CONTINGENCIES

Tobacco-Related Litigation:

Overview. Since 1954, Liggett and other United States cigarette manufacturers have been named as defendants in numerous direct, third-party and purported class actions predicated on the theory that cigarette manufacturers should be liable for damages alleged to have been caused by cigarette smoking or by exposure to secondary smoke from cigarettes. The cases have generally fallen into the following categories: (i) smoking and health cases alleging personal injury brought on behalf of individual plaintiffs (“Individual Actions”); (ii) lawsuits by individuals requesting the benefit of the Engle ruling (“Engle progeny cases”); (iii) smoking and health cases primarily alleging personal injury or seeking court-supervised programs for ongoing medical monitoring, as well as cases alleging that use of the terms “lights” and/or “ultra lights” constitutes a deceptive and unfair trade practice, common law fraud or violation of federal law, purporting to be brought on behalf of a class of individual plaintiffs (“Class Actions”); and (iv) health care cost recovery actions brought by various foreign and domestic governmental plaintiffs and non-governmental plaintiffs seeking reimbursement for health care expenditures allegedly caused by cigarette smoking and/or disgorgement of profits (“Health Care Cost Recovery Actions”). With the commencement of new cases, the defense costs and the risks relating to the unpredictability of litigation increase. The future financial impact of the risks and expenses of litigation are not quantifiable. For the three months ended March 31, 2016 and 2015, Liggett incurred tobacco product liability legal expenses and costs totaling $4,171 and $2,555, respectively. The tobacco product liability legal expenses and costs are included in the operating, selling, administrative and general expenses and litigation settlement and judgment expense line items in the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations.

Litigation is subject to uncertainty and it is possible that there could be adverse developments in pending cases. Management reviews on a quarterly basis with counsel all pending litigation and evaluates the probability of a loss being incurred and whether an estimate can be made of the possible loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome. An unfavorable outcome or settlement of pending tobacco-related litigation could encourage the commencement of additional litigation. Damages awarded in tobacco-related litigation can be significant.

Bonds. Although Liggett has been able to obtain required bonds or relief from bonding requirements in order to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to collect judgments while adverse verdicts are on appeal, there remains a risk that such relief may not be obtainable in all cases. This risk has been reduced given that a majority of states now limit the dollar amount of bonds or require no bond at all. To obtain stays on judgments pending current appeals of the Putney, Calloway, Buchanan, Lambert, Boatright and Ward cases Liggett, as of March 31, 2016, has secured approximately $15,767 in bonds.

In June 2009, Florida amended its existing bond cap statute by adding a $200,000 bond cap that applies to all Engle progeny cases in the aggregate and establishes individual bond caps for individual Engle progeny cases in amounts that vary depending on the number of judgments in effect at a given time. In several cases, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the bond cap statute, but to date the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the statute. It is possible that the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations, and cash flows could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome of such challenges.

Accounting Policy. The Company and its subsidiaries record provisions in their consolidated financial statements for pending litigation when they determine that an unfavorable outcome is probable and the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. At the present time, while it is reasonably possible that an unfavorable outcome in a case may occur, except as disclosed in this Note 7: (i) management has concluded that it is not probable that a loss has been incurred in any of the pending tobacco-related cases; or (ii) management is unable to reasonably estimate the possible loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome of any of the pending tobacco-related cases and, therefore, management has not provided any amounts in the consolidated financial statements for unfavorable outcomes, if any. Legal defense costs are expensed as incurred.

Cautionary Statement About Engle Progeny Cases. Judgments have been entered against Liggett and other industry defendants in Engle progeny cases. A number of the judgments have been affirmed on appeal and satisfied by the defendants. As of March 31, 2016, 24 Engle progeny cases where Liggett was a defendant at trial resulted in verdicts. Fifteen verdicts were returned in favor of the plaintiffs (although in two of these cases (Irimi and Cohen) the court granted defendants' motion for a new trial) and nine in favor of Liggett. In four of the cases, punitive damages were awarded against Liggett (although in Calloway, the punitive damages award was reversed and remanded to the trial court). In certain cases, the judgments were entered jointly and severally with other defendants and Liggett may face the risk that one or more co-defendants decline or otherwise fail to participate in the bonding required for an appeal or to pay their proportionate or jury-allocated share of a judgment. As a result, Liggett under certain circumstances may have to pay more than its proportionate share of any bonding or judgment related amounts. Several of the judgments remain on appeal. Except as discussed in this Note 7 regarding the cases where an adverse verdict was entered against Liggett and that remain on appeal, management is unable to estimate the possible loss or range of loss from the remaining Engle progeny cases as there are currently multiple defendants in each case and, in most cases, discovery has not occurred or is limited. As a result, the Company lacks information about whether plaintiffs are in fact Engle class members (non-class members’ claims are generally time-barred), the relevant smoking history, the nature of the alleged injury and the availability of various defenses, among other things. Further, plaintiffs typically do not specify their demand for damages.

Although Liggett has generally been successful in managing litigation, litigation is subject to uncertainty and significant challenges remain, including with respect to the remaining Engle progeny cases. There can be no assurances that Liggett’s past litigation experience will be representative of future results. Judgments have been entered against Liggett in the past, in Individual Actions and Engle progeny cases, and several of those judgments were affirmed on appeal and satisfied by Liggett. It is possible that the consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows of the Company could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome or settlement of any of the remaining smoking-related litigation. Liggett believes, and has been so advised by counsel, that it has valid defenses to the litigation pending against it, as well as valid bases for appeal of adverse verdicts. All such cases are, and will continue to be, vigorously defended, however, Liggett has entered into settlement discussions in individual cases or groups of cases, where Liggett has determined it was in its best interest to do so, and it may continue to do so in the future, including the remaining Engle progeny cases. In October 2013, Liggett announced a settlement of the claims of over 4,900 Engle progeny plaintiffs (see Engle Progeny Settlement below). As of March 31, 2016, Liggett (and in certain cases the Company) had, on an individual basis, settled 174 Engle progeny cases for approximately $5,982 in the aggregate. Three of those settlements occurred in the first quarter of 2016.

Individual Actions

As of March 31, 2016, there were 37 Individual Actions pending against Liggett and, in certain cases, the Company, where one or more individual plaintiffs allege injury resulting from cigarette smoking, addiction to cigarette smoking or exposure to secondary smoke and seek compensatory and, in some cases, punitive damages. These cases do not include the remaining Engle progeny cases or the individual cases pending in West Virginia state court as part of a consolidated action. The following table lists the number of Individual Actions by state:



State		Number of Cases
Florida		12
Maryland		12
New York		7
Louisiana		2
West Virginia		2
Missouri		1
Ohio		1

The plaintiffs’ allegations of liability in cases in which individuals seek recovery for injuries allegedly caused by cigarette smoking are based on various theories of recovery, including negligence, gross negligence, breach of special duty, strict liability, fraud, concealment, misrepresentation, design defect, failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranties, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, concert of action, unjust enrichment, common law public nuisance, property damage, invasion of privacy, mental anguish, emotional distress, disability, shock, indemnity, violations of deceptive trade practice laws, the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), state RICO statutes and antitrust statutes. In many of these cases, in addition to compensatory damages, plaintiffs also seek other forms of relief including treble/multiple damages, medical monitoring, disgorgement of profits and punitive damages. Although alleged damages often are not determinable from a complaint, and the law governing the pleading and calculation of damages varies from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction, compensatory and punitive damages have been specifically pleaded in a number of cases, sometimes in amounts ranging into the hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars.

Defenses raised in Individual Actions include lack of proximate cause, assumption of the risk, comparative fault and/or contributory negligence, lack of design defect, statute of limitations, equitable defenses such as “unclean hands” and lack of benefit, failure to state a claim and federal preemption.

Engle Progeny Cases

Engle Case. In May 1994, Engle was filed against Liggett and others in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The class consisted of all Florida residents who, by November 21, 1996, “have suffered, presently suffer or have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarette smoking.” In July 1999, after the conclusion of Phase I of the trial, the jury returned a verdict against Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers on certain issues determined by the trial court to be “common” to the causes of action of the plaintiff class. The jury made several findings adverse to the defendants including that defendants’ conduct “rose to a level that would permit a potential award or entitlement to punitive damages.” Phase II of the trial was a causation and damages trial for three of the class plaintiffs and a punitive damages trial on a class-wide basis before the same jury that returned the verdict in Phase I. In April 2000, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $12,704 to the three class plaintiffs, to be reduced in proportion to the respective plaintiff’s fault. In July 2000, the jury awarded approximately $145,000,000 in punitive damages, including $790,000 against Liggett.

In May 2003, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and remanded the case with instructions to decertify the class. The judgment in favor of one of the three class plaintiffs, in the amount of $5,831, was overturned as time barred and the court found that Liggett was not liable to the other two class plaintiffs.

In July 2006, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision vacating the punitive damages award and held that the class should be decertified prospectively, but determined that the following Phase I findings are entitled to res judicata effect in Engle progeny cases: (i) that smoking causes lung cancer, among other diseases; (ii) that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive; (iii) that defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous; (iv) that defendants concealed material information knowing that the information was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking; (v) that defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers would rely on the information to their detriment; (vi) that defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective; and (vii) that defendants were negligent. The Florida Supreme Court decision also allowed former class members to proceed to trial on individual liability issues (using the above findings) and compensatory and punitive damage issues, provided they filed their individual lawsuits by January 2008. In December 2006, the Florida Supreme Court added the finding that defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to the representations made by defendants. In October 2007, the United States Supreme Court denied defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari.

Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court’s July 2006 ruling in Engle, which decertified the class on a prospective basis, and affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the punitive damages award, former class members had until January 2008 in which to file individual lawsuits. As a result, Liggett and the Company, and other cigarette manufacturers, were sued in thousands of Engle progeny cases in both federal and state courts in Florida. Although the Company was not named as a defendant in the Engle case, it was named as a defendant in substantially all of the Engle progeny cases where Liggett was named as a defendant.

Engle Progeny Settlement. In October 2013, the Company entered into a settlement with approximately 4,900 Engle progeny plaintiffs and their counsel. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Liggett agreed to pay a total of approximately $110,000, with approximately $61,600 paid in a lump sum and the balance to be paid in installments over 14 years, starting in February 2015. In exchange, the claims of over 4,900 plaintiffs were dismissed with prejudice against the Company and Liggett. Due to the settlement, in 2013 the Company recorded a charge of $86,213, of which $25,213 is related to certain payments discounted to their present value using an 11% annual discount rate. The Company recorded a charge of $643 in the first quarter of 2015 for additional cases joining the settlement and the restructuring of certain payments related to several previously settled cases. The installment payments total approximately $48,000 on an undiscounted basis. The Company’s future payments will be approximately $3,400 per annum through 2028, with a cost of living increase beginning in 2021.

Notwithstanding the comprehensive nature of the Engle Progeny Settlement, approximately 255 plaintiffs’ claims remain outstanding. Therefore, the Company and Liggett may still be subject to periodic adverse judgments which could have a material adverse affect on the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows.

As of March 31, 2016, the following Engle progeny cases have resulted in judgments against Liggett:



Date	Case Name	County	Liggett Compensatory Damages (as adjusted)⁽¹⁾	Liggett Punitive Damages	Status ⁽²⁾
June 2002	Lukacs v. R.J. Reynolds	Miami-Dade	$12,418	$—	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
August 2009	Campbell v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	156	—	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
March 2010	Douglas v. R.J. Reynolds	Hillsborough	1,350	—	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
April 2010	Clay v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	349	1,000	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
April 2010	Putney v. R.J. Reynolds	Broward	3,008	—	On June 12, 2013, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the amount of the award. Both sides sought discretionary review from the Florida Supreme Court. In February 2016, the Florida Supreme Court reinstated the jury's verdict. The defendants moved for clarification of that order, which was granted in March 2016. The court clarified that it reversed the district court's decision regarding the statute of repose only, leaving the remaining portions of the decision intact. The case will be remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with those portions of the district court's decision that were not reversed.
April 2011	Tullo v. R.J. Reynolds	Palm Beach	225	—	Liggett satisfied the judgment and other than an issue with respect to the calculation of interest on the judgment and the amount of costs owed by Liggett, the case is concluded.



January 2012	Ward v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	1	—	Liggett satisfied the merits judgment. Subsequently, the trial court entered a final judgment on attorneys' fees and costs for $981 and defendants appealed that judgment.
May 2012	Calloway v. R.J. Reynolds	Broward	1,530	—	A joint and several judgment for $16,100 was entered against R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, Lorillard and Liggett. On January 6, 2016, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed in part, including the $7,600 punitive damages award against Liggett, and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on certain issues. Both sides have moved for rehearing.
December 2012	Buchanan v. R.J. Reynolds	Leon	2,750	—	A joint and several judgment for $5,500 was entered against Liggett and Philip Morris. The court refused to reduce the award by decedent's comparative fault. Judgment was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal, but the court certified an issue of conflict with another case. The defendants sought discretionary review by the Florida Supreme Court, which was declined in February 2016. The defendants are considering their appellate options.
May 2013	Cohen v. R.J. Reynolds	Palm Beach	—	—	In May 2013, the jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $2,055 and apportioned 10% of the fault to Liggett ($205). Defendants' motion seeking a new trial was granted by the trial court. Plaintiff appealed and defendants cross-appealed. Oral argument is scheduled for June 7, 2016.
August 2013	Rizzuto v. R.J. Reynolds	Hernando	3,479	—	Liggett settled its portion of the judgment for $1,500 and the case is concluded as to Liggett.
August 2014	Irimi v. R.J. Reynolds	Broward	—	—	In August 2014, the jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $3,123 and apportioned 1% of the fault to Liggett ($31). In January 2015, the trial court granted defendants' motion for a new trial. Plaintiff appealed.
October 2014	Lambert v. R.J. Reynolds	Pinellas	3,600	9,500	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
November 2014	Boatright v. R.J. Reynolds	Polk	—	300	In November 2014, the jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $15,000 with 15% fault apportioned to plaintiff and 85% to Philip Morris. The jury further assessed punitive damages against Philip Morris for $19,700 and Liggett for $300. Post trial motions were denied. A joint and several judgment was entered in the amount of $12,750 on the compensatory damages. Judgment was further entered against Liggett for $300 in punitive damages. Defendants appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed.
June 2015	Caprio v. R.J. Reynolds	Broward	—	—	In February 2015, the jury answered certain questions on the verdict form, but were deadlocked as to others. The jury returned a verdict of $559 in economic damages. The court entered a partial judgment and ordered a new trial on the remaining issues, including comparative fault and punitive damages. Defendants appealed.
Total Damages Awarded:			28,866	10,800
Amounts accrued, paid or compromised:			(24,328)	(10,500)
Damages remaining on Appeal:			$4,538	$300
(1) Compensatory damages are adjusted to reflect the jury's allocation of comparative fault and only include Liggett's jury allocated share, regardless of whether a judgment was joint and several. The amounts listed above do not include attorneys' fees or statutory interest.
(2) See Exhibit 99.1 for a more complete description of the cases currently on appeal.

Through March 31, 2016, Liggett paid $35,416, including interest and attorneys' fees, to satisfy the judgments in the following Engle progeny cases: Lukacs, Campbell, Douglas, Clay, Tullo, Ward, Rizzuto and Lambert.

The Company’s current potential range of loss in the remaining cases on appeal is between $0 and $4,838 in the aggregate, plus interest and attorneys' fees, however, this is only an estimate and final damages in any case might increase as a result of pending appeals. In determining the range of loss, the Company considers potential settlements as well as future appellate relief. Except as disclosed elsewhere in this Note 7, the Company is unable to determine a range of loss related to the remaining Engle progeny cases. The Company's balance sheet as of March 31, 2016 contains an accrual of $4,323 for the Buchanan Engle progeny case. As cases proceed through the appellate process, the Company will consider accruals on a case-by-case basis if an unfavorable outcome becomes probable and the amount can be reasonably estimated.

Appeals of Engle Progeny Judgments. In December 2010, in the Martin case, a state court case against R.J. Reynolds, the First District Court of Appeal held that the trial court correctly construed the Florida Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Engle in instructing the jury on the preclusive effect of the Phase I Engle findings. In July 2011, the Florida Supreme Court declined to review the First District Court of Appeal’s decision. In March 2012, the United States Supreme Court declined to review the Martin case, along with the Campbell case and two other Engle progeny cases. The Martin decision has led to additional adverse rulings by other state appellate courts.

In Jimmie Lee Brown, a state court case against R.J. Reynolds, the trial court tried the case in two phases. In the first phase, the jury determined that the smoker was addicted to cigarettes that contained nicotine and that his addiction was a legal cause of his death, thereby establishing he was an Engle class member. In the second phase, the jury determined whether the plaintiff established legal cause and damages with regard to each of the underlying claims. The jury found in favor of plaintiff in both phases. In September 2011, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment entered in plaintiff’s favor and approved the trial court’s procedure of bifurcating the trial. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with Martin that individual post-Engle plaintiffs need not prove conduct elements as part of their burden of proof, but disagreed with Martin to the extent that the First District Court of Appeal only required a finding that the smoker was a class member to establish legal causation as to addiction and the underlying claims. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that in addition to establishing class membership, Engle progeny plaintiffs must also establish legal causation and damages as to each claim asserted. In so finding, the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Jimmie Lee Brown is in conflict with Martin.

In Rey, a state court case, the trial court entered final summary judgment on all claims in favor of the Company, Liggett and Lorillard based on what has been referred to in the Engle progeny litigation as the “Liggett Rule.” The Liggett Rule stands for the proposition that a manufacturer cannot have liability to a smoker under any asserted claim if the smoker did not use a product manufactured by that particular defendant. The Liggett Rule is based on the entry of final judgment in favor of Liggett/Brooke Group in Engle on all of the claims asserted against them by class representatives Mary Farnan and Angie Della Vecchia, even though the Florida Supreme Court upheld, as res judicata, the generic finding that Liggett/Brooke Group engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud by concealment. In September 2011, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part holding that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted against them other than the claim for civil conspiracy. Defendants’ further appellate efforts were unsuccessful.

In Douglas, a state court case, the Second District Court of Appeal issued a decision affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff and upholding the use of the Engle jury findings, but certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether granting res judicata effect to the Engle jury findings violates defendants’ federal due process rights. In March 2013, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the use of Engle jury findings and determined that there is no violation of the defendants’ due process rights. This was the first time the Florida Supreme Court addressed the merits of an Engle progeny case. In October 2013, the United States Supreme Court declined to review the decision and Liggett satisfied the judgment. To date, the United States Supreme Court has declined to review any Engle progeny decisions.

In Hess, a state court case, in April 2015, the Florida Supreme Court held that Engle defendants cannot raise a statute of repose defense to claims for concealment or conspiracy. Defendants' motion for rehearing was denied.

In April 2015, in Graham, a federal case, the Eleventh Circuit held that federal law impliedly preempts use of the res judicata Engle findings to establish claims for strict liability or negligence. In February 2016, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s opinion and granted Plaintiff’s motion for rehearing en banc. Defendant's filed a motion requesting that the court enter a briefing order directing the parties to address both implied preemption and whether the application of the Engle findings violates federal due process. That motion was granted and briefing is underway.

Maryland Cases

Liggett is currently a defendant in 12 multi-defendant personal injury cases in Maryland that allege claims arising from asbestos and tobacco exposure. Liggett along with other tobacco defendants have moved (or are in the process of moving) to dismiss the cases. In the past, motions to dismiss have generally been successful, typically resulting in the dismissal without prejudice of the tobacco company defendants, including Liggett. Recently, however, a Maryland intermediate appellate court ruled, in Stidham, et al. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, et al., that dismissal of tobacco company defendants may not be appropriate where injury is asserted based on both asbestos and tobacco usage. Although Stidham is subject to further appellate review, and the scope of its holding is not yet known, it is possible that Liggett and other tobacco company defendants will not be dismissed from pending synergy exposure cases, and may be named as a defendant in asbestos-related personal injury actions in Maryland going forward, including approximately 20 additional synergy exposure cases currently pending in Maryland state court.

Liggett Only Cases

There are currently three cases pending where Liggett is the only remaining defendant. Each of these cases is an Individual Action. In November 2015, in Hausrath (NY state court), one of the Individual Actions, the court entered a case management order providing discovery deadlines. There has been no further activity in the other two Individual Actions. Cases where Liggett is the only defendant could increase as a result of the remaining Engle progeny cases.

Class Actions

As of March 31, 2016, three actions were pending for which either a class had been certified or plaintiffs were seeking class certification where Liggett is a named defendant. Other cigarette manufacturers are also named in these actions.

Plaintiffs’ allegations of liability in class action cases are based on various theories of recovery, including negligence, gross negligence, strict liability, fraud, misrepresentation, design defect, failure to warn, nuisance, breach of express and implied warranties, breach of special duty, conspiracy, concert of action, violation of deceptive trade practice laws and consumer protection statutes and claims under the federal and state anti-racketeering statutes. Plaintiffs in the class actions seek various forms of relief, including compensatory and punitive damages, treble/multiple damages and other statutory damages and penalties, creation of medical monitoring and smoking cessation funds, disgorgement of profits, and injunctive and equitable relief.

Defenses raised in these cases include, among others, lack of proximate cause, individual issues predominate, assumption of the risk, comparative fault and/or contributory negligence, statute of limitations and federal preemption.

In November 1997, in Young v. American Tobacco Co., a purported personal injury class action was commenced on behalf of plaintiff and all similarly situated residents in Louisiana who, though not themselves cigarette smokers, allege they were exposed to secondhand smoke from cigarettes that were manufactured by the defendants, including Liggett, and suffered injury as a result of that exposure. The plaintiffs seek to recover an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages. No class certification hearing has been held. In 2013, plaintiffs’ filed a motion to stay the case and that motion was granted.

In February 1998, in Parsons v. AC & S Inc., a purported class action was commenced on behalf of all West Virginia residents who allegedly have personal injury claims arising from exposure to cigarette smoke and asbestos fibers. The complaint seeks to recover $1,000 in compensatory and punitive damages individually and unspecified compensatory and punitive damages for the class. The case is stayed due to the December 2000 bankruptcy of three of the defendants.

Although not technically a class action, in In Re: Tobacco Litigation (Personal Injury Cases), a West Virginia state court consolidated approximately 750 individual smoker actions that were pending prior to 2001 for trial of certain "common" issues. Liggett was severed from trial of the consolidated action. After two mistrials, in May 2013, the jury rejected all but one of the plaintiffs' claims, finding in favor of plaintiffs on the claim that ventilated filter cigarettes between 1964 and July 1, 1969 should have included instructions on how to use them. The issue of damages was reserved for further proceedings. The court entered judgment in October 2013, dismissing all claims except the ventilated filter claim. The judgment was affirmed on appeal and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. In April 2015, the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court which subsequently declined review. In July 2015, the trial court ruled on the scope of the ventilated filter claim and determined that only 30 plaintiffs have potentially viable claims against the non-Liggett defendants, which may be pursued in a second phase of the trial. The court intends to try the claims of these plaintiffs in six consolidated trials, each with five plaintiffs. The trial court set the first date for the consolidated trials for January 9, 2017. With respect to Liggett, the trial court requested that Liggett and plaintiffs brief whether any claims against Liggett survive given the outcome of the first phase of the trial. A hearing is scheduled for May 23, 2016. If the case proceeds against Liggett, it is estimated that Liggett could be a defendant in less than 25 of the remaining individual cases.

In addition to the cases described above, numerous class actions remain certified against other cigarette manufacturers including cases alleging, among other things, that use of the terms “lights” and “ultra lights” constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices. Adverse decisions in these cases could have a material adverse affect on Liggett’s sales volume, operating income and cash flows.

Health Care Cost Recovery Actions

As of March 31, 2016, one Health Care Cost Recovery Action was pending against Liggett, Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. American Tobacco Company, a South Dakota case filed in 1997, where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on various theories of recovery as a result of alleged sales of tobacco products to minors. The case is inactive. Other cigarette manufacturers are also named as defendants.

The claims asserted in health care cost recovery actions vary, but can include the equitable claim of indemnity, common law claims of negligence, strict liability, breach of express and implied warranty, breach of special duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, public nuisance, claims under state and federal statutes governing consumer fraud, antitrust, deceptive trade practices and false advertising, and claims under RICO. Although no specific damage amounts are typically pleaded, it is possible that requested damages might be in the billions of dollars. In these cases, plaintiffs typically assert equitable claims that the tobacco industry was “unjustly enriched” by their payment of health care costs allegedly attributable to smoking and seek reimbursement of those costs. Relief sought by some, but not all, plaintiffs include punitive damages, multiple damages and other statutory damages and penalties, injunctions prohibiting alleged marketing and sales to minors, disclosure of research, disgorgement of profits, funding of anti-smoking programs, additional disclosure of nicotine yields, and payment of attorney and expert witness fees.

Department of Justice Lawsuit

In September 1999, the United States government commenced litigation against Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The action sought to recover an unspecified amount of health care costs paid and to be paid by the federal government for lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema and other smoking-related illnesses allegedly caused by the fraudulent and tortious conduct of defendants, to restrain defendants and co-conspirators from engaging in alleged fraud and other allegedly unlawful conduct in the future, and to compel defendants to disgorge the proceeds of their unlawful conduct. Claims were asserted under RICO.

In August 2006, the trial court entered a Final Judgment against each of the cigarette manufacturing defendants, except Liggett. In May 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed most of the district court’s decision. The United States Supreme Court denied review. As a result, the cigarette manufacturing defendants, other than Liggett, are now subject to the trial court’s Final Judgment which ordered the following relief: (i) an injunction against “committing any act of racketeering” relating to the manufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences or sale of cigarettes in the United States; (ii) an injunction against participating directly or indirectly in the management or control of the Council for Tobacco Research, the Tobacco Institute, or the Center for Indoor Air Research, or any successor or affiliated entities of each; (iii) an injunction against “making, or causing to be made in any way, any material false, misleading, or deceptive statement or representation or engaging in any public relations or marketing endeavor that is disseminated to the United States’ public and that misrepresents or suppresses information concerning cigarettes”; (iv) an injunction against conveying any express or implied health message through use of descriptors on cigarette packaging or in cigarette advertising or promotional material, including “lights,” “ultra lights,” and “low tar,” which the court found could cause consumers to believe one cigarette brand is less hazardous than another brand; (v) the issuance of “corrective statements” in various media regarding the adverse health effects of smoking, the addictiveness of smoking and nicotine, the lack of any significant health benefit from smoking “low tar” or “lights” cigarettes, defendants’ manipulation of cigarette design to ensure optimum nicotine delivery and the adverse health effects of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke; (vi) the disclosure of defendants’ public document websites and the production of all documents produced to the government or produced in any future court or administrative action concerning smoking and health; (vii) the disclosure of disaggregated marketing data to the government in the same form and on the same schedules as defendants now follow in disclosing such data to the Federal Trade Commission for a period of ten years; (viii) certain restrictions on the sale or transfer by defendants of any cigarette brands, brand names, formulas or cigarette business within the United States; and (ix) payment of the government’s costs in bringing the action. In June 2014, the court approved a consent agreement between the defendants and the Department of Justice regarding the “corrective statements” to be issued by the defendants. In May 2015, the court of appeals issued an opinion on the legality of the "corrective statements," affirming them in part and reversing them in part. The implementation of the “corrective statements” is uncertain as proceedings are ongoing.

It is unclear what impact, if any, the Final Judgment will have on the cigarette industry as a whole. To the extent that the Final Judgment leads to a decline in industry-wide shipments of cigarettes in the United States or otherwise results in restrictions that adversely affect the industry, Liggett’s sales volume, operating income and cash flows could be materially adversely affected.

Upcoming Trials

As of March 31, 2016, there were 15 Engle progeny cases scheduled for trial through March 31, 2017, where Liggett (and/or the Company) is a named defendant. Trial dates are, however, subject to change.

MSA and Other State Settlement Agreements

In March 1996, March 1997 and March 1998, Liggett entered into settlements of smoking-related litigation with 45 states and territories. The settlements released Liggett from all smoking-related claims made by those states and territories, including claims for health care cost reimbursement and claims concerning sales of cigarettes to minors.

In November 1998, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds and two other companies (the “Original Participating Manufacturers” or “OPMs”) and Liggett and Vector Tobacco (together with any other tobacco product manufacturer that becomes a signatory, the “Subsequent Participating Manufacturers” or “SPMs”) (the OPMs and SPMs are hereinafter referred to jointly as the “Participating Manufacturers”) entered into the Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”) with 46 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, American Samoa and the Northern Mariana Islands (collectively, the “Settling States”) to settle the asserted and unasserted health care cost recovery and certain other claims of the Settling States. The MSA received final judicial approval in each Settling State.

As a result of the MSA, the Settling States released Liggett and Vector Tobacco from:


•	all claims of the Settling States and their respective political subdivisions and other recipients of state health care funds, relating to: (i) past conduct arising out of the use, sale, distribution, manufacture, development, advertising and marketing of tobacco products; (ii) the health effects of, the exposure to, or research, statements or warnings about, tobacco products; and


•	all monetary claims of the Settling States and their respective subdivisions and other recipients of state health care funds relating to future conduct arising out of the use of, or exposure to, tobacco products that have been manufactured in the ordinary course of business.

The MSA restricts tobacco product advertising and marketing within the Settling States and otherwise restricts the activities of Participating Manufacturers. Among other things, the MSA prohibits the targeting of youth in the advertising, promotion or marketing of tobacco products; bans the use of cartoon characters in all tobacco advertising and promotion; limits each Participating Manufacturer to one tobacco brand name sponsorship during any 12-month period; bans all outdoor advertising, with certain limited exceptions; prohibits payments for tobacco product placement in various media; bans gift offers based on the purchase of tobacco products without sufficient proof that the intended recipient is an adult; prohibits Participating Manufacturers from licensing third parties to advertise tobacco brand names in any manner prohibited under the MSA; and prohibits Participating Manufacturers from using as a tobacco product brand name any nationally recognized non-tobacco brand or trade name or the names of sports teams, entertainment groups or individual celebrities.

The MSA also requires Participating Manufacturers to affirm corporate principles to comply with the MSA and to reduce underage use of tobacco products and imposes restrictions on lobbying activities conducted on behalf of Participating Manufacturers. In addition, the MSA provides for the appointment of an independent auditor to calculate and determine the amounts of payments owed pursuant to the MSA.

Under the payment provisions of the MSA, the Participating Manufacturers are required to make annual payments of $9,000,000 (subject to applicable adjustments, offsets and reductions including a "Non-Participating Manufacturers Adjustment" or "NPM Adjustment"). These annual payments are allocated based on unit volume of domestic cigarette shipments. The payment obligations under the MSA are the several, and not joint, obligation of each Participating Manufacturer and are not the responsibility of any parent or affiliate of a Participating Manufacturer.

Liggett has no payment obligations under the MSA except to the extent its market share exceeds a market share exemption of approximately 1.65% of total cigarettes sold in the United States. Vector Tobacco has no payment obligations under the MSA except to the extent its market share exceeds a market share exemption of approximately 0.28% of total cigarettes sold in the United States. Liggett and Vector Tobacco’s domestic shipments accounted for 3.3% of the total cigarettes sold in the United States in 2015. If Liggett’s or Vector Tobacco’s market share exceeds their respective market share exemption in a given year, then on April 15 of the following year, Liggett and/or Vector Tobacco, as the case may be, must pay on each excess unit an amount equal (on a per-unit basis) to that due from the OPMs for that year. On December 30, 2015, Liggett and Vector Tobacco pre-paid $100,000 of their approximate $115,000 2015 MSA obligation, the balance of which was paid in April 2016.

Certain MSA Disputes

NPM Adjustment. Liggett and Vector Tobacco contend that they are entitled to an NPM Adjustment for each year from 2003 - 2015. The NPM Adjustment is a potential adjustment to annual MSA payments, available when the Participating Manufacturers suffer a market share loss to NPMs for a particular year and an economic consulting firm selected pursuant to the MSA determines that the MSA was a “significant factor contributing to” that loss. A Settling State that has “diligently enforced” its qualifying escrow statute in the year in question may be able to avoid its allocable share of the NPM Adjustment. For 2003 - 2015, Liggett and Vector Tobacco, as applicable, disputed that they owed the Settling States the NPM Adjustments as calculated by the Independent Auditor. As permitted by the MSA, Liggett and Vector Tobacco either paid subject to dispute, withheld payment or paid into a disputed payment account, the amounts associated with these NPM Adjustments.

The two requirements for application of the NPM Adjustment, a market share loss and a finding or agreement that the MSA was a significant factor in that loss, have been satisfied, and the Participating Manufacturers are engaged in disputes with certain of the Settling States over whether they diligently enforced their respective escrow statutes in each of the years at issue. After several years of litigation over whether the MSA’s arbitration clause required a multistate arbitration of the NPM Adjustment dispute, 48 of 49 state courts ultimately compelled the states to participate in a single, multistate arbitration of the 2003 NPM Adjustment. Notwithstanding, many states continued to refuse to arbitrate and agreed to do so only after the Participating Manufacturers agreed to a 20% reduction in their 2003 NPM Adjustment claims.

The arbitration for the 2003 NPM Adjustment began in June 2010. During the proceedings, the Participating Manufacturers decided not to contest the diligent enforcement of 16 states, with a combined allocable share of approximately 14%.

While the 2003 arbitration was underway, the Participating Manufacturers entered into a term sheet with 22 states settling the NPM Adjustment for 2003 - 2012 and agreeing to terms to address the NPM Adjustment with respect to those states for future years. The parties have been working towards converting the term sheet into a final settlement agreement.

The Participating Manufacturers continued to contest the diligence of 15 states relating to the 2003 NPM Adjustment. In September 2013, the panel found that six of those states did not diligently enforce their MSA escrow statutes in 2003.

Two of the states found non-diligent, Kentucky and Indiana, agreed to settle the dispute and enter into the term sheet described above.

The remaining four non-diligent states pursued motions in their respective state courts seeking to vacate or reduce the amount of the arbitration award. The Pennsylvania and Maryland courts refused to vacate the award but reduced the recovery by approximately 50% and state court appellate proceedings are now exhausted. The remaining two challenges to the 2003 arbitration award, in Missouri and New Mexico, remain pending in state court. In Missouri, the appellate court reversed the trial court, which had reduced the arbitration award, and reinstated the full award. The Missouri Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of that decision, but proceedings are currently stayed pending a possible settlement with Missouri, described below. There has been no decision in New Mexico.

In October 2015, substantially all of the Participating Manufacturers settled the NPM Adjustment dispute with the state of New York for 2004 - 2014 and agreed to a mechanism for potential future credits against the Participating Manufacturers' MSA payments for 2015 forward.

In February 2016, Missouri agreed to join the settlement, bringing the total number of states that joined the settlement to 25. Missouri’s joinder in the settlement will become effective, and its challenge to the arbitration award will be dismissed, only if Missouri enacts certain legislation related to the MSA’s escrow statute by June 3, 2016.

As a result of the settlements and arbitration award described above, Liggett and Vector Tobacco reduced cost of sales in the aggregate by $22,356 for years 2013 - 2015. Liggett and Vector Tobacco maybe entitled to further adjustments for 2015 forward. The remaining NPM Adjustment accrual of approximately $20,000 at March 31, 2016 relates to the disputed amounts Liggett withheld from the non-settling states for 2004 - 2010, which may be subject to payment, with interest, if Liggett loses the disputes for those years. Following release of previously disputed amounts to the state of New York as part of the October 2015 settlement, it is anticipated there will be approximately $23,000 remaining in the disputed payments accounts relating to Liggett's 2011- 2014 NPM Adjustment disputes with the non-settling states.

Disputes over the NPM Adjustments for 2004-2014 remain to be arbitrated with the states that have not joined the settlement. The arbitration panel for the 2004 NPM Adjustment dispute has been selected and that proceeding has commenced.

“Gross” v. “Net” Calculations. In October 2004, the independent auditor notified all Participating Manufacturers that their payment obligations under the MSA, dating from the agreement’s execution in late 1998, had been recalculated using “net” units, rather than “gross” units (which had been used since 1999). Liggett objected to this retroactive change and disputed the change in methodology.

In December 2012, the parties arbitrated the dispute. In February 2013, the arbitrators ruled that the independent auditor was precluded from recalculating Liggett’s grandfathered market share (“GFMS”) exemption. The arbitrators further ruled that, for purposes of calculating Liggett’s payment obligations, Liggett’s market share, calculated on a net basis, should be increased by a factor of 1.25%. Liggett filed a motion seeking correction of the part of the arbitrators’ decision that would require the 1.25% increase in Liggett’s market share. The states opposed Liggett’s motion.

In October 2014, the panel issued a Corrected Final Award that eliminated the 1.25% adjustment increase. The panel further determined that the independent auditor shall compute Liggett’s market share for all years after 2000 on a “net” basis, but adjust that computation to approximate “gross” market share by using actual returned product data for each year. In July 2015, the independent auditor issued calculations, purportedly based on the Corrected Final Award, which indicated that Liggett owed approximately $16,000 for years 2001 - 2013. In March 2016, the independent auditor issued revised calculations indicating that Liggett owed approximately $6,600 for years 2001 - 2013. Based on these revised calculations Liggett is fully accrued for this matter although Liggett continues to dispute the independent auditor’s calculation.

Other State Settlements. The MSA replaced Liggett’s prior settlements with all states and territories except for Florida, Mississippi, Texas and Minnesota. Each of these four states, prior to the effective date of the MSA, negotiated and executed settlement agreements with each of the other major tobacco companies, separate from those settlements reached previously with Liggett. Except as described below, Liggett’s agreements with these states remain in full force and effect. These states’ settlement agreements with Liggett contained most favored nation provisions which could reduce Liggett’s payment obligations based on subsequent settlements or resolutions by those states with certain other tobacco companies. Beginning in 1999, Liggett determined that, based on settlements with United States Tobacco Company, Liggett’s payment obligations to those four states were eliminated. With respect to all non-economic obligations under the previous settlements, Liggett believes it is entitled to the most favorable provisions as between the MSA and each state’s respective settlement with the other major tobacco companies. Therefore, Liggett’s non-economic obligations to all states and territories are now defined by the MSA.

In 2003, as a result of a dispute with Minnesota regarding its settlement agreement, Liggett agreed to pay $100 a year in any year cigarettes manufactured by Liggett are sold in that state. The Attorneys General for Florida, Mississippi and Texas previously advised Liggett that they believed that Liggett had failed to make payments under the respective settlement agreements with those states. In 2010, Liggett settled with Florida and agreed to pay $1,200 and to make further annual payments of $250 for a period of 21 years, starting in March 2011, with the payments from year 12 forward being subject to an inflation adjustment. These payments are in lieu of any other payments allegedly due to Florida.

On January 12, 2016, the Attorney General for Mississippi commenced an action against Liggett in state court in Jackson County, Mississippi (Chancery Division) to enforce a settlement agreement between Liggett, Mississippi and several other states, alleging that Liggett is liable to Mississippi for at least $22,000 plus attorneys' fees and punitive damages. Liggett has not yet formally appeared or served responsive papers in the action, but denies the claims and intends to litigate the asserted claims. There can be no assurance that Liggett will be able to resolve the matters with Texas or Mississippi or that Liggett will not be required to make additional payments which could adversely affect the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows.

Cautionary Statement

Management is not able to reasonably predict the outcome of the litigation pending or threatened against Liggett or the Company. Litigation is subject to many uncertainties. Liggett has been found liable in multiple Engle progeny cases and Individual Actions, several of which were affirmed on appeal and satisfied by Liggett. It is possible that other cases could be decided unfavorably against Liggett and that Liggett will be unsuccessful on appeal. Liggett may attempt to settle particular cases if it believes it is in its best interest to do so.

Management cannot predict the cash requirements related to any future defense costs, settlements or judgments, including cash required to bond any appeals, and there is a risk that those requirements will not be able to be met. An unfavorable outcome of a pending smoking-related case could encourage the commencement of additional litigation. Except as discussed in this Note 7, management is unable to estimate the loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome of the cases pending against Liggett or the costs of defending such cases and as a result has not provided any amounts in its consolidated financial statements for unfavorable outcomes.

The tobacco industry is subject to a wide range of laws and regulations regarding the marketing, sale, taxation and use of tobacco products imposed by local, state and federal governments. There have been a number of restrictive regulatory actions, adverse legislative and political decisions and other unfavorable developments concerning cigarette smoking and the tobacco industry. These developments may negatively affect the perception of potential triers of fact with respect to the tobacco industry, possibly to the detriment of certain pending litigation, and may prompt the commencement of additional litigation or legislation.

It is possible that the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome in any of the smoking-related litigation.

The activity in the Company's accruals for the MSA and tobacco litigation for the three months ended March 31, 2016 were as follows:



	Current Liabilities									Non-Current Liabilities
	Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement			Litigation Accruals			Total			Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement		Litigation Accruals			Total

Balance at January 1, 2016	$	29,241		$	22,904		$	52,145		$	20,094	$	24,718		$	44,812
Expenses	14,835			2,504			17,339			—		—			—
NPM Settlement adjustment	—			—			—			—		—			—
Change in MSA obligations capitalized as inventory	(406		)	—			(406		)	—		—			—
Payments	—			(21,171		)	(21,171		)	—		—			—
Reclassification from non-current liabilities	—			3,252			3,252			—		(3,252		)	(3,252		)
Interest on withholding	35			197			232			—		568			568
Balance as of March 31, 2016	$	43,705		$	7,686		$	51,391		$	20,094	$	22,034		$	42,128

The activity in the Company's accruals for the MSA and tobacco litigation for the three months ended March 31, 2015 were as follows:



	Current Liabilities								Non-Current Liabilities
	Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement		Litigation Accruals			Total			Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement		Litigation Accruals			Total

Balance at January 1, 2015	$	26,322	$	3,149		$	29,471		$	25,809	$	25,700		$	51,509
Expenses	24,760		1,115			25,875			—		(195		)	(195		)
NPM Settlement adjustment	—		—			—			—		—			—
Change in MSA obligations capitalized as inventory	445		—			445			—		—			—
Payments	—		(4,295		)	(4,295		)	—		—			—
Reclassification from non-current liabilities	—		3,305			3,305			—		(3,305		)	(3,305		)
Interest on withholding	—		89			89			—		638			638
Balance as of March 31, 2015	$	51,527	$	3,363		$	54,890		$	25,809	$	22,838		$	48,647

Other Matters:

Liggett’s and Vector Tobacco’s management are unaware of any material environmental conditions affecting their existing facilities. Liggett’s and Vector Tobacco’s management believe that current operations are conducted in material compliance with all environmental laws and regulations and other laws and regulations governing cigarette manufacturers. Compliance with federal, state and local provisions regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment, has not had a material affect on the capital expenditures, results of operations or competitive position of Liggett or Vector Tobacco.

Liggett Vector Brands entered into an agreement with a subsidiary of the Convenience Distribution Association to support a program to permit certain tobacco distributors to secure, on reasonable terms, tax stamp bonds required by state and local governments for the distribution of cigarettes. Under the agreement, Liggett Vector Brands has agreed to pay a portion of losses incurred by the surety under the bond program, with a maximum loss exposure of $500. The Company believes the fair value of Liggett Vector Brands’ obligation under the agreement was immaterial at March 31, 2016.

Management is of the opinion that the liabilities, if any, resulting from other proceedings, lawsuits and claims pending against the Company and certain of its consolidated subsidiaries unrelated to tobacco product liability should not materially affect the Company’s condensed consolidated financial position, results of operations or cash flows.