CONTINGENCIES

Tobacco-Related Litigation:

Overview

Since 1954, Liggett and other United States cigarette manufacturers have been named as defendants in numerous direct, third-party and purported class actions predicated on the theory that cigarette manufacturers should be liable for damages alleged to have been caused by cigarette smoking or by exposure to secondary smoke from cigarettes. New cases continue to be commenced against Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers. The cases have generally fallen into the following categories: (i) smoking and health cases alleging personal injury brought on behalf of individual plaintiffs (“Individual Actions”); (ii) smoking and health cases primarily alleging personal injury or seeking court-supervised programs for ongoing medical monitoring, as well as cases alleging the use of the terms “lights” and/or “ultra lights” constitutes a deceptive and unfair trade practice, common law fraud or violation of federal law, purporting to be brought on behalf of a class of individual plaintiffs (“Class Actions”); and (iii) health care cost recovery actions brought by various foreign and domestic governmental plaintiffs and non-governmental plaintiffs seeking reimbursement for health care expenditures allegedly caused by cigarette smoking and/or disgorgement of profits (“Health Care Cost Recovery Actions”). As new cases are commenced, the costs associated with defending these cases and the risks relating to the inherent unpredictability of litigation continue to increase. The future financial impact of the risks and expenses of litigation are not quantifiable at this time. For the years ended December 31, 2011, 2010 and 2009, Liggett incurred legal expenses and other litigation costs totaling approximately $7,795, $23,389 (which includes $16,161 for the Lukacs and Ferlanti judgments described below), and $6,000, respectively.

Litigation is subject to uncertainty and it is possible that there could be adverse developments in pending or future cases. Management reviews on a quarterly basis with counsel all pending litigation and evaluates whether an estimate can be made of the possible loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome. An unfavorable outcome or settlement of pending tobacco-related or other litigation could encourage the commencement of additional litigation. Damages awarded in some tobacco-related litigation can be significant.

Although Liggett has been able to obtain required bonds or relief from bonding requirements in order to prevent plaintiffs from seeking to collect judgments while adverse verdicts are on appeal, there remains a risk that such relief may not be obtainable in all cases. This risk has been reduced given that a majority of states now limit the dollar amount of bonds or require no bond at all. Liggett has secured approximately $4,308 in bonds as of December 31, 2011.

In June 2009, Florida amended its existing bond cap statute by adding a $200,000 bond cap that applies to all Engle progeny cases (defined below) in the aggregate and establishes individual bond caps for individual Engle progeny cases in amounts that vary depending on the number of judgments in effect at a given time. The legislation applies to judgments entered after the effective date of the legislation. Plaintiffs, in several cases, have challenged the constitutionality of the bond cap statute, but to date, the courts that have addressed the issue have upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The plaintiffs have appealed these rulings and the Florida Supreme Court has granted review of the Hall decision denying plaintiff's challenge to the bond cap statute. No federal court has yet addressed the issue. Although the Company cannot predict the outcome of such challenges, it is possible that the Company's financial position, results of operations, or cash flows could be materially affected by an unfavorable outcome of such challenges.

The Company and its subsidiaries record provisions in their consolidated financial statements for pending litigation when they determine that an unfavorable outcome is probable and the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. At the present time, while it is reasonably possible that an unfavorable outcome in a case may occur, except as disclosed in this Note 12: (i) management has concluded that it is not probable that a loss has been incurred in any of the pending tobacco-related cases; or (ii) management is unable to estimate the possible loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome of any of the pending tobacco-related cases and, therefore, management has not provided any amounts in the consolidated financial statements for unfavorable outcomes, if any. Legal defense costs are expensed as incurred.

Cautionary Statement About Engle Progeny Cases. Adverse verdicts have been entered against Liggett and other industry defendants in Engle progeny cases brought in Florida state court, and two of these verdicts have been affirmed on appeal. At December 31, 2011, Liggett and the Company are defendants in 3,000 state court Engle progeny cases. Through December 31, 2011, 55 state court cases have been tried against the industry, with plaintiffs' verdicts in 36 cases and defense verdicts in 19 cases. Other cases have either been dismissed by the court on summary judgment or a mistrial was declared. Since Engle progeny trials started in 2009, an average of approximately 20 cases per year have been tried. Based on the current rate of trials per year, it would require decades to resolve the remaining state court Engle progeny cases. To date, an adverse verdict has been entered against Liggett in six of the cases tried (exclusive of the Lukacs case, discussed below). Excluding the Lukacs case, the verdicts against Liggett have ranged from $1 to $3,008. In one of these cases, the verdict included punitive damages in the amount of $1,000. Except as discussed in this Note 12 with respect to the six cases where an adverse verdict was entered against Liggett, management is unable to estimate the possible loss or range of loss from remaining Engle progeny cases as there are currently multiple defendants in each case and discovery has not occurred or is limited. As a result, the Company lacks information about whether plaintiffs are in fact Engle class members (non-class members' claims are generally time-barred), the relevant smoking history, the nature of the alleged injury and the availability of various defenses, among other things. Further, plaintiffs typically do not specify their demand for damages. The Company believes that the process under which Engle progeny cases are tried is unconstitutional and continues to pursue its appellate rights. Litigation is subject to many uncertainties, and it is possible that our consolidated financial position, results of operations or cash flows could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome in any such tobacco-related litigation.

Although Liggett has generally been successful in managing litigation in the past, litigation is subject to uncertainty and significant challenges remain, particularly with respect to the Engle progeny cases. There can be no assurances that Liggett's past litigation experience will be representative of future results. Adverse verdicts have been rendered against Liggett in the past, in individual cases and Engle progeny cases, and several of these verdicts have been affirmed on appeal. It is possible that the consolidated results of operations, cash flows or financial position of the Company could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome or settlement of certain pending litigation. Liggett believes, and has been so advised by counsel, that it has valid defenses to the litigation pending against it, as well as valid bases for appeal of adverse verdicts. All such cases are, and will continue to be, vigorously defended. Liggett may, however, enter into settlement discussions in particular cases if it believes it is in its best interest to do so. In connection with the Engle progeny cases, Liggett has been receptive to opportunities to settle cases on favorable economic terms and will continue to do so. Through January 31, 2012, Liggett has settled 76 Engle progeny cases for approximately $988, in the aggregate. There can be no assurances that Liggett's settlement experience to date will be representative of future results.

Non-Engle Individual Actions

As of December 31, 2011, there were 33 individual cases pending against Liggett and/or the Company, where one or more individual plaintiffs allege injury resulting from cigarette smoking, addiction to cigarette smoking or exposure to secondary smoke and seek compensatory and, in some cases, punitive damages. These cases do not include Engle progeny cases or the approximately 100 individual cases pending in West Virginia state court as part of a consolidated action. The following table lists the number of individual cases, by state, that are pending against Liggett or its affiliates as of December 31, 2011 (excluding Engle progeny cases and the consolidated cases in West Virginia):



State		Number of Cases
Florida		16
New York		8
Louisiana		4
West Virginia		2
Maryland		1
Missouri		1
Ohio		1

The plaintiffs' allegations of liability in cases in which individuals seek recovery for injuries allegedly caused by cigarette smoking are based on various theories of recovery, including negligence, gross negligence, breach of special duty, strict liability, fraud, concealment, misrepresentation, design defect, failure to warn, breach of express and implied warranties, conspiracy, aiding and abetting, concert of action, unjust enrichment, common law public nuisance, property damage, invasion of privacy, mental anguish, emotional distress, disability, shock, indemnity and violations of deceptive trade practice laws, the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), state RICO statutes and antitrust statutes. In many of these cases, in addition to compensatory damages, plaintiffs also seek other forms of relief including treble/multiple damages, medical monitoring, disgorgement of profits and punitive damages. Although alleged damages often are not determinable from a complaint, and the law governing the pleading and calculation of damages varies from state to state and jurisdiction to jurisdiction, compensatory and punitive damages have been specifically pleaded in a number of cases, sometimes in amounts ranging into the hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars.

Defenses raised in individual cases include lack of proximate cause, assumption of the risk, comparative fault and/or contributory negligence, lack of design defect, statute of limitations, equitable defenses such as “unclean hands” and lack of benefit, failure to state a claim and federal preemption.

Liggett Only Cases. There are currently seven cases pending where Liggett is the only tobacco company defendant. Cases where Liggett is the only defendant could increase substantially as a result of the Engle progeny cases.

In February 2009, in Ferlanti v. Liggett Group, a Florida state court jury awarded compensatory damages to plaintiff and an $816 judgment was entered by the court. That judgment was affirmed on appeal and was satisfied by Liggett in March 2011. In September 2010, the court awarded plaintiff legal fees of $996. Plaintiff appealed the amount of the attorneys' fee award. Liggett previously accrued $2,000 for the Ferlanti case. In Welch v. R.J. Reynolds and Katz v. R.J. Reynolds, both Engle progeny cases, no trial dates have been set. There has been no recent activity in Hausrath v. Philip Morris, a case pending in New York state court, where two individuals are suing. The other three individual actions, in which Liggett is the only tobacco company defendant, are dormant.

Engle Progeny Cases. In 2000, a jury in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. rendered a $145,000,000 punitive damages verdict in favor of a “Florida Class” against certain cigarette manufacturers, including Liggett. Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court’s July 2006 ruling in Engle, which decertified the class on a prospective basis, and affirmed the appellate court’s reversal of the punitive damages award, former class members had one year from January 11, 2007 in which to file individual lawsuits. In addition, some individuals who filed suit prior to January 11, 2007, and who claim they meet the conditions in Engle, are attempting to avail themselves of the Engle ruling. Lawsuits by individuals requesting the benefit of the Engle ruling, whether filed before or after the January 11, 2007 deadline, are referred to as the “Engle progeny cases.” As of December 31, 2011, Liggett and the Company are named defendants in 5,755 Engle progeny cases in both federal (2,755 cases) and state (3,000 cases) courts in Florida. Other cigarette manufacturers are also named as defendants in these cases, although as a case proceeds, one or more defendants may ultimately be dismissed from the action. Although the Company was not named as a defendant in Engle, it has been named as a defendant in most of the Engle progeny cases where Liggett is named as a defendant. These cases include approximately 7,950 plaintiffs. The number of state court Engle progeny cases may increase as multi-plaintiff cases continue to be severed into individual cases. The total number of plaintiffs may also increase as a result of attempts by existing plaintiffs to add additional parties.

As of January 31, 2012, the following Engle progeny cases have resulted in judgments against Liggett:



Date	Case Name	County	Net Compensatory Damages	Punitive Damages	Status
June 2002	Lukacs v. R.J. Reynolds	Miami-Dade	$12,418	None	Affirmed on appeal by the Third District Court of Appeal. Judgment has been paid and the case is concluded. See "Lukacs Case" description below.
August 2009	Campbell v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	$156	None	Affirmed on appeal by the Third District Court of Appeal. Defendants filed a motion with the District Court of Appeal for certification to Florida Supreme Court, which was denied by the court on May 13, 2011. Defendants have sought review by the US Supreme Court.
March 2010	Douglas v. R.J. Reynolds	Hillsborough	$1,350	None	On appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal. Argument on the merits of the appeal was heard on October 4, 2011.
April 2010	Clay v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	$349	$1,000	Affirmed on appeal by the First District Court of Appeal on January 25, 2012.
April 2010	Putney v. R.J. Reynolds	Broward	$3,008	None	On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
April 2011	Tullo v. R.J. Reynolds	Palm Beach	$225	None	On appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
January 2012	Ward v. R.J. Reynolds	Escambia	$1	None

The Company's potential range of loss in the Campbell, Douglas, Clay, Putney, Tullo and Ward cases is between $0 and $6,089 in the aggregate, plus accrued interest and legal fees. No amounts have been expensed or accrued in the accompanying consolidated financial statements for these cases other than $181. In determining the range of loss, the Company considers potential settlements as well as future appellate relief. The Company is unable to determine a range related to the remaining Engle progeny cases. For further information on the Engle case and on Engle progeny cases, see “Class Actions — Engle Case,” below.

Lukacs Case. In June 2002, the jury in a Florida state court action entitled Lukacs v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., awarded $37,500 in compensatory damages, jointly and severally, in a case involving Liggett and two other cigarette manufacturers, which amount was subsequently reduced by the court. The jury found Liggett 50% responsible for the damages incurred by the plaintiff. The Lukacs case was the first case to be tried as an individual Engle progeny case, but was tried almost five years prior to the Florida Supreme Court's final decision in Engle. In November 2008, the court entered final judgment in the amount of $24,835, plus interest from June 2002. In March 2010, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, per curiam. In June 2010, Liggett satisfied its share of the judgment, including attorneys' fees and accrued interest, for $14,361.

Class Actions

As of December 31, 2011, there were six actions pending for which either a class had been certified or plaintiffs were seeking class certification, where Liggett is a named defendant, including one alleged price fixing case. Other cigarette manufacturers are also named in these actions.

Plaintiffs' allegations of liability in class action cases are based on various theories of recovery, including negligence, gross negligence, strict liability, fraud, misrepresentation, design defect, failure to warn, nuisance, breach of express and implied warranties, breach of special duty, conspiracy, concert of action, violation of deceptive trade practice laws and consumer protection statutes and claims under the federal and state anti-racketeering statutes. Plaintiffs in the class actions seek various forms of relief, including compensatory and punitive damages, treble/multiple damages and other statutory damages and penalties, creation of medical monitoring and smoking cessation funds, disgorgement of profits, and injunctive and equitable relief.

Defenses raised in these cases include, among others, lack of proximate cause, individual issues predominate, assumption of the risk, comparative fault and/or contributory negligence, statute of limitations and federal preemption.

Engle Case. In May 1994, Engle was filed against Liggett and others in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The class consisted of all Florida residents who, by November 21, 1996, “have suffered, presently suffer or have died from diseases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarette smoking.” In July 1999, after the conclusion of Phase I of the trial, the jury returned a verdict against Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers on certain issues determined by the trial court to be “common” to the causes of action of the plaintiff class. The jury made several findings adverse to the defendants including that defendants' conduct “rose to a level that would permit a potential award or entitlement to punitive damages.” Phase II of the trial was a causation and damages trial for three of the class plaintiffs and a punitive damages trial on a class-wide basis before the same jury that returned the verdict in Phase I. In April 2000, the jury awarded compensatory damages of $12,704 to the three class plaintiffs, to be reduced in proportion to the respective plaintiff’s fault. In July 2000, the jury awarded approximately $145,000,000 in punitive damages, including $790,000 against Liggett.

In May 2003, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and remanded the case with instructions to decertify the class. The judgment in favor of one of the three class plaintiffs, in the amount of $5,831, was overturned as time barred and the court found that Liggett was not liable to the other two class plaintiffs.

In July 2006, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision vacating the punitive damages award and held that the class should be decertified prospectively, but determined that the following Phase I findings are entitled to res judicata effect in Engle progeny cases: (i) that smoking causes lung cancer, among other diseases; (ii) that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive; (iii) that defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous; (iv) that defendants concealed material information knowing that the information was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking; (v) that defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers would rely on the information to their detriment; (vi) that defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective; and (vii) that defendants were negligent. The Florida Supreme Court decision also allowed former class members to proceed to trial on individual liability issues (using the above findings) and compensatory and punitive damage issues, provided they filed their individual lawsuits by January 2008. In December 2006, the Florida Supreme Court added the finding that defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to the representations made by defendants. In October 2007, the United States Supreme Court denied defendants' petition for writ of certiorari. As a result of the Engle decision, approximately 7,950 plaintiffs have claims pending against the Company and Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers.

Federal Engle Progeny Cases. Three federal district courts (in the Merlob, B. Brown and Burr cases) ruled that the findings in Phase I of the Engle proceedings could not be used to satisfy elements of plaintiffs' claims, and two of those rulings (B. Brown and Burr) were certified by the trial court for interlocutory review. The certification was granted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the appeals were consolidated (in February 2009, the appeal in Burr was dismissed for lack of prosecution). In July 2010, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that plaintiffs do not have an unlimited right to use the findings from the original Engle trial to meet their burden of establishing the elements of their claims at trial. Rather, plaintiffs may only use the findings to establish specific facts that they demonstrate with a reasonable degree of certainty were actually decided by the original Engle jury. The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine what specific factual findings the Engle jury actually made. All federal cases were stayed pending review by the Eleventh Circuit. In December 2010, stays were lifted in 12 cases selected by plaintiffs, two of which were subsequently re-stayed. Liggett is a defendant in one of the cases. In August 2011, the court ordered the activation of an additional 22 cases. Liggett is a defendant in 14 of the 22 cases.

Appeals of Engle Progeny Verdicts. In December 2010, in the Martin case, a state court case against R.J. Reynolds, the First District Court of Appeal issued the first ruling by a Florida intermediate appellate court to address the B. Brown decision discussed above. The panel held that the trial court correctly construed the Florida Supreme Court's 2006 decision in Engle in instructing the jury on the preclusive effect of the Phase I Engle proceedings, expressly disagreeing with certain aspects of the B. Brown decision. In July 2011, the Florida Supreme Court declined to review the First District Court of Appeal's decision. This matter may be subject to review by the United States Supreme Court. This decision could lead to other adverse rulings by state appellate courts.

In the Waggoner case, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida directed the parties to brief the applicability of the Engle findings to all Middle District cases. Liggett and the Company are not defendants in Waggoner, but nonetheless, were directed to submit motions on the issues. In December 2011, the district court ruled that it was bound by Martin and Jimmie Lee Brown (discussed below) and that the application of the Phase I findings did not deprive defendants of any constitutional due process rights. The court ruled, however, that plaintiffs must establish legal causation to establish liability. With respect to punitive damages, the district court held that the plaintiffs could rely on the findings in support of their punitive damages claims but that, in addition, plaintiffs must demonstrate specific conduct by specific defendants, independent of the Engle findings, that satisfies the standards for awards of punitive damages. The Waggoner ruling will apply to all of the cases pending in the Middle District of Florida. The defendants are seeking review of the due process ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Waggoner court declined to reach certain issues raised by Liggett and the Company and directed that their motion be re-filed in a case in which they are named as defendants. As a result, certain issues specific to Liggett are now pending before the court in the Young-McCray case.

In Jimmie Lee Brown, a state court case against R.J. Reynolds, the trial court tried the case in two phases. In the first phase, the jury determined that the smoker was addicted to cigarettes that contained nicotine and that his addiction was a legal cause of his death, thereby establishing he was an Engle class member. In the second phase, the jury determined whether the plaintiff established legal cause and damages with regard to each of the underlying claims. The jury found in favor of plaintiff in both phases. In September 2011, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment entered in plaintiff's favor and approved the trial court's procedure of bifurcating the trial. The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with Martin that individual post-Engle plaintiffs need not prove conduct elements as part of their burden of proof, but disagreed with Martin to the extent that the First District Court of Appeal only required a finding that the smoker was a class member to establish legal causation as to addiction and the underlying claims. The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that in addition to establishing class membership, Engle progeny plaintiffs must also establish legal causation and damages as to each claim asserted. In so finding, the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Jimmie Lee Brown is in conflict with Martin. In dicta, the Fourth District Court of Appeal further voiced concern that the preclusive effect of the Engle findings violates the tobacco company defendants' due process rights and, in the special concurring opinion, the court emphasized that until the Florida Supreme Court gives trial courts guidance as to what it intended by its Engle decision, trial courts will continue to play “a form of legal poker.” In September 2011, R.J. Reynolds filed a motion asking the Fourth District Court of Appeal to certify the case to the Florida Supreme Court for review. The motion was denied in October 2011.

In the Rey case, a state court Engle progeny case, the trial court entered final summary judgment on all claims in favor of the Company, Liggett and Lorillard (the "Moving Defendants”) based on what has been referred to in the progeny litigation as the "Liggett Rule." The Liggett Rule stands for the proposition that a manufacturer cannot have liability to a smoker under any asserted claim if the smoker did not use a product manufactured by that particular defendant. The Liggett Rule is based on the entry of final judgment in favor of Liggett/Brooke Group in Engle on all of the claims asserted against them by class representatives Mary Farnan and Angie Della Vecchia, even though the Florida Supreme Court upheld, as res judicata, the generic finding that Liggett/Brooke Group engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud by concealment. In September 2011, the Third District Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part holding that the Moving Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted against them other than the claim for civil conspiracy. The Moving Defendants' motions for rehearing were denied with regard to the Liggett Rule issues. Moving Defendants are seeking further review by the Florida Supreme Court. Oral argument occurred on February 7, 2012 in the Fifth District Court of Appeal in other progeny cases in which summary judgment was granted in favor of non-use defendants.

Other Class Actions. In Smith v. Philip Morris, a Kansas state court case filed in February 2000, plaintiffs allege that cigarette manufacturers conspired to fix cigarette prices in violation of antitrust laws. Plaintiffs seek to recover an unspecified amount in actual and punitive damages. Class certification was granted in November 2001. In November 2010, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In addition to joining that summary judgment motion, Liggett filed its own summary judgment motion in June 2011. Oral argument occurred on January 18, 2012. Trial is scheduled for July 16, 2012.

Class action suits have been filed in a number of states against cigarette manufacturers, alleging, among other things, that use of the terms “light” and “ultra light” constitutes unfair and deceptive trade practices. In December 2008, the United States Supreme Court, in Altria Group v. Good, ruled that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did not preempt the state law claims asserted by the plaintiffs and that they could proceed with their claims under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The case was returned to the federal court in Maine and consolidated with other federal cases. In June 2011, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice after the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Good decision has resulted in the filing of additional “lights” class action cases in other states against other cigarette manufacturers. Although Liggett was not a defendant in the Good case, and is not a defendant in most of the other “lights” class actions, an adverse ruling or commencement of additional “lights” related class actions could have a material adverse effect on the Company.

In November 1997, in Young v. American Tobacco Co., a purported personal injury class action was commenced on behalf of plaintiff and all similarly situated residents in Louisiana who, though not themselves cigarette smokers, are alleged to have been exposed to secondhand smoke from cigarettes which were manufactured by the defendants, and who suffered injury as a result of that exposure. The plaintiffs seek to recover an unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages. In October 2004, the trial court stayed this case pending the outcome of an appeal in another matter, which is now concluded.

In February 1998, in Parsons v. AC & S Inc., a case pending in West Virginia, the class was commenced on behalf of all West Virginia residents who allegedly have personal injury claims arising from exposure to cigarette smoke and asbestos fibers. The complaint seeks to recover unspecified damages. The case is stayed as a result of the December 2000 bankruptcy of three of the defendants.

In June 1998, in Cleary v. Philip Morris, a putative class action was brought in Illinois state court on behalf of persons who were allegedly injured by: (i) defendants' purported conspiracy to conceal material facts regarding the addictive nature of nicotine; (ii) defendants' alleged acts of targeting their advertising and marketing to minors; and (iii) defendants' claimed breach of the public's right to defendants' compliance with laws prohibiting the distribution of cigarettes to minors. Plaintiffs sought disgorgement of all profits unjustly received through defendants' sale of cigarettes to plaintiffs and the class. In March 2009, plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint adding, among other things, allegations regarding defendants' sale of “lights” cigarettes. The case was then removed to federal court on the basis of this new claim. In November 2009, plaintiffs filed a revised motion for class certification as to the three proposed classes, which motion was denied by the court. In February 2010, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants as to all claims, other than a “lights” claim involving another cigarette manufacturer. The court granted leave to the plaintiffs to reinstate the motion as to the addiction claims. Plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended Complaint in an attempt to resurrect their addiction claims. In June 2010, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint and in July 2010, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. In August 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Plaintiff's petition for rehearing was denied by the Seventh Circuit in November 2011.

In April 2001, in Brown v. Philip Morris USA, a California state court granted in part plaintiffs' motion for class certification and certified a class comprised of adult residents of California who smoked at least one of defendants' cigarettes “during the applicable time period” and who were exposed to defendants' marketing and advertising activities in California. In March 2005, the court granted defendants' motion to decertify the class based on a recent change in California law. In June 2009, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings regarding whether the class representatives have, or can, demonstrate standing. In August 2009, the California Supreme Court denied defendants' rehearing petition and issued its mandate. In September 2009, plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the court's September 2004 order finding that plaintiffs' allegations regarding “lights” cigarettes are preempted by federal law, in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in Good. In March 2010, the trial court granted reconsideration of its September 2004 order granting partial summary judgment to defendants with respect to plaintiffs' “lights” claims on the basis of judicial decisions issued since its order was issued, including Good, thereby reinstating plaintiffs' “lights” claims. Since the trial court's prior ruling decertifying the class was reversed on appeal by the California Supreme Court, the parties and the court are treating all claims currently being asserted by the plaintiffs as certified, subject, however, to defendants' challenge to the class representatives' standing to assert their claims. In December 2010, defendants filed a motion for a determination that the class representatives set forth in plaintiffs' tenth amended complaint lacked standing to pursue the claims. The motion was granted by the court. Plaintiffs moved to file an amended complaint adding new class representatives, which motion was granted by the court and in July 2011, plaintiffs filed their eleventh amended complaint adding new putative class representatives. Defendants filed their response in November 2011. Oral argument occurred on January 24, 2012 to consider the defendants' challenge to the new class representatives. Trial is scheduled for October 5, 2012.

Although not technically a class action, in In Re: Tobacco Litigation (Personal Injury Cases), a West Virginia state court consolidated approximately 750 individual smoker actions that were pending prior to 2001 for trial of certain common issues. In January 2002, the court severed Liggett from the trial of the consolidated action, which commenced in June 2010 and ended in a mistrial. The rescheduled trial commenced in October 2011 and on November 8, 2011, a mistrial was declared. If the case were to proceed against Liggett, it is estimated that Liggett could be a defendant in approximately 100 of the individual cases.

In addition to the cases described above, numerous class actions remain certified against other cigarette manufacturers. Adverse decisions in these cases could have a material adverse affect on Liggett’s sales volume, operating income and cash flows.

Health Care Cost Recovery Actions

As of December 31, 2011, there was one Health Care Cost Recovery Action pending against Liggett, Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. American Tobacco Company, a South Dakota case filed in 1997, where the plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on various theories of recovery as a result of alleged sales of tobacco products to minors. This case is inactive. Other cigarette manufacturers are also named as defendants. The claims asserted in health care cost recovery actions vary. Although, typically, no specific damage amounts are pled, it is possible that requested damages might be in the billions of dollars. In these cases, plaintiffs typically assert equitable claims that the tobacco industry was “unjustly enriched” by their payment of health care costs allegedly attributable to smoking and seek reimbursement of those costs. Relief sought by some, but not all, plaintiffs include punitive damages, multiple damages and other statutory damages and penalties, injunctions prohibiting alleged marketing and sales to minors, disclosure of research, disgorgement of profits, funding of anti-smoking programs, additional disclosure of nicotine yields, and payment of attorney and expert witness fees.

Other claims asserted include the equitable claim of indemnity, common law claims of negligence, strict liability, breach of express and implied warranty, breach of special duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, public nuisance, claims under state and federal statutes governing consumer fraud, antitrust, deceptive trade practices and false advertising, and claims under RICO.

Department of Justice Lawsuit. In September 1999, the United States government commenced litigation against Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The action sought to recover an unspecified amount of health care costs paid and to be paid by the federal government for lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema and other smoking-related illnesses allegedly caused by the fraudulent and tortious conduct of defendants, to restrain defendants and co-conspirators from engaging in alleged fraud and other allegedly unlawful conduct in the future, and to compel defendants to disgorge the proceeds of their unlawful conduct. Claims were asserted under RICO.

In August 2006, the trial court entered a Final Judgment against each of the cigarette manufacturing defendants, except Liggett. In May 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed most of the district court's decision. In February 2010, the government and all defendants, other than Liggett, filed petitions for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. In June 2010, the United States Supreme Court, without comment, denied review. As a result, the cigarette manufacturing defendants, other than Liggett, are now subject to the trial court's Final Judgment which ordered the following relief: (i) an injunction against “committing any act of racketeering” relating to the manufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences or sale of cigarettes in the United States; (ii) an injunction against participating directly or indirectly in the management or control of the Council for Tobacco Research, the Tobacco Institute, or the Center for Indoor Air Research, or any successor or affiliated entities of each (iii) an injunction against “making, or causing to be made in any way, any material false, misleading, or deceptive statement or representation or engaging in any public relations or marketing endeavor that is disseminated to the United States' public and that misrepresents or suppresses information concerning cigarettes”; (iv) an injunction against conveying any express or implied health message through use of descriptors on cigarette packaging or in cigarette advertising or promotional material, including “lights,” “ultra lights,” and “low tar,” which the court found could cause consumers to believe one cigarette brand is less hazardous than another brand; (v) the issuance of “corrective statements” in various media regarding the adverse health effects of smoking, the addictiveness of smoking and nicotine, the lack of any significant health benefit from smoking “low tar” or “light” cigarettes, defendants' manipulation of cigarette design to ensure optimum nicotine delivery and the adverse health effects of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke; (vi) the disclosure of defendants' public document websites and the production of all documents produced to the government or produced in any future court or administrative action concerning smoking and health; (vii) the disclosure of disaggregated marketing data to the government in the same form and on the same schedules as defendants now follow in disclosing such data to the Federal Trade Commission for a period of ten years; (viii) certain restrictions on the sale or transfer by defendants of any cigarette brands, brand names, formulas or cigarette business within the United States; and (ix) payment of the government's costs in bringing the action. Two issues remain pending before the district court: (i) the substance of the court-ordered corrective statements and (ii) the requirements related to point-of-sale signage. Other matters are currently on appeal.

It is unclear what impact, if any, the Final Judgment will have on the cigarette industry as a whole. To the extent that the Final Judgment leads to a decline in industry-wide shipments of cigarettes in the United States or otherwise results in restrictions that adversely affect the industry, Liggett's sales volume, operating income and cash flows could be materially adversely affected.

Upcoming Trials

As of December 31, 2011, there were 52 Engle progeny cases scheduled for trial through December 31, 2012. The Company and/or Liggett and other cigarette manufacturers are currently named as defendants in each of these cases, although as a case proceeds, one or more defendants may ultimately be dismissed from the action. In addition, in Smith v. Philip Morris, trial is scheduled for July 16, 2012 and in Brown v. Philip Morris USA, trial has been scheduled for October 5, 2012. No other cases are currently scheduled for trial in 2012. Trial dates are, however, subject to change.

MSA and Other State Settlement Agreements

In March 1996, March 1997 and March 1998, Liggett entered into settlements of smoking-related litigation with 45 states and territories. The settlements released Liggett from all smoking-related claims made by those states and territories, including claims for health care cost reimbursement and claims concerning sales of cigarettes to minors.

In November 1998, Philip Morris, Brown & Williamson, R.J. Reynolds and Lorillard (the “Original Participating Manufacturers” or “OPMs”) and Liggett (together with any other tobacco product manufacturer that becomes a signatory, the “Subsequent Participating Manufacturers” or “SPMs”) (the OPMs and SPMs are hereinafter referred to jointly as the “Participating Manufacturers”) entered into the Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”) with 46 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, American Samoa and the Northern Mariana Islands (collectively, the “Settling States”) to settle the asserted and unasserted health care cost recovery and certain other claims of the Settling States. The MSA received final judicial approval in each Settling State.

As a result of the MSA, the Settling States released Liggett from:

•all claims of the Settling States and their respective political subdivisions and other recipients of state health care funds, relating to: (i) past conduct arising out of the use, sale, distribution, manufacture, development, advertising and marketing of tobacco products; (ii) the health effects of, the exposure to, or research, statements or warnings about, tobacco products; and


•	all monetary claims of the Settling States and their respective subdivisions and other recipients of state health care funds relating to future conduct arising out of the use of, or exposure to, tobacco products that have been manufactured in the ordinary course of business.

The MSA restricts tobacco product advertising and marketing within the Settling States and otherwise restricts the activities of Participating Manufacturers. Among other things, the MSA prohibits the targeting of youth in the advertising, promotion or marketing of tobacco products; bans the use of cartoon characters in all tobacco advertising and promotion; limits each Participating Manufacturer to one tobacco brand name sponsorship during any 12-month period; bans all outdoor advertising, with certain limited exceptions; prohibits payments for tobacco product placement in various media; bans gift offers based on the purchase of tobacco products without sufficient proof that the intended recipient is an adult; prohibits Participating Manufacturers from licensing third parties to advertise tobacco brand names in any manner prohibited under the MSA; and prohibits Participating Manufacturers from using as a tobacco product brand name any nationally recognized non-tobacco brand or trade name or the names of sports teams, entertainment groups or individual celebrities.

The MSA also requires Participating Manufacturers to affirm corporate principles to comply with the MSA and to reduce underage use of tobacco products and imposes restrictions on lobbying activities conducted on behalf of Participating Manufacturers. In addition, the MSA provides for the appointment of an independent auditor to calculate and determine the amounts of payments owed pursuant to the MSA.

Under the payment provisions of the MSA, the Participating Manufacturers are required to make annual payments of $9,000,000 (subject to applicable adjustments, offsets and reductions). These annual payments are allocated based on unit volume of domestic cigarette shipments. The payment obligations under the MSA are the several, and not joint, obligation of each Participating Manufacturer and are not the responsibility of any parent or affiliate of a Participating Manufacturer.

Liggett has no payment obligations under the MSA except to the extent its market share exceeds a market share exemption of approximately 1.65% of total cigarettes sold in the United States. Vector Tobacco has no payment obligations under the MSA except to the extent its market share exceeds a market share exemption of approximately 0.28% of total cigarettes sold in the United States. For years ended December 31, 2011, 2010 and 2009, Liggett and Vector Tobacco’s domestic shipments accounted for approximately 3.8%, 3.5% and 2.7% , respectively, of the total cigarettes sold in the United States. If Liggett’s or Vector Tobacco’s market share exceeds their respective market share exemption in a given year, then on April 15 of the following year, Liggett and/or Vector Tobacco, as the case may be, must pay on each excess unit an amount equal (on a per-unit basis) to that due from the OPMs for that year. On December 31, 2011, Liggett and Vector Tobacco paid $101,500 of their estimated $152,700 2011 MSA payment obligation.

Certain MSA Disputes

NPM Adjustment. In March 2006, an economic consulting firm selected pursuant to the MSA determined that the MSA was a “significant factor contributing to” the loss of market share of Participating Manufacturers, to non-participating manufacturers, for 2003. This is known as the “NPM Adjustment.” The economic consulting firm subsequently rendered the same decision with respect to 2004 and 2005. In March 2009, a different economic consulting firm made the same determination for 2006. As a result, the manufacturers are entitled to potential NPM Adjustments to each of their 2003 - 2006 MSA payments. The Participating Manufacturers are also entitled to potential NPM Adjustments to their 2007 - 2012 payments pursuant to agreements entered into between the OPMs and the Settling States under which the OPMs agreed to make certain payments for the benefit of the Settling States, in exchange for which the Settling States stipulated that the MSA was a “significant factor contributing to” the loss of market share of Participating Manufacturers for each of those years. A Settling State that has diligently enforced its qualifying escrow statute in the year in question may be able to avoid application of the NPM Adjustment to the payments made by the manufacturers for the benefit of that Settling State.

For 2003 – 2011, Liggett and Vector Tobacco, as applicable, disputed that they owed the Settling States the NPM Adjustments as calculated by the Independent Auditor. As permitted by the MSA, Liggett and Vector Tobacco withheld payment associated with these NPM Adjustment amounts. For 2003, Liggett and Vector Tobacco paid the NPM adjustment amount of $9,345 to the Settling States although both companies continue to dispute this amount is owed. The total amount withheld (or paid into a disputed payment account) by Liggett and Vector Tobacco for 2004 – 2011 was $46,938. At December 31, 2011, included in “Other assets” on the Company’s consolidated balance sheet was a non-current receivable of $6,542 relating to the $9,345 payment.

The following amounts have not been expensed by the Company as they relate to Liggett and Vector Tobacco’s NPM Adjustment claims: $6,542 for 2003, $3,789 for 2004 and $800 for 2005. Liggett and Vector Tobacco have expensed all disputed amounts related to the NPM Adjustment since 2005.

Since April 2006, notwithstanding provisions in the MSA requiring arbitration, litigation was filed in 49 Settling States involving the issue of whether the application of the NPM Adjustment for 2003 is to be determined through litigation or arbitration. These actions relate to the potential NPM Adjustment for 2003, which the independent auditor under the MSA previously determined to be as much as $1,200,000 for all Participating Manufacturers. All but one of the 48 courts that have decided the issue have ruled that the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute is arbitrable. All 47 of those decisions are final. One court, the Montana Supreme Court, ruled that Montana’s claim of diligent enforcement must be litigated. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari with respect to that opinion. In response to a proposal from the OPMs and many of the SPMs, 45 of the Settling States, representing approximately 90% of the allocable share of the Settling States, entered into an agreement providing for a nationwide arbitration of the dispute with respect to the NPM Adjustment for 2003. In June 2010, the three person arbitration panel was selected and procedural hearings, discovery and briefing on legal issues of general application have commenced. Discovery has concluded and substantive hearings are currently scheduled to commence in the second quarter of 2012. Because states representing more than 80% of the allocable share signed the agreement, signing states will receive a 20% reduction of any 2003 NPM adjustment awarded in the arbitration. There can be no assurance that Liggett or Vector Tobacco will receive any adjustment as a result of these proceedings.

Gross v. Net Calculations. In October 2004, the independent auditor notified Liggett and all other Participating Manufacturers that their payment obligations under the MSA, dating from the agreement’s execution in late 1998, had been recalculated using “net” unit amounts, rather than “gross” unit amounts (which had been used since 1999).

Liggett objected to this retroactive change and disputed the change in methodology. Liggett contends that the retroactive change from “gross” to “net” unit amounts is impermissible for several reasons, including:


•	use of “net” unit amounts is not required by the MSA (as reflected by, among other things, the use of “gross” unit amounts through 2005);

•such a change is not authorized without the consent of affected parties to the MSA;


•	the MSA provides for four-year time limitation periods for revisiting calculations and determinations, which precludes recalculating Liggett’s 1997 Market Share (and thus, Liggett’s market share exemption); and

•Liggett and others have relied upon the calculations based on “gross” unit amounts since 1998.

The change in the method of calculation could result in Liggett owing, at a minimum, approximately $10,200, plus interest, of additional MSA payments for prior years, because the proposed change from “gross” to “net” units would serve to lower Liggett’s market share exemption under the MSA. The Company estimates that Liggett’s future MSA payments would be at least approximately $2,500 higher if the method of calculation is changed. No amounts have been expensed or accrued in the accompanying consolidated financial statements for any potential liability relating to the “gross” versus “net” dispute. There can be no assurance that Liggett will not be required to make additional payments, which payments could adversely affect the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations or cash flows. In August 2011, Liggett received notice from several states seeking to initiate arbitration as to this matter. The parties have entered into an agreement regarding procedures for the arbitration and selection of the arbitrators.

Litigation Challenging the MSA. In Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. King, litigation pending in federal court in New York, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the statutes enacted by New York and other states in connection with the MSA on the grounds that the statutes violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and federal antitrust laws. In September 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that if all of the allegations of the complaint were assumed to be true, plaintiffs had stated a claim for relief and that the New York federal court had jurisdiction over the other state defendants. On remand, the trial court held that plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits. After discovery in November 2009, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. In March 2011, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed the decision. That appeal has been stayed, pending resolution of a motion to alter or amend judgment. Grand River, at the end of 2011, dismissed the action and the appeal, with prejudice, as to certain state defendants.

In October 2008, Vibo Corporation, Inc., d/b/a General Tobacco (“Vibo”) commenced litigation in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against each of the Settling States and certain Participating Manufacturers, including Liggett and Vector Tobacco. Vibo sought damages from Participating Manufacturers under antitrust laws, and also brought a number of constitutional challenges to the MSA and its provisions. Vibo alleged, among other things, that the market share exemptions (i.e., grandfathered shares) provided to SPMs that joined the MSA by a certain date, including Liggett and Vector Tobacco, violate federal antitrust and constitutional law. In January 2009, the district court dismissed the complaint. In January 2010, the court entered final judgment in favor of the defendants. Vibo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and the case was argued on October 6, 2011. On February 22, 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.

Litigation challenging the validity of the MSA, including claims that the MSA violates antitrust laws, has not been successful to date.

Other State Settlements. The MSA replaced Liggett’s prior settlements with all states and territories except for Florida, Mississippi, Texas and Minnesota. Each of these four states, prior to the effective date of the MSA, negotiated and executed settlement agreements with each of the other major tobacco companies, separate from those settlements reached previously with Liggett. Except as described below, Liggett's agreements with these states remain in full force and effect. These states' settlement agreements with Liggett contained most favored nation provisions which could reduce Liggett's payment obligations based on subsequent settlements or resolutions by those states with certain other tobacco companies. Beginning in 1999, Liggett determined that, based on each of these four states' settlements with United States Tobacco Company, Liggett's payment obligations to those states had been eliminated. With respect to all non-economic obligations under the previous settlements, Liggett believes it is entitled to the most favorable provisions as between the MSA and each state's respective settlement with the other major tobacco companies. Therefore, Liggett's non-economic obligations to all states and territories are now defined by the MSA.

In 2003, as a result of a dispute with Minnesota regarding its settlement agreement, Liggett agreed to pay $100 a year, in any year cigarettes manufactured by Liggett are sold in that state. In 2003 and 2004, the Attorneys General for Florida, Mississippi and Texas advised Liggett that they believed that Liggett had failed to make certain required payments under the respective settlement agreements with these states. In December 2010, Liggett settled with Florida and agreed to pay $1,200 and to make further annual payments of $250 for a period of 21 years, starting in March 2011. The payments in years 12 – 21 will be subject to an inflation adjustment. These payments are in lieu of any other payments allegedly due to Florida under the original settlement agreement. The Company accrued approximately $3,200 for this matter in 2010. In February 2012, Mississippi provided Liggett with a 60-day notice that the state intended to pursue its remedies if Liggett did not cure the alleged defaults. There can be no assurance that Liggett will be able to resolve the matters with Texas and Mississippi or that Liggett will not be required to make additional payments which could adversely affect the Company's consolidated financial position, results of operations or cash flows.

Cautionary Statement. Management is not able to predict the outcome of the litigation pending or threatened against Liggett or the Company. Litigation is subject to many uncertainties. For example, the jury in the Lukacs case, an Engle progeny case tried in 2002, awarded $24,835 in compensatory damages against Liggett and two other defendants and found Liggett 50% responsible for the damages. The verdict was affirmed on appeal and Liggett paid $14,361 in June 2010. Through January 31, 2012, Liggett has been found liable in six other Engle progeny cases. These cases are currently on appeal although appellate efforts to date have not been successful. Liggett has also had verdicts entered against it in other individual cases, which verdicts were affirmed on appeal and, thereafter, satisfied by Liggett. It is possible that other cases could be decided unfavorably against Liggett and that Liggett will be unsuccessful on appeal. Liggett may attempt to settle particular cases if it believes it is in its best interest to do so.

Management cannot predict the cash requirements related to any future defense costs, settlements or judgments, including cash required to bond any appeals, and there is a risk that those requirements will not be able to be met. An unfavorable outcome of a pending smoking and health case could encourage the commencement of additional similar litigation, or could lead to multiple adverse decisions in the Engle progeny cases. Except as discussed in this note, management is unable to estimate the loss or range of loss that could result from an unfavorable outcome of the cases pending against Liggett or the costs of defending such cases and as a result has not provided any amounts in its consolidated financial statements for unfavorable outcomes.

The tobacco industry is subject to a wide range of laws and regulations regarding the marketing, sale, taxation and use of tobacco products imposed by local, state and federal governments. There have been a number of restrictive regulatory actions, adverse legislative and political decisions and other unfavorable developments concerning cigarette smoking and the tobacco industry. These developments may negatively affect the perception of potential triers of fact with respect to the tobacco industry, possibly to the detriment of certain pending litigation, and may prompt the commencement of additional litigation or legislation.

It is possible that the Company’s consolidated financial position, results of operations or cash flows could be materially adversely affected by an unfavorable outcome in any of the smoking-related litigation.

The activity in the company's accruals for tobacco litigation for the three years ended December 31, 2011 were as follows:



	Current Liabilities									Non-Current Liabilities
	Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement			Litigation Accruals			Total			Payments due under Master Settlement Agreement		Litigation Accruals		Total

Balance at January 1, 2009	$	15,868		$	4,800		$	20,668		$	14,587	$	—	$	14,587
Expenses	67,158			100			67,258			—		—		—
Change in MSA obligations capitalized as inventory	(2,206		)	—			(2,206		)	—		—		—
Payments	(54,299		)	(2,400		)	(56,699		)	—		—		—
Reclassification to non-current liabilities	(7,718		)	—			(7,718		)	7,718		—		7,718
Accrual reversals	—			(2,500		)	(2,500		)	—		—		—
Balance at December 31, 2009	18,803			—			18,803			22,305		—		22,305
Expenses	135,684			19,882			155,566			—		—		—
Change in MSA obligations capitalized as inventory	2,736			—			2,736			—		—		—
Payments	(105,435		)	(15,699		)	(121,134		)	—		—		—
Reclassification to non-current liabilities	(7,900		)	—			(7,900		)	7,900		—		7,900
Balance at December 31, 2010	43,888			4,183			48,071			30,205		—		30,205
Expenses	155,707			885			156,592			—		—		—
Change in MSA obligations capitalized as inventory	(2,495		)	—			(2,495		)	—		—		—
Payments	(128,258		)	(1,917		)	(130,175		)	—		—		—
Reclassification to non-current liabilities	(17,668		)	(1,600		)	(19,268		)	17,667		1,600		19,267
Interest on withholding	—			—			—			1,466		—		1,466
Balance at December 31, 2011	$	51,174		$	1,551		$	52,725		$	49,338	$	1,600	$	50,938

Other Matters:

Liggett’s and Vector Tobacco’s management are unaware of any material environmental conditions affecting their existing facilities. Liggett’s and Vector Tobacco’s management believe that current operations are conducted in material compliance with all environmental laws and regulations and other laws and regulations governing cigarette manufacturers. Compliance with federal, state and local provisions regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment, has not had a material effect on the capital expenditures, results of operations or competitive position of Liggett or Vector Tobacco.

In February 2004, Liggett Vector Brands entered into a five year agreement with a subsidiary of the American Wholesale Marketers Association to support a program to permit certain tobacco distributors to secure, on reasonable terms, tax stamp bonds required by state and local governments for the distribution of cigarettes. This agreement has been extended through February 2016. Under the agreement, Liggett Vector Brands has agreed to pay a portion of losses, if any, incurred by the surety under the bond program, with a maximum loss exposure of $500 for Liggett Vector Brands. To secure its potential obligations under the agreement, Liggett Vector Brands has delivered to the subsidiary of the association a $100 letter of credit and agreed to fund up to an additional $400. Liggett Vector Brands has incurred no losses to date under this agreement, and the Company believes the fair value of Liggett Vector Brands’ obligation under the agreement was immaterial at December 31, 2011.

There may be several other proceedings, lawsuits and claims pending against the Company and certain of its consolidated subsidiaries unrelated to tobacco or tobacco product liability. Management is of the opinion that the liabilities, if any, ultimately resulting from such other proceedings, lawsuits and claims should not materially affect the Company’s financial position, results of operations or cash flows.