EMMIS COMMUNICATIONS BOARD OF DIRECTORS URGED TO RECONSIDER SALE OF COMPANY FOR
POTENTIAL 40% PREMIUM BY ARNHOLD AND S. BLEICHROEDER ADVISERS, LLC

NEW YORK, Sept. 27, 2006 - Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder Advisers, LLC today
announced that it that it has sent the following letter to the Board of
Directors of Emmis Communications Corporation (Nasdaq: EMMS):

         September 27, 2006

         The Board of Directors
         Emmis Communications Corporation
         One Emmis Plaza
         40 Monument Circle-Suite 700
         Indianapolis, IN  46204

         Members of the Board:

         Our firm and funds that we advise are holders of 650,000 shares of
Emmis Communications Class A common stock, which represents approximately 1.7%
of all common shares outstanding. In an amended 13D filing issued on September
18, 2006, Emmis Chairman and CEO Jeffrey Smulyan disclosed that after
withdrawing his $15.25 buy-out offer for Emmis on August 4, 2006, he engaged in
exploratory discussions with the Special Committee regarding the "potential
reinstitution of a proposal at a price of $16.80 per share in cash." The filing
indicates that although these discussions ended on or around August 31, 2006,
Mr. Smulyan may in the future seek to engage in discussions with the Board of
Emmis regarding "a potential offer with different terms" and may "determine to
make a similar proposal on different terms," signaling his ongoing interest in
taking Emmis private. We note that $16.80 represents a premium of 40% to the
average closing price of Emmis shares on the five trading days prior to the date
of this 13D filing. We are writing to express our firmly held view that the
Board's apparent decision not to pursue a transaction at a premium of this
magnitude was simply not in the best interests of shareholders. We urge the
Board to take whatever actions necessary to revive discussions with Mr. Smulyan
and proceed expeditiously toward a definitive agreement with him and a
shareholder vote on the matter.

         When Mr. Smulyan originally withdrew his $15.25 proposal in early
August, it was unclear exactly what went wrong. In the press release issued by
Mr. Smulyan, he alluded to a "downturn in the financing markets" as well as a
decline in broadcasting valuations. We believe many investors at the time
assumed Mr. Smulyan could not obtain the financing required to consummate the
transaction. Subsequent press reports, however, including an August 8 article in
THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, indicated that Mr. Smulyan's proposal was withdrawn
because the Special Committee demanded too high a price, even though he had
offered to increase the take-out price. Mr. Smulyan's SEC filing from September
18 further clarifies the situation, noting that he expected to receive "executed
commitment letters" from his financial backers once an agreement was finalized.
At this point, we can only conclude that responsibility for a deal not being
reached with Mr. Smulyan lies squarely on the shoulders of the members of the
Special





Committee, who have apparently decided that a buy-out at or above $15.25
per share, and perhaps even as high as $16.80 per share, is inadequate.

         Why would the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of a
struggling public company in a struggling industry spurn repeated efforts to
take the company private at a substantial premium? We believe the answer lies in
an extreme over-reaction to perceived conflicts of interest arising out of Mr.
Smulyan's personal and professional ties to Board members, including the fact
that only two of the nine Board members (and only one Special Committee member)
were elected by Class A shareholders voting as a single class. As noted in the
company's proxy statement from June, 2006, through his 100% ownership of all
outstanding Class B shares, Mr. Smulyan controls approximately 48.9% of the
voting power of all Emmis common shares and therefore effectively determines
seven of the nine Board members who are elected by a majority vote of all
outstanding common shares. In addition, these Class B shares provide Mr. Smulyan
supermajority voting rights that now empower him to prevent the sale of the
company to any other party.

         We suspect that, to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the Special
Committee has refused to support a proposal from Mr. Smulyan that does not
achieve, or come very close to, the full private market value of the company's
assets. As a number of sell-side analysts have recently demonstrated, and the
valuation work of the Special Committee's own advisers may have confirmed, the
liquidation of Emmis's radio stations and other assets could possibly generate
more than $20 per share in value on an after-tax basis. At the current share
price of approximately $12 per share, Emmis trades at approximately 10 times
estimates of 2007 total company EBITDA and approximately 8.5 times segment
EBITDA (excluding corporate overhead). In 2006, benchmark radio asset
transactions have taken place at 12 to 13 times forward estimates of broadcast
cash flow, including Entercom's acquisition this August of 15 stations from CBS.
By our analysis, the opportunity to capture a higher multiple for radio cash
flows in the private market, combined with the potential to eliminate corporate
overhead (which depresses total company EBITDA by 20-25%), results in a
liquidation value for Emmis at or above $20 per share.

         We believe members of the Special Committee and the Board might have
felt vulnerable to criticism if they recommended a transaction at a price that
represented a discount to their advisers' estimates of the full private market
value of the company's assets, even if it involved a 40% premium to the trading
price of the shares. There is a fatal flaw with this reasoning, however, in that
liquidation value is only relevant if it can be realized. The unfortunate
reality is that Mr. Smulyan is the controlling shareholder of this company, and
he has chosen to oppose any alternative transaction. A proper valuation must
apply a substantial minority discount to the Class A shares.

         Nonetheless, it should not be the primary motivation of a director of a
public company to inoculate himself or herself from any possible criticism. The
primary concern should be to act in the best interests of shareholders for whom
board members act as fiduciaries. As a general matter, we find it difficult to
defend the proposition that to deny shareholders a potential 40% premium on
their shares is to act in their best interests. In the case of Emmis, we find
this proposition impossible to defend, for several reasons:





(1)   THE BOARD HAS NOT OUTLINED ANY ALTERNATIVE PATH TO ACHIEVE FULL PRIVATE
      MARKET VALUE. If the Special Committee truly believes shareholders are
      entitled to $20 per share or more in value, they should put forth a plan
      to get us there. Other than the sale of the company to a third party, the
      only conceivable way is to pursue a liquidation strategy, selling the
      company's core radio assets in the private market and using the proceeds
      to pay down debt, buyback shares or return cash to shareholders directly.
      The $4 special cash dividend announced on September 18, 2006 is a token
      gesture at best, as it merely distributes cash from a previously announced
      non-core asset sale that we believe was otherwise intended to pay down
      debt. If the Board won't support a transaction at anything less than
      liquidation value, why has the Board not initiated the process of putting
      the company's assets into a liquidating trust?

(2)   MR. SMULYAN REFUSES TO SUPPORT A TRANSACTION WITH A THIRD PARTY. While the
      sale of the company to a third party would obviously offer the potential
      to obtain maximum value, it simply will not happen without Mr. Smulyan's
      support. Class A shareholders, who have some 80% of the economic ownership
      of Emmis Communications, are not only deprived of voting control over the
      company, now the Board denies them the opportunity to vote on the sale of
      the company under the one set of circumstances in which they can actually
      determine the outcome.

(3)   EMMIS IS NOT VIABLE AS A PUBLIC COMPANY THAT CAN CREATE LONG-TERM VALUE
      FOR SHAREHOLDERS. As we believe the announcement of a $4 special cash
      dividend suggests, Emmis faces a problem buying back shares at this point
      because of the already limited public float. With inconsistent and
      declining broadcasting cash flows, operating in an industry facing
      significant competitive challenges, Emmis clearly belongs in private
      hands, a point that was obviously not lost on the founder of this company.
      Corporate overhead costs, which consume as much as a quarter of the total
      company's operating income, are completely mismatched relative to the
      current scope of the company's broadcasting operations, especially as
      Emmis has continued to divest non-core assets. Moreover, Mr. Smulyan
      continues on as Chairman and CEO, while stating in SEC filings that he may
      seek to acquire the company or otherwise increase his ownership of Emmis
      again in the future. This raises the question: in which direction--up or
      down--does Mr. Smulyan have the personal financial incentive to see the
      stock price move?

(4)   TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE. If the Special Committee is holding out for the
      day Mr. Smulyan capitulates and agrees to auction the company or its
      assets, the Board should ask itself, does the extra potential
      consideration justify the delay and additional risk? There is no evidence
      that Emmis's core radio assets will experience a turnaround anytime soon,
      there is no guarantee that the gap between public and private market
      multiples for radio cash flows will be sustained, and there is no
      assurance that the credit markets will remain accommodative. Logically,
      Mr. Smulyan will only put the company up for sale once he's convinced that
      the future of the business and the industry is truly bleak--at which
      point, potential third party bidders may share the same view.




(5)   EVERYONE COULD BENEFIT. Typically, it's management that seeks to remain
      entrenched, while shareholders push for a transaction. In this case, all
      Emmis "stakeholders" stand to benefit from a deal with Mr. Smulyan.
      Management would keep control of the company. Emmis's corporate office
      would likely remain intact. Emmis employees would not only keep their
      jobs, they would have the opportunity to join Mr. Smulyan in his effort to
      pursue a growth strategy at Emmis as a private company unencumbered by the
      demands of the public market. As for the company's shareholders, we are
      highly confident that a transaction in the neighborhood of $16.80 per
      share would be quite well received. While we realize there was some
      initial resistance from shareholders when the $15.25 proposal was first
      announced (at a time when broadcasting valuations were much healthier), we
      suggest that had more to do with expectations that the Board, given its
      history and Mr. Smulyan's influence over its composition, would not go out
      of its way to extract a better price from him. Perhaps this message was
      heard all too well. We encourage Board members of Emmis to consult with
      the investors who actually own Emmis shares and find out how they would
      regard the opportunity to realize an immediate 40% increase in the value
      of those shares.

      We believe the Board of Directors should pursue the following course of
 action: Reconstitute the Special Committee and invite Mr. Smulyan back to the
 negotiating table. Put together a transaction at a price in the range of what
 was indicated in his 13D filing. If the Board is not comfortable recommending
 the transaction because the price is less than some theoretical maximum value
 contained in a banker's fairness opinion, then why not hold a vote without any
 Board recommendation at all? We note that Indiana Business Corporation Law
 (specifically, Title 23, Article 1, Chapter 40, Section 3) permits a Board of
 Directors to submit a plan of merger without a recommendation under certain
 circumstances. Ask Mr. Smulyan to exclude himself from voting on the
 transaction, such that the affirmative vote of a majority of minority
 shareholders is required. If a deal is struck in the vicinity of $16.80, we
 would be quite surprised if the transaction did not receive overwhelming
 shareholder support.

      Please feel free to contact us at any time to discuss these matters
further. Thank you for considering our views on what we believe is realistically
the best possible outcome for our investment in Emmis Class A shares.

      Yours truly,

      Robert J. Hordon     Jason B. Dahl             Jonathan R. Spitzer
      Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder Advisers, LLC



FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Contact: Robert Hordon
Company: Arnhold and S. Bleichroeder Advisers, LLC
Phone: (212) 698-3124