UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 14A

Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934

Filed by the Registrant x   Filed by a Party other than the Registrant  ¨

Check the appropriate box:

¨ Preliminary Proxy Statement

¨ Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))

¨ Definitive Proxy Statement

¨ Definitive Additional Materials

x  Soliciting Materials Pursuant to §240.14a-12

Ryerson Inc.

(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in Its Charter)

(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):

x  No fee required.

¨ Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.

(1)  Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:

(2)  Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:

(3)  Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):

(4)  Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:

(5)  Total fee paid:

¨ Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.

¨ Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.

(1)  Amount Previously Paid:

(2)  Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:

(3)  Filing Party:

(4)  Date Filed:

Filed by: Ryerson Inc.

Pursuant to Rule 14a-12

under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Subject Company: Ryerson Inc.

Commission File No. 001-09117

On August 8, 2007, representatives of Ryerson Inc. will deliver a presentation to Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”). A copy of material that will be used in the presentation to ISS is set forth below.

Investor Presentation

Regarding Upcoming Events

•

Election of Directors: August 23, 2007

•

Stockholder Vote on Sale to Platinum Equity:

Anticipated in Fourth Quarter of 2007

August 7, 2007

2

Safe Harbor Provision

During this presentation, we will make forward-looking statements

subject to known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause

actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by

such statements. Such risks and uncertainties include, but are not

limited to, the volatility in metals demand and prices, the cyclicality of

the various industries the company serves, and other risks described in

reports filed with the SEC. We assume no obligation to update the

information provided in this presentation.

3

Proxy Solicitation

Important Information

In connection with its proposed merger with an affiliate of Platinum Equity, LLC, Ryerson plans to

file with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) a preliminary proxy statement and a

definitive proxy statement. The definitive proxy statement will be mailed to stockholders of Ryerson.

Stockholders of Ryerson are urged to read the proxy statement relating to the merger and other

relevant materials when they become available because they will contain important information

about the merger and Ryerson.

Security holders may obtain a free copy of the proxy statement and any other relevant documents

(when available) that Ryerson files with the SEC at the SEC’s web site at http://www.sec.gov. The

definitive proxy statement and these other documents may be accessed at www.ryerson.com or

obtained free from Ryerson by directing a request to Ryerson Inc., ATTN: Investor Relations, 2621

West 15th Place, Chicago, IL 60608.

Certain Information Regarding Participants

Ryerson, its directors and executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of

the Company’s security holders in connection with the proposed merger.  Security holders may

obtain information regarding the names, affiliations and interests of such individuals in the

Company’s proxy statement in connection with its 2007 annual meeting of stockholders, which was

filed with the SEC on July 31, 2007. To the extent holdings of the Company’s equity securities have

changed since the amounts reflected in such proxy statement, such changes have been reflected

on Statements of Change in Ownership on Form 4 filed with the SEC.

4

Use of non-GAAP

Financial Information

The Company uses the LIFO method of inventory accounting in the

U.S., which results in a better matching of costs and revenues than

the FIFO method. To supplement its consolidated condensed financial

statements presented on a GAAP basis, the company has provided

certain non-GAAP financial measures, in some cases adjusted to

reflect

the

effects

of

valuing

inventory

on

a

FIFO

basis.

While

FIFO

is

an acceptable inventory valuation method under U.S. GAAP, the

presentation of FIFO basis financial information is considered non-

GAAP financial information as the company applies LIFO inventory

valuation for its financial reporting purposes.  A reconciliation of the

adjustments from GAAP financial measures to non-GAAP financial

measures is contained in the addendum to this presentation and may

be

accessed

at

www.ryerson.com.

This

non-GAAP

financial

information

is

not

meant

to

be

considered

in

isolation

or

as

a

substitute for financial measures prepared in accordance with GAAP.

Ryerson believes that providing these non-GAAP financial measures

in addition to the related GAAP measures better enables investors to

understand the company’s operating performance and also facilitates

comparisons

of

Ryerson’s

operating

performance

with

the

performance of other companies in the industry, many of which value

inventories on a FIFO basis (in whole or part).

5

Background

•

Ryerson is party to a sale agreement with Platinum Equity,

anticipated to go to a stockholder vote in 4Q2007

•

The current Board, after an exhaustive and public auction

process, strongly supports this sale over any other option

available, including remaining independent

•

There is an election of Directors scheduled prior to the

stockholder vote on the merger

•

Harbinger seeks to gain control of a new board, effectively

changing control of the Board and the company for no premium

•

There is uncertainty regarding Harbinger’s position on the sale.

A Harbinger controlled Board could change its recommendation

allowing termination (by buyer or seller) of the deal and denying

stockholders the right to vote on the deal

6

Agenda

•

Overview of Metal Service Center Industry and Ryerson

–

Ryerson: Performance has been strong vs. competition

–

Harbinger: Operating criticisms are unfounded

•

Annual Election of Directors

–

Ryerson: Well governed by its independent directors and achieves

high

ISS governance ratings

–

Harbinger: Has not put forth their own strategic plan (supports

Ryerson’s), operating plan or management team and presents

unqualified directors

–

On a change in control, current financings accelerate; there is no

Harbinger plan to refinance in an uncertain credit market

•

Sale of Ryerson to Platinum Equity

–

Right time to sell given current financial performance and cyclical nature

of industry

–

Board’s process was thorough and unbiased in achieving the highest

available price

–

Price is a good and fair deal for stockholders compared to other

options

7

Role of the Metals Service Center Industry

~30%

OEM’S

•

Appliances

•

Transportation

•

Construction equipment

•

Office equipment

•

Agricultural equipment

Fabricators

Domestic  

steel, ~80%

End users

Metals Service Center Industry

~70%

Imported

steel, ~20%

Market Size: $120 Billion (Purch. Mag.)

Products: Carbon, Stainless, Aluminum

Forms: Flat products, Plates, Bars, Tubing

Processes: Fabrication, Cutting to length,

slitting, burning, tolling

Fragmented

>3,000 North America participants

Integrated

metal mills

Mini mills

Ryerson is a market leader

2006 sales of $5.9 billion

1H07 sales of $3.3 billion

97 facilities/66 market areas  

8

Post 1999

–

Strategic Actions Taken to

Improve Ryerson’s Performance

Cost Reductions

•

Reduced headcount and capacity by 1/3—closed or downsized 26 facilities

•

Centralized and streamlined back room

•

Radically flattened and streamlined organization

•

Froze pension plan

•

Outsourced logistics

Sourcing

•

Strategic sourcing to consolidate and leverage buy with most capable mills

Organizational Structure and Management Processes

•

Simplified many basic business practices

•

Implemented on-line account profitability system

•

Brought talented and experienced outsiders into key positions

•

Realigned incentive compensation system

•

Substantially upgraded all online information systems

•

Selected SAP as a new IT platform and began conversion process

Growth

•

Multiple acquisitions to build stronger competitive positions

Focus on operational efficiencies and building a platform for growth

9

1999 –

2004: (Pre-Integris Acquisition)

Results of Restructuring Improve

Ryerson Performance

1999

2004

Square footage

Employees (year end)

Tons shipped per employee

Number of suppliers

Annualized fixed-cost savings

8.1mm

3,574

824

52

$85mm

11.5mm

5,054

663

150+

—

10

2005: Acquisition and Integration of  Integris 

Further Improves Financial Performance and

Competitive Position

•

Closed January 4, 2005 for $644MM

–

Paid 6.3x LTM EBITDA for highly strategic acquisition

–

Immediately accretive

•

2004 sales of $2.0 Billion

•

By far the largest of a series of acquisitions focused on

improving competitive positions in key product lines

•

Annualized cost savings of $60MM by Y/E 2007

–

$50MM achieved by June 30, 2007

•

Strengthened resulting management team-best of the best from

both companies in all positions

Coupled with prior restructuring, creates a company with strong

competitive positions and superior financial performance

11

Ryerson’s Strategic Programs have

Demonstrated Strong Sales Growth…

$2,783

$5,909

$3,281

$-

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

$5,000

$6,000

$7,000

1997-1999

2006

2007- 6 mons

Sales

•

Poor competitive positions

•

High overhead Structure

•

Outdated IT infrastructure

•

Restructured

•

Strong product positions

•

State of the art IT infrastructure

•

Track record of results

12

Through

Implementation

of

its

Strategic

Programs,

Ryerson

Became

One

of

the

Leading

Public

Metal

Service

Center

Companies…

$0.6

$0.8

$0.9

$0.9

$1.0

$1.2

$1.3

$1.8

$1.8

$2.7

$3.0

$5.9

$5.7

$0.0

$1.0

$2.0

$3.0

$4.0

$5.0

$6.0

$7.0

2006 Revenue

13

…And Has Steadily Improved Financial

Returns Relative to Competitors

Initiatives

$85mm Restructuring

$50mm of annualized

synergies from

Integris acquisition

Source: Company reports

Notes:   

1    Calculated as tax-effected FIFO EBIT/average invested capital

2    Includes A.M. Castle, Central Steel & Wire, Earle M. Jorgensen, Gibraltar Industries, Olympic Steel, Metals USA, Novamerican, PNA Group, Reliance Steel & Aluminum,

Russel Metals, Samuel Manu-Tech, Shiloh Industries, Steel Technologies and Worthington Industries

Consolidated over 20 locations

Centralized shared services (credit, IT, accounting,

purchasing, HR)

Increased local accountability for customer service

Strategic sourcing

Created backbone for future acquisitions—J&F

Steel (2004), Integris Metals (2005) and Lancaster

Steel (2006)

Supplier leverage

Reduced overhead

Consolidated 5 service

centers

After

Tax

Return

on

Invested

Capital

1

(LIFO

companies

adjusted

to

FIFO)

Sale of Inland Steel

Acquired Thypin Steel,

Washington Specialty Metals

and Cardinal Metals

(7.0)

(4.0)

(1.0)

2.0

5.0

8.0

11.0

14.0

17.0

20.0

23.0

26.0

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H

2007

RYI

Peers²

Post-

Restructuring

Pre-

Restructuring

10.0

15.1

12.2

6.3

12.0

11.9

9.7

13.1

15.8

11.9

0.0

3.0

6.0

9.0

12.0

15.0

18.0

10-Year

5-Year

3-Year

1-Year

Average

RYI

Peers²

1H 2007

14

…And Financial Performance 1H07

Beats 75% of Public Competitors

After Tax  ROIC 2006

1H 2007

Source: Company Reports

Note: Calculations are adjusted to FIFO when  necessary. Reference set of companies based on Harbingers reference set, per 13D Filing

5.8

9.6

11.2

11.9

12.1

12.2

12.8

14.0

17.6

18.4

20.9

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

SHLO

ROCK

MUSA

SMT

WOR

RYI

TONS

ZEUS

RUS

CAS

RS

4.4

5.5

8.2

8.4

8.8

10.3

10.5

11.1

12.0

16.4

20.2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

22

SHLO

ROCK

WOR

TONS

SMT

MUSA

ZEUS

RUS

RYI

RS

CAS

15

Improving Performance Has Also Been

Reflected in Ryerson’s Stock Price

Peers

include:

A.M.

Castle,

Gibraltar,

Novamerican

Olympic,

Reliance,

Russel,

Samuel

Manu-Tech,

Shiloh

Industries,

Steel

Technologies

and

Worthington:

market

cup

weighted

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Dec-03

Jul-04

Feb-05

Aug-05

Mar-06

Sep-06

Ryerson

Peers

S&P 500

$34.50

Transaction w/Platinum Price = $34.50

Price = $25.09

Dec-06

16

Harbinger’s Critique of Ryerson’s

Operating Performance is Flawed

Harbinger claims

•

Ryerson underperforms its competitors on 3 specific financial measures: gross margin %, EBITDA %

and inventory turns, however…

The facts are:

•

Gross margin % is not a good comparable measure: competitors have different product and customer

mix:

–

Product Mix –

a ton of stainless steel or aluminum sells for a multiple of a ton of  carbon flat roll

steel;  the mark-up gross margin percentage is lower, but the gross profit dollars per ton is much

higher for  stainless and aluminum

–

Customer

Type

-

Program

account

versus

transactional

–

Ryerson

has

a

higher

proportion

of

large

OEM

program

account

customers

–

larger

orders,

more

gross

profit

dollars,

but

lower

percentage margin 

–

Toll

processing

-

the

processor

is

paid

a

“toll”

to

process

the

material.

Low

sales

dollar,

but

no

material cost, and thus high gross margin percentage

•

EBITDA % is not a good comparable measure;

–

Ignores asset intensity and working capital management that differ across competitors

•

Harbinger

did

not

adjust

to

a

comparable

inventory

accounting

method

for

peers

-

LIFO

vs. FIFO generate very different results, particularly in a period of rapidly changing

prices

•

FIFO ROIC% adjusts for all these differences

Return on Invested Capital with comparable inventory accounting

is the best measure of financial performance.  On this measure,

Ryerson outperforms most of the peers selected by Harbinger

17

Additionally, Harbinger’s Criticism of

Inventory Management is Not Supported

by the MSCI’s Inventory Turn Data…

Note:

1      Calculated as cost of goods sold (adjusted for LIFO impact) divided by average inventory over the period (adjusted for LIFO

reserve)

for

Ryerson;

MSCI

inventory

turns

calculated

as

shipments

divided

by

average

inventory

over

period;

see

addendum for detailed assumptions and reconciliation to GAAP results

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.8

4.0

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

5.0

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

YTD

(6 months)

Ryerson

Metal Service Center Institute

3.8

Average

3.7

18

…And Ryerson has been Improving

its Inventory Management Faster Than

MSCI Comparables Since Mid 2006

Days Sales in Inventory

88

110

121

88

86

85

105

122

100

96

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

130

6/30/2006

9/30/2006

12/31/2006

3/31/2007

6/30/2007

Ryerson

MSCI

Note: Calculated using Inventory level (in tons)

as of date indicated above divided by average

daily shipments (annualized shipments / 365)

19

Agenda: Annual Election of Directors

•

Overview of Metal Service Center Industry and Ryerson

–

Ryerson: Performance has been strong vs. competition

–

Harbinger: Operating criticisms are unfounded

•

Annual Election of Directors

–

Ryerson: Well governed by its independent directors and achieves

high ISS governance ratings

–

Harbinger: Has not put forth their own strategic plan (supports

Ryerson’s), operating plan or management team and presents

unqualified directors

–

On a change in control, current financings accelerate; there is no

Harbinger plan to refinance in an uncertain credit market

•

Sale of Ryerson to Platinum Equity

–

Right time to sell given current financial performance and cyclical nature

of industry

–

Board’s process was thorough and unbiased in achieving the highest

available price

–

Price is a good and fair deal for stockholders compared to other

options

20

Ryerson is Well-Governed by its

Independent Directors

•

Five of the ten independent board members were newly elected in

the last four years: Longer tenure directors understand historical

perspective, shorter tenure brings new insights, questions and

debate

•

Directors are accomplished executives with significant public board

and executive management experience

•

Board members have a variety of backgrounds in core areas

relevant to operations, including complex multi-location service

businesses, finance, marketing, technology, M&A and International

•

Board closely monitors implementation of strategy and operational

results

•

Compensation and Audit committees comprised solely of

independents

21

Ryerson is Well-Governed by its

Independent Directors (cont’d)

•

Lead Director works closely with management to set

Board agendas

•

Independent directors meet in executive session at

every meeting without management

•

Board is actively involved in guiding the direction of the

company: Integris acquisition, international expansion,

leadership development, etc. 

•

On ISS Governance Rating, Ryerson outperformed

96.6% of the companies in the S&P 500 and 94.3%

of

the companies in the materials group

•

Individual directors’

biographies follow

22

JAMESON A. BAXTER

Director since 1999

•

President of Baxter Associates, Inc., since 1986.

•

Vice President and Principal of

Regency Group, Inc.,

1989 to 1992

•

Vice President of The First Boston Corporation,

1975 to 1986

•

Director of The Putnam Funds; Chairman of 

Contract Committee and member of the Marketing

Committee, Brokerage Committee, Board Policy and

Nominating Committee, and Executive Committee.

•

Previously served on Boards of Directors of Banta

Corporation

and Avondale Financial Corp.

RICHARD G. CLINE

Director since 1996

•

Chairman of Hawthorne Investors, Inc., since 2000

•

Chairman of Hussmann International, Inc.,1998 to 2000.

•

Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of

NICOR,

Inc.,

1986

to

1995.

•

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Jewel

Companies,

Inc.,

1984

to

1986.

•

Director

of

PepsiAmericas,

Inc.;

Chair

of

the

Management

Resources and Compensation Committee; member of

Affiliated Transactions Committee and Governance,

Finance and Nominating Committee.

•

Chairman and a trustee of Northern Institutional Funds,

and Northern Multi-Manager Funds.

•

Past Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

•

Previously served on Boards of Directors of Jewel

Companies,

Inc.,

Whitman

Corporation

and

Kmart

Corporation.

RUSSELL M. FLAUM

Director since 2004

•

Executive Vice President of Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,

overseeing the $3 billion Global Industrial Packaging

Systems business, since 1992; Vice President of

Marketing, 1986 to 1992.

•

President

of

Signode

Corporation,

1990

to

1992.

•

Previously served on Board of Directors of Quanex

Corporation.

JAMES A. HENDERSON

Director since 1996

Lead Director

•

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Cummins Inc.,

1995 to 1999; Executive Vice President, President and

Chief

Operating

Officer,

1975

to

1995.

•

Lead Director of AT&T Inc.; Chair of the Human

Resources Committee and member of the

Finance/Pension Committee and the Executive Committee.

•

Director of Nanophase Technologies Corporation; Chair

of Nominating Committee and member of the

Compensation and Governance Committee.

•

Previously served on Boards of Directors of International

Paper Co., Rohm and Haas Company, SBC

Communications Inc., Championship Auto Racing

Teams,

Inc.,

Ameritech

Corporation

and

Cummins

Engine Company, Inc.

23

GREGORY P. JOSEFOWICZ

Director since 1999

•

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of

Borders

Group,

Inc.,

2002

to

2006;

President

and

Chief

Executive Officer, 1999 to 2002.

•

President of Albertson’s, Inc.,

Midwest Region 1999 to

2002.

•

Chief Executive Officer of the Jewel-Osco division of

American

Stores

Company,

1997

to

1999.

•

Director of PetSmart, Inc.; member of Compensation

Committee and Corporate Governance Committee.

•

Director of Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.; member of Audit

Committee.

•

Previously served on Boards of Directors of Spartan

Stores

Inc.

and

Borders

Group,

Inc.

JAMES R. KACKLEY

Director since 2007

•

Private investor.

•

Public accountant for Arthur Andersen, 1963 to 1999.

•

Audit partner, 1974 to 1999.

•

Chief Financial Officer for Andersen Worldwide.

•

Adjunct professor at the Kellstadt School of

Management at DePaul University.

•

Director of PepsiAmericas, Inc.; member of the

Compensation and Audit Committees, and Audit

Committee financial expert.

•

Director of Herman Miller, Inc.; Chairman of Audit

Committee and Audit Committee financial expert.

DENNIS J. KELLER

Director since 2005

•

Non-executive

Chairman

of

the

Board

of

DeVry

Inc.,

since

2006; Executive Chairman of the Board, 1987 to 2006;

Chief Executive Officer, 1987 to 2002 (DeVry was

purchased by Keller from Bell & Howell in 1987); Co-Chief

Executive Officer,  2002 to 2004.

•

Co-founder of Keller Graduate School of Management, 

1973;

Chairman

of

the

Board

and

Chief

Executive

Officer

from 1973 to 1987.

•

Director of Nicor Inc.; Chair of the Compensation

Committee.

MARTHA MILLER DE LOMBERA

Director since 2004

•

Vice President and General Manager—Latin American

North Market Development Organization of the Procter &

Gamble

Company;

various

executive

positions,

1976

to

2001.

•

Director of Wal-Mart de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.

•

Director

of

Nationwide

Financial

Services,

Inc.;

member

of Finance Committee.

•

Director

of

Sally

Beauty

Holdings,

Inc.;

member

Compensation

Committee

and

Nominating

and

Governance Committee.

24

NEIL S. NOVICH

Director since 1996

•

Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of the

Company since 1999.

•

Former Head, Distribution and Logistics Practice, Bain &

Company.

•

Director of W.W. Grainger, Inc.; Member of Board Affairs

and Nominating Committee and  Compensation

Committee.

JERRY K. PEARLMAN

Director since 1996

•

Chairman of Zenith Electronics Corporation; Chief

Executive Officer, 1983 -

1995.

•

Director

of

Nanophase

Technologies

Corporation;

Chairman of Compensation and Governance Committee

and member of Audit and Finance Committee.

•

Director of Smurfit Stone Container Corporation;

Chairman of Audit Committee and member of

Compensation Committee.

•

Previously served on Board of Directors of  Royal

Packaging Industries Van Leer, N.V and First Chicago

Corporation.

ANRÉ

D. WILLIAMS

Director since 2004

•

President—Global Commercial Card, American Express

Company;

Executive

Vice

President—U.S.

Commercial

Card,  2003 to 2007; Senior Vice President—U.S. Middle

Market,  2000 to 2003,Vice President/General Manager—

Western Region, Corporate Services, 1999 to 2000, Vice

President—Acquisition

and

Advertising,

1996

to

1999;

and

Director—New Product Development from 1994 to 1996.

25

The Board has Ensured that Management

Incentive Compensation is Aligned with

Stockholders

Short-

and long-term incentive plans:

–

Annual incentive tied to OROOA (operating return on operating assets);

no payout if minimum thresholds are not met

–

Corporate staff: Tied to corporate performance

–

Target set by Compensation committee based on business plan and

industry conditions

Long-term incentive

–

Paid in performance shares, not options

–

Tied to 4-year return on net assets (no payout if minimum thresholds are

not met)

–

Compensation committee sets target above median performance of

cyclical industries

Designed to pay for performance and create long-term value

–

Incentive pay represents nearly one-half of executives’

total target

compensation

Stock ownership guidelines in place

26

Giving Harbinger Control

Will Not

Provide Adequate Governance for

Stockholders

•

Harbinger’s

criticism

of

Ryerson’s

“under

performance”

is 

rebutted when results are measured with appropriate metric

(ROIC%) and accounting. Additionally, the accusation of below

industry inventory management is inconsistent with the MSCI

data

•

Electing Harbinger’s nominees hands over control to a single

stockholder without providing stockholders any control premium

•

Neither Harbinger nor its nominees have proposed any 

strategic direction or plans of any kind.  In fact, Harbinger stated

“Ryerson’s long-term strategy to simultaneously improve cost

structure and productivity and expand its customer base while

remaining a leader in a consolidating industry is the right one”*

•

Additionally, no plan for day-to-day management and no

financing plan has been disclosed (financings accelerate on a

change in control)

*Press Release of January 2, 2007

27

Harbinger Has Stated No Strategic Plan for

Day-to-Day Management, Even While Asking

to be Given Control of the Company…

…In fact, Harbinger’s Proxy States:

The HCP Nominees stand committed to pursuing and implementing

strategies for enhancing stockholder value and restoring public confidence

and

support

in

the

Company.

However,

there

can

be

no

assurance

that

the

actions

the

HCP

Nominees

intend

to

take

will

be

implemented

if

they

are

elected

or

the

HCP

Nominees

will

improve

the

Company’s

business

or

prospects

or

otherwise

enhance

stockholder

value.

Your

vote to elect the HCP Nominees does not constitute a vote in favor of any

value-enhancing

plans

of

the

HCP

Funds

for

the

Company.

Neither

the

HCP

Funds

nor,

to

the

knowledge

of

the

HCP

Funds,

any

other

person

on

behalf

of

the

HCP

Funds

has

made

or

undertaken

any

analysis

or

reports

as

to

whether

stockholder

value

will

be

maximized

as

a

result

of

the

solicitation

described

in

this

proxy

statement

or

obtained

reports

from

consultants

or

other

outside

parties

as

to

whether

the proposals presented herein would have an effect on stockholder value.

There

can

be

no

assurance

that

stockholder

value

will

be

maximized

as

a

result

of

this

solicitation

or

the

election

of

the

HCP

Funds

Nominees.

Source: Harbinger Proxy, filed August 7, 2007, page 18

28

Background on Harbinger’s Nominees

Nominees

Background

Keith Butler

Interlocking

director with Davis at Atlas Air*

Eugene Davis

Extensive previous experience on Harbinger Boards

Serves on seven public company boards and numerous

private company boards

Interlocking

director with Butler at Atlas Air

*

Former interlocking

director with Morris and Dienst

at

MUSA

Daniel Dienst

Interlocking

director with Davis and Morris at MUSA

Interlocking

directorship with Morris at Metal Management

Richard Kochersperger

No experience as a public company director

No metals industry experience

Larry Liebovich

No experience as public company independent director

Direct industry experience with very small independent

competitor

purchased

by

Reliance.

Liebovich

did

not

hold

any

senior positions at Reliance

Gerald Morris

Former interlocking

director with Dienst

& Davis

Interlocking directorship with Dienst

at Metal Management

Allen Ritchie

No experience as public company independent director

*Harbinger is largest stockholder of Atlas Air

29

Harbinger Suggests That Their Nominees Will

Improve the Sale Transaction Process.  Let’s

Look at Their Record —

•

CEO holds meetings with several private equity funds including Apollo (pg. 14)

•

Apollo approaches CEO to express interest in pursuing a transaction with MUSA (pg. 14)

•

Board enters confidentiality agreement with Apollo (pg. 14)

•

Board

decides

not

to

conduct

an

auction

(pg. 15)

•

Apollo indicates transaction predicated on CEO remaining with surviving company (pg. 16)

•

CEO begins negotiating employment agreement with Apollo (pg. 17)

•

Apollo informs MUSA Board that CEO employment agreement is executed (pg. 21)

•

Board approves transaction (pg. 21)

•

Compensation Committee of MUSA recommends $500,000 bonus to Dienst on

completion of transaction (pg. 21)

•

Company agrees not to “initiate, solicit, encourage or facilitate any inquiries with respect

to,

or

the

making

of,

an

acquisition

proposal”

(pg. 73)

Result: MUSA sold to Apollo for 4X EBITDA with no auction process or go shop

Nov. 04

Jan. 05

Feb. 05

March 1, 05

March 15, 05

Wk of April 11

May 14

May 18

May 18

Metals USA Directorship of Davis, Dienst and Morris: 

Sale to Apollo in November 2005*

*Proxy filed September, 2005

Merger

Agreement

30

•

Harbinger claims its nominees have more relevant industry experience.

Three (Dienst, Davis, Morris) were directors of Metals USA (MUSA), from

October 2002 through November 2005, a Ryerson competitor and one

of

the peers selected by Harbinger

•

These nominees joined the MUSA board following its bankruptcy filing and

stayed through MUSA’s re-emergence as a public company and its

eventual purchase by Apollo. However, the charts on the next page show

that the performance of MUSA under Dienst, Davis and Morris lagged

Ryerson and continues to lag today: 

–

On a ROIC % basis, MUSA lagged Ryerson throughout the period

–

Ryerson inventory turns exceed MUSA throughout the period

•

Additionally, the MUSA board and Dienst, Davis and Morris approved the

sale of MUSA to Apollo for a price multiple of 4x EBITDA, one of

the

lowest price multiples for a comparable sale transaction in the service

center industry and well below the average

•

Though Harbinger is highly critical of Ryerson’s board oversight in this

area, these

Harbinger nominees have a poor track record 

Giving Harbinger Control

Will Not

Provide Adequate Governance for

Stockholders (cont’d)

31

Ryerson/MUSA Relative Performance

ROIC

1

Inventory Turns

2

Source:   Company reports

Notes:     Ryerson adjusted for LIFO

1

Calculated

as

EBIT

plus

earnings

from

equity

in

affiliates,

divided

by

the

average

invested

capital

(total

debt

+

minority

interest

+

preferred

stock

+

shareholders’

equity)

over the period

2    Calculated as COGS adjusted to exclude LIFO gain or loss divided by the average at current value over the period

(5)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H2007

Ryerson

Metals USA

Average = 10.3

Average = 9.1

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H2007

Ryerson

Metals USA

Average = 3.7

Average = 3.4

32

Reject Harbinger Slate

•

Harbinger has stated no plan as to what they would to do 

–

Operating plan

–

Strategic plan

–

Financing plan

Shareholders have a right to know what Harbinger would do differently if they gain

control of the Board

•

They have not stated their position on the Platinum merger agreement. Stockholders

have a right to know their position before they vote on the Board

•

A vote for Harbinger’s slate surrenders control without Harbinger paying a control

premium, having bought approximately 10% of the stock at prices ranging from $20.07

to $23.53

•

We

believe

Harbinger’s

nominees

are

not

qualified

–

lack

necessary

experience

with

large, complex public companies with international investments and poor performance

of MUSA and a questionable sale process to Apollo

•

Ryerson’s results prove the strategy and the current Board’s oversight is working

•

Ryerson’s stockholders have been rewarded with above market returns

We ask for your support for the Company’s

nominees in the upcoming stockholder vote

33

Agenda: Sale of Ryerson to Platinum

Equity

•

Overview of Metal Service Center Industry and Ryerson

–

Ryerson: Performance has been strong vs. competition

–

Harbinger: Operating criticisms are unfounded

•

Annual Election of Directors

–

Ryerson: Well governed by its independent directors and

achieves high ISS governance ratings

–

Harbinger: Has not put forth their own strategic plan (supports

Ryerson’s), operating plan or management team and presents

unqualified directors

–

On a change in control, current financings accelerate; there is no

Harbinger plan to refinance in an uncertain credit market

•

Sale of Ryerson to Platinum Equity

–

Right time to sell given current financial performance and

cyclical nature of industry

–

Board’s process was thorough and unbiased in achieving

the highest available price

–

Price is a good and fair deal for stockholders vs. compared

to other options

34

Events Leading up to Decision to

Review Strategic Alternatives

•

Ryerson’s financial performance has improved continuously over time

relative to competitors; in 1H07 outperforms 8 out of 10 public competitors

•

Harbinger, as a major stockholder, sought a change in control of

the

company at the Board level; this change in control would not reflect any

premium for other stockholders

•

Ryerson’s stock price rose rapidly after Harbinger’s filing due to increased

market

focus

leading

the

Board

to

consider

whether

Ryerson’s

future

value

could

be

delivered

to

stockholders

today

through

alternatives

such

as

a

stock buy-back, sale, partial sale, or leverage recap

•

A review of options such as stock buybacks, leverage recaps and partial

sales led the Board to conclude that these provide no substantial additional

value to stockholders and would likely over-leverage the Company,

particularly in a recession

•

Based

on

this

set

of

circumstances

the

Board

elected

to

evaluate

the

company’s strategic plan vs. a complete sale considering a variety of

factors:

–

Was this the right time to sell?

–

What is the best price that could be achieved?

–

Is this price a better value for stockholders than simply implementing the

strategic plan?

35

1/1/2003

12/2/2003

11/2/2004

10/3/2005

9/4/2006

8/6/2007

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

40.00

45.00

50.00

Key Events vs. Ryerson Stock Price

Source:  FactSet, Company reports, Factiva

12/13/06

Harbinger files 13-D

re 9.7% holding

1/2/07

Harbinger proposes

slate of 7 directors

2/14/07

Ryerson announces Q4 ‘06 and

FY2006 results, and exploration of

strategic alternatives

5/2/07

Ryerson reports

Q1 results

4/07

Rumors circulate

regarding potential sale

and possible price

7/24/07

Ryerson

announces sale

to Platinum

Equity

(2005 Average Price = 16.84)

(2006 Average Price = 25.39)

(2004 Average Price = 14.25)

Platinum Offer = $34.50/share

8/1/07

Ryerson reports

record Q2 ’07

results

(2003 Average Price = 8.03)

36

The Board Followed a Deliberate and

Exhaustive Process to Determine the

Best Outcome for Stockholders

I.

Review the company’s current strategic plan

•

Historical performance

•

Impact of cyclicality and future performance under

various scenarios

•

Execution risks

II.

Determine whether this is a good time to sell

•

Position in industry cycle

•

Portion of operational improvements already achieved

III.

Conduct a thorough, unbiased and public auction

to attain the highest available price

IV.

Compare the best sale price attainable with the

value embedded in the company's strategic plan

37

Historical Financial and Business

Performance

Historical

Fiscal

Year

Ended

December

31,

1,2

LTM

(US$mm, unless otherwise noted)

1998A

1999A

2000A

2001A

2002A

2003A

2004A

2005A

2006A

6/30/07

Tons

Shipped

(000s)

3,108

3,333

3,339

2,817

2,610

2,553

2,821

3,499

3,292

3,190

Revenue

2,783

2,764

2,862

2,244

2,097

2,189

3,302

5,781

5,909

6,234

Gross

Profit

626

632

570

352

367

358

489

883

854

917

Operating Expenses

503

501

502

374

353

337

383

658

671

669

EBIT (Excl. One-Time Items)

4

90

99

36

(54)

(12)

10

98

209

167

208

Reported Net Income

544

56

(30)

(60)

(97)

(14)

56

98

72

83

Depreciation & Amortization

33

32

32

32

25

24

21

39

40

40

LIFO

Adjustment

(41)

(8)

(22)

(31)

29

22

274

(62)

189

206

ROIC

(%)

5

3.6

6.1

0.9

(6.5)

1.7

3.1

25.7

6.9

12.2

14.3

EPS (Diluted)

6

0.99

1.56

(1.03)

(2.47)

(3.86)

(0.56)

2.18

3.78

2.50

2.81

Inventory

501

543

568

410

494

501

607

834

1,129

791

LIFO Reserve

71

63

41

10

39

61

335

273

504

561

Inventory Turns (x)

—Tons

Basis

-

-

-

-

-

-

3.8

4.3

3.2

3.3

Notes:  

1   Acquisition of Integris

Metals closed on January 4, 2005

2   Summary of acquisitions:

1997

-

Cardinal

Metals,

Omni

Metals,

Thypin

Steel;

1999

-

Washington

Specialty

Metals;

2004

-

J&F

Steel;

2005

-

Integris

Metals;

2006

-

Lancaster Steel

3   Adjusted for embedded D&A; detailed in Appendix A

4   One-time items detailed in Appendix A

5

Calculated

as

tax-effected

FIFO

EBIT

/

average

invested

capital

(adjusted

for

tax-affected

LIFO

reserve)

6   As-reported

3

3

EBITDA (Excl. One-Time Items)

4

FIFO EBITDA (Excl. One-Time Items)

4

123

131

67

(22)

13

34

119

249

248

207

56

82

123

45

(53)

43

392

187

396

454

38

Ryerson’s Long-Term Strategic Plan

Growth through acquisitions and joint ventures

•

Expand acquisition pipeline in specific geographies and product lines

•

Fully integrate acquisitions to achieve backroom savings and other operating

efficiencies

•

Expand international JVs in Mexico, India and China to follow customers

offshore

Gain market share organically

•

Provide unique capabilities to multi-location / multi-national manufacturers

through a specialized sales account team

•

Move downstream into high value parts and assemblies

•

Add accounts through targeted marketing programs

Continue focus on improving operating efficiencies

•

Complete conversion of all service centers to SAP and achieve targeted

savings

•

Consistently achieve 5 inventory turns

•

Continue to implement Six Sigma program to offset inflation

•

Expand global metals trading to reduce purchased material costs

•

Improve performance at service centers lagging overall company performance

39

Overview of Projected Cases

     Case I

Projections per Ryerson’s long term strategic plan, but without a recession

Gain market share organically

Additional Growth via acquisitions and new international investments and joint

ventures

Continue improving operations

     Case II

Same as projections per Case I, but excludes any growth from acquisitions or new

international investments and joint ventures

     Case III

Assumes economic downturn begins in 2008 and continues through 2010 with

recovery in 2011

Does not include any growth from acquisitions or new international investments

Expenses are managed more aggressively in conjunction with lower sales volume

Management prepared three financial Cases as follows:

40

Projections: Weighted Average

Scenario

EPS

4.30

5.15                5.80

6.52 

7.28

Weighted Average Scenario Based on probability of 33% each for Case I, Case II and Case III

'07-11

($mm except as noted)

2007F

2008F

2009F

2010F

2011F

CAGR

Tons (000s)

3,336

3,327

3,474

3,618

3,898

4.0%

Revenue

6,903

6,371

6,580

6,908

7,711

2.8%

EBITDA

323

302

320

346

410

6.1%

EBIT

283

262

280

306

370

6.9%

Net Income

137

145

161

181

226

13.3%

Fiscal Year Ending December 31,

41

The Board Followed a Deliberate and

Exhaustive Process to Determine the

Best Outcome for Stockholders

I.

Review the company’s current strategic plan

•

Historical performance

•

Impact of cyclicality and future performance under

various scenarios

•

Execution risks

II.

Determine whether this is a good time to sell

•

Position in industry cycle

•

Portion of operational improvements already

achieved

III.

Conduct a thorough, unbiased and public auction

to attain the highest available price

IV.

Compare the best sale price attainable with the

value embedded in the company's strategic plan

42

Risks to Strategic Plan -

External

•

Industry is slow growth and cyclical

•

Current volume at historic peaks

•

Industrial economy recession likely in

any 5 –

7 year period

•

Pricing at peak levels

•

Pricing drops rapidly in a recession

•

Nickel pricing at all-time high in Q2 at

almost $55,000/tonne vs. average of

$25,000 in 2005 –

has already fallen to

$35,000 more recently

150

250

350

450

550

650

750

850

Hot Rolled

Cold Rolled

Carbon Plate

1,000

1,600

2,200

2,800

3,400

4,000

4,600

5,200

5,800

6,400

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

Stainless

Aluminum

150

250

350

450

550

650

750

850

Hot Rolled

Cold Rolled

Carbon Plate

1,000

1,600

2,200

2,800

3,400

4,000

4,600

5,200

5,800

6,400

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

Stainless

Aluminum

Source: Purchasing Magazine, Bloomberg

Notes:

1     Spot prices include raw materials' surcharges starting in 1st Quarter 2001

2     Prices represent quarterly averages

Metals Pricing

Stainless & Aluminum

Hot Rolled, Cold Rolled & Carbon Plate

Industry

Shipments

30000

40000

50000

60000

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Cagr = 2.0%

MSCI Shipments

43

Timing is Appropriate to Consider a

Sale

•

Industry volume has shown recent declines

•

Metal pricing at or near peak and softening

•

Many of the benefits of strategic initiatives

have already been realized

•

Ryerson already performing better than most

public competitors

Right time to sell at a fair price

44

The Board Followed a Deliberate and

Exhaustive Process to Determine the

Best Outcome for Stockholders

I.

Review the company’s current strategic plan

•

Historical performance

•

Impact of cyclicality and future performance under

various scenarios

•

Execution risks

II.

Determine whether this is a good time to sell

•

Position in industry cycle

•

Portion of operational improvements already achieved

III.

Conduct a thorough, unbiased and public

auction to attain the highest available price

IV.

Compare the best sale price attainable with the

value embedded in the company's strategic plan

45

Strategic Process Highlights

•

Board met 30 times between January 10 and July 24

–

Executive sessions excluding management

–

Separate discussions with legal (Skadden Arps) and financial advisors

(UBS)

•

Board conducted broad and public auction process

–

55 parties contacted (23 mills, 6 service centers, 26 Private Equity)

–

20 executed Confidentiality Agreements

–

8 indications of interest

–

3 conditional bids (including Platinum)

–

2 additional parties expressed interest in July

–

Interested parties had extensive access to management,

comprehensive due diligence material and site visits

•

Management conducted presentations to six interested parties. 

Extensive access provided to Company data

•

Board restricted management discussions concerning employment

and compensation with bidders

•

Board has met regularly since July 24 to actively monitor go shop

period

46

•

Extensive negotiation process conducted by

UBS at the Board’s direction

–

Negotiated with Platinum as well as other bidders

–

Independent Directors controlled discussions

regarding management continuity

–

Extensive effort by UBS to receive the highest offer

possible

–

Platinum provided the highest price at $34.50 per

share

–

Offer includes a “go shop”

through August 18, 2007

and a “no shop”

period both with modest breakup

fees

–

Platinum offer not contingent on further due

diligence, financing or Ryerson management

employment

Strategic

Process

Highlights

(cont’d)

47

•

Board determined that it was in best interests of

stockholders to accept Platinum offer of $34.50 vs.

remaining an independent company or any other

alternative

–

UBS presented its financial analysis to the Board and

delivered a fairness opinion with respect to the $34.50 per

share to be received by the holders of Ryerson's common

stock

•

Platinum offer at $34.50

–

15% premium to 2/13 ($30.01) price, the day prior to Board

announcing process

–

45% premium to 12/13 ($23.77) price, the day that Harbinger

filed its 13D

–

36% premium over the 2006 average price of $25.39

–

22% higher than the average price for any quarter in Ryerson

history (prior to start of the strategic initiative process)

•

Definitive Merger Agreement signed July 24, 2007

Strategic Process Highlights (cont’d)

48

This Was The Best Price Available

•

Active and public auction process prior to

definitive agreement

•

Platinum agreement is not contingent on:

–

Due Diligence

–

Ryerson management –

there are no contracts

with management

–

Financing

•

Go shop and no shop provisions encourage

superior bids

–

At the Board’s direction, UBS is actively taking

advantage of these provisions

49

The Board Followed a Deliberate and

Exhaustive Process to Determine the

Best Outcome for Stockholders

I.

Review the company’s current strategic plan

•

Historical performance

•

Impact of cyclicality and future performance under

various scenarios

•

Execution risks

II.

Determine whether is was a good time to sell

•

Position in industry operational cycle

•

Portion of improvements already achieved

III.

Conduct a thorough, unbiased and public auction

to attain the highest available price

IV.

Compare the best sale price attainable with the

value embedded in the company's strategic

plan

50

Historical Trading Multiples Analysis—

EV/LTM EBITDA

Selected

Companies

1

Source:  FactSet (not pro forma for any acquisitions)

Notes:

1      Selected companies include A.M. Castle, Novamerican, Olympic, Reliance, and Russel; calculated using the median multiple across peers; excludes Novamerican post

announcement of acquisition by Symmetry Holdings

2

LTM as of 6/30/07

3

LTM as of 3/31/07

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

Jan-05

Jul-05

Jan-06

Jul-06

Jan-07

Jul-07

Average = 5.4x

Offer Value = 7.7x EBITDA²

Offer value = 9.0x EBITDA³

51

Implied Multiples of Selected Precedent

Transactions

Source: Based on reported financials adjusted for one-time items

1.

Annualized 1H2005 results

2.

Adjusted for impact of company-owned life insurance plan

3.

Normalized financials are average of prior 5 years

4.

Annualized 1H2006 results

3.5

4.0

4.9

5.2

5.7

6.0

6.2

6.2

6.3

7.4

7.7

9.0

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

Mean 5.5

Median 5.9

52

Comparison of Offer to Potential

Future Value of Stock

Current offer compares well to potential future value even

before factoring any execution risk adjustment

Equal Weighted Case

Comparison of PV of Estimated Future Share Price to $34.50 Offer

$0.00

$5.00

$10.00

$15.00

$20.00

$25.00

$30.00

$35.00

$40.00

$45.00

$50.00

2009 EBITDA basis

2011 EBITDA basis

PV per Share @ 5x EBITDA

PV per Share @ 5.5x EBITDA

PV per Share @ 6x EBITDA

PV per Share @ 6.5x EBITDA

PV per Share @ 7.0x EBITDA

Platinum Offer

PV per share price calculated by

future EBITDA x multiple, less debt,

discounted @ 15% on a diluted share

basis

53

EV/EBIT

EV/EBITDA

CY

CY

LTM

5-Year

Average

CY

CY

LTM

7.5

7.1

7.0 to 8.6

10.0

8.6

10.0

8.5

8.4

8.2

7.4 to 9.5

10.2

7.5

10.1

7.4

8.4

8.4

7.5 to 9.5

11.0

11.0

10.9

10.9

5.7

5.6

4.8 to 6.7

7.2

7.2

7.2

7.2

6.5

6.2

5.6 to 7.9

7.8

7.3

7.7

7.3

7.0

6.8

5.9 to 8.6

7.9

6.5

7.8

6.5

7.5

7.7

6.4 to 8.2

9.1

9.1

9.0

9.0

Selected

Companies

6

Mean…………………….…….

Median………………….……..

Range………………………....

Ryerson at July 23, 2007 Closing

Price ($34.96)

4

IBES…………….........……….

Weighted Average

Scenario

5………………………………..

Ryerson at merger consideration

price ($34.50)

IBES………………………….…

Weighted Average

Scenario

5………………………………….

2008E

2007E

EV/LTM

EBITDA

3

2008E

2007E

1.

LTM multiples for all companies are presented as of 3/31/07, based on publicly reported information and adjusted for one-time items.

2.

Share prices as of 7/23/07.

3.

Excludes

multiples

greater

than

10.0x

and

lower

than

3.0x,

which

excludes

20.5%

of

data

points;

including

outliers,

peers

average

multiple

is

6.6x,

Ryerson is 10.2x

4.

Diluted share count per company management as of 5/31/07.

5.

Weighted Average Scenario based on probability weights of 33% each for Case I, Case II, and Case III, as directed by Ryerson management

6.

Reliance, Russel, A.M. Castle and Olympic

Selected Publicly Traded Companies in the

North American Service Center Industry 1, 2

54

Discounted Cash Flow Analysis

•

Based on publicly available balance sheet as of      

March 31, 2007

•

Included cash flows during Q2-Q4 2007 and 2008-2011

based on Weighted Average Scenario

•

Assumes discount rates in the range of 11.5% -

14.5%

for enterprise value

•

Assumes terminal value multiple in the range of 5.5x –

7.0x

Implied

equity

value

per

share

range

of

$27

-

$41

before consideration of execution risk

55

Ryerson’s Long-Term Strategic Plan

Growth through acquisitions and joint ventures

•

Expand acquisition pipeline in specific geographies and product lines

•

Fully integrate acquisitions to achieve backroom savings and other operating

efficiencies

•

Expand international JVs in Mexico, India and China to follow customers

offshore

Gain market share organically

•

Provide unique capabilities to multi-location / multi-national manufacturers

through a specialized sales account team

•

Move downstream into high value parts and assemblies

•

Add accounts through targeted marketing programs

Continue focus on improving operating efficiencies

•

Complete conversion of all service centers to SAP and achieve targeted

savings

•

Consistently achieve 5 inventory turns

•

Continue to implement Six Sigma program to offset inflation

•

Expand global metals trading to reduce purchased material costs

•

Improve performance at service centers lagging overall company performance

56

Summary

•

Ryerson Performance

–

Ryerson:  Performance has been strong vs. competition

–

Harbinger: Operating criticisms are unfounded

•

Ryerson Governance

–

Ryerson:  Well governed by its independent directors and

achieves high ISS governance ratings

–

Harbinger: Has not put forth their own strategic plan

(supports Ryerson’s), operating plan or management team

and presents unqualified directors

–

On a change in control, current financings accelerate; there

is no Harbinger plan to refinance in an uncertain credit

market

•

Sale of Ryerson to Platinum Equity

–

Right time to sell given current financial performance and

cyclical native of industry

–

Board’s process was thorough and unbiased in achieving the

highest available price

–

Price is a good and fair deal for stockholders vs. comparison

to other options

–

Harbinger has not stated its position on the Platinum merger

57

Ryerson

is

Asking

for

Your

Support

•

VOTE FOR the Board that proposes to sell to Platinum

Equity

–

Right time to sell

–

Best deal available

–

Good and fair deal for stockholders

•

VOTE FOR the Ryerson Board

–

Board has governed Ryerson well

–

Harbinger has not demonstrated any valid reason they should be in

control of the Board

–

Harbinger refuses to take a position on the merger; stockholders

have a right to know Harbinger’s position before they vote on the

Board

–

Change in board puts Platinum deal at risk

–

A Harbinger controlled Board could change the recommendation

which would allow either party to terminate, denying stockholders

the right to vote on the deal. Why substitute Harbinger’s judgments

for all stockholders’

judgment?

–

If Harbinger supports the deal, there is no reason to change the

Board. If Harbinger does not support the deal, they have not

provided a strategic plan to run the company

Company Confidential

End

59

Addendums

60

Reconciliation of Certain Non-GAAP Items

LTM

($mm)

1997 (1)

1998 (1)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H 2007

6/30/2007

Operating Profit

133.1

96.0

97.0

(4.1)

(76.0)

(7.9)

3.4

99.7

232.9

183.9

139.3

202.7

Adjustments

+ Gain on Sale of Asset

(8.9)

(5.9)

(1.8)

-

(1.3)

(10.9)

-

(5.6)

(6.6)

(21.6)

(2.2)

(2.2)

+ Pension Curtailment Gain

(8.9)

-

-

(4.4)

-

-

-

-

(21.0)

-

-

-

+Restructuring & Plant Closure Costs

-

-

3.6

27.8

19.4

2.7

6.2

3.6

4.0

4.5

3.4

7.2

+Charge Related to Customer Bankruptcy

-

-

-

16.2

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

+ Gain on Sales of Company Interests

-

-

-

-

3.3

(4.1)

-

-

-

-

-

-

+ Write-Off

-

-

-

-

1.0

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

+ Adjustment to Sale of IEMC

-

-

-

-

-

8.5

-

-

-

-

-

-

EBIT

115.3

90.1

98.8

35.5

(53.6)

(11.7)

9.6

97.7

209.3

166.8

140.5

207.7

+ Depreciation & Amortization

27.7

33.2

32.1

31.8

31.8

25.0

23.9

21.1

39.2

40.0

19.7

40.0

EBITDA

143.0

123.3

130.9

67.3

(21.8)

13.3

33.5

118.8

248.5

206.8

160.2

247.7

+ LIFO expense (2)

(12.7)

(41.4)

(8.0)

(22.0)

(31.3)

29.4

22.1

273.5

(62.0)

189.3

57.0

206.0

FIFO EBITDA

130.3

81.9

122.9

45.3

(53.1)

42.7

55.6

392.3

186.5

396.1

217.2

453.7

- Depreciation & Amortization

27.7

33.2

32.1

31.8

31.8

25.0

23.9

21.1

39.2

40.0

19.7

40.0

FIFO EBIT

102.6

48.7

90.8

13.5

(84.9)

17.7

31.7

371.2

147.3

356.1

197.5

413.7

Source: Company reports, 2001-2005 results restated per 2005 10-K

Notes:

1  Excludes results of Inland Steel Company operations which were sold in 1998

2 1997-2005 LIFO expense assumed equal to change in LIFO reserve year-over-year

61

Reconciliation of Return on Invested Capital

($mm, unless otherwise noted)

1997 (1)

1998 (1)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H2007

FIFO EBIT (2)

102.6

48.7

90.8

13.5

(84.9)

17.7

31.7

371.2

147.3

356.1

197.5

Tax-Effected FIFO EBIT (3)

66.7

31.7

59.0

8.8

(55.2)

11.5

20.6

241.3

95.7

231.5

128.4

Average Period Short-Term Debt

-

-

-

48.5

48.5

-

-

-

-

-

-

Average Period Current Portion of Long-Term Debt

4.2

3.2

-

71.3

71.3

-

-

-

Average Period Long-Term Debt

260.1

257.0

257.9

179.8

100.7

160.5

243.4

396.3

525.6

865.8

926.0

Average Period Minority Interest

58.7

58.7

29.4

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Shareholders' Equity

    Shareholders' Equity

427.5

563.6

697.8

661.7

554.6

409.1

386.6

439.6

547.8

648.7

742.8

           LIFO Reserve

112.4

71.0

63.0

41.0

9.7

39.1

61.2

334.7

272.7

504.0

561.0

    + Tax-Effected LIFO Reserve (3)

73.1

46.2

41.0

26.7

6.3

25.4

39.8

217.6

177.3

327.6

364.7

FIFO Shareholders' Equity

500.6

609.8

738.8

688.4

560.9

434.5

426.4

657.2

725.1

976.3

1,107.5

Average Period FIFO Shareholders' Equity

473.1

555.2

674.3

713.6

624.6

497.7

430.4

541.8

691.1

851.5

1,035.8

Average Period FIFO Invested Capital

796.1

874.0

961.5

1,013.1

845.0

658.2

673.8

938.0

1,392.8

1,893.4

2,078.5

FIFO Return on Invested Capital (%)

8.4

3.6

6.1

0.9

(6.5)

1.7

3.1

25.7

6.9

12.2

12.0

Source: Company reports, 2001-2005 results restated per 2005 10-K

Notes:

1  Excludes results of Inland Steel Company operations which were sold in 1998

2 See reconciliation on prior page

3 Based on assumed 35% tax rate

62

Reconciliation of Gross Margin and

Inventory Turns

($mm, unless otherwise noted)

1997 (1)

1998 (1)

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

1H2007

Revenue

2,804.0

2,782.7

2,763.5

2,862.4

2,243.5

2,096.5

2,189.4

3,302.0

5,780.5

5,908.9

3,281.0

Cost of Goods Sold (2)

2,178.0

2,156.9

2,131.6

2,292.7

1,891.6

1,729.8

1,830.4

2,810.8

4,893.5

5,050.9

2,786.8

+ Depreciation & Amortization Embedded in COGS (3)

-

-

-

-

-

-

(12.0)

(10.6)

(19.6)

(20.0)

(9.8)

+ Charge from Change in Method of Applying LIFO

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

-9.6

0

0

+ LIFO (Expense)/Benefit (4)

12.7

41.4

8.0

22.0

31.3

(29.4)

(22.1)

(273.5)

62.0

(189.3)

(57.2)

Adjusted FIFO Cost of Goods Sold

2,190.7

2,198.3

2,139.6

2,314.7

1,922.9

1,700.4

1,796.3

2,526.7

4,926.3

4,841.6

2,719.8

FIFO Gross Profit

613.3

584.4

623.9

547.7

320.6

396.1

393.1

775.3

854.2

1,067.3

561.2

FIFO Gross Profit Margin (%)

21.9

21.0

22.6

19.1

14.3

18.9

18.0

23.5

14.8

18.1

17.1

Inventory:

  Inventory

425.7

500.6

543.1

567.9

409.5

493.9

501.1

606.9

834.3

1,128.6

790.8

  + LIFO Reserve

112.4

71.0

63.0

41.0

9.7

39.1

61.2

334.7

272.7

504.0

561.0

FIFO Inventory

538.1

571.6

606.1

608.9

419.2

533.0

562.3

941.6

1,107.0

1,632.6

1,351.8

FIFO Average Inventory

488.8

554.9

588.9

607.5

514.1

476.1

547.7

752.0

1,024.3

1,369.8

1,455.9

FIFO Inventory Turns (x) (5)

4.5

4.0

3.6

3.8

3.7

3.6

3.3

3.4

4.8

3.5

3.7

Source: Company reports, 2001-2005 results restated per 2005 10-K

Notes:

1  Excludes results of Inland Steel Company operations which were sold in 1998

2 2001 and 2002 COGS adjusted by $69.8mm and $61.8MM, respectively, due to 2005 restatement

3 Assumed to be 50% of reported D&A

4 1997-2005 LIFO expense equal to change in LIFO reserve year-over-year

5 Calculated as cost of goods sold (adjusted to exclude LIFO impact) divided by the average inventory over the period (adjusted for LIFO reserve)