Note 9. Commitments and Contingencies

Financial Condition and Liquidity

As described in Note 6 – Current Liabilities and Debt Obligations, we maintain a revolving Facility with Wells Fargo. Borrowings under the Facility are collateralized by substantially all of our assets including inventory, equipment, and accounts receivable. The amount of available borrowings fluctuates based on the underlying asset-borrowing base, in general 85% of our trade accounts receivable, as adjusted by certain reserves (as further defined in the Facility agreement). The Facility provides us with virtually all of the liquidity we require to meet our operating, investing and financing needs. Therefore, maintaining sufficient availability on the Facility is the most critical factor in our liquidity. While a variety of factors related to sources and uses of cash, such as timeliness of accounts receivable collections, vendor credit terms, or significant collateral requirements, ultimately impact our liquidity, such factors may or may not have a direct impact on our liquidity, based on how the transactions associated with such circumstances impact our availability under the Facility. For example, a contractual requirement to post collateral for a duration of several months, depending on the materiality of the amount, could have an immediate negative effect on our liquidity, as such a circumstance would utilize availability on the Facility without a near-term cash inflow back to us. Likewise, the release of such collateral could have a corresponding positive effect on our liquidity, as it would represent an addition to our availability without any corresponding near-term cash outflow. Similarly, a slow-down of payments from a customer, group of customers or government payment office would not have an immediate and direct effect on our availability on the Facility unless the slowdown was material in amount and over an extended period of time. Any of these examples could have an impact on the Facility, and therefore our liquidity.

We believe that available cash and borrowings under the Facility will be sufficient to generate adequate amounts of cash to meet our needs for operating expenses, debt service requirements, and projected capital expenditures through the foreseeable future. We anticipate the continued need for a credit facility upon terms and conditions substantially similar to the Facility in order to meet our long term needs for operating expenses, debt service requirements, and projected capital expenditures. Our working capital was $11.3 million and $21.3 million as of September 30, 2011 and December 31, 2010, respectively. Although no assurances can be given, we expect that we will be in compliance throughout the term of the Facility with respect to the financial and other covenants.

Legal Proceedings

Costa Brava Partnership III, L.P., et al. v. Telos Corporation, et al.

As previously reported, Costa Brava Partnership III, L.P. (“Costa Brava”), a holder of our Public Preferred Stock, filed a lawsuit (hereinafter the “Complaint”) on October 17, 2005 in the Circuit Court for the City of Baltimore in the State of Maryland (“the Court”) against the Company, its directors, and certain of its officers. As of September 30, 2011, Costa Brava owns 12.7% of the outstanding Public Preferred Stock.

The Complaint alleged that the Company and its officers and directors had engaged in tactics to avoid paying mandatory dividends on the Public Preferred Stock, and asserted that the Public Preferred Stock had characteristics of debt instruments even though it was issued by the Company in the form of stock. Costa Brava alleged, among other things, that the Company and an independent committee of the Board of Directors had done nothing to improve what they claimed to be the Company's insolvency, or its ability to redeem the Public Preferred Stock and pay accrued dividends. They also challenged the bonus payments to the Company's officers and directors, and consulting fees paid to the holder of a majority of the Company's common stock.

On December 22, 2005, the Company's Board of Directors established a special litigation committee (“Special Litigation Committee”) composed of independent directors to review and evaluate the matters raised in the derivative suit filed against the Company by Costa Brava.

On January 9, 2006, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint or, in the alternative, to stay the action until the Special Litigation Committee had sufficient time to properly investigate and respond to Costa Brava's demands. On March 30, 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, and denied the alternative request for a stay.

On February 8, 2006, Wynnefield Small Cap Value, L.P. (“Wynnefield”) filed a motion to intervene. An order was entered on May 25, 2006 by the Court, designating Wynnefield Partners as the plaintiff with Costa Brava in the lawsuit. On May 31, 2006, an Amended Complaint was filed in which Wynnefield joined as a Plaintiff. Costa Brava and Wynnefield are hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiffs.”

On May 26, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale or disposal of Xacta Corporation, a subsidiary of the Company, or any of its assets until the lawsuit is resolved on the merits. Subsequently, an order was issued dismissing the motion without prejudice on October 26, 2006, and then reissued on January 26, 2007.

On August 30, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion for receivership following the resignations of six of the nine members of the Board of Directors on August 16, 2006. Within a week of the resignations, three new independent board members were added and two more were added in October 2006, bringing the total board membership to eight. Thus, the board and all board committees, including the Special Litigation Committee and the Transaction Committee, were fully reconstituted. The Plaintiffs' motion for receivership was denied on November 29, 2006. In its Memorandum Opinion denying the motion for receivership, the Court concluded that the Plaintiffs' holdings in the Public Preferred Stock represented a minority equity interest (not a fixed liability), and that their minority equity interest did not provide a guarantee to payment of dividends or redemption of their shares. The Court further stated that it could not find that the Plaintiffs' expectations were objectively reasonable, and concluded that the Plaintiffs had not been denied any rights as defined by the proxy statement and prospectus forming the terms of the Public Preferred Stock.

On February 15, 2007, the Plaintiffs filed their second Motion for Preliminary Injunction to prevent the sale or disposal of any corporate assets outside the ordinary course of business until such time that two new Class D directors could be elected. On April 19, 2007, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion. Two new Class D Directors, Messrs. Seth W. Hamot and Andrew R. Siegel, were elected at the June 18, 2007 special meeting of the holders of Public Preferred Stock.

On February 27, 2007, the Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint and added Mr. John R. C. Porter, then majority shareholder, as a defendant. The Company filed its motion to strike/dismiss and motion for summary judgment on March 28, 2007. On June 6, 2007, the Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. The following counts were dismissed: allegations of fraudulent conveyance (Count I); request for permanent and preliminary injunction related to the fraudulent conveyance allegations (Count II); and allegations of shareholder oppression against Mr. John Porter (Count V). The following counts were not dismissed: request for appointment of a receiver (Count III); request to dissolve the corporation (Count IV); breach of fiduciary duty by directors (Count VI); and breach of fiduciary duty by officers (Count VII).

On May 29, 2007, Telos filed a Counterclaim (“Telos Counterclaim”) against the Plaintiffs alleging interference with its relationship with Wells Fargo, and a related motion for a preliminary injunction. On June 4, 2007, the Court entered a consent order in which the Plaintiffs agreed to cease and desist communications with Wells Fargo. On August 28, 2007, the Court issued a ruling granting Telos' motion for a preliminary injunction.

On July 20, 2007, counsel for the Special Litigation Committee issued its final report, which found that the available evidence did not support the derivative claims, and there was no instance of bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty or self-interested action or inaction that would make it in the Company's best interests to support the derivative claims. Further, Special Litigation Committee counsel recommended that the Company take all action necessary, appropriate and consistent with such findings.

Thus, on August 24, 2007, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the derivative claims as recommended by the Special Litigation Committee and its report. On January 7, 2008, the Court granted the Company's motion to dismiss the derivative claims and dismissed Counts VI and VII of the Second Amended Complaint, leaving only Counts III and IV remaining. Accordingly, all counts against the individual defendants were dismissed. Subsequently, the Company filed a motion for Summary Judgment on February 1, 2008 to dismiss the remaining counts.

On February 12, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint which included all the previous counts from the original Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint as well as additional counts. The additional counts were as follows: breach of contract against Telos (Count VIII); preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the Company from entering into a transaction to dispose of assets that allegedly would unjustly enrich the officers and directors (Count IX); and a request for an accounting alleging that the Company failed to prepare financial statements as required under Maryland law (Count X). The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss or to Strike the Third Amended Complaint or for Summary Judgment on February 19, 2008.

On March 3, 2008, the Plaintiffs and all the Defendants to the litigation entered into a Stipulation regarding the Third Amended Complaint. All parties stipulated that the Third Amended Complaint alleges causes of action against the Company only and not against the individual defendants. The parties stipulated that, for purposes of appellate preservation only, the Third Amended Complaint contained allegations concerning parties who, and causes of action which, had been dismissed by prior orders of the Court. The parties further stipulated that all causes of action asserted against the individual defendants in the Third Amended Complaint, and Counts I, II, V, VI and VII of the Third Amended Complaint, were dismissed with prejudice in accordance with the Court's prior rulings. The parties stipulated that the Plaintiffs were not seeking reconsideration of the Court's previous rulings concerning parties or causes of action that had been dismissed.

On April 15, 2008, the Court issued an order dismissing with prejudice the remaining counts (Counts III, IV, VIII, IX, and X) of the Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint against the Company.

On June 19, 2008, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Serve Discovery on Wells Fargo in connection with the Telos Counterclaim. The Company filed its opposition to the motion on July 8, 2008. On December 2, 2008, the Company filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of the counterclaim without prejudice, and the Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion on December 19, 2008. A hearing was held on January 23, 2009 before Judge W. Michel Pierson. On the same day, Judge Pierson issued an order granting the Company's motion to dismiss the counterclaim without prejudice and denying the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to service discovery as moot.

On February 23, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

On March 6, 2009, the Plaintiffs (now Appellants) filed the Civil Appeal Information Report. The Appellees include the Company and the directors and officers previously named in the dismissed complaints. The Appellants listed a total of 12 issues and sub-issues for review.

On April 8, 2009, the Appellants filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to Court of Special Appeals with the Court of Appeals of Maryland. On June 12, 2009, the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, stating that “there has been no showing that review by certiorari is desirable and in the public interest.” The oral arguments were held before the Maryland Court of Special Appeals on May 3, 2010. The court has yet to render a decision on the matter.

At this stage of the appeal process, it is impossible to reasonably determine the degree of probability related to Plaintiffs' (Appellants') success in any of their assertions. Although there can be no assurance as to the ultimate outcome of this appeal process, the Company and its officers and directors strenuously deny Plaintiffs' claims, will continue to vigorously defend the matter, and oppose the relief sought.

Hamot et al. v. Telos Corporation

On August 2, 2007, Messrs. Seth W. Hamot and Mr. Andrew R. Siegel, principals of Costa Brava Partnership III L.P. (“Costa Brava”) and Class D Directors of Telos (“Class D Directors”), filed a verified complaint against the Company and a motion for a temporary restraining order in the Circuit Court for the City of Baltimore, Maryland (“the Court” or “Circuit Court”). The complaint alleged that certain company documents and records had not been promptly provided to them as requested, and that these documents were necessary to fulfill their fiduciary duty as directors.

On August 22, 2007 the Class D Directors filed an amended verified complaint and an amended motion for temporary restraining order alleging that the Company was denying them the ability to effectively review, examine, consider and question future regulatory filings and other important actions and undertakings of the Company.

On August 28, 2007, the Court converted the motion for temporary restraining order into a request for a preliminary injunction and entered a preliminary injunction stating that the Class D Directors were entitled to documents in response to reasonable requests for information pertinent and necessary to perform their duties as members of the Board. In addition, the Court noted that during the pendency of the shareholder litigation, it was not inclined to permit the Class D Directors, through the guise of their newly acquired director status, to avoid their currently binding commitments under the stipulation and protective order entered on July 7, 2006. Pursuant to the terms of that order the Company is entitled to designate documents produced in discovery or submitted to the Court as “confidential” or “highly confidential” and to withhold from the Class D Directors information protected by the work product doctrine or attorney-client privilege.

On September 24, 2007, the Class D Directors filed a new motion for temporary restraining order and a second amended verified complaint in which they requested that the Court “compel Telos to adhere to the Telos Amended and Restated Bylaws” and alleged that provisions concerning the noticing of Board committee meetings and the recording of Board meeting minutes had been violated and that Mr. Wood's service as both CEO and Chairman of the Board was improper and impermissible under the Company's Bylaws. The Court denied the Class D Directors' motion on October 12, 2007. On the same day, the Court issued an amended preliminary injunction stating that the Class D Directors are entitled to receive written responses to requests for Board of Directors or Board committee minutes within seven (7) days of any such requests and copies of such minutes within fifteen (15) days of any such requests, as well as written responses to all other requests for information and/or documents related to their duties as directors within seven (7) days of such requests, and all Board of Directors appropriate information and/or documents within thirty (30) days of any such requests. The Court further stated that in all other respects, the preliminary injunction order of August 28, 2007 shall remain in full force and effect.

On April 16, 2008, the Company's independent auditor, Reznick Group, P.C. (“Reznick”), resigned. In its resignation letter addressed to the Chairman of the Audit Committee, Reznick stated that it believed that its independence had been impaired due to communications from the Class D Directors that it perceived as threats of litigation and attempts to influence its opinion on certain accounting issues. The communications included a March 28, 2008 letter that was sent on the letterhead of Roark, Rearden & Hamot Capital Management, LLC (“RRHCM”), which is the general partner of Costa Brava, and of which Seth Hamot, Class D Director, is the managing member, to Goodman & Company, L.L.P. (“Goodman”), which had served as the Company's independent auditor prior to the engagement of Reznick. The letter also was blind-copied to Reznick. The letter demanded that Goodman withdraw its audit opinion for the years 2006, 2005, and 2004, and threatened further legal action against Goodman, stating “Costa Brava reserves its right to bring claims against Goodman for any damages resulting from clean audit opinions relating to past or future financial statements.”

After Reznick resigned citing impairment to its independence as a result of communications from the Class D Directors, the Company filed a Counterclaim on April 23, 2008, in an effort to prevent the Class D Directors from engaging in any further acts of misrepresentation, interference and improper influence upon the Company's independent auditors regarding, among other things, a specific accounting treatment (from that of a non-current liability to that of a current liability) for their holdings in the Company's Public Preferred Stock. The Counterclaim states claims against the Class D Directors for Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship with Goodman (Count I); Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship with Reznick (Count II); Tortious Inference with Economic or Business Relations with Goodman (Count III); Tortious Inference with Economic or Business Relations with Reznick (Count IV); Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Hamot (Count V); and Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Siegel (Count VI).

On May 1, 2008, the Court issued an order “to preserve the status quo until a hearing may be conducted.” The Status Quo Order, among other things, stated that the Class D Directors must “cease, desist and refrain from any and all direct or indirect, verbal or written, contact or communication with the Company's past, current and future auditors, including without limitation Goodman & Company, LLP, (“Goodman”) and Reznick Group (“Reznick”), acting either singly or in concert with others, and either directly with any such auditors and/or with their agents or employees.”

On June 20, 2008, the Company filed its First Amended Counterclaim supplementing and updating its allegations.

On June 27, 2008, the Court granted the Company's Motion for Preliminary Injunction against the Class D Directors regarding their interference with the Company's relationship with its current and former auditors. The Court ordered Hamot and Siegel to:

… cease, desist and refrain from any and all direct and indirect contact or communications (whether verbal, written, or otherwise) with Goodman, Reznick, or any other former, current or future auditors of Telos Corporation, or with any agents or representatives of any such auditors, regarding the conduct herein prohibited, during the pendency of this litigation or until such time as Telos obtains audited financial statements for 2007 and files its 10-K with the SEC.

The Court further prohibited Hamot and Siegel from:

… engaging in contacts, communications or other conduct prohibited by this Order acting either singly or in concert with others, including any entities that they control or through which they operate, including, but not limited to, Costa Brava, RRHCM and RRH [Roark, Rearden, & Hamot Capital Management, LLC and Roark, Rearden & Hamot entities, respectively]. It also specifically prohibits any such actions or conduct undertaken through or in concert or collusion with other persons or entities, including, but not limited to, Wynnefield Partners Small Cap Value, L.P. (“Wynnefield”), Paul Berger or any other holders of the Public Preferred Stock.

The Order further states:

In this case, Telos has contractual relationships with both Reznick and Goodman, which are reflected in their engagement letters with Telos, and Hamot and Siegel had knowledge of these relationships. The record further indicates that Hamot and Siegel intentionally interfered with these relationships, and that their interference caused the non-performance by Reznick and Goodman of the services they were engaged to perform, as well as Reznick's termination of the engagement. Thus, Telos has raised a substantial claim for tortious interference with contract under the facts presented.

… As discussed above, the record indicates that Telos is likely to demonstrate that Hamot and Siegel intentionally sought to interfere with Reznick's audit through questionable and potentially misleading communications and barely-veiled threats of litigation, and that their interference caused Reznick to resign. Telos, therefore, has also raised claims going to the merits of its count for tortious interference with business or economic relations.

The Order also states that “Telos is likely to demonstrate that their conduct was not just wrongful, but unlawful.” It further states that “Telos is likely to show that Hamot and Siegel used potentially misleading communications and threats of litigation in an effort to dictate the accounting treatment that Reznick should adopt, thereby running afoul of Sarbanes-Oxley section 303 and SEC Rule 13b2-2 and providing another basis for liability for tortious interference with business or economic relations.”

In addition, the Order states:

Here, the conduct by Hamot and Siegel indicates that they put their interests ahead of the corporation they were supposed to be serving and sought to disrupt the company's essential relationships to serve their own ends. Indeed, even after being advised at Telos' April 2, 2008, board meeting that their conduct was jeopardizing the company's relationship with its auditor, they continued to send more communications to Reznick attempting to influence its opinions. … Given the record before the Court, it appears that Telos likely will be able to demonstrate that Hamot and Siegel breached their fiduciary duties to the Company.

Lastly, the Order states that “the public interest favors Telos.” It states:

When directors with conflicted interests are allowed to interfere with [the audit] process, the public's interest in the integrity of the process – and its interest in the integrity of the financial information that ultimately will be provided to the investing public – suffers. Moreover, it also is in the public interest to protect the operational status quo of an ongoing viable business, which employs over 500 people and provides essential services to the United States military.

The Class D Directors filed a Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim on May 21, 2008 and it was denied on July 24, 2008.

On July 16, 2008, the Class D Directors filed a Motion for Stay of Enforcement of Interlocutory Order in the Circuit Court seeking a stay of enforcement of the June 27, 2008 preliminary injunction. The Circuit Court denied the Class D Directors' motion on August 15, 2008.

On July 25, 2008, the Class D Directors filed a Notice of Appeal of the June 27, 2008 Preliminary Injunction.

On July 30, 2008, the Class D Directors filed in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland a motion to stay enforcement of the June 27, 2008 preliminary injunction pending appeal of the preliminary injunction. The motion was denied without prejudice by the Court of Special Appeals on August 5, 2008. The Class D Directors filed a renewed motion to stay the preliminary injunction in the Court of Special Appeals on August 20, 2008 and that motion was denied on September 15, 2008.

On October 2, 2008, the Company filed a Second Amended Counterclaim which added a Count VII, requesting that the Court issue a declaratory judgment that the Class D Directors are not entitled to indemnification or the advancement of expenses under Maryland law.

The oral argument on the Class D Directors' appeal of the June 27, 2008 preliminary injunction took place before the Court of Special Appeals on November 3, 2008. The Court of Special Appeals took the matter under advisement and, to date, has not issued a decision on the appeal.

Through a letter dated December 17, 2008, the Company informed the Court of Special Appeals that the audit of the Company's 2007 financial statements had been completed and the Company had filed its 2007 Form 10-K with the SEC as of that date. In their response letter of December 19, 2008 to the Court of Special Appeals, the Class D Directors reiterated their position that the “controversy between the parties is capable of repetition, yet evading appellate review” and further argued that, in any event, the Court should decide the issue of whether the appeal was moot “only upon a fully-briefed motion.” The Company responded on December 23, 2008 that it would be amenable to additional briefing. Thus, on December 30, 2008, the Court of Special Appeals issued an order directing the parties to submit further briefing on the issue of whether the Company's filing of its 2007 Form 10-K mooted the Class D Directors appeal of the June 27, 2008 preliminary injunction or whether the appeal remained justicable, and if so, under what theory. The Company and the Class D Directors filed their respective Supplemental Memoranda on the mootness issue on January 14, 2009. On January 21, 2009, the Company and the Class D Directors filed their respective Supplemental Reply Memoranda on the mootness issue. On May 6, 2009, the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal of the June 27, 2008 preliminary injunction as moot.

On April 1, 2009, the Class D Directors filed a Petition for Constructive Civil Contempt with the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Petition alleges that the Company violated the Court's August 28, 2007 and October 12, 2007 Orders, referenced above, for failing to provide requested documents or information that the Class D Directors allege is “pertinent and necessary to Plaintiffs' duties as Telos' directors.” In addition, on April 21, 2009, the Company filed a motion to dismiss the petition and to dismiss the complaint as moot. On December 30, 2009, the Court ordered that the petition be dismissed. The Court stated “the remedy of civil contempt is not appropriate upon the circumstances before the court. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to resort to this remedy when they failed to engage in good faith exchange with defendant to address the concerns that were raised by defendant or even to acknowledge defendant's response to their demands for documents.” However, the Court denied the Company's motion to dismiss the complaint but stated it would schedule a status conference at a later date to review the matter with counsel.

On April 12, 2010, regarding the Hamot et al. v. Telos matter, the Class D Directors filed a Motion for the Advancement of Legal Fees and Expenses. The Class D Directors demand that the Company advance legal fees and expenses incurred in defending against the counterclaim brought by Telos. The Class D Directors allege that since they were party to a lawsuit by reason of their service as Company board members, they should be indemnified. The Class D Directors claim that Maryland law and the Company bylaws entitle them to indemnification. In the counterclaim filed by the Company on April 23, 2008, the Company sought a preliminary injunction to prevent further unlawful interference with the Company's relationship with the former and current outside auditors, which eventually led to the resignation of the Company's outside auditors at the time. The Company was successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction against the Class D Directors. On June 25, 2008, the Class D Directors filed an appeal to the preliminary injunction but that appeal was dismissed as moot on May 6, 2009. On September 8, 2008, the Class D Directors submitted a letter through counsel demanding indemnification and reimbursement for expenses incurred related to the counterclaim. On October 2, 2008, the Board of Directors determined that the Class D Directors were not entitled to advancement or indemnification. That same day, the Company filed a second amended counterclaim, adding Count Seven which sought a declaratory judgment that as directors, the Plaintiffs were not entitled to advancement or indemnification of legal fees and expenses.

The Company filed its opposition brief on May 11, 2010 to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Advancement of Legal Fees and Expenses. The Company states that the Plaintiffs failed to meet the basic statutory requirements of the law in seeking indemnification. The hearing on this matter took place on August 17, 2010.

On November 3, 2011, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Advancement, as well as the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and request for fees. The Court found that the Plaintiffs had not met the statutory standard of appropriate standard of conduct. The Court stated:

It must be emphasized that a determination that an affirmation of good faith is insufficient is unusual, requiring a high degree of proof. Given the purpose of advancement provisions, they should be construed liberally in favor of advancement, and such a construction weighs against an overly intrusive examination into whether an affirmation was made in good faith. Furthermore, a court must take pains to avoid conducting an indemnification inquiry under the guise of an advancement determination. Therefore, it is a rare case where the court could conclude that a lack of good faith precludes advancement. This is such a rare case. Under the particular circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the record demonstrates that Hamot and Siegel could not have entertained a good faith belief that they met the statutory standards for indemnification.

The Court noted that the Plaintiffs filed their motion 18 months after the conclusion of the Company's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, “long after Telos rejected the demand for advancement and long after any other activity in the litigation.” When the Plaintiffs sought reimbursement, it was for the expenses incurred in the unsuccessful defense of the preliminary injunction proceedings in which the court had concluded that they had been guilty of a breach of their duties as directors. The opinion notes that Judge Matricciani explicitly stated that the Plaintiffs' acts and omissions were committed in bad faith. “These findings are inconsistent with the conclusion that Hamot and Siegel met the statutory standard for indemnification.” Therefore, the Plaintiffs “could not entertain a good faith belief that they met the standard, at least insofar as they requested advancement of expenses for litigation of the preliminary injunction.” In addition, the court stated that since the Plaintiffs were “seeking reimbursement for expenses relating to the proceedings that culminated in those findings, those findings must furnish the standard by which their good faith relief should be measured. Their belief is inconsistent with those findings.”

However, the court refused to rule at this time as to whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to an advance for future expenses incurred related to the counterclaim. In that case, the court stated that its analysis of the good faith affirmation will be different. It would depend on the nature of the relief sought by the Company and the basis for the claims asserted. Therefore, the court refused to determine at this time that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to advancement as a matter of law, and denied the Company's motion for summary judgment on the matter.

On July 19, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction with the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. The Plaintiffs claim that the Company failed to respond to their letter request for documents. Subsequent to the filing, the parties exchanged further correspondence on the matter. On July 23, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed to dismiss its motion.

At this stage of the litigation and appeal process, it is impossible to reasonably determine the degree of probability related to the Class D Directors' success in any of their assertions and claims. Although there can be no assurance as to the ultimate outcome of these proceedings, the Company and its officers and directors strenuously deny the Class D Directors' claims, and will vigorously defend the matter, and continue to oppose the relief sought.

Andrew Siegel v. Telos Corporation, et. al.

On June 30, 2010, Mr. Andrew Siegel filed a Complaint against Telos Corporation, Doe I-XX, and Roe Corporation I-XX in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. Subsequently, Mr. Siegel withdrew the lawsuit on August 19, 2010.

Other Litigation

In addition, the Company is a party to litigation arising in the ordinary course of business. In the opinion of management, while the results of such litigation cannot be predicted with any reasonable degree of certainty, the final outcome of such known matters will not, based upon all available information, have a material adverse effect on the Company's consolidated financial position, results of operations or cash flows.