CONTINGENCIES

Tobacco-Related Litigation:

Overview. Since 1954, Liggett and other United States cigarette manufacturers have been named as defendants in numerous direct, third-party and purported class actions predicated on the theory that cigarette manufacturers should be liable for damages alleged to have been caused by cigarette smoking or by exposure to secondary smoke from cigarettes. The cases have generally fallen into the following categories: (i) smoking and health cases alleging personal injury brought on behalf of individual plaintiffs (“Individual Actions”); (ii) lawsuits by individuals requesting the benefit of the Engle ruling (“Engle progeny cases”); (iii) smoking and health cases primarily alleging personal injury or seeking court-supervised programs for ongoing medical monitoring, as well as cases alleging that use of the terms “lights” and/or “ultra lights” constitutes a deceptive and unfair trade practice, common law fraud or violation of federal law, purporting to be brought on behalf of a class of individual plaintiffs (“Class Actions”); and (iv) health care cost recovery actions brought by various foreign and domestic governmental plaintiffs and non-governmental plaintiffs seeking reimbursement for health care expenditures allegedly caused by cigarette smoking and/or disgorgement of profits (“Health Care Cost Recovery Actions”). With the commencement of new cases, the defense costs and the risks relating to the unpredictability of litigation increase. The future financial impact of the risks and expenses of litigation are not quantifiable. For the three months ended March 31, 2015 and 2014, Liggett incurred tobacco product liability legal expenses and other litigation costs totaling $2,555 and $3,357, respectively.

Litigation is subject to uncertainty and it is possible that there could be adverse developments in pending cases. Management reviews on a quarterly basis with counsel all pending litigation and evaluates whether an estimate can be made of the possible loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome. An unfavorable outcome or settlement of pending tobacco-related litigation could encourage the commencement of additional litigation. Damages awarded in some tobacco-related litigation can be significant.

Bonds. Although Liggett has been able to obtain required bonds or relief from bonding requirements in order to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to collect judgments while adverse verdicts are on appeal, there remains a risk that such relief may not be obtainable in all cases. This risk has been reduced given that a majority of states now limit the dollar amount of bonds or require no bond at all. To obtain stays on judgments pending current appeals, Liggett has secured approximately $12,268 in bonds as of March 31, 2015.

In June 2009, Florida amended its existing bond cap statute by adding a $200,000 bond cap that applies to all Engle progeny cases in the aggregate and establishes individual bond caps for individual Engle progeny cases in amounts that vary depending on the number of judgments in effect at a given time. In several cases, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the bond cap statute, but to date the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the statute. It is possible that the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations, and cash flows could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome of such challenges.

Accounting Policy. The Company and its subsidiaries record provisions in their consolidated financial statements for pending litigation when they determine that an unfavorable outcome is probable and the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. At the present time, while it is reasonably possible that an unfavorable outcome in a case may occur, except as disclosed in this Note 7: (i) management has concluded that it is not probable that a loss has been incurred in any of the pending tobacco-related cases; or (ii) management is unable to reasonably estimate the possible loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome of any of the pending tobacco-related cases and, therefore, management has not provided any amounts in the consolidated financial statements for unfavorable outcomes, if any. Legal defense costs are expensed as incurred.

Cautionary Statement About Engle Progeny Cases. Judgments have been entered against Liggett and other industry defendants in Engle progeny cases. A number of the judgments have been affirmed on appeal and satisfied by the defendants. As of March 31, 2015, 21 Engle progeny cases where Liggett was a defendant at trial resulted in verdicts. Fourteen verdicts were returned in favor of the plaintiffs and seven in favor of Liggett. Excluding the Lukacs case, which was tried in 2002, seven years before the trials of Engle progeny cases commenced, the compensatory verdicts against Liggett have ranged from $1 to $3,600. In certain cases, the judgments entered have been joint and several with other defendants. In four of the cases, punitive damages were awarded against Liggett. Except as discussed in this Note 7 regarding the cases where an adverse verdict was entered against Liggett and that remain on appeal, management is unable to estimate the possible loss or range of loss from the remaining Engle progeny cases as there are currently multiple defendants in each case and, in most cases, discovery has not occurred or is limited. As a result, the Company lacks information about whether plaintiffs are in fact Engle class members (non-class members’ claims are generally time-barred), the relevant smoking history, the nature of the alleged injury and the availability of various defenses, among other things. Further, plaintiffs typically do not specify their demand for damages.

Although Liggett has generally been successful in managing litigation, litigation is subject to uncertainty and significant challenges remain, including with respect to the remaining Engle progeny cases. There can be no assurances that Liggett’s past litigation experience will be representative of future results. Judgments have been entered against Liggett in the past, in Individual Actions and Engle progeny cases, and several of those judgments were affirmed on appeal and satisfied by Liggett. It is possible that the consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows of the Company could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome or settlement of any of the remaining smoking-related litigation. Liggett believes, and has been so advised by counsel, that it has valid defenses to the litigation pending against it, as well as valid bases for appeal of adverse verdicts. All such cases are, and will continue to be, vigorously defended. Liggett may, however, enter into settlement discussions in particular cases if it believes it is in its best interest to do so, including the remaining Engle progeny cases. As of March 31, 2015, Liggett (and in certain cases the Company) had, on an individual basis, settled 161 Engle progeny cases for approximately $2,205 in the aggregate. Six of those settlements occurred in the first quarter of 2015. In October 2013, Liggett announced a settlement of the claims of over 4,900 Engle progeny plaintiffs (see Engle Progeny Settlement below).

Individual Actions

As of March 31, 2015, there were 48 Individual Actions pending against Liggett and, in certain cases, the Company, where one or more individual plaintiffs allege injury resulting from cigarette smoking, addiction to cigarette smoking or exposure to secondary smoke and seek compensatory and, in some cases, punitive damages. These cases do not include Engle progeny cases or the approximately 100 individual cases pending in West Virginia state court as part of a consolidated action. The following table lists the number of Individual Actions by state:



State		Number of Cases
Florida		27
New York		8
Maryland		7
Louisiana		2
West Virginia		2
Missouri		1
Ohio		1

The plaintiffs’ allegations of liability in cases in which individuals seek recovery for injuries allegedly caused by cigarette smoking are based on various theories of recovery, including negligence, gross negligence, breach of special duty, strict liability, fraud, concealment, misrepresentation, design defect, failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranties, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, concert of action, unjust enrichment, common law public nuisance, property damage, invasion of privacy, mental anguish, emotional distress, disability, shock, indemnity, violations of deceptive trade practice laws, the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), state RICO statutes and antitrust statutes. In many of these cases, in addition to compensatory damages, plaintiffs also seek other forms of relief including treble/multiple damages, medical monitoring, disgorgement of profits and punitive damages. Although alleged damages often are not determinable from a complaint, and the law governing the pleading and calculation of damages varies from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction, compensatory and punitive damages have been specifically pleaded in a number of cases, sometimes in amounts ranging into the hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars.

Defenses raised in Individual Actions include lack of proximate cause, assumption of the risk, comparative fault and/or contributory negligence, lack of design defect, statute of limitations, equitable defenses such as “unclean hands” and lack of benefit, failure to state a claim and federal preemption.

Engle Progeny Cases

Engle Case. In May 1994, Engle was filed against Liggett and others in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The class consisted of all Florida residents who, by November 21, 1996, “have suffered, presently suffer or have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarette smoking.” In July 1999, after the conclusion of Phase I of the trial, the jury returned a verdict against Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers on certain issues determined by the trial court to be “common” to the causes of action of the plaintiff class. The jury made several findings adverse to the defendants including that defendants’ conduct “rose to a level that would permit a potential award or entitlement to punitive damages.” Phase II of the trial was a causation and damages trial for three of the class plaintiffs and a punitive damages trial on a class-wide basis before the same jury that returned the verdict in Phase I. In April 2000, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $12,704 to the three class plaintiffs, to be reduced in proportion to the respective plaintiff’s fault. In July 2000, the jury awarded approximately $145,000,000 in punitive damages, including $790,000 against Liggett.

In May 2003, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and remanded the case with instructions to decertify the class. The judgment in favor of one of the three class plaintiffs, in the amount of $5,831, was overturned as time barred and the court found that Liggett was not liable to the other two class plaintiffs.

In July 2006, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision vacating the punitive damages award and held that the class should be decertified prospectively, but determined that the following Phase I findings are entitled to res judicata effect in Engle progeny cases: (i) that smoking causes lung cancer, among other diseases; (ii) that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive; (iii) that defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous; (iv) that defendants concealed material information knowing that the information was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking; (v) that defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers would rely on the information to their detriment; (vi) that defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective; and (vii) that defendants were negligent. The Florida Supreme Court decision also allowed former class members to proceed to trial on individual liability issues (using the above findings) and compensatory and punitive damage issues, provided they filed their individual lawsuits by January 2008. In December 2006, the Florida Supreme Court added the finding that defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to the representations made by defendants. In October 2007, the United States Supreme Court denied defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari.

Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court’s July 2006 ruling in Engle, which decertified the class on a prospective basis, and affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the punitive damages award, former class members had until January 2008 in which to file individual lawsuits. As a result, Liggett and the Company, and other cigarette manufacturers, were named defendants in thousands of Engle progeny cases in both federal and state courts in Florida. Although the Company was not named as a defendant in the Engle case, it was named as a defendant in substantially all of the Engle progeny cases where Liggett was named as a defendant.

Engle Progeny Settlement. In October 2013, the Company entered into a settlement with approximately 4,900 Engle progeny plaintiffs and their counsel. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement, Liggett agreed to pay a total of approximately $110,000, with approximately $61,600 paid in a lump sum and the balance to be paid in installments over 14 years, starting in February 2015. In exchange, the claims of over 4,900 plaintiffs were dismissed with prejudice against the Company and Liggett. Due to the settlement, in 2013 the Company recorded a charge of $86,213, of which $25,213 is related to certain payments discounted to their present value. The present value of the installment payments was computed using an 11% annual discount rate. The Company recorded an additional charge of $643 in the first quarter of 2015 for additional cases joining the settlement and the restructuring of certain payments related to several previously settled cases. The installment payments total approximately $48,000 on an undiscounted basis. The Company’s future payments will be approximately $3,426 per annum through 2028, with a cost of living increase beginning in 2021.

Notwithstanding the comprehensive nature of the Engle Progeny Settlement, approximately 310 plaintiffs’ claims remain outstanding. Therefore, the Company and Liggett may still be subject to periodic adverse judgments which could have a material adverse affect on the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows.

As of March 31, 2015, the following Engle progeny cases have resulted in judgments against Liggett:



Date	Case Name	County	Liggett Compensatory Damages (as adjusted)⁽¹⁾	Liggett Punitive Damages	Status ⁽²⁾
June 2002	Lukacs v. R.J. Reynolds	Miami-Dade	$12,418	$—	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
August 2009	Campbell v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	156	—	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
March 2010	Douglas v. R.J. Reynolds	Hillsborough	1,350	—	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
April 2010	Clay v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	349	1,000	Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded.
April 2010	Putney v. R.J. Reynolds	Broward	3,008	—	On June 12, 2013, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing which was denied. Both sides sought discretionary review from the Florida Supreme Court. The appeal is stayed pending the outcome of Hess.
April 2011	Tullo v. R.J. Reynolds	Palm Beach	225	—	Affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Discretionary review from the Florida Supreme Court was denied. Liggett satisfied the judgment and the case is concluded, other than an issue with respect to the calculation of interest on the judgment and the amount of costs owed by Liggett.
January 2012	Ward v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	1	—	Liggett satisfied the merits judgment and other than an issue regarding attorneys' fees, the case is concluded.
May 2012	Calloway v. R.J. Reynolds	Broward	1,947	7,600	A joint and several judgment for $16,100 was entered against R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris, Lorillard and Liggett. On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Oral argument is set for July 16, 2015.
December 2012	Buchanan v. R.J. Reynolds	Leon	2,035	—	A joint and several judgment for $5,500 was entered against Liggett and Philip Morris. Judgment was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal, but the court certified an issue of conflict with another case. The defendants sought discretionary review by the Florida Supreme Court. The appeal is stayed pending the outcome of Hess.
May 2013	Cohen v. R.J. Reynolds	Palm Beach	205	—	Defendants' motion seeking a new trial was granted by the trial court. Plaintiff appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
August 2013	Rizzuto v. R.J. Reynolds	Hernando	3,479	—	Liggett settled its portion of the judgment for $1,500 and the case is concluded as to Liggett.
August 2014	Irimi v. R.J. Reynolds	Broward	—	—	Judgment was entered against Liggett for $31. In January 2015, the trial court granted defendants' motion for a new trial. Plaintiff appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
October 2014	Lambert v. R.J. Reynolds	Pinellas	3,600	9,500	A final judgment was entered against Liggett for $13,100. Liggett was the only defendant at trial. On appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal.
November 2014	Boatright v. R.J. Reynolds	Polk	—	300	In November 2014, the jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $15,000 with 15% fault apportioned to plaintiff and 85% to Philip Morris. The jury further assessed punitive damages against Philip Morris for $19,700 and Liggett for $300. Post-trial motions were denied. A joint and several judgment was entered in the amount of $12,750 on the compensatory damages. An additional $300 in punitive damages was awarded against Liggett. On appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal.
Total Damages Awarded:			28,773	18,400
Amounts paid or compromised:			(17,978)	(1,000)
Damages remaining on Appeal:			$10,795	$17,400
(1) Compensatory damages are adjusted to reflect the jury's allocation of comparative fault. The amounts listed above do not include attorneys' fees or statutory interest.
(2) See Exhibit 99.1 for a more complete description of the cases currently on appeal.

Through March 31, 2015, Liggett paid $20,312, including interest and legal fees, to satisfy the judgments in seven Engle progeny cases (Lukacs, Campbell, Douglas, Clay, Tullo, Ward and Rizzuto).

The Company’s potential range of loss in the Putney, Calloway, Buchanan, Cohen, Lambert and Boatright cases is between $0 and $28,195 in the aggregate, plus interest and legal fees. In determining the range of loss, the Company considers potential settlements as well as future appellate relief. Except as disclosed elsewhere in this Note 7 , the Company is unable to determine a range of loss related to the remaining Engle progeny cases. No amounts have been expensed or accrued in the accompanying consolidated financial statements for the cases described above. However, as cases proceed through the appellate process, the Company will consider accruals on a case-by-case basis if an unfavorable outcome becomes probable and the amount can be reasonably estimated.

Appeals of Engle Progeny Judgments. In December 2010, in the Martin case, a state court case against R.J. Reynolds, the First District Court of Appeal held that the trial court correctly construed the Florida Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Engle in instructing the jury on the preclusive effect of the Phase I Engle findings. In July 2011, the Florida Supreme Court declined to review the First District Court of Appeal’s decision. In March 2012, the United States Supreme Court declined to review the Martin case, along with the Campbell case and two other Engle progeny cases. The Martin decision has led to additional adverse rulings by other state appellate courts.

In Jimmie Lee Brown, a state court case against R.J. Reynolds, the trial court tried the case in two phases. In the first phase, the jury determined that the smoker was addicted to cigarettes that contained nicotine and that his addiction was a legal cause of his death, thereby establishing he was an Engle class member. In the second phase, the jury determined whether the plaintiff established legal cause and damages with regard to each of the underlying claims. The jury found in favor of plaintiff in both phases. In September 2011, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment entered in plaintiff’s favor and approved the trial court’s procedure of bifurcating the trial. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with Martin that individual post-Engle plaintiffs need not prove conduct elements as part of their burden of proof, but disagreed with Martin to the extent that the First District Court of Appeal only required a finding that the smoker was a class member to establish legal causation as to addiction and the underlying claims. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that in addition to establishing class membership, Engle progeny plaintiffs must also establish legal causation and damages as to each claim asserted. In so finding, the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Jimmie Lee Brown is in conflict with Martin.

In the Rey case, a state court case, the trial court entered final summary judgment on all claims in favor of the Company, Liggett and Lorillard based on what has been referred to in the Engle progeny litigation as the “Liggett Rule.” The Liggett Rule stands for the proposition that a manufacturer cannot have liability to a smoker under any asserted claim if the smoker did not use a product manufactured by that particular defendant. The Liggett Rule is based on the entry of final judgment in favor of Liggett/Brooke Group in Engle on all of the claims asserted against them by class representatives Mary Farnan and Angie Della Vecchia, even though the Florida Supreme Court upheld, as res judicata, the generic finding that Liggett/Brooke Group engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud by concealment. In September 2011, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part holding that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted against them other than the claim for civil conspiracy. Defendants’ further appellate efforts were unsuccessful.

In March 2012, in Douglas, the Second District Court of Appeal issued a decision affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff and upholding the use of the Engle jury findings but certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether granting res judicata effect to the Engle jury findings violates defendants’ federal due process rights. In March 2013, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the use of Engle jury findings and determined that there is no violation of the defendants’ due process rights. This was the first time the Florida Supreme Court addressed the merits of an Engle progeny case. In October 2013, the United States Supreme Court declined to review the decision and Liggett satisfied the judgment. To date, the United States Supreme Court has declined to review any Engle progeny decisions.

In Hess, a case pending in Broward County, the jury returned a verdict finding that decedent relied to his detriment on an omission by the defendant before May 5, 1982 (twelve years prior to the filing of the Engle Complaint). Defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s fraudulent concealment claim on the basis that the claim was barred by Florida’s statute of repose. The trial court denied the motion and was reversed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which held that any Engle progeny claim for a fraud committed before May 5, 1982 is barred. In April 2015, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision and reinstated the jury verdict. The Florida Supreme Court held that Engle defendants cannot raise a statute of repose defense to claims for concealment or conspiracy. Defendants intend to move for rehearing.

On April 8, 2015, in Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the Eleventh Circuit found meritorious a defense that, in Engle progeny cases, federal law impliedly preempts use of the preserved Engle findings to establish claims for strict liability or negligence.

Liggett Only Cases. There are currently four cases pending where Liggett is the only remaining defendant. These cases consist of three Individual Actions and one Engle progeny case. The Engle progeny case is not currently set for trial. In one of the Individual Actions, Hausrath (NY state court), plaintiff moved to restore the case to the active docket calendar after it was removed by the court. The motion was granted, affirmed on appeal and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. There has been no recent activity in the other two Individual Actions. Cases where Liggett is the only defendant could increase as a result of the remaining Engle progeny cases.

Class Actions

As of March 31, 2015, there were four actions pending for which either a class had been certified or plaintiffs were seeking class certification where Liggett is a named defendant, including one alleged price fixing case. Other cigarette manufacturers are also named in these actions.

Plaintiffs’ allegations of liability in class action cases are based on various theories of recovery, including negligence, gross negligence, strict liability, fraud, misrepresentation, design defect, failure to warn, nuisance, breach of express and implied warranties, breach of special duty, conspiracy, concert of action, violation of deceptive trade practice laws and consumer protection statutes and claims under the federal and state anti-racketeering statutes. Plaintiffs in the class actions seek various forms of relief, including compensatory and punitive damages, treble/multiple damages and other statutory damages and penalties, creation of medical monitoring and smoking cessation funds, disgorgement of profits, and injunctive and equitable relief.

Defenses raised in these cases include, among others, lack of proximate cause, individual issues predominate, assumption of the risk, comparative fault and/or contributory negligence, statute of limitations and federal preemption.

In November 1997, in Young v. American Tobacco Co., a purported personal injury class action was commenced on behalf of plaintiff and all similarly situated residents in Louisiana who, though not themselves cigarette smokers, allege they were exposed to secondhand smoke from cigarettes that were manufactured by the defendants, including Liggett, and suffered injury as a result of that exposure. The plaintiffs seek to recover an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages. No class certification hearing has been held. In 2013, plaintiffs’ filed a motion to stay the case. The defendants did not oppose and the stay was entered by the court.

In February 1998, in Parsons v. AC & S Inc., a class was commenced on behalf of all West Virginia residents who allegedly have personal injury claims arising from exposure to cigarette smoke and asbestos fibers. The complaint seeks to recover $1,000 in compensatory and punitive damages individually and unspecified compensatory and punitive damages for the class. The case is stayed due to the December 2000 bankruptcy of three of the defendants.

In February 2000, in Smith v. Philip Morris, a case pending in Kansas, a class was commenced against cigarette manufacturers alleging they conspired to fix cigarette prices in violation of antitrust laws. Plaintiffs seek to recover an unspecified amount in actual and punitive damages. Class certification was granted in November 2001. In January 2012, the trial court heard oral argument on defendants’ motions for summary judgment and in March 2012, the court granted the motions and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. In July 2014, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. On August 18, 2014, plaintiffs filed a petition for review with the Kansas Supreme Court.

Although not technically a class action, in In Re: Tobacco Litigation (Personal Injury Cases), a West Virginia state court consolidated approximately 750 individual smoker actions that were pending prior to 2001 for trial of certain common issues. In January 2002, the court severed Liggett from the trial of the consolidated action. After two mistrials, on May 15, 2013, the jury rejected all but one of the plaintiffs’ claims, finding for the plaintiffs on the claim that ventilated filter cigarettes sold between 1964 and 1969 should have included instructions on how to use them. The issue of damages was reserved for further proceedings that have not yet been scheduled. The court entered judgment in October 2013, dismissing all claims except the ventilated filter claim. The judgment was affirmed on appeal and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. A hearing is scheduled for June 8, 2015 to address the remaining disputed issues. If the case were to proceed against Liggett as is, it is estimated that Liggett could be a defendant in less than 25 of the remaining individual cases. In April 2015, the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.

Class action suits have been filed in a number of states against cigarette manufacturers, alleging, among other things, that use of the terms “lights” and “ultra lights” constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices. In December 2008, the United States Supreme Court, in Altria Group v. Good, ruled that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did not preempt the state law claims asserted by the plaintiffs and that they could proceed with their claims under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Good decision resulted in the filing of additional “lights” class action cases in other states against other cigarette manufacturers. Although Liggett was not a defendant in the Good case, and is not currently a defendant in any other “lights” class actions, an adverse ruling or commencement of additional “lights” related class actions could have a material adverse effect on the Company.

In addition to the cases described above, numerous class actions remain certified against other cigarette manufacturers. Adverse decisions in these cases could have a material adverse affect on Liggett’s sales volume, operating income and cash flows.

Health Care Cost Recovery Actions

As of March 31, 2015, there was one remaining Health Care Cost Recovery Action pending against Liggett, Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. American Tobacco Company, a South Dakota case filed in 1997, where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on various theories of recovery as a result of alleged sales of tobacco products to minors. The case is inactive. Other cigarette manufacturers are also named as defendants.

The claims asserted in health care cost recovery actions vary, but can include the equitable claim of indemnity, common law claims of negligence, strict liability, breach of express and implied warranty, breach of special duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, public nuisance, claims under state and federal statutes governing consumer fraud, antitrust, deceptive trade practices and false advertising, and claims under RICO. Although no specific damage amounts are typically pleaded, it is possible that requested damages might be in the billions of dollars. In these cases, plaintiffs typically assert equitable claims that the tobacco industry was “unjustly enriched” by their payment of health care costs allegedly attributable to smoking and seek reimbursement of those costs. Relief sought by some, but not all, plaintiffs include punitive damages, multiple damages and other statutory damages and penalties, injunctions prohibiting alleged marketing and sales to minors, disclosure of research, disgorgement of profits, funding of anti-smoking programs, additional disclosure of nicotine yields, and payment of attorney and expert witness fees.

Department of Justice Lawsuit.

In September 1999, the United States government commenced litigation against Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The action sought to recover an unspecified amount of health care costs paid and to be paid by the federal government for lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema and other smoking-related illnesses allegedly caused by the fraudulent and tortious conduct of defendants, to restrain defendants and co-conspirators from engaging in alleged fraud and other allegedly unlawful conduct in the future, and to compel defendants to disgorge the proceeds of their unlawful conduct. Claims were asserted under RICO.

In August 2006, the trial court entered a Final Judgment against each of the cigarette manufacturing defendants, except Liggett. In May 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed most of the district court’s decision. The United States Supreme Court denied review. As a result, the cigarette manufacturing defendants, other than Liggett, are now subject to the trial court’s Final Judgment which ordered the following relief: (i) an injunction against “committing any act of racketeering” relating to the manufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences or sale of cigarettes in the United States; (ii) an injunction against participating directly or indirectly in the management or control of the Council for Tobacco Research, the Tobacco Institute, or the Center for Indoor Air Research, or any successor or affiliated entities of each; (iii) an injunction against “making, or causing to be made in any way, any material false, misleading, or deceptive statement or representation or engaging in any public relations or marketing endeavor that is disseminated to the United States’ public and that misrepresents or suppresses information concerning cigarettes”; (iv) an injunction against conveying any express or implied health message through use of descriptors on cigarette packaging or in cigarette advertising or promotional material, including “lights,” “ultra lights,” and “low tar,” which the court found could cause consumers to believe one cigarette brand is less hazardous than another brand; (v) the issuance of “corrective statements” in various media regarding the adverse health effects of smoking, the addictiveness of smoking and nicotine, the lack of any significant health benefit from smoking “low tar” or “lights” cigarettes, defendants’ manipulation of cigarette design to ensure optimum nicotine delivery and the adverse health effects of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke; (vi) the disclosure of defendants’ public document websites and the production of all documents produced to the government or produced in any future court or administrative action concerning smoking and health; (vii) the disclosure of disaggregated marketing data to the government in the same form and on the same schedules as defendants now follow in disclosing such data to the Federal Trade Commission for a period of ten years; (viii) certain restrictions on the sale or transfer by defendants of any cigarette brands, brand names, formulas or cigarette business within the United States; and (ix) payment of the government’s costs in bringing the action. In June 2014, the court approved a consent agreement between the defendants and the Department of Justice regarding the “corrective statements” to be issued by the defendants. The implementation of the “corrective statements” is uncertain as the defendants are appealing the specific language of the statements.

It is unclear what impact, if any, the Final Judgment will have on the cigarette industry as a whole. To the extent that the Final Judgment leads to a decline in industry-wide shipments of cigarettes in the United States or otherwise results in restrictions that adversely affect the industry, Liggett’s sales volume, operating income and cash flows could be materially adversely affected.

Upcoming Trials

As of March 31, 2015, there were 12 Engle progeny cases scheduled for trial through March 31, 2016, where Liggett (and/or the Company) is a named defendant. Trial dates are, however, subject to change.

MSA and Other State Settlement Agreements

In March 1996, March 1997 and March 1998, Liggett entered into settlements of smoking-related litigation with 45 states and territories. The settlements released Liggett from all smoking-related claims made by those states and territories, including claims for health care cost reimbursement and claims concerning sales of cigarettes to minors.

In November 1998, Philip Morris, Brown & Williamson, R.J. Reynolds and Lorillard (the “Original Participating Manufacturers” or “OPMs”) and Liggett (together with any other tobacco product manufacturer that becomes a signatory, the “Subsequent Participating Manufacturers” or “SPMs”) (the OPMs and SPMs are hereinafter referred to jointly as the “Participating Manufacturers”) entered into the Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”) with 46 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, American Samoa and the Northern Mariana Islands (collectively, the “Settling States”) to settle the asserted and unasserted health care cost recovery and certain other claims of the Settling States. The MSA received final judicial approval in each Settling State.

As a result of the MSA, the Settling States released Liggett from:


•	all claims of the Settling States and their respective political subdivisions and other recipients of state health care funds, relating to: (i) past conduct arising out of the use, sale, distribution, manufacture, development, advertising and marketing of tobacco products; (ii) the health effects of, the exposure to, or research, statements or warnings about, tobacco products; and


•	all monetary claims of the Settling States and their respective subdivisions and other recipients of state health care funds relating to future conduct arising out of the use of, or exposure to, tobacco products that have been manufactured in the ordinary course of business.

The MSA restricts tobacco product advertising and marketing within the Settling States and otherwise restricts the activities of Participating Manufacturers. Among other things, the MSA prohibits the targeting of youth in the advertising, promotion or marketing of tobacco products; bans the use of cartoon characters in all tobacco advertising and promotion; limits each Participating Manufacturer to one tobacco brand name sponsorship during any 12-month period; bans all outdoor advertising, with certain limited exceptions; prohibits payments for tobacco product placement in various media; bans gift offers based on the purchase of tobacco products without sufficient proof that the intended recipient is an adult; prohibits Participating Manufacturers from licensing third parties to advertise tobacco brand names in any manner prohibited under the MSA; and prohibits Participating Manufacturers from using as a tobacco product brand name any nationally recognized non-tobacco brand or trade name or the names of sports teams, entertainment groups or individual celebrities.

The MSA also requires Participating Manufacturers to affirm corporate principles to comply with the MSA and to reduce underage use of tobacco products and imposes restrictions on lobbying activities conducted on behalf of Participating Manufacturers. In addition, the MSA provides for the appointment of an independent auditor to calculate and determine the amounts of payments owed pursuant to the MSA.

Under the payment provisions of the MSA, the Participating Manufacturers are required to make annual payments of $9,000,000 (subject to applicable adjustments, offsets and reductions). These annual payments are allocated based on unit volume of domestic cigarette shipments. The payment obligations under the MSA are the several, and not joint, obligation of each Participating Manufacturer and are not the responsibility of any parent or affiliate of a Participating Manufacturer.

Liggett has no payment obligations under the MSA except to the extent its market share exceeds a market share exemption of approximately 1.65% of total cigarettes sold in the United States. Vector Tobacco has no payment obligations under the MSA except to the extent its market share exceeds a market share exemption of approximately 0.28% of total cigarettes sold in the United States. Liggett and Vector Tobacco’s domestic shipments accounted for 3.4% of the total cigarettes sold in the United States in 2014. If Liggett’s or Vector Tobacco’s market share exceeds their respective market share exemption in a given year, then on April 15 of the following year, Liggett and/or Vector Tobacco, as the case may be, must pay on each excess unit an amount equal (on a per-unit basis) to that due from the OPMs for that year. On December 31, 2014, Liggett and Vector Tobacco pre-paid $100,000 of their approximate $117,800 2014 MSA obligation. Liggett and Vector Tobacco paid the remaining $17,800 on April 15, 2015.

Certain MSA Disputes

NPM Adjustment. In March 2006, an economic consulting firm selected pursuant to the MSA determined that the MSA was a “significant factor contributing to” the loss of market share of Participating Manufacturers, to non-participating manufacturers, for 2003. This is known as the “NPM Adjustment.” The economic consulting firm subsequently rendered the same decision with respect to 2004 and 2005. In March 2009, a different economic consulting firm made the same determination for 2006. As a result, the manufacturers are entitled to potential NPM Adjustments to each of their 2003 - 2006 MSA payments. The Participating Manufacturers are also entitled to potential NPM Adjustments to their 2007 - 2013 payments pursuant to agreements entered into between the OPMs and the Settling States under which the OPMs agreed to make certain payments for the benefit of the Settling States, in exchange for which the Settling States stipulated that the MSA was a “significant factor contributing to” the loss of market share of Participating Manufacturers for each of those years. A Settling State that has diligently enforced its qualifying escrow statute in the year in question may be able to avoid allocation of the NPM Adjustment to the payments made by the manufacturers for the benefit of that Settling State.

For 2003 - 2013, Liggett and Vector Tobacco, as applicable, disputed that they owed the Settling States the NPM Adjustments as calculated by the independent auditor. As permitted by the MSA, Liggett (and Vector Tobacco) paid subject to dispute, withheld payment or paid into a disputed payment account the amounts associated with these NPM Adjustments.

Notwithstanding provisions in the MSA requiring arbitration, litigation was filed in 49 Settling States involving the application of the NPM Adjustment for 2003 and whether it was to be determined through litigation or arbitration. These actions related to the potential NPM Adjustment for 2003, which the independent auditor under the MSA previously determined to be as much as $1,200,000 for all Participating Manufacturers. All but one of the 48 courts that decided the issue ruled that the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute was arbitrable.

In response to a proposal from the OPMs and many of the SPMs, 45 of the Settling States, representing approximately 90% of the allocable share of the Settling States, entered into an agreement providing for a nationwide arbitration of the dispute with respect to the NPM Adjustment for 2003. In exchange, the OPMs and SPMs agreed to a 20% reduction in amounts recovered for the NPM Adjustment for 2003. In June 2010, the three person arbitration panel was selected. In November 2011, the Participating Manufacturers advised the arbitration panel that they were not contesting diligent enforcement of 16 Settling States for 2003. Substantive hearings commenced in April 2012 and were completed in June 2013.

In December 2012, the Participating Manufacturers entered into a “term sheet” with 20 Settling States setting out terms for settlement of the NPM Adjustment for 2003 - 2012 and addressing the NPM Adjustment with respect to those states for future years. Certain of the non-settling states objected to the settlement. In March 2013, the arbitration panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award which, among other things, overruled the objections of the non-settling states and directed the independent auditor to implement certain terms of the term sheet effective with the 2013 MSA payments. In May 2013, two additional states joined the settlement and in June 2014, another two states joined the settlement. Several non-settling states are attempting to vacate the settlement award by filing state court actions. In Idaho, a trial court denied that state’s motion to vacate, and the state appealed that denial. In Colorado, a trial court also denied that state’s motion to vacate; Colorado did not appeal. Although certain terms of the settlement were implemented by the independent auditor on April 15, 2013, no assurance can be given as to the ultimate outcome of the non-settling states’ challenges. The parties have been working towards converting the “term sheet” into a final settlement agreement.

As a result of the settlement, in the first nine months of 2013, Liggett recognized income of $6,947. Liggett received credits of $1,733 in April 2014 from these settling states related to the 2013 NPM Adjustment. The remaining NPM Adjustment accrual of $25,809 at March 31, 2015 relates to the disputed amounts Liggett withheld from the non-settling states for 2004 - 2010, which may be subject to payment, with interest, if Liggett loses the disputes for those years. Approximately $30,100 currently remains in the disputed payments accounts relating to the 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 NPM Adjustment dispute with the non-settling states.

In September 2013, the panel issued its decisions with respect to the 15 states that did not enter into the Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award, finding that six states did not diligently enforce their MSA escrow statutes in 2003. As a result of this ruling Liggett recognized income of $5,987 including interest, in the third quarter of 2013. All six of the states that were found to be non-diligent filed motions in state court seeking to vacate or reduce the amount of the arbitration award. In Pennsylvania, the trial court rejected the state’s motion to vacate the award, but granted its motion to reduce the award. As a result, in April 2014, Liggett received a credit in the amount of $6,441 for the 2003 NPM Adjustment (as calculated by the independent auditor). Liggett subsequently reimbursed the six states 20% of that credit pursuant to the agreement discussed above, bringing its net recovery to $5,152, which is approximately $1,315 lower than the amount to which Liggett believes it is entitled. Subsequent to the April 15, 2014 MSA payment date, a state court in Missouri issued a ruling similar to the ruling in Pennsylvania. As such, Liggett’s 2003 NPM Adjustment credit could be reduced by an additional $521. In June 2014, Kentucky and Indiana agreed to settle the dispute. As a result, Liggett recognized income of approximately $1,400 in the second quarter of 2014. The Participating Manufacturers, including Liggett, appealed the Pennsylvania and Missouri decisions. In April 2015, the Pennsylvania decision was affirmed by the appellate court. The Participating Manufacturers are reviewing their options for further appeal. If Liggett is unsuccessful in its appeals or if other states are successful with respect to any such motions, the amount of the 2003 NPM Adjustment and any interest or earnings to which Liggett is entitled could be lower than the amounts described above and Liggett would be obligated to pay the difference.

Disputes over the NPM Adjustments for 2004-2014 remain to be arbitrated with the states that have not joined the settlement.

“Gross” v. “Net” Calculations. In October 2004, the independent auditor notified all Participating Manufacturers that their payment obligations under the MSA, dating from the agreement’s execution in late 1998, had been re-calculated using “net” units, rather than “gross” units (which had been used since 1999). Liggett objected to this retroactive change and disputed the change in methodology.

In December 2012, the parties arbitrated the dispute. In February 2013, the arbitrators ruled that the independent auditor was precluded from recalculating Liggett’s grandfathered market share (“GFMS”) exemption. The arbitrators further ruled that, for purposes of calculating Liggett’s payment obligations, Liggett’s market share, calculated on a net basis, should be increased by a factor of 1.25%. Liggett filed a motion seeking correction of the part of the arbitrators’ decision that would require the 1.25% increase in Liggett’s market share. The states objected to Liggett’s motion.

In October 2014, the panel issued a Corrected Final Award that eliminated the 1.25% adjustment increase. The panel further determined that the independent auditor shall compute Liggett’s market share for all years after 2000 on a “net” basis, but, adjust that computation to approximate “gross” market share by using actual returned product data for each year. Liggett contends that the independent auditor's calculations regarding the implementation of the Corrected Final Award, including amounts purportedly owed by Liggett for years 2001 - 2013 are not consistent with the Corrected Final Award and Liggett has disputed them. Liggett accrued $8,500 for this matter included in non-current litigation accruals as of March 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014.

Other State Settlements. The MSA replaced Liggett’s prior settlements with all states and territories except for Florida, Mississippi, Texas and Minnesota. Each of these four states, prior to the effective date of the MSA, negotiated and executed settlement agreements with each of the other major tobacco companies, separate from those settlements reached previously with Liggett. Except as described below, Liggett’s agreements with these states remain in full force and effect. These states’ settlement agreements with Liggett contained most favored nation provisions which could reduce Liggett’s payment obligations based on subsequent settlements or resolutions by those states with certain other tobacco companies. Beginning in 1999, Liggett determined that, based on each of these four states’ settlements with United States Tobacco Company, Liggett’s payment obligations to those states were eliminated. With respect to all non-economic obligations under the previous settlements, Liggett believes it is entitled to the most favorable provisions as between the MSA and each state’s respective settlement with the other major tobacco companies. Therefore, Liggett’s non-economic obligations to all states and territories are now defined by the MSA.

In 2003, as a result of a dispute with Minnesota regarding its settlement agreement, Liggett agreed to pay $100 a year in any year cigarettes manufactured by Liggett are sold in that state. The Attorneys General for Florida, Mississippi and Texas previously advised Liggett that they believed that Liggett had failed to make payments under the respective settlement agreements with those states. In 2010, Liggett settled with Florida and agreed to pay $1,200 and to make further annual payments of $250 for a period of 21 years, starting in March 2011, with the payments from year 12 forward being subject to an inflation adjustment. These payments are in lieu of any other payments allegedly due to Florida. In 2012, Mississippi provided Liggett with a 60-day notice that the state intended to pursue its remedies if Liggett did not cure the alleged defaults. Liggett responded to Mississippi’s letter denying the existence of any defaults. There can be no assurance that Liggett will be able to resolve the matters with Texas and Mississippi or that Liggett will not be required to make additional payments which could adversely affect the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows.

Cautionary Statement. Management is not able to reasonably predict the outcome of the litigation pending or threatened against Liggett or the Company. Litigation is subject to many uncertainties. Liggett has been found liable in multiple Engle progeny cases and in Individual Actions, several of which were affirmed on appeal and satisfied by Liggett. It is possible that other cases could be decided unfavorably against Liggett and that Liggett will be unsuccessful on appeal. Liggett may attempt to settle particular cases if it believes it is in its best interest to do so.

Management cannot predict the cash requirements related to any future defense costs, settlements or judgments, including cash required to bond any appeals, and there is a risk that those requirements will not be able to be met. An unfavorable outcome of a pending smoking-related case could encourage the commencement of additional litigation. Except as discussed in this Note 7, management is unable to estimate the loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome of the cases pending against Liggett or the costs of defending such cases and as a result has not provided any amounts in its consolidated financial statements for unfavorable outcomes.

The tobacco industry is subject to a wide range of laws and regulations regarding the marketing, sale, taxation and use of tobacco products imposed by local, state and federal governments. There have been a number of restrictive regulatory actions, adverse legislative and political decisions and other unfavorable developments concerning cigarette smoking and the tobacco industry. These developments may negatively affect the perception of potential triers of fact with respect to the tobacco industry, possibly to the detriment of certain pending litigation, and may prompt the commencement of additional litigation or legislation.

It is possible that the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations and cash flows could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome in any of the smoking-related litigation.

The activity in the Company's accruals for the MSA and tobacco litigation for the three months ended March 31, 2015 were as follows:



	Current Liabilities								Non-Current Liabilities
	Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement		Litigation Accruals			Total			Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement		Litigation Accruals			Total

Balance at January 1, 2015	$	26,322	$	3,149		$	29,471		$	25,809	$	25,700		$	51,509
Expenses	24,760		1,115			25,875			—		(195		)	(195		)
NPM Settlement adjustment	—		—			—			—		—			—
Change in MSA obligations capitalized as inventory	445		—			445			—		—			—
Payments	—		(4,295		)	(4,295		)	—		—			—
Reclassification from non-current liabilities	—		3,305			3,305			—		(3,305		)	(3,305		)
Interest on withholding	—		89			89			—		638			638
Balance as of March 31, 2015	$	51,527	$	3,363		$	54,890		$	25,809	$	22,838		$	48,647

The activity in the Company's accruals for the MSA and tobacco litigation for the three months ended March 31, 2014 were as follows:



	Current Liabilities								Non-Current Liabilities
	Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement		Litigation Accruals			Total			Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement		Litigation Accruals			Total

Balance at January 1, 2014	$	25,348	$	59,310		$	84,658		$	27,571	$	27,058		$	54,629
Expenses	24,542		1,688			26,230			—		—			—
NPM Settlement adjustment	—		—			—			—		—			—
Change in MSA obligations capitalized as inventory	29		—			29			—		—			—
Payments	—		(59,782		)	(59,782		)	—		—			—
Reclassification from non-current liabilities	—		3,575			3,575			—		(3,575		)	(3,575		)
Interest on withholding	—		6			6			—		263			263
Balance as of March 31, 2014	$	49,919	$	4,797		$	54,716		$	27,571	$	23,746		$	51,317

Other Matters:

Liggett’s and Vector Tobacco’s management are unaware of any material environmental conditions affecting their existing facilities. Liggett’s and Vector Tobacco’s management believe that current operations are conducted in material compliance with all environmental laws and regulations and other laws and regulations governing cigarette manufacturers. Compliance with federal, state and local provisions regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment, has not had a material effect on the capital expenditures, results of operations or competitive position of Liggett or Vector Tobacco.

Liggett Vector Brands entered into an agreement with a subsidiary of the American Wholesale Marketers Association to support a program to permit certain tobacco distributors to secure, on reasonable terms, tax stamp bonds required by state and local governments for the distribution of cigarettes. The agreement expires in February 2016. Under the agreement, Liggett Vector Brands has agreed to pay a portion of losses incurred by the surety under the bond program, with a maximum loss exposure of $500. To secure its potential obligations under the agreement, Liggett Vector Brands posted a $100 letter of credit and agreed to fund up to an additional $400. In the third quarter of 2013, Liggett paid $83 for obligations under this program, and therefore, is only committed to fund an additional $317 over the letter of credit. The Company believes Liggett Vector Brands’ obligation under the agreement was immaterial at March 31, 2015.

There are several other proceedings, lawsuits and claims pending against the Company or one or more of its consolidated subsidiaries unrelated to tobacco or tobacco product liability. For instance, Douglas Elliman is subject to various types of litigation in the ordinary course of its business. Management is of the opinion that the liabilities, if any, ultimately resulting from such other proceedings, lawsuits and claims should not materially affect the Company’s financial position, results of operations or cash flows.