Exchange

This presentation contains various forward-looking statements which represent the company’s estimates or expectations regarding future events. All forward-looking statements involve a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause the actual results to differ materially from the projected results. Additional information is contained in Delta’s Securities and Exchange Commission filings, including its Form 10-K filed with the SEC on March 29, 2006 and its Form 10-Q filed with the SEC on November 9, 2006. Caution should be taken not to place undue reliance on Delta’s forward-looking statements, which represent Delta’s views only as of the date of this presentation, and which Delta has no current intention to update. None of the statements contained herein are a solicitation of votes for or against any plan of reorganization. Any such solicitation shall only be made through a disclosure statement approved by the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code.Safe Harbor

US Airways/Delta Merger Would Be Highly Anti competitive Proposed merger would substantially reduce competition • US Airways and Delta have overlapping networks •US Airways/Delta merger would reduce competition on thousands of city pairs -Nearly 2,000 incremental city pairs with over 90% US Airways/Delta passenger share -Over 9,500 city pairs with reductions of competition that creat a presumption of market power under DOJ Merger Guidelines-31 overlapping nonstop domestic routes (12 of which would become monopoly routes due to the proposed merger) • US Airways/Delta would dominate 71 U.S. cities and 3 key East Coast airports In fact, the proposed US Airways/Delta merger would be far more anticompetitive than the attempted US Airways/United Airlines merger rejected by the DOJ after a 14-month investigation • More than 3 times as many incremental city pairs with over 90% passenger share • Thousands more city-pairs with competition decreases that would presumptively violate DOJ Merger Guidelines • 50% more overlapping nonstop routes • 4 times as many overlapping hubs Contrary to US Airways’ claims, these competitive problems would not be solved by • Low cost carriers -low cost carriers do not serve smaller communities • Claimed efficiencies -US Airways claimed efficiencies flow from capacity reduction, not unit cost reduction, and would result in-Elimination of competitive service-Higher fares/fewer discounted seats on many routes ABC

Atlanta and Charlotte Hubs are Redundant90175778050100150200 Total cities served from Charlotte and Atlanta by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from Charlotte by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from Atlanta by Delta and/or US Airways Overlap cities Cities served Source: OAG November 2006 • Atlanta covers 92% of the cities served by Charlotte • Atlanta also serves 77 cities not served by Charlotte • Downsizing of Charlotte hub is inevitable • Atlanta covers 92% of the cities served by Charlotte • Atlanta also serves 77 cities not served by Charlotte • Downsizing of Charlotte hub is inevitable Downsizing of Charlotte Hub is Inevitable Overlapping networks Overlapping networks A

Cincinnati and Pittsburgh Hubs are Redundant Source: OAG November 2006 411247310050100150200Total cities served from Pittsburgh and Cincinnati by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from Pittsburgh by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from Cincinnati by Delta and/or US Airways Overlap cities Cities served • Cincinnati covers 80% of the cities served by Pittsburgh • Cincinnati also serves 73 cities not served by Pittsburgh • Downsizing of Pittsburgh hub is inevitable • Cincinnati covers 80% of the cities served by Pittsburgh • Cincinnati also serves 73 cities not served by Pittsburgh • Downsizing of Pittsburgh hub is inevitable Downsizing of Pittsburgh Hub is Inevitable Overlapping networks Overlapping networks A

Salt Lake City, Phoenix, and Las Vegas Hubs are Redundant Source: OAG November 2006 6411032122050100150200 Total cities served from Las Vegas, Phoenix, and Salt Lake City by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from Las Vegas by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from Phoenix by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from Salt Lake City by Delta and/or US Airways Overlap cities Cities served • Salt Lake City covers 82% of the cities served by Phoenix and Las Vegas • Salt Lake City also serves 32 cities not served by Phoenix and Las Vegas • Downsizing of one or more of these hubs is inevitable • Salt Lake City covers 82% of the cities served by Phoenix and Las Vegas • Salt Lake City also serves 32 cities not served by Phoenix and Las Vegas • Downsizing of one or more of these hubs is inevitable Downsizing of One or More of These Hubs is Inevitable Overlapping networks Overlapping networks A

US Airways’ and Delta’s Main International Gateways are Redundant Atlanta (ATL) / New York (JFK) vs. Charlotte (CLT) / Philadelphia (PHL) -Transatlantic routes overlap141803202550Total cities served from CLT/PHL and ATL/JFK by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from CLT/PHL by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from ATL/JFK by Delta and/or US Airways Overlap cities Cities served Atlanta (ATL) / New York (JFK) vs. Charlotte (CLT) / Philadelphia (PHL) -Caribbean routes overlap Cities served Note: Excludes seasonal offerings Source:OAG November 2006 192314302550Total cities served from CLT/PHL and ATL/JFK by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from CLT/PHL by US Airways and/or Delta Cities served only from ATL/JFK by Delta and/or US Airways Overlap cities • Essentially all of the combined Transatlantic and Caribbean destinations would be served out of Atlanta and New York (JFK) • Loss of international service is inevitable for Charlotte and Philadelphia and further domestic reductions are likely • Essentially all of the combined Transatlantic and Caribbean destinations would be served out of Atlanta and New York (JFK) • Loss of international service is inevitable for Charlotte and Philadelphia and further domestic reductions are likely Overlapping networks Overlapping networks A

“The so-called "relevant market" in which we evaluate whether a particular merger will lessen competition is not the whole industry. Rather, we have to look at the markets in which passengers buy air travel. These markets are the particular origin and destination city pairs (and occasionally airport pairs) on which passengers fly. It is competition in particular city pair markets that is relevant to competition for passengers.” DOJ Defines Competitiveness on a City Pair Level Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division (Nov. 2005)Source: Speech given by Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Bruce McDonald on November 3, 2005 to the Regional Airlines Association The proposed US Airways/Delta merger would eliminate or reduce competition on thousands of domestic city pairs impacting millions of passengers per year Reduced city pair competition Reduced city pair competition A

Domestic International Total 1,4028.8 M $1.4 B Number of city pairs Passengers per year affected Associated annual revenue 5690.8 M $0.2B1, 9719.6 M $1.6B Merger Would Create Nearly 2,000 Incremental City Pairs with More than 90% US Airways/Delta Passenger Share Note: All share calculations are based on passenger traffic; includes all non-directional city pairs recorded in DB1B from 2Q 2005to 2Q 2006; excludes US Airways and Delta locations that will not be served going forward based on the OAG November 2006 data; excludes airports that neither US Airways nor Delta serve to account for code share agreements Source:OAG November 2006; DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006Reduced city pair competition Reduced city pair competition A

Merger Would Create 1,402 Incremental Domestic City Pairs With More than 90% US Airways/Delta Passenger Share Reduced city pair competition Reduced city pair competition A ALLENTOWN ALBUQUERQUE ALBANY NANTUCKET AUGUSTA ALBANY To ANCHORAGE ALTOONA WATERTOWN ATLANTA AUGUSTA AUSTIN ASHEVILLE SCRANTON KALAMAZOO HARTFORD BRADFORD BAKERSFIELD BINGHAM TONBANGORBAR HARBOR BIRMINGHAM BILLINGS BECKLEY PRINCETON NASHVILLE BOISE BOSTON BRUNSWICK BUTTE BATON ROUGE BURLINGTON BUFFALO BURBANK BALTIMORE BOZEMAN COLUMBIA AKRONCEDAR CITY CHATTANOOGA CHARLOTTESVILLE CHARLESTON CEDAR RAPIDS CLEVELAND CHARLOTTE COLUMBUS COLORADO SPRNGS CASPER CORPUS CHRISTI CHARLESTON COLUMBUS CINCINNATI DAYTONA BEACHD AYTON WASHINGTON-DCA/IAD DENVER DALLAS-FORT WORTH DOTHAN DURANGO DES MOINES DETROITDU BOISE AGLEEL KOEL PASOERIEEUGENEE VANSVILLE NEW BERN NEW ARKKEY WEST To FAIR BANKS FRESNO FAYETTEVILLE KALISPELL FRANKLIN FLAGSTAFF FORT LAUDERDALE FLORENCE FARMINGTON SIOUX FALLS GARDEN CITY SPOKANE GRAND JUNCTION GAINESVILLE GULF PORT GREEN BAY FT HOOD GRAND RAPIDS GREENSBORO GREENVILLE GREAT FALLS HAGERSTOWN LAKE HAVASU CITY WHITE PLAINS HUNTSVILLE ASHLAND NEW HAVEN HYANNIS HAYS HOUSTON WICHITA IDAHO FALLS WILMINGTON INDIANAPOLIS WILLIAMSPORT ISLIP JACKSON JACKSONJACKSONVILLE NEW YORK-JFK/LGA JOHNSTOWN LANSING LAS VEGAS LOS ANGELES LEBANON LEXINGTON LAFAYETTE LONG BEACH LITTLE ROCKLAN CASTERGREENBRIER LEWISTON LYNCHBURG KANSAS CITY ORLANDO HARRISBURG MERIDIAN MEMPHIS MISSION/MCALLEN MEDFORD MONTGOMERY MANHATTAN MANCHESTER MIAMI MILWAUKEE MELBOURNE MONROE MOBILE SALINAS/MONTEREY MADISON MISSOULAMINN /ST PAUL MASSENANEW ORLEANS MARTHA'S VINEYARD MYRTLE BEACH JACKSONVILLE OAKLAND To KAHULUI OKLAHOMA CITY OMAHA ONTARIO CHICAGO-OR DNORFOLK WEST PALM BEACH PORTLAND PANAMA CITY GREENVILLENEW PORT NEWS PHILADELPHIA PHOENIX PITTSBURGH PENSACOLA PRESQUE ISLE PALM SPRINGS PROVIDENCE PORTLAND BEND/REDMOND RALEIGH/DURHAM RICHMOND ROCKLAND RENOROANOKE ROCHESTER FORT MYERS SAN DIEGO SAVANNAH SANTA BARBARA SOUTHBEND SAN LUIS OBISPOSALISBURY STATE COLLEGE LOUISVILLE SEATTLE SAN FRANCISCO SPRINGFIELD STAUNTON SHREVEPORT SAN JOSE SAN JUAN SALT LAKE CITYS ALINA SACRAMENTO ORANGE COUNTY SARASOTA ST LOUIS ST THOMAS ST CROIX SUN VALLEY NEWBURGH SYRACUSE TALLAHASSEE TOLEDO TAMPA BRISTOL TULSA TUCSON TWIN FALLS KNOXVILLE VALDOSTA FORT WALTON BEACH WEST YELLOWSTONE FAYETTEVILLE YUMA To KAHULUI Note: All share calculations are based on passenger traffic; includes all non-directional city pairs recorded in DB1B from 2Q 2005to 2Q 2006; excludes US Airways and Delta locations that will not be served going forward based on the OAG November 2006 data; excludes airports that neither US Airways nor Delta serve to account for code share agreements Source:OAG November 2006; DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006

Merger Would Create 569 Incremental International City Pairs With More than 90% US Airways/Delta Passenger Share Reduced city pair competition Reduced city pair competition A ALLENTOWN NANTUCKET AUGUSTA ALBANY ANTIGUA WATERTOWN ATLANTA ARUBA ASHEVILLE SCRANTON BARCELONA HAMILTON HARTFORD BAKERSFIELD BARBADOS/BRIDGETOWN BINGHAMTON BANGOR BIRMINGHAM BILLINGS BOISE To MUMBAI BOSTON BUDAPEST BUFFALO BELIZE CITY COLUMBIA AKRON CEDAR CITY CHATTANOOGA CHARLOTTESVILLE CHARLESTON CLEVELAND CHARLOTTE COLORADO SPRINGS CHARLESTON CANCUN CINCINNATI COZUMEL DAYTON WASHINGTON-DC AERIEEUGENE NEW BERN FAYETTEVILLE ROME FORT LAUDERDALE FLORENCE FREEPORT GARDEN CITYGRAND CAYMAN GUADALAJARAGR AND JUNCTION GAINESVILLE GULFPORT GRAND RAPIDS GREENSBORO GREENVILLE GUATEMALA CITYGUAYMASHERMOSILLOWHITE PLAINSHUNTSVILLE ASHLAND NEW HAVENIDAHO FALLS WILMINGTON INDIANAPOLISIS LIPISTANBUL JACKSON JACKSONVILLE KINGSTON LOS ANGELES LEXINGTON NEW YORK-LA GUARDIALIBERIA LITTLE ROCKLYNCHBURGMADRIDMONTEGO BAY HARRISBURGMEMPHIS MEXICO CITY MONTGOMERY MANCHESTER MILWAUKEE MOBIL EMONTERREY MILA MYRTLE BEACH MAZATLANNASSAUNICE JACKSONVILLE OAKLAND OKLAHOMA CITY ONTARIO NORFOLKWEST PALM BEACH NEW PORT NEWS PHILADELPHIA POCATELLO PITTSBURGH PROVIDENC IALESPENSACOLAPASCO/KENNEWICKPALM SPRINGS PANAMA CITY PUNTA CANA PROVIDENCE PUERTO VALLARTA PORTLAND ROANOKE ROCHESTERFORT MYERS ROATAN SAN SALVADOR SAN DIEGO SAVANNAH SANTA BARBARA SOUTH BEND STATE COLLEGE To SANTIA GOLOUISVILLE SANTO DOMINGO SAN JOSELOS CABOSSAN JOSEST KITTS SALT LAKE CITY ORANGE COUNTY SARASOTA ST MAARTEN SYRACUSE TALLAHASSEE To TEL AVIVBRISTOLTWIN FALLS KNOXVILLE ST LUCIAVENICEFAYETTEVILLEFREDERICTONHALIFAXOTTAWA MONTREAL TORONTO ZÜRICH Note: All share calculations are based on passenger traffic; includes all non-directional city pairs recorded in DB1B from 2Q 2005to 2Q 2006; excludes US Airways and Delta locations that will not be served going forward based on the OAG November 2006 data; excludes airports that neither US Airways nor Delta serve to account for code share agreements Source:OAG November 2006; DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006

148861,3131,4712,6251,9651,32101,5003,000100-200201-500501-1,5001,501-2,5002,501-4,000>4,000Absolute HHI increase Passengers affected/year Associated annual revenue 34.5 M $5.9 B 39.6 M $6.9 B 11.9 M $2.1 B 7.1 M $1.2 B 5.0 M $0.7 B Total 139.6 M $23.9 B 9,581 Note: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a common measure of market concentration used in antitrust analysis; includes all non-directional city pairs recorded in DB1B -YE 2Q 2006 with an original HHI >1,800; excludes US Airways and Delta locations that will not be served going forward based on OAG November 2006 data; excludes airports that neither US Airways nor Delta serve to account for code share agreements Source:OAG November 2006; DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006; Department of Justice Antitrust Division • DOJ Merger Guidelines state that increases of more than 100 HHI-points (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) in highly concentrated markets (HHI>1,800) create a presumption that the merger is likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise • This merger would create presumption of market power in city pairs accounting for 26% out of 36,257 city pairs served by US Airways/Delta impacting 140M passengers and $24B in revenue each year • DOJ Merger Guidelines state that increases of more than 100 HHI-points (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) in highly concentrated markets (HHI>1,800) create a presumption that the merger is likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise • This merger would create presumption of market power in city pairs accounting for 26% out of 36,257 city pairs served by US Airways/Delta impacting 140M passengers and $24B in revenue eachyear41.5M$7.1BReduced city pair competition Reduced city pair competition A Number of highly concentrated city pairs impacted (HHI>1,800) Merger Would Create Presumption of Market Power Under DOJ Merger Guidelines for More Than 9,500 City Pairs Mergers That Create or Enhance Market Power Are Challenged By DOJ

US Airways and Delta Have 31 Overlapping Nonstop Domestic Routes12 of Which Would Become Monopoly Routes due to Merger Reduced city pair competition Reduced city pair competition A US Airways/Delta merger would directly reduce competition on these routes, impacting 11.6M annual passengers and accounting for $1.6B in annual revenue US Airways/Delta merger would directly reduce competition on these routes, impacting 11.6M annual passengers and accounting for $1.6B in annual revenue Monopoly routes Phoenix Las Vegas Fort Lauderdale Orlando Salt Lake City Key West Atlanta Charlotte Charleston Huntsville Savannah Greenville/Spartanburg Greensboro Raleigh/Durham Columbus Boston New York-JFK Washington Cincinnati Richmond Portland Philadelphia Myrtle Beach New York-LGA Note: Accounts for new announced services Source:OAG November 2006; DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006 Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta Boston Boston Boston Boston Boston Charleston Charlotte Charlotte Columbus Columbus Cincinnati Washington, DC Washington, DC Washington, DC Key West Fort Lauderdale Greensboro Greenville/Spartanburg NY-JFK Las Vegas Las Vegas NY-LaGuardia NY-LaGuardia NY-LaGuardia NY-LaGuardia Phoenix Charlotte Washington, DC Las Vegas Philadelphia Phoenix Washington, DC Las Vegas NY-LaGuardia Myrtle Beach Savannah NY-La Guardia Cincinnati NY-LaGuardia Washington, DCNY-LaGuardia Philadelphia Huntsville NY-LaGuardia Savannah Orlando Las Vegas NY-LaGuardia NY-LaGuardia Las Vegas Orlando Salt Lake City Portland Raleigh/Durham Richmond Savannah Salt Lake City-------------------------------

US Airways/Delta Would Dominate 71 U.S. Cities (1) No competitive low cost carrier presence (>5% passenger share) at any of these cities No competitive low cost carrier presence (>5% passenger share) at any of these cities (1) Cities not shown: Yuma, Lake Havasu City, Flagstaff, St. George, Cedar City, Elko, Twin Falls, Pocatello, West Yellowstone, Great Bend, Salina, Manhattan Note: Dominant defined as ≥65% passenger share; excludes 3 airports with less than 100 passengers per year; calculation based on departing passenger share in the respective regions Source:OAG November 2006; DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006 Wilmington Fayetteville Pinehurst Augusta Columbus Albany Macon Valdosta Brunswick Lynchburg Dothan Florence Huntington Naples Melbourne Panama City Gainesville Cincinnati Tallahassee Daytona Beach Wilmington Jacksonville, NC New Bern, NC Ithaca/Cortland Hilton Head Salisbury Greenville Williamsport Presque Isle Du Bois Johnstown Altoona Oil City Bar Harbor Watertown Lebanon Rockland Ogdensburg Athens Jamestown Lancaster Augusta Hagerstown Bradford Beckley Princeton Charleston Asheville Chattanooga Bristol (Tri-Cities) Scranton Charlottesville Greenbrier Staunton Meridian Montgomery Columbus Massena New Haven Color of bubble= Carrier <10K 10K-99K 100K-1M>1M Size of bubble= Passengers/year No dominant passenger share today US Airways passenger share ≥65% today Delta passenger share ≥65% today

Merger Would Substantially Reduce Competition at Boston, New York-La Guardia, and Washington-Reagan National Airports US Airways/Delta passenger share position Number of non-stop routes where merger would reduce competition from...BOSDCALGA38.417.039.624.548.516.62.9x1.6x2.3xNearest competitor US Airways/Delta nearest competitor US Airways/Delta Nearest competitor US Airways/Delta Change due to merger 7271,0787442 to 1 carrier3 to 2 carriers Total 2 to 1 carrier 3 to 2 carriers Total 2 to 1 carrier 3 to 2 carriers Total 25775123361,4331,7591,605 Today’s HHI Future HHI 2,1602,8372,349 Dominated cities Dominated cities A Note: Share position analysis based on passenger traffic; Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a common measure of market concentration used in antitrust analysis. The DOJ states that HHI increases of >50 points in moderately (>1,000 and <1,800) and highly concentrated markets (>1,800) raise significant anticompetitive concerns; American Airlines represents US Airways/Delta’s nearest competitor at BOS, LGA, and DCASource:DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006; Department of Justice Antitrust Division

US Airways and Delta Would Operate 52% of Slots and 40% of Gates at Major East Coast Airports (1) Analysis shows slots operated (and not slots owned) after shuttle divestiture (assuming all divestitures will come out of Delta’s current slots) (2) New York-LaGuardia includes Marine Air Terminal; gate counts for mainline gates; off-gate Regional Jet parking positions excluded(3) Assuming all divestitures will come out of Delta’s current gates (4 gates at LGA, 2 gates at DCA, and 2 gates at BOS Note: One slot refers to one arrival or one departure Source: OAG November 2006; snapshot of operating performance, November 17, 2006; FAAUS Airways/Delta would operate over half of the slots at 2 key capacity controlled airports(1)US Airways/Delta would have 40% of the gates at 3 key East Coast airports(2), (3)US Airways Delta Other Combined US Airways/Delta share % LGA 49% DCA 57% 34% 15% 51% 47% 10% 43% 27% 11% 62% 32% 14% 54% 21% 19% 60% LGA 38% DCA 46% BOS 40% Weighted average: 52% Weighted average: 40% Dominated citiesDominated citiesAEven AfterShuttle Divestiture

Combined Entity Would Dominate New York-LaGuardia and Washington-Reagan National Airport sNote: One slot refers to one arrival or one departure; AA -American Airlines; CO -Continental Airlines; DL -Delta Air Lines; NW -Northwest Airlines; UA -United Airlines; FL -AirTran Airways; B6 -JetBlue Airways; WN -Southwest Airlines Source:OAG November 2006; snapshot of operating performance, November 17, 2006Combined US Airways/Delta would operate nearly 4x more slots than the next largest carrie rEven After Shuttle Divestiture Combined US Airways/Delta would operate over 2x more slots than the next largest carrier 108 0 16 26 38 48 56 2 560 400 800 US/DL current AA UA NW CO FL B6 WN All Other Slots US Airways/Delta slots after shuttle divestiture 62 00 10 32 46 50 1 200 300 600 US/DL current AA NW CO UA FL B6 WN All Other Slots US Airways/Delta slots after shuttle divestiture650586508476New York-LaGuardia Operating Slots by Carrier Washington-Reagan National Operating Slots by Carrier US Airways Delta Dominated cities Dominated cities A

Dominated cities Dominated cities A Divestiture of US Airways/Delta Slots Would Reduce Service to Small Communities Delta and US Airways are the Only Significant Providers of Small City Service From LGA and DCA Small/Non-hub cities served from New York-LaGuardia Small/Non-hub cities served from Washington-Reagan National Source:OAG November 2006; snapshot of operating performance, November 17, 2006; FAA 267 US Airways/Delta TodayOtherAirlines 25 3 US Airways/Delta Today Other Airlines New York-LaGuardia and Washington-Reagan National airports are likely to lose service to small communities

(1) Highly concentrated markets have a HHI of ≥1,800 (2)HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Source:DB1B data YE 2Q 2001 and YE 2Q 2006; OAG 2Q 2001 and November 2006 Criteria Incremental city pairs with more than 90% passenger share City pairs creating presumption of market power under DOJ Merger Guidelines • Number of highly concentrated(1)city pairs with an HHI (2) change ≥100 Overlapping nonstop routes • Number of overlapping nonstop domestic routes Overlapping hubs • Overview of overlapping hubs US Airways/Delta (2006) 1,971 9,581 31 US Airways/United Airlines (2001) 558 3,529 21 • Atlanta -Charlotte • Pittsburgh -Cincinnati • Philadelphia -NY/JFK • Phoenix/Las Vegas -Salt Lake City • Baltimore -Washington Dulles -Philadelphia/Pittsburgh 3.5x higher 2.7x higher 1.5x higher 4x more More anticompetitive than rejected merger More anticompetitive than rejected merger B Proposed Merger is Far More Anticompetitive Than the Attempted US Airways/United Merger DOJ Rejected US Airways/United Merger After a 14-Month Investigation

US Airways/Delta Would Be the Largest Carrier in 127 Small Communities More than Any Other Carrier Pasco/Kennewick Jackson Elko Cedar City Bakersfield Lake Havasu City Flagstaff Yuma Farmington Grand Junction St George Lovell/Powell Idaho • Idaho Falls • Pocatello • Sun Valley • Twin Falls Montana • Billings • Bozeman • Butte • Great Falls • Helena • Kalispell • Missoula • West Yellowstone Great Bend Manhattan Dodge City Garden City Salina Hays North Carolina • Greensboro • Wilmington • Asheville • Fayetteville • Jacksonville • New Bern • Greenville • Pinehurst South Carolina • Charleston • Greenville/Spartanburg • Myrtle Beach • Columbia • Hilton Head • Florence Georgia • Savannah •Augusta • Columbus • Valdosta • Albany • Brunswick-Glynco • Macon • Athens Virginia • Norfolk • Richmond•Roanoke•Charlottesville•Lynchburg•StauntonPennsylvania•Allentown•Altoona•Bradford•Du Bois • Erie • Harrisburg • Johnstown • Lancaster • Oil City/Franklin • Scranton • State College • Williamsport West Virginia • Beckley • Charleston • Greenbrier • Princeton/Bluefield Maine • Augusta • Bangor • Bar Harbor • Portland • Presque Isle • Rockland New York • Albany • Binghamton • Elmira/Corning • Ithaca/Cortland • Jamestown • Massena • Newburgh • Ogdensburg • Rochester • Syracuse • Watertown •White Plains Knoxville Fort Wayne Toledo South Bend Dayton Evansville Lexington Ashland/Huntington Bristol (Tri-Cities)Baton Rouge Monroe Gulfport/Biloxi Meridian Montgomery Columbus Huntsville Chattanooga Dothan Mobil Fort Walton Beach Tallahassee Pensacola Daytona Beach Melbourne Sarasota Naples Key West Gainesville Panama City Lebanon Burlington New Haven Salisbury Wilmington Hagerstown Low cost carriers do not serve small communities Low cost carriers do not serve small communities C Note: Calculation based on departing passenger share in the respective regions; “small communities” as categorized by the FAA (small and non-hub airports)Source:DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006

Note: Calculation based on departing passenger share in the respective regions; small communities” as categorized by the FAA (small and non-hub airports); low cost carrier service defined as >5% passenger shareSource:DB1B data -YE 2Q 2006 • Likely reduction of service for these 127 small community airports • Low cost carriers unlikely to enter small community markets • Reduction in competition likely to result in increased fares or complete loss of service (e.g., in Athens, GA) • Likely reduction of service for these 127 small community airports • Low cost carriers unlikely to enter small community markets • Reduction in competition likely to result in increased fares or complete loss of service (e.g., in Athens, GA)Only 14 of These 127 Small Communities Have Low Cost Carrier Service Small communities without low cost carrier service Small communities with low cost carrier service Billings Gulfport/Biloxi Sarasota Pensacola Savannah Myrtle Beach Richmond Norfolk Dayton White Plains Albany Syracuse Rochester Burlington Low cost carriers do not serve small communities Low cost carriers do not serve small communities C

Low Cost Carriers Avoid Serving Small Communities (1) Measured by average daily departures Note: Includes all markets served by Southwest, AirTran, Frontier, and JetBlue; airport segmentation in accordance to the FAA classification Source:OAG 1Q 2000 and November 2006 Despite significant growth in number of markets served (67% since 2000), low cost carriers have made very limited entries into small and non-hub markets Despite significant growth in number of markets served (67% since 2000), low cost carriers have made very limited entries into small and non-hub markets 275 4 2,485 1,652 389 7 1,291 1,213 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 Large>7.0M passengers/yearMedium1.75M-7.0Mpassengers/year Small 0.5 M-1.75 M passengers/year Non-hub <0.5 M passengers/year Domestic cities served by low cost carriers (1) Evolution of low cost carrier service by market type 2000 2006 Low Cost Carrier Growth Since 2000 has Focused on Large and Medium Markets Low cost carriers do not serve small communities Low cost carriers do not serve small communities C

“The merger will create over $1.65B in synergies that greatly outweigh any theoretical antitrust concerns ”US Airways plans to accomplish this by: • Combining 2 overlapping networks • Eliminating significant capacity-Approximately 180 aircraft • Reducing competition substantially at more than 70 airports and thousands of city pairs US Airways’ claimed efficiencies The facts • Reducing capacity and raising fares are not efficiencies that DOJ recognizes to justify mergers • In fact, DOJ states that “efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near monopoly" • To the contrary, these are effects that raise serious antitrust issues Claimed efficiencies will not be accepted Claimed efficiencies will not be accepted C US Airways’ Claimed Efficiencies Do Not Justify This Substantial Reduction in Competition Source: Company analysis; Department of Justice Antitrust division

5 26 66 97 0 50 100 Small/non-hub cities with service gains Small/non-hub cities with no change in service Small/non-hub cities with service decreases Total small/non-hub cities served US Airways/America West Merger Led to Reductions of Service in Small Communities Cities (#) Claimed efficiencies will not be accepted Claimed efficiencies will not be accepted C Note: “Small communities” as categorized by the FAA (small and non-hub airports)(1) OAG May 2005 and May 2006US Airways’ small community service changes after America West merger(1)US Airways/Delta Merger Would Result in Even Greater Reductions

(1) Based on average fare increases for American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines Source:D B1 B data -2Q 2005 and 2Q 2006; US Airways 8k filing, November 17, 2006 Claimed efficiencies will not be accepted Claimed efficiencies will not be accepted C The facts“ Merger synergies will enable the new Delta to continue offering consumer-friendly fares” US Airways ’claim US Airways has increased average fares in almost 4 times as many markets as it has lowered them 6,599 1,742 US Airways fare increases US Airways fare decreases Number of routes(2Q 05 vs. 2Q 06)US Airways average fares increased nearly 2 times that of other legacy carriers (1) 24.3% 14.4%US Airways Average for other legacy carriers Average market change in fares(%)(2Q 05 vs. 2Q 06 -weighted by traffic)Since its Merger with America West, US Airways has Raised Fares More than its Competitors

Proposed Merger Would Likely Be Challenged by Regulators Conclusion • Proposed merger is anticompetitive because of-Overlapping networks-Significant reduction of competition on thousands of city pairs-Domination of more than 70 cities and 3 key East Coast airports • Proposed merger would be more anticompetitive than the attempted US Airways/United Airlines merger in terms of-Dominated city pairs-Unacceptable decreases in competition-Overlapping nonstop routes-Overlapping hubs • Contrary to US Airways ’claims, these competitive problems would not be solved by-Low cost carrier entry-Claimed efficiencies-Divestitures US Airways/Delta merger will have serious adverse consequences for consumers and small communities US Airways/Delta merger will have serious adverse consequences for consumers and small communities