

Companies,

Inc.,

1984

1986.

•

Director

PepsiAmericas,

Inc.;

Chair

the

Management

Resources and Compensation Committee; member of

Affiliated Transactions Committee and Governance,

Finance and Nominating Committee.

•

Chairman and a trustee of Northern Institutional Funds,

and Northern Multi-Manager Funds.

•

Past Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

•

Previously served on Boards of Directors of Jewel

Companies,

Inc.,

Whitman

Corporation

and

Kmart

Corporation.

RUSSELL M. FLAUM

Director since 2004

•

Executive Vice President of Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,

overseeing the $3 billion Global Industrial Packaging

Systems business, since 1992; Vice President of

Marketing, 1986 to 1992.

•

President

Signode

Corporation,

1990

1992.

•

Previously served on Board of Directors of Quanex

Corporation.

JAMES A. HENDERSON

Director since 1996

Lead Director

•

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Cummins Inc.,

1995 to 1999; Executive Vice President, President and

Chief

Operating

Officer,

1975

1995.

•

Lead Director of AT&T Inc.; Chair of the Human

Resources Committee and member of the

Finance/Pension Committee and the Executive Committee.

•

Director of Nanophase Technologies Corporation; Chair

of Nominating Committee and member of the

Compensation and Governance Committee.

•

Previously served on Boards of Directors of International

Paper Co., Rohm and Haas Company, SBC

Communications Inc., Championship Auto Racing

Teams,

Inc.,

Ameritech

Corporation

and

Cummins

Engine Company, Inc.

GREGORY P. JOSEFOWICZ

Director since 1999

•

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of

Borders

Group,

Inc.,

2002

2006;

President

and

Chief

Executive Officer, 1999 to 2002.

•

President of Albertson’s, Inc.,

Midwest Region 1999 to

2002.

•

Chief Executive Officer of the Jewel-Osco division of

American

Stores

Company,

1997

1999.

•

Director of PetSmart, Inc.; member of Compensation

Committee and Corporate Governance Committee.

•

Director of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.; member of Audit

Committee.

•

Previously served on Boards of Directors of Spartan

Stores

Inc.

and

Borders

Group,

Inc.

JAMES R. KACKLEY

Director since 2007

•

Private investor.

•

Public accountant for Arthur Andersen, 1963 to 1999.

•

Audit partner, 1974 to 1999.

•

Chief Financial Officer for Andersen Worldwide.

•

Adjunct professor at the Kellstadt School of

Management at DePaul University.

•

Director of PepsiAmericas, Inc.; member of the

Compensation and Audit Committees, and Audit

Committee financial expert.

•

Director of Herman Miller, Inc.; Chairman of Audit

Committee and Audit Committee financial expert.

DENNIS J. KELLER

Director since 2005

•

Non-executive

Chairman

the

Board

DeVry

Inc.,

since

2006; Executive Chairman of the Board, 1987 to 2006;

Chief Executive Officer, 1987 to 2002 (DeVry was

purchased by Keller from Bell & Howell in 1987); Co-Chief

Executive Officer, 2002 to 2004.

•

Co-founder of Keller Graduate School of Management,

1973;

Chairman

the

Board

and

Chief

Executive

Officer

from 1973 to 1987.

•

Director of Nicor Inc.; Chair of the Compensation

Committee.

MARTHA MILLER DE LOMBERA

Director since 2004

•

Vice President and General Manager—Latin American

North Market Development Organization of the Procter &

Gamble

Company;

various

executive

positions,

1976

2001.

•

Director of Wal-Mart de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.

•

Director

Nationwide

Financial

Services,

Inc.;

member

of Finance Committee.

•

Director

Sally

Beauty

Holdings,

Inc.;

member

Compensation

Committee

and

Nominating

and

Governance Committee.

NEIL S. NOVICH

Director since 1996

•

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the

Company since 1999.

•

Former Head, Distribution and Logistics Practice, Bain &

Company.

•

Director of W.W. Grainger, Inc.; Member of Board Affairs

and Nominating Committee and Compensation

Committee.

JERRY K. PEARLMAN

Director since 1996

•

Chairman of Zenith Electronics Corporation; Chief

Executive Officer, 1983 -

1995.

•

Director

Nanophase

Technologies

Corporation;

Chairman of Compensation and Governance Committee

and member of Audit and Finance Committee.

•

Director of Smurfit Stone Container Corporation;

Chairman of Audit Committee and member of

Compensation Committee.

•

Previously served on Board of Directors of Royal

Packaging Industries Van Leer, N.V and First Chicago

Corporation.

ANRÉ

D. WILLIAMS

Director since 2004

•

President—Global Commercial Card, American Express

Company;

Executive

Vice

President—U.S.

Commercial

Card, 2003 to 2007; Senior Vice President—U.S. Middle

Market, 2000 to 2003,Vice President/General Manager—

Western Region, Corporate Services, 1999 to 2000, Vice

President—Acquisition

and

Advertising,

1996

1999;

and

Director—New Product Development from 1994 to 1996.

The Board has Ensured that Management

Incentive Compensation is Aligned with

Stockholders

Short-

and long-term incentive plans:

–

Annual incentive tied to OROOA (operating return on operating assets);

no payout if minimum thresholds are not met

–

Corporate staff: Tied to corporate performance

–

Target set by Compensation committee based on business plan and

industry conditions

Long-term incentive

–

Paid in performance shares, not options

–

Tied to 4-year return on net assets (no payout if minimum thresholds are

not met)

–

Compensation committee sets target above median performance of

cyclical industries

Designed to pay for performance and create long-term value

–

Incentive pay represents nearly one-half of executives’

total target

compensation

Stock ownership guidelines in place

Giving Harbinger Control

Will Not

Provide Adequate Governance for

Stockholders

•

Harbinger’s

criticism

Ryerson’s

“under

performance”

rebutted when results are measured with appropriate metric

(ROIC%) and accounting. Additionally, the accusation of below

industry inventory management is inconsistent with the MSCI

data

•

Electing Harbinger’s nominees hands over control to a single

stockholder without providing stockholders any control premium

•

Neither Harbinger nor its nominees have proposed any

strategic direction or plans of any kind. In fact, Harbinger stated

“Ryerson’s long-term strategy to simultaneously improve cost

structure and productivity and expand its customer base while

remaining a leader in a consolidating industry is the right one”*

•

Additionally, no plan for day-to-day management and no

financing plan has been disclosed (financings accelerate on a

change in control)

*Press Release of January 2, 2007

Harbinger Has Stated No Strategic Plan for

Day-to-Day Management, Even While Asking

to be Given Control of the Company…

…In fact, Harbinger’s Proxy States:

The HCP Nominees stand committed to pursuing and implementing

strategies for enhancing stockholder value and restoring public confidence

and

support

the

Company.

However,

there

can

assurance

that

the

actions

the

HCP

Nominees

intend

take

will

implemented

they

are

elected

the

HCP

Nominees

will

improve

the

Company’s

business

prospects

otherwise

enhance

stockholder

value.

Your

vote to elect the HCP Nominees does not constitute a vote in favor of any

value-enhancing

plans

the

HCP

Funds

for

the

Company.

Neither

the

HCP

Funds

nor,

the

knowledge

the

HCP

Funds,

any

other

person

behalf

the

HCP

Funds

has

made

undertaken

any

analysis

reports

whether

stockholder

value

will

maximized

result

the

solicitation

described

this

proxy

statement

obtained

reports

from

consultants

other

outside

parties

whether

the proposals presented herein would have an effect on stockholder value.

There

can

assurance

that

stockholder

value

will

maximized

result

this

solicitation

the

election

the

HCP

Funds

Nominees.

Source: Harbinger Proxy, filed August 7, 2007, page 18

Background on Harbinger’s Nominees

Nominees

Background

Keith Butler

Interlocking

director with Davis at Atlas Air*

Eugene Davis

Extensive previous experience on Harbinger Boards

Serves on seven public company boards and numerous

private company boards

Interlocking

director with Butler at Atlas Air

Former interlocking

director with Morris and Dienst

MUSA

Daniel Dienst

Interlocking

director with Davis and Morris at MUSA

Interlocking

directorship with Morris at Metal Management

Richard Kochersperger

No experience as a public company director

No metals industry experience

Larry Liebovich

No experience as public company independent director

Direct industry experience with very small independent

competitor

purchased

Reliance.

Liebovich

did

not

hold

any

senior positions at Reliance

Gerald Morris

Former interlocking

director with Dienst

& Davis

Interlocking directorship with Dienst

at Metal Management

Allen Ritchie

No experience as public company independent director

*Harbinger is largest stockholder of Atlas Air

Harbinger Suggests That Their Nominees Will

Improve the Sale Transaction Process. Let’s

Look at Their Record —

•

CEO holds meetings with several private equity funds including Apollo (pg. 14)

•

Apollo approaches CEO to express interest in pursuing a transaction with MUSA (pg. 14)

•

Board enters confidentiality agreement with Apollo (pg. 14)

•

Board

decides

not

conduct

auction

(pg. 15)

•

Apollo indicates transaction predicated on CEO remaining with surviving company (pg. 16)

•

CEO begins negotiating employment agreement with Apollo (pg. 17)

•

Apollo informs MUSA Board that CEO employment agreement is executed (pg. 21)

•

Board approves transaction (pg. 21)

•

Compensation Committee of MUSA recommends $500,000 bonus to Dienst on

completion of transaction (pg. 21)

•

Company agrees not to “initiate, solicit, encourage or facilitate any inquiries with respect

to,

the

making

of,

acquisition

proposal”

(pg. 73)

Result: MUSA sold to Apollo for 4X EBITDA with no auction process or go shop

Nov. 04

Jan. 05

Feb. 05

March 1, 05

March 15, 05

Wk of April 11

May 14

May 18

Metals USA Directorship of Davis, Dienst and Morris:

Sale to Apollo in November 2005*

*Proxy filed September, 2005

Merger

Agreement

•

Harbinger claims its nominees have more relevant industry experience.

Three (Dienst, Davis, Morris) were directors of Metals USA (MUSA), from

October 2002 through November 2005, a Ryerson competitor and one

the peers selected by Harbinger

•

These nominees joined the MUSA board following its bankruptcy filing and

stayed through MUSA’s re-emergence as a public company and its

eventual purchase by Apollo. However, the charts on the next page show

that the performance of MUSA under Dienst, Davis and Morris lagged

Ryerson and continues to lag today:

–

On a ROIC % basis, MUSA lagged Ryerson throughout the period

–

Ryerson inventory turns exceed MUSA throughout the period

•

Additionally, the MUSA board and Dienst, Davis and Morris approved the

sale of MUSA to Apollo for a price multiple of 4x EBITDA, one of

the

lowest price multiples for a comparable sale transaction in the service

center industry and well below the average

•

Though Harbinger is highly critical of Ryerson’s board oversight in this

area, these

Harbinger nominees have a poor track record

Giving Harbinger Control

Will Not

Provide Adequate Governance for

Stockholders (cont’d)

Ryerson/MUSA Relative Performance

ROIC

Inventory Turns

Source: Company reports

Notes: Ryerson adjusted for LIFO

Calculated

EBIT

plus

earnings

from

equity

affiliates,

divided

the

average

invested

capital

(total

debt

minority

interest

preferred

stock

shareholders’

equity)

over the period

2 Calculated as COGS adjusted to exclude LIFO gain or loss divided by the average at current value over the period

(5)

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H2007

Ryerson

Metals USA

Average = 10.3

Average = 9.1

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H2007

Ryerson

Metals USA

Average = 3.7

Average = 3.4

Reject Harbinger Slate

•

Harbinger has stated no plan as to what they would to do

–

Operating plan

–

Strategic plan

–

Financing plan

Shareholders have a right to know what Harbinger would do differently if they gain

control of the Board

•

They have not stated their position on the Platinum merger agreement. Stockholders

have a right to know their position before they vote on the Board

•

A vote for Harbinger’s slate surrenders control without Harbinger paying a control

premium, having bought approximately 10% of the stock at prices ranging from $20.07

to $23.53

•

believe

Harbinger’s

nominees

are

not

qualified

–

lack

necessary

experience

with

large, complex public companies with international investments and poor performance

of MUSA and a questionable sale process to Apollo

•

Ryerson’s results prove the strategy and the current Board’s oversight is working

•

Ryerson’s stockholders have been rewarded with above market returns

We ask for your support for the Company’s

nominees in the upcoming stockholder vote

Agenda: Sale of Ryerson to Platinum

Equity

•

Overview of Metal Service Center Industry and Ryerson

–

Ryerson: Performance has been strong vs. competition

–

Harbinger: Operating criticisms are unfounded

•

Annual Election of Directors

–

Ryerson: Well governed by its independent directors and

achieves high ISS governance ratings

–

Harbinger: Has not put forth their own strategic plan (supports

Ryerson’s), operating plan or management team and presents

unqualified directors

–

On a change in control, current financings accelerate; there is no

Harbinger plan to refinance in an uncertain credit market

•

Sale of Ryerson to Platinum Equity

–

Right time to sell given current financial performance and

cyclical nature of industry

–

Board’s process was thorough and unbiased in achieving

the highest available price

–

Price is a good and fair deal for stockholders vs. compared

to other options

Events Leading up to Decision to

Review Strategic Alternatives

•

Ryerson’s financial performance has improved continuously over time

relative to competitors; in 1H07 outperforms 8 out of 10 public competitors

•

Harbinger, as a major stockholder, sought a change in control of

the

company at the Board level; this change in control would not reflect any

premium for other stockholders

•

Ryerson’s stock price rose rapidly after Harbinger’s filing due to increased

market

focus

leading

the

Board

consider

whether

Ryerson’s

future

value

could

delivered

stockholders

today

through

alternatives

such

stock buy-back, sale, partial sale, or leverage recap

•

A review of options such as stock buybacks, leverage recaps and partial

sales led the Board to conclude that these provide no substantial additional

value to stockholders and would likely over-leverage the Company,

particularly in a recession

•

Based

this

set

circumstances

the

Board

elected

evaluate

the

company’s strategic plan vs. a complete sale considering a variety of

factors:

–

Was this the right time to sell?

–

What is the best price that could be achieved?

–

Is this price a better value for stockholders than simply implementing the

strategic plan?

1/1/2003

12/2/2003

11/2/2004

10/3/2005

9/4/2006

8/6/2007

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

50.00

Key Events vs. Ryerson Stock Price

Source: FactSet, Company reports, Factiva

12/13/06

Harbinger files 13-D

re 9.7% holding

1/2/07

Harbinger proposes

slate of 7 directors

2/14/07

Ryerson announces Q4 ‘06 and

FY2006 results, and exploration of

strategic alternatives

5/2/07

Ryerson reports

Q1 results

4/07

Rumors circulate

regarding potential sale

and possible price

7/24/07

Ryerson

announces sale

to Platinum

Equity

(2005 Average Price = 16.84)

(2006 Average Price = 25.39)

(2004 Average Price = 14.25)

Platinum Offer = $34.50/share

8/1/07

Ryerson reports

record Q2 ’07

results

(2003 Average Price = 8.03)

The Board Followed a Deliberate and

Exhaustive Process to Determine the

Best Outcome for Stockholders

Review the company’s current strategic plan

•

Historical performance

•

Impact of cyclicality and future performance under

various scenarios

•

Execution risks

II.

Determine whether this is a good time to sell

•

Position in industry cycle

•

Portion of operational improvements already achieved

III.

Conduct a thorough, unbiased and public auction

to attain the highest available price

IV.

Compare the best sale price attainable with the

value embedded in the company's strategic plan

Historical Financial and Business

Performance

Historical

Fiscal

Year

Ended

December

31,

1,2

LTM

(US$mm, unless otherwise noted)

1998A

1999A

2000A

2001A

2002A

2003A

2004A

2005A

2006A

6/30/07

Tons

Shipped

(000s)

3,108

3,333

3,339

2,817

2,610

2,553

2,821

3,499

3,292

3,190

Revenue

2,783

2,764

2,862

2,244

2,097

2,189

3,302

5,781

5,909

6,234

Gross

Profit

626

632

570

352

367

358

489

883

854

917

Operating Expenses

503

501

502

374

353

337

383

658

671

669

EBIT (Excl. One-Time Items)

(54)

(12)

209

167

208

Reported Net Income

544

(30)

(60)

(97)

(14)

Depreciation & Amortization

LIFO

Adjustment

(41)

(8)

(22)

(31)

274

(62)

189

206

ROIC

(%)

3.6

6.1

0.9

(6.5)

1.7

3.1

25.7

6.9

12.2

14.3

EPS (Diluted)

0.99

1.56

(1.03)

(2.47)

(3.86)

(0.56)

2.18

3.78

2.50

2.81

Inventory

501

543

568

410

494

501

607

834

1,129

791

LIFO Reserve

335

273

504

561

Inventory Turns (x)

—Tons

Basis

3.8

4.3

3.2

3.3

Notes:

1 Acquisition of Integris

Metals closed on January 4, 2005

2 Summary of acquisitions:

1997

Cardinal

Metals,

Omni

Metals,

Thypin

Steel;

1999

Washington

Specialty

Metals;

2004

J&F

Steel;

2005

Integris

Metals;

2006

Lancaster Steel

3 Adjusted for embedded D&A; detailed in Appendix A

4 One-time items detailed in Appendix A

Calculated

tax-effected

FIFO

EBIT

average

invested

capital

(adjusted

for

tax-affected

LIFO

reserve)

6 As-reported

EBITDA (Excl. One-Time Items)

FIFO EBITDA (Excl. One-Time Items)

123

131

(22)

119

249

248

207

123

(53)

392

187

396

454

Ryerson’s Long-Term Strategic Plan

Growth through acquisitions and joint ventures

•

Expand acquisition pipeline in specific geographies and product lines

•

Fully integrate acquisitions to achieve backroom savings and other operating

efficiencies

•

Expand international JVs in Mexico, India and China to follow customers

offshore

Gain market share organically

•

Provide unique capabilities to multi-location / multi-national manufacturers

through a specialized sales account team

•

Move downstream into high value parts and assemblies

•

Add accounts through targeted marketing programs

Continue focus on improving operating efficiencies

•

Complete conversion of all service centers to SAP and achieve targeted

savings

•

Consistently achieve 5 inventory turns

•

Continue to implement Six Sigma program to offset inflation

•

Expand global metals trading to reduce purchased material costs

•

Improve performance at service centers lagging overall company performance

Overview of Projected Cases

Case I

Projections per Ryerson’s long term strategic plan, but without a recession

Gain market share organically

Additional Growth via acquisitions and new international investments and joint

ventures

Continue improving operations

Case II

Same as projections per Case I, but excludes any growth from acquisitions or new

international investments and joint ventures

Case III

Assumes economic downturn begins in 2008 and continues through 2010 with

recovery in 2011

Does not include any growth from acquisitions or new international investments

Expenses are managed more aggressively in conjunction with lower sales volume

Management prepared three financial Cases as follows:

The Board Followed a Deliberate and

Exhaustive Process to Determine the

Best Outcome for Stockholders

Review the company’s current strategic plan

•

Historical performance

•

Impact of cyclicality and future performance under

various scenarios

•

Execution risks

II.

Determine whether this is a good time to sell

•

Position in industry cycle

•

Portion of operational improvements already

achieved

III.

Conduct a thorough, unbiased and public auction

to attain the highest available price

IV.

Compare the best sale price attainable with the

value embedded in the company's strategic plan

Risks to Strategic Plan -

External

•

Industry is slow growth and cyclical

•

Current volume at historic peaks

•

Industrial economy recession likely in

any 5 –

7 year period

•

Pricing at peak levels

•

Pricing drops rapidly in a recession

•

Nickel pricing at all-time high in Q2 at

almost $55,000/tonne vs. average of

$25,000 in 2005 –

has already fallen to

$35,000 more recently

150

250

350

450

550

650

750

850

Hot Rolled

Cold Rolled

Carbon Plate

1,000

1,600

2,200

2,800

3,400

4,000

4,600

5,200

5,800

6,400

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

Stainless

Aluminum

150

250

350

450

550

650

750

850

Hot Rolled

Cold Rolled

Carbon Plate

1,000

1,600

2,200

2,800

3,400

4,000

4,600

5,200

5,800

6,400

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

Stainless

Aluminum

Source: Purchasing Magazine, Bloomberg

Notes:

1 Spot prices include raw materials' surcharges starting in 1st Quarter 2001

2 Prices represent quarterly averages

Metals Pricing

Stainless & Aluminum

Hot Rolled, Cold Rolled & Carbon Plate

Industry

Shipments

30000

40000

50000

60000

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Cagr = 2.0%

MSCI Shipments

The Board Followed a Deliberate and

Exhaustive Process to Determine the

Best Outcome for Stockholders

Review the company’s current strategic plan

•

Historical performance

•

Impact of cyclicality and future performance under

various scenarios

•

Execution risks

II.

Determine whether this is a good time to sell

•

Position in industry cycle

•

Portion of operational improvements already achieved

III.

Conduct a thorough, unbiased and public

auction to attain the highest available price

IV.

Compare the best sale price attainable with the

value embedded in the company's strategic plan

Strategic Process Highlights

•

Board met 30 times between January 10 and July 24

–

Executive sessions excluding management

–

Separate discussions with legal (Skadden Arps) and financial advisors

(UBS)

•

Board conducted broad and public auction process

–

55 parties contacted (23 mills, 6 service centers, 26 Private Equity)

–

20 executed Confidentiality Agreements

–

8 indications of interest

–

3 conditional bids (including Platinum)

–

2 additional parties expressed interest in July

–

Interested parties had extensive access to management,

comprehensive due diligence material and site visits

•

Management conducted presentations to six interested parties.

Extensive access provided to Company data

•

Board restricted management discussions concerning employment

and compensation with bidders

•

Board has met regularly since July 24 to actively monitor go shop

period

•

Extensive negotiation process conducted by

UBS at the Board’s direction

–

Negotiated with Platinum as well as other bidders

–

Independent Directors controlled discussions

regarding management continuity

–

Extensive effort by UBS to receive the highest offer

possible

–

Platinum provided the highest price at $34.50 per

–

Offer includes a “go shop”

through August 18, 2007

and a “no shop”

period both with modest breakup

fees

–

Platinum offer not contingent on further due

diligence, financing or Ryerson management

employment

Strategic

Process

Highlights

(cont’d)

•

Board determined that it was in best interests of

stockholders to accept Platinum offer of $34.50 vs.

remaining an independent company or any other

alternative

–

UBS presented its financial analysis to the Board and

delivered a fairness opinion with respect to the $34.50 per

share to be received by the holders of Ryerson's common

stock

•

Platinum offer at $34.50

–

15% premium to 2/13 ($30.01) price, the day prior to Board

announcing process

–

45% premium to 12/13 ($23.77) price, the day that Harbinger

filed its 13D

–

36% premium over the 2006 average price of $25.39

–

22% higher than the average price for any quarter in Ryerson

history (prior to start of the strategic initiative process)

•

Definitive Merger Agreement signed July 24, 2007

Strategic Process Highlights (cont’d)

The Board Followed a Deliberate and

Exhaustive Process to Determine the

Best Outcome for Stockholders

Review the company’s current strategic plan

•

Historical performance

•

Impact of cyclicality and future performance under

various scenarios

•

Execution risks

II.

Determine whether is was a good time to sell

•

Position in industry operational cycle

•

Portion of improvements already achieved

III.

Conduct a thorough, unbiased and public auction

to attain the highest available price

IV.

Compare the best sale price attainable with the

value embedded in the company's strategic

plan

Historical Trading Multiples Analysis—

EV/LTM EBITDA

Selected

Companies

Source: FactSet (not pro forma for any acquisitions)

Notes:

1 Selected companies include A.M. Castle, Novamerican, Olympic, Reliance, and Russel; calculated using the median multiple across peers; excludes Novamerican post

announcement of acquisition by Symmetry Holdings

LTM as of 6/30/07

LTM as of 3/31/07

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

Jan-05

Jul-05

Jan-06

Jul-06

Jan-07

Jul-07

Average = 5.4x

Offer Value = 7.7x EBITDA²

Offer value = 9.0x EBITDA³

Comparison of Offer to Potential

Future Value of Stock

Current offer compares well to potential future value even

before factoring any execution risk adjustment

Equal Weighted Case

Comparison of PV of Estimated Future Share Price to $34.50 Offer

$0.00

$5.00

$10.00

$15.00

$20.00

$25.00

$30.00

$35.00

$40.00

$45.00

$50.00

2009 EBITDA basis

2011 EBITDA basis

PV per Share @ 5x EBITDA

PV per Share @ 5.5x EBITDA

PV per Share @ 6x EBITDA

PV per Share @ 6.5x EBITDA

PV per Share @ 7.0x EBITDA

Platinum Offer

PV per share price calculated by

future EBITDA x multiple, less debt,

discounted @ 15% on a diluted share

basis

EV/EBIT

EV/EBITDA

LTM

5-Year

Average

LTM

7.5

7.1

7.0 to 8.6

10.0

8.6

10.0

8.5

8.4

8.2

7.4 to 9.5

10.2

7.5

10.1

7.4

8.4

7.5 to 9.5

11.0

10.9

5.7

5.6

4.8 to 6.7

7.2

6.5

6.2

5.6 to 7.9

7.8

7.3

7.7

7.3

7.0

6.8

5.9 to 8.6

7.9

6.5

7.8

6.5

7.5

7.7

6.4 to 8.2

9.1

9.0

Selected

Companies

Mean…………………….…….

Median………………….……..

Range………………………....

Ryerson at July 23, 2007 Closing

Price ($34.96)

IBES…………….........……….

Weighted Average

Scenario

5………………………………..

Ryerson at merger consideration

price ($34.50)

IBES………………………….…

Weighted Average

Scenario

5………………………………….

2008E

2007E

EV/LTM

EBITDA

2008E

2007E

LTM multiples for all companies are presented as of 3/31/07, based on publicly reported information and adjusted for one-time items.

Share prices as of 7/23/07.

Excludes

multiples

greater

than

10.0x

and

lower

than

3.0x,

which

excludes

20.5%

data

points;

including

outliers,

peers

average

multiple

6.6x,

Ryerson is 10.2x

Diluted share count per company management as of 5/31/07.

Weighted Average Scenario based on probability weights of 33% each for Case I, Case II, and Case III, as directed by Ryerson management

Reliance, Russel, A.M. Castle and Olympic

Selected Publicly Traded Companies in the

North American Service Center Industry 1, 2

Ryerson’s Long-Term Strategic Plan

Growth through acquisitions and joint ventures

•

Expand acquisition pipeline in specific geographies and product lines

•

Fully integrate acquisitions to achieve backroom savings and other operating

efficiencies

•

Expand international JVs in Mexico, India and China to follow customers

offshore

Gain market share organically

•

Provide unique capabilities to multi-location / multi-national manufacturers

through a specialized sales account team

•

Move downstream into high value parts and assemblies

•

Add accounts through targeted marketing programs

Continue focus on improving operating efficiencies

•

Complete conversion of all service centers to SAP and achieve targeted

savings

•

Consistently achieve 5 inventory turns

•

Continue to implement Six Sigma program to offset inflation

•

Expand global metals trading to reduce purchased material costs

•

Improve performance at service centers lagging overall company performance

Summary

•

Ryerson Performance

–

Ryerson: Performance has been strong vs. competition

–

Harbinger: Operating criticisms are unfounded

•

Ryerson Governance

–

Ryerson: Well governed by its independent directors and

achieves high ISS governance ratings

–

Harbinger: Has not put forth their own strategic plan

(supports Ryerson’s), operating plan or management team

and presents unqualified directors

–

On a change in control, current financings accelerate; there

is no Harbinger plan to refinance in an uncertain credit

market

•

Sale of Ryerson to Platinum Equity

–

Right time to sell given current financial performance and

cyclical native of industry

–

Board’s process was thorough and unbiased in achieving the

highest available price

–

Price is a good and fair deal for stockholders vs. comparison

to other options

–

Harbinger has not stated its position on the Platinum merger

Ryerson

Asking

for

Your

Support

•

VOTE FOR the Board that proposes to sell to Platinum

Equity

–

Right time to sell

–

Best deal available

–

Good and fair deal for stockholders

•

VOTE FOR the Ryerson Board

–

Board has governed Ryerson well

–

Harbinger has not demonstrated any valid reason they should be in

control of the Board

–

Harbinger refuses to take a position on the merger; stockholders

have a right to know Harbinger’s position before they vote on the

Board

–

Change in board puts Platinum deal at risk

–

A Harbinger controlled Board could change the recommendation

which would allow either party to terminate, denying stockholders

the right to vote on the deal. Why substitute Harbinger’s judgments

for all stockholders’

judgment?

–

If Harbinger supports the deal, there is no reason to change the

Board. If Harbinger does not support the deal, they have not

provided a strategic plan to run the company

Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Items

LTM

($mm)

1997 (1)

1998 (1)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H 2007

6/30/2007

Operating Profit

133.1

96.0

97.0

(4.1)

(76.0)

(7.9)

3.4

99.7

232.9

183.9

139.3

202.7

Adjustments

+ Gain on Sale of Asset

(8.9)

(5.9)

(1.8)

(1.3)

(10.9)

(5.6)

(6.6)

(21.6)

(2.2)

+ Pension Curtailment Gain

(8.9)

(4.4)

(21.0)

+Restructuring & Plant Closure Costs

3.6

27.8

19.4

2.7

6.2

3.6

4.0

4.5

3.4

7.2

+Charge Related to Customer Bankruptcy

16.2

+ Gain on Sales of Company Interests

3.3

(4.1)

+ Write-Off

1.0

+ Adjustment to Sale of IEMC

8.5

EBIT

115.3

90.1

98.8

35.5

(53.6)

(11.7)

9.6

97.7

209.3

166.8

140.5

207.7

+ Depreciation & Amortization

27.7

33.2

32.1

31.8

25.0

23.9

21.1

39.2

40.0

19.7

40.0

EBITDA

143.0

123.3

130.9

67.3

(21.8)

13.3

33.5

118.8

248.5

206.8

160.2

247.7

+ LIFO expense (2)

(12.7)

(41.4)

(8.0)

(22.0)

(31.3)

29.4

22.1

273.5

(62.0)

189.3

57.0

206.0

FIFO EBITDA

130.3

81.9

122.9

45.3

(53.1)

42.7

55.6

392.3

186.5

396.1

217.2

453.7

- Depreciation & Amortization

27.7

33.2

32.1

31.8

25.0

23.9

21.1

39.2

40.0

19.7

40.0

FIFO EBIT

102.6

48.7

90.8

13.5

(84.9)

17.7

31.7

371.2

147.3

356.1

197.5

413.7

Source: Company reports, 2001-2005 results restated per 2005 10-K

Notes:

1 Excludes results of Inland Steel Company operations which were sold in 1998

2 1997-2005 LIFO expense assumed equal to change in LIFO reserve year-over-year

Reconciliation of Return on Invested Capital

($mm, unless otherwise noted)

1997 (1)

1998 (1)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H2007

FIFO EBIT (2)

102.6

48.7

90.8

13.5

(84.9)

17.7

31.7

371.2

147.3

356.1

197.5

Tax-Effected FIFO EBIT (3)

66.7

31.7

59.0

8.8

(55.2)

11.5

20.6

241.3

95.7

231.5

128.4

Average Period Short-Term Debt

48.5

Average Period Current Portion of Long-Term Debt

4.2

3.2

71.3

Average Period Long-Term Debt

260.1

257.0

257.9

179.8

100.7

160.5

243.4

396.3

525.6

865.8

926.0

Average Period Minority Interest

58.7

29.4

Shareholders' Equity

427.5

563.6

697.8

661.7

554.6

409.1

386.6

439.6

547.8

648.7

742.8

LIFO Reserve

112.4

71.0

63.0

41.0

9.7

39.1

61.2

334.7

272.7

504.0

561.0

+ Tax-Effected LIFO Reserve (3)

73.1

46.2

41.0

26.7

6.3

25.4

39.8

217.6

177.3

327.6

364.7

FIFO Shareholders' Equity

500.6

609.8

738.8

688.4

560.9

434.5

426.4

657.2

725.1

976.3

1,107.5

Average Period FIFO Shareholders' Equity

473.1

555.2

674.3

713.6

624.6

497.7

430.4

541.8

691.1

851.5

1,035.8

Average Period FIFO Invested Capital

796.1

874.0

961.5

1,013.1

845.0

658.2

673.8

938.0

1,392.8

1,893.4

2,078.5

FIFO Return on Invested Capital (%)

8.4

3.6

6.1

0.9

(6.5)

1.7

3.1

25.7

6.9

12.2

12.0

Source: Company reports, 2001-2005 results restated per 2005 10-K

Notes:

1 Excludes results of Inland Steel Company operations which were sold in 1998

2 See reconciliation on prior page

3 Based on assumed 35% tax rate

Reconciliation of Gross Margin and

Inventory Turns

($mm, unless otherwise noted)

1997 (1)

1998 (1)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H2007

Revenue

2,804.0

2,782.7

2,763.5

2,862.4

2,243.5

2,096.5

2,189.4

3,302.0

5,780.5

5,908.9

3,281.0

Cost of Goods Sold (2)

2,178.0

2,156.9

2,131.6

2,292.7

1,891.6

1,729.8

1,830.4

2,810.8

4,893.5

5,050.9

2,786.8

+ Depreciation & Amortization Embedded in COGS (3)

(12.0)

(10.6)

(19.6)

(20.0)

(9.8)

+ Charge from Change in Method of Applying LIFO

-9.6

+ LIFO (Expense)/Benefit (4)

12.7

41.4

8.0

22.0

31.3

(29.4)

(22.1)

(273.5)

62.0

(189.3)

(57.2)

Adjusted FIFO Cost of Goods Sold

2,190.7

2,198.3

2,139.6

2,314.7

1,922.9

1,700.4

1,796.3

2,526.7

4,926.3

4,841.6

2,719.8

FIFO Gross Profit

613.3

584.4

623.9

547.7

320.6

396.1

393.1

775.3

854.2

1,067.3

561.2

FIFO Gross Profit Margin (%)

21.9

21.0

22.6

19.1

14.3

18.9

18.0

23.5

14.8

18.1

17.1

Inventory:

Inventory

425.7

500.6

543.1

567.9

409.5

493.9

501.1

606.9

834.3

1,128.6

790.8

+ LIFO Reserve

112.4

71.0

63.0

41.0

9.7

39.1

61.2

334.7

272.7

504.0

561.0

FIFO Inventory

538.1

571.6

606.1

608.9

419.2

533.0

562.3

941.6

1,107.0

1,632.6

1,351.8

FIFO Average Inventory

488.8

554.9

588.9

607.5

514.1

476.1

547.7

752.0

1,024.3

1,369.8

1,455.9

FIFO Inventory Turns (x) (5)

4.5

4.0

3.6

3.8

3.7

3.6

3.3

3.4

4.8

3.5

3.7

Source: Company reports, 2001-2005 results restated per 2005 10-K

Notes:

1 Excludes results of Inland Steel Company operations which were sold in 1998

2 2001 and 2002 COGS adjusted by $69.8mm and $61.8MM, respectively, due to 2005 restatement

3 Assumed to be 50% of reported D&A

4 1997-2005 LIFO expense equal to change in LIFO reserve year-over-year

5 Calculated as cost of goods sold (adjusted to exclude LIFO impact) divided by the average inventory over the period (adjusted for LIFO reserve)