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                                  RYERSON INC.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                (Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)


                 HARBINGER CAPITAL PARTNERS MASTER FUND I, LTD.
                                       AND
            HARBINGER CAPITAL PARTNERS SPECIAL SITUATIONS FUND, L.P.
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    (Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

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The following  press release was issued by Harbinger  Capital  Partners  Master
Fund I, Ltd. and Harbinger  Capital Partners  Special  Situations Fund, L.P. on
August 15, 2007.




                 HARBINGER CAPITAL PARTNERS ASKS STOCKHOLDERS:
                DO YOU TRUST RYERSON'S BOARD TO MAXIMIZE VALUE?

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

NEW YORK,  AUGUST 15, 2007 - Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. and
Harbinger   Capital   Partners  Special   Situations   Fund,  L.P.   (together,
"Harbinger")  today issued a Letter to Ryerson Inc.'s (NYSE: RYI) stockholders.
This and other information  related to Ryerson is accessible on the Internet at
www.maximizeryersonvalue.com.  The  following  is the  text  of the  letter  to
stockholders:

Dear Ryerson Stockholder:

Do you  trust  Ryerson's  Board of  Directors  to  maximize  the  value of your
investment in Ryerson? As Ryerson's largest  stockholder,  holding over 9.5% of
the  stock,   we  do  not.  The  company  has  tried  any  number  of  ways  to
mischaracterize  our  effort to elect a slate of  independent  and  experienced
directors.  They have accused us of wanting to control the  company.  They have
accused  us  wanting  to  prevent  you  from  voting  on  the  Platinum  Equity
transaction.  In fact, however, our interests,  and yours, are aligned: we each
want to maximize  the value of our  investment  in  Ryerson.  From a history of
lackluster   operating   performance,   to  their  embrace  of  an  unreliable,
below-market bid for the company,  the Ryerson Board has again and again failed
in this essential task.

      THE CURRENT RYERSON BOARD WANTS STOCKHOLDERS TO HELP THEM SAVE FACE

                   CEO NEIL NOVICH WANTS YOU TO SAVE HIS JOB

   HARBINGER WANTS TO ENSURE THAT ALL STOCKHOLDERS RECEIVE MAXIMUM VALUE FOR
      THEIR SHARES AND ARE PROTECTED IN A PERIOD OF HEIGHTENED VOLATILITY

We believe that the current Board and  management  team have  consistently  and
repeatedly  disregarded  stockholder rights and failed to enhance value for the
Company's   stockholders.   There  is  no  hiding  from  the  facts:  Ryerson's
performance, relative to steel and service center peers, has been dismal. While
Ryerson  is one of the  leading  metal  service  center  companies  in terms of
revenues,  management has been unable to translate that position into value for
stockholders. Over the time period from 1998 to 2006 when Ryerson's stock price
declined  nearly 16%, the Service  Center  composite  experienced  a 267% gain.
Ryerson's  claimed "best measure of financial  performance" ROIC of 12% for the
first half of 2007 is less than their average weighted cost of capital of 11.5%
to 14.5%.  In other  words,  they  destroy  value for each  dollar of  invested
capital!

We nominated a slate of independent directors with the experience and expertise
to put  Ryerson  on  the  path  to  executing  its  strategic  plan,  improving
operations and enhancing profitability. How did the Ryerson Board react?

         o     They   delayed   indefinitely   the  Annual   Meeting,   denying
               stockholders the right to vote for new leadership.

         o     They  engaged in a strategic  review  process  triggered  not by
               market opportunities or operational demands, but by their desire
               to  preserve  the  current  management  and avoid being fired by
               shareholders.

         o     While the market expressed  confidence in the potential value of
               Ryerson by driving  the stock  price as high as $44.00 on May 9,
               2007,  they accepted a TAKE-UNDER  bid that keeps  management in
               place but pays stockholders only $34.50,  for a discount of 1.3%
               to the closing price on the day before the  announcement  of the
               transaction and a 21.6% discount to the May 9 price.



         o     They  defended  their actions based on an analysis of fair value
               predicated  on the same  flawed  execution  and low  performance
               hurdles that has made  multi-millionaires  of those  individuals
               who have consistently failed to deliver value to stockholders.

         o     In an  uncertain  debt market,  they signed an  agreement  for a
               leveraged  buy-out  that gives  Platinum  Equity the  unilateral
               ability  to walk from the deal by paying a $25  million  reverse
               termination  fee,  leaving  stockholders  at risk  for a  broken
               transaction or renegotiation by Platinum Equity.

         o     They have  denigrated our directors,  attacking with  particular
               venom the  record of Eugene  Davis,  Daniel  Dienst  and  Gerald
               Morris  with  Metals  USA,  Inc.  But they  cannot  dispute  the
               results: the sale price for Metals USA in the Apollo transaction
               represented a 95.9% compounded  annual return from its emergence
               from  bankruptcy  in November  2002 to the  announcement  of the
               transaction in May 2005. During the same period, Ryerson's stock
               produced only about a third of that return.

         o     They have resorted to scare tactics,  claiming that the election
               of the Harbinger nominees will result in the acceleration of the
               company's debt.  However,  we believe that the Ryerson board has
               the  ability  to  prevent  the  acceleration  of  that  debt  by
               approving  the  election  of  the  Harbinger  nominees.  If  the
               incumbents   would  be  willing  to  have  the  company's   debt
               accelerate in order to preserve themselves in office, we believe
               that  speaks  volumes  about how this board  measures  their own
               interests against those of the stockholders.

                BLINDLY SUPPORTING THE PLATINUM EQUITY OFFER MAY
                    RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT VALUE UNREALIZED.

Ryerson has made much of the fact that we have not committed to supporting  the
Platinum  Equity bid.  Quite  simply,  we are not prepared to rubber stamp this
transaction  and leave the  company's  future in the hands of this Board.  In a
message to company  employees  after the  announcement  of the Platinum  Equity
transaction,  CEO Neil  Novich  stated:  "THERE WILL BE AN  INCREASED  SENSE OF
URGENCY  RELATED TO OUR FINANCIAL  PERFORMANCE.  WHILE OUR STRATEGIC  DIRECTION
WILL REMAIN THE SAME, THERE WILL BE A GROWING  EMPHASIS ON FINANCIAL  RESULTS."
If there is value to be  realized at Ryerson,  why should  Platinum  Equity and
Ryerson's management be the only investors to benefit from that value?

Make no mistake,  our goal is to maximize the value of our investment.  IN THIS
OUR INTERESTS,  AND YOURS, ARE COMPLETELY ALIGNED. That is why we have selected
a slate of directors who are independent and accomplished, with a wide range of
complimentary  experience  and  expertise,  and  with a  shared  commitment  to
maximize stockholder value.

IF THE  PLATINUM  EQUITY OFFER IS IN FACT THE BEST  ALTERNATIVE,  WE EXPECT THE
HARBINGER  NOMINEES WILL SUPPORT THAT  TRANSACTION AND WILL STAND FIRM IN FAVOR
OF SHAREHOLDERS DURING A TIME OF FINANCIAL MARKET UNCERTAINTY.

Harbinger has nominated a slate of seven highly experienced individuals because
we  believe  they  are  uniquely   qualified  to  review  the  Platinum  Equity
transaction  and will act in the best  interests  of all Ryerson  stockholders.
They are fully prepared to undertake  this review,  working  expeditiously  and
within the terms of the merger  agreement,  including  moving towards a vote in
the fourth quarter of 2007.

Most  importantly,   we  believe  Harbinger's  nominees  are  the  best  choice
shareholders  have  to  protect  their  interests  in a  period  of  heightened
uncertainty.  If the current  Board  maintains  control,  we fear that Platinum
Equity may exploit  these  circumstances  by seeking to "re-cut"  its deal with
only a  break-up  fee of less than $1 per share to stand in its way.  Harbinger
does NOT want to find  shareholders  facing the choice between a lowered bid or
suffering through another year of watching Ryerson wallow in mediocrity.

    VISIT OUR WEBSITE AT WWW.MAXIMIZERYERSONVALUE.COM AND SEE FOR YOURSELF.



Stockholders  can judge the experience and  qualifications  of our nominees for
themselves.  Our nominees  boast 71 years of relevant  industry  experience and
range from veterans of the metal services and related industries to specialists
in logistics,  distribution,  corporate  restructuring  and finance.  Visit our
website at  www.maximizeryersonvalue.com  to read about our  nominees and their
experience,  and decide for yourself who is best positioned to guide our mutual
investment.

We strongly encourage Ryerson  stockholders to sign, date, and return the GREEN
proxy card that they have received. If you have previously signed a white proxy
card, you can revoke that vote by immediately  signing,  dating and mailing the
GREEN proxy card you received in the mail.

Stockholders  who  have  questions  about  Harbinger's  solicitation,  or  need
assistance  in voting  their GREEN proxy card,  should call  Harbinger's  proxy
solicitors,   Innisfree  M&A   Incorporated,   Toll-Free  at   888-750-5834  or
212-750-5833 (call collect).

ABOUT HARBINGER CAPITAL PARTNERS
The Harbinger Capital Partners investment team located in New York City manages
in  excess  of $12  billion  in  capital  as of August  1,  2007,  through  two
complementary  strategies.  Harbinger  Capital  Partners Master Fund I, Ltd. is
focused on restructurings,  liquidations,  event-driven situations, turnarounds
and capital  structure  arbitrage,  including both long and short  positions in
highly  leveraged  and  financially  distressed  companies.  Harbinger  Capital
Partners Special Situations Fund, L.P. is focused on medium to long-term equity
investments  with  a  primarily  long  bias,  with  flexibility  to  use  other
investment  strategies and types of securities  when  attractive  opportunities
arise.

Investor contact:
Harbert Management Corporation - John McCullough - 205-987-5576

Media contact:
Sard Verbinnen & Co - Dan Gagnier or Robin Weinberg - 212-687-8080


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