SCHEDULE 14A
                    Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a)
            of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. __)


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Filed by a Party other than the Registrant    [x]

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[  ]     Preliminary Proxy Statement
[  ]     Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by
         Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
[  ]     Definitive Proxy Statement
[  ]     Definitive Additional Materials
[X ]      Soliciting Material Pursuant to ss. 240.14a-12

                             Mylan Laboratories Inc.

                (Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)

                                 Carl C. Icahn,
                   Barberry Corp., Hopper Investments LLC and
                         High River Limited Partnership


    (Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

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     On  December  2, 2004,  the New York Times  published  an  article  titled
"Nothing Ventured, Everything Gained," a copy of which is attached hereto.



     SECURITY  HOLDERS  ARE  ADVISED  TO READ  THE  PROXY  STATEMENT  AND  OTHER
DOCUMENTS  RELATED TO  SOLICITATION  OF PROXIES BY MR. ICAHN AND HIS  AFFILIATES
FROM THE STOCKHOLDERS OF MYLAN  LABORATORIES INC. FOR USE AT ITS SPECIAL MEETING
WHEN  AND  IF  THEY  BECOME  AVAILABLE   BECAUSE  THEY  WILL  CONTAIN  IMPORTANT
INFORMATION.  WHEN COMPLETED,  A DEFINITIVE  PROXY STATEMENT AND A FORM OF PROXY
WILL BE MAILED TO STOCKHOLDERS OF MYLAN  LABORATORIES INC. AND WILL BE AVAILABLE
AT  NO  CHARGE  AT  THE   SECURITIES  AND  EXCHANGE   COMMISSION'S   WEBSITE  AT
HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV.   INFORMATION  RELATING  TO  THE  PARTICIPANTS  IN  A  PROXY
SOLICITATION  IS  CONTAINED  IN THE  SCHEDULE  14A  FILED BY MR.  ICAHN  AND HIS
AFFILIATES WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE  COMMISSION ON OCTOBER 14, 2004 WITH
RESPECT TO MYLAN  LABORATORIES INC. THAT SCHEDULE 14A IS CURRENTLY  AVAILABLE AT
NO CHARGE ON THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S WEBSITE.







NOTHING VENTURED, EVERYTHING GAINED

Hedge Fund Gets Voting Stake While Holding No Economic Interest

By Andrew Ross Sorkin


     A new trading  tactic that could tip proxy fights and takeover  battles has
emerged from the shadows of the hedge fund industry, igniting outrage among some
investors and corporate governance experts.

     The tactic is a complex hedging  technique that allows an investor to buy a
voting stake without actually holding an economic interest in the company. While
Wall Street has long speculated about such a tactic,  it was not until this week
that the first signs of such a strategy were disclosed amid a takeover fight for
King  Pharmaceuticals,  a  generic  drug  maker,  by  its  larger  rival,  Mylan
Laboratories.

     The Perry  Corporation,  a New  York-based  hedge fund,  owns seven million
shares of King, hoping to profit from the spread between the price Mylan offered
for King shares,  $16.49,  and King's actual share price, which closed yesterday
at $12.42.  If the deal is  completed,  Perry  stands to make over $28  million,
based on figures in a filing with the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  on
Tuesday.

     Perry appears to have set up a  sophisticated  swap trade with Bear Stearns
and Goldman  Sachs so that it now  controls  about 10 percent of Mylan's  votes,
with limited or no exposure to  fluctuations  in Mylan's share price.  While the
language  in the  filing is opaque,  Perry  seems to have  accomplished  this by
buying 26.6 million  shares of Mylan while having Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs
sell the same number of shares short, removing any risk for either side.

     The move,  which leaves Perry as the largest,  if indirect,  shareholder of
Mylan, could help ensure that Mylan receives enough shareholder votes to approve
the deal for King at a time when the next-biggest  shareholder of Mylan, Carl C.
Icahn, is trying to block the merger.

     If other  investors were to employ the same trading  method,  it could have
far-reaching  implications on corporate  elections and shareholder votes because
sophisticated  investors could effectively buy shareholder votes without putting
money at risk.  There has been talk on Wall Street that similar tactics may have
been used in the 2002 proxy fight over the $24 billion merger of Hewlett-Packard
and Compaq  Computer and the $1.5 billion  acquisition  of MONY by AXA of France
this year.

     "It's a little  scary what is going on here,"  said Nell  Minow,  editor of
Corporate  Library,  an  independent  research  firm  specializing  in corporate
governance. "You're allowing someone to manipulate the market. It undermines the
whole  concept of linking  ownership  and control.  It is not  illegal,  but the
question is, 'Should it be?' I say,  'Yes.' The vote should  accompany some kind
of underlying interest."

     George  Travers,  director of  compliance  for Perry,  declined to comment.
Perry,  with about $8 billion under  management,  is run by Richard C. Perry,  a
former banker at Goldman.

     Mr. Icahn is furious about the Perry trade,  which would have the result of
negating his own 10 percent stake in Mylan.

     "If this is true,  in our  opinion,  this  maneuver is rigging an election,
plain and simple,  and robbing  shareholders  of the right to have a  meaningful
vote - one of the few rights they have left," Mr. Icahn said. "If hedge funds or
any other investors are permitted to dictate the outcome of corporate  elections
without  having  economic  interest  in the  companies,  then any  semblance  of
corporate democracy we still have in our country would become a travesty."

     The  apparent  use of such a tactic  will only help  fuel the  debate  over
whether  there should be more  regulation  of hedge funds,  which are  privately
managed pools of assets that are typically open only to wealthy investors. Their
secretive  practices  have been  questioned  as the assets and influence of such
funds have grown sharply in recent years.


     To be sure,  investors - not just hedge funds - have long tried to game the
system of owning  shares to  influence  votes.  Indeed,  shareholders  often buy
shares for only a brief period  before a record date or deadline that gives them
the right to vote and then they immediately sell the shares.

     But the  technique  seemingly  being applied by Perry would take gaming the
system to a new extreme  because the company would be getting the opportunity to
vote without ever having a true economic interest in the shares.

     Still,  some experts are not sure the technique should be made illegal.  "I
agree it's a new  unprecedented  factor,  but I'm  hesitant to say the law could
manage this," said John C. Coffee,  a specialist on securities  law at Columbia.
"A shareholder has no fiduciary duty to other shareholders."