Version 5

New Leadership Is Needed At Arconic

January 31st, 2017 www.NewArconic.com





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Why Are We Here?

Prolonged disappointing financial results combined with the irreparably damaged credibility of Arconic's current management have created a circumstance whereby Arconic will never approach its potential under the current CEO

- For more than a year, Elliott has engaged in private discussions with the Company regarding the numerous ways in which Arconic could effectively execute its business separation, improve operational performance, enhance investor communications, and establish improved corporate governance practices
 - While we have appreciated the dialogue and remain excited about the Arconic opportunity, we <u>believe a change in CEO is needed</u> for the Company to sustainably create maximum shareholder value

Clear Evidence for the Need of Change in Leadership



Poor Total Shareholder Returns

- A cumulative loss of nearly 70% in value
- --- Profound underperformance compared to any of the Company's self-selected peer groups
- Worst TSR record of any active S&P 500 CEO



Abysmal Operating Performance

- On pace to miss all key operating metrics for 2016; new 2019 targets are indistinguishable from the original guidance for 2016
- Returns on invested capital have remained below cost of capital during Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld's entire tenure
- Massive margin improvement opportunity has existed for years and has not been realized



Broken Company Culture

- We believe that an obsession with image, prestige, and stature is the current CEO's key focus
- Wasteful corporate spending on questionable projects that enthuse the CEO but provide little benefit to the business or shareholders
- Antiquated corporate governance has resulted in failure to hold the CEO accountable, but has enabled the delivery to him
 of more than \$111 million in compensation over an 8 year period

Poor Total Shareholder Return: See pages 5,11,12, and 13 for details

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Our Goals at Arconic

Elliott is Arconic's largest shareholder, owning approximately 10.5% of shares outstanding. We are seeking sustained improvements at Arconic to benefit all long-term stakeholders Please note that Elliott holds economic interest of over 12.1% of Arconic

Change the Culture



✓ Instill a culture dedicated to fierce operational focus

- ✓ Foster an entrepreneurial spirit by empowering and incentivizing each business unit and each manufacturing plant to participate in the upside of operational improvements
- ✓ Eliminate image-driven and wasteful culture (e.g. "The Jetsons" ad campaign, continued headquarters at Lever House)
- ✓ Overhaul the Company's antiquated corporate governance and adopt modern best practices demonstrating that "New Arconic" welcomes accountability



- ✓ Achieve substantial and real corporate-level margin improvement through:
 - ✓ Closing the persistent margin gap to the Company's closest peer in the EPS business
 - ✓ Achieving real margin improvements in GRP and TCS businesses
 - ✓ Dramatically reducing corporate overhead
- ✓ Allocate capital away from wasteful projects and toward more practical growth strategies


We believe that through a combination of operational and cultural changes, Arconic has an approximately 45 – 105% upside

Source for images: Instagram

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Change the Culture: Remove Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld from Arconic

Despite years of poor performance, a culture of grandiose rhetoric devoid of any real substance or follow-through has been tolerated



Peer Group Median. Source: Bloomberg. TSR Trailing as of 10/31/2016, the day before Alcoa and Arconic split. Since CEO TSR: 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016. Peer Proxy is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes two groups named by the Company, Industrials Peers which are the following ten companies: 3M CO, CUMMINS INC, DANAHER CORP, DEERE & CO, EATON CORP PLC, EMERSON ELECTRIC CO, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP, L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC, NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP, RAYTHEON COMPANY, And Materials Peers which are the following 10 companies: UD VONT [E.1.] DE NEMOURS, DOW CHEMICAL CO/THE, FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC, HUNTSMAN CORP, INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO, PPG INDUSTRIES INC, NEWMONT MINING CORP, NUCOR CORP, UNITED STATES STEEL CORP, LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A. THE Company's self-selected Aluminum Company peers consist of: ALUMINUM CORP OF CHINA LTD-H, UNITED CO RUSAL PLC, NORSK HYDRO ASA, ALUMINA LTD, NATIONAL ALUMINUM CO LTD, SHANDONG NANSHAN ALUMINUM. Since Low is date range 3/6/2009 – 10/31/2016.

Source for all quotes in this presentation, Bloomberg transcripts, unless otherwise indicated. Emphasis added by Elliott for all quotes throughout this presentation


Change the Culture: Consider Larry Lawson for CEO

Elliott has engaged Mr. Lawson as a consultant on its investment in Arconic and believes that Mr. Lawson should be a leading candidate to become the Company's CEO, as he has the ideal set of skills needed to turn around Arconic's woefully and continually underperforming business





- ✓ Former CEO of Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. (NYSE: SPR)
- ✓ Former Executive Vice President of Aeronautics of Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT)
- ✓ Former Flight Control Engineer of McDonnell Douglas (Acquired by The Boeing Company in 1997)



"<u>SPR stock is up over 160% since Larry Lawson was named president and CEO</u> of the company on March 19, 2013 effective April 6, 2013. Sentiment for <u>SPR has improved as the company focused on controlling costs, generating positive free cash</u> <u>flow</u>, and divesting the problematic G650 and G280 wing programs in Tulsa. In our view<u>, market expectation for performance is</u> <u>now significantly higher for SPR than with the previous management team</u>."

BAML, 4/30/15

"[H]e is a <u>tough change agent with unrelenting demands on performance improvements</u>. As such, we're beginning to conclude that he might be just what SPR always needed."

arclays, 12/18/13

Source for stock chart: Bloomberg, ending day prior to announced of planned departure of Mr. Lawson as CEO (6/7/2016)

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Drive Sustainable Shareholder Value Through Operational Improvement





<u>Close the Margin Gap with Precision Castparts ("PCC")</u>

- EPS margins have been an average of 700 basis points below PCC despite the fact that there are few (if any) structural reasons for this gap
- Each 100 bps improvement in margins at Arconic's EPS business is worth ~\$1.20/share
- Improving margins by 900 basis-points to levels approximating PCC's would increase value by ~\$10.50/share



Achieve Real Margin Improvement in Global Rolled Products ("GRP")

- Management's 3-5 year goal of increasing GRP margins is misleading at best, deceptive at worst, and the majority is already baked
- Approximately 130-150 bps of the targeted improvement comes from simply eliminating can sheet volumes
- Reaching industry average performance would increase EBITDA by \$150 million
- Achieving half-way to best-in-class in each product would increase EBITDA by \$245 million, worth ~\$4.40/share



Reduction of Corporate Overhead

- Arconic has excess corporate overhead which we believe is a direct result of the Company's "CEO-centric" culture
- Alcoa Corp. which has overhead costs which are roughly half those of its former parent has already announced plans to cut \$50 million, while repeatedly highlighting the cost reduction opportunity resulting from the separation from its bloated former parent:

"Very, very focused on cutting costs, and you'll hear me talk about that, that's one of the things that's different about Alcoa Corp. As we go forward, we'll be very, very focused on not only cutting cost at the plant level, but also in the overhead structure... We did not take any of the corporate jets with us. We skinny down the corporate office to only 15 people here in New York. So we're now on one floor in the New York office. We've eliminated our Geneva office. We've gone – and I use these just as examples. We've gone location by location and cut overhead costs, but there's still more work to be done."

William F. Oplinger, CFO of Alcoa Corp, 11/16/16

— Cutting a comparable \$100 million would increase value by \$800 million, worth ~\$1.60/share



Implement Capital Allocation Discipline

- Arconic has spent \$2.2 billion at GRP without increasing EBITDA dollars.
- ROA at EPS plummeted during Dr. Kleinfeld's tenure
- More disciplined capital spending and exploration of strategic options with respect to GRP and TCS could produce significant additional value

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Even Modest Improvement Produces Dramatic Returns



Elliott's targets are based on the mid-point of Arconic's 2017 revenue target

• Unlike management, Elliott believes that Arconic margins can be improved even absent additional scale

- In short, even without growth, Arconic could be worth at least \$33-\$46 per share.

		Lo	w		High				
	<u>Amount</u>	Multiple	<u>Value</u>	<u>\$ / Share</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Multiple</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>\$ / Share</u>	
Current Performance / Price (as of 1/30/2017)	\$1,815	8.7x		\$22.50	\$1,815	8.7x		\$22.50	
EPS Margin Improvement	\$342	9.0x	\$3,078	\$6.31	\$513	11.0x	\$5,643	\$11.56	
GRP Margin Improvement	\$150	7.5x	\$1,131	\$2.32	\$245	8.8x	\$2,153	\$4.41	
TCS Margin Improvement	\$36	7.3x	\$262	\$0.54	\$36	10.3x	\$371	\$0.76	
Cut Corporate Costs	\$50	8.7x	\$434	\$0.89	\$100	8.6x	\$858	\$1.76	
Overall Improvement	\$578	8.5x	\$4,906	\$10.05	\$894	10.1x	\$9,024	\$18.49	
Improved Credibility + Multiple Expansion					\$1,815	1.4x	\$2,554	\$5.23	
Total	\$2,393	8.5x		\$32.55	\$2,709	10.1x		\$46.23	
Vs. Current Share Price				45%	•			105%	

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Low Case

- 600 bps improvement at EPS at 9.0x multiple
- GRP to achieve in-line performance with peers based on bottoms-up mix analysis
- Cut \$50 million in Corporate costs

High Case

- 900 bps improvement at EPS at 11.0x multiple
- GRP to achieve goal half-way between industry average cost-bucket upside and best-in-class (see pg. 21)
- Cut \$100 million in Corporate costs

Note: Corporate Costs opportunity takes into account substantial hidden Corporate costs that we believe are pushed down to segments

Shareholder Nominees



Please note that if the Company renominates Ulrich Schmidt at the 2017 annual

meeting, Elliott does not intend to seek his replacement.

Ideal mix of skills and experience to deliver meaningful change at Arconic



— Former Executive Vice President of Precision Castparts ("PCC") Elmer Doty

Christopher Ayers

- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of Accudyne Industries (Acquired by The Carlyle Group in 2012)

Former Chief Executive Officer of WireCo WorldGroup, Inc., a leading producer of specialty steel wire ropes Former Vice President of Alcoa Inc. and President of its Global Primary Products Business (NYSE: AA)

- Former President and CEO of Vought Aircraft
- Former Executive Vice President of United Defense Industries, now part of BAE System Plc. (LON: BA)



Charles Hall

- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of AM General
- 37-year career with General Dynamics Corporation (NYSE:GD)
- Final position with General Dynamics was Executive Vice President of Combat Systems

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Bernd Kessler

- Former Chief Executive Officer of SRTechnics AG,
- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of MTU Maintenance, a subsidiary of Aero Engines AG (ETR:MTX)
- Mr. Kessler held management and executive positions for 20 years at Honeywell International Inc. (NYSE:HON)



Patrice Merrin

(NASDAQ:NVDQ)

- Former CEO and a director of Luscar Ltd., Canada's largest producer of thermal coal
- Former Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Sherritt International Corporation (TSE:S)
 Director of Stillwater Mining Company (NYSE:SWC), Glencore plc (LON:GLEN), and Novadag Technologies Inc.






"On a short, meaning next year or this year, and midterm, three- to five-year timeframe, we will continue to produce outstanding shareholder value across all businesses, and <u>take my word, that's our promise</u>."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 1/10/2011

TSR Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld



Since becoming CEO, Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has underperformed the Company's proxy peer median by 156% and the S&P 500 by 151%





"I think then <u>we are creating substantial shareholder value</u>. That's the main driver that we will continue to follow here."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 4/10/1


Source: Bloomberg. TSR 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016, ending the day prior to the Alcoa/Arconic split. Peer group is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes: DU PONT (E.I.) DE NEMOURS, DOW CHEMICAL CO/THE, FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC, HUNTSMAN CORP, INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO, LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A, PFG INDUSTRIES INC, NEWMONT MINING CORP, NUCOR CORP, UNITED STATES STEEL CORP, 3M CO, CUMMINS INC, DANAHER CORP, DEERE & CO, EATON CORP PLC, EMERSON ELECTRIC CO, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP, L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP, RAYTHEON COMPANY. Alcoa's low point was 3/6/2009

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TSR Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld vs. Company Selected Peers

vs Proxy Peers vs. Industrials Proxy Peers vs. Materials Proxy Peers vs. Aluminum Peers vs. S&P 500 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 4-Year 5-Year 6-Year 7-Year 8-Year с. 0 4.1 0.1





Alcoa Cumulative TSR Relative to Each Peer Median and S&P 500 Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld

Peer Group Median. Source: Bloomberg. TSR Trailing as of 10/31/2016, the day before Alcoa and Arconic split. Since CEO TSR: 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016. Peer Proxy is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes two groups named by the Company, industrials board: iboard: board is a set of a s HYDRO ASA, ALUMINA LTD, NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO LTD, SHANDONG NANSHAN ALUMINUM. Since Low is date range 3/6/2009 – 10/31/2016.

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
Alcoa vs. S&P 500 During CEO Tenure



465 of the current S&P 500 companies have been in the index since May 1, 2008. Out of those 465 companies, Alcoa ranks 456th. All of the companies to the left of Alcoa have changed CEOs during this period

"But we are also very focused on ensuring that each and every dollar that we spend, whether it'd be an expense or whether it'd be for a capital investment will both sustain the operations that we have today, and therefore, the cash generation but also, **look forward to create additional value for our shareholders**."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 6/20/16




S&P 500 Returns , 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016


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Arconic's "Dr. Klaus" Discount – 2017 Numbers



Arconic's discount, we believe, can principally be attributed to current management's lack of credibility





Selected Comps: Boeing, Airbus, Spirit Aerosystems, Triumph Group, MTU Aero Engines, Meggitt, TransDigm, Moog, Curtiss-Wright, Woodward, TriMas, Esterline, HEICO, Rockwell-Collins, Safran, Barnes Group, Carpenter Technology, Kaiser Aluminum, Hexcel, United Technologies, AMAG Austria Metall, Embraer, Rolls-Royce, Parker-Hannifin, Crane, Eaton, Zodiac Aerospace, AMETEK, GKN, Honeywell, Hindalco, UACJ

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Arconic's "Dr. Klaus" Discount – 2018 Numbers


11x

9x 7x 5x 10.1x

Arconic

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Larger discount on 2018 estimates suggests lack of confidence in management's ability to hit targets



Selected Comps: Boeing, Airbus, Spirit Aerosystems, Triumph Group, MTU Aero Engines, Meggitt, TransDigm, Moog, Curtiss-Wright, Woodward, TriMas, Esterline, HEICO, Rockwell-Collins, Safran, Barnes Group, Carpenter Technology, Kaiser Aluminum, Hexcel, United Technologies, AMAG Austria Metall, Embraer, Rolls-Royce, Parker-Hannifin, Crane, Eaton, Zodiac Aerospace, AMETEK, GKN, Honeywell, Hindalco, UACI

Mean

Median

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
"Now, I mean, talking to managers, you'd say disciplined execution? Really? I mean, is that a strategic priority? Isn't that what business is about? I mean, <u>it's not just warm words and nice plans, you've</u> got to execute, right? But we actually have put I think more of a discipline around it than what you typically find in an organization."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 11/7/13

"New" 2019 Guidance Resembles Original 2016 Guidance

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After a series of massive guidance misses, the Company released three year targets which are nearly identical to the Company's original 2016 guidance, which pertained until as recently as April 2016



"As we stated in the webcast, we are excited about Arconic's prospects and believe we have a compelling opportunity to create significant long-term value for our shareholders. During the 2017 to 2019 time period, <u>we have set</u> <u>targets that outperform market growth</u>, increase profit margins towards benchmark level and above, improve capital efficiency and significantly reduce debt to strengthen Arconic's balance sheet and credit rating."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld Letter to Shareholders, 12/14/16

Source: Company filings and investor presentations

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
Returns Lower Than Cost of Capital



During Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld's tenure, returns on invested capital have remained consistently below the Company's weighted average cost of capital

"We look at IRRs versus cost of capital, right. So we're breaking in part of the synergies, <u>we look at the returns versus</u> <u>cost of capital</u>."

r. Klaus Kleinfeld, 11/4/15




Alcoa ROIC vs. WACC

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Arconic EPS: Unable to Close the PCC Margin Gap

Elliott worked with a number of experts including: former employees and customers of both Arconic EPS and Precision Castparts, external consulting firms, and an investment bank. The conclusion is unambiguous. EPS and PCC are substantially similar businesses. Nonetheless, Arconic's EPS business is substantially less profitable than PCC



Every 100 bps improvement in margins at Arconic's EPS business is worth ~\$1.20/share

Note: Arconic EPS margins are fully adjusted and include proportional share of estimated downstream corporate and pension expenses based on historical LegacyCo reported figures; Historical PCP numbers adjusted for pension expenses

Source: Company filings; Arconic investor presentations

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GRP: Massive Room to Improve

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Going bottoms-up, we analyzed GRP's mix and cost position relative to peers. The opportunity for improvement is enormous

		CAN BODY STOCK	PLATE	BRAZING SHEET	AUTO BODY	HEAT TREATED	AUTO STRUCTURAL	OTHER	TOTAL
Industry Avg.	Opportunity size	\$70M	\$32M	\$1M	\$20M	\$2M	\$1M	\$21M	~\$150M (Mid Pt.)
Best-in- Class	Opportunity size	\$99M	\$81M	\$31M	\$15M	\$22M	\$1M	\$89M	~\$245M
Best-in- Class with BDP on Overhead/ WIP	Opportunity size	\$127M	\$95M	\$35M	\$15M	\$27M	\$1M	\$102M	~\$400M
BDP Across the Board	Opportunity size	\$242M	\$117M	\$53M	\$59M	\$42M	\$10M	\$218M	~\$750M

Notes:

Industry Average: Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and average production cost summed across Raw Material, Overheard & WIP, and Other. Where Arconic's costs
are lower than average at the cost-bucket level, \$0 improvement opportunity assumed; other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs

Best-in-Class: Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and best in class ('BIC') production cost of the top 10 volume producers for each product; Other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs; Production cost opportunity based on non-China benchmarking; Opportunity size calculated using global Arconic volumes

 Best in-Class w/ BDP on Overhead and WIP: Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and best in class ('BIC') production cost of the top 10 volume producers for each product, BDP overhead and WIP used in place of BIC overhead and WIP; Other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs; Production cost opportunity based on non-China benchmarking; Opportunity size calculated using global Arconic volumes

BDP Across the Board: Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and Best Demonstrated Practice (BDP) production cost (lowest cost line item across top 10 producers) summed across Raw Material, Overheard & WIP, and Other; Other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs. The cost-level established by "Best Demonstrated Practice" may not be fully achievable. The components of rolling costs are interactive, i.e. one component might be low or high directly as a result of another being high or low.

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from Industry Data

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
Poor Corporate Governance Practices

"[O]ne of the things about Alcoa Corp. that is fundamentally different than Alcoa Inc. is that we were given the opportunity to come out with <u>a much better governance structure</u>. So as a new company, <u>we separated the Chairman and the CEO role.</u> <u>I personally believe that's the right way to have the business set up</u>. <u>In addition to that, we've decided to incorporate in Delaware is much more shareholder-friendly</u>."

William F. Oplinger, CFO Alcoa Corp, 11/16/16

Governance Issue	Arconic	Best Practice			
Election of Directors	Staggered Board	Annually Elected Board			
State of Incorporation	Pennsylvania	Delaware			
Removal of Directors	Requires 80% of outstanding	Majority of outstanding			
Bylaw & Charter Amendments	Requires Supermajority	Majority of outstanding			
Leadership Structure	Combined Chairman & CEO	Separate Chairman & CEO			
CEO Share Retention Policy	6X Base Salary	10X Base Salary			
CEO Additional Public Co. Boards	2	0			
Board Stock Ownership	No Open-Market Purchase Requirement	3x Director Salary OM Purchases			

Percentage of Staggered Boards in S&P 500




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Generous Compensation Despite Continually Poor Performance

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has been paid more than \$111M during his tenure despite generating massively negative returns. He has also sold more shares than he owns, including \$46M of stock since 2014



Cumulative TSR vs. Cumulative CEO Compensation

"The <u>Company has been deficient in linking executive pay to corporate performance</u>, as indicated by the <u>'D' grade received by the</u> <u>Company</u> in Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance model. <u>Shareholders should be concerned with this disconnect</u>. A properly structured pay program should motivate executives to drive corporate performance, thus aligning executive and long-term shareholder interests. In this case, as indicated by the poor grade, the Company has not implemented such a program. In our view, <u>shareholders should be concerned with the</u> **compensation committee's failure** in this area."

Glass Lewis, 2016 Alcoa Proxy Paper

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Culture of High C-Suite Turnover

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has been the only constant among Company leadership. Notably there have been 7 heads of investor relations

Position	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	# leaders since 2008
Chairman & CEO	Kiaus Kielmfeid				Ver 44					1
EVP, CFO	Chuck McLane					William Oplinger			Ken Giacobbe	3
President, EPS	William Christopher			Olivier Jamault				\rightarrow	Kari Tragi	3
President GRP	Helmut Wieser			Kay Meggers						2
President, TCS	Kevin Kramer*	Tim Myers*						Jose promotional	iteri Tragi then Tim Myers	5
EVP, HR & EHS	Regina Hitchery		John Bergen		Michael Barriere		Roy Harvey	Vas Nair		5
EVP, Legal	J. Michael Schell	Nicholas DeRoma			Kurt Waldo then Audrey Strauss				Kate Ramundo	5
EVP, Technology	Mohammad Zaidi			Raymond Kilmer						2
Director, Investor Relations	Greg Aschman	Matthew Garth	Roy Harvey	Kelly Pasterick				Nahla Azmy	Matt Garth and Patricia Figueroa	

Despite the Company's penchant for repeatedly 'shooting the messenger,' the problems at Arconic run much deeper than poor investor communications

Note: *President of Wheel and Transportation Products (TCS was not yet a separate entity); Positions listed above not representative of full executive committee; Karl Tragl replaced Jose Drummond at end of 2015, and was replaced by Tim Myers in April 2016 25 ELLIOTT®

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Version 4

New Leadership Is Needed At Arconic

February 3rd, 2017 www.NewArconic.com





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Why Are We Here?

Prolonged disappointing financial results combined with the irreparably damaged credibility of Arconic's current management have created a circumstance whereby Arconic will never approach its potential under the current CEO

- For more than a year, Elliott has engaged in private discussions with the Company regarding the numerous ways in which Arconic could effectively execute its business separation, improve operational performance, enhance investor communications, and establish improved corporate governance practices
 - While we have appreciated the dialogue and remain excited about the Arconic opportunity, we <u>believe a change in CEO is needed</u> for the Company to sustainably create maximum shareholder value

Clear Evidence for the Need of Change in Leadership



Poor Total Shareholder Returns

- A cumulative loss of nearly 70% in value
- --- Profound underperformance compared to any of the Company's self-selected peer groups
- Worst TSR record of any active S&P 500 CEO



Abysmal Operating Performance

- On pace to miss all key operating metrics for 2016; new 2019 targets are indistinguishable from the original guidance for 2016
- Returns on invested capital have remained below cost of capital during Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld's entire tenure
- Massive margin improvement opportunity has existed for years and has not been realized



Broken Company Culture

- We believe that an obsession with image, prestige, and stature is the current CEO's key focus
- Wasteful corporate spending on questionable projects that enthuse the CEO but provide little benefit to the business or shareholders
- Antiquated corporate governance has resulted in failure to hold the CEO accountable, but has enabled the delivery to him
 of more than \$111 million in compensation over an 8 year period

Poor Total Shareholder Return: See pages 5,11,12, and 13 for details

3



Our Goals at Arconic

Elliott is Arconic's largest shareholder, owning approximately 10.5% of shares outstanding. We are seeking sustained improvements at Arconic to benefit all long-term stakeholders Please note that Elliott holds economic interest of over 12.1% of Arconic

Change the Culture



✓ Instill a culture dedicated to fierce operational focus

- ✓ Foster an entrepreneurial spirit by empowering and incentivizing each business unit and each manufacturing plant to participate in the upside of operational improvements
- ✓ Eliminate image-driven and wasteful culture (e.g. "The Jetsons" ad campaign, continued headquarters at Lever House)
- ✓ Overhaul the Company's antiquated corporate governance and adopt modern best practices demonstrating that "New Arconic" welcomes accountability



- ✓ Achieve substantial and real corporate-level margin improvement through:
 - ✓ Closing the persistent margin gap to the Company's closest peer in the EPS business
 - ✓ Achieving real margin improvements in GRP and TCS businesses
 - ✓ Dramatically reducing corporate overhead
- ✓ Allocate capital away from wasteful projects and toward more practical growth strategies


We believe that through a combination of operational and cultural changes, Arconic has an approximately 45 - 138% upside

Source for images: Instagram

4

Change the Culture: Remove Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld from Arconic

Despite years of poor performance, a culture of grandiose rhetoric devoid of any real substance or follow-through has been tolerated



Peer Group Median. Source: Bloomberg. TSR Trailing as of 10/31/2016, the day before Alcoa and Arconic split. Since CEO TSR: 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016. Peer Proxy is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes two groups named by the Company, Industrials Peers which are the following ten companies: 3M CO, CUMMINS INC, DANAHER CORP, DEERE & CO, EATON CORP PLC, EMERSON ELECTRIC CO, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP, L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC, NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP, RAYTHEON COMPANY, And Materials Peers which are the following 10 companies: UD VONT [E.1.] DE NEMOURS, DOW CHEMICAL CO/THE, FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC, HUNTSMAN CORP, INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO, PPG INDUSTRIES INC, NEWMONT MINING CORP, NUCOR CORP, UNITED STATES STEEL CORP, LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A. THE Company's self-selected Aluminum Company peers consist of: ALUMINUM CORP OF CHINA LTD-H, UNITED CO RUSAL PLC, NORSK HYDRO ASA, ALUMINA LTD, NATIONAL ALUMINUM CO LTD, SHANDONG NANSHAN ALUMINUM. Since Low is date range 3/6/2009 – 10/31/2016.

Source for all quotes in this presentation, Bloomberg transcripts, unless otherwise indicated. Emphasis added by Elliott for all quotes throughout this presentation


Change the Culture: Consider Larry Lawson for CEO

Elliott has engaged Mr. Lawson as a consultant on its investment in Arconic and believes that Mr. Lawson should be a leading candidate to become the Company's CEO, as he has the ideal set of skills needed to turn around Arconic's woefully and continually underperforming business





- ✓ Former CEO of Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. (NYSE: SPR)
- ✓ Former Executive Vice President of Aeronautics of Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT)
- ✓ Former Flight Control Engineer of McDonnell Douglas (Acquired by The Boeing Company in 1997)



"<u>SPR stock is up over 160% since Larry Lawson was named president and CEO</u> of the company on March 19, 2013 effective April 6, 2013. Sentiment for <u>SPR has improved as the company focused on controlling costs, generating positive free cash</u> <u>flow</u>, and divesting the problematic G650 and G280 wing programs in Tulsa. In our view<u>, market expectation for performance is</u> <u>now significantly higher for SPR than with the previous management team</u>."

BAML, 4/30/15

"[H]e is a <u>tough change agent with unrelenting demands on performance improvements</u>. As such, we're beginning to conclude that he might be just what SPR always needed."

arclays, 12/18/13

Source for stock chart: Bloomberg, ending day prior to announced of planned departure of Mr. Lawson as CEO (6/7/2016)

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Drive Sustainable Shareholder Value Through Operational Improvement





Close the Margin Gap with Precision Castparts ("PCC")

- EPS margins have consistently lagged 700-1100 basis points below PCC despite the fact that there are few (if any) structural reasons for this gap
- Each 100 bps improvement in margins at Arconic's EPS business is worth ~\$1.20/share
- Improving margins by 900 basis-points to levels approximating PCC's would increase value by ~\$10.50/share



Achieve Real Margin Improvement in Global Rolled Products ("GRP")

- Management's 3-5 year goal of increasing GRP margins is misleading at best, deceptive at worst, and the majority is already baked
- Approximately 130-150 bps of the targeted improvement comes from simply eliminating can sheet volumes
- Reaching industry average performance would increase EBITDA by \$150 million
- Achieving best demonstrated practice (BDP) would increase EBITDA by \$750 million, worth ~\$13.50/share



Reduction of Corporate Overhead

- Arconic has excess corporate overhead which we believe is a direct result of the Company's "CEO-centric" culture
- Alcoa Corp. which has overhead costs which are roughly half those of its former parent has already announced plans to cut \$50 million, while repeatedly highlighting the cost reduction opportunity resulting from the separation from its bloated former parent:

"Yery, very focused on cutting costs, and you'll hear me talk about that, that's one of the things that's different about Alcoa Corp. As we go forward, we'll be very, very focused on not only cutting cost at the plant level, but also in the overhead structure... We did not take any of the corporate jets with us. We skinny down the corporate office to only 15 people here in New York. So we're now on one floor in the New York office. We've eliminated our Geneva office. We've gone – and I use these just as examples. We've gone location by location and cut overhead costs, but there's still more work to be done."

William F. Oplinger, CFO of Alcoa Corp, 11/16/16

— Cutting a comparable \$100 million would increase value by \$800 million, worth ~\$1.60/share



Implement Capital Allocation Discipline

- Arconic has spent \$2.2 billion at GRP without increasing EBITDA dollars.
- ROA at EPS plummeted during Dr. Kleinfeld's tenure
- More disciplined capital spending and exploration of strategic options with respect to GRP and TCS could produce significant additional value

1. We attribute 100-200 bps of the margin gap to hidden Corporate spend hence closing the full gap is less than 1,100

Even Modest Improvement Produces Dramatic Returns



Elliott's targets are based on the mid-point of Arconic's 2017 revenue target

• Unlike management, Elliott believes that Arconic margins can be improved even absent additional scale

- In short, even without growth, Arconic could be worth at least \$33-\$54 per share.

		Lo	w		High			
	Amount	<u>Multiple</u>	Value	<u>\$/Share</u>	<u>Amount</u>	Multiple	<u>Value</u>	\$/Share
Current Performance/Price	\$1,815	8.7x		\$22.50	\$1,815	8.7x		\$22.50
EPS Margin Improvement	\$342	9.0x	\$3,078	\$6.31	\$513	11.0x	\$5,643	\$11.56
GRP Margin Improvement	\$150	7.5x	\$1,131	\$2.32	\$750	8.8x	\$6,590	\$13.50
TCS Improvement	\$36	7.3x	\$261	\$0.53	\$36	10.3x	\$371	\$0.76
Cut Corporate Costs	\$50	8.6x	\$429	\$0.88	\$100	8.6x	\$858	\$1.76
Overall Improvement	\$578	8.5x	\$4 <i>,</i> 899	\$10.04	\$1,399	9.6x	\$13,462	\$27.59
Improved Credibility & Multiple Expansion					\$1,815	0.9x	\$1,698	\$3.48
Total	\$2,393	8.5x		\$32.54	\$3,214	9.6x		\$53.57
vs. Current Share Price				44.6%				138.1%

Low Case

- 600 bps improvement at EPS at 9.0x multiple
- GRP to achieve in-line performance with peers based on bottoms-up mix analysis
- Cut \$50 million in Corporate costs
- High Case
 - 900 bps improvement at EPS at 11.0x multiple
 - GRP to achieve Best Demonstrated Practice (BDP) performance based on bottoms-up mix analysis (pg. 21 and Appendix)

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• Cut \$100 million in Corporate costs

Note: Corporate Costs opportunity takes into account substantial hidden Corporate costs that we believe are pushed down to segments

Shareholder Nominees



Please note that if the Company renominates Ulrich Schmidt at the 2016 annual

meeting, Elliott does not intend to seek his replacement.

Ideal mix of skills and experience to deliver meaningful change at Arconic



Elmer Doty

Christopher Ayers

- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of Accudyne Industries (Acquired by The Carlyle Group in 2012)

Former Chief Executive Officer of WireCo WorldGroup, Inc., a leading producer of specialty steel wire ropes Former Vice President of Alcoa Inc. and President of its Global Primary Products Business (NYSE: AA)

- Former President and CEO of Vought Aircraft
- Former Executive Vice President of United Defense Industries, now part of BAE System Plc. (LON: BA)



Charles Hall

— Former President and Chief Executive Officer of AM General

Former Executive Vice President of Precision Castparts ("PCC")

- 37-year career with General Dynamics Corporation (NYSE:GD)
- Final position with General Dynamics was Executive Vice President of Combat Systems

Father
-
(A)

Bernd Kessler

- Former Chief Executive Officer of SRTechnics AG,
- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of MTU Maintenance, a subsidiary of Aero Engines AG (ETR:MTX)
- Mr. Kessler held management and executive positions for 20 years at Honeywell International Inc. (NYSE:HON)



Patrice Merrin

(NASDAQ:NVDQ)

- Former CEO and a director of Luscar Ltd., Canada's largest producer of thermal coal
- Former Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Sherritt International Corporation (TSE:S)
 Director of Stillwater Mining Company (NYSE:SWC), Glencore plc (LON:GLEN), and Novadaq Technologies Inc.






"On a short, meaning next year or this year, and midterm, three- to five-year timeframe, we will continue to produce outstanding shareholder value across all businesses, and <u>take my word, that's our promise</u>."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 1/10/2011

TSR Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld



Since becoming CEO, Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has underperformed the Company's proxy peer median by 156% and the S&P 500 by 151%





"I think then <u>we are creating substantial shareholder value</u>. That's the main driver that we will continue to follow here."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 4/10/1


Source: Bloomberg. TSR 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016, ending the day prior to the Alcoa/Arconic split. Peer group is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes: DU PONT (E.I.) DE NEMOURS, DOW CHEMICAL CO/THE, FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC, HUNTSMAN CORP, INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO, LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A, PFG INDUSTRIES INC, NEWMONT MINING CORP, NUCOR CORP, UNITED STATES STEEL CORP, 3M CO, CUMMINS INC, DANAHER CORP, DEERE & CO, EATON CORP PLC, EMERSON ELECTRIC CO, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP, L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP, RAYTHEON COMPANY. Alcoa's low point was 3/6/2009

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TSR Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld vs. Company Selected Peers

vs Proxy Peers vs. Industrials Proxy Peers vs. Materials Proxy Peers vs. Aluminum Peers vs. S&P 500 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 4-Year 5-Year 6-Year 7-Year 8-Year с. 0 4.1 0.1





Alcoa Cumulative TSR Relative to Each Peer Median and S&P 500 Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld

Peer Group Median. Source: Bloomberg. TSR Trailing as of 10/31/2016, the day before Alcoa and Arconic split. Since CEO TSR: 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016. Peer Proxy is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes two groups named by the Company, industrials board: iboard: board is a set of a s HYDRO ASA, ALUMINA LTD, NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO LTD, SHANDONG NANSHAN ALUMINUM. Since Low is date range 3/6/2009 – 10/31/2016.

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
Alcoa vs. S&P 500 During CEO Tenure



465 of the current S&P 500 companies have been in the index since May 1, 2008. Out of those 465 companies, Alcoa ranks 456th. All of the companies to the left of Alcoa have changed CEOs during this period

"But we are also very focused on ensuring that each and every dollar that we spend, whether it'd be an expense or whether it'd be for a capital investment will both sustain the operations that we have today, and therefore, the cash generation but also, **look forward to create additional value for our shareholders**."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 6/20/16




S&P 500 Returns , 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016


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Arconic's "Dr. Klaus" Discount – 2017 Numbers



Arconic's discount, we believe, can principally be attributed to current management's lack of credibility





Selected Comps: Boeing, Airbus, Spirit Aerosystems, Triumph Group, MTU Aero Engines, Meggitt, TransDigm, Moog, Curtiss-Wright, Woodward, TriMas, Esterline, HEICO, Rockwell-Collins, Safran, Barnes Group, Carpenter Technology, Kaiser Aluminum, Hexcel, United Technologies, AMAG Austria Metall, Embraer, Rolls-Royce, Parker-Hannifin, Crane, Eaton, Zodiac Aerospace, AMETEK, GKN, Honeywell, Hindalco, UACJ

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Arconic's "Dr. Klaus" Discount – 2018 Numbers


11x

9x 7x 5x 10.1x

Arconic

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Larger discount on 2018 estimates suggests lack of confidence in management's ability to hit targets



Selected Comps: Boeing, Airbus, Spirit Aerosystems, Triumph Group, MTU Aero Engines, Meggitt, TransDigm, Moog, Curtiss-Wright, Woodward, TriMas, Esterline, HEICO, Rockwell-Collins, Safran, Barnes Group, Carpenter Technology, Kaiser Aluminum, Hexcel, United Technologies, AMAG Austria Metall, Embraer, Rolls-Royce, Parker-Hannifin, Crane, Eaton, Zodiac Aerospace, AMETEK, GKN, Honeywell, Hindalco, UACI

Mean

Median

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


"Now, I mean, talking to managers, you'd say disciplined execution? Really? I mean, is that a strategic priority? Isn't that what business is about? I mean, <u>it's not just warm words and nice plans, you've</u> got to execute, right? But we actually have put I think more of a discipline around it than what you typically find in an organization."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 11/7/13

"New" 2019 Guidance Closely Resembles Original 2016 Guidance

After a series of massive guidance misses, the Company released three year targets which are nearly identical to the Company's original 2016 guidance, which pertained until as recently as April 2016



"As we stated in the webcast, we are excited about Arconic's prospects and believe we have a compelling opportunity to create significant long-term value for our shareholders. During the 2017 to 2019 time period, <u>we have set</u> <u>targets that outperform market growth</u>, increase profit margins towards benchmark level and above, improve capital efficiency and significantly reduce debt to strengthen Arconic's balance sheet and credit rating."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld Letter to Shareholders, 12/14/16

Source: Company filings and investor presentations

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
Returns Lower Than Cost of Capital



During Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld's tenure, returns on invested capital have remained consistently below the Company's weighted average cost of capital

"We look at IRRs versus cost of capital, right. So we're breaking in part of the synergies, <u>we look at the returns versus</u> <u>cost of capital</u>."

r. Klaus Kleinfeld, 11/4/15




Alcoa ROIC vs. WACC

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Arconic EPS: Unable to Close the PCC Margin Gap

Elliott worked with a number of experts including: former employees and customers of both Arconic EPS and Precision Castparts, external consulting firms, and an investment bank. The conclusion is unambiguous. EPS and PCC are substantially similar businesses. Nonetheless, *Arconic's EPS business is substantially less profitable than PCC*



Every 100 bps improvement in margins at Arconic's EPS business is worth ~\$1.20/share

Note: Arconic EPS margins include proportional share of estimated downstream corporate and pension expenses based on historical LegacyCo reported figures; Historical PCP numbers adjusted for pension expenses

Source: Company filings; Alcoa investor presentation

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GRP: Massive Room to Improve

Going bottoms-up, we analyzed GRP's mix and cost position relative to peers. The opportunity for improvement is enormous

mous		CAN BODY STOCK	PLATE	BRAZING SHEET	AUTO BODY	HEAT TREATED	AUTO STRUCTURAL	OTHER	TOTAL
	Arconic Production Cost 2015 (\$/ton)*	904	1,335	988	1,126	1,161	1,066	948	1,000
	Indexed BDP** Production Cost (\$/ton)	757	1,089	828	971	879	817	790	832
	Production cost improvement opportunity**	16%	18%	16%	14%	24%	23%	17%	17%
ortunity oucket	Raw Material	0%	6%	31%	4%	7%	45%	19%	10%
nt opp							t differential		
veme ible tc	Overhead & WIP	43%	40%	17%	37%	37%	22%	17%	32%
% of improvement opportunity attributable to cost bucket	Other	57%	54%	53%	59%	56%	33%	64%	58%
	Arconic current production (K ton)	37%	11%	7%	9%	3%	1%	31%	100%
	Opportunity size	\$242M	\$117M	\$53M	\$59M	\$42M	\$10M	\$218M	~\$750M
	A	-						- 1 - 1	

\$750 million improvement in EBITDA at GRP is worth ~\$13.50/share

Note: * Indexed to 1,000; **Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and Best Demonstrated Practice (BDP) production cost (lowest cost line item across top 10 producers) summed across Raw Material, Overheard & WIP, and Other; Other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs. The cost-level established by "Best Demonstrated Practice" may not be fully achievable. The components of rolling costs are interactive, i.e. one component might be low or high directly as a result of another being high or low.

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU Cost Data.

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Poor Corporate Governance Practices


t me more ainen the annartunity to

"[O]ne of the things about Alcoa Corp. that is fundamentally different than Alcoa Inc. is that we were given the opportunity to come out with <u>a much better governance structure</u>. So as a new company, <u>we separated the Chairman and the CEO role.</u> <u>I personally believe that's the right way to have the business set up</u>. <u>In addition to that</u>, we've decided to <u>incorporate in Delaware</u>... <u>Delaware is much more shareholder-friendly</u>."

William F. Oplinger, CFO Alcoa Corp, 11/16/16

Governance Issue	Arconic	Best Practice		
Election of Directors	Staggered Board	Annually Elected Board		
State of Incorporation	Pennsylvania	Delaware		
Removal of Directors	Requires 80% of outstanding	Majority of outstanding		
Bylaw & Charter Amendments	Requires Supermajority	Majority of outstanding		
Leadership Structure	Combined Chairman & CEO	Separate Chairman & CEO		
CEO Share Retention Policy	6X Base Salary	10X Base Salary		
CEO Additional Public Co. Boards	2	0		
Board Stock Ownership	No Open-Market Purchase Requirement	3x Director Salary OM Purchases		


Percentage of Staggered Boards in S&P 500



23

Generous Compensation Despite Continually Poor Performance

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has been paid more than \$111M during his tenure despite generating massively negative returns. He has also sold more shares than he owns, including \$46M of stock since 2014



Cumulative TSR vs. Cumulative CEO Compensation

"The <u>Company has been deficient in linking executive pay to corporate performance</u>, as indicated by the <u>'D' grade received by the</u> <u>Company</u> in Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance model. <u>Shareholders should be concerned with this disconnect</u>. A properly structured pay program should motivate executives to drive corporate performance, thus aligning executive and long-term shareholder interests. In this case, as indicated by the poor grade, the Company has not implemented such a program. In our view, <u>shareholders should be concerned with the</u> **compensation committee's failure** in this area."

Glass Lewis, 2016 Alcoa Proxy Paper

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\Leftrightarrow

Culture of High C-Suite Turnover

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has been the only constant among Company leadership. Notably there have been 7 heads of investor relations


Position	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	# leaders since 2008
Chairman & CEO	Klaus Kleinfeid									1
EVP, CFO	Chuck McLane					William Oplinger			Ken Giacobbe	3
President, EPS	William Christopher			Olivier Jerrault					Kari Tragi	3
President GRP	Helmut Wieser			Kay Meggers						2
President, TCS	Kavin Kramar*	Tim Myers*		0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0				Jose crummond	Kari Tragi then Tim Myers	5
EVP, HR & EHS	Regina Hitchery		John Bergen		Michael Barriere		Roy Harvey	Vas Nair		5
EVP, Legal	J. Michael Schell	Nicholas DeRoma			Kurt Waldo then Audrey Strauss				Kate Ramundo	5
EVP, Technology	Mohammad Zaidi			Raymond Kilmer						2
Director, Investor Relations	Greg Aschman	Matthew Garth	Roy Harvey	Kelly Pasterick				Nahla Azmy	Matt Garth and Patricia Figueroa	

Despite the Company's penchant for repeatedly 'shooting the messenger,' the problems at Arconic run much deeper than poor investor communications

Note: *President of Wheel and Transportation Products (TCS was not yet a separate entity); Positions listed above not representative of full executive committee; Karl Tragl replaced Jose Drummond at end of 2015, and was replaced by Tim Myers in April 2016 25 25 ELLIOTT®

Appendix: Additional GRP Supporting Data






Note: * BDP (green) assumes minimum cost in each bucket, Best in class (yellow) assumes lowest total cost producer for product (excludes Comp R in this BIC example for better apples-to apples comparison); "The cost-level established by "Best Demonstrated Practice" may not be fully achievable. The components of rolling costs are interactive, i.e. one component might be low or high directly as a result of another being high or low:" Production indexed to Arconic at 10.9 Production cost indexed to Arconic at 51,000 per ton

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data

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GRP Benchmarking: Plate




Note: * BDP (green) assumes minimum cost in each bucket, Best in class (yellow) assumes lowest total cost producer for product (excludes Comp R in this BIC example for better apples-to apples comparison); "The cost-level established by "Best Demonstrated Practice" may not be fully achievable. The components of rolling costs are interactive, i.e. one component might be low or high directly as a result of another being high or low:" Production indexed to Arconic at 1.0; Production cost indexed to Arconic at \$1,000 per ton

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data

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
GRP Benchmarking: Brazing Sheet



Note: * BDP (green) assumes minimum cost in each bucket, Best in class (yellow) assumes lowest total cost producer for product (excludes Comp R in this BIC example for better apples-to apples comparison); "The cost-level established by "Best Demonstrated Practice" may not be fully achievable. The components of rolling costs are interactive, i.e. one component might be low or high directly as a result of another being high or low:" Production indexed to Arconic at 1.0; Production cost indexed to Arconic at \$1,000 per ton

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data

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


GRP Benchmarking: Auto Body Sheet

Note: * BDP (green) assumes minimum cost in each bucket, Best in class (yellow) assumes lowest total cost producer for product (excludes Comp R in this BIC example for better apples-to apples comparison); "The cost-level established by "Best Demonstrated Practice" may not be fully achievable. The components of rolling costs are interactive, i.e. one component might be low or high directly as a result of another being high or low:" Production indexed to Arconic at 1.0; Production cost indexed to Arconic at \$1,000 per ton

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data

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GRP Benchmarking: Heat Treat Sheet (Auto & Other)

Note: * BDP (green) assumes minimum cost in each bucket, Best in class (yellow) assumes lowest total cost producer for product (excludes Comp R in this BIC example for better apples-to apples comparison); "The cost-level established by "Best Demonstrated Practice" may not be fully achievable. The components of rolling costs are interactive, i.e. one component might be low or high directly as a result of another being high or low:" Production indexed to Arconic at 1.0; Production cost indexed to Arconic at \$1,000 per ton

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data

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1400 Raw Material Overheads & WIP Finishing Cast House Cold Mill Delivery Hot Mill 1,218 1,157 1200 1,090 1,093 1,085 1,070 1,053 1,000 987 Indexed production cost (\$/ton) 978 1000 767 800 600 400 200 0 Comp. G Comp. C Comp. H Comp. S Comp. A Comp. D Other Arconic Comp. N Comp. R BDP Indexed Production 0.3 0.6 2.6 12.1 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.3 1.0 3.2 (Kmt)

GRP Benchmarking: Auto Structural

Note: * BDP (green) assumes minimum cost in each bucket, Best in class (yellow) assumes lowest total cost producer for product (excludes Comp R in this BIC example for better apples-to apples comparison); "The cost-level established by "Best Demonstrated Practice" may not be fully achievable. The components of rolling costs are interactive, i.e. one component might be low or high directly as a result of another being high or low:" Production indexed to Arconic at 1.0; Production cost indexed to Arconic at \$1,000 per ton

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data

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Benchmarking analysis suggests there is headroom for GRP to improve cost position vs. industry average

GRP Benchmarking

		CAN BODY STOCK	PLATE	BRAZING SHEET	AUTO BODY	HEAT TREATED	AUTO STRUCTURAL	OTHER	TOTAL
	Arconic Production Cost 2015 (\$/ton)*	904	1,335	988	1,126	1,161	1,066	948	1,000
	Production cost improvement opportunity**	5%	5%	0%	5%	1%	2%	2%	3%
portunity bucket	Raw Material	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
% of improvement opportunity attributable to cost bucket	Overhead & WIP	67%	53%	0%	66%	85%	76%	~1%	54%
% of impr attribut	Other	33%	47%	100%	34%	15%	24%	~99%	46%
	Arconic current production (K ton)	37%	11%	7%	9%	3%	1%	31%	100%
	Opportunity size	\$70M	\$32M	\$1M	\$20M	\$2M	\$1M	\$21M	~\$150M

Note: *Indexed to 1,000; ** Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and average production cost summed across Raw Material, Overheard & WIP, and Other. Where Arconic's costs are lower than average at the cost-bucket level, \$0 improvement opportunity assumed; other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs; costs per ton indexed to 1,000

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data





Benchmarking analysis suggests there is headroom for GRP to improve cost position vs. best-in-class 'BIC'

GRP Benchmarking

		CAN BODY STOCK	PLATE	BRAZING SHEET	AUTO BODY	HEAT TREATED	AUTO STRUCTURAL	OTHER	TOTAL
	Arconic Production Cost 2015 (\$/ton)*	904	1,335	988	1,126	1,161	1,066	948	1,000
	Indexed BIC** Production Cost (\$/ton)	844	1,164	892	1,087	1,016	1,052	884	924
	Production cost improvement opportunity**	7%	13%	10%	4%	12%	1%	7%	8%
oortunity bucket	Raw Material	-9%	-9%	72%	-229%	5%	-826%	20%	-4%
% of improvement opportunity attributable to cost bucket	Overhead & WIP	77%	40%	10%	144%	50%	393%	28%	51%
% of imp attribu	Other	32%	68%	18%	185%	45%	533%	52%	53%
	Arconic current production (K ton)	37%	11%	7%	9%	3%	1%	31%	100%
	Opportunity size	\$99M	\$81M	\$31M	\$15M	\$22M	\$1M	\$89M	~\$340M

Note: *Indexed to 1,000; **Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and best in class ('BIC') production cost of the top 10 volume producers for each product; Other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs; Production cost opportunity based on non-China benchmarking; Opportunity size calculated using global Arconic volumes; costs per ton indexed to 1,000

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data

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Benchmarking analysis suggests there is headroom for GRP to improve cost position vs. BIC w/ BDP overhead & WIP

GRP Benchmarking

		CAN BODY STOCK	PLATE	BRAZING SHEET	AUTO BODY	HEAT TREATED	AUTO STRUCTURAL	OTHER	TOTAL
	Arconic Production Cost 2015 (\$/ton)*	904	1,335	988	1,126	1,161	1,066	948	1,000
	Indexed BIC** Production Cost (\$/ton)	827	1,135	881	1,086	984	1,052	874	909
	Production cost improvement opportunity**	9%	15%	11%	4%	15%	1%	8%	9%
oortunity bucket	Raw Material	-7%	-7%	65%	-223%	4%	-826%	16%	-4%
% of improvement opportunity attributable to cost bucket	Overhead & WIP	82%	49%	19%	143%	59%	393%	42%	60%
% of imp attribu	Other	25%	58%	16%	181%	37%	533%	41%	44%
	Arconic current production (K ton)	37%	11%	7%	9%	3%	1%	31%	100%
	Opportunity size	\$127M	\$95M	\$35M	\$15M	\$27M	\$1M	\$102M	~\$400M

Note: *Indexed to 1,000; ** Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and best in class ('BIC') production cost of the top 10 volume producers for each product, BDP overhead and WIP used in place of BIC overhead and WIP; Other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs; Production cost opportunity based on non-China benchmarking; Opportunity size calculated using global Arconic volumes; costs per ton indexed to 1,000

Source: Elliott Analysis Derived from CRU cost data

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Per Share Improvement Data Tables *Effect of Performance Improvements at GRP and EPS*

	Per Share	Increase fr	om GRP P	erformance	e Improvem	ent					
			Low						High		
			\$ millions								
			\$150	\$250	\$350	\$450	\$550	\$650	\$750		
	Low	7.54x	\$2.32	\$3.86	\$5.41	\$6.95	\$8.50	\$10.04	\$11.59		
a .		7.75x	\$2.38	\$3.97	\$5.56	\$7.15	\$8.73	\$10.32	\$11.91		
Multiple		8.00x	\$2.46	\$4.10	\$5.74	\$7.38	\$9.02	\$10.66	\$12.30		
Mul		8.25x	\$2.54	\$4.23	\$5.92	\$7.61	\$9.30	\$10.99	\$12.68		
	High	8.50x	\$2.61	\$4.35	\$6.10	\$7.84	\$9.58	\$11.32	\$13.06		
	півії	8.79x	\$2.70	\$4.50	\$6.30	\$8.10	\$9.90	\$11.70	\$13.50		
	Per Share I	ncrease fr	om EPS Pe	rformance	Improveme	ent					
	Low Basis Points										
			600	650	700	750	800	850	900		
	Low	9.00x	\$6.31	\$6.83	\$7.36	\$7.88	\$8.41	\$8.94	\$9.46		

			000	030	700	730	800	020	900
	Low	9.00x	\$6.31	\$6.83	\$7.36	\$7.88	\$8.41	\$8.94	\$9.46
ole		9.25x	\$6.48	\$7.02	\$7.56	\$8.10	\$8.64	\$9.18	\$9.72
		9.50x	\$6.66	\$7.21	\$7.77	\$8.32	\$8.88	\$9.43	\$9.99
		9.75x	\$6.83	\$7.40	\$7.97	\$8.54	\$9.11	\$9.68	\$10.25
Multiple		10.00x	\$7.01	\$7.59	\$8.18	\$8.76	\$9.34	\$9.93	\$10.51
Z		10.25x	\$7.18	\$7.78	\$8.38	\$8.98	\$9.58	\$10.18	\$10.78
		10.50x	\$7.36	\$7.97	\$8.59	\$9.20	\$9.81	\$10.42	\$11.04
		10.75x	\$7.53	\$8.16	\$8.79	\$9.42	\$10.05	\$10.67	\$11.30
	High	11.00x	\$7.71	\$8.35	\$8.99	\$9.64	\$10.28	\$10.92	\$11.56
					36				

Contact Information



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Version 3

New Leadership Is Needed At Arconic

January 31, 2017 www.NewArconic.com





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Why Are We Here?

Prolonged disappointing financial results combined with the irreparably damaged credibility of Arconic's current management have created a circumstance whereby Arconic will never approach its potential under the current CEO

- For more than a year, Elliott has engaged in private discussions with the Company regarding the numerous ways in which Arconic could effectively execute its business separation, improve operational performance, enhance investor communications, and establish improved corporate governance practices
 - While we have appreciated the dialogue and remain excited about the Arconic opportunity, we <u>believe a change in CEO is needed</u> for the Company to sustainably create maximum shareholder value

Clear Evidence for the Need of Change in Leadership



Poor Total Shareholder Returns

- A cumulative loss of nearly 70% in value
- --- Profound underperformance compared to any of the Company's self-selected peer groups
- Worst TSR record of any active S&P 500 CEO



Abysmal Operating Performance

- On pace to miss all key operating metrics for 2016; new 2019 targets are indistinguishable from the original guidance for 2016
- Returns on invested capital have remained below cost of capital during Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld's entire tenure
- Massive margin improvement opportunity has existed for years and has not been realized



Broken Company Culture

- We believe that an obsession with image, prestige, and stature is the current CEO's key focus
- Wasteful corporate spending on questionable projects that enthuse the CEO but provide little benefit to the business or shareholders
- Antiquated corporate governance has resulted in failure to hold the CEO accountable, but has enabled the delivery to him
 of more than \$111 million in compensation over an 8 year period

Poor Total Shareholder Return: See pages 5,11,12, and 13 for details

3



Our Goals at Arconic

Elliott is Arconic's largest shareholder, owning approximately 10.5% of shares outstanding. We are seeking sustained improvements at Arconic to benefit all long-term stakeholders Please note that Elliott holds economic interest of over 12.1% of Arconic

Change the Culture



✓ Instill a culture dedicated to fierce operational focus

- ✓ Foster an entrepreneurial spirit by empowering and incentivizing each business unit and each manufacturing plant to participate in the upside of operational improvements
- ✓ Eliminate image-driven and wasteful culture (e.g. "The Jetsons" ad campaign, continued headquarters at Lever House)
- ✓ Overhaul the Company's antiquated corporate governance and adopt modern best practices demonstrating that "New Arconic" welcomes accountability



- ✓ Achieve substantial and real corporate-level margin improvement through:
 - ✓ Closing the persistent margin gap to the Company's closest peer in the EPS business
 - ✓ Achieving real margin improvements in GRP and TCS businesses
 - ✓ Dramatically reducing corporate overhead
- ✓ Allocate capital away from wasteful projects and toward more practical growth strategies


We believe that through a combination of operational and cultural changes, Arconic has an approximately 45 - 138% upside

Source for images: Instagram

4

Change the Culture: Remove Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld from Arconic

Despite years of poor performance, a culture of grandiose rhetoric devoid of any real substance or follow-through has been tolerated



Peer Group Median. Source: Bloomberg. TSR Trailing as of 10/31/2016, the day before Alcoa and Arconic split. Since CEO TSR: 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016. Peer Proxy is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes two groups named by the Company, Industrials Peers which are the following ten companies: 3M CO, CUMMINS INC, DANAHER CORP, DEERE & CO, EATON CORP PLC, EMERSON ELECTRIC CO, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP, L3 TECHNOLOGIES INC, NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP, RAYTHEON COMPANY, And Materials Peers which are the following 10 companies: UD VONT [E.1.] DE NEMOURS, DOW CHEMICAL CO/THE, FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC, HUNTSMAN CORP, INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO, PPG INDUSTRIES INC, NEWMONT MINING CORP, NUCOR CORP, UNITED STATES STEEL CORP, LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A. THE Company's self-selected Aluminum Company peers consist of: ALUMINUM CORP OF CHINA LTD-H, UNITED CO RUSAL PLC, NORSK HYDRO ASA, ALUMINA LTD, NATIONAL ALUMINUM CO LTD, SHANDONG NANSHAN ALUMINUM. Since Low is date range 3/6/2009 – 10/31/2016.

Source for all quotes in this presentation, Bloomberg transcripts, unless otherwise indicated. Emphasis added by Elliott for all quotes throughout this presentation


Change the Culture: Consider Larry Lawson for CEO

Elliott has engaged Mr. Lawson as a consultant on its investment in Arconic and believes that Mr. Lawson should be a leading candidate to become the Company's CEO, as he has the ideal set of skills needed to turn around Arconic's woefully and continually underperforming business





- ✓ Former CEO of Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. (NYSE: SPR)
- ✓ Former Executive Vice President of Aeronautics of Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT)
- ✓ Former Flight Control Engineer of McDonnell Douglas (Acquired by The Boeing Company in 1997)



"<u>SPR stock is up over 160% since Larry Lawson was named president and CEO</u> of the company on March 19, 2013 effective April 6, 2013. Sentiment for <u>SPR has improved as the company focused on controlling costs, generating positive free cash</u> <u>flow</u>, and divesting the problematic G650 and G280 wing programs in Tulsa. In our view<u>, market expectation for performance is</u> <u>now significantly higher for SPR than with the previous management team</u>."

BAML, 4/30/15

"[H]e is a <u>tough change agent with unrelenting demands on performance improvements</u>. As such, we're beginning to conclude that he might be just what SPR always needed."

arclays, 12/18/13

Source for stock chart: Bloomberg, ending day prior to announced of planned departure of Mr. Lawson as CEO (6/7/2016)

6

Drive Sustainable Shareholder Value Through Operational Improvement





Close the Margin Gap with Precision Castparts ("PCC")

- EPS margins have consistently lagged 700-1100 basis points below PCC despite the fact that there are few (if any) structural reasons for this gap
- Each 100 bps improvement in margins at Arconic's EPS business is worth ~\$1.20/share
- Improving margins by 900 basis-points to levels approximating PCC's would increase value by ~\$10.50/share



Achieve Real Margin Improvement in Global Rolled Products ("GRP")

- Management's 3-5 year goal of increasing GRP margins is misleading at best, deceptive at worst, and the majority is already baked
- Approximately 130-150 bps of the targeted improvement comes from simply eliminating can sheet volumes
- Reaching industry average performance would increase EBITDA by \$150 million
- Achieving best-in-class performance would increase EBITDA by \$750 million, worth ~\$13.50/share



Reduction of Corporate Overhead

- Arconic has excess corporate overhead which we believe is a direct result of the Company's "CEO-centric" culture
- Alcoa Corp. which has overhead costs which are roughly half those of its former parent has already announced plans to cut \$50 million, while repeatedly highlighting the cost reduction opportunity resulting from the separation from its bloated former parent:

"Very, very focused on cutting costs, and you'll hear me talk about that, that's one of the things that's different about Alcoa Corp. As we go forward, we'll be very, very focused on not only cutting cost at the plant level, but also in the overhead structure... We did not take any of the corporate jets with us. We skinny down the corporate office to only 15 people here in New York. So we're now on one floor in the New York office. We've eliminated our Geneva office. We've gone – and I use these just as examples. We've gone location by location and cut overhead costs, but there's still more work to be done."

William F. Oplinger, CFO of Alcoa Corp, 11/16/16

— Cutting a comparable \$100 million would increase value by \$800 million, worth ~\$1.60/share



Implement Capital Allocation Discipline

- Arconic has spent \$2.2 billion at GRP without increasing EBITDA dollars.
- ROA at EPS plummeted during Dr. Kleinfeld's tenure
- More disciplined capital spending and exploration of strategic options with respect to GRP and TCS could produce significant additional value

1. We attribute 200 bps of the margin gap to hidden Corporate spend hence closing the full gap is less than 1,100 $\,^7$

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Even Modest Improvement Produces Dramatic Returns



Elliott's targets are based on the mid-point of Arconic's 2017 revenue target

• Unlike management, Elliott believes that Arconic margins can be improved even absent additional scale

- In short, even without growth, Arconic could be worth at least \$33-\$54 per share.

		Low			High			
	Amount	<u>Multiple</u>	Value	<u>\$/Share</u>	<u>Amount</u>	Multiple	<u>Value</u>	\$/Share
Current Performance/Price	\$1,815	8.7x		\$22.50	\$1,815	8.7x		\$22.50
EPS Margin Improvement	\$342	9.0x	\$3,078	\$6.31	\$513	11.0x	\$5,643	\$11.56
GRP Margin Improvement	\$150	7.5x	\$1,131	\$2.32	\$750	8.8x	\$6 <i>,</i> 590	\$13.50
TCS Improvement	\$36	7.3x	\$261	\$0.53	\$36	10.3x	\$371	\$0.76
Cut Corporate Costs	\$50	8.6x	\$429	\$0.88	\$100	8.6x	\$858	\$1.76
Overall Improvement	\$578	8.5x	\$4,899	\$10.04	\$1,399	9.6x	\$13,462	\$27.59
Improved Credibility & Multiple Expansion					\$1,815	0.9x	\$1,698	\$3.48
Total	\$2,393	8.5x		\$32.54	\$3,214	9.6x		\$53.57
vs. Current Share Price				44.6%				138.1%

Low Case

- 600 bps improvement at EPS at 9.0x multiple
- GRP to achieve in-line performance with peers based on bottoms-up mix analysis
- Cut \$50 million in Corporate costs
- High Case
 - 900 bps improvement at EPS at 11.0x multiple
 - GRP to achieve best-in-class performance with peers based on bottoms-up mix analysis
 - Cut \$100 million in Corporate costs

Shareholder Nominees



Please note that if the Company renominates Ulrich Schmidt at the 2016 annual

meeting, Elliott does not intend to seek his replacement.

Ideal mix of skills and experience to deliver meaningful change at Arconic



Former Executive Vice President of Precision Castparts ("PCC") Elmer Doty

Christopher Ayers

- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of Accudyne Industries (Acquired by The Carlyle Group in 2012)

Former Chief Executive Officer of WireCo WorldGroup, Inc., a leading producer of specialty steel wire ropes Former Vice President of Alcoa Inc. and President of its Global Primary Products Business (NYSE: AA)

- Former President and CEO of Vought Aircraft
- Former Executive Vice President of United Defense Industries, now part of BAE System Plc. (LON: BA)



Charles Hall

- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of AM General
- 37-year career with General Dynamics Corporation (NYSE:GD)
- Final position with General Dynamics was Executive Vice President of Combat Systems

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Bernd Kessler

- Former Chief Executive Officer of SRTechnics AG,
- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of MTU Maintenance, a subsidiary of Aero Engines AG (ETR:MTX)
- Mr. Kessler held management and executive positions for 20 years at Honeywell International Inc. (NYSE:HON)



Patrice Merrin

- Former CEO and a director of Luscar Ltd., Canada's largest producer of thermal coal
- Former Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Sherritt International Corporation (TSE:S)
 Director of Stillwater Mining Company (NYSE:SWC), Glencoreplc (LON:GLEN), and Novadaq Technologies Inc. (NASDAQ:NVDQ)






"On a short, meaning next year or this year, and midterm, three- to five-year timeframe, we will continue to produce outstanding shareholder value across all businesses, and <u>take my word, that's our promise</u>."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 1/10/2011

TSR Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld



Since becoming CEO, Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has underperformed the Company's proxy peer median by 156% and the S&P 500 by 151%





"I think then <u>we are creating substantial shareholder value</u>. That's the main driver that we will continue to follow here."


Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 4/10/1

Source: Bloomberg. TSR 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016, ending the day prior to the Alcoa/Arconic split. Peer group is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes: DU PONT (E.I.) DE NEMOURS, DOW CHEMICAL CO/THE, FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC, HUNTSMAN CORP, INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO, LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A, PPG INDUSTRIES INC, NEWMONT MINING CORP, NUCOR CORP, UNITED STATES STEEL CORP, 3M CO, CUMMINS INC, DANAHER CORP, DEERE & CO, EATON CORP PLC, EMERSON ELECTRIC CO, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP, L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP, RAYTHEON COMPANY. Alcoa's low point was 3/6/2009

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TSR Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld vs. Company Selected Peers

vs Proxy Peers vs. Industrials Proxy Peers vs. Materials Proxy Peers vs. Aluminum Peers vs. S&P 500 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 4-Year 5-Year 6-Year 7-Year 8-Year с. 0 4.1 0.1





Alcoa Cumulative TSR Relative to Each Peer Median and S&P 500 Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld

Peer Group Median. Source: Bloomberg. TSR Trailing as of 10/31/2016, the day before Alcoa and Arconic split. Since CEO TSR: 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016. Peer Proxy is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes two groups named by the Company, industrials board: iboard: board is a set of a s HYDRO ASA, ALUMINA LTD, NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO LTD, SHANDONG NANSHAN ALUMINUM. Since Low is date range 3/6/2009 – 10/31/2016.

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
Alcoa vs. S&P 500 During CEO Tenure



465 of the current S&P 500 companies have been in the index since May 1, 2008. Out of those 465 companies, Alcoa ranks 456th. All of the companies to the left of Alcoa have changed CEOs during this period

"But we are also very focused on ensuring that each and every dollar that we spend, whether it'd be an expense or whether it'd be for a capital investment will both sustain the operations that we have today, and therefore, the cash generation but also, **look forward to create additional value for our shareholders**."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 6/20/16




S&P 500 Returns , 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016


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Arconic's "Dr. Klaus" Discount – 2017 Numbers



Arconic's discount, we believe, can principally be attributed to current management's lack of credibility





Selected Comps: Boeing, Airbus, Spirit Aerosystems, Triumph Group, MTU Aero Engines, Meggitt, TransDigm, Moog, Curtiss-Wright, Woodward, TriMas, Esterline, HEICO, Rockwell-Collins, Safran, Barnes Group, Carpenter Technology, Kaiser Aluminum, Hexcel, United Technologies, AMAG Austria Metall, Embraer, Rolls-Royce, Parker-Hannifin, Crane, Eaton, Zodaic Aerospace, AMETEK, GKN, Honeywell, Hindalco, UACJ

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
Arconic's "Dr. Klaus" Discount – 2018 Numbers

9x

7x 5x

Arconic

Larger discount on 2018 estimates suggests lack of confidence in management's ability to hit targets



Selected Comps: Boeing, Airbus, Spirit Aerosystems, Triumph Group, MTU Aero Engines, Meggitt, TransDigm, Moog, Curtiss-Wright, Woodward, TriMas, Esterline, HEICO, Rockwell-Collins, Safran, Barnes Group, Carpenter Technology, Kaiser Aluminum, Hexcel, United Technologies, AMAG Austria Metall, Embraer, Rolls-Royce, Parker-Hannifin, Crane, Eaton, Zodaic Aerospace, AMETEK, GKN, Honeywell, Hindalco, UACJ

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


"Now, I mean, talking to managers, you'd say disciplined execution? Really? I mean, is that a strategic priority? Isn't that what business is about? I mean, <u>it's not just warm words and nice plans, you've</u> got to execute, right? But we actually have put I think more of a discipline around it than what you typically find in an organization."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 11/7/13

"New" 2019 Guidance Closely Resembles Original 2016 Guidance

After a series of massive guidance misses, the Company released three year targets which are nearly identical to the Company's original 2016 guidance, which pertained until as recently as April 2016



"As we stated in the webcast, we are excited about Arconic's prospects and believe we have a compelling opportunity to create significant long-term value for our shareholders. During the 2017 to 2019 time period, <u>we have set</u> <u>targets that outperform market growth</u>, increase profit margins towards benchmark level and above, improve capital efficiency and significantly reduce debt to strengthen Arconic's balance sheet and credit rating."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld Letter to Shareholders, 12/14/16

Source: Company filings and investor presentations

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
Returns Lower Than Cost of Capital



During Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld's tenure, returns on invested capital have remained consistently below the Company's weighted average cost of capital

"We look at IRRs versus cost of capital, right. So we're breaking in part of the synergies, <u>we look at the returns versus</u> <u>cost of capital</u>."

r. Klaus Kleinfeld, 11/4/15




Alcoa ROIC vs. WACC

18




Arconic EPS: Unable to Close the PCC Margin Gap

Elliott worked with a number of experts including: former employees and customers of both Arconic EPS and Precision Castparts, external consulting firm, and an investment bank. The conclusion is unambiguous. EPS and PCC are substantially similar businesses. Nonetheless, <u>Arconic's EPS business is substantially less profitable than PCC</u>







Every 100 bps improvement in margins at Arconic's EPS business is worth ~\$1.20/share

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GRP: Massive Room to Improve

Going bottoms-up, we analyzed GRP's mix and cost position relative to peers. The opportunity for improvement is enormous

Jinous		CAN BODY STOCK	PLATE	BRAZING SHEET	AUTO BODY	HEAT TREATED	AUTO STRUCTURAL	OTHER	TOTAL
	Arconic Production Cost 2015 (\$/ton)	\$2,613	\$3,858	\$2,854	\$3,255	\$3,356	\$3,081	\$2,739	\$2,898
	Industry Average Cost	\$2,188	\$3,147	\$2,393	\$2,807	\$2,541	\$2,362	\$2,284	\$2,404
	Production cost improvement opportunity*	\$426	\$711	\$602	\$447	\$815	\$719	\$455	~\$500
% of improvement opportunity attributable to cost bucket	Raw Material	0%	6%	31%	4%	7%	45%	19%	10%
roveme. attribu bucket				Overhead	l and WIP is a maj	or driver of cos	t differential		
% of improvement oortunity attributa to cost bucket		43%	40%	17%	37%	37%	22%	17%	32%
% of opportu	Other	57%	54%	53%	59%	56%	33%	64%	58%
Ī	Arconic current production (K ton)	569	165	114	131	52	14	480	1,525
	Opportunity size (A x B)	\$242M	\$117M	\$69M	\$59M	\$42M	\$10M	\$218M	~\$750M

\$750 million improvement in EBITDA at GRP is worth ~\$13.50/share

Note: *Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and average production cost summed across Raw Material, Overheard & WIP, and Other. Where Arconic's costs are lower than average, \$0 improvement opportunity assumed; other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs Source: CRU cost data




Poor Corporate Governance Practices

"[O]ne of the things about Alcoa Corp. that is fundamentally different than Alcoa Inc. is that we were given the opportunity to come out with <u>a much better governance structure</u>. So as a new company, <u>we separated the Chairman and the CEO role.</u> <u>I personally believe that's the right way to have the business set up</u>. <u>In addition to that, we've decided to incorporate in Delaware is much more shareholder-friendly</u>."

William F. Oplinger, CFO Alcoa Corp, 11/16/16

Governance Issue	Arconic	Best Practice		
Election of Directors	Staggered Board	Annually Elected Board		
State of Incorporation	Pennsylvania	Delaware		
Removal of Directors	Requires 80% of outstanding	Majority of outstanding		
Bylaw & Charter Amendments	Requires Supermajority	Majority of outstanding		
Leadership Structure	Combined Chairman & CEO	Separate Chairman & CEO		
CEO Share Retention Policy	6X Base Salary	10X Base Salary		
CEO Additional Public Co. Boards	2	0		
Board Stock Ownership	No Open-Market Purchase Requirement	3x Director Salary OM Purchases		

Percentage of Staggered Boards in S&P 500




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Generous Compensation Despite Continually Poor Performance

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has been paid more than \$111M during his tenure despite generating massively negative returns. He has also sold more shares than he owns, including \$46M of stock since 2014



Cumulative TSR vs. Cumulative CEO Compensation

"The <u>Company has been deficient in linking executive pay to corporate performance</u>, as indicated by the <u>'D' grade received by the</u> <u>Company</u> in Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance model. <u>Shareholders should be concerned with this disconnect</u>. A properly structured pay program should motivate executives to drive corporate performance, thus aligning executive and long-term shareholder interests. In this case, as indicated by the poor grade, the Company has not implemented such a program. In our view, <u>shareholders should be concerned with the</u> **compensation committee's failure** in this area."

Glass Lewis, 2016 Alcoa Proxy Paper

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Culture of High C-Suite Turnover

of leaders since 2008 Position 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld 1 CEO William Oplinger 3 EVP, CFO Chuck McLane Ken Glacobbe William 3 President, EPS Karl I ragi **Oliver Jarrault** Christopher 2 President GRP Helmut Wieser Kay Meggers Karl Tragl / Tim Myers 4 President, TCS Kevin Kramer Jose Drummond Tim Myers Michael Barriere 5 EVP, HR & EHS Regina Hitchery John Bergen Ron Harvey Vas Nair Nicholas DeRoma EVP, Legal I. Michael Schell Audrey Strauss 4 Kate Ramundo n/a 2 EVP Bus Serv. n/a n/a n/a Mark Davies Graeme Bottger Raymond Kilmer 2 EVP, Technology Mohammad Zaidi J. Michael Schell Daniel Cruise 2 EVP, Bus. Dev. Director, Investor Matt Garth/ Patricia Figuero: 7 Greg Aschman Matthew Garth Roy Harvey Kelly Pasterick Nahla Azmy Relations

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has been the only constant among Company leadership. Notably there have been 7 heads of investor relations

Despite the Company's penchant for repeatedly 'shooting the messenger,' the problems at Arconic run much deeper than poor investor communications

Note: Positions listed above not representative of full executive committee; Karl Tragl replaced Jose Drummond at end of 2015, and was replaced by Tim Myers in April 2016 Source: Archived company websites 25

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Contact Information



Arconic Shareholders



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Version 1

New Leadership Is Needed At Arconic

January 31, 2017 www.NewArconic.com





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Why Are We Here?

Prolonged disappointing financial results combined with the irreparably damaged credibility of Arconic's current management have created a circumstance whereby Arconic will never approach its potential under the current CEO

- For more than a year, Elliott has engaged in private discussions with the Company regarding the numerous ways in which Arconic could effectively execute its business separation, improve operational performance, enhance investor communications, and establish improved corporate governance practices
 - While we have appreciated the dialogue and remain excited about the Arconic opportunity, we <u>believe a change in CEO is needed</u> for the Company to create sustainable shareholder value

Clear Evidence for the Need of Change in Leadership



Poor Total Shareholder Returns

- A cumulative loss of nearly 70% in value
- Profound underperformance compared to any of the Company's self-selected peer groups
- Worst TSR record of any active S&P 500 CEO



Abysmal Operating Performance

- On pace to miss all key operating metrics for 2016; new 2019 targets are indistinguishable from the original guidance for 2016
- Returns on invested capital have remained below cost of capital during Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld's entire tenure
- Massive margin improvement opportunity has existed for years and has not been realized



Broken Company Culture

- We believe that an obsession with image, prestige, and stature is the current CEO's key focus
- Wasteful corporate spending on questionable projects that enthuse the CEO but provide little benefit to the business or shareholders
- Antiquated corporate governance has resulted in failure to hold the CEO accountable, but have delivered to him more than \$100M in compensation over an 8 year period

Poor Total Shareholder Return: See pages 10,11, and 12 for details

3



Our Goals at Arconic

Elliott is Arconic's largest shareholder, owning approximately 10.5% of shares outstanding. We are seeking <u>sustained</u> <i>improvements at Arconic to benefit all long-term stakeholders

Change the Culture



✓ Instill a culture dedicated to fierce operational focus

- ✓ Foster an entrepreneurial spirit by empowering and incentivizing each business unit and each manufacturing plant to participate in the upside of operational improvements
- ✓ Eliminate image-driven and wasteful culture (e.g. "The Jetsons" ad campaign, continued headquarters at Lever House)
- ✓ Overhaul the Company's antiquated corporate governance and adopt modern best practices demonstrating that "New Arconic" welcomes accountability

Improve the Business



- ✓ Achieve substantial and real corporate-level margin improvement through:
 - ✓ Closing the persistent margin gap to the Company's closest peer in the EPS business
 - ✓ Achieving real margin improvements in GRP and TCS businesses
 - ✓ Dramatically reducing corporate overhead
- ✓ Allocate capital away from wasteful projects and toward more practical growth strategies

We believe that through a combination of operational and cultural changes, Arconic has an approximately 45 - 138% upside


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Source for images: Instagram

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Change the Culture: Remove Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld from Arconic

Despite years of poor performance, a culture of grandiose rhetoric devoid of any real substance or follow-through has been tolerated



Peer Group Median. Source: Bloomberg. TSR Trailing as of 10/31/2016, the day before Alcoa and Arconic split. Since CEO TSR: 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016. Peer Proxy is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes two groups named by the Company, Industrials Peers which are the following ten companies: 3M CO, CUMMINS INC, DANAHER CORP, DEERE & CO, EATON CORP PLC, EMERSON ELECTRIC CO, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP, 13 TECHNOLOGIES INC, NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP, RAYTHEON COMPANY, And Materials Peers which are the following 10 companies: DU PONT [E.I.] DE NEMOURS, DOW CHEMICAL CO/THE, FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC, HUNTSMAN CORP, INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO, PPG INDUSTRIES INC, NEWMONT MINING CORP, NUCOR CORP, UNITED STATES STEEL CORP, LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A. THE Company's self-selected Aluminum Company peers consist of: ALUMINUM CORP OF CHINA LTD-H, UNITED CO RUSAL PLC, NORSK HYDRO ASA, ALUMINA LTD, NATIONAL ALUMINUM CO LTD, SHANDONG NANSHAN ALUMINUM. Since Low is date range 3/6/2009 – 10/31/2016.

Source for all quotes in this presentation, Bloomberg transcripts, unless otherwise indicated. Emphasis added by Elliott for all quotes throughout this presentation


Change the Culture: Consider Larry Lawson for CEO

Elliott has engaged Mr. Lawson as a consultant on its investment in Arconic and believes that Mr. Lawson should be a leading candidate to become the Company's CEO, as he has the ideal set of skills needed to turnaround Arconic's woefully and continually underperforming business

Larry Lawson



- ✓ Former CEO of Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. (NYSE: SPR)
- ✓ Former Executive Vice President of Aeronautics of Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT)
- ✓ Former Flight Control Engineer of McDonnell Douglas (Acquired by The Boeing Company in 1997)



"<u>SPR stock is up over 160% since Larry Lawson was named president and CEO</u> of the company on March 19, 2013 effective April 6, 2013. Sentiment for <u>SPR has improved as the company focused on controlling costs, generating positive free cash</u> <u>flow</u>, and divesting the problematic G650 and G280 wing programs in Tulsa. In our view<u>, market expectation for performance is</u> <u>now significantly higher for SPR than with the previous management team</u>."

BAML, 4/30/15

"[H]e is a <u>tough change agent with unrelenting demands on performance improvements</u>. As such, we're beginning to conclude that he might be just what SPR always needed."

rclays, 12/18/13

Source for stock chart: Bloomberg, ending day prior to announced of planned departure of Mr. Lawson as CEO (6/7/2016) Source for quotes: Bloomberg transcripts. 6

Drive Sustainable Shareholder Value Through Operational Improvement





Close the Margin Gap with Precision Castparts ("PCC'")

- EPS margins have consistently lagged 700-1100 basis points below PCC despite the fact that there are few (if any) structural reasons for this gap
- Each 100 bps improvement in margins at Arconic's EPS business is worth ~\$1.20/share
- Improving margins by 900 basis-points to levels approximating PCC's would increase Arconic's shares by ~\$10.80/share
 an approximately 50% increase

Achieve Real Margin Improvement in Global Rolled Products ("GRP")

- Management's 3-5 year goal of increasing GRP margins is misleading at best, deceptive at worst, and the majority is already baked
- Approximately 130-150 bps of the targeted improvement comes from simply eliminating can sheet volumes
- Reaching industry average performance would increase EBITDA by \$125 million
- Achieving best-in-class performance would increase EBITDA by \$750 million, worth ~\$13.50/share

Reduction of Corporate Overhead

- Arconic has excess corporate overhead which we believe is a direct result of the Company's "CEO-centric" culture
 - Alcoa Corp. which has overhead costs which are roughly half those of its former parent has already announced plans to cut \$50 million, while repeatedly highlighting the cost reduction opportunity resulting from the separation from its bloated former parent
 - "Very, very focused on cutting costs, and you'll hear me talk about that, that's one of the things that's different about Alcoa Corp. As we go forward, we'll be very, very focused on not only cutting cost at the plant level, but also in the overhead structure... We did not take any of the corporate jets with us. We skinny down the corporate office to only 15 people here in New York. So we're now on one floor in the New York office. We've eliminated our Geneva office. We've gone -- and I use these just as examples. We've gone location by location and cut overhead costs, but there's still more work to be done." William F. Oplinger, Goldman Sachs Global Metals & Mining Conference, November 16th, 2016
- Cutting a comparable \$100 million would increase value by \$800 million worth ~\$1.60/share or 7%



3

Implement Capital Allocation Discipline

- Arconic has spent \$2.2 billion at GRP without increasing EBITDA dollars.
- ROA at EPS plummeted during Dr. Kleinfeld's tenure
- More disciplined capital spending and exploration of strategic options with respect to GRP and BCS could produce significant additional value

1. We attribute 200 bps of the margin gap to hidden Corporate spend hence closing the full gap is less than 1,100 $\,^7$

Even Modest Improvement Produces Dramatic Returns



Elliott's targets are based on the mid-point of Arconic's 2017 revenue

• Unlike management, Elliott believes that Arconic margins can be improved even absent additional scale

- In short, even without growth, Arconic could be worth at least \$33-\$54 per share if it improves along the lines of our plan.

		Low			High			
	Amount	<u>Multiple</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>\$/Share</u>	<u>Amount</u>	Multiple	<u>Value</u>	\$/Share
Current Performance/Price	\$1,815	8.7x		\$22.50	\$1,815	8.7x		\$22.50
EPS Margin Improvement	\$342	9.0x	\$3 <i>,</i> 078	\$6.31	\$513	11.0x	\$5,643	\$11.56
GRP Margin Improvement	\$150	7.5x	\$1,131	\$2.32	\$750	8.8x	\$6,590	\$13.50
TCS Improvement	\$36	7.3x	\$261	\$0.53	\$36	10.3x	\$371	\$0.76
Cut Corporate Costs	\$50	8.6x	\$429	\$0.88	\$100	8.6x	\$858	\$1.76
Overall Improvement	\$578	8.5x	\$4,899	\$10.04	\$1,399	9.6x	\$13,462	\$27.59
Improved Credibility & Multiple Expansion					\$1,815	0.9x	\$1,698	\$3.48
Total	\$2,393	8.5x		\$32.54	\$3,214	9.6x		\$53.57
vs. Current Share Price				44.6%				138.1%

Low Case

- 600 bps improvement at EPS at 9.0x multiple
- GRP to achieve in-line performance with peers based on bottoms-up mix analysis
- Cut \$50 million in Corporate costs

High Case

- 900 bps improvement at EPS at 11.0x multiple
- GRP to achieve best-in-class performance with peers based on bottoms-up mix analysis
- Cut \$100 million in Corporate costs

Shareholder Nominees

Ideal mix of skills and experience to deliver meaningful change at Arconic



Christopher Ayers

- Former Chief Executive Officer of WireCo WorldGroup, Inc., a leading producer of specialty steel wire ropes
- Former Vice President of Alcoa Inc. and President of its Global Primary Products Business (NYSE: AA)
- Former Executive Vice President of Precision Castparts ("PCC")



Elmer Doty

- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of Accudyne Industries (Acquired by The Carlyle Group in 2012)
- Former President and CEO if Vought Aircraft
- Former Executive Vice President of United Defense Industries, now part of BAE System Plc. (LON: BA)



Charles Hall

- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of AM General
- 37-year career with General Dynamics Corporation (NYSE:GD)
- Final position with General Dynamics was Executive Vice President of Combat Systems

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Bernd Kessler

- Former Chief Executive Officer of SRTechnics AG,
- Former President and Chief Executive Officer of MTU Maintenance, a subsidiary of Aero Engines AG (ETR:MTX)
- Mr. Kessler held management and executive positions for 20 years at Honeywell International Inc. (NYSE:HON)



Patrice Merrin

(NASDAQ:NVDQ)

- Former CEO and a director of Luscar Ltd., Canada's largest producer of thermal coal
- Former Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Sherritt International Corporation (TSE:S)
 Director of Stillwater Mining Company (NYSE:SWC), Glencoreplc (LON:GLEN), and Novadaq Technologies Inc.






"On a short, meaning next year or this year, and midterm, three- to five-year timeframe, we will continue to produce outstanding shareholder value across all businesses, and <u>take my word, that's our promise</u>."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 1/10/2011

TSR Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld



Since becoming CEO, Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has underperformed the Company's proxy peer median by 156% and the S&P 500 by 151%





"I think then <u>we are creating substantial shareholder value</u>. That's the main driver that we will continue to follow here."


Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 4/10/1

Source: Bloomberg. TSR 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016, ending the day prior to the Alcoa/Arconic split. Peer group is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes: DU PONT (E.I.) DE NEMOURS, DOW CHEMICAL CO/THE, FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC, HUNTSMAN CORP, INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO, LYONDELLBASELL INDU-CL A, PPG INDUSTRIES INC, NEWMONT MINING CORP, NUCOR CORP, UNITED STATES STEEL CORP, 3M CO, CUMMINS INC, DANAHER CORP, DEERE & CO, EATON CORP PLC, EMERSON ELECTRIC CO, GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP, L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP, RAYTHEON COMPANY. Alcoa's low point was 3/6/2009

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TSR Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld vs. Company Selected Peers

vs Proxy Peers vs. Industrials Proxy Peers vs. Materials Proxy Peers vs. Aluminum Peers vs. S&P 500 1-Year 2-Year 3-Year 4-Year 5-Year 6-Year 7-Year 8-Year с. 0 4.1 0.1





Alcoa Cumulative TSR Relative to Each Peer Median and S&P 500 Under Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld

Peer Group Median. Source: Bloomberg. TSR Trailing as of 10/31/2016, the day before Alcoa and Arconic split. Since CEO TSR: 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016. Peer Proxy is Alcoa's 2016 self-selected proxy peers and includes two groups named by the Company, industrials board: iboard: board is a set of a s HYDRO ASA, ALUMINA LTD, NATIONAL ALUMINIUM CO LTD, SHANDONG NANSHAN ALUMINUM. Since Low is date range 3/6/2009 – 10/31/2016.

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
Alcoa vs. S&P 500 During CEO Tenure



465 of the current S&P 500 companies have been in the index since May 1, 2008. Out of those 465 companies, Alcoa ranks 456th. All of the companies to the left of Alcoa have changed CEO's during this period

"But we are also very focused on ensuring that each and every dollar that we spend, whether it'd be an expense or whether it'd be for a capital investment will both sustain the operations that we have today, and therefore, the cash generation but also, **look forward to create additional value for our shareholders**."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 6/20/16




S&P 500 Returns , 5/1/2008 - 10/31/2016


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Arconic's "Dr. Klaus" Discount – 2017 Numbers



Arconic's discount, we believe, can principally be attributed to current management's lack of credibility





Selected Comps: Boeing, Airbus, Spirit Aerosystems, Triumph Group, MTU Aero Engines, Meggitt, TransDigm, Moog, Curtiss-Wright, Woodward, TriMas, Esterline, HEICO, Rockwell-Collins, Safran, Barnes Group, Carpenter Technology, Kaiser Aluminum, Hexcel, United Technologies, AMAG Austria Metall, Embraer, Rolls-Royce, Parker-Hannifin, Crane, Eaton, Zodaic Aerospace, AMETEK, GKN, Honeywell, Hindalco, UACJ

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
Arconic's "Dr. Klaus" Discount – 2018 Numbers

9x

7x 5x

Arconic

Larger discount on 2018 estimates suggests lack of confidence in management's ability to hit targets



Selected Comps: Boeing, Airbus, Spirit Aerosystems, Triumph Group, MTU Aero Engines, Meggitt, TransDigm, Moog, Curtiss-Wright, Woodward, TriMas, Esterline, HEICO, Rockwell-Collins, Safran, Barnes Group, Carpenter Technology, Kaiser Aluminum, Hexcel, United Technologies, AMAG Austria Metall, Embraer, Rolls-Royce, Parker-Hannifin, Crane, Eaton, Zodaic Aerospace, AMETEK, GKN, Honeywell, Hindalco, UACJ

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Median

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


"Now, I mean, talking to managers, you'd say disciplined execution? Really? I mean, is that a strategic priority? Isn't that what business is about? I mean, <u>it's not just warm words and nice plans, you've</u> got to execute, right? But we actually have put I think more of a discipline around it than what you typically find in an organization."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, 11/7/13

"New" 2019 Guidance Closely Resembles Original 2016 Guidance

After a series of massive guidance misses, the Company released three year targets which are nearly identical to the Company's original 2016 guidance, which pertained until as recently as April 2016



"As we stated in the webcast, we are excited about Arconic's prospects and believe we have a compelling opportunity to create significant long-term value for our shareholders. During the 2017 to 2019 time period, <u>we have set</u> <u>targets that outperform market growth</u>, increase profit margins towards benchmark level and above, improve capital efficiency and significantly reduce debt to strengthen Arconic's balance sheet and credit rating."

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld Letter to Shareholders, 12/14/16

Source: Company filings and investor presentations

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
Returns Lower Than Cost of Capital



During Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld's tenure, returns on invested capital have remained consistently below the Company's weighted average cost of capital

"We look at IRRs versus cost of capital, right. So we're breaking in part of the synergies, <u>we look at the returns versus</u> <u>cost of capital</u>."

. Klaus Kleinfeld, 11/4/15




Alcoa ROIC vs. WACC


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Arconic EPS: Unable to Close the PCC Margin Gap

Elliott worked with a number of experts including: former employees and customers of both Arconic EPS and Precision Castparts, external consulting firm, and an investment bank. The conclusion is unambiguous. EPS and PCC are substantially similar businesses. Nonetheless, <u>Arconic's EPS business is substantially less profitable than PCC</u>







Every 100 bps improvement in margins at Arconic's EPS business is worth ~\$1.20/share

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GRP: Massive Room to Improve

Going bottoms-up, we analyzed GRP's mix and cost position relative to peers. The opportunity for improvement is enormous

Jinous		CAN BODY STOCK	PLATE	BRAZING SHEET	AUTO BODY	HEAT TREATED	AUTO STRUCTURAL	OTHER	TOTAL		
	Arconic Production Cost 2015 (\$/ton)	\$2,613	\$3,858	\$2,854	\$3,255	\$3,356	\$3,081	\$2,739	\$2,898		
	Best-In-Class Production Cost	\$2,188	\$3,147	\$2,393	\$2,807	\$2,541	\$2,362	\$2,284	\$2,404		
	Production cost improvement opportunity*	\$426	\$711	\$461	\$447	\$815	\$719	\$455	~\$500		
	Raw Material	0%	6%	31%	4%	7%	45%	19%	10%		
ovemer attribut bucket		Overhead and WIP is a major driver of cost differential									
% of improvement oortunity attributai to cost bucket	Overhead & WIP	43%	40%	17%	37%	37%	22%	17%	32%		
lao B	Other	57%	54%	53%	59%	56%	33%	64%	58%		
	Arconic current production (K ton)	569	165	114	131	52	14	480	1,525		
	Opportunity size (A x B)	\$242M	\$117M	\$69M	\$59M	\$42M	\$10M	\$218M	~\$750M		

\$750 million improvement in EBITDA at GRP is worth ~\$13.50/share

Note: *Production cost improvement opportunity calculated as difference between Arconic production cost and best-in-class production cost (lowest cost line item across top 10 producers) summed across Raw Material, Overheard & WIP, and Other; Other and total buckets are weight averaged based on Arconic tonnage for industry costs Source: CRU cost data

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
Poor Corporate Governance Practices

"[O]ne of the things about Alcoa Corp. that is fundamentally different than Alcoa Inc. is that we were given the opportunity to come out with <u>a much better governance structure</u>. So as a new company, <u>we separated the Chairman and the CEO role.</u> <u>I personally believe that's the right way to have the business set up</u>. <u>In addition to that</u>, we've decided to <u>incorporate in Delaware</u>... <u>Delaware is much more shareholder-friendly</u>."

William F. Oplinger, CFO Alcoa Corp, 11/16/16

Governance Issue	Arconic	Best Practice		
Election of Directors	Staggered Board	Annually Elected Board		
State of Incorporation	Pennsylvania	Delaware		
Removal of Directors	Requires 80% of outstanding	Majority of outstanding		
Bylaw & Charter Amendments	Requires Supermajority	Majority of outstanding		
Leadership Structure	Combined Chairman & CEO	Separate Chairman & CEO		
CEO Share Retention Policy	6X Base Salary	10X Base Salary		
CEO Additional Public Co. Boards	2	0		
Board Stock Ownership	No Open-Market Purchase Requirement	3x Director Salary OM Purchases		

Percentage of Staggered Boards in S&P 500




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Generous Compensation Despite Poor Performance

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Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has been paid more than \$111M during his tenure despite generating massively negative returns. He has also sold more shares than he owns, including \$46M of stock since 2014



Cumulative TSR vs. Cumulative CEO Compensation

"The <u>Company has been deficient in linking executive pay to corporate performance</u>, as indicated by the <u>'D' grade received by the</u> <u>Company</u> in Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance model. <u>Shareholders should be concerned with this disconnect</u>. A properly structured pay program should motivate executives to drive corporate performance, thus aligning executive and long-term shareholder interests. In this case, as indicated by the poor grade, the Company has not implemented such a program. In our view, <u>shareholders should be concerned with the</u> compensation committee's failure in this area."

Glass Lewis, 2016 Alcoa Proxy Paper

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Culture of High C-Suite Turnover

of leaders since 2008 Position 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld 1 CEO William Oplinger 3 EVP, CFO Chuck McLane Ken Glacobbe William 3 President, EPS Karl I ragi **Oliver Jarrault** Christopher 2 President GRP Helmut Wieser Kay Meggers Karl Tragl / Tim Myers 4 President, TCS Kevin Kramer Jose Drummond Tim Myers Michael Barriere 5 EVP, HR & EHS Regina Hitchery John Bergen Ron Harvey Vas Nair Nicholas DeRoma EVP, Legal I. Michael Schell Audrey Strauss 4 Kate Ramundo n/a 2 EVP Bus Serv. n/a n/a n/a Mark Davies Graeme Bottger Raymond Kilmer 2 EVP, Technology Mohammad Zaidi J. Michael Schell Daniel Cruise 2 EVP, Bus. Dev. Director, Investor Matt Garth/ Patricia Figuero: 7 Greg Aschman Matthew Garth Roy Harvey Kelly Pasterick Nahla Azmy Relations

Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld has been the only constant among Company leadership. Notably there have been 7 heads of investor relations

Despite the Company's penchant for repeatedly 'shooting the messenger,' the problems at Arconic run much deeper than poor investor communications

Note: Positions listed above not representative of full executive committee; Karl Tragl replaced Jose Drummond at end of 2015, and was replaced by Tim Myers in April 2016 Source: Archived company websites 24

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Contact Information



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