-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Proc-Type: 2001,MIC-CLEAR Originator-Name: webmaster@www.sec.gov Originator-Key-Asymmetric: MFgwCgYEVQgBAQICAf8DSgAwRwJAW2sNKK9AVtBzYZmr6aGjlWyK3XmZv3dTINen TWSM7vrzLADbmYQaionwg5sDW3P6oaM5D3tdezXMm7z1T+B+twIDAQAB MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA, WTbVGBd+QBKkF7Nf3Zmg63JrKqxdxCbTjg3o4GYdDxyD08nsZkQStisGH+R6fGw7 KIypLpVmLHgYDSFE1Q08qA== 0001193125-04-101599.txt : 20040610 0001193125-04-101599.hdr.sgml : 20040610 20040610152749 ACCESSION NUMBER: 0001193125-04-101599 CONFORMED SUBMISSION TYPE: SC TO-T/A PUBLIC DOCUMENT COUNT: 46 FILED AS OF DATE: 20040610 GROUP MEMBERS: PEPPER ACQUISITION CORP. SUBJECT COMPANY: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: PEOPLESOFT INC CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0000875570 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: SERVICES-PREPACKAGED SOFTWARE [7372] IRS NUMBER: 680137069 STATE OF INCORPORATION: DE FISCAL YEAR END: 1231 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: SC TO-T/A SEC ACT: 1934 Act SEC FILE NUMBER: 005-42583 FILM NUMBER: 04858261 BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: 4460 HACIENDA DRIVE CITY: PLEASANTON STATE: CA ZIP: 94588-8618 BUSINESS PHONE: 925-225-3000 MAIL ADDRESS: STREET 1: 4460 HACIENDA DRIVE CITY: PLEASANTON STATE: CA ZIP: 94588-8618 FILED BY: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: ORACLE CORP /DE/ CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0000777676 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: SERVICES-PREPACKAGED SOFTWARE [7372] IRS NUMBER: 942871189 STATE OF INCORPORATION: DE FISCAL YEAR END: 0531 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: SC TO-T/A BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: 500 ORACLE PKWY CITY: REDWOOD CITY STATE: CA ZIP: 94065 BUSINESS PHONE: 6505067000 MAIL ADDRESS: STREET 1: 500 ORACLE PARKWAY STREET 2: MAIL STOP 5 OP 7 CITY: REDWOOD CITY STATE: CA ZIP: 94065 FORMER COMPANY: FORMER CONFORMED NAME: ORACLE SYSTEMS CORP DATE OF NAME CHANGE: 19920703 SC TO-T/A 1 dsctota.htm AMENDMENT NO. 60 TO SC TO-T Amendment No. 60 to SC TO-T

UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549


Amendment No. 60

to

SCHEDULE TO

(RULE 14d-100)

Tender Offer Statement Pursuant to Section 14(d)(1) or 13(e)(1) of

the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

PEOPLESOFT, INC.

(Name of Subject Company)

PEPPER ACQUISITION CORP.

ORACLE CORPORATION

(Names of Filing Persons—Offeror)

COMMON STOCK, PAR VALUE $0.01 PER SHARE

(Title of Class of Securities)


712713106

(Cusip Number of Class of Securities)

Daniel Cooperman

Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary

Oracle Corporation

500 Oracle Parkway

Redwood City, California 94065

Telephone: (650) 506-7000

(Name, Address and Telephone Number of Person Authorized to Receive Notices

and Communications on Behalf of Filing Persons)

Copies to:

William M. Kelly

Davis Polk & Wardwell

1600 El Camino Real

Menlo Park, California 94025

Telephone: (650) 752-2000

CALCULATION OF FILING FEE

     
Transaction Valuation*   Amount of Filing Fee**
$7,662,396,777   $857,534
     
*   Estimated for purposes of calculating the amount of filing fee only. Transaction value derived by multiplying 364,876,037 (the number of shares of common stock of the subject company outstanding as of May 4, 2004 (according to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by the subject company on May 10, 2004) by $21.00 (the purchase price per share offered by Offeror).
**   The amount of the filing fee is calculated in accordance with Rule 0-11 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (i) with respect to the fee paid on February 4, 2004, equals 0.00012670% of the transaction valuation based on Fee Rate Advisory #7 for Fiscal Year 2004 issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 28, 2004, and (ii) with respect to fees paid prior to February 4, 2004, equals 0.00008090% of the transaction valuation based on Fee Rate Advisory #11 for Fiscal Year 2003 issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on February 21, 2003.
x   Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing with which the offsetting fee was previously paid. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.
Amount Previously Paid:   $270,941   Filing Party:   Oracle Corporation
Form or Registration No.:   SC TO-T/A   Date Filed:   February 4, 2004
Amount Previously Paid:   $87,131   Filing Party:   Oracle Corporation
Form or Registration No.:   SC TO-T/A   Date Filed:   July 24, 2003
Amount Previously Paid:   $89,647   Filing Party:   Oracle Corporation
Form or Registration No.:   SC TO-T/A   Date Filed:   June 18, 2003
Amount Previously Paid:   $409,815   Filing Party:   Oracle Corporation
Form or Registration No.:   SC TO-T   Date Filed:   June 9, 2003
¨   Check the box if the filing relates solely to preliminary communications made before the commencement of a tender offer.

Check the appropriate boxes below to designate any transactions to which the statement relates:

x   third-party tender offer subject to Rule 14d-1.
¨   issuer tender offer subject to Rule 13e-4.
¨   going-private transaction subject to Rule 13e-3.
¨   amendment to Schedule 13D under Rule 13d-2.

Check the following box if the filing is a final amendment reporting the results of the tender offer.  ¨

 



Items 1 through 9, and Item 11.

 

This Amendment No. 60 to Tender Offer Statement on Schedule TO amends and supplements the statement originally filed on June 9, 2003, as amended, by Oracle Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“Parent”), and Pepper Acquisition Corp. (the “Purchaser”), a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of Parent. This Schedule TO relates to the offer by the Purchaser to purchase all outstanding shares of common stock, par value $0.01 per share, and the associated preferred stock purchase rights (together, the “Shares”), of PeopleSoft, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), at $21.00 per Share, net to the seller in cash, without interest, upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Amended and Restated Offer to Purchase, dated February 12, 2004, as amended (the “Amended and Restated Offer to Purchase”), and in the related Amended and Restated Letter of Transmittal (which, together with any amendments or supplements thereto, collectively constitute the “Offer”). The information set forth in the Amended and Restated Offer to Purchase and the related Amended and Restated Letter of Transmittal is incorporated herein by reference with respect to Items 1 through 9 and 11 of this Schedule TO.

 

Item 10.    Financial Statements.

 

Not applicable.

 

Item 11.    Additional Information.

 

On June 7, 2004, trial in the case of United States of America, et al. v. Oracle Corporation began in the United States District Court, Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, the Honorable Vaughn R. Walker presiding. Parent’s answer to the complaint is filed herewith as Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxix). Parent’s trial brief is filed herewith as Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxx). Parent’s list of witnesses expected to be called at trial is filed herewith as Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxxi). Slides that were displayed during Parent’s opening statement are filed herewith as Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxxii).


Item 12.    Exhibits.

 

(a)(1)(i)    Offer to Purchase dated June 9, 2003.*
(a)(1)(ii)    Form of Letter of Transmittal.*
(a)(1)(iii)    Form of Notice of Guaranteed Delivery.*
(a)(1)(iv)    Form of Letter to Brokers, Dealers, Commercial Banks, Trust Companies and Other Nominees.*
(a)(1)(v)    Form of Letter to Clients for use by Brokers, Dealers, Commercial Banks, Trust Companies and Other Nominees.*
(a)(1)(vi)    Guidelines for Certification of Taxpayer Identification Number on Substitute Form W-9.*
(a)(1)(vii)    Form of summary advertisement dated June 9, 2003.*
(a)(1)(viii)    Amended and Restated Offer to Purchase dated July 24, 2003.*
(a)(1)(ix)    Form of Amended and Restated Letter of Transmittal.*
(a)(1)(x)    Form of Amended and Restated Notice of Guaranteed Delivery.*
(a)(1)(xi)    Amended and Restated Offer to Purchase dated February 12, 2004.*
(a)(1)(xii)    Form of Amended and Restated Letter of Transmittal.*
(a)(1)(xiii)    Form of Amended and Restated Notice of Guaranteed Delivery.*
(a)(1)(xiv)    Form of Letter to Brokers, Dealers, Commercial Banks, Trust Companies and Other Nominees.*
(a)(1)(xv)    Form of Letter to Clients for use by Brokers, Dealers, Commercial Banks, Trust Companies and Other Nominees.*
(a)(5)(i)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 6, 2003.*
(a)(5)(ii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 9, 2003.*
(a)(5)(iii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted June 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(iv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(v)    Slide presentation by Parent, dated June 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(vi)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(vii)    Complaint and Jury Demand filed in the District Court for the City and County of Denver, Colorado on June 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(viii)    Complaint filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo on June 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(ix)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(x)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xi)    Complaint filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on June 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xii)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xiii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xiv)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xvi)    Complaint filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County, on June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xvii)    Transcript of Conference Call held by Parent on June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xviii)    Investor presentation by Parent, dated June 18, 2003.*


(a)(5)(xix)    Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xx)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 19, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxi)    Email statement to press issued by Parent, dated June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 20, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxiii)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 23, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxiv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 24, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxv)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 27, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxvi)    Text of email message to Parent employees dated June 26, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxvii)    Email statement to press issued by Parent, dated June 29, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxviii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxix)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxx)    Letter to PeopleSoft customers, dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxi)    Case study dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxii)    Information regarding Parent customer support dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxiii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxiv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 1, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 2, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxvi)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 3, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxvii)    Amended text of information on Parent’s internal website, posted July 9, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxviii)    Text of material prepared for presentation to analysts, dated July 9, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxix)    Transcript of portion of webcast presentation to analysts pertaining to the tender offer, dated July 9, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxx)    Text of e-mail message to PeopleSoft User Group, dated July 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxi)    Advertisement placed by Parent on July 11, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 14, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxiii)    Text of letter to partners, sent July 14, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxiv)    Questions and answers for PeopleSoft customers, dated July 14, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 15, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxvi)    Advertisement placed by Parent on July 15, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxvii)    Transcript of “town hall” presentation to PeopleSoft customers, dated July 17, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxviii)    Advertisement placed by Parent on July 2, 2003.*
(a)(5)(il)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(l)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 17, 2003.*
(a)(5)(li)    Transcript of “Oracle Beat” presentation to Parent employees, dated July 17, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 24, 2003.*
(a)(5)(liii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated August 8, 2003.*
(a)(5)(liv)    Transcript of portion of webcast comments pertaining to the tender offer, from CIBC World Markets Enterprise Software Conference on August 6, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lv)    Transcript of portion of webcast Q&A session pertaining to the tender offer, from CIBC World Markets Enterprise Software Conference on August 6, 2003.*


(a)(5)(lvi)    Text of portion of slide presentation pertaining to the tender offer, prepared for CIBC World Markets Enterprise Software Conference on August 6, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lvii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on August 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lviii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted August 15, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lix)    Text of letter to customers, sent August 22, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lx)    Notice of “town hall” meeting, sent August 22, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxi)    Comments by Parent spokesman, provided August 26, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated August 27, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxiii)    Transcript of “town hall” presentation to PeopleSoft customers, dated September 3, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxiv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated September 4, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxv)    Text of employee announcement on Parent’s internal website, dated September 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxvi)    Stipulation and Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo on August 15, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxvii)    Order Granting Stipulation Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, issued by the District Court for the City and County of Denver, Colorado on August 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxviii)    First Amended Complaint filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on August 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxix)    Demurrer filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on September 11, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxx)    Amended Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on August 4, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxi)    Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and related documents filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on August 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxii)    Transcript of portion of earnings conference call pertaining to tender offer, held September 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxiii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on October 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxiv)    Transcript of portion of annual meeting pertaining to tender offer, held October 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxv)    Redacted slide presentation from annual meeting held October 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxvi)    Amended text of information on Parent’s internal website dated September 4, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxvii)    Order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on November 5, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxviii)    Text of email message to analysts, dated October 27, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxix)    Text of press release issued by Parent on November 7, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxx)    Motion to Expedite Proceedings (redacted) filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on November 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxi)    Notice of Motion, Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Proposed Order filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on November 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxii)    Notice of Motion, Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Proposed Order filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on November 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxiii)    Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief conditionally filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on November 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxiv)    Transcript of portion of presentation to Goldman Sachs Software Retreat pertaining to tender offer, held November 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxv)    Text of email message to Parent employees dated November 17, 2003.*


(a)(5)(lxxxvi)    Text of press release issued by Parent on November 24, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxvii)    Transcript of conference call held by Parent on November 24, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxviii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted November 25, 2003.*
(a)(5)(1xxxix)    Notice of Motion, Revised Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Proposed Order filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on December 8, 2003.*
(a)(5)(1xxxx)    Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief conditionally filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on December 8, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxi)    Second Amended Complaint (Redacted) filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on December 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on December 19, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxiii)    Transcript of portion of presentation to Soundview Investor Bus Tour pertaining to tender offer, held January 7, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxiv)    Text of press release issued by Parent on January 23, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxv)    Text of press release issued by Parent on February 4, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxvi)    Text of communication to customers dated February 4, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxvii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted February 4, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxviii)    Form of summary advertisement dated February 5, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxix)    Demurrer filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on January 20, 2004.*
(a)(5)(c)    Transcript of portion of Corporate Q&A at AppsWorld Financial Analyst Day pertaining to the tender offer, held January 28, 2004.*
(a)(5)(ci)    Text of press release issued by Parent on February 9, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on February 10, 2004.*
(a)(5)(ciii)   

Transcript of portion of comments to Merrill Lynch Computer Services and Software:

CEO Conference 2004, held February 11, 2004.*

(a)(5)(civ)    Text of letter to PeopleSoft Stockholder dated February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cv)    Text of letter to PeopleSoft Stockholder dated February 12, 2004; first distributed February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cvi)    Investor Presentation by Parent, dated February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cvii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cviii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cix)    Investor Presentation by Parent, dated February 25, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cx)    Text of Editorial in The Wall Street Journal, published February 23, 2004; redistributed by Parent on February 25, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxi)    Order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on February 25, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxii)    Order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on February 25, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxiii)    Text of press release by Parent, dated February 26, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxiv)    Text of press release by Parent, dated February 26, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxv)    Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division on February 26, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxvi)    Transcript of presentation to Quest User Group, held March 1, 2004.*


(a)(5)(cxvii)    Text of letter to J.D. Edwards customers, dated March 1, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxviii)    Answer by Parent filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division on March 4, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxix)    Text of email message to Parent employees dated March 5, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxx)    Email statement to press issued by Parent, dated March 12, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxi)    Text of press release by Parent, dated April 15, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxii)    Transcript of portion of comments to JP Morgan Technology & Telecom Conference pertaining to the tender offer, held May 4, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxiii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on May 14, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxiv)    Transcript of portion of presentation to Merrill Lynch European Roadshow Conference pertaining to the tender offer, held April 27, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxv)    Text of information on Parent’s website, revised June 7, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxvi)    Text of information on Parent’s website, revised June 4, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxvii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, revised June 4, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxviii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, revised June 4, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxix)    Answer filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division on March 4, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxx)    Trial Memorandum filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division on June 1, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxxi)    List of witnesses intended to be called at trial, delivered March 22, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxxii)    Slides displayed during Parent’s opening statement at trial, June 7, 2004.
(b)(1)    Commitment letter described in Section 10, “Source and Amount of Funds” of the Offer to Purchase (the “Commitment Letter”).*
(b)(2)   

Side Letter to the Commitment Letter.*

(b)(3)    364-Day Revolving Credit Agreement described in Section 10, “Source and Amount of Funds” of the Offer to Purchase.*
(b)(4)    Corrected Schedule 2 to 364-Day Revolving Credit Agreement.*
(c)    Not applicable.
(d)    Not applicable.
(e)    Not applicable.
(f)    Not applicable.
(g)    Not applicable.
(h)    Not applicable.

*   Previously filed


SIGNATURE

 

After due inquiry and to the best of my knowledge and belief, I certify that the information set forth in this statement is true, complete and correct.

 

Dated:  June 10, 2004

 

ORACLE CORPORATION

 

By:  

    /s/    SAFRA CATZ


    Name:   Safra Catz
    Title:   President
PEPPER ACQUISITION CORP.
By:  

    /s/    SAFRA CATZ


    Name:   Safra Catz
    Title:   President


EXHIBIT INDEX

 

Index No.


    
(a)(1)(i)    Offer to Purchase dated June 9, 2003.*
(a)(1)(ii)    Form of Letter of Transmittal.*
(a)(1)(iii)    Form of Notice of Guaranteed Delivery.*
(a)(1)(iv)    Form of Letter to Brokers, Dealers, Commercial Banks, Trust Companies and Other Nominees.*
(a)(1)(v)    Form of Letter to Clients for use by Brokers, Dealers, Commercial Banks, Trust Companies and Other Nominees.*
(a)(1)(vi)    Guidelines for Certification of Taxpayer Identification Number on Substitute Form W-9.*
(a)(1)(vii)    Form of summary advertisement dated June 9, 2003.*
(a)(1)(viii)    Amended and Restated Offer to Purchase dated July 24, 2003.*
(a)(1)(ix)    Form of Amended and Restated Letter of Transmittal.*
(a)(1)(x)    Form of Amended and Restated Notice of Guaranteed Delivery.*
(a)(1)(xi)    Amended and Restated Offer to Purchase dated February 12, 2004.*
(a)(1)(xii)    Form of Amended and Restated Letter of Transmittal.*
(a)(1)(xiii)    Form of Amended and Restated Notice of Guaranteed Delivery.*
(a)(1)(xiv)    Form of Letter to Brokers, Dealers, Commercial Banks, Trust Companies and Other Nominees.*
(a)(1)(xv)    Form of Letter to Clients for use by Brokers, Dealers, Commercial Banks, Trust Companies and Other Nominees.*
(a)(5)(i)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 6, 2003.*
(a)(5)(ii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 9, 2003.*
(a)(5)(iii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted June 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(iv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(v)    Slide presentation by Parent, dated June 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(vi)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(vii)    Complaint and Jury Demand filed in the District Court for the City and County of Denver, Colorado on June 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(viii)    Complaint filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo on June 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(ix)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(x)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xi)    Complaint filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on June 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xii)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xiii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xiv)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted June 16, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xvi)    Complaint filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County, on June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xvii)    Transcript of Conference Call held by Parent on June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xviii)    Investor presentation by Parent, dated June 18, 2003.*


Index No.


    
(a)(5)(xix)    Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xx)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 19, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxi)    Email statement to press issued by Parent, dated June 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 20, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxiii)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 23, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxiv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 24, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxv)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 27, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxvi)    Text of email message to Parent employees dated June 26, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxvii)    Email statement to press issued by Parent, dated June 29, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxviii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxix)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxx)    Letter to PeopleSoft customers, dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxi)    Case study dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxii)    Information regarding Parent customer support dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxiii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxiv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 1, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 2, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxvi)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 3, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxvii)    Amended text of information on Parent’s internal website, posted July 9, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxviii)    Text of material prepared for presentation to analysts, dated July 9, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxix)    Transcript of portion of webcast presentation to analysts pertaining to the tender offer, dated July 9, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxx)    Text of e-mail message to PeopleSoft User Group, dated July 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxi)    Advertisement placed by Parent on July 11, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 14, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxiii)    Text of letter to partners, sent July 14, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxiv)    Questions and answers for PeopleSoft customers, dated July 14, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 15, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxvi)    Advertisement placed by Parent on July 15, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxvii)    Transcript of “town hall” presentation to PeopleSoft customers, dated July 17, 2003.*
(a)(5)(xxxxviii)    Advertisement placed by Parent on July 2, 2003.*
(a)(5)(il)    Advertisement placed by Parent on June 30, 2003.*
(a)(5)(l)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 17, 2003.*
(a)(5)(li)    Transcript of “Oracle Beat” presentation to Parent employees, dated July 17, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated July 24, 2003.*
(a)(5)(liii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated August 8, 2003.*
(a)(5)(liv)    Transcript of portion of webcast comments pertaining to the tender offer, from CIBC World Markets Enterprise Software Conference on August 6, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lv)    Transcript of portion of webcast Q&A session pertaining to the tender offer, from CIBC World Markets Enterprise Software Conference on August 6, 2003.*


Index No.


    
(a)(5)(lvi)    Text of portion of slide presentation pertaining to the tender offer, prepared for CIBC World Markets Enterprise Software Conference on August 6, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lvii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on August 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lviii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted August 15, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lix)    Text of letter to customers, sent August 22, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lx)    Notice of “town hall” meeting, sent August 22, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxi)    Comments by Parent spokesman, provided August 26, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxii)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated August 27, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxiii)    Transcript of “town hall” presentation to PeopleSoft customers, dated September 3, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxiv)    Text of press release issued by Parent, dated September 4, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxv)    Text of employee announcement on Parent’s internal website, dated September 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxvi)    Stipulation and Order Dismissing Case Without Prejudice filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo on August 15, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxvii)    Order Granting Stipulation Dismissing Case Without Prejudice, issued by the District Court for the City and County of Denver, Colorado on August 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxviii)    First Amended Complaint filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on August 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxix)    Demurrer filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on September 11, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxx)    Amended Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on August 4, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxi)    Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and related documents filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on August 18, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxii)    Transcript of portion of earnings conference call pertaining to tender offer, held September 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxiii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on October 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxiv)    Transcript of portion of annual meeting pertaining to tender offer, held October 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxv)    Redacted slide presentation from annual meeting held October 13, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxvi)    Amended text of information on Parent’s internal website dated September 4, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxvii)    Order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on November 5, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxviii)    Text of email message to analysts, dated October 27, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxix)    Text of press release issued by Parent on November 7, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxx)    Motion to Expedite Proceedings (redacted) filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on November 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxi)    Notice of Motion, Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Proposed Order filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on November 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxii)    Notice of Motion, Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Proposed Order filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on November 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxiii)    Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief conditionally filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on November 10, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxiv)    Transcript of portion of presentation to Goldman Sachs Software Retreat pertaining to tender offer, held November 13, 2003.*


Index No.


    
(a)(5)(lxxxv)    Text of email message to present employees, dated November 17, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxvi)    Text of press release issued by Parent on November 24, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxvii)    Transcript of conference call held by Parent on November 24, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxviii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted November 25, 2003.*
(a)(5)(1xxxix)    Notice of Motion, Revised Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and Proposed Order filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on December 8, 2003.*
(a)(5)(1xxxx)    Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief conditionally filed in the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, New Castle County on December 8, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxi)    Second Amended Complaint (Redacted) filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on December 12, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on December 19, 2003.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxiii)    Transcript of portion of presentation to Soundview Investor Bus Tour pertaining to tender offer, held January 7, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxiv)    Text of press release issued by Parent on January 23, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxv)    Text of press release issued by Parent on February 4, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxvi)    Text of communication to customers dated February 4, 2004*
(a)(5)(lxxxxvii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted February 4, 2004*
(a)(5)(lxxxxviii)    Form of summary advertisement dated February 5, 2004.*
(a)(5)(lxxxxix)    Demurrer filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on January 20, 2004.*
(a)(5)(c)    Transcript of portion of Corporate Q&A at AppsWorld Financial Analyst Day pertaining to the tender offer, held January 28, 2004.*
(a)(5)(ci)    Text of press release issued by Parent on February 9, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on February 10, 2004.*
(a)(5)(ciii)   

Transcript of portion of comments to Merrill Lynch Computer Services and Software:

CEO Conference 2004, held February 11, 2004.*

(a)(5)(civ)    Text of letter to PeopleSoft Stockholder dated February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cv)    Text of letter to PeopleSoft Stockholder dated February 12, 2004; first distributed February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cvi)    Investor Presentation by Parent, dated February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cvii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cviii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, posted February 17, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cix)    Investor Presentation by Parent, dated February 25, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cx)    Text of Editorial in The Wall Street Journal, published February 23, 2004; redistributed by Parent on February 25, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxi)    Order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on February 25, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxii)    Order entered by the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda on February 25, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxiii)    Text of press release by Parent, dated February 26, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxiv)    Text of press release by Parent, dated February 26, 2004.*


Index No.


    
(a)(5)(cxv)    Complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division on February 26, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxvi)    Transcript of presentation to Quest User Group, held March 1, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxvii)    Text of letter to J.D. Edwards customers, dated March 1, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxvii)    Text of letter to J.D. Edwards customers, dated March 1, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxviii)    Answer by Parent filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division on March 4, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxix)    Text of email message to Parent employees dated March 5, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxx)    Email statement to press issued by Parent, dated March 12, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxi)    Text of press release by Parent, dated April 15, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxii)    Transcript of portion of comments to JP Morgan Technology & Telecom Conference pertaining to the tender offer, held May 4, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxiii)    Text of press release issued by Parent on May 14, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxiv)    Transcript of portion of presentation to Merrill Lynch European Roadshow Conference pertaining to the tender offer, held April 27, 2004.*
(a)(5)(cxxv)    Text of information on Parent’s website, revised June 7, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxvi)    Text of information on Parent’s website, revised June 4, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxvii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, revised June 4, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxviii)    Text of information on Parent’s website, revised June 4, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxix)    Answer filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division on March 4, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxx)    Trial Memorandum filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division on June 1, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxxi)    List of witnesses intended to be called at trial, delivered March 22, 2004.
(a)(5)(cxxxii)    Slides displayed during Parent’s opening statement at trial, June 7, 2004.
(b)(1)    Commitment letter described in Section 10, “Source and Amount of Funds” of the Offer to Purchase (the “Commitment Letter”).*
(b)(2)    Side Letter to the Commitment Letter.*
(b)(3)    364-Day Revolving Credit Agreement described in Section 10, “Source and Amount of Funds” of the Offer to Purchase.*
(b)(4)    Corrected Schedule 2 to 364-Day Revolving Credit Agreement.*
(c)    Not applicable.
(d)    Not applicable.
(e)    Not applicable.
(f)    Not applicable.
(g)    Not applicable.
(h)    Not applicable.

*   Previously filed
EX-99.(A)(5)(CXXV) 2 dex99a5cxxv.htm TEXT OF INFORMATION ON PARENT'S WEBSITE, REVISED JUNE 7, 2004. Text of information on Parent's website, revised June 7, 2004.

Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxv)

 

Oracle Case Filings

 

A list of selected Oracle trial documents.

 

  Oracle Answer (PDF, 256k)

 

  Oracle Trial Brief (PDF, 162k)

 

  Oracle Witness List (PDF, 110k)

 

  Oracle Opening Statement slides (PDF, 543k)

 

THE SOLICITATION AND THE OFFER TO BUY PEOPLESOFT’S COMMON STOCK IS ONLY MADE PURSUANT TO THE OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS THAT ORACLE CORPORATION AND PEPPER ACQUISITION CORP. FILED ON JUNE 9, 2003, AS AMENDED AND RESTATED ON FEBRUARY 12, 2004 AND AS SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED. STOCKHOLDERS SHOULD READ THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS CAREFULLY BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE OFFER. STOCKHOLDERS CAN OBTAIN THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS FREE AT THE SEC’S WEBSITE AT WWW.SEC.GOV, FROM CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON LLC, THE DEALER MANAGER FOR THE OFFER, FROM MACKENZIE PARTNERS, THE INFORMATION AGENT FOR THE OFFER, OR FROM ORACLE CORPORATION.

EX-99.(A)(5)(CXXVI) 3 dex99a5cxxvi.htm TEXT OF INFORMATION ON PARENT'S WEBSITE, REVISED JUNE 4, 2004. Text of information on Parent's website, revised June 4, 2004.

Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxvi)

 

How to Tender Your Shares

 

1. Get copies of the Offer to Purchase, the Letter of Transmittal, and related documents free from any one of these sources:

 

¨ Information Agent for the Offer: MacKenzie Partners, Inc,105 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016; call collect: (212) 929-5500, toll free: (800) 322-2885, e-mail: proxy@mackenziepartners.com

 

¨ Dealer Manager for the Offer: Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, Eleven Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10010-3629; (800) 881-8320 (toll free)

 

¨ Oracle Investor Relations: Oracle Corporation, 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood Shores, CA 94065; (650) 506-4073; e-mail investor_us@oracle.com

 

¨ The US Securities and Exchange Commission Web site (www.sec.gov)

 

¨ Download PDF versions of the files individually:

 

  Offer to Purchase (217k)

 

  Letter of Transmittal (82k)

 

  Notice of Guaranteed Delivery (39k)

 

  Letter to Clients (34k)

 

  Letter to Brokers (51k)

 

  Guidelines for Certification of Taxpayer Identification Number on Substitute From W-9 (28k)

 

Or, download all related documents in a single .zip file (ZIP, 394k)

 

2. Send the Amended and Restated Letter of Transmittal and certificates for Shares and any other required documents to the Depositary for the Offer, American Stock Transfer & Trust Company, at one of the addresses below:

 

¨ By mail, overnight courier, or hand: 59 Maiden Lane, New York, New York 10038

 

¨ By facsimile (for eligible institutions only): (718) 234-5001. To confirm facsimile transmission, call toll free: (877) 248-6417

 

Please note that on May 14, 2004, Oracle announced that it revised its cash tender offer to purchase all of the outstanding shares of PeopleSoft, Inc. to $21 per share and that it has extended the tender offer to midnight EDT on Friday, July 16, 2004. PeopleSoft stockholders who wish to tender may continue to use the Amended and Restated Offer to Purchase, the Letter of Transmittal, and related documents from February 12, 2004.

 

If your shares are held in street name by your broker, dealer, bank, trust company or other nominee, such nominee can tender your shares through The Depository Trust Company.


Questions and requests for assistance can be directed to MacKenzie Partners, Inc. at (800) 322-2885 (toll-free) or (212) 929-5500, or by e-mail proxy@mackenziepartners.com

 

Find out more at oracle.com/peoplesoft or call 1.800.633.0925

 

THE SOLICITATION AND THE OFFER TO BUY PEOPLESOFT’S COMMON STOCK IS ONLY MADE PURSUANT TO THE OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS THAT ORACLE CORPORATION AND PEPPER ACQUISITION CORP. FILED ON JUNE 9, 2003, AS AMENDED AND RESTATED ON FEBRUARY 12, 2004 AND AS SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED. STOCKHOLDERS SHOULD READ THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS CAREFULLY BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE OFFER. STOCKHOLDERS CAN OBTAIN THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS FREE AT THE SEC’S WEBSITE AT WWW.SEC.GOV, FROM CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON LLC, THE DEALER MANAGER FOR THE OFFER, FROM MACKENZIE PARTNERS, THE INFORMATION AGENT FOR THE OFFER, OR FROM ORACLE CORPORATION.

EX-99.(A)(5)(CXXVII) 4 dex99a5cxxvii.htm TEXT OF INFORMATION ON PARENT'S WEBSITE, REVISED JUNE 4, 2004 Text of information on Parent's website, revised June 4, 2004

Exhibit (a) (5) (cxxvii)

 

Shareholder Benefits

 

On May 14, 2004, Oracle Corporate revised its cash tender offer to purchase the outstanding shares of PeopleSoft, Inc., to $21.00 per share.

 

“Our revised offer reflects changes in market conditions and in PeopleSoft’s market valuation,” said Oracle Chairman and CFO Jeff Henley. “Our new offer represents a premium of 21% over PeopleSoft’s closing price today of $17.30. That’s a higher premium than our previous offer was on the date made, calculated on both a single day and 30 day moving average basis. I believe that this deal will benefit stockholders of both companies.”

 

THE SOLICITATION AND THE OFFER TO BUY PEOPLESOFT’S COMMON STOCK IS ONLY MADE PURSUANT TO THE OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS THAT ORACLE CORPORATION AND PEPPER ACQUISITION CORP. FILED ON JUNE 9, 2003, AS AMENDED AND RESTATED ON FEBRUARY 12, 2004 AND AS SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED. STOCKHOLDERS SHOULD READ THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS CAREFULLY BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE OFFER. STOCKHOLDERS CAN OBTAIN THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS FREE AT THE SEC’S WEBSITE AT WWW.SEC.GOV, FROM CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON LLC, THE DEALER MANAGER FOR THE OFFER, FROM MACKENZIE PARTNERS, THE INFORMATION AGENT FOR THE OFFER, OR FROM ORACLE CORPORATION.

EX-99.(A)(5)CXXVIII 5 dex99a5cxxviii.htm TEXT OF INFORMATION ON PARENT'S WEBSITE, REVISED JUNE 4, 2004 Text of information on Parent's website, revised June 4, 2004

Exhibit (a) (5) (cxxviii)

Oracle To Challenge Department of Justice Lawsuit

Trial Begins Monday, June 7, 2004

 

Read the press release.

 

February 26, 2004—Oracle announced that its Board of Directors has met and decided to vigorously challenge the Justice Department’s lawsuit to block Oracle’s merger with PeopleSoft. The Department’s claim that there are only three vendors that meet the needs of large enterprises does not fit with the reality of the highly competitive, dynamic and rapidly changing market. Oracle has always been an innovator in the industry and led the way to reducing total cost of ownership and believes that the combined company will be able to offer products and services at even lower prices.

 

“We believe that the government’s case is without basis in fact or in law, and we look forward to proving this in court,” said Jim Finn, Oracle spokesperson.

 

¨ The trial is scheduled to begin on Monday, June 7, and run until Friday, July 2. Judge Vaughn R. Walker of the US District Court of Northern California will be presiding.

 

¨ Selected Oracle Case Filings: Including our Answer, Trial Brief, and Witness List.

 

¨ DOJ Case Filings (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/): The United States Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division Web site where they publish trial documents.

 

THE SOLICITATION AND THE OFFER TO BUY PEOPLESOFT’S COMMON STOCK IS ONLY MADE PURSUANT TO THE OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS THAT ORACLE CORPORATION AND PEPPER ACQUISITION CORP. FILED ON JUNE 9, 2003, AS AMENDED AND RESTATED ON FEBRUARY 12, 2004 AND AS SUBSEQUENTLY AMENDED. STOCKHOLDERS SHOULD READ THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS CAREFULLY BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE OFFER. STOCKHOLDERS CAN OBTAIN THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OFFER TO PURCHASE AND RELATED MATERIALS FREE AT THE SEC’S WEBSITE AT WWW.SEC.GOV, FROM CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON LLC, THE DEALER MANAGER FOR THE OFFER, FROM MACKENZIE PARTNERS, THE INFORMATION AGENT FOR THE OFFER, OR FROM ORACLE CORPORATION.

EX-99.(A)(5)(CXXIX) 6 dex99a5cxxix.htm ANSWER FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Answer filed in the United States District Court

Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxix)

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

J. Thomas Rosch (Bar No. 37668)

Gregory P. Lindstrom (Bar No. 82334)

Daniel M. Wall (Bar No. 102580)

505 Montgomery Street, Suite 1900

San Francisco, California 94111-2562

Telephone: (415) 391-0600

Facsimile: (415) 395-8095

 

ORACLE CORPORATION

Dorian Daley (Bar No. 129049)

Jeffrey S. Ross (Bar No. 138172)

500 Oracle Parkway, 7th Floor

Redwood Shores, California 94065

Telephone: (650) 506-5200

Facsimile: (650) 506-7114

 

Attorneys for Defendant

ORACLE CORPORATION

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

SAN FRANCISCO JUDICIAL DISTRICT

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF TEXAS, STATE OF HAWAII, STATE OF MARYLAND, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEW YORK, and STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA,

 

Plaintiffs,

 

v.

 

ORACLE CORPORATION,

 

Defendant.

 

 

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

 

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

 

COMES NOW ORACLE CORPORATION (“Oracle”), and in response to plaintiffs’ Complaint states the following. (Numbered paragraphs contains plaintiffs’ allegations verbatim.)

 

ALLEGATION 1. Unless it is enjoined, Oracle’s proposed acquisition of PeopleSoft will substantially increase already high concentration among vendors that sell high function Human Resource Management (HRM) software and high function Financial

 

    1  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


Management Services (FMS) software purchased by organizations for use in the United States and abroad. More specifically, the proposed transaction will eliminate aggressive head-to-head competition between Oracle and PeopleSoft, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18. Such a reduction in competition is likely to result in higher prices, less innovation and decreased support for these high function integrated software applications.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 1. Oracle’s proposed acquisition of PeopleSoft does not violate the Clayton Act. To the contrary, the proposed acquisition is procompetitive, in that it will permit Oracle to better compete with the clear market leader, SAP AG, and the numerous other existing competitors of the relevant software products, and will position Oracle to compete effectively with Microsoft Corp., which is aggressively expanding its position in enterprise applications software. There is no relevant antitrust market for either “high function Human Resource Management (HRM) software” or “high function Financial Management Services (FMS) software.” The actual markets in which Oracle sells its HR and FMS products are highly competitive and not concentrated. In fact, there is no such product as “high function” HRM or FMS software. Oracle, PeopleSoft and other vendors market and license the same HRM and FMS software to customers of different sizes and needs, not “low function” versions to some and “high function” versions to others. Plaintiffs’ “high function” market definitions are a means of gerrymandering the market around SAP, PeopleSoft and Oracle. They lack any factual or legal basis.

 

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

 

ALLEGATION 2. This complaint is filed and this action is instituted under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25, to prevent and restrain the defendant from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits these are plaintiffs’ intentions. Oracle denies the acquisition would violate the Clayton Act.

 

    2  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


ALLEGATION 3. The Plaintiff States bring this action under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, to prevent and restrain the violation by defendants of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 18. The Plaintiff States bring this suit pursuant to their statutory, equitable and/or common law powers as common law parens patriae on behalf of their respective states’ business and property, citizens, general welfare and economies. Many of the states also represent governmental entities in their proprietary capacities, which may include state departments, bureaus, agencies and political subdivisions that have purchased or are likely future purchasers of high-function HRM and FMS software. This proposed acquisition threatens loss or damage to the business or property, as well as the general welfare and economies, of each of the Plaintiff States, and to the citizens of each of the Plaintiff States. Plaintiff States’ governmental entities and their citizens will be subject to a continuing and substantial threat of irreparable injury to their business or property, and to the general welfare and economy, and to competition, in their States unless the defendant is enjoined from carrying out this proposed acquisition.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits the plaintiff states purport to bring this action under the statutes cited, in their parens patriae capacity, and in some cases in proprietary capacities. Oracle otherwise denies the allegations of this paragraph.

 

ALLEGATION 4. The defendant is engaged in interstate commerce and in activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. The defendant sells its products throughout the United States. Oracle’s sales in the United States, and in each of the Plaintiff States, represent a regular, continuous and substantial flow of interstate commerce, and have had a substantial effect upon interstate commerce as well as commerce with and in each of the Plaintiff States. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and jurisdiction over the defendant, pursuant to Sections 12, 15 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 22, 25 and 26, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a) and 1345.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits the allegations of paragraph 4.

 

    3  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


ALLEGATION 5. The defendant transacts business and is found within the Northern District of California. Venue is proper in this District under 15 U.S.C. § 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits the allegations of paragraph 5.

 

ALLEGATION 6. Intradistrict Assignment: Oracle Corporation’s worldwide headquarters is located in San Mateo County, California. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-2, all civil actions arising in San Mateo County shall be assigned to the San Francisco Division or the Oakland Division of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits the allegations of paragraph 6.

 

II. PARTIES TO THE PROPOSED MERGER

 

ALLEGATION 7. Oracle is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive office in Redwood City, California. Oracle provides organizations with database technology, enterprise software applications and related consulting services, in the United States and abroad. In 2003, Oracle earned over $9 billion in revenues, including over $2 billion of revenues related to enterprise software applications.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits the allegations of paragraph 7.

 

ALLEGATION 8. PeopleSoft is a Delaware Corporation with its principal executive office in Pleasanton, California. PeopleSoft provides organizations with enterprise software applications and offers related consulting services in the United States and abroad. PeopleSoft earned over $2 billion in revenues in 2003, comprised entirely of enterprise software applications-related revenues.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle is informed and believes these allegations are generally true, and on that basis admits the allegations of paragraph 8.

 

    4  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


III. BACKGROUND

 

ALLEGATION 9. In today’s global economy, the ability to reduce the costs inherent in running an organization is vital to an organization’s success. Most organizations (including corporations, federal, state, and local government agencies, and non-profit organizations) automate their financial management and human resource functions in order to provide better products and services to their customers or constituencies and to enhance shareholder and taxpayer value through more efficient operations. The software used to accomplish these tasks varies greatly depending on the needs of the customer. For example, while a small business’ needs may be met by simple retail PC-based software (often referred to as an ‘off the shelf” solution), a large corporation may require a multimillion dollar software solution that is configured to the organization’s needs and can perform these important functions seamlessly and simultaneously across multiple divisions or subsidiaries, multiple lines of business, and multiple legal jurisdictions. Customers with requirements for a product that can support such a multifaceted organization typically invest significant resources into identifying, purchasing and implementing software solutions that can be configured to meet the requirements of the individual organization. As described in more detail below, customers with the most demanding requirements typically find that the set of vendors that can meet their requirements is limited to Oracle, PeopleSoft and one other firm, Germany’s SAP AG.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Except as admitted below, Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 9. In today’s global economy, the ability to reduce the costs inherent in running an organization is in fact vital to an organization’s success. Most organizations (including corporations, federal, state, and local government agencies, and non-profit organizations) therefore do automate their financial management and human resource functions in search of operational efficiencies. The strategies employed do vary depending on the needs of the customer, but not in the manner plaintiffs allege. In particular, the claim that “multifaceted organizations” with “the most demanding requirements” have distinctive needs that can be, or are, met only by software from Oracle, PeopleSoft or SAP is incorrect. It is impossible to generalize about the HRM or FMS software “needs” of any set of enterprises, let alone a group

 

    5  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


described as amorphously as plaintiffs’ Complaint purports to describe them. Numerous software vendors besides SAP, PeopleSoft and Oracle serve “multifaceted organizations” with “the most demanding requirements,” including organizations of every size and in every part of the economy. And many such organizations choose to solve the same set of problems by developing custom software (or modifying legacy systems) internally, or by outsourcing entire business functions. This substantial diversity of vendors serving large organizations results from the significant investments of resources such organizations devote to identifying products that meet their needs. That is, large enterprises invest in elaborate procurement processes so they can choose wisely among all available alternatives, not to waste time and resources before they default to purchasing software from SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft. That vision of the market is illogical and wrong.

 

ALLEGATION 10. There is a variety of enterprise software products that organizations use to automate different types of business functions. Among others, enterprise software can be used to (1) manage employees through HRM software and (2) maintain financial records through FMS software.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits that HRM and FMS software are types of enterprise applications software.

 

ALLEGATION 11. Some organizations, while requiring enterprise software with deeper functionality than that provided by “off the shelf” PC-based software, still have relatively straightforward, simple business processes and data processing and reporting requirements. Enterprise software vendors often refer to these organizations as the “mid-market” or “general business market.”

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 11, which incorrectly characterize what is meant by the “mid-market” or “general business market.” The allegations also incorrectly suggest that the “business processes” undertaken by the Human Resources and Finance departments of corporate enterprises differ substantially based on the size

 

    6  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


of the enterprise. That clearly is not the case with respect to large and medium-sized corporate enterprises, which in general have quite similar, and often externally-mandated, HR and financial management practices. That is, the “business processes” employed by the HR departments of both medium and large enterprises are influenced by the same labor, tax, immigration and other laws. Similarly, the “business processes” employed by the Finance departments of both medium and large enterprises are influenced by the same set of Generally Accepted Accounting Practices, tax laws, and S.E.C. requirements. FMS and HRM software adapts to the resulting, relatively standardized business processes, allowing such software to be used by a wide variety of enterprises.

 

ALLEGATION 12. While enterprise software products that serve the “mid-market” or “general business market” often must be professionally installed and maintained, they are relatively inexpensive. These products have limited capacity to support customers with diverse operations such as multiple geographic locations, distinct legal entities or business units within the organization, or numerous lines of business. As these products have a limited set of configuration options, the implementation costs associated with this software are comparatively modest.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 12, which incorrectly characterize the relevant products and the dynamics of the so-called “mid-market” or “general business market.” The HRM and FMS software Oracle and other vendors market to enterprises is in most cases the same software, regardless of the size or complexity of the enterprise or, more importantly, the particular implementation. That is, while the particular modules chosen and the implementation challenges may differ from one customer to the next, there is only one code set, one software “product.” That software is capable of serving small, medium and large enterprises alike, regardless of their unique computing needs or functional requirements. In general, implementation costs increase with enterprise size, but that is unremarkable. The absolute implementation costs for every type of business software generally increase with enterprise size.

 

    7  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


ALLEGATION 13. While “off the shelf” and “mid-market” solutions are used for the simpler application needs of most organizations, many customers, due to their internal structure and unique administrative processes, must also invest in higher function products. These higher function products have the capability to support the unique requirements of each customer across diverse and multi-faceted organizations.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 13. The concept of “higher function products” used throughout plaintiffs’ complaint is artificial and meaningless. The relevant products do not have higher functional capacities the way, for example, a dump truck has a higher load-carrying capacity than a pickup truck. As already noted, Oracle and other vendors market the same software products (i.e., code) to customers of different sizes. Accordingly, the FMS or HRM software Oracle might sell to a Fortune 50 company is the same software product than it might sell to a “mid-market” enterprise. Conversely, the software products plaintiffs would try to relegate to the “mid-market” can and do serve very large enterprises. Furthermore, the “administrative processes” employed by the HR and Finance departments of most enterprises are not, in any meaningful sense, unique. They are largely defined by labor, tax and securities laws, and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Indeed, to the extent large “multi-faceted” organizations have needs that can best be served by genuinely “higher function” HRM and FMS products, they would likely chose for those needs the highly specialized products (available from many vendors) that plaintiffs refer to as “associated functions” in paragraph 16.

 

ALLEGATION 14. Customers with high-level functional needs (“enterprise customers”) require products (“high-function enterprise software”) that can support their ongoing business processes and reporting requirements that may stretch across multiple jurisdictions (often requiring support for foreign languages and reporting requirements), multiple legal entities or divisions within the organization and multiple lines of business. These products must have the scale and flexibility to support thousands of simultaneous users and many tens of thousands of simultaneous transactions, and the ability to integrate seamlessly into bundles or “suites” of

 

    8  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


associated HRM and FMS functions. Most importantly, these products must have the flexibility through configuration options or other means to be matched to the administrative and reporting processes of each unique customer.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 14. Plaintiffs’ description of “enterprise customers,” in this and subsequent paragraphs, is a series of generalities, in each case amounting to little more than the claim that customers need what they need. This is particularly evident in paragraph 14’s opening line, the tautological claim that high-function customers need high-function software. The “identifying” criteria that follow (e.g., multiple divisions, operations in multiple jurisdictions) do not identify a particular kind of enterprise and do not accurately describe the purchasing behavior of “enterprise customers,” as such criteria often apply equally to enterprises that plaintiffs would describe as “mid-market” or “general business.” In fact, nowhere do plaintiffs offer any objective criteria for identifying these customers, even though they are, allegedly, “[t]he customers harmed by this transaction.” (Complaint ¶ 28)

 

ALLEGATION 15. Vendor characteristics are also important to enterprise customers when identifying their supplier options. Enterprise customers demand a product that has a wide range of functional options available so that they have the option of purchasing additional functional modules to expand the automation of their business or governmental processes. Enterprise customers also expect periodic updates, for example, keeping the software current regarding local tax and employment laws in every state and country in which they operate. In addition, enterprise customers purchase ongoing maintenance and support. In return, enterprise customers expect 24-hour technical support to be available to them in every country in which they operate. Consequently, enterprise customers will not consider a vendor that lacks the resources necessary to provide continuous technical support and to continuously enhance and expand the functional footprint of its products throughout their long lifecycles.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 15, the thrust of which appears to be that “enterprise customers” are distinguishable by their regard for

 

    9  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


these common vendor characteristics. There is no single kind of customer that values the vendor characteristics listed in paragraph 15. One can say neither that all “enterprise customers” value these traits, nor that only “enterprise customers” value these traits. “Mid-market” customers value these traits to an extent indistinguishable from so called “enterprise customers.” Nor is it true that regard for these traits comes in an “all or nothing” package. Some customers value only a subset of these factors yet have otherwise similar demand characteristics as customers that value all or none of these factors. Plaintiffs also err in claiming that all the support functions listed must be provided by the software vendor. Numerous organizations like IBM Global Services and Accenture that write little or no software code implement and to various degrees support FMS and HRM products. Many large enterprises likewise implement and provide some support for these products “in-house,” with their own personnel.

 

ALLEGATION 16. As integrated suites of HRM and FMS functions have been developed, organizations have recognized the benefits of acquiring these solutions through products that permit the integration of associated functions from a single vendor.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle assumes that by “integrated suites of HRM and FMS functions,” plaintiffs refer to bundles of the more common HRM programs (e.g., employee records, benefits) and, separately, the more common FMS programs (e.g., general ledger, accounts payable, accounts receivable). Upon that assumption, Oracle admits that some organizations see benefits to being able to integrate associated functions (meaning, Oracle assumes, more specialized applications from the same HRM and FMS categories) with their HRM or FMS software. Oracle otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 16. In reality, so-called “point solutions” or “best of breed” solutions providing what the Complaint calls “associated functions” are engineered to integrate with the other products of most if not all major HRM and FMS vendors, and are routinely used by so called “enterprise customers” as part of their HRM and FMS systems. Consequently, it is common for customers that buy HRM or FMS products from the likes of an Oracle or SAP to supplement that software with other vendors’ complementary software.

 

    10  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


ALLEGATION 17. Understandably, enterprise customers are generally unwilling to consider high function enterprise software unless it has been successfully implemented by other similarly-situated customers (i.e., organizations of the same industry or governmental type with similarly complex functional needs). An organization’s ability to manage its human resource and financial management information is fundamental to its ability to operate. In addition, these complex and comprehensive solutions are typically more expensive to license and maintain and more difficult to implement than other software products. Consequently, the availability of satisfied referral customers is a prerequisite for many organizations to consider a vendor’s software product.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits that references from similarly situated customers are used in marketing FMS and HRM solutions. In fact, one of the reasons that competition for larger enterprises is particularly intense is that vendors want to obtain such accounts as reference customers. Oracle otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 17. In particular, to the extent these allegations are meant to suggest that purchasers of “high function enterprise software” are generally unwilling to consider or procure FMS or HRM solutions from vendors other than SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft, Oracle denies that claim. Moreover, many vendors besides SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft have such reference customers within the set of “enterprise customers” described by plaintiffs in their Complaint. As but one example, Lawson (an HRM and FMS vendor excluded from plaintiffs’ proposed markets) lists on its website as reference customers MasterCard Inc., McDonald’s Corporation, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Safeway, Target Corporation, Louisiana-Pacific Corporation, Walgreen Co., and many other large enterprises.

 

ALLEGATION 18. Organizations purchasing high-function enterprise software typically go through an extensive procurement process by which they determine whether they need high-function enterprise software to meet their needs and identify their preferred vendors. The procurement process for enterprise customers can last from six to eighteen months and involves

 

    11  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


extensive communications with the software vendors and often third-party consultants hired by the customer.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits that many FMS and HRM software customers go through an extensive procurement process to identify qualified vendors and receive bids. The procurement process for some customers lasts from six to eighteen months and involves extensive interaction with software vendors and third-party consultants. Oracle otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 18, and in particular any suggestion that “enterprise customers” are distinguishable by the nature of the procurement processes they employ.

 

ALLEGATION 19. Enterprise customers normally initiate the procurement process by performing a detailed assessment of their functional requirements, which are generally shared with potential suppliers. Based on the vendor responses and follow-up discussions, enterprise customers, often with the assistance of consulting firms, identify those vendors that can potentially meet the enterprise customer’s needs and vendors with the capability to supply support, maintenance and upgrades over the life of the product.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits that some customers conduct “a detailed assessment of their functional requirements” as part of a software procurement process. Oracle otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 19, and in particular any suggestion that “enterprise customers” are distinguishable by the nature of the procurement processes they employ, as similar procurement processes are routinely conducted by so-called “mid-market” customers.

 

ALLEGATION 20. To ensure that they obtain the product that most closely fits their needs, enterprise customers provide the vendors with detailed descriptions of their functional requirements. Enterprise customers meet frequently with vendors under consideration and share detailed information regarding their requirements, the internal processes to be supported, the customer’s hardware and database platforms and other information relevant to the customer’s needs. As the procurement process proceeds, enterprise customers typically ask the vendors still under consideration to demonstrate their software. The vendors must establish that their software

 

    12  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


can be tailored to support the customer’s specific business processes, primarily through configuration options built into the software code. Vendors typically know which other firms they are competing against, based on information developed during the lengthy procurement process. Often customers identify competing vendors and the prices that they are offering in an effort to encourage price competition.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 20. While there are noncontroversial claims in this paragraph, for example that customers disclose some of their functional requirements to the vendors they invite to bid, the thrust of the allegations is that the bidding process marks the customers as targets for price discrimination strategies. The customers plaintiffs have identified – the largest and most sophisticated business enterprises and governmental agencies in the world – are much smarter than that. The bidding processes they employ are designed to, and do in fact, maximize competitive pressures. Customers control the bids, choosing what information to reveal to bidders, including but not limited to information concerning competing vendors. There is never a guarantee that any information revealed is accurate. Thus, while customers may claim to “identify competing vendors and the prices that they are offering in an effort to encourage price competition,” vendors are left to guess whether the information provided is correct. Oracle specifically denies that it or other vendors “typically know which other firms they are competing against.”

 

ALLEGATION 21. Vendors compete against one another to offer a solution with the lowest total cost of ownership. The total cost of ownership includes, among other things, the license fee, maintenance fee, and cost of implementing the software. The identity of the competitors in each sale and their relative ability to meet the prospective customer’s functional needs are key factors in the vendor’s pricing decision.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits that customers are generally concerned with the total cost of automating the business processes that HRM and FMS software facilitate. In that respect, they consider alternatives to procuring FMS or HRM software, such as outsourcing the business function to the likes of an ADP or Fidelity. Oracle also admits that in

 

    13  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


evaluating proposed solutions from HRM and FMS software vendors, customers typically focus to some extent on total cost of ownership, which includes the license fee, maintenance fee, and cost of implementing the software. That does not mean, however, that customers will always procure the software, the implementation services and the maintenance from a single vendor. They may, for example, procure the software from Oracle and the implementation services from a systems integrator like IBM Global Services or Accenture. Oracle denies that a key factor in a vendor’s pricing decision is its perception of its competitors’ ability to meet the prospective customer’s functional needs, except perhaps occasionally. Due to the high level of standardization of HR and financial management practices, the functional differences among the competing HRM and FMS products upon which a decision to “ignore” a competitor could reasonably be based are minimal. Furthermore, vendors rarely have reliable information regarding who their competitors are with respect to a given customer, let alone how the customer perceives the competing vendors’ functional capabilities. Neither do vendors have reliable information regarding the other subjective factors motivating customer decisions, e.g., the level of satisfaction with an existing vendor, references from other customers, risk aversion, etc. Oracle otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 21.

 

ALLEGATION 22. While using different proxies to describe customers that require high-function enterprise software (such as volume of revenue and number of users), industry analysts recognize the existence of this group and that the vendors who have the products and other characteristics to satisfy this group are Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP. For example, in 2002, when Charles Phillips, currently the Co-President of Oracle, worked as an industry analyst for Morgan Stanley, he issued a report that stated:

 

[T]he back-office applications market for global companies is dominated by an oligopoly comprised of SAP, PeopleSoft, and Oracle. The market is down to three viable suppliers who will help re-automate the back office business processes for global enterprises for years to come.... PeopleSoft has made it into an elite club

 

    14  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


of critical enterprise software suppliers—those with thousands of customers relying on the company for mission critical functions.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies that industry analysts generally or typically recognize the existence of anything akin to a market in which SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft alone sell to some definable group of “enterprise customers.” Industry analysts of course recognize that SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft are among the largest and most-established vendors of these products, and much of the written analysis of the industry therefore focuses on these firms. The great majority of that analysis, however, also recognizes the competition provided by other software vendors, by outsourcers, and particularly in the case of larger enterprises by the constant option to maintain and upgrade one’s existing FMS and HRM solutions. The Morgan Stanley 2002 report quoted addresses what Mr. Phillips called “the back-office applications market for global companies,” which is an amalgam of associated software categories, not the markets alleged in the Complaint, and certainly not any relevant antitrust market. Furthermore, the majority view among “industry analysts” today is not that there is any three-firm oligopoly in markets like plaintiffs’ have proposed. To the contrary, the most recent statements by “industry analysts” – commenting on the filing of this suit – have opined that plaintiffs’ contentions of a market consisting solely of SAP, PeopleSoft and Oracle are wrong. Except as admitted herein, Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 22.

 

IV. TRADE AND COMMERCE: RELEVANT PRODUCT AND GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS

 

ALLEGATION 23. The products affected by the proposed merger are:

 

(a) Human Resource Management (HRM) software and accompanying services that can be integrated into suites of associated functions from a single vendor with performance characteristics that meet the demands of multifaceted organizations with high-level functional needs (“high function HRM software”); and

 

(b) Financial Management Services (FMS) software and accompanying services that can be integrated into suites of associated functions from a single vendor with

 

    15  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


performance characteristics that meet the demands of multifaceted organizations with high-level functional needs (“high function FMS software”).

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracles denies the allegations of paragraph 23, except to acknowledge that they contain plaintiffs’ relevant market contentions. In the first place, the allegations do not describe, as the opening line claims, “products.” There is no such thing as “high-function” HRM and FMS software, separate and apart from HRM and FMS software generally. The term is unknown to the industry, and was invented by plaintiffs to cloak as a “product description” plaintiffs’ effort to define a market consisting solely of SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft. HRM and FMS software vendors generally do not have distinct “high-function” products. The HRM and FMS software they market to and install at large enterprises is the same software they market to and install at medium-sized enterprises. The proposed product definitions are also circular: if one incorporates the definition of “enterprise customer” (a synonym for “multifaceted organizations with high-level functional needs”) found elsewhere in the Complaint (e.g., paragraph 28), the market is defined as FMS and HRM software “with performance characteristics that meet the demands of … organizations with functional requirements met only by high-function HRM and FMS software.” Finally, Oracle denies that whether an HRM or FMS product “can be integrated into suites of associated functions from a single vendor” has any substantial bearing on the definition of the relevant market. This is a characteristic that SAP, Oracle, PeopleSoft and other vendors sometimes market as an advantage of using their solutions, but point solution and best of breed providers offer potent competition against SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft at all times. This is even true with respect to “add-on” sales (sales made after a primary implementation, supplementing the originally-acquired functionality), where the incumbent provider’s advantage would theoretically be at its greatest.

 

ALLEGATION 24. High function HRM and high function FMS software are lines of commerce and distinct markets under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 24.

 

    16  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


ALLEGATION 25. Each enterprise customer that needs high function HRM software solutions and high function FMS software solutions to satisfy its functional requirements has a unique end use for these products. The purchase of the relevant products is conducted through a procurement process that demonstrates that the software can be configured to meet the unique end use of the individual customer. The price of the software is set based on the circumstances presented by each transaction. and vendors can price discriminate against individual customers. Other means to support human resources and financial management functions are not sufficiently substitutable for enterprise customers to discipline a small but significant increase in the price for high function HRM and FMS software.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 25. The first sentence, claiming that every customer’s use of these products is unique, is less true with respect to HRM and FMS software than with respect to any other kind of business applications software. HRM and FMS software is among the most standardized, less differentiated business applications software to be found, reflecting the fact that Human Resources and Financial Management business practices are themselves highly standardized, and in many cases effectively mandated by labor laws, tax codes, and Generally Accepted Accounting Practices. For this reason, the second sentence, claiming that the procurement process reveals “the unique end use of the individual customer,” is effectively untrue. Of course the procurement process reveals detail about the customer’s functional needs, e.g., the hardware and software environment in which the software would run, but not the kind or quality of information (i.e., about the customer’s values, preferences, proclivities and other subjective criteria) required to implement a price discrimination strategy. Oracle emphatically denies the claim that the bidding process facilitates, or even allows, price discrimination. Oracle has no means of deducing its customers’ demand functions or their preferences for certain competitors. It must and does respond aggressively to all competitive bids – and purported competitive bids, since whether another vendor’s bid is real is unknown. Finally, “other means to support human resources and financial management functions,” such as outsourcing and maintaining (upgrading) one’s legacy or incumbent HRM or FMS system, do restrain current pricing, and would constrain any effort to exercise unilateral market power.

 

    17  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


ALLEGATION 26. Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP sell HRM and FMS software throughout the United States and the world. The United States is a relevant geographic market within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits that Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP (among other firms) sell HRM and FMS software throughout the United States and the world. Oracle denies the remaining allegations of paragraph 26.

 

V. MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS

 

ALLEGATION 27. The markets for high function HRM and FMS software are highly concentrated and the proposed purchase of PeopleSoft by Oracle would substantially increase concentration. The proposed purchase of PeopleSoft would reduce from three to two the number of firms that compete in the development and sale of these products.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 27. There is no such thing as “high function” HRM and FMS software, and the markets for HRM and FMS software are not highly concentrated. Data on this are available – despite the absence of any market share or structural concentration data in plaintiffs’ Complaint. Addressing HRM software first, IDC’s most recent estimate indicates that Oracle and PeopleSoft would have a combined 14% share of total revenues expended on HRMS (i.e., HR and Payroll) licenses and maintenance. Looking solely at new license revenue, Gartner estimates that Oracle and PeopleSoft would have a combined share of 24% of the “Human Capital Management” market (their description of HRM software). Turning to FMS functionality, IDC reports that the parties would have a combined share of 9% of the FMS market, based on license and maintenance revenue. Gartner reports that the parties’ combined share of new license revenue for FMS would be 14%. These are not concentrated markets. Furthermore, Oracle and PeopleSoft are not two of three competitors in the putative markets, they are two of many. Gartner and IDC each name dozens of HRM software vendors, and dozens of FMS software vendors. Other important HRM and FMS software vendors include Microsoft, Lawson, Sage, Hyperion, ADP, Kronos, and SSA

 

    18  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


Baan. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding market concentration erroneously ignore these many other competitive vendors.

 

ALLEGATION 28. The customers harmed by this transaction are enterprise customers, i.e. organizations with functional requirements met only by high-function HRM and FMS software, that purchase these products through a procurement process like that described above. Many customers that will be harmed by this merger are identifiable by their reliance on the “Big 5” consulting firms in selecting and often implementing the software they purchase.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 28. No customers will be harmed by the proposed transaction, but least of all the world’s largest, most sophisticated business enterprises. They are the savviest, most effective negotiators to be found, and notwithstanding plaintiffs’ allegations that these customers already face a supplier oligopoly, they tend to get the lowest prices found in the market. Oracle also denies that plaintiffs’ description of “enterprise customers” has any meaning or utility. It does not distinguish or describe anyone, and therefore fails genuinely to define the market. Finally, the suggestion that a sophisticated procurement process and consultation with the Big 5 consulting firms makes a customer more amenable to exploitation is illogical and wrong.

 

ALLEGATION 29. The possibility of losing the bid forces Oracle to offer customers a product that meets the customers’ functional requirements as closely as possible and at the lowest possible total cost of ownership, subject to Oracle’s cost of providing the product. Oracle and PeopleSoft constrain one another’s pricing and routinely compete to win customers by offering deep license and maintenance discounts, striving to satisfy customers’ unique requirements better than the other, reducing customers’ implementation costs, and making other business concessions. In addition, both competitors track the products offered by the other and dedicate significant resources to adding product enhancements to match and hopefully surpass each other’s products.

 

    19  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits that the possibility of losing bids drives Oracle and other vendors to offer the best possible product at the lowest possible price. Oracle otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 29, and in particular the implication that Oracle’s competitive interaction with PeopleSoft constrains its pricing more than its competitive interaction with SAP or other vendors. That claim is clearly incorrect with respect to FMS software, as to which SAP is a far stronger competitor than PeopleSoft, especially for large enterprises. PeopleSoft is a more potent competitor for HRM software, but not stronger than SAP with respect to the kind of “multi-faceted” customers the Complaint describes. These kinds of customers constitute the segment of the market in which SAP is most successful. Finally, with respect to any given bid (the apparent focus of the Complaint), and irrespective of enterprise size or complexity, other vendors may and often are as great a competitive threat to Oracle as SAP or PeopleSoft. It is the possibility of losing the bid to any vendor that forces Oracle (and SAP and PeopleSoft) to compete aggressively, especially since vendors rarely have reliable information about who their “closest” competition is for a given project.

 

ALLEGATION 30. If this merger is permitted and PeopleSoft is eliminated as a competitor, Oracle’s incentive to offer deep license and maintenance discounts, to strive to best meet customers’ functional requirements, to reduce customers’ total cost of ownership, and to make other business concessions will be reduced. In the absence of continued competition from PeopleSoft, Oracle’s incentives to continue to innovate and upgrade its products in order to win additional customers, and to maintain its current customers, will be substantially reduced.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 30. The elimination of PeopleSoft as a competitor will not negatively affect Oracle’s incentives to offer deep license and maintenance discounts, to strive to best meet customers’ functional requirements, to reduce customers’ total cost of ownership, and to make other business concessions. SAP and other competitors will provide more than sufficient competitive pressure on Oracle to constrain its pricing and assure competitive behavior. Plaintiffs’ innovation arguments – their claim that in the absence of continued competition from PeopleSoft, Oracle’s

 

    20  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


incentives to continue to innovate and upgrade its products will be reduced – are without basis. Oracle licenses the same HRM and FMS software to all of its customers, “multi-faceted” or not. The intense competitive pressure it faces in what plaintiffs call the “mid-market” therefore creates constant pressure to innovate and upgrade the products, even if one assumes counterfactually that there is a separate market for “multi-faceted” organizations. Moreover, a critically important spur to innovation now and for the foreseeable future is Microsoft’s publicly announced $10 billion effort to develop state-of-the-art business applications software for its .NET platform. Lastly, the growing trend toward outsourcing forces HRM and FMS software vendors to continue innovating. Incentives to innovate are growing, and nothing about this acquisition will change that.

 

ALLEGATION 31. The elimination of one of only three vendors of high-function enterprise software will likely result in higher prices. In addition, Oracle and PeopleSoft are the two best alternatives for a significant number of customers that do not view SAP to be a viable substitute.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 31. As there are more than three vendors of HRM or FMS software (or “high-function” HRM or FMS software), the first sentence is necessarily incorrect. The claim of the second sentence that Oracle and PeopleSoft are the two best alternatives for a significant number of customers that do not view SAP to be a viable substitute is baseless. SAP is far and away the market leader with respect to these products, especially with large enterprises, the focus of plaintiffs’ Complaint, and even more so with respect to FMS software. While plaintiffs avoid providing market share data in the Complaint, SAP would likely command a monopoly-like share of “markets” limited to large enterprises. To claim, therefore, that a “significant number” of such customers “do not view SAP to be a viable substitute” is unfounded and contrary to all recognized industry analysis and data. That implies there is a relevant market in which Oracle and PeopleSoft are the only competitors, and therefore in which the proposed acquisition would be a merger to monopoly. Plaintiffs have not provided any description of who those customers might be or why they could

 

    21  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


not secure a credible bid from SAP. In fact, if anyone’s products are the next best substitutes to PeopleSoft’s HRM products for larger enterprise customers with the “multi-faceted” characteristics cited in the Complaint, it is SAP’s.

 

ALLEGATION 32. Current customers of Oracle and PeopleSoft will also be harmed by the proposed acquisition. Competition between Oracle and PeopleSoft has led to a high level of innovation and upgrades to each company’s products. Oracle will no longer have the incentive to innovate in order to differentiate itself from PeopleSoft. Further, these customers benefit from competition between Oracle and PeopleSoft when purchasing additional products and services. Consequently, enterprise customers within the current installed customer bases of Oracle and PeopleSoft will likely suffer harm if the merger is permitted. The Plaintiff States’ governmental entities, general welfare, economies and citizens will be injured by reason of the resulting substantial lessening of competition.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 32. Current customers of Oracle and PeopleSoft will benefit from the proposed acquisition, which will accelerate innovation and improve Oracle’s competitiveness. Moreover, Oracle will continue to have to innovate to compete against the respective HRM and FMS products of SAP, the industry leader, and other competing vendors. Even the claim that Oracle will lose the incentive to differentiate itself from PeopleSoft is untrue, since in the near term Oracle will need to prove to the current PeopleSoft installed base that Oracle is a high quality, trustworthy vendor whom they should retain as their HRM and/or FMS vendor the next time they procure HRM or FMS software.

 

VI. LACK OF COUNTERVAILING FACTORS

 

ALLEGATION 33. Entry or expansion will not be timely, likely, or sufficient to undo the competitive harm that will likely result from the proposed merger.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 33. Assuming counterfactually that entry or expansion would be needed to undo competitive harm from the merger, the required entry or expansion, according to the theory of plaintiffs’

 

    22  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


complaint, would simply be the emergence of credible “third bidders” enterprise customers could use to place additional competitive pressure on Oracle and SAP. Enterprise customers could facilitate the “entry” of such bidders at will, simply by soliciting bids from vendors other than SAP and Oracle. As this is often done today, by large enterprises among others, there is no reason to think it could not be done in the event of a post-acquisition price increase. Existing suppliers could also expand their market reach in the event that post-acquisition prices to large enterprises were to rise. Microsoft is already engaged in a $10 billion development program focused on business applications, and while Microsoft’s short term plans are reportedly focused on the more lucrative mid-market customers, nothing would prevent Microsoft from targeting large enterprises were post-acquisition prices to those customers to rise.

 

ALLEGATION 34. There are high barriers to entry or expansion into the markets for high function HRM software and high function FMS software. The barriers include the high cost to research and develop competing products, the time needed to develop these products and the need for a direct sales and marketing force.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 34. Oracle especially denies these claims if one considers existing vendors of HRM and FMS software other than SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft to be “potential entrants” into “high-function” markets as alleged by plaintiffs. These other vendors already have borne the R&D, product development, and sales and marketing costs plaintiffs claim are entry barriers, and therefore would face no meaningful barriers to “enter” the high-function markets.

 

ALLEGATION 35. In addition, new entrants lacking high quality reference customers for their products would find it difficult to persuade customers to incur the investment and risk associated with acquiring an untested product to support the customers’ most fundamental business processes and data.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 35. The existing vendors of HRM and FMS software other than SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft whom

 

    23  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


plaintiffs deem to be “potential entrants” into some “high-function” market already have numerous reference customers, including many large enterprises.

 

ALLEGATION 36. Although Oracle asserts that the merger would produce substantial efficiencies, it cannot demonstrate merger-specific and cognizable efficiencies that would be sufficient to offset the merger’s anticompetitive effects.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 36. As the merger will not produce anticompetitive effects, Oracle need not demonstrate any efficiencies. Nevertheless, substantial efficiencies will result from the combination and integration of Oracle and PeopleSoft. The proposed transaction will enable the combined company to: (1) produce, deliver and support enterprise application software at a lower cost; (2) provide improved support to both existing and new customers; (3) continue support and enhancement of customers’ existing applications; (4) offer future applications with greater functionality that combine the best features of both companies’ products; and (5) accelerate innovation with respect to new applications and solutions. The estimated cost-savings will be many times any plausible estimate of potential overcharges of large enterprise customers, and competition against SAP and others will assure that the benefits of such cost savings are passed on to consumers.

 

VII. VIOLATION ALLEGED

 

ALLEGATION 37. The United States and the Plaintiff States hereby incorporate paragraphs 1 through 36.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle hereby incorporates its responses to paragraphs 1 through 36.

 

ALLEGATION 38. Pursuant to its public tender offer, Oracle plans to purchase PeopleSoft.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle admits the allegations of paragraph 38.

 

    24  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


ALLEGATION 39. The effect of the proposed acquisition of PeopleSoft by Oracle would be to lessen competition substantially in interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 39.

 

ALLEGATION 40. The transaction would likely have the following effects, among others:

 

(a) competition in the development, provision, sale and support of high function HRM software and high function FMS software in the relevant product and geographic markets would be eliminated or substantially lessened;

 

(b) actual and future competition between Oracle and PeopleSoft, and between these companies and others, in the development, provision, sale and support of high function HRM software and high function FMS software would be eliminated or substantially lessened;

 

(c) prices for high function HRM software and high function FMS software would likely increase to levels above those that would prevail absent the merger;

 

(d) innovation and quality of high function HRM software and high function FMS software would likely decrease to levels below those that would prevail absent the merger, and;

 

(e) quality of support for high function HRM software and high function FMS software would likely decrease to levels below those that would prevail absent the merger.

 

ORACLE’S RESPONSE: Oracle denies the allegations of paragraph 40. The acquisition will increase competition in the relevant markets by better positioning Oracle to compete against SAP, the clear market leader, and in the future against Microsoft, without any countervailing adverse effects.

 

    25  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP


WHEREFORE, Oracle prays for judgment in its favor, a declaration that its proposed acquisition of PeopleSoft does not violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act or any other applicable law, and for such other relief as may be appropriate under the circumstances.

 

DATED: March 4, 2004

     

Respectfully submitted,

       

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

       

J. Thomas Rosch

Gregory P. Lindstrom

Daniel M. Wall

       

ORACLE CORPORATION

       

Dorian Daley

Jeffrey S. Ross

            By:  

/s/

               

Daniel M. Wall

Attorneys for Defendant

                ORACLE CORPORATION

 

    26  

ORACLE CORPORATION’S ANSWER

CASE NO. C 04-807 VRW

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

EX-99.(A)(5)(CXXX) 7 dex99a5cxxx.htm TRIAL MEMORANDUM FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Trial Memorandum filed in the United States District Court

Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxx)

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

J. Thomas Rosch (Bar No. 37668)

Gregory P. Lindstrom (Bar No. 82334)

Daniel M. Wall (Bar No. 102580)

505 Montgomery Street, Suite 1900

San Francisco, California 94111-2562

Telephone: (415) 391-0600

Facsimile: (415) 395-8095

 

ORACLE CORPORATION

Dorian Daley (Bar No. 129049)

Jeffrey S. Ross (Bar No. 138172)

500 Oracle Parkway, 7th Floor

Redwood Shores, California 94065

Telephone: (650) 506-5200

Facsimile: (650) 506-7114

 

Attorneys for Defendant

ORACLE CORPORATION

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

  CASE NO. C 04-0807 VRW

Plaintiffs,

   
    DEFENDANT ORACLE CORPORATION’S

v.

  TRIAL MEMORANDUM

ORACLE CORPORATION,

   

Defendant.

   

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

     

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION    1
    Industry Background    1
    The Plaintiffs’ Case    5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT    8
    This Is Not a Standard Coordinated Effects Case    8
    Market Definition    9
    Competitive Effects    13
    Conclusion    16
THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE FACTS    17
    I.   Plaintiffs’ Alleged Relevant Markets Are Not Well-Defined As A Matter Of Law, And Are Inconsistent With The Facts    17
        A.   Plaintiffs’ Product Market Allegations Are Insufficient As A Matter Of Law    17
        B.   Plaintiffs’ Alleged Product Markets Ignore Reasonable Substitutes That Must Be Included As A Matter Of Law    20
                (1)  Maintaining incumbent systems    21
                (2)  Other vendors    22
                (3)  Outsourcing    23
        C.   Plaintiffs’ Geographic Market is Contrary to Law and to Their Own Product Market Allegations    24
    II.   Price Discrimination Theory Could Not Sustain The Alleged Relevant Markets    26
    III.   Every Procurement Is Not A Separate Market    28
    IV.   This Merger Will Have No Adverse Competitive Effects    29
        A.   Plaintiffs Are Entitled To No Presumption Of Anticompetitive Effects    29
        B.   “Unilateral Effects” Theory Supplies No Proof Of Anticompetitive Harm    30
        C.   “Auction Theory” Cannot Be Used to Infer Anticompetitive Effects In This Case    32

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  i  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


D. Sophisticated Customers And The Extraordinary
Dynamism Of The Software Industry Would Defeat Any
Attempted Price Increase

   34

E. The Government Ignores Substantial Productive and
Innovative Efficiencies

   36

CONCLUSION

   38

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  ii  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

 

FEDERAL CASES

 

Adaptive Power Solutions LLC v. Hughes Missile System Co., 141 F.3d 947

   34

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585

   13

Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209

   34

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294

   17, 20

California v. Sutter Health System, 84 F.Supp.2d 1057, aff’d, 217 F.3d 846

   17, 25, 30

Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 86 F.Supp.2d 154

   29

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451

   14

FTC v. Freeman Hospital, 69 F.3d 260

   20

FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045

   17, 20, 24, 29

Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2

   9, 31

Midcon Corp., 112 F.T.C. 93

   18, 27

New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F.Supp. 321

   17

PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F.Supp.2d 243, aff’d, 315 F.3d 101

   24

Pilch v. French Hospital, 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,935

   25

In re R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 120 F.T.C. 36

   27, 29

Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421

   9, 20, 31, 32, 34

Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320

   24

Thurman v. Pay N Pak Stores, 875 F.2d at 1373

   23, 24, 29

Total Ben. v. Group Insurance Admin., Inc., 875 F.Supp. 1228

   29

United States v. America Telegraph & Telegraph Co., 524 F.Supp. 1336

   29

United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F.Supp. 1400

   34

United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F.Supp. 3, aff’d, 908 F.2d 981

   14, 18

United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981

   13, 17, 30, 34, 35

United States v. Country Lake Foods, 754 F.Supp. 669

   34

United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95

   18

United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302

   19

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  iii  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486    18
United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 983 F.Supp. 121    35
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602    17
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321    29
United States v. Sungard System, Inc., 172 F.Supp.2d 172    17, 19, 21, 23, 29, 30
Westman Commission Co. v. Hobart International, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216    24
MISCELLANEOUS     
IIA Phillip A. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 517c (2d ed. 2002)    27, 28
Jerry A. Hausman, et al., Market Definition Under Price Discrimination, 64 Antitrust L.J. 367, 370 (1996    26
United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992) ¶ 2.21    14
1982 Justice Department Merger Guidelines ¶ 3.2    9, 36

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  iv  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


INTRODUCTION

 

The Justice Department and ten States seek to enjoin Oracle’s proposed acquisition of PeopleSoft as a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act under a suspect variant of the novel “unilateral effects” theory. Plaintiffs’ case fails because the main elements of the unilateral effects theory are factually unsupported, and because under traditional merger law the proposed transaction does not raise substantial competitive concerns.

 

Industry Background

 

Large organizations are good candidates for “business process automation” – i.e., computerizing what they do. Both Oracle and PeopleSoft develop and license (industry participants say “sell” instead of “license”) a variety of software products and related services for business process automation – including “Enterprise Applications Software” or EAS. EAS is sold to many tens of thousands of business, government and academic organizations around the world. There are numerous types of EAS, including programs for automating manufacturing processes, Supply Chain Management (“SCM”) and Customer Relations Management (“CRM”). The government’s case focuses on two types of “back office” EAS, “Financial Management Services” (“FMS”) and “Human Resource Management” (“HRM”). FMS includes accounting functions such as general ledger, accounts receivable, accounts payable and asset management. HRM encompasses such matters as payroll, timekeeping, personnel and benefits.

 

FMS and HRM were the first business processes to be automated. Plaintiffs’ experts admit that virtually all large organizations long ago computerized their basic financial and HR record keeping. Because software does not wear out, virtually all large enterprises already have modern EAS or older “legacy systems” for FMS and HRM. This software needs to be periodically updated, for example to capture changes in tax and labor laws. But so long as it is updated, FMS and HRM solutions are extremely durable, lasting ten to twenty years. FMS and HRM solutions are also the most commodity-like products in EAS. They need to be, because how a business maintains a General Ledger, or what information it maintains on employees and their compensation, is mostly dictated by accounting rules, tax laws, and the like. Functionally, there are few meaningful differences between the FMS and HRM solutions of the

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  1  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


major vendors.1

 

Large entities tend to have highly diverse Information Technology (“IT”) environments, with different solutions chosen by division, subsidiary, function, department or location. The same is true of their EAS systems. Some companies choose different EAS solutions for different needs, turning to a vendor with a particularly strong industry-specific approach to one need (referred to as a “vertical” solution), and to others for other needs. Some organizations prefer to standardize as much as possible on EAS capable of meeting their enterprise-wide needs. Some – in fact a large majority today – just want to maintain or incrementally improve the solutions they selected or developed at some earlier time. They “window shop” for HRM and FMS solutions from time to time, but don’t buy unless convinced the expenditure would produce an acceptable return on investment (“ROI”). In addition, a rapidly growing number of large enterprises “outsource” virtually their entire HR function to vendors like ADP, Fidelity and Ceridian. These outsourcers assume the role of an internal HR department on behalf of their customers. Bank of America recently chose this alternative, outsourcing its entire HR function to Fidelity, which promotes this capability in conjunction with its huge retirement-investments business.

 

EAS vendors compete for a piece of this action. Such vendors typically offer what may be thought of as catalogues of software modules with various automation capabilities. Some offer larger catalogues than others. A few, mainly SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft, offer such extensive catalogues that they can appeal to almost any kind of organization irrespective of industry or location, and can offer a kind of “one stop shopping” to the very largest organizations, providing them with most of their EAS needs for both the back office (FMS and HRM) and the different types of customer-facing or supplier-facing “front offices” (CRM and SCM). These are often called EAS “suites,” an example being the Oracle eBusinessSuite.

 

The government’s case is not about these cross-category suites, i.e., bundles of


 

1 In contrast, there is extensive differentiation in SCM and CRM solutions, particularly in “verticalization,” meaning the adaptation of basic functions to the needs of specific industries (or “verticals”).

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  2  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


FMS, HRM, CRM and/or SCM. That is important to know because the government often tries to use evidence about Oracle’s eBusinessSuite and similar products to prove its much different case.2 The government’s case is about back office software only, and it treats FMS and HRM as distinct products. Although the government is vague as to the number and functionality of the modules that constitute either “high function” FMS or HRM, the two alleged relevant products appear to be made up of the most basic FMS and most basic HRM modules, respectively.

 

If nothing else, this makes the government’s case highly anachronistic. To repeat: virtually every “large, complex enterprise” already has a modern, fully-functional software solution for its basic financial and human resources management needs, most likely procured or upgraded just a few years ago, during the technology spending boom that coincided with anticipation of Y2K. Hardly any very large organizations are buying this kind of software now, nor are many very large organizations likely to do so in the next five or six years. They simply don’t need to. These are not strategically important or “mission critical” kinds of software. Customer behavior is therefore heavily influenced by an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality. These realities are reflected in numerous industry analyses describing the back office software markets as “saturated” or “mature,” at least with respect to large enterprises.3

 

Instead, the near-term market opportunity for FMS and HRM is in what is commonly called the “mid-market,” meaning sales to corporations outside the Fortune 2000, Forbes Global 2000 and similar lists. That, for example, is where Microsoft is focusing, having concluded that there is no money to be made selling back office software to global enterprises. There are thousands of large corporations in the mid-market; local companies such as AutoDesk, Cost Plus and Network Associates would fall in this category – and demonstrate that “mid-market” companies are hardly small, simple organizations. Nevertheless, the “penetration” (rate


2 They did it at the May 21 technology tutorial, when they showed a video clip in which Larry Ellison discussed his argument in favor of the eBusinessSuite as an alternative to what he called “best of breed” solutions. Under Mr. Ellison’s terminology, customers who buy in discrete FMS and HRM markets are buying “best of breed” solutions.

 

3 Oracle and PeopleSoft together, for example, have sold fewer than twenty FMS or HRM suites to LCE customers in the past year.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  3  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


of adoption) of FMS and HRM into this next tier of organizations is not as great as it is among corporate giants, and there are simply a lot more of them. Consequently, there is money to be made in the mid-market, which makes it the locus of FMS and HRM competition today and for some time to come.

 

It is significant then, that the government concedes the mid-market is highly competitive and the merger is not a problem with respect to it.

 

As for the very large organizations, e.g., those that are in the Global 2000, etc., their near-term IT priorities are on CRM, SCM and what is known as “horizontal” integration of their existing EAS software, i.e., connecting and thereby enhancing the use of what they already have. Those are also areas the government concedes are highly competitive and as to which the merger is not a problem.

 

Thus the anachronism: the only competitive problem the government purports to find, and which it has chosen to address, is in highly saturated “markets” for the sale of basic back office software to huge companies that already have the products and have little if any intention of replacing them anytime soon.

 

In the IT industry, what does induce change is innovation – new products, technologies and business models that offer such substantially increased performance that it becomes worth it to discard an otherwise functional solution. These markets are spectacularly innovative and dynamic. Indeed, for the last thirty years a torrent of innovation has boosted IT performance at a constantly accelerating pace. This has been true across the entire technology landscape, from microprocessors to storage capacity to software markets of every kind. In this environment, performance advantages, especially so-called “leap-frog technologies,” tend to be much more important determinants of competitive outcomes than price, and breakthroughs at the hardware, software or business concept levels frequently make entire categories of old products obsolete. Market boundaries therefore shift constantly, and often very rapidly.4


 

4 The Department of Justice understood this not very long ago; its landmark case against Microsoft and the resulting settlement were premised on the idea that new “middleware”

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  4  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


The markets for EAS software have been no exception to that principle of constant creative destruction. Transformative events occur with regularity. Microsoft’s aggressive entry into EAS markets is a recent example of this competitive dynamism, but it is neither the only one nor, tellingly, the most important one. The explosive growth of alternatives to EAS solutions, like HR outsourcing and “software as service,” and the development of application integration technologies that reduce the costs of integrating heterogeneous application environments, are in some ways better illustrations of dynamic competition. It is therefore extremely important to understand the core value that these products have to the users, e.g., lowering the costs of paying employees or consolidating financial statements. IT, after all, is a means to an end, typically increased productivity. The “market” therefore consists of the technologies and services that can most cost-effectively advance the customer’s underlying business goals. New paths to the same ends are being invented all the time, and it would be grave error to ignore them in considering the prospective effects of a merger on competition.

 

The Plaintiffs’ Case

 

Plaintiffs’ case begins with the most confusing, meaningless market definition ever pursued in a government merger challenge. Plaintiffs allege that the relevant markets are “high function” FMS and HRM software – defined as software (and associated services) for FMS and HRM sold in the United States that “can be integrated into suites of associated functions from a single vendor with performance characteristics that meet the demands of multifaceted organizations with high-level functional needs.” First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 23. Plaintiffs define “customers with high-level functional needs” as those that “require” high function enterprise software. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiffs never break that forthrightly circular loop, but do offer various subjective descriptions of the software they are talking about—such as that it must support “business processes and reporting requirements that may stretch across multiple jurisdictions (often requiring support for foreign languages and reporting requirements), multiple legal entities or divisions within the organization and multiple lines of

 


technologies might break down Microsoft’s monopoly in the entirely different category of operating system software.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  5  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


business.” Id. For convenience we will refer to these organizations as “LCEs,” meaning large, complex enterprises.

 

The Complaint alleges that Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP are the only vendors of “high function” FMS and HRM software because only these three companies have both the requisite products and “vendor characteristics” needed to meet the demands of LCEs. Thus, Plaintiffs contend, LCE customers buy in a market with at best three firms, and the combination of Oracle and PeopleSoft therefore would constitute a merger to duopoly.5 Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that some LCEs consider Oracle and PeopleSoft to be their only alternatives as vendors of “high function” HRM and FMS software, implying that for such customers the combination of Oracle and PeopleSoft would be a merger to monopoly.

 

Plaintiffs and their experts essentially admit that it is impossible to identify a “high function” customer by any objective criteria. Plaintiffs therefore intertwine their market definition arguments with their allegations concerning the procurement process that LCEs employ. Plaintiffs essentially claim that even though every large customer’s needs are “unique” and it is impossible to identify “high function” customers with any objective metric, the procurement process sorts large organizations into two groups: (1) those who need “high function” FMS and HRM available only from SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft, and (2) those whose lesser needs give them additional options. This sorting is supposedly a consequence of the information the customers reveal about their needs in the course of the elaborate software procurement process – essentially, customers identify themselves as having “high function” needs. Vendors see this and behave accordingly, competing more or less aggressively according to the customer’s revealed options and the identity of other participating competitors.

 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint justified the three-firm only market based on the ability of FMS and HRM vendors to price discriminate against those customers that need “high function”


 

5 Plaintiffs’ identification of vendors has wavered somewhat. The Complaint alleged a three-firm market, and the Justice Department’s sworn interrogatory answers repeated that contention. By contrast, Prof. Elzinga, Plaintiffs’ main expert witness, presents market share calculations that list as many as five or six firms, but then argues that only SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft count for the analysis of the market.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  6  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


software. FAC ¶ 25. It is important to note that Plaintiffs have abandoned this theory; their expert, Professor Elzinga, claims to be applying only “traditional” market definition criteria. This is most likely because the LCEs that allegedly buy “high function” software indisputably pay less per-user than smaller organizations, the exact opposite of what price discrimination-based market definition requires.

 

Plaintiffs’ allegations of anticompetitive effect are not based on classic oligopoly theory – the theory that dominates analysis in merger decisions since Section 7 was last amended substantively in 1950. This is a supremely important point to which we will return often. It is oligopoly theory – or “coordinated effects” theory in the language of the DOJ’s Merger Guidelines – that makes us suspicious of “three to two” mergers. The fact that Plaintiffs do not pursue such a theory (because they can’t) transforms everything in this case.

 

Instead, Plaintiffs’ “competitive effects” arguments rest entirely on “unilateral effects” – a novel and judicially untested theory focusing solely on “localized” harm within a subpart of a properly defined relevant market. Plaintiffs begin with market allegations focusing on a part of the EAS spectrum (FMS and HRM software), then further segment that part of the spectrum into particular types of FMS and HRM software specifically demanded by and sold to a certain class of customers that allegedly prefer to purchase such software from a certain type of vendor in a certain way. The unilateral effects analysis further narrows Plaintiffs’ focus by purporting to identify anticompetitive effects that arise only with regard to customers with especially strong preferences for the high function FMS and HRM software of the merging parties, meaning customers that view Oracle and PeopleSoft as their best and second-best alternatives. Customers that view the market leader, SAP, as an equally good substitute for either Oracle or PeopleSoft aren’t hurt at all. That turns out to be a strong majority of the customers in both of these markets. So the group of vulnerable customers is very small.

 

Plaintiffs theorize harm to these customers using auction theory, claiming that the procurement process for EAS functions like a Sotheby’s art auction where the winning bidder’s price is set by the bid of the second place bidder (since the winner need only outbid that person by a dollar). This is completely novel – it is a kind of argument never before advanced in a

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  7  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


government merger challenge. It is also obviously inapplicable, for while Plaintiffs’ experts repeatedly assert that these markets involve auction-like “bidding,” EAS procurements indisputably involve simultaneous bilateral negotiations between the buyer and one or two competing sellers, a very different process to which auction theory does not apply.

 

Finally, Plaintiffs dismiss the possibility that SAP or other firms can protect the few vulnerable consumers by offering them as good an option as Oracle or PeopleSoft. In Plaintiffs’ story, SAP is relegated to the role of a weak “third best option” for the relatively few large enterprises that it does not already serve at least in part. Plaintiffs discount entirely all other EAS vendors and everyone who sells alternatives to EAS. Save for SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft products, all of the options that large enterprises actually use to solve their back office automation needs are defined out of existence, including outsourcing, legacy systems, and numerous products offered by other global firms and purchased by similar LCE customers. Of particular note, Microsoft is pigeonholed as a mid-market company that, despite its unsurpassed resources and noted aggressive streak, would be unable to reach disgruntled customers.

 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

 

By claiming to find only three competitors in its alleged markets, Plaintiffs spin this case as a routine police action to stop a “three-to-two” merger – an apparent slam dunk for Plaintiffs. In reality each link in Plaintiffs’ “merger-to-duopoly” logic is missing.

 

This Is Not a Standard Coordinated Effects Case

 

First and foremost, the government literally ignores standard “coordinated effects” theory – the well-worn oligopoly notion common to nearly all decided merger cases, that substantially increasing concentration in a concentrated market means less competition. This is the theory that has conditioned us to think of “three to two mergers” as slam dunks for the government – and it is concededly not applicable to these markets. Regardless of the overall level of market concentration, “unilateral effects” theory applies only if there are discernable and substantial parts of the alleged relevant markets dominated by the merging parties alone and protected from competition by other market participants. Unilateral effect analysis, in other words, is not advanced by chanting “three to two merger” like a mantra. It requires a specific

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  8  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


and highly-focused inquiry.

 

Neither the Supreme Court nor any Court of Appeals has endorsed unilateral effects theory. Consequently, the only source of standards for unilateral effects analysis is Paragraph 2.21 of the government’s own Merger Guidelines.6 The Guidelines presume that an adverse unilateral effect arises where (1) “a significant share of sales in the market [are] accounted for by consumers who regard the products of the merging firms as their first and second choices,” (2) “the merging firms have a combined market share of at least thirty-five percent,” and (3) “repositioning of the non-parties’ product lines to replace the localized competition lost through the merger [is] unlikely.” That thirty-five percent threshold is compelled by the views of the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit respecting the minimum market share required to exercise market power. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7-8, 26 (1984) (30% market share below threshold for market power, as matter of law); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (following Jefferson Parish on this point)

 

Existing industry calculations of FMS and HRM market shares – of which there are dozens – consistently indicate many more vendors than three, and market shares for Oracle and PeopleSoft that if combined would fall far below thirty-five percent. Market definition thus becomes central to Plaintiffs’ efforts to meet the test from its own Guidelines, and to portray this case as a three to two merger.

 

Market Definition

 

Plaintiffs’ market definition allegations are unacceptably vague, methodologically suspect and factually deficient in geographic and product dimensions. Settled law requires that a


 

6 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1992) (as amended). The unilateral-effects provision first appeared in the 1992 version of the Guidelines. The 1982 Justice Department Merger Guidelines contained a “leading-firm proviso”, ¶ III.A.2., 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,102 (1982), delimiting the safe-harbor for agency scrutiny of the possibility that a merger would create a leading firm, able to wield monopoly power (i.e., independent of any oligopoly relationship to its competitors). That provision has both a well-established basis in antitrust economics (single-firm monopoly being a well-recognized phenomenon in antitrust), and a solid legal foundation in Section 7 (prohibiting acquisitions whose effect may be “to tend to create a monopoly”).

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  9  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


relevant product market include all reasonable alternatives, i.e., all demand substitutes. This at least includes products and services to which such customers do turn to satisfy the same requirements as the products of the merging companies. It is equally clear that a geographic market must encompass “the area of effective competition . . . to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.” A straightforward application of these tests would define the relevant markets in this case as world markets for all of the technologies and services now in common use to automate financial and human resources management functions. This would include not just FMS and HRM packages from SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft, but comparable software packages from other vendors, multi-vendor “best of breed” solutions, legacy and incumbent systems, and outsourcing services.

 

Plaintiffs gerrymander with abandon to escape that conclusion. They begin with the geographic market – an issue so clear that reasonable people ought not be debating it. This case is a textbook example of a world market. All major vendors – e.g., SAP, Oracle, PeopleSoft, Microsoft, SSA, ADP – operate globally. A German-based company, SAP, developed its software largely outside the U.S. and yet is now both the global industry leader, and the firm with the leading share of U.S. sales. Plaintiffs’ own product market contentions exalt the global dimension of both the products and their customers, including multi-language and multi-jurisdictional capability, and “follow-the-sun” 24/7 support and service. FAC ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiffs’ expert, Kenneth Elzinga, admits that under the widely-used geographic market definition test that he developed, one would conclude this is a world market.

 

The problem is that a worldwide market is fatal to Plaintiffs’ case in the alleged FMS software “market,” because the combined Oracle-PeopleSoft market share would be well below thirty-five percent and SAP’s dominant share of FMS software sales would foreclose any argument that the merged firm would have substantial market power, “localized” or otherwise. Plaintiffs’ case in the alleged HRM market would also be severely weakened. So, without any factual or legal foundation whatsoever, Plaintiffs allege a U.S.-only market.

 

Plaintiffs’ vague and circular descriptions of the product market are also an effort to get past the thirty-five percent threshold. There is apparently no force on earth that can get

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  10  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


Plaintiffs to define “high function” FMS and HRM in plain and objective terms. Ask Plaintiffs to define it and a rambling, adjective-dominated litany of features and “vendor characteristics” is returned. Even Plaintiffs’ experts admit there are no “metrics” to define these alleged markets, and indeed both abandoned the concept when, for market definition calculations and other empirical work, they required clear standards for what is in or out of the market. It is difficult to summarize all the things that are wrong with this market definition, but a few things stand out.

 

The notion of “high function” software is made up; no such thing exists. SAP, Oracle, PeopleSoft and other vendors have not written separate code for multi-billion dollar companies, and “smaller,” multi-hundred million dollar companies. The same code and the same catalogue of software modules are available to both the huge and the merely large.7 The “high function” notion is in reality a way of circumventing legal and economic principles weighing heavily against defining markets in reference to customers. That is precisely what Plaintiffs are doing, and the only thing that truly defines these markets is that the customers included in them (not excluded from them) chose SAP, Oracle or PeopleSoft software.

 

Every identifying criterion for this “market” is honored in the breach. For example, while Plaintiffs stress multi-jurisdictional, multi-lingual and multi-currency capability more than any other “high function” need, the “high function” customers on Plaintiffs’ witness list include the State of North Dakota, Erie County, New York, the Metro North commuter railroad and companies that operate only in the U.S., only in U.S. dollars, and only in English. The same anomalies occur with regard to every other allegedly identifying criterion.

 

Every large organization that turns to a “rogue vendor” of EAS software is deemed not to have “high function” needs. Dozens of billion-dollar plus enterprises have turned to companies such as Lawson, Microsoft, ADP, Fidelity, and AMS for their FMS or HRM needs. Safeway, Johnson & Johnson, the Department of Justice, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Federal Reserve Bank, the State of Arizona, Bank of America, Tyco and Comcast are but a few examples. Plaintiffs dismiss every such example as aberrational for one reason or another.


 

7 In contrast, special versions are available from many vendors for small businesses.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  11  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


There is no consistency to the explanations, just the outcome.

 

Plaintiffs will not specify which FMS and HRM modules are in the relevant markets, and under what conditions. Many large companies standardize on a single vendor’s FMS or HRM products for certain modules, e.g., general ledger and accounts receivable FMS modules, supplementing that with additional modules, often called “point solutions,” available from many vendors. The Complaint suggests the relevant markets are limited to FMS and HRM sales in some kind of package, or at least to modules that can be integrated into broader suites. Plaintiffs’ discovery efforts have also emphasized competitions to become a corporation’s standard FMS or HRM solution. Nonetheless, plaintiffs refuse to state any criteria for determining whether a given FMS or HRM sale is in the market or not. The operative principle seems to be that if including the sale will boost Oracle’s or PeopleSoft’s market share, include it.

 

Every alternative to acquiring an enterprise-wide FMS or HRM solution is excluded from the market. When considering replacing existing systems, customers have choices. They can certainly procure a solution from SAP, Oracle or PeopleSoft, but they can also buy comprehensive back office software packages from other vendors, stitch together multi-vendor “best of breed” solutions, continue to use legacy and incumbent systems, or turn to outsourcing services. Plaintiffs simply define away all these options.

 

The end result of this gerrymandering process is a market with no discernable boundaries – the ultimate “know it when you see it” market. Such a market fails as a matter of law, mandating judgment for the defendant.

 

Plaintiffs cannot escape their burden to define relevant markets by claiming that “high function” customers identify themselves to the vendors during the procurement process. Any legal foundation for that argument – which was never strong – disappeared the moment Professor Elzinga abandoned, for market definition purposes, reliance on price discrimination. That is because the only legally-sanctioned way to define a market based on customer characteristics is when such characteristics permit price discrimination. Out of an abundance of caution given plaintiffs’ ever-changing theories, we will discuss this body of law below, but given Professor Elzinga’s recent testimony, the discussion appears to be unnecessary.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  12  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


In any event, the claim that customers identify their need for only SAP, Oracle or PeopleSoft software fails an obvious plausibility test: Why would a class of customers that is by definition limited to the largest, most sophisticated organizations in the world reveal to suppliers the kind of information that marks them as vulnerable to price discrimination? These customers choose the procurement process that they use to buy these products. Plaintiffs’ theory requires the assumption that they do so without regard for their own economic self-interest. Economic logic and antitrust law make that an impermissible explanation of real-world commercial behavior. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 604 n.31 (1985)(quoting Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 156 (1978)).

 

Finally, Plaintiffs cannot sidestep the burdens of market definition by claiming – as they apparently do – that every procurement for “high function” FMS and HRM constitutes a distinct antitrust market. There is no authority whatsoever for this approach. The enforcement agencies and the courts have analyzed plenty of markets involving lengthy, negotiated procurement processes for customized products, and have never found traditional antitrust analysis to be inadequate before. See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). A single sale, moreover, is clearly not a “line of commerce” within the meaning of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. And if every procurement is truly unique enough to be a separate market, then coherent antitrust analysis is impossible: there would be no way to calculate market shares, every buyer would be a monopsonist more than capable of fending off seller power, and the outcome of any merger would be beyond the predictive powers of economic theory.

 

Competitive Effects

 

Even in an improperly defined three-firm market, there is no reasonable concern that the world’s largest, most sophisticated corporations will be prey to Oracle because they “only” have SAP as an alternative.

 

In the first place, the evidence at trial will clearly show that SAP software is a very strong substitute for Oracle software, such that the primary concern of the unilateral effects doctrine is inapplicable. This is simply not the paradigmatic unilateral effects case where the

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  13  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


products of the merging firms are fundamentally different from those of other firms in the relevant market, e.g., where two local newspapers appeal to different advertisers than competing regional or national newspapers. SAP offers the same kinds of products as Oracle and PeopleSoft and appeals to exactly the same kinds of customers. So there is no reason to assume a priori that SAP may be absent from some “locale” within the alleged relevant markets, and therefore unable to offer large enterprises a credible alternative to Oracle software.

 

In fact, the evidence at trial will show that it is SAP, not PeopleSoft, that is Oracle’s strongest competitor, forcing it to offer the largest discounts. This is dispositive evidence in a unilateral effects case, regardless of the level of market concentration, because it shows that SAP can prevent the unilateral exercise of market power by Oracle. Plaintiffs offer only theory in response, insisting that the odd customer that ranks SAP third would inevitably experience a price increase because auction theory says so. That is not how antitrust analysis works. The Supreme Court has made it clear that “actual market realities,” not theory, are the drivers of antitrust analysis. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992). Here the facts show that SAP can and does force Oracle to behave competitively.

 

Furthermore, in the rare case that SAP is not a good “fit” for a large enterprise, the question under unilateral effects analysis is whether SAP could “reposition” its products “to replace the localized competition lost through the merger.” Merger Guidelines ¶ 2.21. If SAP can reposition, the unilateral effects theory is defeated.

 

Oracle has pressed Plaintiffs to identify customers who don’t find SAP products to be a good alternative and to describe SAP’s product weaknesses. They simply can’t do it. At best, Plaintiffs state in highly general terms that SAP lacks some features and functions that Oracle and PeopleSoft have and which some customers value. They have also, on occasion, suggested that SAP is comparatively weak outside its manufacturing industry stronghold (which SAP dominates by a wide margin), and that its offerings to financial services firms (banks and insurance companies) are not on par with Oracle’s and PeopleSoft’s. These arguments, however, are baseless, and not even PeopleSoft’s witnesses – who will say just about anything in support of the government’s case – will claim SAP has distinct product weaknesses. Furthermore, there

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  14  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


is no basis for claiming that SAP could not address any weakness that might be identified, and thus “reposition.” Indeed, Plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Elzinga, recently admitted that he could think of no reason why SAP would not reposition if there was money to be made by it. Under the Merger Guidelines, that should be dispositive.

 

Plaintiffs nevertheless claim that there are many examples of customers that do prefer Oracle and PeopleSoft over SAP. This is evident, they say, in numerous documents (especially discount approval forms) showing that large enterprises chose Oracle and PeopleSoft to face off against one another in the final round of an FMS or HRM procurement. Of course there are such examples – as there are for every other vendor pairing one can think of. The very nature of differentiated-products competition preordains that consumers’ relative preferences for different products will be unevenly distributed. As a result, were the courts to accept this ordinary phenomenon as proof of unilateral effects, the government would have carte blanche to stop any merger in any differentiated market.8 That is not the law. A merger is unlawful only if it is likely to affect competition adversely in a “line of commerce,” not merely across a scattering of customers connected only by their fondness for the merging firms. At the end of the day, that is all Plaintiffs can hope to prove.

 

Finally, Plaintiffs’ arguments ignore the ability of the world’s largest and most sophisticated organizations to protect themselves from the exercise of unilateral market power. It is important to understand that Plaintiffs’ zeal to find some part of the EAS landscape in which this deal is problematic has resulted in a “market” made up solely of huge corporations and other institutions with enormous buyer power. This is the segment of the EAS market that always gets the very best deals, with the most concessions from vendors – even though under Plaintiffs’ view of the world it is already a three-firm oligopoly. The reason for this is that large enterprises have enormous leverage in the negotiation process. The deals are very large, and since seller variable costs are low, losing is very expensive. Large enterprises are the firms that can most credibly


8 PeopleSoft’s recent acquisition of J.D. Edwards, for example, would clearly have been unlawful, because there are numerous documents showing that some customers thought PeopleSoft and J.D. Edwards products were their best options.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  15  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


threaten to maintain their existing solutions, reduce their purchases of a vendor’s products if they are mistreated, or move to outsourcing. They are all important reference accounts, a status they can and do trade for price concessions. And if nothing else, large enterprises can always credibly threaten to turn to SAP, already the most popular choice of such firms. None of this will change as a result of this merger. The companies in the alleged relevant markets are in fact the last group that will ever be the victims of unilateral market power.

 

Conclusion

 

The government has improperly defined the market and cannot meet the requirements of its own unilateral effects test in the gerrymandered market of its choice. Blocking this transaction would therefore clearly be contrary to the substantive standards of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Beyond that, however, blocking this deal would do real harm to the efficient evolution of this industry. The government has simply missed the important competitive forces in this industry that are driving this tender offer, obsessing over one tree in a richly dynamic forest. This acquisition will result in a stronger competitor to SAP, and a stronger competitor in the broader enterprise software “stack” to the behemoths of this industry, IBM and Microsoft. It will also result in multi-billion dollar efficiencies that will benefit all EAS buyers of all sizes and types. These procompetitive effects ought not be sacrificed to speculative concerns that huge corporations more than capable of fending for themselves will get hurt.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  16  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE FACTS

 

Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits only those acquisitions whose effect may be “substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly” in a “line of commerce.” There must be a “reasonable probability” of substantial competitive harm; a “mere possibility” will not suffice. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1974); United States v. Sungard Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 180 (D.D.C. 2001); New York v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321, 358-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

 

Because the statute requires proof of likely harm to competition in a “line of commerce”, the “first step” in any Section 7 case is to define the relevant market allegedly threatened by the transaction. Sungard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 181; California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000) (mem. op.). The second step is to show that the acquisition is likely to harm competition substantially in that market. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Sungard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 180. The government always bears the burden of proof regarding market definition. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (8th Cir. 1999); Sungard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 181. Moreover, without a presumption of likely competitive injury, the government also bears the burden of proving that second element of the offense as well, and, in any event, the government always bears the ultimate burden of persuasion that the acquisition will lessen competition in the relevant market. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 983; Sungard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 180.

 

Plaintiffs cannot discharge their burdens of proof and persuasion on either issue.

 

I. PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGED RELEVANT MARKETS ARE NOT WELL-DEFINED AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE FACTS

 

  A. Plaintiffs’ Product Market Allegations Are Insufficient As A Matter Of Law

 

The relevant market has both a product and a geographic dimension. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324-28 (1962). It must be “well-defined” in both respects. Tenet, 186 F. 3d at 1052. This means not only that the government must define the market with

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  17  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


sufficient specificity that it can be determined “who is in and who is out of the market,” Midcon Corp., 112 F.T.C. 93, 141 (1989), but which sales are relevant to calculating market shares. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 102-06 (2nd Cir. 1995); see, United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-504 (1974). Otherwise, competitive effects cannot be confidently predicted. In re Midcon Corp., 112 F.T.C. at 141; United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1990) (“‘[T]he relevant product market proposed by the [government] is too amorphous to be subjected to the hard economic analysis required by § 7’”) (quoting Carter Hawley Hale Stores v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 253 (C.D. Cal. 1984)), aff’d, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

 

Plaintiffs’ proposed market does not meet this threshold requirement. It is literally circular. “High function” software is defined as software that “meet[s] the demands of multifaceted organizations with high-level functional needs,” FAC ¶23, while “multifaceted organizations with high-level functional needs” are in turn defined as those customers who require “high function enterprise software,” id. ¶14. Plaintiffs offer various subjective descriptions of those supposed “high-level” needs, but none of them supplies a reliable way to determine whether any particular customer is in or out of the alleged “markets.” As discussed above, Plaintiffs’ chief economic expert, Professor Elzinga, has admitted, with respect to the supply side of the market, that “[t]here is no quantitative metric based on software characteristics (i.e., complexity of functionalities) that precisely distinguishes the markets for high function FMS and HRM software from midmarket and general purpose software.” Economic Analysis of the Proposed Oracle Corp. – PeopleSoft, Inc. Merger, Report of Kenneth G. Elzinga at 44 (Apr. 26, 2004)(“Report”). He has also admitted, with respect to the demand side of the market, that “there is no single metric delineating customers of high function enterprise software” either. Id. at 43. Indeed, “customers of similar size metrics and in similar industries may have made ‘radically different’ choices for solving their ‘unique solutions.’” Id. at 94-95.

 

The absence of a usable market definition is also reflected in the analyses of concentration and pricing by Plaintiffs’ experts. For example, in analyzing market shares and concentration in the “high function” FMS and HRM software “markets”, Professor Elzinga is

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  18  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


forced to abandon his own market definition and resort to precisely the kinds of “quantitative metric[s]” that he earlier disavowed. Professor Elzinga uses the numerical size of the transaction (i.e., greater than $500,000) – not the functionality of the software sold or the size or complexity of the customer – as the basis for his analysis. Report at 46-47. In analyzing direct competition between Oracle and PeopleSoft, as well as in constructing his “econometric” study of pricing, Professor McAfee not only uses the size of the deal (instead of the functionality of the software sold or the size or complexity of the customer) to differentiate sales of “high function” software from other software, but he uses ERP suite transactions instead of transactions involving actual sales of FMS and/or HRM software (the “high function” products allegedly constituting the relevant product market). Id. at 40-45, 51-55. In short, the government’s proposed market lacks any meaningful boundaries, and therefore fails as a matter of law.

 

Second, plaintiffs’ alleged markets also fail the threshold requirement that relevant markets constitute a “line of commerce.” That requirement is apparent from the language of Section 7 itself. It is also the teaching of recent cases in which the courts have demanded that when the government points to customers allegedly threatened by the challenged merger because their choices will be more limited, the government must demonstrate that such customers have been chosen on a proper and reliable basis to ensure they are “representative” of a larger group of purchasers numerous enough to constitute a distinct “line of commerce.” Sungard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 184-86; United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 1997).

 

Plaintiffs’ proposed market fails this test. Here Plaintiffs and their experts identified no more than a few dozen purchasers of “high function” FMS and/or HRM software who are allegedly threatened by this proposed merger. Even assuming that the alternatives available to meet the needs of these customers are limited to the products of the merging parties (and SAP), as the government contends, that number represents a tiny fraction of the thousands

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  19  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


of LCEs within the Plaintiffs’ own purchaser limitations.9 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ experts provide no basis whatever for concluding that these nineteen customers are “representative” of any substantial or even identifiable subset of purchasers. Thus, the alleged market also fails this second threshold requirement.

 

  B. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Product Markets Ignore Reasonable Substitutes That Must Be Included As A Matter Of Law

 

A “well-defined” product market must include all “reasonabl[y] interchangeab[le]” products. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325; Sungard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 182 (citing cases). This means that the market must include all alternatives to which customers “could practicably turn for alternative services should the merger be consummated and prices become anticompetitive.” Tenet, 186 F.3d at 1052; see also FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 269 (8th Cir. 1995). Or, as the Ninth Circuit has put it, the market must include the products of all sellers “who have the ‘actual or potential’ ability to deprive each other of significant levels of business.” Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Thurman Indus. v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1374 (9th Cir. 1989)). Professor Elzinga acknowledges that this legal test is also the economic test. He states that “demand substitution is used to define the products included in the relevant market” and that “[d]emand substitution identifies the alternative products consumers could buy that would protect them from a price increase for the product of the merging firms . . . .” Report at 24.

 

The Complaint pays lip service to this cardinal rule by alleging that LCEs not just prefer, but need, the “high function” FMS and HRM software contained in the ERP suites of Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP. However, by limiting the product market to the suites of those three vendors, Plaintiffs’ product market definition violates the rule as it applies to the real world. Plaintiffs omit at least three important alternatives to which LCE customers can, and regularly do, turn. All of these options constrain the pricing of Oracle, PeopleSoft, and SAP.


9 See 5/27/04 Elzinga Dep. [66-67] (admitting that “the customer declarations represent a tiny tiny fraction or a sliver of the entire customer base”).

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  20  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


  (1) Maintaining incumbent systems

 

First, Plaintiffs ignore the existing systems operated by virtually all potential purchasers, certainly including LCEs. These systems give each LCE the option to “just say ‘no’” to any vendor, including to SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft. The supposedly vulnerable customers in Plaintiffs’ tale are the world’s largest enterprises, and these specific functions (financial, human resources) are the most basic and universal. The FMS and HRM software on the incumbent system is a non-depreciating resource (a “durable good”) which the customer can operate indefinitely so long as updates are available.10 The legacy system gives the customer the option not to buy anything – to simply continue operating and upgrading the system that it has. The existence of this option is reflected in the win-loss reports of all three vendors whose products Plaintiffs assert alone comprise the relevant market. The viability of the incumbent or “legacy” option will also be established by the trial testimony of customer and vendor witnesses.

 

The Justice Department’s omission of this alternative is inexplicable given that in Sungard, supra, it made the very same mistake, and lost the case because of it. There the product at issue was “Business Continuity/Disaster Recovery” – systems that permit businesses to keep operating or to promptly restore operations in the event of natural disaster, prolonged power failures and the like. The government excluded customers’ incumbent internal systems from the relevant market. The court found this exclusion unfounded, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 186-190, and it consequently concluded that the government had failed to prove that the acquisition at issue would violate Section 7.11


 

10 There are trivial exceptions to this for customers whose IT systems are somehow destroyed beyond the possibility of reconstruction, or whose underlying IT systems otherwise become inoperable.

 

11 Professor Elzinga admits “there are documents from both Oracle and PeopleSoft mentioning prospective customers who may stay with their legacy systems instead of becoming actual customers.” Report at 66-67. He argues nevertheless that including “self-supply” in the relevant product market should be limited to situations in which a “vertically integrated firm can direct its self-supply to become market supply.” Id. at 67. That is exactly the argument rejected in Sungard. Professor Elzinga also asserts that “self supply” should be ignored because “few (if any)” customers “would build a legacy system from scratch” and that a legacy system would have to be “constantly updated to reflect regulatory and tax changes.” Id. at 65-67. These assertions are just shadow-boxing. An LCE need not (and rarely does) build its “system from

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  21  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


  (2) Other vendors

 

Second, plaintiffs exclude the FMS and HRM packages sold by other vendors like Microsoft, SSA and Lawson, from which plaintiff State of Michigan recently purchased an FMS package. They also tie themselves into knots trying to figure out what to do with AMS, from which the Justice Department itself purchased a huge, comprehensive and very “high-function” HRM solution. In the same breath, Professor Elzinga includes AMS in his market share calculation and declares this is still a “three to two” deal because AMS doesn’t really count.

 

Plaintiffs attempt to justify the exclusion of these alternatives on the ground that those packages do not possess all of the FMS/HRM product and vendor characteristics of ERP suites sold by Oracle, PeopleSoft and SAP. That is certainly not true of the FMS and HRM “basic components” identified by Plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Marco Iansiti. Expert Report of Professor Marco Iansiti at 11-12 (April 26, 2004). The evidence will show that the HRM and FMS packages sold by numerous other vendors have those “basic components.” And, as discussed above, Professor Elzinga has acknowledged there is no “metric” (to borrow his phrase) to define what additional components are “high function” components and which are not.

 

Moreover, as discussed above, if and to the extent that those other packages lack any supposed “high function” components by themselves, those components can be supplied with modules and features provided by “best of breed” or “point solution” providers. Sales of individual FMS or HRM packages – and even more disaggregated elements of such packages treating one or two individual functions, such as asset management (part of FMS) – are common, and dozens of vendors in addition to SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft provide such alternative solutions. These vendors are frequently invited to bid for LCE sales, alone or with partners, and often they win. Professor Elzinga acknowledges “many best of breed sales have been made.” Many of these sales are to a division or similar sub-unit of a larger LCE customer. Nothing compels LCEs to procure on a global, enterprise-wide basis. Professor Elzinga acknowledges scratch.” It can simply upgrade the system it has. LCEs have been constantly “updating” their legacy systems – as they must update every EAS system – every year to stay abreast of current regulatory and tax requirements, and can continue to do so.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  22  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


that “[i]t would be idle to contend that high function HRM and FMS software are always acquired on a suite basis from one vendor.” Id. at 79. He also admits that “large, complex organizations that buy high function HRM and FMS software also may purchase midmarket enterprise software (to take care of particular HRM or FMS tasks at a particular plant or business operations),” id. at 78-79, and that “customers of similar size metrics and in similar industries may have made ‘radically different’ choices for solving their ‘unique situation,’” id. at 94-95. Thus, as explained below, statements offered by Plaintiffs from at most a few a dozen LCEs that prefer to procure globally (or in any other “bundle”) can at most identify a small handful of potentially “inframarginal” customers – customers who claim not to perceive any alternative other than the software solution they prefer.

 

Plaintiffs’ position boils down to the contention that the FMS and HRM software contained in the suites that are in its product market offer “one-stop shopping” while other FMS and HRM packages do not. In Thurman v. Pay ‘N PakStores, the Ninth Circuit made it clear that is no justification at all for excluding the other packages from the product market. There the Court rejected a market limited to “one stop” home improvement stores where, as here, customers could satisfy their needs by assembling purchases made from other sources – hardware stores in that case. 875 F.2d at 1373-74. Professor Elzinga admits that that is correct as a matter of economics, as well as law, stating that “[i]f separate point solutions are a viable option, then the case is weakened for delineating the relevant product market as a suite or product set of what technically are non-substitutable products.” Report at 79.

 

  (3) Outsourcing

 

Third, Plaintiffs exclude outsourcing provided by firms such as ADP, Fidelity, and increasingly by systems integrators like Accenture, even though there will be evidence that many LCEs (including, for example, Bank of America) have outsourced their HR functions, replacing HRM solutions (that outsourcers call “in-sourcing”). Outsourcing is the ultimate in “one-stop shopping,” since both software and labor is acquired from the outsourcer, and it is the most potent new competitive force in the HR world. It is, to be sure, a different approach than HRM software run by company employees, but that is immaterial. The point is that it is

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  23  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


competitive, and indisputably so. There is no justification for excluding it from the relevant HR market.12

 

In sum, Plaintiffs’ product market definition – FMS and HRM software packages that possess the functionality, scalability and flexibility to enable an LCE to perform all of its human resource and financial management tasks seamlessly by means of an integrated suite and which is sold by a vendor who possesses “vision, technology, staying power and global resources” – is not a market that includes the alternatives to which an LCE “could practicably turn” and which therefore have “the actual or potential ability to deprive” a post-acquisition Oracle of “significant levels of business,” especially if it tried to impose a material price increase. See Tenet, 186 F.3d at 1052; Thurman v. Pay ‘N Pak Stores, 875 F.2d at 1373. It is instead the kind of “‘strange, red-haired, bearded man-with-a-limp’” market that the district court mocked in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 114 F. Supp. 2d 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citation omitted), aff’d, 315 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2002), because it was so clearly gerrymandered to yield a product market supporting the plaintiff’s case. It is, in short, not “well-defined,” as a matter of law.

 

  C. Plaintiffs’ Geographic Market Is Contrary To Law And To Their Own Product Market Allegations

 

As a matter of law, the relevant geographic market in an antitrust case is “the area of effective competition . . . in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.” Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961). In other words, it is “‘the narrowest market which is wide enough so that products from adjacent areas . . . cannot compete on substantial parity with those included in the market.’” Westman Comm’n Co. v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1222 (10th Cir.1986) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). As discussed above, Plaintiffs limit the relevant geographic market to the

 


12 Professor Elzinga tries to dismiss the outsourcers as competitors on the ground that to include them in the relevant market would be “double counting” since some of them use Oracle, PeopleSoft and/or SAP software. Report at 69. That is not the answer: a number of outsourcers operate their own propriety software, and those who do not can price their services so that they can beat an alternative involving the purchase of the software they are using.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  24  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


United States. This is remarkable for at least two reasons.

 

First, the leading geographic-market definition methodology recognized by the courts was co-authored by the government’s chief economic expert, Professor Elzinga, and he admits that under that methodology, the geographic market is clearly worldwide. Under the “Elzinga-Hogarty test” (E-H), a proposed geographic market must be expanded until two criteria are met: (1) vendors outside the proposed geographic market do not supply significant amounts of product within the proposed market (the “Little In From Outside” or “LIFO” criterion), and (2) vendors inside the area supply few products to those outside (“Little Out From Inside” or “LOFI”). Sutter, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1069. As Judge Chesney noted in Sutter, courts have generally required that 90% of the product consumed in an areas must be produced in that area for it to be a well-defined geographic market. Id. at 1069. See also Pilch v. French Hosp., 2000-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,935 at 87,966-67 & n.5 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Again, Professor Elzinga admits that applying E-H to this case would result in a world market. 5/28/04 Elzinga Dep. at 60. (admitting that a geographic market limited to “the United States probably would not survive the Elzinga-Hogarty test, mainly because of SAP”).

 

Second, plaintiffs’ geographic market allegations are flatly inconsistent with their own product market allegations. Plaintiffs’ subjective descriptions of “high function” customers invariably emphasize the global nature of their operations and needs. For example, Professor Elzinga opines that “[c]ustomers of high function enterprise software cannot use midmarket software not so much because they are ‘large.’ Rather, their organizations may embrace different production functions spread across different countries with different currencies and different laws.” Report at 13. But if the product market is defined by customers with global needs and operations, the geographic market cannot be limited to the United States. The customers Plaintiffs describe not only operate globally, but purchase globally as well. Plaintiffs’ methodology would put an FMS sale to DaimlerChrysler “in” the market if the paperwork is completed in Detroit, but “out” of the market if the sale is consummated in Stuttgart. That is plainly arbitrary.

 

The evidence will confirm that transportation costs associated with selling FMS

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  25  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


and HRM software are minimal, and there are no other substantial barriers to selling it on an international basis. SAP, the first EAS innovator and still market leader, is based in Germany, and – despite a significant share of U.S. sales – produces its software outside the U.S. Oracle, PeopleSoft and other FMS/HRM software vendors located in the United States sell it throughout the world. In short, the record will show without question that the relevant geographic market is worldwide in scope.

 

II. PRICE DISCRIMINATION THEORY COULD NOT SUSTAIN THE ALLEGED RELEVANT MARKETS

 

Plaintiffs commenced this litigation brandishing a “price-discrimination” approach to market definition. Price discrimination is mentioned in the relevant-market section of the Complaint, FAC ¶ 25, and Plaintiffs’ principal expert report asserts the legitimacy of using price discrimination markets to analyze this case. Report at 27-28. Yet neither seemed definitive: the Complaint fell short of any clear invocation of the relevant Guidelines provision (¶ 1.12), and Professor Elzinga’s Report simply falls back on “traditional” analysis, claiming that his conclusions are unaffected by the choice of approach. Report at 30 & n.51.

 

Professor Elzinga has now clearly conceded that he is not defining the market using the price discrimination approach. So be it – Plaintiffs have no remaining path to victory. Absent proof that vendors can identify ERP customers vulnerable to price discrimination and discriminate against them, Plaintiffs have no arguable legal grounds upon which to limit the market to customers who regard FMS and HRM suites as the only acceptable means to automate financial and HR processes. If vendors cannot target and impose adverse price discrimination on an identifiable set of customers, such customers will share in the benefits of competition from these other alternatives even if they could not themselves rely on them directly.13

 

In reality, Plaintiffs’ decision to abandon price discrimination as a basis for


 

13 “[I]mportant conditions [for feasibility of price discrimination include] that the hypothetical monopolist is able to identify the customers to whom price can be increased “ Jerry A. Hausman, et al., Market Definition Under Price Discrimination, 64 Antitrust L.J. 367, 370 (1996).

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  26  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


market definition was not gratuitous; the theory could not have succeeded in this case. First, the price discrimination theory requires proof that sellers charge higher prices to those with fewer choices, not lower prices as LCEs indisputably get. There is no theory about defining markets around customers who benefit from price discrimination.

 

Second, the price discrimination market definition theory that does exist is of dubious validity. The FTC has repeatedly warned that there are “analytical hazards” in defining markets by reference to possible price discrimination. In re R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 120 F.T.C. 36, 159-60; see also In re Midcon Corp., 112 F.T.C. 93, 141 (1989). They stem from the fact that varying customer preferences for differentiated product alternatives “is an economic truism.” Donnelley, 120 F.T.C. at 53. Consequently, there is “the potential for [the price discrimination market definition] approach to swallow up the market definition principles established by the federal courts and the Commission.” Id. at 54. At the very least, “that risk requires a particular rigor in examining the conceptual basis for distinguishing the allegedly inelastic customers and the factual basis for the prediction that price discrimination with respect to those customers is likely.” Id. at 159-60; see also Midcon Corp. 112 F.T.C. at 155, 158 (“In considering possible markets under this theory, there is a danger of implicitly assuming the conclusion” and while “the possibility of price discrimination might in appropriate circumstances be enough to justify concern about anticompetitive effects . . . ‘possibilities’ can be a weak foundation for a prediction of ‘likely’, ‘substantial’ competitive effects.”)

 

In particular, in markets like these involving differentiated products, price differences are not probative of the power to engage in price discrimination. As the authors of the preeminent antitrust treatise emphasize, “even in modestly complex markets the correlation between market power and price differences, discriminatory or not, is very difficult to establish. In many markets where either products or transactions are differentiated, price discrimination indicates little more than that firms are not perfect competitors. It tells us almost nothing about the amount of market power held by a single firm or even a collective. This fact greatly limits the use of price discrimination evidence to establish market power for antitrust purposes.” IIA

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  27  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


Phillip A. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 517c (2d ed. 2002)(“Areeda”).14

 

Plaintiffs’ treatment of differences in the prices (i.e., discounts) that Oracle has given to different LCEs as evidence of price discrimination here is especially far-fetched. Some customers inevitably get better prices than others when prices and terms are arrived at by negotiation because the outcome reflects the relative skills of the negotiators, incumbency advantages, reference opportunities, and even the proximity of the transaction to the end of a vendor’s fiscal year. That cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered evidence of systematic economic price discrimination.

 

Again, all of this appears to be moot, because the only one of Plaintiffs’ witnesses who could advance a price discrimination-based market definition theory, Professor Elzinga, does not intend to do so. It is still worth knowing that the theory could not succeed.

 

III. EVERY PROCUREMENT IS NOT A SEPARATE MARKET

 

During the Hart-Scott-Rodino process, in interrogatory answers, and most recently in deposition testimony by Professor Elzinga, the government has claimed it would be economically valid to treat each FMS and HRM procurement as a distinct relevant market. At one level this is an important concession: it implicitly acknowledges that the “high function” concept does not define a traditional market, because it is impossible to generalize about who needs this made-up product. However, asserting that each procurement is a relevant market does not improve Plaintiffs’ position. There is no legal authority for such markets, and the notion that individual procurements could each be a “line of commerce” defies common sense.

 

No court has ever embraced the theory that an individual procurement of a product may be considered its own relevant product market. Indeed, the government has never advanced this theory in court, for good reasons. To begin with, the legal requirements for

 


14 Areeda goes on to point out that in the licensing of intellectual property (like software) “price discrimination is ubiquitous and seldom indicates significant market power”; that “[significant product differentiation generally undermines any useful correlation between price discrimination and the kind of market power that is necessary for antitrust analysis”; and that “[when products are differentiated, different groups of customers value the variations by differing amounts”; and that “[the result often makes price discrimination possible even for relatively small firms.” Areeda at ¶¶ 517c2, 517c4.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  28  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


proving a well-defined relevant product market are still the same. The market must include not just the products of the vendors who are invited to that one procurement, but all of the alternatives to which similarly situated customers “could practicably turn” in the event that preferred competitors were to disappoint. See Tenet, 186 F.3d at 1052; see also Thurman v. Pay ‘N Pak, 875 F.2d at 1373-74. Thus, to use an example, if Johnson & Johnson can use Lawson HRM software (which it does), Lawson cannot be excluded from a single procurement market for, say, Pfizer, merely because for whatever reason Pfizer was not interested in Lawson.15

 

At most, a given LCE’s selection of the final round competitors constitutes evidence of that firm’s preferences among alternatives. Markets, however, are defined on the basis of alternatives that can reasonably satisfy a customer’s needs, not on the basis of what a customer prefers. As the FTC observed in Donnelley, n.65, “‘[t]here will almost always be classes of customers with strong preferences for [differentiated] products, but to reason from the existence of such classes that each is entitled to the “protection” of a separate narrow market definition grossly overstates the market power of the sellers.’” 120 F.T.C. at 159 n.65 (quoting Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of the Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1805, 1816 (1990)).16

 

IV. THIS MERGER WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS

 

  A. Plaintiffs Are Entitled To No Presumption Of Anticompetitive Effects

 

In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963), the


15 This is a more specific expression of the principle that where customers have in fact purchased material quantities from certain sellers, those products must be included in the relevant market, as a matter of law. See, e.g., Donnelley, 120 F.T.C. at 153 (rejecting government allegation that market consisted of gravure printers since offset printers were not suitable for print jobs with more than thirty-two pages and print runs more than ten million copies; stating that evidence that “offset accounted for 13.5%” of those jobs “could be considered dispositive” against government); Sungard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 182 (rejecting a product market “limited to shared hotsite services for main frame and midrange computer processing centers” where there was evidence that main frame and midrange computer processing centers used alternatives to shared hotsite services).

 

16 Numerous courts have rejected market definitions based simply on customer preferences. See, e.g., Thurman, 875 F.2d at 1373-74; Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 86 F. Supp. 2d 154, 160-62 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1379-80 (D.D.C. 1981); cf., Total Ben. v. Group Ins. Admin., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. La. 1995).

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  29  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


Supreme Court held that anticompetitive effects could be presumed when an acquisition created undue concentration in a well-defined relevant market. The soundness of this presumption, based on the theory that high concentration begets anticompetitive coordinated effects, has been questioned even by government enforcement authorities. As FTC Chairman Timothy Muris recently stated, “the preeminence that some would continue to give to concentration or HHI numbers is misplaced. State-of-the-art merger analysis has moved well beyond a simplistic causality of high concentration leading to anticompetitive effects.” Prepared Remarks of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, Workshop on Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Feb. 17, 2004) available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/040217hmgwksp.htm (last visited May 31, 2004). However, the viability of the Philadelphia Bank presumption, or its applicability to unilateral effects doctrine, which the Supreme Court has never considered, are moot issues in this case.

 

The three-firm concentrated market Plaintiffs allege is simply the byproduct of their fictitious market definition. As a matter of law, the likelihood that an acquisition will have anti-competitive effects cannot be presumed when the government has failed to prove a well-defined relevant market. Sungard, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 181; Sutter, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1068. And in all events, the government bears the ultimate burden of proving the likelihood of adverse competitive effects. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

 

  B. “Unilateral Effects” Theory Supplies No Proof Of Anticompetitive Harm

 

As noted earlier, the core of unilateral effects theory is proof that a substantial class of identifiable customers have uniquely strong preferences for products of the merging firms, above those of all others in the market. The examples of potential unilateral effects problems the government has given in the past have involved markets in which differentiation is specific and tangible – for example, radio stations with similar formats that appeal to advertisers trying to reach the demographic group that prefers that format, or ski resorts that are particularly convenient to some customers. The potential of other market participants to “reposition” and thus protect consumers is measured in relation to what they would need to do to adjust their

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  30  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


product offerings in line with the preferences of the threatened customer group.17

 

Plaintiffs have failed to lay even the foundation for this argument. They have identified nothing specific or tangible about how Oracle and PeopleSoft products are different than SAP products. They seem to be saying only that some unidentifiable LCE customers, in unidentifiable circumstances, would not consider SAP as good a choice as Oracle or PeopleSoft. Nothing in the government’s own unilateral effects guidelines, let alone the law, sanctions approaching random customer preferences for the merging firms as a unilateral effects issue.

 

In any event, Plaintiffs cannot meet two of the Merger Guidelines’ requirements for presuming adverse unilateral effects. First, they cannot prove Oracle and PeopleSoft will have a post-merger market share of at least 35%. This also means Plaintiffs cannot meet the requirements of case law concerning proof of unilateral market power, which likewise demands shares in the 35% range. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 8, 26 (1984) (30% market share below threshold for market power, as matter of law); Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1435 (following Jefferson Parish on this point).

 

Second, Plaintiffs have no credible argument that SAP, the undisputed market leader with global reach and enormous development resources, cannot “reposition” to better serve those customers (whoever they are) that currently prefer Oracle and PeopleSoft. Every witness in this case that makes a living in this industry – system integrators, competitors, Oracle witnesses and even PeopleSoft witnesses – has agreed that SAP is either already capable or soon will be capable of competing effectively for every LCE customer, in every vertical, in every part of the world. It is already addressing its very few historical weaknesses, and not even PeopleSoft CEO Craig Conway will sign on to the notion that SAP is not a fully credible competitor in all parts of the alleged relevant markets. If the merged Oracle/PeopleSoft attempted to raise prices in any particular vertical or with any particular customer, SAP would pounce on the opportunity in a second. This one fact – which will be established to summary judgment standards – is fully

 


17 Note this does not require new entry. Of course new entry can also trump unilateral effects, but repositioning by existing competitors is sufficient.

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  31  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


dispositive of this case.

 

The history of this market also makes it clear that smaller players can compete successfully with Oracle, SAP and PeopleSoft by focusing on particular vertical segments. For example, although Lawson may not (yet) enjoy the broad-based market penetration of the “Big 3” vendors, it has developed a very strong market position in the health care industry – where currently 8 of the 10 largest companies use its products. AMS has enjoyed similar success in the government sector. AMS or Lawson would not have to duplicate PeopleSoft’s current market position to eliminate a localized “unilateral effect” from an Oracle/PeopleSoft merger; they need only reposition their offerings to cater to customers in the parts of the market where unilateral market power was exercised. With SAP omnipresent, this won’t be needed to discipline post-merger pricing, but it will be there just the same.

 

  C. “Auction Theory” Cannot Be Used to Infer Anticompetitive Effects In This Case

 

As noted earlier, Plaintiffs claim that EAS procurements operate like auction markets. One of Plaintiffs’ experts, Professor R. Preston McAfee, claims the merger will be anticompetitive because the elimination of PeopleSoft will reduce the number of potential “bidders” in FMS and HRM procurements from three to two, which, as a matter of auction theory, will increase prices (or reduce discounts). Using a “merger simulation” based on auction theory, he predicts wildly implausible price increases as a result of the merger. However, this theory does not work as a vehicle for establishing the likelihood of competitive injury here.

 

To begin with, FMS and HRM procurements are not auctions. They aren’t even close. In procuring this kind of software, an LCE usually issues a request for proposal (“RFP”) to numerous software vendors whose products the LCE considers potential solutions. Plaintiffs’ expert Professor Elzinga estimates that five to eight RFP recipients is typical. Report at 16-18, Ex. 3. In the next stage of the process, each interested vendor tries to persuade the LCE that it offers the best product to meet the customer’s needs. Id. at 18-19, Ex. 3. Then the customer typically winnows the field (“down-selects”) to one or two vendors, rarely three. Simultaneous bilateral negotiations, not any kind of auction or competitive bidding, are then used to select the

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  32  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


winning vendor and determine prices. In other words, the buyer negotiates separately with the two finalists for as long as it wants, playing them off one another. The “rules” in the pricing phase are thus ad hoc, whatever the buyer chooses, because the buyer (and typically its advisors) are in complete command of the process.

 

Professor McAfee’s first premise – that as a result of the merger there will be a reduction in the number of “bidders” from three to two – is therefore plainly wrong. In most instances today, the number of vendors involved during the pricing process is already two, not three, reflecting the fact that LCEs have generally concluded that two is the optimal number for achieving competitive prices. This is a powerful reason why SAP can be expected to protect consumers from post-merger price increases, whether PeopleSoft exists or not.

 

Professor McAfee’s second premise – that the procurement process constitutes “bidding” as that term is understood in economics – is also wrong. In auction theory, “bidding” is a rule-based process for submitting quotations to buyers that they accept or reject. A fundamental belief of auction theorists is that “rules matter,” so that who bids and how they bid should be carefully scripted. By these standards, there is no bidding in the relevant markets (although the word “bidding” is used, in its lay sense). Auction theory does not predict the outcome of bilateral negotiations, rendering it irrelevant to this case. Unlike the outcome of a bidding process, the outcome of a negotiation is largely, if not exclusively, determined by leverage and other factors impossible to model, such as the relative skills of the parties doing the negotiating.

 

Large buyers such as the LCEs that make up the “high function” markets have enormous leverage, further marginalizing the utility of auction theory. First, because software’s variable costs are trivially small, whenever a vendor loses a sale, they lose almost all profit. The lost revenues are not offset to any substantial degree by avoided costs. That phenomenon, coupled with the fact that each lost sale to an LCE costs the vendor not only the initial license fees but also a substantial ongoing revenue stream associated with service and maintenance, means that vendors never want to lose large deals, and will cut prices to the bone to get them. Second, large buyers can credibly threaten vendors to “do nothing” by delaying or canceling the

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  33  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


purchase. They almost never need to buy back office software, because they virtually always have it already. Third, large buyers are valuable reference opportunities, for which vendors “pay” in the form of higher discounts.

 

In Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990), Judge (now Justice) Thomas expressed skepticism about seller power to exploit “sophisticat[ed]” customers who negotiate their purchase prices, as opposed to “small consumers who may possess imperfect information and limited bargaining power.” Disbelief, not skepticism, is warranted here: the record will show that the LCEs that Plaintiffs claim are in need of government protection here get the best prices (i.e., the highest discounts).18 Claiming that these customers will be exploited successfully because they might be if they conducted auctions, which they do not, makes no economic sense.

 

The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have admonished that an economic expert’s opinion that is not based on the facts must be disregarded. Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993); Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1995). There being no basis for application of auction theory in the real world procurement process here, there is no basis for predicting adverse competitive effects from auction or bidding theory.

 

  D. Sophisticated Customers And The Extraordinary Dynamism Of The Software Industry Would Defeat Any Attempted Price Increase

 

Even when high market shares and concentration provide a basis for a presumption of likely anticompetitive effects, that presumption is defeated when there are factors suggesting that these statistics may give an inaccurate prediction of the proposed acquisition’s probable effect on competition. See Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 984, 987. Those factors may include the sophistication and power of the buyers involved (Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 986-87; United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 781 F. Supp. 1400, 1422 (S.D. Iowa 2001); United


 

18 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that antitrust claims must make economic sense or else they can and should be rejected as a matter of law. Adaptive Power Solutions LLC v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 141 F.3d 947, 952-53 (9th Cir. 1998).

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  34  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


States v. Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. 669, 673, 679-80 (D. Minn. 1990)); the likelihood of entry or repositioning that would change the competitive landscape in the market (Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 984, 987); and the existence of cognizable efficiencies associated with the merger. (See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)).

 

Each of those factors exists here. First, the buyers allegedly at risk here are the largest and most sophisticated buyers of FMS and HRM software. The evidence will show that they are more than capable of protecting themselves. One simply cannot emphasize enough that – despite Plaintiffs’ elaborate price discrimination theories—the largest customers currently pay the lowest prices for EAS software.

 

Furthermore, LCEs needn’t stand in place to allow themselves to be victimized by a post-merger attempt at exercising unilateral market power. They have many credible counterstrategies. If, unlikely as it seems, turning to SAP is not a credible threat, they can bring in Microsoft, or Lawson, or any of the other FMS and HRM vendors that have prevailed in large enterprise procurements. If that doesn’t work, they can threaten to reduce their consumption of Oracle products. Large enterprises are not just candidates for the few FMS and HRM modules that make up the alleged relevant markets; they are huge buyers of the more specialized FMS and HRM modules, of CRM and SCM software, and of database and middleware software. They could easily discipline Oracle’s FMS and HRM pricing simply by threatening not to buy other Oracle products, as to which there are abundant competitive options. If that doesn’t work, they can simply delay their purchases until market conditions are more favorable. They hold all the cards.

 

The credibility of these strategies is increasing by the day as new integration technologies make it easier and easier to operate multi-vendor applications solutions, and new vendors and business process automation options arrive on the scene. If ever there was a moment when large enterprises were dependent on deeply integrated suites of the type the Tier 1 vendors offer – and there was not – its has been overtaken by new technologies (such as the emerging “application integration layer”), by new vendors (such as Microsoft) and by new or enhanced business process automation models (such as outsourcing and “software as service”).

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  35  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


Competition to provide EAS solutions and alternative paths to more efficient business process automation is intensifying constantly.

 

The Plaintiffs’ only substantial response to these points is that the competitive landscape will not be materially different over the next two years – the arbitrary period of time used in the Merger Guidelines to assess the likelihood of new entry. Oracle disagrees. These markets are, as Plaintiffs’ expert Professor Elzinga has described software markets generally, “exceptionally dynamic,” and a lot can happen in two years. Having said that, two years is clearly not the appropriate time frame in which to assess any issue in this case. First, it is undisputed that FMS and HRM systems are “durable goods.” The Merger Guidelines recognize that “[w]here the relevant product is a durable good, consumers, in response to a significant commitment to entry, may defer purchases by making additional investments to extend the life of previously purchased goods,” and they further provide that in those circumstances a longer time horizon for assessing entry is appropriate. Merger Guidelines ¶ 3.2. The government’s fixation on the next two years is contrary to its own Guidelines.

 

Finally, the notion that this merger should stand or fall based on what happens in the “high function” FMS and HRM markets over the next two years is simply perverse given that hardly any sales at all are being made to large enterprises at this time. The vast majority of large enterprises have perfectly functional back office systems that they are not looking to replace. They will replace them eventually, of course, but in five or ten years, not within two. So for whose benefit is the government seeking to block this merger? The evidence will show that by the time large enterprises return to the market to purchase new back office software, the competitive landscape will be very different from what it is now. In short, if the object of this analysis is to protect consumers, then the truly “relevant” markets are the markets of 2008, 2010 and 2015, not those of the next two years alone.

 

  E. The Government Ignores Substantial Productive and Innovative Efficiencies

 

The resources and scale of Microsoft, IBM and in applications SAP dwarf those of Oracle (and will continue to do so post-acquisition). As Mr. Ellison stated when Oracle made its tender offer for PeopleSoft, the acquisition is a vehicle for acquiring resources and scale to

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  36  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


enable Oracle to compete with those huge firms in the new environment that is now unfolding. Mr. Ellison is not alone in that view. The benefit – and need – to acquire additional resources and scale led PeopleSoft’s Mr. Conway to suggest to Mr. Ellison in 2002 that the companies’ applications software businesses should be combined, and the same considerations are reflected in PeopleSoft’s acquisition of J.D. Edwards. The evidence at trial will show a wide industry consensus that consolidation in search of efficiencies is an inevitable and beneficial industry dynamic.

 

For Oracle, the need for scale is heavily driven by competition in “the stack” – the complementary software technologies that, together with hardware, constitute the overall IT solutions that business enterprises use. By all accounts, there are two dominant “stack” players today and for the foreseeable future: Microsoft and IBM. Oracle and SAP are the best-positioned firms to offer consumers a viable alternative to the Microsoft and IBM stacks. This acquisition is an important step in assuring the viability of an Oracle stack, and therefore a more competitive stack market. IBM and Microsoft both know this. Their internal documents show it, and it explains why both have lobbied the Justice Department to bring this case.

 

If this acquisition does not occur, LCEs will be hurt. Not today and not in the next two years, perhaps, but they will be hurt eventually because they are the largest consumers of software up and down the stack, and therefore the firms with the most to gain from competition along the stack. This is never factored in to the government’s analysis. The government has fixated so completely on the possibility of unilateral effects affecting a handful of Oracle/PeopleSoft aficionados that is has completely missed the broader competitive dynamics at play. Microsoft hasn’t made that mistake, nor has IBM. But Plaintiffs surely have.

 

Allowing Oracle to acquire PeopleSoft – which frankly is not a player in stack-based competition and has no long-term prospects of remaining an independent company – will lead to compelling dynamic efficiencies. It will create critical mass in the Oracle stack, assuring that “ISVs” (Independent Software Vendors, which develop applications for different platforms) support that stack in addition to the IBM and Microsoft alternatives. It will create scale – a much larger Oracle applications business with a larger recurring revenue stream from maintenance fees

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  37  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


– that will fuel additional R&D and innovation. Plaintiffs have never disputed the importance of resources and scale in this competitive environment; indeed they cite scale and scope as important EAS vendor attributes.

 

Increased scale, moreover, will predictably lead to cost savings and productive efficiencies that exceed a billion dollars annually. Plaintiffs experts dispute only the magnitude, not the existence, of those savings and efficiencies. Whatever the magnitude may be, it will certainly exceed any losses that supposedly vulnerable LCEs may suffer. The record will show that Oracle and PeopleSoft together have made fewer than twenty sales of HRM and FMS suites during the last year. The total purchases by LCEs that view Oracle and PeopleSoft as their two best choices can’t be more than $25-30 million per year. Even assuming arguendo that those sales would be made at prices 10% higher post-acquisition (and there is no evidence at all to support that assumption), the potential supracompetitive pricing is an infinitesimal fraction of the achievable efficiencies.

 

Plaintiffs respond that cost savings and scale efficiencies are not cognizable because they will not be shared with customers. Scholars and commentators debate whether proof of such a pass-on is necessary to consideration of efficiency benefits, but fortunately this is another debate mooted by the facts of this case. Here the only customers claimed to be adversely impacted are a limited number of LCEs. The government does not pretend that there is any dearth of competition for the FMS and HRM software business of all other enterprise customers. Under those circumstances, as a matter of elementary economics, some of the value to Oracle of the transaction must necessarily be “competed away”, and thus shared, with customers. That being so, these are cognizable efficiencies, even on the government’s own terms.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The evidence at trial will show that the government’s effort to block this acquisition based on unilateral effects doctrine must fail. It is impossible to condemn this merger in either a well-defined market or even in a gerrymandered three-firm only market. In a market defined as antitrust law requires, the case is a non-starter. In a three-firm only market, the case fails because SAP can clearly discipline any attempt at the exercise of unilateral market power,

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  38  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum


because of pervasive buyer power, and because the trivial price increase that is even theoretically possible would be dwarfed by cognizable efficiencies. Furthermore, this case violates the cardinal principle of “First, do no harm.” The merger is procompetitive, helping to assure a competitive alternative to the IBM and Microsoft technology stacks. It does not violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

 

DATED: June 1, 2004

     

Respectfully Submitted,

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

               

J. Thomas Rosch

Gregory P. Lindstrom

Daniel M. Wall

                 
       

ORACLE CORPORATION

               

Dorian Daley

Jeffery S. Ross

                 
            BY:   / s /
               

Daniel M. Wall

           

Attorneys for Defendant

ORACLE CORPORATION

 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

SAN FRANCISCO

  39  

Case Number: C 04-0807 VRW

Defendant Oracle Corporation’s Trial Memorandum

EX-99.(A)(5)(CXXXI) 8 dex99a5cxxxi.htm LIST OF WITNESSES INTENDED TO BE CALLED AT TRIAL List of witnesses intended to be called at trial

Exhibit (a)(5)(cxxxi)

 

Daniel M. Wall

   505 Montgomery Street, Suite 1900

Direct Dial: (415) 395-8240

   San Francisco, California 94111-2562

dan.wall@lw.com

   Tel: (415) 391-0600 Fax: (415) 395-8095
     www.lw.com

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

   FIRM / AFFILIATE OFFICES
     Boston    New Jersey
     Brussels    New York
     Chicago    Northern Virginia
     Frankfurt    Orange County
     Hamburg    Paris
     Hong Kong    San Diego
     London    San Francisco
     Los Angeles    Silicon Valley
     Milan    Singapore
     Moscow    Tokyo
          Washington, D.C.

 

March 22, 2004

 

BY HAND DELIVERY

 

The Hon. Vaughn R. Walker

United States District Judge

U.S. District Court, Northern District of California

Courtroom 6, 17th Floor,

450 Golden Gate Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102

 

  Re: United States v. Oracle Corporation, Case No. C 04-00807 VRW

 

Dear Judge Walker:

 

Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of the Case Management Order, enclosed herewith is Defendant Oracle Corporation’s list of witnesses it intends to call live at trial, the order in which they will be called, a brief description of the subjects to which they will testify, and the estimated time of direct examination.

 

Very truly yours,

 

Daniel M. Wall

of LATHAM & WATKINS LLP

 

Enclosure


ORACLE WITNESS LIST

 

Order

  

Witness


  

Subject Matter


  

Est.

Time
(hrs.)


1    Tom Campbell Haas School of Business    Expert economic testimony to be disclosed pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the CMO.    2.5
2    Charles Peters Emerson Electric    Large enterprise options to procuring FMS and HRMS suites from SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft; procurement dynamics.    2.0
3    Ken Harris Retail.In.Genius    Professional experience (Gap, Nike, Pepsi); FMS and HRMS procurement dynamics; strategies for assuring competitive pricing.    1.5
4    Christy Bass Accenture    Procurement dynamics; current market conditions, prospects; SAP strength, product offerings, and strategic initiatives; Accenture outsourcing efforts    1.5
5    Richard Knowles SAP    FMS and HRMS market dynamics; SAP product offerings and strategic initiatives; FMS and HRMS competition and pricing.    1.5
6    Kevin Fitzgerald Oracle    Federal, state and local government procurement dynamics; competition; recent procurements and results.    1.0
7   

Donna Morea

AMS

   FMS and HRMS market dynamics in the public sector verticals; AMS successes against Tier 1 vendors; AMS strategic direction.    1.5
8   

Lisa Pope

Oracle

   Commercial procurement dynamics; competition; use of mixed vendor applications solutions.    1.5
9   

Bob Greene

Oracle

   HRMS market; procurement dynamics; functional comparisons of HRMS products.    1.0
10   

Keith Block

Oracle

   Oracle pricing procedures and strategies; feasibility of price discrimination strategies proposed by plaintiffs.    1.0
11   

Safra Catz

Oracle

   Oracle pricing procedures and strategies; feasibility of price discrimination strategies proposed by plaintiffs; PeopleSoft overtures for a combination with Oracle; rationale for proposed acquisition; efficiencies expected from the transaction.    1.0


Order

  

Witness


  

Subject Matter


  

Est.
Time
(hrs.)


12    Dera Anderson Novell   

Alternatives to ERP suites; procurement dynamics; strategies for assuring competitive pricing.

 

   1.0
13   

John Coughlan Lawson Software

 

   Lawson product offerings, positioning, and customers; FMS and HRMS competition.    1.0
14   

Michael Sternklar Fidelity

 

   Outsourcing as competition for FMS and HRMS suites; Fidelity product offerings and positioning    1.0
15   

Brian Mearns

Bank of America

 

   Replacement of PeopleSoft EAS with Fidelity outsourcing solution and resulting cost savings; alternatives to ERP suites.    1.0
16   

Jay Rising

ADP

  

Outsourcing as competition for FMS and HRMS suites; ADP products offerings and positioning

 

   1.0
17   

Steve Mills

IBM

  

IBM database, application, integration layer, and stack positioning and strategies.

 

   1.5
18   

Cindy Bates Microsoft

 

  

Microsoft applications strategies and capabilities; competition with one’s installed base.

 

   1.5
19    David Schmaier Siebel Systems   

EAS market dynamics; intensity of competition for large EAS implementations; susceptibility to competition from new models such as hosted solutions and software as service; effects of integration layer technologies.

 

   1.0
20    Craig Conway PeopleSoft   

FMS and HRMS competitive dynamics; PeopleSoft’s competition in large enterprise deals; customer alternatives to ERP suites; prior proposal to combine Oracle and PeopleSoft applications businesses; sustainability of PeopleSoft’s current business model; opposition to acquisition.

 

   6.0
21   

Jerry Hausman M.I.T.

 

   Expert economic testimony to be disclosed pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the CMO.    4.5
22   

Dale Kutnick

Meta Group

 

   Expert industry testimony to be disclosed pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the CMO.    2.0
23   

Ron Wohl

Oracle

  

Drivers of technological innovation; absence of technological barriers to expansion or respositioning; technologies facilitating mixed vendor applications solutions.

 

   2.0

 


Order

 

Witness


 

Subject Matter


  

Est.

Time

(hrs.)


24  

Larry Ellison

Oracle

  Purpose of the acquisition; relationship of acquisition to competition with IBM, Microsoft and others.    1.0
25  

David Teece

Haas School of

Business

  Expert economic testimony to be disclosed pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the CMO.    2.5
EX-99.(A)(5)(CXXXII) 9 dex99a5cxxxii.htm SLIDES DISPLAYED DURING PARENT'S OPENING STATEMENT AT TRIAL, JUNE 7, 2004. Slides displayed during Parent's opening statement at trial, June 7, 2004.

Exhibit (a)(5)(xxxii)

LOGO

 

Exhibit (a)(5)(xxxii)

Oracle’s Opening Statement

June 7, 2004


LOGO

 

This is not a traditional case

The government concedes it has no case under the concentration/collusion theory that is the foundation of most merger law.

. Coordinated effects were not pleaded.

. Professor Elzinga closed the door:


LOGO

 

“3 to 2” is About Collusion

. “When an economic approach is taken in a section 7 case, the ultimate issue is whether the challenged acquisition is likely to facilitate collusion.”

Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC

807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986)

(Posner, J.)


LOGO

 

Unilateral Effects Analysis is Novel

. Competition must be “localized.”

. The merging firms must be closer substitutes for each other than they are for other firms.

. This must be true for a substantial number of consumers in relation to the market.

. The merging firms’ combined market share must exceed 35%.

. Firms already in the market (e.g., SAP) must be unable to reposition to discipline pricing.


LOGO

 

Oracle Will Prove

. The facts of this case do not present a unilateral effects issue.

. This is not a “3 to 2” merger.

. Competition from SAP and others, and strong buyer power, would prevent the unilateral exercise of market power. . In the most important competitive arenas, the merger is procompetitive and will benefit large enterprises greatly.


LOGO

 

Is Unilateral Effects Theory Applicable?


LOGO

 

The Unilateral Effects Concern

Theory

Reality


LOGO

 

SAP Is Not a Weak Substitute

Theory

“Reality”

(Assuming 3-firm market)


LOGO

 

No Repositioning Argument

Theory

. DOJ literally has no “repositioning” argument.

. Never discussed in DOJ’s Trial Brief.

. Never addressed by DOJ’s experts.


LOGO

 

DOJ: “Not Everyone Loves SAP”

. DOJ says because random customers prefer Oracle and PeopleSoft over SAP, there is a unilateral effects problem.

. No tangible SAP product weaknesses are identified (let alone proven).

. Factors unrelated to product differentiation, such as incumbency advantages, are used to identify “vulnerable customers.”

There is no legal foundation for this theory.


LOGO

 

“Proof” – Trial by Vignette

. Selected examples of Oracle-PeopleSoft head-to-head competition allegedly indicate a broader unilateral effects problem.

. Selected customers say they played off Oracle against PeopleSoft.

. But are there customers that played off other vendors against one another? MANY.

. Selected documents show Oracle competing against PeopleSoft.

. But are there documents showing other vendors competing head-to-head? MANY.


LOGO

 

There Is No Unilateral Effects Issue

. SAP is a strong substitute for Oracle across the spectrum of large enterprises.

. For any given procurement, so are others.

. SAP, not PeopleSoft, causes Oracle to price most aggressively.

. Professor Hausman will so testify.

. Prof. McAfee came to the same conclusion. This is the opposite of Staples.


LOGO

 

Market Definition

(How the government gets to a “3-to-2” merger and 35% shares.)


LOGO

 

A Non-Starter In FMS

2002 FMS License Revenue (Gartner)


LOGO

 

Or In HRMS

WW HR/Payroll Revenue by Top Vendor

source: IDC, 2001


LOGO

 

Getting to DOJ’s Market (1)

. Cut out the “Mid-Market”

. DOJ focuses on the very largest corporations in the world.

. Thousands of large enterprises are excluded from the market – because they indisputably turn to other vendors.

<2000 Companies

10-15,000 Companies


LOGO

 

Getting to DOJ’s “Market” (2)

. Cut out all non-US companies.

. Why?

. Because SAP dominates the footprints of truly global companies, especially with respect to FMS.

. In a world market, the FMS case is over.

. HRM shares also decline substantially.

Only 751 of the Forbes Global 2000 are U.S. companies.


LOGO

 

Getting to DOJ’s “Market” (3)

. Hypothesize a distinct “high-function” product that is sold to the largest enterprises, but not to “mid-market” companies.

. There is no such product.

. The FMS and HRMS that SAP, Oracle, PeopleSoft and others sell to the top 2000 companies is the same product they sell to the top 10,000.

The “Mid-Market” strategy in the documents DOJ used is aimed at companies with less than 1,000 employees.


LOGO

 

200 Word Market Definition


LOGO

 

Getting to DOJ’s “Market” (4)

Choices

Process

Results

The Procurement Process


LOGO

 

The Secret “Market”


LOGO

 

Traditional Markets

. All products and services to which “large, complex enterprises” could turn.

. Similar products that are chosen by similar customers.

. Different technologies or approaches that capture the same business EAS vendors seek.

. Decentralized systems

. Outsourcing the business function

. “Outside options” such as keeping what one already has.


LOGO

 

Microsoft is Pursuing Enterprises

Divisions and Subsidiaries

All Corporate Accounts


LOGO

 

Other ERP Vendors: Lawson Software


LOGO

 

Plaintiffs’ Own Choices

April 26, 2004

AMS Solution Selected by Department of Justice for Department-wide Financial and Procurement System

DOJ Becomes 28th Federal Entity to Choose AMS Momentum® Suite

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

State of Michigan


LOGO

 

Recent HR Outsourcing Wins


LOGO

 

Outsourcing is Competition


LOGO

 

PeopleSoft’s Perspective

The Competitive Landscape

HCM Opportunities

Outsource Providers

Niche Vendors

ERP Solutions


LOGO

 

There Are No “High-Function” Shares

Neither Professor Elzinga nor Professor McAfee were able to implement the “high-function” concept.


LOGO

 

Even in a “3 to 2,” the Proposed Acquisition is not Anticompetitive


LOGO

 

Does this make sense?

DOJ:

A reduction of the number of bidders from three to two will lead to higher prices for “high-function” customers.

The Market Reality:

. Large customers already choose to negotiate prices with only two vendors, sometimes one.

. They do so on the advice of consultants and system integrators that are repeat players.

. They consistently get the highest discounts and most concessions.


LOGO

 

Sources of Customer Leverage

. Lost enterprise bids are very costly.

. Variable costs are low; lost revenue is lost profit.

. Follow-on business.

. More modules, pillars, infrastructure needs.

. Reference value.

. Control of key information.

. They can learn what is important about vendors while concealing what is important about them.

. A credible “do nothing” option.


LOGO

 

Nothing Critical Will Change

Today Post-Merger

One or two firms negotiating

with buyer. Unchanged

Buyers with leverage that

don’t need to buy at all. Unchanged

Buyers can conceal their

reserve price and vendor

preferences. Unchanged

Seller costs of losing are

huge; price discrimination is

very risky. Unchanged


LOGO

 

In the Most Important Competitive Arena, the Merger is Procompetitive


LOGO

 

The Stack is What Matters

. The important competitive struggle is among Oracle, Microsoft, IBM and SAP.


LOGO

 

PeopleSoft is Not “On the Map”

. PeopleSoft is not a player in the stack

. It lacks both the resources and the plan to become a player.

. The question is not whether PeopleSoft is acquired, but by whom.


LOGO

 

The Acquisition is Procompetitive

. Oracle and PeopleSoft together can compete effectively against SAP, IBM and Microsoft.

. By spreading fixed R&D costs over a large base of customers, Oracle can innovate even more than it does today.

. Speculative concerns about harm to mega-corporations should not stand in the way.

GRAPHIC 10 g60400oracle_page01.jpg GRAPHIC begin 644 g60400oracle_page01.jpg M_]C_X``02D9)1@`!`@$`R`#(``#_[0FZ4&AO=&]S:&]P(#,N,``X0DE-`^T` M`````!``R`````$``0#(`````0`!.$))300-```````$````'CA"24T$&0`` M````!````!XX0DE-`_,```````D```````````$`.$))300*```````!```X M0DE-)Q````````H``0`````````".$))30/U``````!(`"]F9@`!`&QF9@`& M```````!`"]F9@`!`*&9F@`&```````!`#(````!`%H````&```````!`#4` M```!`"T````&```````!.$))30/X``````!P``#_____________________ M________`^@`````_____________________________P/H`````/______ M______________________\#Z`````#_____________________________ M`^@``#A"24T$"```````$`````$```)````"0``````X0DE-!!X```````0` M````.$))300:``````!]````!@`````````````"#0```J@````.`$\`4@!! M`$,`3`!%`%\`4`!A`&<`90!?`#``,0````$````````````````````````` M`0`````````````"J````@T````````````````````````````````````` M````````.$))3004```````$`````3A"24T$#``````''`````$```!P```` M5@```5```'#@```'```8``'_V/_@`!!*1DE&``$"`0!(`$@``/_N``Y!9&]B M90!D@`````'_VP"$``P("`@)"`P)"0P1"PH+$14/#`P/%1@3$Q43$Q@1#`P, M#`P,$0P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P!#0L+#0X-$`X.$!0. M#@X4%`X.#@X4$0P,#`P,$1$,#`P,#`P1#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P, M#`P,#`P,#/_``!$(`%8`<`,!(@`"$0$#$0'_W0`$``?_Q`$_```!!0$!`0$! M`0`````````#``$"!`4&!P@)"@L!``$%`0$!`0$!``````````$``@,$!08' M"`D*"Q```00!`P($`@4'!@@%`PPS`0`"$0,$(1(Q!4%181,B<8$R!A21H;%" M(R054L%B,S1R@M%#!R624_#A\6-S-1:BLH,F1)-49$7"HW0V%])5XF7RLX3# MTW7C\T8GE*2%M)7$U.3TI;7%U>7U5F9VAI:FML;6YO8W1U=G=X>7I[?'U^?W M$0`"`@$"!`0#!`4&!P<&!34!``(1`R$Q$@1!46%Q(A,%,H&1%*&Q0B/!4M'P M,R1BX7*"DD-3%6-S-/$E!A:BLH,')C7"TD235*,79$55-G1EXO*SA,/3=>/S M1I2DA;25Q-3D]*6UQ=7E]59F=H:6IK;&UN;V)S='5V=WAY>GM\?_V@`,`P$` M`A$#$0`_`/54DDDE*22224I))))2DDDDE*22224I))))2DDDDE/_T/55"QCG M`!KS69Y:`?\`JPY3224#2'T;?^Y#_N9_Z32]&W_N0_[F?^DT9)"EW&?#_%BA M]&W_`+D/^YG_`*32]&W_`+D/^YG_`*31DDJ5QGP_Q8H?1M_[D/\`N9_Z32]& MW_N0_P"YG_I-&22I7&?#_%BA]&W_`+D/^YG_`*32]&W_`+D/^YG_`*31DDJ5 MQGP_Q8H?1M_[D/\`N9_Z32]&W_N0_P"YG_I-&22I7&?#_%BPK8YH(<\V$]W` M#_J&M4TDD5I-O__1]522224L9C3E8#.H_62NM[OL1R"&,/N`K/KDLKR,=C6O M=^K5N=OJRO?[/^Y#/TZZ!))3AMZA]8;,T4_8@S&MAOKNT]-X-GJ^S])ZNQNU MS+7>EC7^E[/Z57L=V=UVS&QK1C&BY_JA](:'CU&6-;0RU[RQU6+=CMOL]?9_ MHO\`PMD;:';?326"UX9ZKME>XQ+H<_:/[+')*GAM;VAXLL+FF M#J?T3F^US/YGT['LL_[4?S7Z--9UCJU%N*R["#1EW,J:`2]P!?LNW^F-K?3Q MVOS?5_F?39Z'_"+2?U3I[*7W"]EC*V[WFH^H0W=Z>_93ZC]F_P#.4E3_.WT^HE.6.I?6*I]LX3LAK;'M8W: M&2"\>B&O]1VQK,?^=?\`K%?J_I*[_P">Q<>>-U+ZRVAC+.GUUO`:++7.E[O:[>ZUNV^WT_2]&S_2+8Q\K'R0XT6-L##M?M[.+6V;7?RMEC$5)3B,Z ME]8'L+W=/;0&O8UP)-K@TG]*0QOI>KZ-;/\`!/\`TOK_`/`V5OVTDDE*2222 M4__2]522224I))))2E7R\'$S`UN54+6LDM#I@$_G?U_Y:L))*:E?2NFU?S6- M6R6UL.UH'MJCT&>W\VK8S:E=TO`O)-U0L+MLEQ)G9_-'GZ5;OTC/^%_3?SJM MI)*0XN'B8;',Q:64-L<;'BMH:'/(#76.V_2>[;]-&2224I))))2DDDDE/__3 M]526?UO*ZMBXC;.DXK6''&>*(NJR9<>*?\`B3D]6DN4_;/UZ_\`*6K_`#Q_Z62_ M;/UZ_P#*6K_/'_I9-]Z/[L_\23)_HW+_`)WE_P#VHP_]^]6DN4_;/UZ_\I:O M\\?^EDOVS]>O_*6K_/'_`*62]Z/[L_\`$DK_`$;E_P`[R_\`[48?^_>K27*? MMGZ]?^4M7^>/_2R7[9^O7_E+5_GC_P!+)>]']V?^))7^CO\`REJ_SQ_Z62_;/UZ_\I:O\\?^EDO>C^[/_$DK_1N7_.\O_P"U M&'_OWJTER]76?KD2?6Z2U@D1LA^GYW_:FM.WK'UOEN_IC0"?>0V8;_):6?^)"3_ M`/_4]527RJDDI^JDE\JI)*?JI)?*J22GZJ27RJDDI^JDE\JI)*?JI)?*J22G MZJ27RJDDI__9.$))300A``````!5`````0$````/`$$`9`!O`&(`90`@`%`` M:`!O`'0`;P!S`&@`;P!P````$P!!`&0`;P!B`&4`(`!0`&@`;P!T`&\`'0`````0V]P>7)I M9VAT("AC*2`Q.3DX($AE=VQE='0M4&%C:V%R9"!#;VUP86YY``!D97-C```` M`````!)S4D="($E%0S8Q.38V+3(N,0``````````````$G-21T(@245#-C$Y M-C8M,BXQ```````````````````````````````````````````````````` M``````````````!865H@````````\U$``0````$6S%A96B`````````````` M````````6%E:(````````&^B```X]0```Y!865H@````````8ID``+>%```8 MVEA96B`````````DH```#X0``+;/9&5S8P`````````6245#(&AT='`Z+R]W M=W`&,`:`!M`'(`=P!\`($`A@"+`)``E0": M`)\`I`"I`*X`L@"W`+P`P0#&`,L`T`#5`-L`X`#E`.L`\`#V`/L!`0$'`0T! M$P$9`1\!)0$K`3(!.`$^`44!3`%2`5D!8`%G`6X!=0%\`8,!BP&2`9H!H0&I M`;$!N0'!`$!Z0'R`?H"`P(,`A0"'0(F`B\".`)!`DL"5`)=`F<" M<0)Z`H0"C@*8`J("K`*V`L$"RP+5`N`"ZP+U`P`#"P,6`R$#+0,X`T,#3P-: M`V8#<@-^`XH#E@.B`ZX#N@/'`],#X`/L`_D$!@03!"`$+00[!$@$501C!'$$ M?@2,!)H$J`2V!,0$TP3A!/`$_@4-!1P%*P4Z!4D%6`5G!7<%A@66!:8%M07% M!=4%Y07V!@8&%@8G!C<&2`99!FH&>P:,!IT&KP;`!M$&XP;U!P<'&09!ZP'OP?2!^4'^`@+"!\(,@A&"%H(;@B"")8(J@B^"-((YPC[ M"1`))0DZ"4\)9`EY"8\)I`FZ"<\)Y0G["A$*)PH]"E0*:@J!"I@*K@K%"MP* M\PL+"R(+.0M1"VD+@`N8"[`+R`OA"_D,$@PJ#$,,7`QU#(X,IPS`#-D,\PT- M#28-0`U:#70-C@VI#<,-W@WX#A,.+@Y)#F0.?PZ;#K8.T@[N#PD/)0]!#UX/ M>@^6#[,/SP_L$`D0)A!#$&$0?A";$+D0UQ#U$1,1,1%/$6T1C!&J$)%ZX7TA?W M&!L80!AE&(H8KQC5&/H9(!E%&6L9D1FW&=T:!!HJ&E$:=QJ>&L4:[!L4&SL; M8QN*&[(;VAP"'"H<4AQ['*,0!YJ'I0>OA[I M'Q,?/A]I'Y0?OQ_J(!4@02!L()@@Q"#P(1PA2"%U(:$ASB'[(B--@U M$S5--8Y",$)R0K5"]T,Z0WU#P$0#1$=$BD3.11)%546: M1=Y&(D9G1JM&\$25^!8+UA]6,M9 M&EEI6;A:!UI66J9:]5M%6Y5;Y5PU7(9O5\/7V%?LV`% M8%=@JF#\84]AHF'U8DEBG&+P8T-CEV/K9$!DE&3I93UEDF7G9CUFDF;H9SUG MDV?I:#]HEFCL:4-IFFGQ:DAJGVKW:T]KIVO_;%=LKVT(;6!MN6X2;FMNQ&\> M;WAOT7`K<(9PX'$Z<95Q\')+%V/G:;=OAW M5G>S>!%X;GC,>2IYB7GG>D9ZI7L$>V-[PGPA?(%\X7U!?:%^`7YB?L)_(W^$ M?^6`1X"H@0J!:X'-@C""DH+T@U>#NH0=A("$XX5'A:N&#H9RAM>'.X>?B`2( M:8C.B3.)F8G^BF2*RHLPBY:+_(QCC,J-,8V8C?^.9H[.CS:/GI`&D&Z0UI$_ MD:B2$9)ZDN.339.VE""4BI3TE5^5R98TEI^7"I=UE^"83)BXF229D)G\FFB: MU9M"FZ^<')R)G/>=9)W2GD">KI\=GXN?^J!IH-BA1Z&VHB:BEJ,&HW:CYJ16 MI,>E.*6IIAJFBZ;]IVZGX*A2J,2I-ZFIJARJCZL"JW6KZ:QK_UP'#`[,%GP>/"7\+;PUC# MU,11Q,[%2\7(QD;&P\=!Q[_(/%$XIZ#+HO.E&Z=#J6^KEZW#K^^R&[1'MG.XH[K3O0._,\%CPY?%R\?_R MC/,9\Z?T-/3"]5#UWO9M]OOWBO@9^*CY./G'^E?ZY_MW_`?\F/TI_;K^2_[< M_VW____N``Y!9&]B90!D0`````'_VP"$``$!`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$! M`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$!`0$"`@("`@("`@("`@,#`P,#`P,#`P,! M`0$!`0$!`0$!`0("`0("`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,# M`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`__``!$(`@T"J`,!$0`"$0$#$0'_W0`$`%7_ MQ`&B````!@(#`0`````````````'"`8%!`D#"@(!``L!```&`P$!`0`````` M``````8%!`,'`@@!"0`*"Q```@$#!`$#`P(#`P,"!@EU`0(#!!$%$@8A!Q,B M``@Q%$$R(Q4)44(6820S%U)Q@1ABD25#H;'P)C1R"AG!T34GX5,V@O&2HD14 M7J%AH>(B8J4E9:7F)F:I*6FIZBIJK2UMK>XN;K$Q<;'R,G*U-76U]C9 MVN3EYN?HZ>KT]?;W^/GZ$0`"`0,"!`0#!00$!`8&!6T!`@,1!"$2!3$&`"(3 M05$',F$4<0A"@2.1%5*A8A8S";$DP=%#$A:.SP]/C\RD:E*2TQ-3D])6EM<75Y?4H1U=F M.':&EJ:VQM;F]F=WAY>GM\?7Y_=(6&AXB)BHN,C8Z/@Y25EI>8F9J;G)V>GY M*CI*6FIZBIJJNLK:ZOK_V@`,`P$``A$#$0`_`-_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__0W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_]'?X]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U__TM_C MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7__3W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=?_]3?X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U__U=_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__6W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_]??X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U__T-_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__1W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_]+?X]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U__T]_C MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7__4W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=?_]7?X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=%H^4WQ1ZM^8&PB$?\,9_";_`)V_R-_]'WO#V`_]9'DS_?VX_P#95)UEA_R=$^\S_P`H')W_ M`'(K3KW_``QG\)O^=O\`(W_T?>\/?O\`61Y,_P!_;C_V52=>_P"3HGWF?^4# MD[_N16G7O^&,_A-_SM_D;_Z/O>'OW^LCR9_O[3/]_;C_`-E4G7O^3HGWF?\`E`Y._P"Y M%:=>_P"&,_A-_P`[?Y&_^C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_LJDZ]_R=$^\S_R@\/?O]9'DS_?VX_\`95)U[_DZ)]YG_E`Y._[D5IU[ M_AC/X3?\[?Y&_P#H^]X>_?ZR/)G^_MQ_[*I.O?\`)T3[S/\`R@\/?O]9'DS_?VX_]E4G7O^3HGWF?^4#D[_N16G7O^&,_ MA-_SM_D;_P"C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_`+*I.O?\G1/O,_\`*!R=_P!R*TZ]_P`, M9_";_G;_`"-_]'WO#W[_`%D>3/\`?VX_]E4G7O\`DZ)]YG_E`Y._[D5IU[_A MC/X3?\[?Y&_^C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_LJDZ]_R=$^\S_R@\/?O]9'DS_?VX_P#95)U[_DZ)]YG_`)0.3O\`N16G7O\`AC/X M3?\`.W^1O_H^]X>_?ZR/)G^_MQ_[*I.O?\G1/O,_\H')W__Y.B?>9_Y0.3O^Y%:=>_X8S^$W_.W^ M1O\`Z/O>'OW^LCR9_O[_?ZR/)G^_MQ_P"RJ3KW_)T3[S/_`"@9_Y0.3O^Y%:=>_X8S^$W_.W^1O M_H^]X>_?ZR/)G^_MQ_[*I.O?\G1/O,_\H')W__Y.B?>9_P"4#D[_`+D5IU[_`(8S^$W_`#M_D;_Z M/O>'OW^LCR9_O[3/]_;C_P!E4G7O^3HGWF?^4#D[_N16G7O^&,_A-_SM_D;_`.C[WA[] M_K(\F?[^W'_LJDZ]_P`G1/O,_P#*!R=_W(K3KW_#&?PF_P"=O\C?_1][P]^_ MUD>3/]_;C_V52=>_Y.B?>9_Y0.3O^Y%:=>_X8S^$W_.W^1O_`*/O>'OW^LCR M9_O[\/?O\` M61Y,_P!_;C_V52=>_P"3HGWF?^4#D[_N16G7O^&,_A-_SM_D;_Z/O>'OW^LC MR9_O[3/] M_;C_`-E4G7O^3HGWF?\`E`Y._P"Y%:=>_P"&,_A-_P`[?Y&_^C[WA[]_K(\F M?[^W'_LJDZ]_R=$^\S_R@\/?O]9'DS_?V MX_\`95)U[_DZ)]YG_E`Y._[D5IU[_AC/X3?\[?Y&_P#H^]X>_?ZR/)G^_MQ_ M[*I.O?\`)T3[S/\`R@\/?O]9'DS_?VX_] ME4G7O^3HGWF?^4#D[_N16G7O^&,_A-_SM_D;_P"C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_`+*I M.O?\G1/O,_\`*!R=_P!R*TZ]_P`,9_";_G;_`"-_]'WO#W[_`%D>3/\`?VX_ M]E4G7O\`DZ)]YG_E`Y._[D5IU[_AC/X3?\[?Y&_^C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_LJD MZ]_R=$^\S_R@\/?O]9'DS_?VX_P#95)U[ M_DZ)]YG_`)0.3O\`N16G7O\`AC/X3?\`.W^1O_H^]X>_?ZR/)G^_MQ_[*I.O M?\G1/O,_\H')W__Y M.B?>9_Y0.3O^Y%:=>_X8S^$W_.W^1O\`Z/O>'OW^LCR9_O[_?ZR/)G^_MQ_P"RJ3KW_)T3[S/_ M`"@9_Y0.3O^Y%:=>_X8S^$W_.W^1O_H^]X>_?ZR/)G^_MQ_[*I.O?\G1/O,_\ MH')W__Y.B?>9_P"4 M#D[_`+D5IU[_`(8S^$W_`#M_D;_Z/O>'OW^LCR9_O[3/]_;C_P!E4G7O^3HGWF?^4#D[ M_N16G7O^&,_A-_SM_D;_`.C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_LJDZ]_P`G1/O,_P#*!R=_ MW(K3KW_#&?PF_P"=O\C?_1][P]^_UD>3/]_;C_V52=>_Y.B?>9_Y0.3O^Y%: M=>_X8S^$W_.W^1O_`*/O>'OW^LCR9_O[\/?O\`61Y,_P!_;C_V52=>_P"3HGWF?^4#D[_N M16G7O^&,_A-_SM_D;_Z/O>'OW^LCR9_O[3/]_;C_`-E4G7O^3HGWF?\`E`Y._P"Y%:=> M_P"&,_A-_P`[?Y&_^C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_LJDZ]_R=$^\S_R@\/?O]9'DS_?VX_\`95)U[_DZ)]YG_E`Y._[D5IU[_AC/ MX3?\[?Y&_P#H^]X>_?ZR/)G^_MQ_[*I.O?\`)T3[S/\`R@\/?O]9'DS_?VX_]E4G7O^3HGWF?^4#D[_N16G7O^&,_A-_S MM_D;_P"C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_`+*I.O?\G1/O,_\`*!R=_P!R*TZ]_P`,9_"; M_G;_`"-_]'WO#W[_`%D>3/\`?VX_]E4G7O\`DZ)]YG_E`Y._[D5IU[_AC/X3 M?\[?Y&_^C[WA[]_K(\F?[^W'_LJDZ]_R=$^\S_R@\/?O]9'DS_?VX_P#95)U[_DZ)]YG_`)0.3O\`N16G7O\`AC/X3?\` M.W^1O_H^]X>_?ZR/)G^_MQ_[*I.O?\G1/O,_\H')W__Y.B?>9_Y0.3O^Y%:=>_X8S^$W_.W^1O\` MZ/O>'OW^LCR9_O[_?ZR/)G^_MQ_P"RJ3KW_)T3[S/_`"@M@_%[JO#]/=:3 M[HJ-HX.OS61H9=X[CK=U9XSY[)U&6KA4YK(?Y541+553>)3Q&EE'`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`-#_G65'Q"[PZY^"OPWZ#RGS3_F']M1XV MMPG26&R,^(VIUQM_+H\V-W)VAN."(I1?>T<3UBT7W%%'2XQ&K\A6T%*U/)4^ MZ]T4?<_S-_X5*],;8R?* M@G?MW>E%N;+8^CB:,TV&QN8JJJ3_`#$#FRGW7NK>/Y7O\TWXZ_S5.CJ_M;I/ M^.;5WEL;)4>U^[>E]Z4_VF^NHMZ5,-3)%B,QHCCH\OALJ*"HDQN3IOV:J.&1 M)$@JH:FE@]U[JRVX/T(]^Z]UW[]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[JF7^:1_,H[3^"7 MR'_E=]/=>[#V!O#!_.GY8XOH#L+)[S&XCE=H;;K]T=7X!\SLPX/-8JD7.1P[ M\GD!KHZN#5!&/'8M?W7NKFO?NO=>]^Z]U5A_,"^9'R7^*7R"_ER;3ZOZCZ_W MKT%\JOE#B/C?W[V)NO)U46YNMHP;=Z][]U[KWOW7NJN/YJG\UOH;^57TGBM_=DX_,] MC]M=DY.7:?0'Q^V7KEWSV_O752Q?9TKQTM<,%MG%2U\#9')2PR^/RQP4T-56 MST]+-[KW55.!^7O_``JC[&P%#VKM3^6C\&>O-HY"B3+XSIGM+M7-4_<^0QM0 MCU-)35UEXZ<#B:R.GK-T]6;CK::AFS]%2TU73 M5,]*T;.U%4)64,^0H!)51^Z]U>C[]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NNKCZW% MO?NO=%Z^6&[/D+L7XY=O;N^*'6FW>X_D;@-H5=?U%U?NS+T>!VYO7=T=13)2 MX7+YC(;DV?14%)-3O*Q>3)T270`RK?W[KW7OB?NSY"[Y^./4.[_EAUIMWISY M&Y_:%)7]N]8;3R]'G=M[*W=)45*U6%Q&7H-R;PHJ^DAITB8/'E*Y-3D"5K>_ M=>Z,-?\`XK[]U[KWOW7NO7']??NO==7!^A'OW7NN_?NO=:QG>O\`.;^<7R#^ M9O>OP?\`Y-'Q+ZM^1.X?BW(,'\A?D-W_`+RJ=M=/;/WP,Q58*OVI@\=C-Q[. MJ,VV)RU!4TGE7)O5UM30UOV]$]-2_=2^Z]T$>]_YS_\`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`,9/B<3MJ@2&. M%"L>!C+,UP![KW6XU[]U[K3=^*V"J?B=_P`*W_F5U#U_7K2]9_,;XRMWAN_: M='0TE%04F]9L1M#><^5F5(V-37C>%#N"J6:/Q,RY^4/J(9F]U[H'>K&_FD?S M3/YF/\V/X6[7_F-]S_%KXL?&#Y*Y?*U6Z>M:>I;M+&4T^?WAM[JGI_KG=>,K M]M56S-F)-MNMR.56.O$M;'1QPO'.K%HO=>ZM&^8'3W\\'<.4^#GP,^)W>^>V M+U70]5T*_-#^:ON#$=79G?NY=YX/&UD5=B]O=75NZ:G>>$K\L^)6J62DAA:L MK,O2TW\7AAHZ^6?W7NJ6_P":1M#^8S_("V]U/\I^F?YS7>GRDQ6X.SMI;4WW M\9?EEN2BWUG]SXLTVYLM4Y[;N+W?N;>,C;*J4QIQF2.,QV.KZ)1WG_+"_GK?# M+K5_F#\7/YM?R)^:?RGVK5XO<'9?Q=["VPZ]_.VWCOCL/OW_A,1OGLWK[)=3= MD;L^=/6&>[`ZQR\M'49#8&]LENWXT5.ZMH356/K\G0UJ8#.//31SQ5$T<\4: MR!R&]^Z]T,?\R?YK_*KY3?S$\G_*J^%GS%ZW^`NQ>CNKL/V5\S?EONBOV@=X MTE;O^AI6VOT]UECMUU^$F.=CP.X*#(R5&)R%!6+/4G77T:T30UGNO=$1^2>Z M_FQ_)%VO@_E_T%_.6?\`F7?'/:&\=E47R%^+'R2['VCV7V;E]M[LW!BMKY'. M]=;L?>V[]RTP@FJ*5(HZ!Z!\9-(:F9*ZF-5'[]U[K;G'5/Q_^6.;^)WR]K:* MKWQ_HVVY6=L_'>:ISM=+LW%U7<^R,;3TW8LFT:6MEVQFMZ46RLC)2XC)U$=1 M/B8RV?)4=/"C4=768.IPV9\L<5+/1+&?=>ZV5_?NO=::7; ML_\`LS'_``L,Z.ZY[)@IOYM?\BCYP[!F MJ,/V9N3Y%XWX];X;'"GHI-S=>4_8G7L"X^JK(H%J)&J=N]O;CQD_F:57I*U$ M55"$-[KW4?\`F6?*[^:E4?S]NO\`X!_`CO,;'Q7=OP[PFFBWG3TN8ZSZ:JLU M6=C5>_/D2-MSTLL.:WGLC:FU2^*IJH5--4Y#P1&!RX'OW7ND)\R-G_S/_P#A M/F.K?G10_P`Q[O/^8/\`$BM[8V-LSY9]&_)2:?*[C@IMX5%3#5[CZTR^'W7NK)?YR?\S+NG8F\OAA\#_@CV9U MEU+\A/Y@%'7[RB^3W:&2P=+M#X[]`8.C@S.0[%BH-R4]3A*S.[KQM-D5Q\E6 MDRHF,J(8('K:BEEI_=>ZK:[H^,GSU^$W6N[/EM\2_P#A1'DOE;WOUQMC.=B= MB?'GY"[_`.O]X=4=VTV`ADW1N+;'7&R\SVQNC%;"J:VFIJQ*/'TD*U-0KQ4] M-7T3+&Q]U[H2_P":K_.![D[)_P"$_GQ?_F,_$/L+L*WY`;-^*75.WZ_KCXS]>8G&;0DWU+T/N M+!TV>H_[\;BQ=)"V-?.[@P]5KK(R*NFJ%+S^_=>Z%+:7\SWY*?)3_A,+VC\^ MVW34==_*?;?1_8^(K^Q]CT]#@YY=^]8=ER[";L'"4%/"^.PM?N;'8Y*RI@AA MBI8*RHG6GBB@$2+[KW19OF3\^?F-L#_A+E\3_F+M'Y!]A8'Y-[Q/0[;K[GQ^ M1I(MZYX9_>&YJ+.+75ST,E._\5HZ&*.8B$:E0?XW]U[I7]Q?R[?YT7;GQ-R? MSXWC_.,[EZR^4&V.G(^_-B_&WIG#U_7GQLVQ@L%L>/?L/4>ZOY]6\\3_PGCG_`)G_`';MJBWK\@=@ M?QKI67&?;T.$V_VKWE2[VI]A;+W+54&!_AL.)V_E(LO19;.T]&E*T:4M>E(B M#P>_=>Z";H+^6K_/8[9Z8VA\\MU_SANV]B_-+?&U=O\`:VS/C!D=LT4WQ3V_ MAL]0#P>$W)4QSTO6U)7[?R-?F-D;Z!3_`(5R M?&+LC;7P%V%V3UI\B,OU_P#%#IR/I#I/_9+<-L^"IV+NC+TN?S=/LOL([UDW M,E;B9]E;<6DQ]-0#&U2SPTZNU0A&D^Z]U9;2=:_S9OA!_*5WKA_C[V_NO^9M M\W.P,KMG+=+;MWKMSKOK)^D>O]W['V90STR8#>W8&0VWO2@ZNAP-?58Z!ZOR MY')Y6$243P1S(_NO=$#^0G\JG^:1T_\`&#=WS$[5_P"%`7R.VO\`*OKG8%?V M?7;;K,W#L#XJ3[DVY@:S/#JU-J0[TPVTJK[ZK#XV#*2XAJ:KF:.1L05TQ+[K MW07[0^2GS2_F^?\`"9;NKNW=/R>T=AX6L_V:OJCISH[ M=F6SG6&ZL-B\CM/#;,C[-PV]J&GR5?04\D4=1C#*E$1.43W7NA"_D6UW;O\` M+N_DRY?^9-WY\MM\=X_%_%_%C=^\NKOARVS:';N+Z=S&S^TM]4XQ.TM]2;HR MPS5?V3N**.D5YL71)2RY`LQE5`/?NO=!KT9U)\\?YG?5^"^:'RL_GY/\%L_V M_AJCL;H;XK_&#LG9^R-K=+;7W-4KF=A4?:%-B^T]E5V^`<+'132XG*_2^XDJ((O=>ZL4_DV?S!/E%5?,'Y(_P`J'YQ]U]:?*?MKH[8./[NZ,^6O M6=1M9<=W9TM7U^V\74T.Z*/:4SXA=W8&;=="ZV45RJM7'5O4M!'5S^Z]U5W_ M`"S9/YN7\WN3YR]79S^95VG\<_C3TI\O^S]J9'L?8.,%?\D]TU%0*^GVOU)L M#?BO@H.M>MNO:+&4N1JI**?^)UDV4$+'PA&B]U[K%\2-W?SLZSYK?*W^0QC_ M`)\Y+.ITC4[.[1W/_,1WOMJEWKWCUU\>Z_:>U0S&^>TXFP\'?V2K-U]D[#W-#C\OBZ&NBS>Y,OFJW%R87=^%HVWQ@^=^SOY;'Q7^%F/P.W_D[\AQGMJ8[N M?N/M'>J2+7]?=4U>;SNWLA@*79]-05]":K'U^/FHLC1U-152SB2@I5]U[HL/ M;/?'S#_D3;QZD[YQ'\UZG_FF?`;JM"V_-G M[S7>.[-W9>+%U%%/-3+3U-)CX)&CIJF@ECD-9%[KW1Q_YQORS_F%[-_FP?RR M/C-_+^[ECVG-\HNHNU\=)AL]0-N;J5-/N@MD=TX_!5)QCXU:".$ABZU1_2?=>ZVZO@C\?._P#XR]`T'5OR M6^66Y_FGVA2[KW3FZKO'=VS(-AYFNP>:K(ZC";:DV_3;FW;%'!MRG0Q)**P^ M742$C%E'NO='*]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_T]_C MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]UI,]7]B8[_A.S_.4^4^W M/D=3[LPG\N_^:3O"@[6ZJ[[%#D:OK;IWMRLW1O/.UFU]Z5PIOL<:,'5[LR-! MD3`TM7385L/D)U:E2>2'W7NMDCM?^;W_`"QNF^JLMW'NOYT?%_)[1QN"K\]0 MTVQ^ZNO-^[KW7'0TXLKN+=6=KA'XX*2DIY)'E8`Z1MJ&+;&W\ANVFIA M&L=1C\/MCKC&4'WM(SXVKR^2RJ023&F:0>Z]T*7\B+_M[G_PI$_\6XZO_P#> MK^37OW7NBW?SA^X7P!^!%%\?*7N6JW+L7?E#TWD._ M^P]P-GZ*#;.<[4S]3!MS'T,LN-EH,?%D8JS'1U&.J46GDKZRGD@]U[JBG^?/ M\4?Y*?Q#^/6"V+\&>T-P_*/YB;G[$VQN'>O9I^0%5\A$ZJZ4Q.,S%#DJ;>6; MV=4Q=;;=JMX;ES."I,?3U5,V4DC@U1M%'<5'NO=7B?SA&SWQSB_X3S?S6:?" MU^\>B?B0_5.W.]:G!XO(YN':^P^U]G=1ST.]FJ,.DJPTZ]US>^.RO^$MO='_9?6'7NPNS]O[>V5M+/XO=.[MA;HV?1TU))7; M5KL?5SU]1-1XQ:[&SU/V\52T\?NO="W\[_BY_P`)1?AAU_M7,[2^/.R_E_VU MV%O':NS.N_CQ\7/F/W)V;VIO"HW-DXZ$Y&EH=K=\9V'%T%-$S?;O5^'^(UIB MI*8M-*-/NO=;I70&PMK=5]%=,]9[&V36]:;+Z_ZLV#LS:77.1RM7GV MMJXK#X79E?FZ^ORM=F*[;&.I(Z*6JFJJF2>2$NTLA)<^Z]UK;?S2NP_Y1GRF M_F#Q_P`N7^:K\>,5T[E*'I3&[\^/7SPWOV#1=28WZJ2V/U%U'_*I_FS_RX.FOY1?\RCL# MY0;/^27<]/LKY`?$%NR]L]W;)V7TME:_'2;SWGG<]UJ:7KN@GHMN'(Y*ABJL M53Y_'?PO[T53TSR:O=>Z^@G[]U[K3\_G5;([&_EN_P`U'XC?SV^O>L-T=F]$ M;;V=5="_-O";(@K,EG=O[9R&+W!M##=@Y"G=7HJ+%S[;W73P4\\DE-0IE]O4 M4%1)&U>DC>Z]U??U]_-Q_EC=F=84';^V_GC\5*?95;BH,O/-NCN_K[9>>P<4 M\*3?8[GVENS/8?=&VLU!K"R45;20U*/8:#<7]U[K6KR/9\W_``H4_G>?%[=7 MQUQNH<3C"8VOR3PI'4P13>Z]TV?/7YD]2_!K_A6!\?>X^]=1?./M3>W8?:>;>E,F$VGLW;N$^0M?7RY#+UC1Q25$T24N.C9YZIXHH MG8>Z]T!?\Y#9O1VSO^$S?Q1G^.'QHWS\0^G=]?*KJ#L_9O0W9&Z,WN[>VU,? MV##W%N6/)9O,;AW#NC+$[N2M7+TT4M8SPT=;$K1P-JAC]U[K<^^37_9(GR#_ M`/%<.U__`'V6?]^Z]UIE_#'_`+@O/D-_X8WR>_\`@@LC[]U[I#_/K_N#;^%G M^M\YWC[]U[K?\(_NS M-A],;?R>\.Q-B_)3?/<^(V9A*66OS>[<;UOV#A,ENS$83'4T%15Y3,Q;0J:^ MKI*.!345E12I!$'DD5&]U[K99^,?_"A#^5_F?@#UU\A=^?*'JKK[=6T>F]OK MV%\?LINW%?Z=<3O_`&QMR/&YS8NVNKWJ$WEN^JK\]BY8<34T5))2UM/+#.9( MT=BGNO=5E?\`"./>4_8O5_\`,N[!J<:^&J=]_,.AWE48>35Y,5/NC;V9SR.L9:2CP%%1[=W>N%V?M&#&9B?%19_`U%= MXAF*'-M]O-(T#1+[KW37_P`*>/ES_+![G^`NZNF]O[WZ"^3OS/["W1UMMWXR M8'I+,[+[=[BVINM]\X&MKNCHX8I7D)C M]U[H+/YV?57=?3O_``E<^-?5O?U5DLIW'UOCOAO@>R&KQ+49'`9*AB^RAVYF MJEDURUNT*>II<+/42$F:IIM19F>[>Z]T9W^>9_,DWCU1_*$Z,W;\'^^=NT^V MNZ>Q^GOC9W/\H.E=P4G8E9\?]EY[K*HW#NN?'9'8E?73;;WQ6TE)2TP<5%+E M*2"K*TIAK9Z2>+W7NJY?D)_+K_X3R]"?%?Z6?\`(MIZG,_\)8_YF.WL13SY7<$>'_F#XB3!XZ&2NS"96J^,6VI:;&MC M:99:P5]1'4QLD.CR.'4@&X]^Z]T-/Q*PVWOFI_PDSS'Q%^/^^=E=E_(O"?%' ML"OR73.R]W;V^NQ-RX[*9?(9#%M/15T%))%74.'J:JFG^V:%ZCW7NHW_"4?_F6W\TK_ M`,:<=R?^Z';?OW7NI_P=_P"XK7^<1_XJ1\?_`/WB?BM[]U[H./YP/_<1Q_(6 M_P#)M_\`>HRWOW7NJKH?A9_+$ZO_`)\_\QKX_P#\Y'8F*HMF?)[>\WR4^&_< MW:/9O8?3O7DZ=F;IW-O?=.!?>>Q][[(VT(ZL;^:6*H\%_P`* M4?Y&6$QU'_#\?A_C1\L<50T'GDJOL:/']/=KTE+1_=2O)+4_;0PJGD9F9]-R M23[]U[IV_P"%>/\`VYMWK_XG_HG_`-WN3]^Z]T43_A2+-%0?R8OY7&:K&^VQ M&"^37PCRF:R4H9:'%8VG^.G97FKLA4D>*DI8RP!=RJW(%[GW[KW6WSUGVOU; MW3M2EWWT[V1L+M;9%=45%)1[PZWW?M_>^V*FKHRJUE)!GMM9#)XN2KI&<"6( M2EXR0&`/OW7NE_[]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO> M_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z__]3? MX]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=!YVCU'U5W?L_(=>]S= M:["[9V'EBAR>R^R=H;?WOM:O>,.L4E7@=RX_)XN::$2-HGV3OO/[DV3%) M3,]Z8C'#[0@&'QE1;W7NK9EI::%`D<:*J(H```'OW7N@(ZE^*?QVZ([&[N[.#JL3N M[!4E<54U,%+70P5.A?*CZ5M[KW0:;$_E3_RYNL^@]^?&'8_P\Z3P/1O:24.?EPV5QM/4T+U.0D>BFA5X#&1?W[KW1K M\5T;U!B.G,3\>X.NMJ5_2.$V5C.N%Q]/B<7M*MPNZ%S%- ME<%18VDB@2"K$Z>*-5-P![]U[HA'5'\DG^5#TAVW1=Y=8?!?HW;79N*RDV;P MF;?$9;.XS;N8EE\\>4VQL_Z]T:FJZ:.+ M)1UVWJ*4&594UTR'3Q[]U[J7\A_B[\=/EIL*IZP^2_2O7'=^Q*C[AX\!V+M; M%[BBQ=74T[TDF5V]6UD#9/;&<6GEK8@?1*I]^Z]T5/XR_R??Y97PZ MWQ#V9\<_AGTYU]V)1Z3BM\S8S*[UW9MZ0*4:HVKN#L'+;KRFTZN6-BDDV-EI M99$8J[%20?=>ZLE]^Z]T53Y5_!SXC?.':F.V5\L>@.N>\<#A:EZS`_WRPVO- M[3'P5L=$ M\B*[1%@"/=>Z/9[]U[J!E,5C,YCP.Q292Q,@_AVF5N7#'GW[KW5G76 MW5O6?3>T,7U_U%U[LCJ[8F$1DP^S.O=K8/9NUL6KF\GV.!V]0X[%TK2MRY2( M%VY8D\^_=>ZU9^]?CM1=T_\`"IS;E!VMTL_9/Q^W?_+$S6R=X-O#8=3N+JW- M/65F_HZG;N6R&1QE1MN6N*5496%I1/&[HRZ6TGW[KW5Z?Q0_E7?R\O@]N7+; MT^+'Q.ZJZFWIF8_!5;TH,?D]Q[QIJ4PSP2T&&W5O3*;DS^WL;50U+K/34%13 M05`(\J/I6WNO='(['ZRZX[AV;G.NNV=@[-[.V!N:E-#N+9._]LX;=^T\Y1DW M^WRVW\_19#%5\0;D"6)M+`$6(O[]U[JL_K/^1-_*'Z@["Q_:6P_@5T;0[TQ% M?)E,36YS'[@WMA\7D7=Y(ZW';1WQG]Q[/HJFCE?72O%0*:1U5H?&44CW7NCS M_)'XJ_'?Y?\`7=+U-\F.IMJ]Q]<46YJ5FI,C M@\K038S(XVH565FIJR@J'B<`@E6//OW7NBQ[8^!WQ`V7\8,S\+=K=![%PGQ9 MW#19['9OI2CI\BNSLE1[GR[Y[/P5,4F0?(,,IF9&J92)PQE-P1[]U[J)N_X` M?#7?WQFVK\-MX_'O8.X/B_LG^!?W4Z7R%-D7V?A/[LUE17X+[.!,C'7?[C:R MKED37.URYU7!M[]U[HSE=LW;&3V=6=?5^%HZK9>0VU4;.K=NRJYQ]3M>KQ;X M2IPLB!Q(:.7%2&`C5JT'ZWY]^Z]U6;\B.D.SOY?O\O+L_;?\FWX]]187M#KB MLC[)Z]Z$R>"SV9V;O=IMSXG)]GX6@Q--NW`YFMW9N+:4-811[]U[K6QVC_->_DR+G=J=R]Q?R>=X8W^;I2[+I,EG.@-N?">:GS^9[YH\ M3-729':M)EZ9XH*;*;CI)*NDW#6XFHW)040,C>>>#U^Z]U<'_P`)LOA!WE\2 M/AQVQV1\H-@OUCW_`/,KY#;P^1^Z=A5@JZ7.;,VGN+&XF'9NV-R86>LGBP&= M@J6R==)1-%#74<>1CIJQ1/`T<7NO=;$?OW7NBA?*OX"?##YP8S%8OY8?&WJO MO!<"LD>!RV\=N1-NK`02B?S4F"WGBY,=N[#4,S5+N\%+710O)9V4NJL/=>Z! MCXS?R?OY9?P\WNG9?QT^&G3G7W8=-8XS?$N+RF]-U[?<`JTVUL]V!EMU9+:= M3*A*R2XV2EDD0E68J2/?NO='1[KZ1ZC^1W5^[^EN]NN]J]J]5;]QO\)W;L;> M>+@R^"S%(LT553/)3S#R4M?CJZGBJ:.K@:*KHJN&.>"2.:-'7W7NBQ=)_P`L M3X#?'CHOLCXR]2_%_K?!=`]OY>?/=F=49NGR^_MH;SS%3BL9A)*_,T'8>6W4 MTLZXW#4J1Z'01/`DB!91K]^Z]T@OC;_)S_EB_$3L6G[;^//PSZ@Z^[,H#,V' MWLU%F]W9_;DU0T;2U6U:W?6:W.VU*W]H*L^.%+,L;,BL$=U;W7NC+]$_#GXO M_&*E[3Q_0'2>Q^J<1W9NJNWOVE@-I8YZ/;.[]U92">DR68K=L2SS[?I)LA25 M#0S)2TT$,L(2-D*1QJONO=`S\7/Y6WP`^%/:6\>Z?BM\9-B])=D[^P.2VMNG M/[.K=UQT]=MS+9W&[EKL'1[=R.XJ_;&#QCYK#TLR0T%%3)"(%CC"1C1[]U[H M/?D)_)=_E9?*?L&H[6[S^$W3.[^Q*\,X:AZAJEZ_=/\`H\S6 MU*?=66DE>@ MV;USMC%;7PHKIHH8:O+5M/C*:!LIG,@E,GW5?5--653*&FE=N??NO=)SX]_$ M_P".?Q1H=_8SXZ]1[4ZEH.TM]Y3L[L&EVK!5PQ[KW]FHX8G-H[R[QZ$^Z_T.]DY>&M?<6P/O9Y*FI_@_= M>ZA?*+X6_%'YJ[-AV%\J^@>L^\MM4;O+B8M\[MH,+O'>N2W+N7;^/R$$S)4P4-53PU*6$JN%4#W7NC M&;N^,'0._.]NK/DWO#JW;.?[[Z2PVYMO=4=H5\56VY=C87>-!7XO<^/PDL=5 M'21PYG'Y2HAE\D4C:)F`(O[]U[KKY(?%_H#Y>]95?3/R6ZMVSW#U?79C$9^K MV7NR.LEQ$^9P,SU&'R#+0U=%4"HH)I&9")`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`U"BRU!BC,RBQ6PET^0#2Q'U^A]^Z]UG]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7_UM_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__7W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_]#?X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U__T=_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__2W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=5G]@_/O-[* M_FL=!?RXX>ML57X#N?XL=@_(JL[4DW)5P9C`Y#96YLS@(-KTVUUQ$M%74=?' MB/*]4]9&Z&2PC.FY]U[JS"X_K_C_`+#^OOW7NO>_=>ZQ&>`3+3F:(5#KK6`R M()F07NZQ$ZRHTGFUN/?NO=9"0H+,0``2238`#DDD\``>_=>ZX130SH)8)8YH MVN!)$ZR(;&QLZ$J;'W[KW2.[)S^Y]J==;^W3LG9LW8N\]M;*W3G]H]?4V5IL M%4;ZW/AL'7Y'`;-@S=;#44>&FW/E::*B2JECDBIVG$C*RJ0?=>ZUS-T?SAOY MQVQMK9_>V^/^$_&Z]H[1VE@LGN7=6Y]P_P`P'I#$8#;V!PE#-DLQE\ME,AUY M34M#C\=0TTDDDDC*%5?Z\>_=>ZM[_EK?+S?OSP^&G4/RO[#^/^7^,^4[@I,Y MGL)U=G-U-O&OAV;!G\EC=I;K&:EVOLVIEQ^]L)1192C$F.@)HZJ)U,D;I(_N MO='M]^Z]U2;\Z/YJ_<_4'RJN ME.N-PY*HQFWZG??8VYTJ,?#NS<4T"2TN,E^R7[*IBJ/.Y<0GW7NEW_+=_FBY MGYA=@=Q_%OY+_'/=/PN^=OQ[H,3N3LWXY[KW!2;SQN8Z[W#)30X'M/K#?V+H M:'$[SV;55-=!3U+P!UI*BHB599XY5E]^Z]T07L/^>_\`+G>>>[T[+^`O\K+? MWS'^$OQCWUNCK_M+Y(Q=Q;>ZZS.]ZLV[#_`)L_Q4V)_+3H_P":/293.;LZ&S_7VW=V[+V]A:>A M7L#=N[=UY:GVIA.I:#$5%:M+'V"F^ZAL-74_FDBH:FEJ9&=H8'?W[KW1#.B_ MYS?S'POR#^.O5G\Q_P#EA[L^#76/S&W7B^OOCIW/%W;M+MC$Q]G[HQU;F-D= M9]L87%XK$9+8VYMUTE&:>&*J%+D(:^TZM?\`?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=? M_]/?X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=<&DC1D5W16D8K&K,`TC!2Q5`3=B%!)`_`O[]U[K7,[X_[B@O@ MK_XS)[X_]^-O/W[KW3G_`,)T]Y;OWGUK_,YGWANKK-J[%H:S";4VQUE18/.2XW'PTM'!.OB2HJ?N#+50S^ MZ]TH_P"V\QM7J?#[IVYDJK<#I,87@KZ>+QRS>"6F]U[H'OY:O<&`^./ M\R;XG[`_EO\`Q0_FZ=#_``X[RJ-[=6?*KH3YJ=7;[EZ&VA69#"#-=<]W=4;@ MR>[M^?W(W?1[LQSQ[AEKIHXJK'2"*%E\CJONO=;W?OW7NM>O^:%GLY\XOG1\ M3?Y-^UJBICZDW/A8?FA_,'K<=5QVR'QHZKWC3P]?])92..FG>+'=U=JXNEI< MFIE@E_AZQ%1)%));W7NM@JBHJ/&T=)CL=24U!CZ"F@HJ&AHH(J6CHJ.EB2"F MI*2F@5(*>FIH(U2.-%"(B@```>_=>ZE>_=>Z)1\GNZ_A'_+XVEVM\V._Y>J> ME9LQB<%A^P.U8=J86G[2[6?;T$E/LO8\=3A<:=[]G9VE1VAQ6-!JWIHBS*(H M$D=/=>ZJ)_EY=3?(OY']^_,C^=CW_P!89SH+/=^_&Z#H3X1=#9R('LS97Q@V MW2C?..WSV904E144T6\^U=W4-%D:;'30M4T")*!>GGI]7NO=#]_PFWQV'@_D MB_!N*CBIQ3Y'9O:E=EA',95GRN4[V[4J<[+4R&1RM1/732F5;C0Q(LMK#W7N MM8CX_P!)1Y+^3C_*HV)F$27I^M_X4C=>[,S=!42-!MX]82=M]IU?V-5F0\XJR6FK M-PU6.>2.E@"CR?Y'503^Z]T\_P#":7M[XHX/LO\`FO\`0_4':/1E`NXOYF7R M'W?\>^IMD[\V9+6[D^/V"H\+C-L;OZNVMCLM+D=R]88W!TD$4&5Q\51CQ$J7 MFY!/NO=;:/OW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[K MWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_= M>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KW MOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO_4W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW5*W\UOX%_*+OSL[X>?-;X+=A[)VU M\M_@KNO?>>V;UUW!5[@I^F>[-E]C8"GP>]-A;JJ-O2BMP>9K\9224=%6J(XS M!D:F.6>G/AJ8/=>Z#/X.?"+Y^;_^?V6_F>_S.:KX][2[/VW\>*KXU?'GX[_' M2OW1N#;75VULMNS^\6[-X[IW;GR?XONC<,HJDBCBJZ+ M5UI\"_YROP$^1/R[V'_+[W-\-=W?$;YJ]_\`87R9HNP/D:^^%[`^+?8G:`T[ MSDIMJ;4\+=D24L%)1KBJ>4UM!628^F-4:%9*PR^Z]UAZ$_DF_+7JG^49_,[^ M!6[^W>H>P.\OF;WSW;VEU]V?5YO=5'MK)4/8V,ZMI,=F.U*BEZ[IZW;VZLK7 M;(K*K)4^)QF2HZ:2I18))5OI]U[JT_YG_"SM/Y#?RF.RO@ILC-[%Q_;N[_B[ MM'I;%9W?+;-YSX"?+SX*=O=4=9_.KX,=*T?2N;Q/9M)N6JZ4^1_6$NUL) M2YWJG>V7V[2P[GAV\N?H*Z7'&2E4!\FU0KT%5#!50^Z]TO/B=UI_.[[B^4.P M>^_GWVK\?/C-\?\`K#;FY:"D^'WQ,K,MNZ3N+>.5@:AHMQ]R;XWGC\Y)3;>Q M(G%71TN(RYX/D3\8L+U;N?M_KRMZ];;^T^W*+= M&4V]N^/<_8NU]FU.T\'B=GYC`9O+[^W)_>%:/`4B5D"565FAB8D-I/NO=6(T MS3/34[U"".=X(FGC`L$F:-3(@&IK!7)'U/\`K^_=>ZU<_G[_`"U/YLWR,_F9 M8SYD]=Q_RVNWNE.C=MX;;OQ(Z2^8>XODKE]L]8YS[3$97<_<66Z]ZNVOAML9 M7MO([N2L%-5UM=E:6FQJT2B+[BD@EA]U[JSGX;1_SK7[=J(_Y@2?RSVZ#;9V M;2&/XFK\DSV@V^358I<`M0O;(.U6VF<<:T5@`^Y\GAT>G7[]U[JI;:WP!_GI M?`O;?0SVY,#283" M8D8/<$>-R.;J9\::6@S<0K=54:>`SO`ONO='-WI_(TV=-_)CV)_*\ZY[&AVY MV/U'3[5[-ZU[_JL;70)1_*;;6\ZCLNM[3K,3#59*OIL1N3=N6R=(U/KK)J#$ M5^B+RR01GW[KW1=,=\'OYSWST[E^*&W_`.:=F?ACLWXJ?#CNG9'>NX,%T`^[ MMR;I^7O:_54&7BV-N#<6-S<,.#VULFJR%2*JNQ\D6,334R*,\.K/C"NZ. MX_EYW'V7\8MU=6;-H/[X=/?&;?QHUV]T[3YK(;#VQ7["QU#!3Z*C`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`'CV0?VQ]KMQW*6SL-_WFVLI)XE5I(EGD"%T5NUF4&H#8/GUJN?]!-_ M>O\`WC%U-_Z%^\/^O/O&#_@D]].?ZLVG_.23_-UW?_Y,B>UO_A<>8/\`LDL_ M\_7O^@F_O7_O&+J;_P!"_>'_`%Y]^_X)+??^F9M/^,74W_H7[P_Z\^_?\$EOO_3,VG_.23_-U[_DR)[6_ M^%QY@_[)+/\`S]>_Z";^]?\`O&+J;_T+]X?]>??O^"2WW_IF;3_G))_FZ]_R M9$]K?_"X\P?]DEG_`)^O?]!-_>O_`'C%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_!);[_TS-I_SDD_ MS=>_Y,B>UO\`X7'F#_LDL_\`/U[_`*";^]?^\8NIO_0OWA_UY]^_X)+??^F9 MM/\`G))_FZ]_R9$]K?\`PN/,'_9)9_Y^O?\`03?WK_WC%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_! M);[_`-,S:?\`.23_`#=>_P"3(GM;_P"%QY@_[)+/_/U[_H)O[U_[QBZF_P#0 MOWA_UY]^_P""2WW_`*9FT_YR2?YNO?\`)D3VM_\`"X\P?]DEG_GZ]_T$W]Z_ M]XQ=3?\`H7[P_P"O/OW_``26^_\`3,VG_.23_-U[_DR)[6_^%QY@_P"R2S_S M]>_Z";^]?^\8NIO_`$+]X?\`7GW[_@DM]_Z9FT_YR2?YNO?\F1/:W_PN/,'_ M`&26?^?KW_03?WK_`-XQ=3?^A?O#_KS[]_P26^_],S:?\Y)/\W7O^3(GM;_X M7'F#_LDL_P#/U[_H)O[U_P"\8NIO_0OWA_UY]^_X)+??^F9M/^,74W_H7[P_Z\^_?\$EOO_3,VG_.23_- MU[_DR)[6_P#A<>8/^R2S_P`_7O\`H)O[U_[QBZF_]"_>'_7GW[_@DM]_Z9FT M_P"O_>,74W_H7[P_Z\^_?\$E MOO\`TS-I_P`Y)/\`-U[_`),B>UO_`(7'F#_LDL_\_7O^@F_O7_O&+J;_`-"_ M>'_7GW[_`()+??\`IF;3_G))_FZ]_P`F1/:W_P`+CS!_V26?^?KW_03?WK_W MC%U-_P"A?O#_`*\^_?\`!);[_P!,S:?\Y)/\W7O^3(GM;_X7'F#_`+)+/_/U M[_H)O[U_[QBZF_\`0OWA_P!>??O^"2WW_IF;3_G))_FZ]_R9$]K?_"X\P?\` M9)9_Y^O?]!-_>O\`WC%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_!);[_TS-I_SDD_S=>_Y,B>UO_A< M>8/^R2S_`,_7O^@F_O7_`+QBZF_]"_>'_7GW[_@DM]_Z9FT_YR2?YNO?\F1/ M:W_PN/,'_9)9_P"?KW_03?WK_P!XQ=3?^A?O#_KS[]_P26^_],S:?\Y)/\W7 MO^3(GM;_`.%QY@_[)+/_`#]>_P"@F_O7_O&+J;_T+]X?]>??O^"2WW_IF;3_ M`)R2?YNO?\F1/:W_`,+CS!_V26?^?KW_`$$W]Z_]XQ=3?^A?O#_KS[]_P26^ M_P#3,VG_`#DD_P`W7O\`DR)[6_\`A<>8/^R2S_S]>_Z";^]?^\8NIO\`T+]X M?]>??O\`@DM]_P"F9M/^O_>, M74W_`*%^\/\`KS[]_P`$EOO_`$S-I_SDD_S=>_Y,B>UO_A<>8/\`LDL_\_7O M^@F_O7_O&+J;_P!"_>'_`%Y]^_X)+??^F9M/^,74W_H7[P_Z\^_?\$EOO_3,VG_.23_-U[_DR)[6_^%QY M@_[)+/\`S]>_Z";^]?\`O&+J;_T+]X?]>??O^"2WW_IF;3_G))_FZ]_R9$]K M?_"X\P?]DEG_`)^O?]!-_>O_`'C%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_!);[_TS-I_SDD_S=>_ MY,B>UO\`X7'F#_LDL_\`/U[_`*";^]?^\8NIO_0OWA_UY]^_X)+??^F9M/\` MG))_FZ]_R9$]K?\`PN/,'_9)9_Y^O?\`03?WK_WC%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_!);[_ M`-,S:?\`.23_`#=>_P"3(GM;_P"%QY@_[)+/_/U[_H)O[U_[QBZF_P#0OWA_ MUY]^_P""2WW_`*9FT_YR2?YNO?\`)D3VM_\`"X\P?]DEG_GZ]_T$W]Z_]XQ= M3?\`H7[P_P"O/OW_``26^_\`3,VG_.23_-U[_DR)[6_^%QY@_P"R2S_S]>_Z M";^]?^\8NIO_`$+]X?\`7GW[_@DM]_Z9FT_YR2?YNO?\F1/:W_PN/,'_`&26 M?^?KW_03?WK_`-XQ=3?^A?O#_KS[]_P26^_],S:?\Y)/\W7O^3(GM;_X7'F# M_LDL_P#/U[_H)O[U_P"\8NIO_0OWA_UY]^_X)+??^F9M/^,74W_H7[P_Z\^_?\$EOO_3,VG_.23_-U[_D MR)[6_P#A<>8/^R2S_P`_7O\`H)O[U_[QBZF_]"_>'_7GW[_@DM]_Z9FT_P"< MDG^;KW_)D3VM_P#"X\P?]DEG_GZ]_P!!-_>O_>,74W_H7[P_Z\^_?\$EOO\` MTS-I_P`Y)/\`-U[_`),B>UO_`(7'F#_LDL_\_7O^@F_O7_O&+J;_`-"_>'_7 MGW[_`()+??\`IF;3_G))_FZ]_P`F1/:W_P`+CS!_V26?^?KW_03?WK_WC%U- M_P"A?O#_`*\^_?\`!);[_P!,S:?\Y)/\W7O^3(GM;_X7'F#_`+)+/_/U[_H) MO[U_[QBZF_\`0OWA_P!>??O^"2WW_IF;3_G))_FZ]_R9$]K?_"X\P?\`9)9_ MY^O?]!-_>O\`WC%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_!);[_TS-I_SDD_S=>_Y,B>UO_A<>8/^ MR2S_`,_7O^@F_O7_`+QBZF_]"_>'_7GW[_@DM]_Z9FT_YR2?YNO?\F1/:W_P MN/,'_9)9_P"?KW_03?WK_P!XQ=3?^A?O#_KS[]_P26^_],S:?\Y)/\W7O^3( MGM;_`.%QY@_[)+/_`#]>_P"@F_O7_O&+J;_T+]X?]>??O^"2WW_IF;3_`)R2 M?YNO?\F1/:W_`,+CS!_V26?^?KW_`$$W]Z_]XQ=3?^A?O#_KS[]_P26^_P#3 M,VG_`#DD_P`W7O\`DR)[6_\`A<>8/^R2S_S]>_Z";^]?^\8NIO\`T+]X?]>? M?O\`@DM]_P"F9M/^O_>,74W_ M`*%^\/\`KS[]_P`$EOO_`$S-I_SDD_S=>_Y,B>UO_A<>8/\`LDL_\_7O^@F_ MO7_O&+J;_P!"_>'_`%Y]^_X)+??^F9M/^,74W_H7[P_Z\^_?\$EOO_3,VG_.23_-U[_DR)[6_^%QY@_[) M+/\`S]>_Z";^]?\`O&+J;_T+]X?]>??O^"2WW_IF;3_G))_FZ]_R9$]K?_"X M\P?]DEG_`)^O?]!-_>O_`'C%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_!);[_TS-I_SDD_S=>_Y,B> MUO\`X7'F#_LDL_\`/U[_`*";^]?^\8NIO_0OWA_UY]^_X)+??^F9M/\`G))_ MFZ]_R9$]K?\`PN/,'_9)9_Y^O?\`03?WK_WC%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_!);[_`-,S M:?\`.23_`#=>_P"3(GM;_P"%QY@_[)+/_/U[_H)O[U_[QBZF_P#0OWA_UY]^ M_P""2WW_`*9FT_YR2?YNO?\`)D3VM_\`"X\P?]DEG_GZ]_T$W]Z_]XQ=3?\` MH7[P_P"O/OW_``26^_\`3,VG_.23_-U[_DR)[6_^%QY@_P"R2S_S]>_Z";^] M?^\8NIO_`$+]X?\`7GW[_@DM]_Z9FT_YR2?YNO?\F1/:W_PN/,'_`&26?^?K MW_03?WK_`-XQ=3?^A?O#_KS[]_P26^_],S:?\Y)/\W7O^3(GM;_X7'F#_LDL M_P#/UU_T$W]Z_P#>,74W_H8;P_Z]>]'[R>^UI_5FT_YR2=>/]R+[6`9]\>8/ M^R2S_P`_7?\`T$W=[?\`>,/4_P#Z%V\?^O/NO_!*;[Y?>O^"4WS MB.6K3_G))U[_`),C>U?_`(7+?_\`LDL_\_7O^@F_O7_O&+J;_P!"_>'_`%Y] M[/WD]]_Z9FT_YR2=>_Y,C>UE*_Z^6_T_YY+/_/U[_H)O[U_[QBZE_K_Q^&\/ M^O7OW_!);[3_`)5JT_YR2=>_Y,C>UG'_`%\>8*?\\EG_`)^O#_A3=WL;6^,/ M4YO]/]_=O'G_`*P^]#[RF^?],S:?\Y).O?\`)D;VK''WRW__`+)+/_/U[_H) MN[V'U^,/4P_U]W[Q_'_3GWL?>2WW!_JS:?\`.23KP_N1O:MN'OEOY_ZA+/\` MS]>_Z";^]?\`O&+J;^G_`!^&\/\`KS[\?O*;Z/\`G6;3_G))_FZW_P`F1?:P M'_`%Y]['WDM]I_RK-I M_P`Y)/\`-UX?W(OM814>^/,%/^>2S_S]>_Z";^]?^\8NIO\`T+]X?]>??O\` M@DM]_P"F9M/^O_>,74W_`*%^ M\/\`KS[]_P`$EOO_`$S-I_SDD_S=>_Y,B>UO_A<>8/\`LDL_\_7O^@F_O7_O M&+J;_P!"_>'_`%Y]^_X)+??^F9M/^,74W_H7[P_Z\^_?\$EOO_3,VG_.23_-U[_DR)[6_^%QY@_[)+/\` MS]>_Z";^]?\`O&+J;_T+]X?]>??O^"2WW_IF;3_G))_FZ]_R9$]K?_"X\P?] MDEG_`)^O?]!-_>O_`'C%U-_Z%^\/^O/OW_!);[_TS-I_SDD_S=>_Y,B>UO\` MX7'F#_LDL_\`/U[_`*";^]?^\8NIO_0OWA_UY]^/WD]]`K_5FT_YR2?YNO?\ MF1/:W_PN/,'_`&26?^?K:C^*/<>3^0OQLZ0[QS6'H=O9;M;K?;&^3_*N\2KJRCGE55DE6"0H'=5[59@*D M+@'AT8+V?]1)U[W[KW7O?NO=?__1W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW1&OYF?_;OKYB?^ M*_\`8_\`[H*KV"?"7_`(Z>LH_N2_\`B7/W=/\`Q;=N_P"KZ]?- M-]\Y1P'7VJ=>][Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U:%_*VV!LOI>I=R49RF#WAV%MNJPT.-JV::LEKWH761* MCQ:2A-B)+]L;"RN=PW_<+C;DO+NPVR6X@@<5625"H!*_C"`EM.0:=8*_?NYN MYDV7E3V?Y-VCG*ZY;Y=YNYWV_9]UW6V?PI[3;[E9FD6*;_0'N618!."ICU5U M4J#-?^;S\Z5D>)A4))`%OK[\?= MKG<'1XMJ%'E])!0?*GA\!PIZ=)D_N\ONLE!(;+?G8BI<\P;L68T^,M]9ECQ) M]VQDV3@*K:F`[!P/\X6NW6]GS!=&I195N(E6<1%2$$RDOHT_8/7GIO#WW.7,'+?W<-[YRW7F+V?V'WUM-ELKT MWLZW4]A/L]_//M$E]')')<-MTT:P"?Q0QJ-3`4IWM7='>N/ZTPO=W\P7O'X, M]B?`WLK8^Z8ZS$;,V)M_(;W[$R-?M2JFV[MO85/MKJ[;&?PO8>-SLU+*VNIA MEQKP2>9!I;3NSGWR/;8]ZY]WS8[CD6YA<$1QH9)6*$HD02%&64-0GN&@@U'5 M.8-E]J[WG7\OW.S;7)S=;;#^\ M-\NF9;&V8`T@5@+BX<$@4T$Q(<]QKP-1D/\`?']W]F]R^>;;[O','NN>4O:3 M8(HI>;=\@9XZ[I/;O-L^TVTJ([*YGC%[<+VCPT$;,'723"57\M;9O2?S1WCW M&_1TV[.JL_\`&SM+Y-?&[XX;[IRLF0[BVGAL17YSI#=V+EJ)6KI>NLGF9\L[.4<;B-5+6TBU-3$6+AK24*`@ MW".%;=YR$,$S2,^C6AZJZS7\VSYR9"DS.&;*]9X*DR%+DL6U#A_C]U5BI,-3 M5T,](]+B9!M!J[&O013%8&UF6$JIU:A?W&8^WK.O:_P"[\^Z[:R;=N*V6]W4\3QRB2;?MTE$S(0X>4?5Z)!(15QI" MN"12AIU(_F-8JDI>K_Y;=10XRFIZO+?!O:>3S%114$4-1D\G-O\`WP*FOR4M M/"CUE=(0-V-AM%KRQS-S1=7,$&ZP7$4*336[W2VZ."2XA4&K.>T.P* MK3J#_OUW^Z[3?[A<[=MN\6^Q3[Q<6TBHMJ^Y3LA M$%NE)9+6&1)9_%\]*TE?)_YFY]>HLLNS?YBG5?>.:+K?9?P8I^L:[,P MT>6ILC-49'>>=S-?N/-YG<.5>*3)Y[*Y#,Y&2"GAI(' MK\I5S5U8\-+3)'3TT35$[%8XU5$'"@``>X/GFDN)IKB6GBR,6:@H*L:F@&`* MG@.'75C:MLM-EVO;=GL%86-I!'#&&9G81Q($0%F)9B%459B23DDGIJ]M=&'7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[WH\#U[KZ67\LS_MWU\.O_%?NN/_`'04 MOOHS[:_\J!RA_P`\$/\`QT=?%5]]G_Q+G[QG_BW;C_VD-T>7V-^L7>O>_=>Z M][]U[K__TM_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]T4KYY[`WAVI\,?DUUOU]@ZGI_P#NJ\W1]DN=.;MS2RY8VOF2RN+J=@ M[+##%,K22,L:NY"J*D*K-Z`]:*'_``SA_,P_[Q0WE_Z$W7'_`-FGO"$>T7N0 M`!_56;_>XO\`H/KZG?\`DXY]RC_PO>W?]DVX_P#;'U[_`(9P_F8?]XH;R_\` M0FZW_P#LT][_`-:+W(_Z96;_`'N+_H/KW_)QS[E'_A>]N_[)MQ_[8^O?\,X? MS,/^\4-Y?^A-UO\`_9I[]_K1>Y'_`$RLW^]Q?]!]>_Y..?*&\O_0FZW_\`LT]^_P!:+W(_Z96;_>XO^@^O?\G'/N4? M^%[V[_LFW'_MCZ]_PSA_,P_[Q0WE_P"A-UO_`/9I[]_K1>Y'_3*S?[W%_P!! M]>_Y..?XO^@^O?\`)QS[E'_A>]N_[)MQ_P"V/KW_``SA_,P_[Q0WE_Z$W6__ M`-FGOW^M%[D?],K-_O<7_0?7O^3CGW*/_"][=_V3;C_VQ]>_X9P_F8?]XH;R M_P#0FZW_`/LT]^_UHO]N_P"R;W? M]DVX_P#;'U[_`(9P_F8?]XH;R_\`0FZW_P#LT]^_UHOXO^@^O? M\G'/N4?^%[V[_LFW'_MCZ]_PSA_,P_[Q0WE_Z$W6_P#]FGOW^M%[D?\`3*S? M[W%_T'U[_DXY]RC_`,+WMW_9-N/_`&Q]>_X9P_F8?]XH;R_]";K?_P"S3W[_ M`%HO7_`*$W M6_\`]FGOW^M%[D?],K-_O<7_`$'U[_DXY]RC_P`+WMW_`&3;C_VQ]>_X9P_F M8?\`>*&\O_0FZW_^S3W[_6B]R/\`IE9O][B_Z#Z]_P`G'/N4?^%[V[_LFW'_ M`+8^O?\`#.'\S#_O%#>7_H3=;_\`V:>_?ZT7N1_TRLW^]Q?]!]>_Y..?7_H3=;__`&:>_?ZT7N1_ MTRLW^]Q?]!]>_P"3CGW*/_"][=_V3;C_`-L?7O\`AG#^9A_WBAO+_P!";K?_ M`.S3W[_6B]R/^F5F_P![B_Z#Z]_R<<^Y1_X7O;O^R;7_H3=;_`/V:>_?ZT7N1_P!,K-_O<7_0?7O^3CGW*/\`PO>W?]DVX_\`;'U[ M_AG#^9A_WBAO+_T)NM__`+-/?O\`6B]R/^F5F_WN+_H/KW_)QS[E'_A>]N_[ M)MQ_[8^O?\,X?S,/^\4-Y?\`H3=;_P#V:>_?ZT7N1_TRLW^]Q?\`0?7O^3CG MW*/_``O>W?\`9-N/_;'U[_AG#^9A_P!XH;R_]";K?_[-/?O]:+W(_P"F5F_W MN+_H/KW_`"<<^Y1_X7O;O^R;Y'_3*S?[W%_T'U[_DXY]RC_PO>W?]DVX_]L?7O^&*&\O\`T)NM M_P#[-/?O]:+W(_Z96;_>XO\`H/KW_)QS[E'_`(7O;O\`LFW'_MCZ]_PSA_,P M_P"\4-Y?^A-UO_\`9I[]_K1>Y'_3*S?[W%_T'U[_`)..?_P"&*&\O_`$)NM_\`[-/?O]:+W(_Z96;_`'N+_H/KW_)QS[E' M_A>]N_[)MQ_[8^O?\,X?S,/^\4-Y?^A-UO\`_9I[]_K1>Y'_`$RLW^]Q?]!] M>_Y..?*&\O_0FZW_\`LT]^_P!:+W(_ MZ96;_>XO^@^O?\G'/N4?^%[V[_LFW'_MCZ]_PSA_,P_[Q0WE_P"A-UO_`/9I M[]_K1>Y'_3*S?[W%_P!!]>_Y..?XO^@^O?\`)QS[E'_A>]N_[)MQ_P"V/KW_ M``SA_,P_[Q0WE_Z$W6__`-FGOW^M%[D?],K-_O<7_0?7O^3CGW*/_"][=_V3 M;C_VQ]>_X9P_F8?]XH;R_P#0FZW_`/LT]^_UHO]N_P"R;W?]DVX_P#;'U[_`(9P_F8?]XH;R_\`0FZW_P#LT]^_ MUHOXO^@^O?\G'/N4?^%[V[_LFW'_MCZ]_PSA_,P_[Q0WE_Z$W6 M_P#]FGOW^M%[D?\`3*S?[W%_T'U[_DXY]RC_`,+WMW_9-N/_`&Q]>_X9P_F8 M?]XH;R_]";K?_P"S3W[_`%HO7_`*$W6_\`]FGOW^M%[D?],K-_O<7_`$'U[_DXY]RC_P`+ MWMW_`&3;C_VQ]>_X9P_F8?\`>*&\O_0FZW_^S3W[_6B]R/\`IE9O][B_Z#Z] M_P`G'/N4?^%[V[_LFW'_`+8^O?\`#.'\S#_O%#>7_H3=;_\`V:>_?ZT7N1_T MRLW^]Q?]!]>_Y..? M7_H3=;__`&:>_?ZT7N1_TRLW^]Q?]!]>_P"3CGW*/_"][=_V3;C_`-L?7O\` MAG#^9A_WBAO+_P!";K?_`.S3W[_6B]R/^F5F_P![B_Z#Z]_R<<^Y1_X7O;O^ MR;7_H3=;_`/V:>_?ZT7N1_P!,K-_O<7_0?7O^3CGW M*/\`PO>W?]DVX_\`;'U[_AG#^9A_WBAO+_T)NM__`+-/?O\`6B]R/^F5F_WN M+_H/KW_)QS[E'_A>]N_[)MQ_[8^O?\,X?S,/^\4-Y?\`H3=;_P#V:>_?ZT7N M1_TRLW^]Q?\`0?7O^3CGW*/_``O>W?\`9-N/_;'U[_AG#^9A_P!XH;R_]";K M?_[-/?O]:+W(_P"F5F_WN+_H/KW_`"<<^Y1_X7O;O^R;Y'_3*S?[W%_T'U[_DXY]RC_PO>W?]DVX_]L?7 MO^&*&\O\`T)NM_P#[-/?O]:+W(_Z96;_>XO\`H/KW_)QS[E'_`(7O M;O\`LFW'_MCZ]_PSA_,P_P"\4-Y?^A-UO_\`9I[]_K1>Y'_3*S?[W%_T'U[_ M`)..?_P"&*&\O_`$)NM_\`[-/?O]:+W(_Z M96;_`'N+_H/KW_)QS[E'_A>]N_[)MQ_[8^O?\,X?S,/^\4-Y?^A-UO\`_9I[ M]_K1>Y'_`$RLW^]Q?]!]>_Y..?*&\O M_0FZW_\`LT]^_P!:+W(_Z96;_>XO^@^O?\G'/N4?^%[V[_LFW'_MCZ]_PSA_ M,P_[Q0WE_P"A-UO_`/9I[]_K1>Y'_3*S?[W%_P!!]>_Y..?XO^@^O?\`)QS[ ME'_A>]N_[)MQ_P"V/KW_``SA_,P_[Q0WE_Z$W6__`-FGOW^M%[D?],K-_O<7 M_0?7O^3CGW*/_"][=_V3;C_VQ]>_X9P_F8?]XH;R_P#0FZW_`/LT]^_UHO]N_P"R;W?]DVX_P#;'U[_`(9P_F8? M]XH;R_\`0FZW_P#LT]^_UHOXO^@^O?\G'/N4?^%[V[_LFW'_MC MZ]_PSA_,P_[Q0WE_Z$W6_P#]FGOW^M%[D?\`3*S?[W%_T'U[_DXY]RC_`,+W MMW_9-N/_`&Q]+[K#^6%_-RZ7WSM_LOJOX^]E[&WWM:L6OP6Y<#O#KFEKZ*<` MI(AOO-X*JDJ8F,U?>&_NN=AV+VUY:V3GW9+38^4=T&Y;5%##N\:VU\$DC^I8K;A MKB5EE?6;DS:RVIP6`(3'7?P&_G,]5];=F=.[,Z!WI2=6]OTU-3]@[$RM9TQN M7;N:EHQ:CR<%#N+<&47"9VE&GQU]`::L70G[GH6R7;N1O>+:MNW'9[/8IAM= MV`)8F,#HU.!`=FTL/XUHWSZ/.WMXC-`V=4$_B0FK=G)P.'QVV=TXC'T5-#`[>1DB$M0[%I6=C?W7=>0_ M>'>IK2XW+9+AY8(5ACHT*!(TPJJ$=0!ZXJ>)KT_R!][/^[:]L-IW[9.3/=#9 M[;;]TW2?<;P26^Z7+7-[LNVL'MO'=A8OM7#1+N?JBORFW]_8BE-#3[@V[N#)[GK<]@9*F@9J>K M@I*F*EKH':.HCE1F!66'*?O=M=FEC8[;=);K<"=>^$LDH%-:.S%EJ"0P4@," M0P(/0:YN^\'_`'6?/7,L_-G-/.VP76]3;/+M![36%G]X';+*UV^SL)5M(4TH"EFY"U)IJ8%CDGB>COFWF+^YZYWY MHW[G+F+FS;Y.8=SN#/)P]1M*LKVRE3ALIM'&U=+M+,0RY!O-KJJ*: M4.`0PL/;3;=]X!MSBWCZ*X%^D)B!46JKX9.HJT8HC5.:LI/1E#SM_=!0\AWO MMH>9MGEY1GW%;YHY3O\`+,MVD?A+-%=R(UU"PC[*13(M":J:GJ1VGUM_PH2[ MHZ^W3U=V)UINK+[(WIC_`.$[EQ-#MSXQ[=FR6-,\-2]$V7VXN)S--!-)`HD$ M-1'Y$NK74D'>Y[=[_;Q876V;AMTCV4RZ74)9H66M::D"L`:9H1TUR)SE_=#> MVO-VQ<\\G\YV-OS/MLWBVTKW',MPLJ_O^&< M/YF'_>)^\O\`T)NN/_LT]@3_`%HO7_`*$W6_\`]FGOW^M%[D?],K-_O<7_`$'U[_DX MY]RC_P`+WMW_`&3;C_VQ]>_X9P_F8?\`>*&\O_0FZW_^S3W[_6B]R/\`IE9O M][B_Z#Z]_P`G'/N4?^%[V[_LFW'_`+8^O?\`#.'\S#_O%#>7_H3=;_\`V:>_ M?ZT7N1_TRLW^]Q?]!]>_Y..?7_H3=;__`&:>_?ZT7N1_TRLW^]Q?]!]>_P"3CGW*/_"][=_V3;C_ M`-L?7O\`AG#^9A_WBAO+_P!";K?_`.S3W[_6B]R/^F5F_P![B_Z#Z]_R<<^Y M1_X7O;O^R;7_H3=^R.FMD;:W5M M^KFI*BJP^'IZ:OQ\\U!45=%++33H5+12NA_!(]YO;5R=RUMNX0F. M]@LXT=30E650"*@D8/H2.OEB^]5S=R[S[]Y'WMYTY1W-+WEC=.9+VYM;A0ZK M-!+,S1R*LBHX#*:@,JMZ@=&U]BOJ`.O>_=>Z][]U[K__T]_CW[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__4W^/?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_]7? MX]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U__UM_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7__7W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_]#?X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> 3]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U__V3\_ ` end GRAPHIC 11 g60400oracle_page02.jpg GRAPHIC begin 644 g60400oracle_page02.jpg M_]C_X``02D9)1@`!`@$`R`#(``#_[0_@4&AO=&]S:&]P(#,N,``X0DE-`^T` M`````!``R`````$``0#(`````0`!.$))300-```````$````'CA"24T$&0`` M````!````!XX0DE-`_,```````D```````````$`.$))300*```````!```X M0DE-)Q````````H``0`````````".$))30/U``````!(`"]F9@`!`&QF9@`& M```````!`"]F9@`!`*&9F@`&```````!`#(````!`%H````&```````!`#4` M```!`"T````&```````!.$))30/X``````!P``#_____________________ M________`^@`````_____________________________P/H`````/______ M______________________\#Z`````#_____________________________ M`^@``#A"24T$"```````$`````$```)````"0``````X0DE-!!X```````0` M````.$))300:``````!]````!@`````````````"#0```J@````.`$\`4@!! M`$,`3`!%`%\`4`!A`&<`90!?`#``,@````$````````````````````````` M`0`````````````"J````@T````````````````````````````````````` M````````.$))3004```````$`````3A"24T$#``````-00````$```!P```` M5@```5```'#@```-)0`8``'_V/_@`!!*1DE&``$"`0!(`$@``/_N``Y!9&]B M90!D@`````'_VP"$``P("`@)"`P)"0P1"PH+$14/#`P/%1@3$Q43$Q@1#`P, M#`P,$0P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P!#0L+#0X-$`X.$!0. M#@X4%`X.#@X4$0P,#`P,$1$,#`P,#`P1#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P,#`P, M#`P,#`P,#/_``!$(`%8`<`,!(@`"$0$#$0'_W0`$``?_Q`$_```!!0$!`0$! M`0`````````#``$"!`4&!P@)"@L!``$%`0$!`0$!``````````$``@,$!08' M"`D*"Q```00!`P($`@4'!@@%`PPS`0`"$0,$(1(Q!4%181,B<8$R!A21H;%" M(R054L%B,S1R@M%#!R624_#A\6-S-1:BLH,F1)-49$7"HW0V%])5XF7RLX3# MTW7C\T8GE*2%M)7$U.3TI;7%U>7U5F9VAI:FML;6YO8W1U=G=X>7I[?'U^?W M$0`"`@$"!`0#!`4&!P<&!34!``(1`R$Q$@1!46%Q(A,%,H&1%*&Q0B/!4M'P M,R1BX7*"DD-3%6-S-/$E!A:BLH,')C7"TD235*,79$55-G1EXO*SA,/3=>/S M1I2DA;25Q-3D]*6UQ=7E]59F=H:6IK;&UN;V)S='5V=WAY>GM\?_V@`,`P$` M`A$#$0`_`/54DE7S MV7&USV-;6W?[MNS_`-$_TBFZJLN5]8,/#OMIO8\>B^MAP.#JW`EKG5MU;9L] M^WZ>_P!''9_2KJ$V1];>FT-U;9ZCVEU+'`-WB'[7?2+FL=94^KZ/_@:'%'NG MV,O[A=M)963]8^GXMSJ;-Q>USVAK=A)]-OJ6>SU/49^[^E97O_XK](K'3NJX MG4O5.*7.;20"XB`=PGV?Z_\`@>Q&Q=6M.*8CQ&)X>[=22216*22224__T/54 M'*>VNL/=8ZH;FMW-;N,O(K8W;ML_/>C)))!H@G5RK>J8=.0^B_*LK?58VK\5;&,>VIWTOM57^M=BA;UOI-'J&WJ6STWBM\M;],G8UO\U[O_(?R%#.R M,HYEM=/47T,KK[&?S?^C5"GJ9)M;1UAYV,LN? MMP"&M-KF-H?LV-ML].V[])MW^I^E]?T4*3QGP_Q8MX_6#HK/I=1+1[3)K@?I M#^BU-'^$?]!%_;/2]K;#GNBR2V6"3M<:'>WT=W\ZQU:SJ^NTLQJW6]9L?O)K M8_[#8'/>T?I(J]+<[;N8[V?HV(GVO('5#@_MHMR_T;74.Q/;)==D,V/_`)MO MJX_Z&W])_-TU_P`U:E2N,^'^+%LV]>Z+2=EO4=I`$@L&@>=C?\#^<_VHK>L= M.>3LSW.#&M>YP8(:U[[L=KG.]+V_IL7(8_\`T?I_I$0]/ZLZLM/4W!WJ5N#F MTUB&,_G*X_X?\]_^8Q1QNG]:K=6[3W?1#_`,_]U*E<9\/\ M6*.OK/2KF,?7U`O9>[:UP8""XMJ>/\#^=5DT?2_TB:WKW1Z,E^+9U/9D-(#Z M]K=VYQ-;/\%])_INV(@Z=UH5O9^U9)I#*WFADMMT+LAWNVV?R:?W/^W$2W`Z MH^_>SJ3JJG;]]+:F$>ZKTF>F]TV,]+)_6O\`P%*E<9\/\6*/(ZOT_&U2?U/#98RI^;8UUIK;7-8`N>V[?[OW?H[/31,/!ZQ5'VKJ?VCW;G10RN1+3Z;?=9MKV[F? MZ3^6E2N,^'^+%OUL;">[@!_U#6J:22*TFW_T?54DDDE-;+'4(?]E-<; M6[-T[MV[]-[O=7_,_P`S[/Y[^<_1JN\]>]P8W&`!&TDO)(W1K[0UOZ-'S.GX MN:US+]Q:_8'M#W!I%;_7:W9.SW._G/;O?7^C57]@8F[>+\EK@WTPX7.D,_;6ETMK]6S>QC_3VW>NVNK9_-^G^E4;.B]-QZ',R\N]U= MCJB/M-Y<-U+QDUAOJG;[W5_I?])4STU7'3NCM$,ZM:V8#C]J&K0-@:&SL9_7 M:Q)#=+OK)Z#MM>'ZV\;=S[`WTRT[MVUEGZ1MFW^NS_1IF.^LWIN-E>%Z@7>[ MT]K+'[&U?O\`^$4Z7?6`VL]=F*VHEOJ;'/+AJ?5:SW9Z;__``)5G8_1 MW%COVF\%C&,D9($BL0W?K[G._/5^K/Z956VMN53M8`T3:TF!XN+O""G24__ MTO54'*`-0!$@OKD'^NQ&0LG^;']>O_JV)*86-H!VFMOB?:/_`#%2953P6,\A MM`*>P5SN1DU8]7INOIQK#[V[VU%YI%#K6_F>ILL]/_`$GZ10R)KR+JV8[= MH+2PG$+P&ANZS;94]OJ[OHL_FOTG^D_1J>'3D88;BX_H-]>NRYKMKR?4!J]^ M199=9;D.L]3])8]WJH&;30<]^[&JNDI5@O8ZT>E7%1#8&"]T[@7;ZW,R/TM;?Y*5;K+&N?50QS7N#*P<-S2TN M##ZCB^YK7TU_I=[O9_X'^DKC$PFU"RK`I:VP>F&_9<@$UO9L#7-]'?\`S6YE MGZ--Z&(RES#@4^F0RRNMN)DP=1LW,90[Z'JY'Z';[/\`"5U_I$E-FI]CFG?C MM#@7$S@O$#\RO^>=NTX MF37)AUE?I[@_9[?IUN]^_P#S$E(&G)<\$8[0QK7ETX)UB2"W]8W[F^VME?\` MA?\`BWUV*YBV8S[6X]N$YMP)8ZW[/MJ+F@N]2MWZ3959L=Z6ZQ1'4SU/YU_^#1L#*S,AWZ39M82VT^G=7K`V^E]H:W?[_5W MI*8_5]K6]+8UH#6BV\`#0`>M;PM%9_0?^36_\;?_`.?KEH)*?__3]50O_*6K M_/'_`*63)9!$T1(^43)M8>2GEAQQGBB+JLF7'BG_`(DY/1G+H[7U1_6']ZE] MKQ/]-7_G!/_2R7[9^O7_E+5_GC_TLF^]']V?^))D_T;E_ MSO+_`/M1A_[]VGWT4Y.'9=8VMAIM`<\AH))H,2Y5;*^G79UMUV7C.HN:6.:+ M7M?!:UL>W(]'\UWT*6+/_;/UY/\`WBU?YX_]+)OVQ]>?_*6K_/'_`*52]Z/[ ML_\`$DK_`$;E_P`[R_\`[48?^_=0XWU;,[KJR'$N(.0XB7%KG.V^K])WIM3M MQ_JXT/`NK_2?3G(<2?/_2J7[8^O/\`Y2U? MYX_]*I>]']V?^))7^C/\`TJE[T?W9_P"))7^C7_`/:C#_W[K5T_5VMYL9=4'%S;"3>3[FN] M1KO=;^\C8EW1L.OTL?)J:TF8==O,G^5;8]RQJNK_`%Q)/K=(:P2(V0_3\[_M M16I-ZM];I:']+:`3[R&S#?Y+3DC<_P#M(^Z.TO\`%*#\.R#_`"F'3_78S^UU MN@$.Z6QP,M=9<6D<$&ZTMO_`"EJ_P`\?^EEM=#RNKY6,]_5 ML5N'>+"UE;3(+-K3O^E9^?O1CD$C0$AYQ,5F;DIXH<7'EG_B0D__ MU/54E\JI)*?JI)?*J22GZJ27RJDDI^JDE\JI)*?JI)?*J22GZJ27RJDDI^JD ME\JI)*?_V0`X0DE-!"$``````%4````!`0````\`00!D`&\`8@!E`"``4`!H M`&\`=`!O`',`:`!O`'`````3`$$`9`!O`&(`90`@`%``:`!O`'0`;P!S`&@` M;P!P`"``-@`N`#`````!`#A"24T$!@``````!P`(`````0$`_^(,6$E#0U]0 M4D]&24Q%``$!```,2$QI;F\"$```;6YT`",`*``M M`#(`-P`[`$``10!*`$\`5`!9`%X`8P!H`&T`<@!W`'P`@0"&`(L`D`"5`)H` MGP"D`*D`K@"R`+<`O`#!`,8`RP#0`-4`VP#@`.4`ZP#P`/8`^P$!`0&!YD'K`>_!]('Y0?X"`L('P@R"$8(6@AN"(((E@BJ"+X(T@CG"/L) M$`DE"3H)3PED"7D)CPFD";H)SPGE"?L*$0HG"CT*5`IJ"H$*F`JN"L4*W`KS M"PL+(@LY"U$+:0N`"Y@+L`O("^$+^0P2#"H,0PQ<#'4,C@RG#,`,V0SS#0T- M)@U`#5H-=`V.#:D-PPW>#?@.$PXN#DD.9`Y_#IL.M@[2#NX/"0\E#T$/7@]Z M#Y8/LP_/#^P0"1`F$$,081!^$)L0N1#7$/41$Q$Q$4\1;1&,$:H1R1'H$@<2 M)A)%$F02A!*C$L,2XQ,#$R,30Q-C$X,3I!/%$^44!A0G%$D4:A2+%*T4SA3P M%1(5-!56%7@5FQ6]%>`6`Q8F%DD6;!:/%K(6UA;Z%QT701=E%XD7KA?2%_<8 M&QA`&&48BABO&-48^AD@&449:QF1&;<9W1H$&BH:41IW&IX:Q1KL&Q0;.QMC M&XH;LAO:'`(<*AQ2''LP>%AY`'FH>E!Z^'ND? M$Q\^'VD?E!^_'^H@%2!!(&P@F"#$(/`A'"%((74AH2'.(?LB)R)5(H(BKR+= M(PHC."-F(Y0CPB/P)!\D321\)*LDVB4))3@E:"67)<`^(#Y@/J`^X#\A/V$_HC_B M0"-`9$"F0.=!*4%J0:Q![D(P0G)"M4+W0SI#?4/`1`-$1T2*1,Y%$D5519I% MWD8B1F=&JT;P1S5'>T?`2`5(2TB12-=)'4EC2:E)\$HW2GU*Q$L,2U-+FDOB M3"I,%W)7AI>;%Z]7P]?85^S8`5@ M5V"J8/QA3V&B8?5B26*<8O!C0V.78^MD0&249.EE/6629>=F/6:29NAG/6>3 M9^EH/VB6:.QI0VF::?%J2&J?:O=K3VNG:_]L5VRO;0AM8&VY;A)N:V[$;QYO M>&_1<"MPAG#@<3IQE7'P,QY*GF)>>=Z1GJE>P1[8WO"?"%\@7SA?4%]H7X!?F)^PG\C?X1_ MY8!'@*B!"H%K@%JX8.AG*&UX<[AY^(!(AI MB,Z),XF9B?Z*9(K*BS"+EHO\C&.,RHTQC9B-_XYFCLZ/-H^>D`:0;I#6D3^1 MJ)(1DGJ2XY--D[:4()2*E/257Y7)EC26GY<*EW67X)A,F+B9))F0F?R::)K5 MFT*;KYP0)ZNGQV?BY_ZH&F@V*%'H;:B)J*6HP:C=J/FI%:D MQZ4XI:FF&J:+IOVG;J?@J%*HQ*DWJ:FJ'*J/JP*K=:OIK%RLT*U$K;BN+:ZA MKQ:OB[``L'6PZK%@L=:R2[+"LSBSKK0EM)RU$[6*M@&V>;;PMVBWX+A9N-&Y M2KG"NCNZM;LNNZ>\(;R;O16]C[X*OH2^_[]ZO_7`<,#LP6?!X\)?PMO#6,/4 MQ%'$SL5+QHM\IWZ_@-N"]X43AS.)3XMOC8^/KY'/D_.6$Y@WF MENV<[BCNM.]`[\SP6/#E\7+Q__*, M\QGSI_0T],+U4/7>]FWV^_>*^!GXJ/DX^H6&AXB)BI25EI>8F9JDI::GJ*FJM+6VM[BYNL3%QL?(R'EZ>WQ]?G]TA8:'B(F*BXR-CH^#E)66EYB9FIN]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_]#?X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U__T=_CW[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__2W^/? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[ MKW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=? M_]/?X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W M[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U__U-_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[ MW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__5W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U M[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?N MO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=?_];?X]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z] MU[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O? MNO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U__U]_CW[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[K MW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>] M^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW M7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^ MZ]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7 MO?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z M]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O M?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7__0W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO= M>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW0`?*';WR)W5T=O7`_%'?^R^K^^JX8#^X MN^>PL'_>/:&$-/N;#U6X?XMAOX1G?N_XAM:&MIH?\EE\=1,C^G3J!=NL>Y36 M$\>T7"1;@::6<549%:BC<5J!@YZ&/(%[R5M_-FUWGN'L]U?\H)XGCP6[^',] M8G$>A_$BIIE*,W>M54C-:'6R^??;/\^/^7Q\>,G\C>R?F?\`%[>^V<9NO:^T MY<#LCH_"C.R5FZJJ>EI*F,Y[K?%8_P"VIG@O)>758\`^XRYAN_<#EW;FW*YW MNU>(.JT6,5[OMC`ZSE]GN7ONA^\G.U^_6M\]M+-XD][)X=(@"1^G>. MU37&*>O1KM@]3_\`"A'?FS=D[[HOGE\.J7%;SVSMG=M-0U?2$*UU-C]Q8JAS M,5'4F#JJ6#[J&FK`CE'*ZP;&W/LWMK3W%N(+>X7?[,)(BM0QBM&`/^^OGU'F M\\Q?%4:%[@NKCD]717']?8VZQ>Z)MWCMKYL9;Y&? M&C-="=B=6[8^-.!R>>?Y2[0W?C?N=\[TQR6_BWQ]RVM]ON8EVM2?'5AWL,:='8?G7N7J3.4]P]J[;DKGNTYOV M3<)^>YDC_=4T+4@@8:O$-P/J(Z@]NG]*;@10<>CD7!O8@V^O/T_U_9UU&?7? MOW7NO>_=>Z)M7;:^;#?-O#[JH>Q.K(_@E%U//C,UUI+C2>VZCN%IJUJ;/TN3 M_N9);;2PO3@I_'([%&_R=KW]DK1;Y^_4E6YB_<'@T*4_4\3.:Z/AX?C_`"ZD MV+U5SMTNQ[@?=L[B&2Z#?XH+*BUC*_4#]2NK_B.>(_4%*=')]G749=> M]^Z]U[W[KW7KC^OU^G^/OW7NNKC^HYX_V/\`3W[KW7?OW7NO7]^Z]U6C\^OG MKF_A[V9\'>J]N;`QF\,K\Q?DGM+I>;/9G+5-'CMB;;GW3LC&;IS46+H8/N<] MFZG&[MT4"&IIH*>=/-+YE7P2!CF'F!]ENMBM([<.][=+%4F@1=2!C0<31L9` M!R:\.IU]G?9^V]S-C]V.8;[>9+:UY9V*:^$<:!FN)1#_=>Z]]??NO=!%\@.VJ+H/HKN;O+)8:KW'C^G.K M-_=H5NWZ"JAH:W.4NP]K93<\^(I*VHCF@HZC)1XPPI*Z.L;.&*D"Q1[C>+M^ MWWU^Z%EAA>0@8)T*6H#\Z="3DWEN;G'F[E?E*WN5AGW/<+>U61@66,W$J1!R MH()"EZD`BM*5''HN/\MCY9[D^.`*G%37`X=#CWT]N;'VE]SN8>0-OW&6[MK".U_6D55:1Y; M2">1M"U"+XDC:$JQ5-*L[D%B>OV?]1'4>O7KC^OT]^Z]UZ_OW7NO>_=>ZI`_ MG/\`S7^0OPX_V2+_`$!;KQ>U_P#33\F<3UQV%_$MJ[=W/_%MHU(Q'GQU-_'\ M?7_PJ63[Q_WZ;QSBXLPM[`O.^^;CLG[D_=\P3QKD(]55JKC'<#3CQ&>LK?NO M>UG)GN;_`*Z?];]N>X_=>QM<6^F66+1,/$HQ\)TU4TCM?4OJ.C]_(?;GS2S/ M='QN6J_EEMO?&.-9NS?.Q9:G;!PV-ZZJ1L[<0H$^5M)TB']VI]LN8DL%D/U"L.YDQ0)VMFFKS7B,]0[R9?^ MUUIROS_;\\;)N%SS9-:H-HE@:D4$X$NMKD?4150L82/TYL*XTBN2^=S_`,PS M+]>?S/?BE_+LP/7F/K(>\>OMU=K;T[-RV6G9L3MW$;5[@J\/MK:^WZ2*$',U M.?ZS22JKZJHDACHY3%'3-(_FB++[F1[;FK:.6H[8$3QM(SD\%"R$*H]:IDD\ M,4\P->5O96WWOV"]Q/>V\WMU.TWL-I!:H@[Y'FLE>661B>P1W1"QHH8N-1D" MKI8?>V=M_-C)?*OX];@Z=[$ZLP'Q'PF-W+'\D=B[FQOW'8V[\I/!7#:\VQZ[ M^YN7^T@HJAZ=I_\`QSIT]A^5>Y M?SZ!?+FX>UD'M]SI9_=>Z][]U[KUQ[]U[JM7^;S\D.V/B5_+U M[]^0'1V%9W$R=\;*XI)&I-&%0*<#T<#XV;SW!V/\=>@^P]V M5,5;NG?G2O5F\]RUE/2P4,%7N#=&QL%G,S4PT5*D=-1Q3Y&ND=8HU6.,$*H` M`'LZVN>2ZVS;KF8UED@C9CPJ60$X'S/4;\];59[%SOSCLFW1E-OL]UNX(E)+ M$1Q7$D:`L222%4`DDD\2:]#5>WUX]KN@KUZX_K[]UZHZ][]U[KWOW7NO>_=> MZZN.>1Q]?\/]?W[KW7K@?4@?['W[KW#CUW[]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7 MNO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][ M]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7N MO>_=>Z][]U[KWOW7NO_1W^/?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO M=>]^Z]U[W[KW7O?NO=:_'_"F;_MUONS_`,3/T_\`^[BO]QY[G_\`*JR_\UX_ M\)ZS'^XI_P!/\L?^E7>?\=3JZ#XX?]D\=#?^(8ZN_P#>'P?L:;7_`,DS;O\` MFA'_`,<'6,//'_*Z\X?]+2[_`.K\G6KO\I>BNQ_DI_PH:WCTUU_W5OCH'&;N M^&NVX^U>PNL9J6A['_T545)CJK/;6V9FZG4=NY3=N93&T&+W?AZ^NV['D959>?PY8Y'U!@2*\`!D$\0: M&A'2WVWY[A^]-[?^[?*'N%RAL\.\;7M)N[&[M+;P6A=5DT@@R.P".D>$=0\9 M='!P2?;^9EN_=N%_F]?R9]O8;=.X\1@-Q[L[33<."Q>(X'J(O8G:MLN_N MU_>.Z_CG_-` M^2OWC_O26XC6XN8-)D4Q0PEXG`C_27PT8 MDH_C>&XE\1;1_P"6=\1-_?'GY"[OWA\6OG+MGY0_RU-Z[.@@QNQ=U=M57<._ MMD=A+`]53S[6S6WL?)LS%4U'5J4FTU%')5T->R5-(]11PU#BKE;9[C;=QGFV MG?TNN6)$PAD\1E?CVE1I&>.14'*D@'J`???W)V?G7DW;-L]P?:6?E_WUM+EB M\\5F+."XMZA3XR2OX[DKPJKA)$!CD6.1XQ??[D'K$'K7BW%N_=J?\*3]A;+7 M=.XTV=)\$J_*R;37.91=LR9/[S=P_B3X$50Q3U]H4_>,1D]`YX'N.))IO]@YN"";0OBZ:6_;KIJTY.*T MR?7JH/9^[?CC\V?FK\Q]O?S>/F=WI\;^S=A=Q9W8_2_3%-V%4](]/;:Z\P.5 MKZ#&"@S.4Q&9V]39B*G>(H*F6BDKX)S7^:N-0[0`Z*?;-\WO>HN<=[GMKB.< MK%'K\.-4!H,D%0>'&FH'55JXR0W#;>>/:SVL]L;[[MOMAM.^;'>;8D][>F`7 MU[)<2(&;4DS.P-L82FDJX&* MF-5-$)%Y1VO<=L%\C[PEYLC,#;MK+N!Y@M333RH"145`%2.L,_O#<^\F<]MR MI5SI*,D1L7DZ3,=EXGJ_>4V+W1N'&T.7V[#M78 M6U\KE5R]-LC!9')54]5DY:*D+5-/1BF:R3$B%[6PO=\YTYIVYMTGAVY2"X1J M,P!&E`372"[AUPQ,T?;V^?CE\U:#=VU-Z= M6]P[RJMX?PC)81'AJC*LJ2KK\-JQR*H=:@6ODID^Z/YJO\`-*[(_E\; M4[[W[T3\0/B'LK"[G[YJNH,S5;=WMVSO+-4^`EFVP^=@C>&-*#(;B6@BAJTJ M*"F&-K*AJ:HJ&@\:S=&O>;>:[GEV'<)+?9K.,--X9TM(QIVU^1:F00-+&A-* M!OD:WY6^[W]W_9/>;<>4++>/+;Q>()8;*%#+27PZ@U98O$+(5D?Q8D MUHFO4#GS.^*O:/\`(SHNO/G/\*OD#W?O/I+;>^=M;-^1_P`KC6C,STYR%#6U4%13U!A\],Z+?-IN^0UMM^V+<)W ML5D59H97U*P8TJ,`#TK2H)!!I4="CVN]P>7_`+V,F]>TONGR;M5KS3/:2S[; MN=C!X$L,L*DE)*M(S`*3(5#".2-'1TU:'`<_SJOB)UUV3\R?Y-[9[X@I M_GK\A>M-IYO$T^^*&#"=8[F*!<',=E;MJ\1E165%5)-7H^042 MA`!I*7GG9K:YWOEF^6\N*;A_=6]R-[V+VP] M\.5;CES:"_*&RW4R.8',EU*#?S-%>MX@\>$.FA558B(R5))R-K3XV]$X3XS= M(=?]%;;W?O\`W[A.N\96XO'[N[2SU/N??V;BK1E!"`FKL=1)KGHH?\T/JOYP=W=';?ZK^% M/:&T.E*K=N],;1=W=IY?0C%2U572"MQU8* M.D,-+*))R4)^:K3?;^PCM-CND@9W`ED+%66/ST4''S.5-!0<>I(]@^8O:CE/ MFR\YA]T^7[G=4MK5FL;1(DE@FO!E!NY.S=UXJ2+^)[>.U=E-C=V4.2S MST\D-/44U2BT%1XS/YD1E:-.8=BY;VK;+B\L.;)?WQ&M5_QA6:0CB-*48$^1 M!P>->LW/9_W6]Z^?N>-GY=YN^[[8-[;7DPCFIL\\$-K$]=,GC3ZX65*AF1T/ MB+4)I)!&QS_*&^1'8ORJ_ET?&?NWMK()F>QMQ;9W+@MU9X)''-N2OV!OW=77 MT6Y,A'%'#"F7S]%MB*KK?&JQM5S2,@52%$E\F[E<[ORWME_>-JN65@Q_B*.R M:C\R%J?GUA%]Y+DC9/;KWLY[Y3YW9&R_]"_7G97>^'_T<[CI]N_WISG7_`%3O MUJ':&]_/C,E_&]@9G^)O_$*!/`]1XX[3)IY:YVVV/<>7-Q\2>5/`B>4:#344 MC>BM@U0UR,5]>C'[L'.EYR;[SVNWO]3&TG@QW%Y;ZIK?2Z>' M<)H'AR'4%JU4->JH/Y(/Q.VYUS_+$W3\QL-VCW/6[U[?^-WR0VM7]?9;>D%1 MU-LU-J[X[!I:#.=?[7IL/29#;VX:@[2AEGJ373:I9YV54+\!#D39X[7E67>D MNYS/-;3+H+#PUTLX!5:5![:DU.2>LBOO7^XEYOOO[MWME=QZG<.Y#N*2NI,UE=PY3?F\*G)TM7-YZ6:+ M&+#&C$I"T*/DSEMN8-JM-VW3=+K7'(5B57H%5'JU:@DEVU`Y%!2GE02?>8]Z MX?:'W`YC]ON1.0-B6VO;*.7<)9[8R22SW%J(XC'I=$C6"$1.@TNID+%AEPQY M_E3\&.U/DS\O>V=__P`Q;YF/\??@MB*;#X7XN]8]6?(/'=4T6Z:J6%HLG6;] MDW9CL;0+N:C%%]Y6KX:Z:2;(QP4E6E+2LLA]N^PW6Z[Q=W',F]BWV!:"!(Y0 M@;U+Z@!JQ4\34T!H,Q/[>>[/+_(OMMR[LWLE[8#>?=N5GDW6ZN]N>[>$`U46 MXA9F\%M6B,ZHU"Q%Y(C)("*P>M]Y=<_`K^;O\0.G/Y?OS=W-\C_CM\A<[@]C M]T=?9SM_'=S;9VUE]R;DJ=O5E,^6VW)3;;.6BI9:;)8V981D*6>!TFFE@ET$ M*6T]KR_SELUERYOK7.VW!"R(9!(JEB5.5HM>##S!XD@TZGW?=KWSW?\`NV>Y M/,WO+[4P;)SMLL4D]EZ7-=S(MJ]Y'XL-E:Q%@2B55M M1558E&1G:=`S-'%H:M3^;!\"]R_`KL_X&;1Z_P"]^W>T/BSV!\H-L9S;W7W< M>X5WEF>J.U<#F-GT.0DV[N[FX[URCMMA[A6 M6PR1R7-E&84O+61)F7Q8M3?JP2)3668%9`%"=P-S7\VS=V[-O_S'/Y(N&P.Z M-QX/$;G^1N_*/.)[%QU+V#U]F\Z?D5N>?:'5&X)-L3T^UM@TE5M&*GIZ"6FK'CI*FHC,K M:P5".]\N6\WN+86!OKH1W43RLP<:T+>,VF,Z:*@*T`(."<]9%>V'O1O&W?,%T0Z10UL?^62[B MZE_G&_R7NE]M[\W[4;+PO4F^MHY&FR>Z(Q^6WM3T1.*G''J"O;D6/ M,?W9OO/\T7VT6B[I)N$,RE(E`A,T\+LD).IHT&LJJAL+BIR>D%VQ'W9_."_F M:=_?$.E[K[4Z&^#?P>IL5@NV*#J'-U6U=U]P=EY1ZFE./RFX*?[_`!L:MG:" MOBI$JXJF"#&X>1TI15U+30IKSZ[G+FC<-F%[+;[#84$@C)5I'.*$Y'Q`TK4` M+4"IJ#GET\J_=J]A^3O8[(V]UI\F/CUW#O)^P,=-C- MQ)E*B#<^WJ@T6&QV)F-+0S14M0T<592Y@TRFIEI*J:F"7>-ONN0);'>=IW"X MDV@RA)H9&UBAKW#``Q6A.0U,D$CH_P#;?FW8OO>V'-/MK[@\H[19^XD=C)=; M9N5G#].^N/0/"DJTC.-3*60$QO#K_322-).E1_..SG=V]/YH?\K#8'QY[IW3 MU)D^W=O9*@QVZ\'7U4N-P]'N'=*T]9O&7:\M9#@]P93";8JJBIHXZI'4U$<8 M_I[=YTDOYN:N5+;;;YH6F6@89`!;XM/`D#(KY]%_W9+/E+;?8/W^WOG7E:#< M8=MF#-#(`&=HH0RP^(`717E`5RO!6;H'OYGW\MRJ_E@]"X?Y]?%+Y;?*R7NG MJ7LO8$V]:KMOM-]ZT/8]+N;<4&)DJ5;"/F':-WN_KH94UF1]6L,0,T"_BI4&H(J#T)_87WQC]^^;;OV M=]P_;CEXY637 MN!-``:$]8P>T.[^TWMIS]SI=^X7+]SO=_MIGBVJU,4 M[3S9)^^(P&4?4*Y<@BN$HP/$@UH#QZS']F?_R,_X315?=O9532UV_ MNPNH_CUF-VY"CIQ209/-P=]=;XNMROVRLT<$^4DQ_P!Q*B6C$LC:`JV`$._W M\^Y^V'UUT0;B2.$L1BI$R`G\Z5ZAGVCY4VKDC[]"\J[$C)L]EN&YI"K&I2,[ M;=.J5XD(&T@G)`%23GJ^3X9?]D??%'_Q6OHO_P!]?M;W(&Q_\D7:/^>6+_JV MO6(_NE_T\WW%_P"E]?\`_:7+U7?_`#OOF#W3\7_CKU?L3XW9.#;W>WRO[JVW M\?ME;MDIQ4U>SJ/(6FY2Y=V MJ7<9X0:"=HBI2-_6/2)'==2ZM`5B59@2;[\_X3[9G973==V'T%\TOEI7_/': MN'3=FV>S=S=PS4FTMZ]BXV"&MFP5?C'H#E<+@=PU5,U+3S5&5J7IA)&U8]5" MLB,27'MW)!9&YV[?+P\P(-2NTE%9QY'%0#P!+&GG45ZD[:/ODVNZAY(P=;!84#4(B$;%2#;?)[K#^:[\A/@5T' MUCB-^]8?&WO_`')D<#B?FIV3@=ZU.,RVW-B8NL./SNY^J\SMF&#$0568QZ+F M\O305^,:*))*&CJ%20^SC=;7FW<>7]OM$N(K;<'(%RX:A"#!9"N*D=S`$4^$ M'/4;\@\P?=YY+]W^;]_N]EW#?.3H$=]DM9(59))W75'%=I+5R$8^!"S1RZB1 M-(A('5*7SN^$G\NSXP?'7?/:_07\U;M%?ESL7`ON?9AE^7NU-\;C[,W3B9H9 M*_!';.QVQVZ]G/_`#ML_+G./W>K`^VMY-X4_P#NGG@B MM8GKI?Q9]<++'4%T9#XBU"Z21T:7YVWM)[=6?W MR>>>1[O;+>?9MMBGN=NL[DU@EN?#MYHX'!5PT4*33.JLC]L09E?2002V3\&_ MB+W'L_9F^OY27\V'L&@^9U'F-DYV@B[I^2-7CJG=D+U=/4;CHMX=7Q[0H]]) MD55)*A:/^'Y"@GDA:CJ8I(IC,B"#8=GO88)N4.;Y!O8*L/$FIJ_B#(%#^II1 MAY$$&O0HW3W7]R>6-SW7:_O'?=ULV]KFBGC8V6VZQ"=)$;0W1G-M3(4OXDR-53T&2H(:#)[FIUH*R:!9J.DEDD6-:I8&05[3M^U MV$=U%#N-XPC:8DA(@`HD<5H1EL$Y`J?BIU`7W9?:CEGW"YQY\YMO-BO]TY+Y M:A:ZAV]$5KB^D=I#9VLB@LK:DA?6BL0\@52QB+UJZS/Q(_E,XO:D^Y.K/YXW M8NW/E-14J9/`]Z9WY:[>R%%4[WID6:"MW!MVAAQN3;;U571J'ABRXJHH@MZB M;2PD"C[1R>D1EM.>Y%W8"HE:X4]WJP`!I7^E4>I\\@K;W$^\9<;@ECS#]TZR MG]OG;3)81[1*I$!P1&[,Z>(%)R8"C-6D:5&F\G^2Y\SM_?-OX4XG?7;63PN? M[8ZRW_NOI#L+=6WWHGQ6]