EX-1 2 dex1.htm PRESENTATION ENTITLED "RYERSON INC. - A NEED FOR CHANGE" Presentation entitled "Ryerson Inc. - A Need For Change"
August 7, 2007
Ryerson Inc. –
A Need For Change
Exhibit 1

2
Forward Looking Statements
This presentation contains forward-looking statements.  These statements may be identified by
the use
of
forward-looking
terminology
such
as
the
words
“expects,”
“intends,”
“believes,”
“anticipates”
and
other
terms
with
similar
meaning
indicating
possible
future
events
or
actions
or
potential
impact
on
the
business
or
shareholders
of
Ryerson
Inc.
These
forward-looking
statements are based on current expectations and assumptions that are subject to risks and
uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially.  These risks and uncertainties
include, among others, the ability to successfully solicit sufficient proxies to elect the Harbinger
nominees
to
the
Ryerson
Inc.
board
of
directors,
the
ability
of
the
Harbinger
nominees
to
influence the management of Ryerson Inc. and to improve the operating performance of Ryerson
Inc., and risk factors associated with the business of Ryerson Inc., as described in the Ryerson
Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006, and in other
periodic reports of Ryerson Inc., which are available at no charge at the website of the Securities
and
Exchange
Commission
at
http://www.sec.gov.
Accordingly,
you
should
not
rely
upon
forward-looking statements as a prediction of actual results.

3
The Ryerson Board Needs To Change Now
As Ryerson’s largest stockholder, Harbinger Capital Partners is concerned that the Platinum
Equity transaction may not represent the best course for maximizing stockholder value.
The transaction resulted from a search for strategic alternatives triggered not by market
conditions
or
operational
challenges,
but
by
the
current
Board
of
Directors’
response
to
the
Harbinger proxy fight
We believe the current Board of Directors and senior management are no better equipped to
conduct an effective review of strategic alternatives and maximize stockholder value than they
have been to drive operational performance and profitability.
Under the stewardship of the current Board, Ryerson has consistently failed to perform --
lagging on both measures of profitability and inventory management.
This historical underperformance has resulted in a share price that does not truly reflect
Ryerson’s intrinsic value.
Ryerson stockholders deserve independent and objective analysis of the Platinum Equity offer by
Directors that can apply their expert knowledge to better realize the Company's current and future
value for all stockholders.
If the Platinum Equity offer is determined to be undervalued, stockholders would benefit from
a strategic review process that is singularly focused on maximizing stockholder value.
The Harbinger nominees have the expertise and experience necessary both to guide an effective
review of strategic alternatives and to guide Ryerson toward improved operations and profitability.
Voting for Harbinger’s Slate Ensures That Stockholders Have the
Opportunity to Realize Full and Fair Value for Their Investment

4
Share Price Underperformance
Page 5
Low Historical EBITDA Margins
Page 7
Poor Inventory Management
Page 8
History of Earnings Disappointment
Page 9
Current Board’s Enrichment of Management
Page 10
Ryerson’s Current Board Has Consistently Ignored Stockholders
Page 11
Platinum Equity’s Offer
Page 12
Ryerson Inc. –
A History of Underperformance

5
Share Price Underperformance
Total
Returns
Analysis
–
Ryerson
vs.
Service
Center
Composite
(3/17/1998
–
12/12/2006)
Source: Factset
Note:    Total
returns
includes
change
in
stock
price
and
assume
dividend
reinvestment.
Steel
Service
Center
Composite
Index
is
weighted
by
market
capitalization
and
includes
AM
Castle,
EMJ
(until
3/06),
Metals
USA
(until
11/05),
Novamerican,
Olympic
Steel,
Reliance
Steel,
Russel
Metals.
(1)
Index
reflects
stock
price
as
of
March
17,
1998,
the
date
Ispat
International
announced
the
acquisition
of
Inland
Steel,
the
steel
manufacturing
operations
of
Ryerson
Tull.
Post
sale,
Ryerson
began
operating
as
it
does
today,
as
a
pure
play
steel service center.
(2)
One day prior to Harbinger’s 13-D filing.
In
spite
of
an
industry-leading
position
and
the
tailwind
of
global
consolidation
in
the
steel
industry,
Ryerson
has
significantly underperformed market indices and its peer group in profitability and efficiency.
For the period between March 17, 1998
(1)
and December 12, 2006
(2)
and for the one year period prior to December
12, 2006, total returns for Ryerson decreased by 3%, while the service center composite increased by 233% and
19%, respectively.
1-Year
Total
Returns
Analysis
–
Ryerson
vs.
Service
Center
Composite
Mar-98
Mar-99
Feb-00
Feb-01
Feb-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Dec-04
Dec-05
Dec-06
0
100
200
300
400
500
Ryerson: -3.2%
Steel Service Center Composite: 232.3%
S&P 500: 30.7%
Dec-05
Jan-06
Mar-06
Apr-06
May-06
Jun-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
Ryerson: -3.3%
Steel Service Center Composite: 19.1%
S&P 500: 12.0%

6
Ryerson vs. Reliance
Ryerson’s closest peer, Reliance Steel and Aluminum, has returned 259% to its stockholders, while Ryerson
stockholders
have
lost
3%
between
the
period
of
March
17,
1998
(1)
and
December
12,
2006
(2)
.
Total
Returns
Analysis
–
Ryerson
vs.
Reliance
(3/17/1998
–
12/12/2006)
1-Year
Total
Returns
Analysis
–
Ryerson
vs.
Reliance
Source: Factset
Note:
Total
returns
includeschange
in
stock
price
and
assume
dividend
reinvestment.
(1)
Index
reflects
stock
price
as
of
March
17,
1998,
the
date
Ispat
International
announced
the
acquisition
of
Inland
Steel,
the
steel
manufacturing
operations
of
Ryerson
Tull.
Post
sale,
Ryerson
began
operating
as
it
does
today,
as
a
pure
play steel service center.
(2)
One day prior to Harbinger’s 13-D filing.
Mar-98
Mar-99
Feb-00
Feb-01
Feb-02
Jan-03
Jan-04
Dec-04
Dec-05
Dec-06
0
100
200
300
400
500
Ryerson: -3.2%
Reliance: 259.3%
S&P 500: 30.7%
Dec-05
Jan-06
Mar-06
Apr-06
May-06
Jun-06
Aug-06
Sep-06
Nov-06
Dec-06
60
80
100
120
140
160
Ryerson: -3.3%
Reliance: 18.7%
S&P 500: 12.0%

7
Low Historical EBITDA Margins
Since 1998, Ryerson’s EBITDA margins, defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization
(EBITDA)
divided
by
sales,
have
averaged
2.7%,
less
than
half
of
the
service
center
composite
average
of
6.8%.
In Q1 2007, Ryerson’s EBITDA margin of 4.9% was less than half that of Reliance, which came in with a first
quarter EBITDA margin of 11.8%.  Q2 2007 followed a similar theme, as Ryerson’s EBITDA margin remained
constant at 4.9% while Reliance increased to 12.4%
EBITDA
Margins
–
Ryerson
vs.
Industry
Source: Company filings
Note:    Steel
Service
Center
Composite
Index
includes
AM
Castle,
EMJ
(until
3/06),
Metals
USA
(until
11/05),
Novamerican,
Olympic
Steel,
RelianceSteel,
Russel
Metals.
Companies
reporting
inventory
under
the
last-in,
first-out
(LIFO)method
are
AM
Castle,
EMJ,
Reliance
and
Ryerson.
Companies
reporting
inventory
under
the
first-in,
first-out
(FIFO)
method
are
Metals
USA,
Novamerican,
OlympicSteel
and
Russel
Metals.
-2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Ryerson
Service Center Composite
Reliance
Ryerson Average: 2.7%
Service Center Composite Average: 6.8%
Reliance Average: 9.0%
Ryerson
Reliance
Service Center Composite

8
Poor Inventory Management
Harbinger believes that Ryerson’s poor inventory management has resulted in low inventory turns that have
historically averaged 3.9x over the last nine years while its closest peer, Reliance, has averaged closer to 4.6x
during the same period.
Even
in
Q1
2007
--
a
quarter
with
improved
earnings
--
Ryerson
only
managed
inventory
turns
of
3.7x
in
the
first
quarter,
compared
to
Reliance,
which
had
first
quarter
inventory
turns
of
4.5x.
Q2 2007 proved to be a similarly improved quarter, however Ryerson’s inventory turns were 4.0x for the quarter
while Reliance managed 4.2x
Inventory Turns Analysis
Source: Company filings
Note:     Ryerson
and
Reliance
report
inventory
on
a
LIFO
basis.
Adjustments
have
been
made
based
on
their
company
filings
to
approximate
inventory
value
on
a
FIFO
basis.
3.0x
3.5x
4.0x
4.5x
5.0x
5.5x
6.0x
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Ryerson
Reliance
Ryerson Average: 3.9x
Reliance Average: 4.6x

9
History of Earnings Disappointment
Over the past 37 quarters, Reliance has missed analyst projections only 6 times while Ryerson has failed to meet
expectations 19 times.
Ryerson EPS vs. Wall Street Projections
Reliance EPS vs. Wall Street Projections
Source: FactSet.
Who do you trust as stewards of your capital?
($1.50)
($1.00)
($0.50)
$0.00
$0.50
$1.00
$1.50
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Met or Beat
Missed
Wall Street Estimate
$0.00
$0.30
$0.60
$0.90
$1.20
$1.50
$1.80
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Met or Beat
Missed
Wall Street Estimate

10
$325.0
$355.0
$400.0
$500.0
$525.0
$441.5
$492.3
$544.7
$548.5
$548.5
$570.5
$641.5
$600.0
$560.0
$500.0
$475.0
$817.0
$738.4
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
$700
$800
$900
$1,000
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Reliance CEO Compensation
Ryerson CEO Compensation
Reliance Indexed Price
Ryerson Indexed Price
2003
2004
2005
2006
2002
200
2000
1999
1998
Ryerson
Price Performance: -15.5%
Compensation CAGR: 8.0%
Reliance
Price Performance: 233.2%
Compensation CAGR: 8.0%
Average Delta: 26.7%
Ryerson’s
Board
Has
Enriched
Management
at
Stockholders’
Expense
Total Compensation vs. Stock Price Performance
(Ryerson vs. Reliance)
Management should be compensated for
unique
skills
and
performance
--
something
Ryerson’s current Board has ignored.  Mr.
Novich
does not possess the skills or the
historical performance to justify his
compensation.
Ryerson’s stock has historically under
performed, but its CEO’s base salary has
always been higher than Reliance’s.
Since 1998, the base compensation of
Ryerson’s CEO has on average been
approximately 27% higher than Reliance’s
CEO’s.
Unlike Reliance, the total compensation for
Ryerson’s CEO has not been substantiated by
its stock price performance.
Over a nine year period total
compensation for Ryerson’s CEO
increased by approximately 277% while
its stock price declined by over 15%. In
contrast Reliance's stock price increased
233%, which supports the 400% increase
in its CEO’s total compensation package.
The total compensation for Ryerson’s
CEO increased by approximately 277%
over the last nine years, while the
average CEO total compensation for the
select service center composite
increased by 252%.
Source: Company filings
Note: CAGR
–
Compounded Annual Growth Rate
Source: Company filings
Note: CAGR
–
Compounded Annual Growth Rate
Total
Compensation
includes
base
salary,
bonus
and
other incentive compensation.
Source: Company filings.
Note:  Select
Service
Center
Composite
Index
has
been
chosen
to
include
companies
where CEO compensation information is publicly available. Total compensation
and total returns are calculated as a simple average of the Select Service Center
Composite.
Select
Service
Center
Composite
Index
include
AM
Castle,
RelianceSteel,
Russel
Metals and Olympic Steel (does not include Novamerican, EMJ and Metals USA
due to limited publicly available CEO compensation information).
CAGR
–
Compounded Annual Growth Rate
Total
Compensation
includes
base
salary,
bonus
and
other
incentive
compensation
Base Compensation vs. Stock Price Performance
(Ryerson vs. Reliance)
Total Compensation vs. Total Returns
(Ryerson vs. Industry)

11
Ryerson’s Current Board Has Consistently Ignored
Stockholders
We believe the current Board and senior management have ignored stockholders,
delayed due process and entrenched themselves.
Rather
than
engage
in
a
constructive
dialogue,
the
current
Board
responded
to
the
Harbinger proposals by postponing the 2007 Annual Meeting indefinitely and
launching a five-month search of strategic alternatives that we believe was focused
more on preserving current management than on maximizing value for stockholders.
We believe the current Board and senior management lack the necessary industry
experience and the specific qualifications necessary to understand the value drivers
within the metals service center business.
The incumbents are NOT the right stewards for Ryerson

12
Platinum Equity’s Offer May Not Represent the Best
Course for Maximizing Stockholder Value
The Platinum Equity transaction resulted from a search for strategic alternatives that
was
triggered
by
the
current
Board
of
Directors’
response
to
the
Harbinger
proxy
fight
--
not by market conditions or operational challenges.
We believe Ryerson’s current Board and senior management are no better equipped
to conduct an effective review of strategic alternatives and maximize stockholder
value than they have been to drive operational performance and profitability.
The proposed merger price represents a 1.3% discount to the closing price of
Ryerson
common
stock
on
the
day
prior
to
the
announcement
of
the
Platinum
Equity
transaction and a 21.6% discount from the 52 week closing high of $44.00 set on
May 9, 2007.
We
believe
the
transaction
looks
to
preserve
existing
management
rather
than
maximize stockholder value, therefore questioning the intention and execution of the
strategic review process.
Ryerson stockholders deserve a strategic review process singularly focused on
maximizing stockholder value.
It is time for change…

13
Harbinger’s Alternative
Page 14
Harbinger’s Nominees
Page 15
Experience of Harbinger’s Nominees vs. Ryerson’s Current Board
Page 17
The Ryerson Board Needs To Change Now
Page 18
Appendices
Page 19
Ryerson Inc. –
Harbinger’s Nominees

14
Harbinger Has An Alternative Today
Harbinger’s
nominees
boast
invaluable
experience
and
expertise.
They
range
from
veterans of the metal services and related industries to specialists in logistics,
distribution, corporate restructuring and finance.
Harbinger’s nominees, once elected, will immediately initiate an independent and
objective analysis of the Platinum Equity offer.
If the Platinum Equity offer is determined to be undervalued versus stand-alone or
market opportunities, Harbinger’s nominees will immediately undertake a strategic
review process that is singularly focused on maximizing stockholder value.
Operating within the terms of the Platinum Equity merger agreement, Harbinger’s
nominees can conduct due diligence and review any additional offers promptly
following their election, reaching a conclusive recommendation well in advance of the
stockholder vote on Platinum Equity’s offer.
Harbinger’s Independent Nominees Can Provide Stockholders With
The Opportunity To Realize Full And Fair Value For Their Investments

15
Eugene I. Davis
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of PIRINATE
Consulting Group, LLC, a privately held consulting
firm specializing in turn-around management,
merger and acquisition consulting, proxy contests
and strategic planning advisory services for
domestic and international public and private
business entities.
Mr. Davis currently serves as Chairman of the
Board of Directors for Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings,
Inc. and Foamex, Inc. Mr. Davis is also a director
for Knology Broadband, Inc., American Commercial
Lines, Inc., Footstar Inc., PRG Shultz International,
Inc., Ion Media Networks, Inc., Delta Air Lines, Inc.
and Viskase
Companies Inc.
Mr. Davis is a former director of Metals USA, Inc.
Harbinger’s Solution: Experienced and Independent
Directors
Gerald Morris
President and Chief Executive Officer of Intalite
International N.V., a diversified holding company
with investments primarily in the metals fabrication
industry, for over 30 years. 
Mr. Morris is also a director of Metal Management,
Inc. and is a former director of Metals USA, Inc.
Larry J. Liebovich
After 33 years of service, Mr. Liebovich, 58, is the
former President of Liebovich Steel & Aluminum
Company. 
Currently, Mr. Liebovich serves on the Board of
Directors of a private service center company, is a
freelance consultant and is the author of ‘Metal
Distribution My Way’.
Daniel W. Dienst
Chairman of the Board of Metal Management, Inc.,
one of the largest full service metals recyclers in the
United States, since April 2003, as that company’s
Chief Executive Officer since January 2004, as that
company’s President since September 2004 and as
a member of that company’s Board since 2001.
From May 2000 to January 2004, Mr. Dienst
served
as Managing Director of the Corporate and
Leveraged Finance Group of CIBC World Markets
Corp., a diversified global financial services firm.
Mr. Dienst
previously served as the non-executive
Chairman of the Board of Metals USA, Inc.

16
Allen Ritchie
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
Altec
Industries, Inc., a privately-held provider of
equipment and services to the electric utility,
telecommunications and contractor markets.
From August 2001 until November 2006, he was
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of Protective Life Corporation.
Before joining Protective Life, Mr. Ritchie held a
number of senior management roles with AGCO
Corporation from 1991 to 1997 and Per-Se
Technologies, Inc. from 1998 to 2000.
Keith E. Butler
Sole owner of BCS Placements LLC, an NASD
registered broker dealer that focuses on raising
private equity from institutional investors.
Prior to  launching BCS, Mr. Butler worked as an
investment  banker in the transportation sector for
more  than 20 years. At firms including Alex.Brown,
PaineWebber and, until the end of 2003, UBS.
Mr. Butler is  a member of the Board, and a
member of the Audit Committee, of Atlas Air
Worldwide Holdings, Inc.
Richard Kochersperger
Director of the Food Marketing Group, a virtual
educational resource for the food industry.
Previously, he was the Director of the Center for
Food Marketing at Saint Joseph’s University.
Mr. Kochersperger
has designed and implemented
Executive Education programs for several leading
companies including Albertsons/ACME,
Tengelmann, A&P, Ferrero, Fleming, McCormick
and the USDA Cochran Fellowship. He is the
author of several books on Food Logistics and he
produces the Annual Food Industry Logistics
Benchmark for Food Distributors International.
Harbinger’s Solution: Experienced and Independent
Directors (cont’d)

17
Experience of Harbinger’s Nominees vs. Ryerson’s
Current Board
Years of Relevant Industry Experience
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Ryerson's Current Board
Harbinger's Slate
Harbinger’s
slate
of
independent
directors
have
a
cumulative
total
of
71
years
of
relevant industry experience.
Comparatively,
Ryerson’s
current
Board
only
has
13
years.
In
fact,
CEO
Neil
Novich is the only current Ryerson director with any directly relevant industry
experience.
Source: Biographies in company filings.

18
The Ryerson Board Needs To Change Now
Under the stewardship of the current Board, Ryerson has consistently failed to perform
and
has
been
unable
to
create
value
for
stockholders
--
lagging
on
both
measures
of
profitability and inventory management.
Harbinger’s nominees have proven track records in successfully managing companies
and maximizing value for stockholders.
Ryerson stockholders deserve Directors that can provide immediate oversight to the
Platinum Equity transaction and are prepared to initiate a review of strategic alternatives
and to guide Ryerson toward improved operations and profitability.
VOTE FOR CHANGE.  VOTE FOR THE HARBINGER NOMINEES.

19
Appendices
ROIC Assumptions
Page 20
ROIC: RYI vs. Industry
Page 21
EBITDA Margins
Page 22
Case Study: Metals USA, Inc.
Page 23
Case Study: Metal Management, Inc.
Page 26
Case Study: Liebovich
Page 30
Case Study: Ritchie
Page 31

20
Return on Invested Capital Assumptions
Definition:
Return on invested capital (“ROIC”) is calculated as tax-effected EBIT
(adjusted for LIFO expense) divided by the sum of the average working capital
(adjusted for LIFO reserve) and average PP&E.
Assumptions for ROIC calculation:
Assumed a tax rate of 35% for all the years.
Working capital adjusted for LIFO reserve for Ryerson, Earle M. Jorgenson,
Reliance Steel and A.M. Castle.
EBIT has been adjusted for the LIFO charge.
EBIT includes earnings from equity in affiliates only for Reliance, Gibraltar and
Ryerson.
Companies whose fiscal year does not end in December have not been
calendarized
to December year end.
Peer composite includes:
Steel Service Center Composite:  A.M. Castle EMJ (until 3/06), Metals USA
(until
11/05),
Novamerican,
Olympic
Steel,
Reliance
Steel,
Russel
Metals.

21
Below Average ROIC
Over the past nine years, Ryerson has delivered a below average return on invested capital (“ROIC”) of
approximately 5.5% while the service center composite has achieved an average ROIC of 13.6%.
ROIC –
Ryerson vs. Industry
Source: Company filings
Note:
Steel
Service
Center
Composite
Index
includes
AM
Castle,
EMJ
(until
3/06),
Metals
USA
(until
11/05),
Novamerican,
Olympic
Steel,
Reliance
Steel,
Russel
Metals.
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Ryerson
Service Center Composite
Reliance
Ryerson Average: 5.5%
Service Center Composite Average: 13.6%
Reliance Average: 15.8%
Ryerson
Reliance
Service Center
Composite

22
EBITDA Margins
Source: Company filings.
Note:    Companies reporting inventory under the last-in, first-out (LIFO) method are AM Castle, EMJ, Reliance and Ryerson.
Companies
reporting
inventory
under
the
first-in,
first-out
(FIFO)
method
are
Metals
USA,
Novamerican,
Olympic
Steel
and
Russel
Metals.
Company
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Average
Ryerson
4.4%
4.7%
2.4%
-1.0%
0.6%
1.5%
3.6%
4.3%
3.6%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
2.7%
MUSA
7.6%
7.9%
4.8%
1.2%
0.4%
1.8%
11.6%
12.7%
NA
6.0%
EMJ
6.8%
8.1%
8.3%
7.3%
6.9%
6.8%
7.5%
8.9%
NA
7.6%
TONS
6.2%
6.0%
7.6%
6.7%
6.1%
8.5%
7.2%
15.8%
8.5%
8.1%
ZEUS
3.7%
4.1%
1.9%
3.2%
4.3%
2.0%
12.6%
5.6%
6.4%
4.9%
RS
8.4%
9.2%
8.9%
7.0%
5.6%
6.1%
11.8%
12.2%
12.1%
9.0%
CAS
5.9%
5.1%
3.6%
2.0%
0.8%
0.2%
5.3%
8.4%
9.0%
4.5%
RUS
4.9%
5.1%
5.3%
4.7%
6.1%
5.1%
14.2%
8.5%
10.4%
7.1%
Service Center Composite
6.2%
6.5%
5.8%
4.6%
4.3%
4.4%
10.0%
10.3%
9.3%
6.8%

23
CASE STUDY: Metals USA, Inc.
Metals USA filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy on November 14, 2001.
Daniel Dienst, one of the Harbinger nominees for the Ryerson board of directors, advised the Company throughout
the bankruptcy process.
As
part
of
the
restructuring
initiative,
Mr.
Dienst
advised
the
Company
on
the
divestiture
of
eleven
non-core
business units.
The reorganized company emerged from bankruptcy on November 4, 2002,with a new board of directors that
included Eugene Davis, Daniel Dienst
and Gerald Morris, three of Harbinger’s nominees.
Dan Dienst
and Eugene Davis formed the Office of the Chairman and performed all the duties of the Chief
Executive
of
the
Company
until
a
new
Chief
Executive
Officer
was
appointed
by
the
Board.
Within three months the board found and successfully recruited Lourenco Goncalves, an executive with over
20
years
of
industry
experience,
to
serve
as
President
and
Chief
Executive
Officer
to
execute
on
a
plan
to
continue to “rebuild”
the Metals USA brand, increase market share in higher margin products and make
selective value-added acquisitions.
Metals USA, under the leadership of its new board of directors, implemented significant operational
enhancements:
Local / corporate purchasing strategy replaced previous corporate only purchasing strategy, allowing the
Company to more effectively manage its inventory.
By
implementing
price
“pass
through”
provisions
the
Company
reduced
its
exposure
to
raw
material
price
fluctuations.
Centralized IT, HR, strategic planning and treasury functions which streamlined operations and reduced
corporate overhead.
Began trading on the American Stock Exchange and then moved to the Nasdaq to provide the Company
higher visibility with investors.
The board of directors’
management changes throughout the organization and operating initiatives positioned the
Company well to capitalize on a dynamic steel pricing environment.
By May 2005, the board negotiated on an agreement to sell the company resulting in a 96% compounded annual
return
to its stockholders.

24
CASE STUDY: Metals USA, Inc. (cont’d)
Under the leadership of the new board of directors, Metals USA dramatically improved its operating metrics.
From 2003 to the announcement of the sale of Metals USA, EBITDA increased from $16.9 million to $180.5
million.
Over the same time, EBITDA margins increased from 1.8% to 11.2%.
Ryerson’s margins were significantly lower when compared to Metals USA over the same period.
EBITDA
$16.9
$175.7
$180.5
$0.0
$50.0
$100.0
$150.0
$200.0
$250.0
2003
2004
LTM
3/31/05
Revenue
1,618
963
1,510
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2003
2004
LTM
3/31/05
EBITDA Margin
Tons Shipped
1,288
1,501
1,458
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
2003
2004
LTM
3/31/05
11.2%
11.6%
1.8%
1.5%
4.2%
3.6%
0%
4%
8%
12%
16%
2003
2004
LTM
3/31/05
Metals USA
Ryerson
Source: Company filings.

25
CASE STUDY: Metals USA, Inc. (cont’d)
Apollo’s offer price for Metals USA resulted in a 95.9% compounded annual return
since the time it emerged
from bankruptcy, while Ryerson’s stock only produced a 35.3% compounded annual return over the same period.
Indexed Stock Price Performance Since Bankruptcy
Premiums Paid for Metals USA
0.0%
100.0%
200.0%
300.0%
400.0%
500.0%
600.0%
700.0%
Nov 02
May 03
Nov 03
May 04
Nov 04
May 05
Metals USA
Ryerson
11/04/2002
Metals USA announced its
emergence from bankruptcy.
Shares began trading the
following day at $4.00
5/18/2005
Metals USA announced its sale
to Apollo Management for
$22.00 per share
Prior to
Price
Premium
1-Day
$13.89
58.4%
1-Week
$14.58
50.9%
4-Week
$17.36
26.7%
30-Day Average
$16.33
34.7%
Source: Factset.

26
CASE STUDY: Metal Management, Inc.
Metal
Management
filed
for
Chapter
11
bankruptcy
on
November
20,
2000
and
emerged
on
June
29,
2001.
Daniel
Dienst,
a
Harbinger
nominee
for
the
Ryerson
Board
of
Directors,
served
as
financial
advisor
to
the
Company throughout the bankruptcy process.
Mr. Dienst
joined Metal Management’s board of directors on June 29, 2001, upon the Company’s emergence from
bankruptcy.  In April 2003, he was appointed Chairman.
In
January
2004
Mr.
Dienst
was
named
CEO
and
Gerald
Morris,
another
Harbinger
nominee,
joined
the
board
of
directors.
In
September
2004,
Mr.
Dienst
assumed
the
role
of
President.
In October 2001, the Company was re-listed on the Over the Counter Bulletin Board
In March 2003, the Company was re-admitted to the Nasdaq, enhancing the liquidity in the trading of its
stock and increasing the Company’s profile with investors.
Later that same month, the board filed to be listed on the NYSE in order to further improve liquidity in the
stock.
Daniel Dienst
and Metal Management’s new board has focused on improving operations in order to improve the
Company’s earnings:
Increasing inventory turns.
Providing a high level of customer service.
Leveraging its geographic diversity and size to purchase scrap in regions more effectively.

27
CASE STUDY: Metal Management, Inc. (cont’d)
Over the course of Daniel Dienst’s
and Gerald Morris’
tenure with Metal Management, the Company has
completed three acquisitions and entered into two joint ventures, successfully expanding the Company’s
operations from 46 facilities in 14 states to 57 facilities in 17 states.
In November 2003, the Company successfully acquired scrap metal recycling assets in order to increase
volume.
In
January
2005,
the
Company
entered
into
a
joint
venture
agreement
with
Houchens
Industries
to
operate
an existing scrap processing businesses in Kentucky and a start-up operation in Nashville, further expanding
its geographic footprint.
In
March
2005,
the
Company
announced
a
joint
venture
with
Donjan
Marine
to
form
Port
Albany
Venture
which
conducts
stevedoring
and
marine
services
operations
on
the
Hudson
River.
The
joint
venture
allowed
Metal Management to expand its stevedoring and marine services handing business, a core competency for
the Company.
In March 2006, Metal Management completed the acquisition of Morris Recycling.  The transaction was
accretive to stockholders and further solidified its footprint in the Mid-South region.
In February 2007, the board entered an agreement to acquire TIMCO Scrap Processing.  The transaction
was immediately accretive to earnings and increased the Company’s geographic footprint in the Houston
area.
In March 2007, the Company acquired the assets of Mars Industries.
Under the stewardship of the board and management, the company has focused on maximizing stockholder value:
In March 2004, the Company announced a 2-for-1 stock split to increase liquidity of its stock.
In November 2004, the board approved a regular quarterly dividend of 7.5 cents per share of common stock.
In September 2006, the board approved the repurchase of 10% of its outstanding common stock in order to
enhance stockholder value.
The efforts of Daniel Dienst, Gerald Morris and the rest of the board of the directors contributed to a 58.9%
compounded annual rate
of return for investors.

28
Under the leadership of the new board of directors, Metal Management dramatically improved its operating metrics
From 2002 to 2007, EBITDA increased from $6 million to $107 million.
Over the same time, EBITDA margins increased from 0.7% to 6.7%.
EBITDA
Revenue
EBITDA Margin
Tons Shipped
$767
$631
$770
$1,083
$1,702
$1,589
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
$1,800
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
$6
$27
$55
$100
$164
$107
$0
$30
$60
$90
$120
$150
$180
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
4,000
4,250
4,500
4,750
5,000
5,250
5,500
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
400
425
450
475
500
525
550
Ferrous (thousand tons)
Non-Ferrous (million lbs)
0.7%
4.2%
7.1%
9.3%
9.6%
6.7%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
CASE STUDY: Metal Management, Inc. (cont’d)
Source: Company filings.

29
Since the Company began trading on the OTC, the stock has provided a 58.9% compounded annual rate of
return
for its stockholders, while Ryerson’s stock only produced a 23.5% compounded annual return.
Indexed Stock Price Performance Since Bankruptcy
0.0%
200.0%
400.0%
600.0%
800.0%
1000.0%
1200.0%
1400.0%
1600.0%
1800.0%
Nov 01
Apr 03
Sep 04
Jan 06
Jun 07
Metal Management
Ryerson
11/08/2001
Metal Management began
trading on OTC at $3.25
per share
5/27/2007
Metal Management stock
reached an all time high of
$51.45
CASE STUDY: Metal Management, Inc. (cont’d)
Source: Factset.

30
CASE STUDY: Liebovich
Steel & Aluminum Company
Liebovich
Bros., Inc. a wholly owned subsidiary of Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. is a metal distribution company
that supplies the industry with a complete inventory of carbon steels, alloys, tubing, aluminum, and stainless
steel
The Company consists of six divisions: Liebovich
Steel & Aluminum in Rockford, Illinois, Liebovich/PDM in
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Good Metals Co. in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Custom Fabricators in Rockford, Illinois,
and Liebovich
Steel  & Aluminum North near Green Bay, Wisconsin
The Company’s product offering includes carbon steel plates & sheets, full line of carbon bars & structural
beams, angles & channels, all aluminum products, all stainless products, cold finished bars, all tubing & pipe
products, grating products, alloys, and tool steel
Processing capabilities include saw cutting, shearing, flame cutting & plasma cutting, punching, blasting,
heat treating, rotary grinding, and aluminum precision cutting
Liebovich
Bros. was founded in 1939 and is headquartered in Rockford, Illinois
Through a strategy of making select acquisitions and by maintaining a strong focus on customer and mill
relationships, Liebovich
Bros. was able to grow revenues from $2 million in the early 1970’s to over $12 million by
1980
Monitoring customer’s purchasing trends and rapidly turning inventory were key to the Company achieving
its attractive gross margins along with revenue growth
Liebovich
Bros. was acquired by Reliance Steel and Aluminum in 1999.  At the time of acquisition, the Liebovich
Bros.
management
team
and
partners,
under
Larry
Liebovich’s
leadership,
had
grown
LTM
revenues
to
approximately $150 million
Larry Liebovich
was employed by Liebovich
Steel & Aluminum from 1972 to 2005 and served as President
from 1985 until 2005, following 6 years of experience as a part of Reliance Steel & Aluminum

31
AGCO Corporation (“AGCO”) manufactures and distributes agricultural equipment and related replacement parts
worldwide.
Products include tractors, combines, self-propelled sprayers, hay tools, forage equipment, and implements,
as well as a line of diesel engines.
Allen Ritchie left Arthur Anderson in 1991, where he had been working as a financial advisor to AGCO, to join
AGCO’s
senior
management
team
where
he
assisted
in
taking
the
Company
public
in
1992.
In the early 1990s, Allen Ritchie along with AGCO executives launched an aggressive plan to grow the
Company while simultaneously cutting costs and increasing efficiency.
As part of this initiative, the AGCO team focused on improving inventory turns, rationalizing
manufacturing, reducing overhead and cutting sales & marketing expenses.
Additionally they devised an ambitious acquisition strategy to build a comprehensive and efficient
network of dealers that could supply an expansive and reputable product line.
During
his
affiliation
with
the
Company,
Mr.
Ritchie
helped
grow
AGCO
from
an
organization
with
sales
of
$220
million in 1990 to an approximately $2.0 billion market capitalized company with sales of $3.2 billion upon his
departure in 1997.
CASE STUDY: Allen Ritchie
AGCO Stock Price Performance
$0.00
$8.00
$16.00
$24.00
$32.00
$40.00
Apr 92
Feb 93
Dec 93
Sep 94
Jul 95
May 96
Mar 97
Dec 97
04/16/1992
Completed initial public offering
December 1997
Allen Ritchie's departure from
the firm
Source: Factset.

32
In
1997
Ritchie
joined
Per-Se
Technologies,
an
ailing
health
care
company
hemorrhaging
cash
and
troubled
by
stockholder
lawsuits
and
pending
investigations
into
its
medical
billing
practices.
In an effort to turn around the Company, Ritchie was brought in under a three-year contract to conduct a
strategic review of the Company’s operations.
Ritchie assisted in the sale of several of the Company’s non-core business units, and used proceeds
towards the settlement of litigation and to strengthen the balance sheet.
Ritchie,
along
with
the
executive
management
team,
implemented
a
strategy
focused
on
maintaining
relationships, systems’
integration and growth into high-profit segments.
Ritchie’s efforts helped build the foundation of the Company which was recently sold to McKesson
Corporation for $1.8 billion on November 5, 2006.
From August 2001 until November 2006, Allen Ritchie was the CFO of Protective Life Corporation, an insurance
and investment products company.
During his tenure from 2001 to 2006, Ritchie helped reposition the Company by concentrating on its core
medical billing operations and exiting lower margin businesses, focusing on cash flows as opposed to merely
increasing top-line performance.
Over this five-year period the Company’s stock price doubled.
CASE STUDY: Allen Ritchie (cont’d)

August 7, 2007
Ryerson Inc. –
A Need For Change