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Contingencies and Other Commitments
9 Months Ended
Sep. 30, 2014
Commitments and Contingencies Disclosure [Abstract]  
Contingencies and Other Commitments
Contingencies and Other Commitments
We operate in a highly regulated and litigious industry. As a result, various lawsuits, claims, and legal and regulatory proceedings have been and can be expected to be instituted or asserted against us. The resolution of any such lawsuits, claims, or legal and regulatory proceedings could materially and adversely affect our financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in a given period.
Litigation By and Against Former Independent Auditor—
In March 2003, claims on behalf of HealthSouth were brought against Ernst & Young, LLP in a stockholder derivative lawsuit initially filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama on August 28, 2002 and captioned Tucker v. Scrushy. The Tucker derivative litigation, including the claims against various other defendants and the $2.9 billion judgment against Mr. Scrushy, our former chairman and chief executive officer, is more fully described in “Derivative Litigation” and “Litigation By and Against Former Independent Auditor” in Note 18, Contingencies and Other Commitments, to the consolidated financial statements accompanying the 2013 Form 10-K. The Tucker complaint alleged that from 1996 through 2002, when Ernst & Young served as our independent auditor, Ernst & Young acted recklessly and with gross negligence in performing its duties, and specifically that Ernst & Young failed to perform reviews and audits of our financial statements with due professional care as required by law and by its contractual agreements with us. The claims further alleged Ernst & Young either knew of or, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered and investigated the fraudulent and improper accounting practices being directed by certain officers and employees, and should have reported them to our board of directors and the audit committee. The claims sought compensatory and punitive damages, disgorgement of fees received from us by Ernst & Young, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
On March 18, 2005, Ernst & Young filed a lawsuit captioned Ernst & Young LLP v. HealthSouth Corp. in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. The complaint alleged we provided Ernst & Young with fraudulent management representation letters, financial statements, invoices, bank reconciliations, and journal entries in an effort to conceal accounting fraud. Ernst & Young claimed that as a result of our actions, Ernst & Young’s reputation had been injured and it incurred damages, expenses, and legal fees. On April 1, 2005, we answered Ernst & Young’s claims and asserted counterclaims related or identical to those asserted in the Tucker action. Upon Ernst & Young’s motion, the Alabama state court referred Ernst & Young’s claims and our counterclaims to arbitration pursuant to a clause in the engagement agreements between HealthSouth and Ernst & Young. In August 2006, we and the derivative plaintiffs agreed to jointly prosecute the claims against Ernst & Young in arbitration.
The trial phase of the arbitration process began on July 12, 2010 before a three-person arbitration panel selected under rules of the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”). On December 18, 2012, the AAA panel granted Ernst & Young’s motion to dismiss our claims on the grounds that HealthSouth was not permitted to pursue its claims since certain of its former officers and employees committed fraudulent acts. The panel also denied and dismissed Ernst & Young’s claims against us. On December 18, 2012, we, together with the stockholder derivative plaintiffs, filed a notice of appeal of the panel’s decision in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. On December 28, 2012, we filed a motion to vacate the decision. We asserted that the panel’s decision was contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act and the duties of a public accounting firm to its corporate clients, and that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by entering an award contrary to Alabama law. On April 25, 2013, the court denied our motion to vacate. On June 4, 2013, we filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama seeking review of the circuit court's denial of our motion to vacate the arbitration panel's decision. On June 13, 2014, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision by the circuit court. On June 27, 2014, we filed an application for rehearing with the Supreme Court of Alabama. On August 22, 2014, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied our application, and as a result, we consider this litigation matter concluded.
General Medicine Action—
On August 16, 2004, General Medicine, P.C. filed a lawsuit against us captioned General Medicine, P.C. v. HealthSouth Corp. seeking the recovery of allegedly fraudulent transfers involving assets of Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation, a former subsidiary of HealthSouth. The lawsuit is pending in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama (the “Alabama Action”).
General Medicine’s underlying claim against Horizon/CMS originates from a services contract entered into in 1995 between General Medicine and Horizon/CMS whereby General Medicine agreed to provide medical director services to skilled nursing facilities owned by Horizon/CMS for a term of three years. Horizon/CMS terminated the agreement for cause six months after it was executed, and General Medicine then initiated a lawsuit against Horizon/CMS in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in 1996 (the “Michigan Action”). General Medicine’s complaint in the Michigan Action alleged that Horizon/CMS breached the services contract by wrongfully terminating General Medicine. We acquired Horizon/CMS in 1997 and sold it to Meadowbrook Healthcare, Inc. in 2001 pursuant to a stock purchase agreement. In 2004, Meadowbrook, without the knowledge of HealthSouth, consented to the entry of a final judgment in the Michigan Action in favor of General Medicine against Horizon/CMS for the alleged wrongful termination of the contract with General Medicine in the amount of $376 million (the “Consent Judgment”). The $376 million damages figure was unilaterally selected by General Medicine and was not tested or opposed by Meadowbrook. Additionally, the settlement agreement (the “Settlement”) used as the basis for the Consent Judgment provided that Meadowbrook would pay only $300,000 to General Medicine to settle the Michigan Action and that General Medicine would seek to recover the remaining balance of the Consent Judgment solely from us. We were not a party to the Michigan Action, the Settlement negotiated by Meadowbrook, or the Consent Judgment.
The complaint filed by General Medicine against us in the Alabama Action alleges that while Horizon/CMS was our wholly owned subsidiary, General Medicine was an existing creditor of Horizon/CMS by virtue of the breach of contract claim underlying the Settlement. The complaint also alleges we caused Horizon/CMS to transfer its assets to us for less than a reasonably equivalent value or, in the alternative, with the actual intent to defraud creditors of Horizon/CMS, including General Medicine, in violation of the Alabama Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. General Medicine further alleges in its amended complaint that we are liable for the Consent Judgment despite not being a party to it because as Horizon/CMS’s parent we failed to observe corporate formalities in our operation and ownership of Horizon/CMS, misused our control of Horizon/CMS, stripped assets from Horizon/CMS, and engaged in other conduct which amounted to a fraud on Horizon/CMS’s creditors. General Medicine has requested relief including recovery of the unpaid amount of the Consent Judgment, the avoidance of the subject transfers of assets, attachment of the assets transferred to us, appointment of a receiver over the transferred properties, and a monetary judgment for the value of properties transferred.
We have denied liability to General Medicine and asserted defenses and a counterclaim against General Medicine that the Consent Judgment is the product of collusion by General Medicine and Meadowbrook. Consequently, we assert that the Consent Judgment is not evidence of a legitimate debt owed by Horizon/CMS to General Medicine that is collectible from HealthSouth under any theory of liability.
In 2008, after we obtained discovery concerning the circumstances that led to the entry of the Consent Judgment, we filed a motion in the Michigan Action asking the court to set aside the Consent Judgment on grounds that it was the product of fraud on the court and collusion by the parties. On May 21, 2009, the court granted our motion to set aside the Consent Judgment on grounds that it was the product of fraud on the court. On March 9, 2010, General Medicine filed an appeal of the court's decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The parties agreed to a voluntary stay of the Alabama Action pending the outcome of General Medicine's appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 10, 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling and reinstated the Consent Judgment. Due to the conclusion of the appeal in the Michigan Action, General Medicine requested reactivation of the Alabama Action in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama. On January 10, 2013, we filed a motion for partial summary judgment in the Alabama Action seeking a declaration that the Consent Judgment obtained by General Medicine is not enforceable against us because, among other reasons, it was the result of collusion. On February 27, 2013, the court denied our motion. The court also indicated it concurred with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that the Consent Judgment did nothing more than establish Horizon/CMS's liability to General Medicine and did not establish the amount of General Medicine’s damages claim against Horizon/CMS or the merits of General Medicine's separate fraudulent conveyance claims against HealthSouth.
On January 9, 2014 and on February 18, 2014, the court in the Alabama Action entered rulings based on General Medicine’s stipulation that it would not rely on the Consent Judgment to prove the amount of its damages claim against Horizon/CMS, which rulings together provided that the $376 million damages figure contained in the Consent Judgment is not admissible at trial and that the issue of collusion with respect to the amount of the Consent Judgment is now moot. Instead of relying on the Consent Judgment to prove damages against Horizon/CMS, General Medicine will be required to prove the amount of any damages it has against Horizon/CMS. General Medicine did, however, indicate it would rely on the Consent Judgment to prove its status as a creditor of Horizon/CMS and that Horizon/CMS is indebted to General Medicine for breaching the 1995 services contract. On March 31, 2014, General Medicine filed a motion seeking partial summary judgment and requesting dismissal of our defenses and counterclaim which allege the Consent Judgment was the product of collusion. In opposition to the motion, we argued the Consent Judgment is collusive in its entirety, not just with respect to the $376 million damages figure, and there has never been a valid adjudication that Horizon/CMS breached its 1995 services contract with General Medicine or that Horizon/CMS is indebted to General Medicine for any amount. On July 15, 2014, the court issued an order denying General Medicine’s motion for partial summary judgment.
On May 3, 2014, the Consent Judgment expired under applicable Michigan law without renewal by General Medicine. Based on the expiration, on July 23, 2014, we filed a motion for summary judgment requesting dismissal of General Medicine’s lawsuit against us on grounds that General Medicine is no longer a “creditor” of Horizon/CMS, which is an essential element of the fraudulent transfer and alter ego claims against us, and that General Medicine’s lawsuit against us is now moot. On August 13, 2014, the court denied our motion for summary judgment.
The trial began on September 15, 2014. On September 16, 2014, the court issued a provisional ruling precluding us from offering any evidence at trial that the Consent Judgment was the product of collusion by General Medicine and Meadowbrook, unless General Medicine opens the door by introducing evidence of the $376 million amount of the Consent Judgment. On September 18, 2014, the court granted General Medicine’s motion for a mistrial based on certain statements made during opening statements. The Alabama Action has been reset for trial beginning on March 9, 2015.
On September 24, 2014, we filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Alabama requesting that it review the trial court’s August 13, 2014 order denying our motion for summary judgment. A petition for writ of mandamus is a discretionary appeal, rather than an appeal as a matter of right. If the supreme court agrees to hear our petition, it will direct the parties to submit briefs on the merits and will most likely stay the March 9, 2015 trial until it renders a decision. If it does not agree to hear our petition, then the case is expected to proceed to trial on that date.
We intend to vigorously defend ourselves against General Medicine’s claims. Based on the stage of litigation, review of the current facts and circumstances as we understand them, the nature of the underlying claim, the results of the proceedings to date, and the nature and scope of the defense we continue to mount, we do not believe an adverse judgment or settlement is probable in this matter, and it is also not possible to estimate the amount of loss, if any, or range of possible loss that might result from an adverse judgment or settlement of this case.
Other Litigation—
We have been named as a defendant in a lawsuit filed March 28, 2003 by several individual stockholders in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, captioned Nichols v. HealthSouth Corp. The plaintiffs allege that we, some of our former officers, and our former investment bank engaged in a scheme to overstate and misrepresent our earnings and financial position. The plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive damages. This case was consolidated with the Tucker case for discovery and other pretrial purposes and was stayed in the Circuit Court on August 8, 2005. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 9, 2010 to which we responded with a motion to dismiss filed on December 22, 2010. During a hearing on February 24, 2012, plaintiffs’ counsel indicated his intent to dismiss certain claims against us. Instead, on March 9, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include additional securities fraud claims against HealthSouth and add several former officers to the lawsuit. On September 12, 2012, the plaintiffs further amended their complaint to request certification as a class action. One of those named officers has repeatedly attempted to remove the case to federal district court, most recently on December 11, 2012. We filed our latest motion to remand the case back to state court on January 10, 2013. On September 27, 2013, the federal court remanded the case back to state court. We intend to vigorously defend ourselves in this case. Based on the stage of litigation, review of the current facts and circumstances as we understand them, the nature of the underlying claim, the results of the proceedings to date, and the nature and scope of the defense we continue to mount, we do not believe an adverse judgment or settlement is probable in this matter, and it is also not possible to estimate the amount of loss, if any, or range of possible loss that might result from an adverse judgment or settlement of this case.
Governmental Inquiries and Investigations—
On June 24, 2011, we received a document subpoena addressed to HealthSouth Hospital of Houston, a long-term acute care hospital (“LTCH”) we closed in August 2011, and issued from the Dallas, Texas office of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Inspector General (the “HHS-OIG”). The subpoena stated it was in connection with an investigation of possible false or otherwise improper claims submitted to Medicare and Medicaid and requested documents and materials relating to patient admissions, length of stay, and discharge matters at this closed LTCH. We furnished the documents requested and have heard nothing from HHS-OIG since December 2012.
On March 4, 2013, we received document subpoenas from an office of the HHS-OIG addressed to four of our hospitals. Those subpoenas also requested complete copies of medical records for 100 patients treated at each of those hospitals between September 2008 and June 2012. The investigation is being conducted by the United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”). On April 24, 2014, we received document subpoenas relating to an additional seven of our hospitals. The new subpoenas reference substantially similar investigation subject matter as the original subpoenas and request materials from the period January 2008 through December 2013. Two of the four hospitals addressed in the original set of subpoenas have received supplemental subpoenas to cover this new time period. The new subpoenas do not include requests for specific patient files, but it is expected that such requests will be made for the new group of hospitals.
All of the subpoenas are in connection with an investigation of alleged improper or fraudulent claims submitted to Medicare and Medicaid and request documents and materials relating to practices, procedures, protocols and policies, of certain pre- and post-admissions activities at these hospitals including, among other things, marketing functions, pre-admission screening, post-admission physician evaluations, patient assessment instruments, individualized patient plans of care, and compliance with the Medicare 60% rule. Under the Medicare rule commonly referred to as the “60% rule,” an inpatient rehabilitation hospital must treat 60% or more of its patients from at least one of a specified list of medical conditions in order to be reimbursed at the inpatient rehabilitation hospital payment rates, rather than at the lower acute care hospital payment rates.
We are cooperating fully with the DOJ in connection with these subpoenas and are currently unable to predict the timing or outcome of the related investigations.
Other Matters—
The False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287, allows private citizens, called “relators,” to institute civil proceedings alleging violations of the False Claims Act. These qui tam cases are generally sealed by the court at the time of filing. The only parties typically privy to the information contained in the complaint are the relator, the federal government, and the presiding court. It is possible that qui tam lawsuits have been filed against us and that those suits remain under seal or that we are unaware of such filings or prevented by existing law or court order from discussing or disclosing the filing of such suits. We may be subject to liability under one or more undisclosed qui tam cases brought pursuant to the False Claims Act.
It is our obligation as a participant in Medicare and other federal healthcare programs to routinely conduct audits and reviews of the accuracy of our billing systems and other regulatory compliance matters. As a result of these reviews, we have made, and will continue to make, disclosures to the HHS-OIG and the United States Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services relating to amounts we suspect represent over-payments from these programs, whether due to inaccurate billing or otherwise. Some of these disclosures have resulted in, or may result in, HealthSouth refunding amounts to Medicare or other federal healthcare programs.