0001104659-17-038709.txt : 20170612 0001104659-17-038709.hdr.sgml : 20170612 20170612155342 ACCESSION NUMBER: 0001104659-17-038709 CONFORMED SUBMISSION TYPE: 18-K PUBLIC DOCUMENT COUNT: 3 CONFORMED PERIOD OF REPORT: 20161231 FILED AS OF DATE: 20170612 DATE AS OF CHANGE: 20170612 FILER: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: REPUBLIC OF CHILE CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0000019957 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS [8888] IRS NUMBER: 000000000 FISCAL YEAR END: 1231 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: 18-K SEC ACT: 1934 Act SEC FILE NUMBER: 001-02574 FILM NUMBER: 17906270 BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: MINISTRY OF FINANCE STREET 2: TEATINOS 120 CITY: SANTIAGO CHILE STATE: F3 ZIP: 00000 FORMER COMPANY: FORMER CONFORMED NAME: CHILE REPUBLIC OF DATE OF NAME CHANGE: 20000101 18-K 1 a17-15069_118k.htm 18-K

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UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

 

FORM 18-K

 

For Foreign Governments and Political Subdivisions Thereof

 

ANNUAL REPORT
OF

 

REPUBLIC OF CHILE

(Name of Registrant)

 

Date of end of last fiscal year:  December 31, 2016

 

SECURITIES REGISTERED*
(As of the close of the fiscal year)

 

Title of Issue

 

Amount as to
Which Registration
is Effective

 

Names of
Exchanges on
Which Registered

N/A

 

N/A

 

N/A

 

Name and address of person authorized to receive notices
and communications from the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Andrés de la Cruz, Esq.
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP
One Liberty Plaza
New York, NY 10006

 


*      The Registrant is filing this annual report on a voluntary basis.

 

 

 



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The information set forth below is to be furnished:

 

1.  In respect of each issue of securities of the registrant registered, a brief statement as to:

 

(a) The general effect of any material modifications, not previously reported, of the rights of the holders of such securities.

 

There have been no such modifications.

 

(b) The title and the material provisions of any law, decree or administrative action, not previously reported, by reason of which the security is not being serviced in accordance with the terms thereof.

 

There has been no such law, decree or administrative action.

 

(c) The circumstances of any other failure, not previously reported, to pay principal, interest, or any sinking fund or amortization installment.

 

There has been no such failure.

 

2.  A statement as of the close of the last fiscal year of the registrant giving the total outstanding of:

 

(a) Internal funded debt of the registrant.  (Total to be stated in the currency of the registrant.  If any internal funded debt is payable in foreign currency it should not be included under this paragraph (a), but under paragraph (b) of this item.)

 

As of December 31, 2016, the total outstanding internal funded debt of the registrant was Ps.28,883,378 million.  See “Central Government Total Net Debt” table on page D-136, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.

 

(b) External funded debt of the registrant.  (Totals to be stated in the respective currencies in which payable.  No statement need be furnished as to intergovernmental debt.)

 

The total principal amount of external funded debt of the registrant outstanding as of December 31, 2016 was as follows (in millions of U.S. dollars):

 

U.S. dollars

 

US$

5,821.1

 

Euros

 

3,608.5

 

Chilean pesos

 

650.9

 

Other

 

0.3

 

Total

 

US$

10,080.8

 

 

3.  A statement giving the title, date of issue, date of maturity, interest rate and amount outstanding, together with the currency or currencies in which payable, of each issue of funded debt of the registrant outstanding as of the close of the last fiscal year of the registrant.

 

See “Tables and Supplemental Information,” pages D-138 to D-143 of Exhibit 99.D, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.

 

4.                                      (a) As to each issue of securities of the registrant which is registered, there should be furnished a break-down of the total amount outstanding, as shown in Item 3, into the following:

 

(1) Total amount held by or for the account of the registrant.

 

None.

 

(2) Total estimated amount held by nationals of the registrant (or if registrant is other than a national government by the nationals of its national government); this estimate need be furnished only if it is practicable to do so.

 

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Not available.

 

(3) Total amount otherwise outstanding.

 

Not applicable.

 

(b) If a substantial amount is set forth in answer to paragraph (a)(1) above, describe briefly the method employed by the registrant to reacquire such securities.

 

Not applicable.

 

5.  A statement as of the close of the last fiscal year of the registrant giving the estimated total of:

 

(a) Internal floating indebtedness of the registrant.  (Total to be stated in the currency of the registrant.)

 

See “Public Sector Debt,” pages D-127 to D-137 of Exhibit 99.D, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.

 

(b) External floating indebtedness of the registrant.  (Total to be stated in the respective currencies in which payable.)

 

See “Public Sector Debt,” pages D-127 to D-137 of Exhibit 99.D, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.

 

6.  Statements of the receipts, classified by source, and of the expenditures, classified by purpose, of the registrant for each fiscal year of the registrant ended since the close of the latest fiscal year for which such information was previously reported.  These statements should be so itemized as to be reasonably informative and should cover both ordinary and extraordinary receipts and expenditures; there should be indicated separately, if practicable, the amount of receipts pledged or otherwise specifically allocated to any issue registered, indicating the issue.

 

See “Public Sector Finances,” pages D-107 to D-126 of Exhibit 99.D, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.

 

7.                                      (a) If any foreign exchange control, not previously reported, has been established by the registrant (or if the registrant is other than a national government, by its national government), briefly describe the effect of any such action, not previously reported.

 

Not applicable.

 

(b) If any foreign exchange control previously reported has been discontinued or materially modified, briefly describe the effect of any such action, not previously reported.

 

Not applicable.

 

8.  Brief statements as of a date reasonably close to the date of the filing of this report (indicating such date), in respect of the note issue and gold reserves of the central bank of issue of the registrant, and of any further gold stocks held by the registrant.

 

See “Monetary and Financial System—Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy, General Overview —International Reserves,” page D-89 of Exhibit 99.D, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.

 

9.  Statements of imports and exports of merchandise for each year ended since the close of the latest year for which such information was previously reported.  The statements should be reasonably itemized so far as practicable as to commodities and as to countries.  They should be set forth in items of value and of weight or quantity; if statistics have been established in terms of value, such will suffice.

 

See “Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade—Foreign Trade,” pages D-76 to D-82 of Exhibit 99.D, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.

 

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10. The balances of international payments of the registrant for each year ended since the close of the latest year for which such information was previously reported.  The statements of such balances should conform, if possible, to the nomenclature and form used in the “Statistical Handbook of the League of Nations.”  (These statements need to be furnished only if the registrant has published balances of international payments.)

 

See “Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade—Foreign Trade,” pages D-76 to D-82 of Exhibit 99.D, which is hereby incorporated by reference herein.

 

This annual report comprises:

 

(a) Pages numbered 1 to 6 consecutively.

 

(b) The following exhibits:

 

Exhibit A — None.

 

Exhibit B — None.

 

Exhibit 99.C — The 2017 National Budget

 

Exhibit 99.D — Description of Republic of Chile, dated June 12, 2017.

 

This annual report is filed subject to the Instructions for Form 18-K for Foreign Governments and Political Subdivisions Thereof.

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

SIGNATURE

6

EXHIBIT INDEX

7

EXHIBIT 99.D DESCRIPTION OF REPUBLIC OF CHILE DATED JUNE 12, 2017

8

 

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SIGNATURE

 

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Registrant, Republic of Chile, has duly caused this Annual Report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized, in the City of Santiago, Chile, on the 12th day of June, 2017.

 

 

REPUBLIC OF CHILE

 

 

 

By:

/s/ ALEJANDRO MICCO AGUAYO

 

Alejandro Micco Aguayo

 

Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance

 

Republic of Chile

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EXHIBIT INDEX

 

Exhibit

 

Description

 

 

 

99.C:

 

Copy of the 2017 National Budget.

 

 

 

99.D:

 

Description of Republic of Chile, dated June 12, 2017.

 

7


EX-99.D 2 a17-15069_1ex99dd.htm EX-99.D

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Exhibit 99.D

 

Description of
Republic of Chile
June 12, 2017

 

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

 

The information contained in this section supplements the information about Chile corresponding to the headings below that is contained in Exhibit 99.D to Chile’s annual report on Form 18-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2016.  To the extent the information in this section differs from the information contained in such annual report, you should rely on the information in this section.  Capitalized terms not defined in this section have the meanings ascribed to them in the annual report.

 

THE ECONOMY

 

Gross Domestic Product

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, real GDP increased by 0.1% compared to the same period in 2016, consumption increased by 2.5% and exports decreased by 4.9%.  During that period, aggregate domestic demand increased by 2.9%, gross fixed capital formation decreased by 2.4% and imports increased by 4.%, in each case compared to the same period in 2016.

 

Economic Performance Indicators

 

The following table sets forth certain macroeconomic performance indicators for the fiscal quarter indicated:

 

 

 

Current
Account
(millions of 
US$)(1)

 

Real GDP
Growth
(in %)(2)

 

Domestic
Demand
Growth (in %)(2)

 

2017

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

First quarter

 

(1,014.1

)

0.1

 

2.9

 

 


(1) Current account data for the periods indicated.

(2) % change from previous year at period end.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

The following tables present GDP and expenditures measured at current prices and in chained volume at previous period prices, each for the periods indicated:

 

GDP and Expenditures
(at current prices for period indicated, in billions of Chilean pesos)

 

 

 

January/March
2016

 

January/March
2017

 

GDP

 

41,003

 

42,754

 

Aggregate Domestic Demand

 

40,008

 

42,360

 

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

 

8,990

 

8,838

 

Change in Inventories

 

(234

)

442

 

Total Consumption

 

31,252

 

33,079

 

Private Consumption

 

26,129

 

27,371

 

Government Consumption

 

5,123

 

5,708

 

Total Exports

 

12,325

 

12,156

 

Total Imports

 

11,331

 

11,762

 

Net Exports

 

994

 

394

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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GDP and Expenditure
(chained volume at previous period prices, in billions of Chilean pesos)

 

 

 

January/March
2016

 

January/March
2017

 

GDP

 

35,919

 

35,967

 

Aggregate Domestic Demand

 

34,242

 

35,233

 

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

 

7,426

 

7,244

 

Change in Inventories

 

132

 

639

 

Total Consumption

 

26,685

 

27,349

 

Private Consumption

 

22,777

 

23,237

 

Government Consumption

 

3,915

 

4,113

 

Total Exports

 

11,333

 

10,774

 

Total Imports

 

9,668

 

10,073

 

Net Exports

 

1,666

 

702

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Composition of Demand

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, consumption, as a percentage of GDP and measured at current prices, increased from 76.2% to 77.4% compared to the same period in 2016. Gross fixed capital formation decreased from 21.9% of GDP to 20.7% of GDP in the first three months of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016.  Exports decreased from 30.8% of GDP to 28.7% of GDP and imports accounted for 27.6% of GDP compared to 27.5% of GDP in the first three months of 2016.

 

The following table presents GDP by categories of aggregate demand for the periods indicated:

 

GDP by Aggregate Demand
(percentage of total GDP, except as indicated)

 

 

 

January/March
2016

 

January/March
2017

 

GDP (in billions of pesos)

 

41,003

 

42,754

 

Domestic Absorption

 

97.6

 

99.1

 

Total Consumption

 

76.2

 

77.4

 

Private Consumption

 

63.7

 

64.0

 

Government Consumption

 

12.5

 

13.4

 

Change in inventories

 

(0.6

)

1.0

 

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

 

21.9

 

20.7

 

Exports of goods and services

 

30.8

 

28.7

 

Imports of goods and services

 

27.6

 

27.5

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Savings and Investment

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, total gross savings (or domestic gross investment) increased as a percentage of GDP as a consequence of an increase in external savings.

 

The following table sets forth information for savings and investments for the periods indicated:

 

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Savings and Investment
(% of GDP)

 

 

 

January/March
2016

 

January/March
2017

 

National Savings

 

22.0

 

20.1

 

External Savings

 

(0.6

)

1.6

 

Total Gross Savings or Domestic Gross Investment

 

21.4

 

21.7

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Principal Sectors of the Economy

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, nominal GDP increased by 4.3% compared to the same period in 2016 to Ps.42.8 billion. While the services sector increased by 1.3% and the manufacturing sector increased by 0.8%, the primary sector decreased by 7.8%.  Growth was driven mainly by domestic absorption, which reached 99.1% of GDP.

 

The following tables present the components of Chile’s GDP and their respective growth rates for the period indicated:

 

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Nominal GDP by Sector
(% of GDP, except as indicated)

 

 

 

January/March
2016

 

January/March
2017

 

PRIMARY SECTOR:

 

14.0

 

14.1

 

Agriculture, livestock and forestry

 

5.7

 

5.1

 

Fishing

 

0.6

 

1.0

 

Mining

 

7.7

 

8.1

 

Copper

 

7.1

 

7.2

 

Other

 

0.7

 

0.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MANUFACTURING SECTOR:

 

11.3

 

11.0

 

Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco

 

4.7

 

5.1

 

Textiles, clothing and leather

 

0.2

 

0.2

 

Wood products and furniture

 

0.7

 

0.6

 

Paper and printing products

 

1.1

 

1.0

 

Chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastic products

 

2.5

 

2.1

 

Non-metallic mineral products and base metal product

 

0.5

 

0.4

 

Metal products, machinery and equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing

 

1.6

 

1.7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SERVICES SECTOR:

 

66.4

 

66.3

 

Electricity, oil and gas and water

 

3.0

 

2.7

 

Construction

 

5.8

 

5.7

 

Trade and catering

 

10.8

 

10.9

 

Transport

 

5.4

 

5.1

 

Communications

 

2.9

 

2.9

 

Financial services

 

15.1

 

14.8

 

Housing

 

7.8

 

7.9

 

Personal services

 

10.6

 

11.3

 

Public administration

 

4.8

 

4.9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Subtotal

 

91.7

 

91.4

 

Net adjustments for payments made by financial institutions, VAT and import tariffs

 

8.3

 

8.6

 

Total GDP

 

100

 

100

 

Nominal GDP (millions of Pesos)

 

Ps.

41,002,864

 

Ps.

42,753,879

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Change in GDP by Sector
(% change from same period in previous year)

 

 

 

January/March
2017

 

PRIMARY SECTOR:

 

(7.8

)

Agriculture, livestock and forestry

 

0.0

 

Fishing

 

34.0

 

Mining

 

(13.8

)

Copper

 

(14.4

)

Other

 

(7.3

)

 

 

 

 

MANUFACTURING SECTOR:

 

0.8

 

Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco

 

2.0

 

Textiles, clothing and leather

 

13.0

 

Wood products and furniture

 

4.9

 

Paper and printing products

 

(1.8

)

Chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastic products

 

(4.1

)

Non-metallic mineral products and base metal products

 

(9.4

)

Metal products, machinery and equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing

 

6.4

 

 

 

 

 

SERVICES SECTOR:

 

1.3

 

Electricity, oil and gas and water

 

(0.5

)

Construction

 

(2.2

)

Trade and catering

 

4.5

 

Transport

 

0.4

 

Communications

 

2.7

 

Financial Services

 

(1.6

)

Housing

 

1.8

 

Personal Services

 

4.3

 

Public Administration

 

1.5

 

 

 

 

 

Subtotal

 

(0.4

)

Net adjustments for payments made by financial institutions, VAT and import tariffs

 

3.8

 

Total GDP

 

0.1

 

Real GDP (chained volume at previous year prices)

 

Ps.

35,967,096

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Primary Sector

 

The Chilean economy’s primary sector’s direct contribution to GDP was 14.1% in the first three months of 2017, compared to 14.0% in the same period in 2016.

 

Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry

 

The agriculture, livestock and forestry sector contributed US$2.0 billion in exports for the three months ended March 31, 2017, or 13.4% of exports by value, compared to US$2.2 billion, or 15.5%, during the same period in 2016.

 

Fishing

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the estimated catch was 1,094 million tons, of which sea-caught products accounted for 76.2%, and aquaculture accounted for 23.8%, compared to an estimated catch of 687 million tons in the same period in 2016, of which sea-caught products accounted for 54.7% and aquaculture accounted for 45.3%.

 

Mining

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the mining sector accounted for 8.1% of GDP, compared to 7.7% during the same period in 2016, reflecting the impact on this sector of the increase in international copper prices.  However, the mining sector was adversely affected by a labor conflict and a strike that impacted Chile’s largest copper mine, and contracted in real terms by 13.8% in the first three months of this year, compared to the same period in 2016. Mining products accounted for 48.2% and 48.0% of total exports, totaling approximately US$7.6 billion and US$7.2 billion for the first three months of each of 2017 and 2016, respectively.

 

Manufacturing Sector

 

The following table sets forth information regarding the output of manufacturing production for the periods indicated:

 

Output of Manufactured Products
(in billions of pesos and as a percentage of total)

 

 

 

January/
March 2017

 

 

 

(Ps.)

 

(%)

 

Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco

 

2,183

 

46.3

 

Textiles, clothing and leather

 

76

 

1.6

 

Wood products and furniture

 

255

 

5.4

 

Paper and printing products

 

427

 

9.1

 

Chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastic products

 

913

 

19.4

 

Non-metallic mineral products and base metal products

 

158

 

3.3

 

Metal products, machinery and equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing

 

706

 

15.0

 

Total

 

4,717

 

100.0

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the manufacturing sector increased by 0.8%, compared to the same period in 2016, mainly as a result of a an increase in the production of non-metallic mineral products and base metal products, which was offset by a decrease in the production of foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco.

 

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For the three months ended March 31, 2017, exports of manufactured foodstuff products increased to US$2.3 billion, compared to US$2.0 billion the same period in 2016.

 

The chemicals, petroleum products, rubber and plastics industries exported approximately US$1.0 billion during the first three months of each of 2017 and 2016.

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, wine exports increased to US$0.5 billion, compared to US$0.4 billion in the same period in 2016.

 

Services Sector

 

Energy

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the energy sector accounted for 2.7% of GDP, compared to 3.0% for the same period in 2016.

 

Personal Services

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the personal services sector accounted for 11.3% of GDP, compared to 10.6% for the same period in 2016.

 

Financial Services

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the financial services sector contributed 14.8% to GDP, compared to 15.1% for the same period in 2016.

 

As of March 31, 2017, the market capitalization of the Latin American Integrated Market (Mercado Integrado Latinoamericana, or MILA) totaled US$ 842.7 billion compared to US$800.6 billion for the same period in 2016.

 

Transport and Communications

 

Transport.  For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the transport sector accounted for 5.1% of GDP, compared to 5.4% for the same period in 2016.

 

Communications.  For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the communications sector remained at 2.9% of GDP, compared to the same period in 2016.

 

Housing

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the housing sector accounted for 7.9% of GDP, compared to 7.8% in the same period in 2016.

 

Public Administration

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the public administration sector accounted for 4.9% of GDP, compared to 4.8% in the same period in 2016.

 

Employment and Labor

 

Employment

 

As of March 31, 2017, the rate of unemployment stood at 6.6% compared to 6.2% as of December 31, 2016.

 

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The following table presents information on employment and the labor force in Chile for the periods indicated:

 

Employment and Labor
(in thousands of persons or percentages)

 

 

 

Three months 
ended March 31,
2017

 

Nationwide:

 

 

 

Labor force

 

8,775

 

Employment

 

8,195

 

Participation rate (%)

 

59.5

 

Unemployment rate (%)

 

6.6

 

Santiago:

 

 

 

Labor force

 

3,167

 

Employment

 

2,922

 

Participation rate (%)

 

61.2

 

Unemployment rate (%)

 

7.7

 

 


Source:  National Statistics Institute and University of Chile surveys.

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, the manufacturing sector employed 10.8% of Chile’s labor force and contributed 11.0% of GDP.  For the same period, the agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing sectors contributed 5.1% of GDP and employed 10.1% of Chile’s labor force.  The mining sector, however, accounted for 8.1% of GDP and employed only approximately 2.4% of Chile’s labor force, due to the less labor-intensive nature of this sector.

 

The following table presents information regarding the average percentage of the labor force working in each sector of the economy for the periods indicated:

 

Employment(1)
 (% of total labor force employed by sector)

 

 

 

Three months 
ended March 31, 
2017

 

PRIMARY SECTOR

 

12.4

%

Agriculture, livestock and forestry and fishing

 

10.1

 

Mining

 

2.4

 

MANUFACTURING SECTOR

 

10.8

 

SERVICES SECTOR

 

76.7

 

Electricity, gas and water

 

1.1

 

Construction

 

8.7

 

Trade and catering

 

19.4

 

Transport and communications

 

13.0

 

Financial services

 

1.9

 

Community and social services

 

32.6

 

TOTAL

 

100.0

%

 


(1) Constitutes an average across each period indicated.

Source:  National Statistics Institute.

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, women accounted on average for 41% of the total labor force.

 

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As of February 28, 2017, 9.1 million workers were enrolled in the unemployment insurance system, which manages total assets valued at US$6.8 billion, compared to US$6.2 billion as of August 31, 2016.

 

Wages

 

Real Wages
(% change from same period in 2016)

 

 

 

As of March 31,
2017
(1)

 

Average real wages

 

1.5

 

Average change in productivity

 

(0.4

)

 


(1) Compared to the same period in 2016.

Sources:  Chilean Central Bank and National Statistics Institute.

 

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FOREIGN TRADE

 

Balance of Payments

 

Chile’s balance of payment recorded a deficit of US$(1,987) million for the three months ended March 31, 2017, compared to a surplus of US$137 million for the same period in 2016.

 

Current Account

 

Chile’s current account recorded a deficit of 1.6% of GDP for the three months ended March 31, 2017, compared to a deficit of 0.6% of GDP for the three months ended March 31,2016.

 

The merchandise trade surplus increased to US$1.0 billion for the three months ended March 31, 2017, from US$363 million for the same period in 2016.

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, merchandise exports totaled US$15.8 billion compared to US$15.1 billion for the same period in 2016 and imports totaled US$14.6 billion, compared to US$12.9 billion for the same period in 2016.

 

Capital Account and Financial Account

 

Chile’s capital account recorded a surplus of US$64 million for the three months ended March 31, 2017, compared to a surplus of US$2 million for the same period in 2016.

 

The financial account registered a deficit of US$(1.2) billion and a deficit of US$(2.5) billion for the three months ended March 31, 2016 and 2017, respectively, which represented 2.0% of GDP in 2016 and (3.9)% of GDP in 2017, due to volatility of the financial account when measured for short periods.

 

The following table sets forth Chile’s Balance of Payments for the periods indicated:

 

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Table of Contents

 

Balance of Payments
(in millions of US$)

 

 

 

 

January/March
2016

 

January/March
2017

 

Current account

 

 

 

 

 

Current account, net

 

US$

(363

)

US$

(1,014

)

Goods and Services, net

 

1,434

 

632

 

Merchandise Trade Balance

 

2,154

 

1,204

 

Exports

 

15,079

 

15,795

 

Imports

 

12,925

 

14,591

 

Services

 

(720

)

(573

)

Credits

 

2,412

 

2,687

 

Debits

 

3,132

 

3,260

 

Interest, net

 

(1,577

)

(2,068

)

Interest from investment

 

(1,529

)

(2,020

)

Interest from direct investment(1)  

 

(1,481

)

(1,930

)

Abroad

 

598

 

1,104

 

From abroad

 

2,078

 

3,034

 

Interest from portfolio investment

 

(3

)

(36

)

Dividends

 

385

 

368

 

Interest

 

(387

)

(404

)

Interest from other investment

 

(46

)

(54

)

Credits

 

165

 

200

 

Debits

 

211

 

254

 

Current transfers, net

 

506

 

422

 

Credits

 

553

 

455

 

Debits

 

(47

)

(33

)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Capital and financial accounts

 

 

 

 

 

Capital and financial accounts, net

 

(1,164

)

(2,466

)

Capital account, net

 

2

 

64

 

Financial account, net

 

1,161

 

(2,530

)

Direct investment, net

 

(2,560

)

(635

)

Direct investment abroad

 

1,389

 

1,854

 

Shares and other capital

 

877

 

591

 

Earnings reinvested

 

349

 

984

 

Other capital

 

163

 

279

 

Direct investment to Chile

 

3,949

 

2,490

 

Shares and other capital

 

1,851

 

708

 

Earnings reinvested

 

1,048

 

1,943

 

Other capital(2)  

 

1,049

 

(162

)

Portfolio investment, net

 

3,617

 

1,075

 

Assets

 

4,568

 

1,800

 

Liabilities

 

951

 

726

 

Derived financial instruments, net

 

169

 

(182

)

Other Investment, net(3)  

 

(201

)

(800

)

Assets

 

(841

)

(2,007

)

Commercial credits

 

55

 

(450

)

Loans

 

(154

)

158

 

Currency and deposits

 

(676

)

(1,709

)

Other assets

 

(67

)

(6

)

Liabilities

 

(640

)

(1,207

)

Commercial credits

 

(664

)

(69

)

Loans(3)  

 

(135

)

(1,111

)

Currency and deposits

 

160

 

(27

)

Other liabilities

 

0

 

0

 

Assets in reserve, net

 

137

 

(1,987

)

Errors and omissions, net

 

796

 

(1,580

)

Financial account (excluding change in reserves)

 

US$

(1,024

)

US$

543

 

Total balance of payments

 

US$

137

 

US$

(1,987

)

 


(1) Includes interest.

(2) Net flows of liabilities by loans.

(3) Short term net flows.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Table of Contents

 

Merchandise Trade

 

The primary countries of origin of Chile’s imports for the three months ended March 31, 2017 were China (from where 22.8% of total imports originated), the United States (18.1%), Brazil (8.1%), Argentina (4.5%), Germany (4.1%) and France (2.0%).  The primary destinations of Chile’s exports for the three months ended March 31, 2017, were China (which received 24.1% of total exports), the United States (17.1%), Japan (9.8%), South Korea (6.0%), Brazil (5.0%), Mexico (1.9%) and Taiwan (1.8%).  The origins and destinations of Chile’s exports for the three months ended March 31, 2017 have remained stable compared to the same period in 2016, except for exports to China that have decreased from 28.8% to 24.1%.  During the three months ended March 31, 2017, Chile’s exports to Asia, as a percentage of total assets, decreased from 50.6% to 47.5%, while Chile’s exports to North America increased from 19.4% to 21.5%, as compared to the same period in 2016.  Further, Chile’s geographical distribution of its imports during the three months ended March 31, 2017, experienced some changes, for example, imports from South America and North America (as a percentage of total imports) increased from 16.5% to 20.1% and 21.9% to 22.8% respectively, while imports from Asia have decreased from 37.1% to 35.7%.

 

In the three months ended March 31, 2017, merchandise exports totaled US$15.8 billion and imports totaled US$15.5 billion.  Intermediate goods, such as oil and others fossil fuels, accounted for 49.2% of total imports in the three months ended March 31, 2017 compared to 48.5% for the same period in 2016.  Consumer goods imports amounted to 31.3% in the three months ended March 31, 2017 compared to 29.4% for the same period in 2016.  Imports of capital goods accounted for 19.5% of total imports for that period compared to 22.2% for the same period in 2016.

 

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The following tables set forth information regarding exports and imports for the periods indicated:

 

Geographical Distribution of Merchandise Trade
(% of total exports/imports)

 

 

 

January/March
2016

 

January/March 
2017

 

EXPORTS (FOB)

 

 

 

 

 

Americas:

 

 

 

 

 

Argentina

 

1.0

%

1.4

%

Brazil

 

4.5

%

5.0

%

Mexico

 

2.1

%

1.9

%

United States

 

15.5

%

17.1

%

Other

 

10.5

%

11.5

%

Total Americas:

 

33.5

%

37.0

%

Europe:

 

 

 

 

 

France

 

1.3

%

1.2

%

Germany

 

1.2

%

1.6

%

Italy

 

1.2

%

1.2

%

United Kingdom

 

1.2

%

1.1

%

EFTA

 

0.8

%

0.6

%

Other

 

8.5

%

8.7

%

Total Europe:

 

14.2

%

14.4

%

Asia:

 

 

 

 

 

Japan

 

8.7

%

9.8

%

South Korea

 

6.8

%

6.0

%

Taiwan

 

1.8

%

1.8

%

China

 

28.8

%

24.1

%

Other

 

4.4

%

5.8

%

Total Asia:

 

50.6

%

47.5

%

Other:(1)

 

1.6

%

1.2

%

Total exports:

 

100.0

 

100.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IMPORTS (CIF)

 

 

 

 

 

Americas:

 

 

 

 

 

Argentina

 

4.0

%

4.5

%

Brazil

 

7.2

%

8.1

%

United States

 

17.5

%

18.1

%

Other

 

11.1

%

13.9

%

Total Americas:

 

39.8

%

44.6

%

Europe:

 

 

 

 

 

France

 

3.9

%

2.0

%

Germany

 

3.8

%

4.1

%

Italy

 

1.9

%

1.7

%

United Kingdom

 

0.9

%

0.8

%

EFTA

 

0.7

%

0.5

%

Other

 

8.6

%

7.0

%

Total Europe:

 

19.9

%

16.2

%

Asia:

 

 

 

 

 

Japan

 

3.6

%

3.4

%

South Korea

 

2.6

%

3.5

%

Taiwan

 

0.6

%

0.4

%

China

 

24.9

%

22.8

%

Other

 

5.4

%

5.6

%

Total Asia:

 

37.1

%

35.7

%

Other:(1)

 

3.2

%

3.6

%

Total imports:

 

100.0

 

100.0

 

 


(1) Includes Africa, Oceania and other countries, including countries in tax free zones.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Services Trade

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017, exported services increased by 11.4% and imported services increased by 4.1%, compared to the same period in 2016.

 

MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM

 

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy, General Overview

 

Inflation

 

As of March 31, 2017, the inflation rate stood at 2.7% (year-on-year).  The TPM, decreased to 3.1% throughout the first quarter of 2017.

 

The following table shows changes in the CPI and the PPI for the periods indicated.

 

Inflation

 

 

 

Percentage Change from Previous 
Year at Period End (%)

 

 

 

CPI

 

PPI (1)

 

2017 (March) (2)(3)

 

2.7

 

7.6

 

 


(1) Manufacturing, mining and electricity, water and gas distribution industries.

(2) CPI data for 2017 corresponds to variation from March 2016 to March 2017.

(3) PPI data for 2017 corresponds to variation from March 2016 to March 2017.

Source:  CPI, Chilean Central Bank.  PPI, National Institute of Statistics

 

Exchange Rate Policy

 

The dollar discontinued its appreciation, with the Chilean peso trading at Ps. 662.7/US$ 1.00 on March 31, 2017, after reaching a rate of Ps. 673.4/ US$ 1.00 on January 4, 2017.

 

The following table shows the high, low, average and period-end peso/U.S. dollar exchange rate for the first quarter of 2017.

 

Observed Exchange Rates(1)
(pesos per US$)

 

 

 

High

 

Low

 

Average(2)

 

Period-End

 

Three Months Ended March 31, 2017

 

673.4

 

638.4

 

655.2

 

662.7

 

 


(1) The table presents the annual high, low, average and period-end observed rates for the period.

(2) Represents the average of average monthly rates for the periods indicated.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

International Reserves

 

International reserves of the Chilean Central Bank totaled approximately US$39.0 billion as of March 31, 2017.

 

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Table of Contents

 

The following table shows the composition of net international reserves of the Chilean Central Bank as of the dates indicated:

 

Net International Reserves of the Chilean Central Bank
(in millions of US$)

 

 

 

As of March 31, 2016

 

As of March 31, 2017

 

Chilean Central Bank:

 

 

 

 

 

Assets:

 

 

 

 

 

Gold

 

10

 

10

 

SDRs

 

762

 

734

 

Reserve position in the IMF

 

231

 

217

 

Foreign exchange and bank deposits

 

5,680

 

5,591

 

Securities

 

32,847

 

32,465

 

Other assets

 

23

 

4

 

Total

 

39,553

 

39,022

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Liabilities:

 

 

 

 

 

Reciprocal Credit Agreements

 

 

 

Bonds and promissory notes

 

582

 

511

 

Accounts with international organizations

 

86

 

85

 

SDR allocations

 

1,151

 

1,109

 

Total

 

1,819

 

1,705

 

Total international reserves, net

 

37,734

 

37,317

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank

 

Money Supply

 

The following tables set forth the monthly average monetary base and the average monetary aggregates as of the dates indicated:

 

Monetary Base(1) 
(in billions of pesos)

 

 

 

As of March 31, 2016

 

As of March 31, 2017

 

Currency in circulation

 

5,684

 

6,088

 

Bank reserves

 

39,553

 

39,022

 

Monetary base

 

9,965

 

10,171

 

 


(1) There are no demand deposits at the Chilean Central Bank.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Table of Contents

 

Monetary Aggregates
(in billions of pesos)

 

 

 

As of March 31,
2017

 

 

 

 

 

Currency in circulation

 

6,088

 

Demand deposits at commercial banks

 

23,313

 

M1(1)

 

29,401

 

Total time and savings deposits at banks

 

75,488

 

Others

 

1,166

 

M2(2)

 

106,055

 

Foreign currency deposits at Chilean Central Bank

 

15,525

 

Documents of Chilean Central Bank

 

8,640

 

Letters of Credit

 

259

 

Private Bonds

 

20,877

 

Others

 

38,131

 

M3(3)

 

189,488

 

 


(1)                                 M1:  Currency in circulation plus checking accounts net of float, demand deposits at commercial banks other than the former and other than demand savings deposits.

(2)                                 M2:  M1 plus time deposits, time savings deposits, shares of mutual funds invested in up to one-year term debt instruments and collections by saving and credit cooperatives (excluding time deposit of the mutual funds previously mentioned and of saving and credit cooperatives).

(3)                                 M3:  M2 plus deposits in foreign currency, documents issued by the Chilean Central Bank, Chilean treasury bonds, letters of credit, commercial papers, corporate bonds, shares of the other mutual funds and shares of pension funds in voluntary savings (excluding mutual funds’ and pension funds’ investments in M3 securities).

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

The following table shows selected monetary indicators for the periods indicated:

 

Selected Monetary Indicators
(in % change from same period in 2016)

 

 

 

January/March 2017

 

M1 (% change)

 

6.8

 

M2 (% change)

 

5.3

 

Credit from the financial system (% change) (1)

 

(0.2

)

Average annual peso deposit rate(2)

 

0.3

 

 


(1) As of February 2017.

(2) Represents real interest rates for a period of 120 to 365 days.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Table of Contents

 

The following table shows liquidity and credit aggregates as of the dates indicated:

 

Liquidity and Credit Aggregates
(in billions of pesos)

 

 

 

As of February 28,

 

 

 

2016

 

2017

 

Liquidity aggregates (at period end)

 

9,881.9

 

10,225.2

 

Monetary base:

 

 

 

 

 

Currency, excluding cash in vaults at banks

 

5,701.5

 

6,118.7

 

M1(1)

 

28,335.8

 

29,083.7

 

M2(2)

 

100,423.0

 

103,731.2

 

M3(3)

 

173,792.3

 

187,033.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Credit aggregates (at period end):

 

 

 

 

 

Private sector credit

 

132,031.7

 

138,040.2

 

Public sector credit

 

-551.5

 

-1,368.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total domestic credit(4)

 

105,811.9

 

109,332.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Deposits(4):

 

 

 

 

 

Chilean peso deposits

 

113,536.9

 

120,415.9

 

Foreign-currency deposits

 

20,998.6

 

21,541.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total deposits

 

134,535.5

 

141,956.9

 

 


(1) Currency in circulation plus peso-denominated demand deposits.

(2) M1 plus peso-denominated savings deposits.

(3) M2 plus deposits in foreign currency, principally U.S. dollars.  Does not include government time deposits at Chilean Central Bank.

(4) Includes capital reserves and other net assets and liabilities.

 

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Table of Contents

 

Financial Sector

 

General Overview of Banking System

 

The following tables provide certain statistical information on the financial system:

 

 

 

As of March 31, 2016

 

 

 

Assets

 

Loans

 

Deposits

 

Shareholders’ Equity(1)

 

 

 

Amount

 

Market 
Share

 

Amount

 

Market 
Share

 

Amount

 

Market 
Share

 

Amount

 

Market 
Share

 

Domestically owned private-sector banks

 

252,355

 

83.7

%

180,304

 

86.2

%

142,924

 

81.6

%

20,222

 

88.4

%

Foreign- owned private-sector banks

 

1,253

 

0.4

%

129

 

0.1

%

219

 

0.1

%

458

 

2.0

%

Private-sector total

 

253,607

 

84.2

%

180,433

 

86.2

%

143,143

 

81.7

%

20,681

 

90.4

%

Banco Estado

 

47,735

 

15.8

%

28,857

 

13.8

%

32,033

 

18.3

%

2,203

 

9.6

%

Total banks

 

301,342

 

100.0

%

209,290

 

100.0

%

175,177

 

100.0

%

22,884

 

100.0

%

 

 

 

As of March 31, 2017

 

 

 

Assets

 

Loans

 

Deposits

 

Shareholders’ Equity(1)

 

 

 

Amount

 

Market 
Share

 

Amount

 

Market 
Share

 

Amount

 

Market 
Share

 

Amount

 

Market 
Share

 

Domestically owned private-sector banks

 

268,867

 

83.2

%

196,764

 

86.1

%

148,764

 

81.0

%

23,575

 

89.2

%

Foreign- owned private-sector banks(2)

 

1,623

 

0.5

%

115

 

0.1

%

193

 

0.1

%

490

 

1.9

%

Private-sector total

 

270,489

 

83.7

%

196,879

 

86.2

%

148,956

 

81.1

%

24,066

 

91.0

%

Banco Estado

 

52,572

 

16.3

%

31,592

 

13.8

%

34,680

 

18.9

%

2,375

 

9.0

%

Total banks

 

323,061

 

100.0

%

228,471

 

100.0

%

183,636

 

100.0

%

26,440

 

100.0

%

 


(1) Corresponds to the “Capital Básico”.  This item included capital and reserves.

(2) Foreign-owned subsidiaries of foreign banks are classified as domestically owned private-sector banks.  If classified as foreign-owned private-sector banks, the market share of foreign-owned private-sector banks would be as follows: as of March 31, 2016: assets: 30.6%, loans: 30.9%, deposits: 27.5%, shareholders’ equity: 31.6%, and as of March 31, 2017: assets: 31.1%, loans: 31.1%, deposits: 28.0%, shareholders’ equity: 30.1%, with the corresponding reduction in the market share of domestically owned private-sector banks.

Source:  SBIF.

 

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Table of Contents

 

The following tables set forth the total assets of the four largest Chilean private-sector banks, the state-owned Banco Estado and other banks in the aggregate for the period indicated:

 

 

 

As of March 31, 2016

 

 

 

in billions of Pesos

 

Market Share %

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Banco Santander-Chile

 

34.8

 

17.0

%

Banco Estado

 

32.6

 

15.8

%

Banco de Chile

 

31.1

 

15.1

%

Banco de Crédito e Inversiones

 

29.4

 

14.3

%

Itaú Corpbanca

 

29.9

 

14.6

%

Other banks

 

47.6

 

23.2

%

Total Banking System

 

205.5

 

100.0

%

 


Source:  SBIF.

 

 

 

As of March 31, 2017

 

 

 

in billions of Pesos

 

Market Share %

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Banco Santander-Chile

 

36.7

 

17.2

%

Banco de Chile

 

34.8

 

16.3

%

Banco Estado

 

31.8

 

14.9

%

Itaú Corpbanca

 

31.2

 

14.6

%

Banco de Crédito e Inversiones

 

29.0

 

13.6

%

Other banks

 

50.1

 

23.5

%

Total Banking System

 

213.6

 

100.0

%

 


Source:  SBIF.

 

The following table sets forth information on bank operation efficiency indicators for the periods indicated:

 

Indicators of Financial System Efficiency
(%)

 

 

 

Three months ended

 

 

 

March 31, 2016

 

March 31, 2017

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Return on assets

 

0.2

 

0.3

 

Return on equity

 

3.0

 

3.5

 

Non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans

 

0.9

 

0.8

 

Gross operational margin/assets

 

1.1

 

1.1

 

Operating expenses/operating revenue

 

51.1

 

48.8

 

Operating expenses/average total assets

 

0.5

 

0.5

 

Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets

 

12.9

 

13.6

 

 


Source:  SBIF.

 

Stock Exchanges

 

The table below summarizes recent value and performance indicators for the Santiago Stock Exchange:

 

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Table of Contents

 

Indicators for the Santiago Stock Exchange

 

As of March 31,

 

Market Capitalization 
(in billions of US$)

 

Annual Trading Volume
(in billions of US$)

 

IGPA(1)

 

IPSA(2)

 

2017

 

237.9

 

n.a.

 

23,967.87

 

4,783.42

 

 


(1)                                 The General Stock Price Index (Índice General de Precios de Acciones, or IGPA) is an index weighted by market capitalization that measures the price variations of any stocks listed on the Santiago Stock Exchange with an annual trading volume of at least UF10,000 (US$399,479 as of March 31, 2017).

(2)                                 The Selective Stock Price Index (Índice de Precios Selectivo de Acciones, or IPSA) is an index tied to the stocks on the Santiago Stock Exchange with a market capitalization of at least US$200 million.

Source:  Santiago Stock Exchange.

 

Institutional Investors

 

The following table sets forth the amount of assets of the various types of institutional investors in Chile as of the indicated dates:

 

Total Assets of Institutional Investors (in billions of US$)

 

As of March 31,

 

Pension 
Funds 
(AFPs)

 

Insurance 
Companies

 

Mutual 
Funds

 

Investment 
Funds(1)

 

Foreign 
Capital 
Investment 
Funds

 

Total

 

2016

 

163.3

 

43.2

 

40.1

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

246.6

 

2017

 

186.2

 

47.8

 

51.4

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

285.4

 

 


(1) Includes international investment funds.

Source:  SVS, SP.

 

Pension Funds and the Chilean Pension System

 

As of March 31, 2017, the pension funds held aggregate financial assets totaling approximately US$186.7 billion.

 

PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCES

 

Public Sector Accounts and Fiscal Statistics

 

Fiscal Responsibility Law

 

Pension Reserve Fund

 

The table below sets forth the total contribution to, and total withdrawals from, the Pension Reserve Fund (“FRP”) for the three months ended March 31, 2017, as well as the total assets of the FRP at such date:

 

 

 

Contribution 
(in millions of US$)

 

Withdrawals 
(in millions of 
US$)

 

Total Assets at 
March 31, 2017 
(in millions of US$)

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017

 

0

 

0

 

9,096.99

 

 

Economic and Social Stabilization Fund

 

The table below sets forth the total contribution to, and total withdrawals from, the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (“FEES”) as of March 31, 2017, as well as the total assets of the FEES at such date:

 

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Contribution
(in millions of US$)

 

Withdrawals 
(in millions of 
US$)

 

Total Assets at 
March 31, 2017 
(in millions of US$)

 

For the three months ended March 31, 2017

 

0

 

0

 

14,070.31

 

 

Budget Law and Political Initiatives

 

The following table sets forth a summary of public sector accounts during the three months ended March 31, 2016 and 2017 (calculated on an accrual basis and as a percentage of GDP for the periods indicated):

 

Public Sector Finances
(in billions of US$ and % of total GDP)

 

 

 

January 1, 2016 — March 31, 2016

 

January 1, 2017 — March 31, 2017

 

 

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

Current Revenues and Expenditures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Revenues

 

14.3

 

5.9%

 

14.8

 

5.7%

 

Net taxes(1)

 

11.5

 

5.1%

 

11.9

 

4.6%

 

Copper revenues(2)

 

0.2

 

0.1%

 

0.2

 

0.1%

 

Social Security contributions

 

1.0

 

0.3%

 

1.0

 

0.4%

 

Donations

 

0.0

 

0.0%

 

0.0

 

0.0%

 

Real property incomes

 

0.2

 

0.1%

 

0.2

 

0.1%

 

Operational revenues

 

0.4

 

0.1%

 

0.4

 

0.1%

 

Other revenues

 

1.0

 

0.2%

 

1.0

 

0.4%

 

Expenditures

 

12.4

 

4.7%

 

12.8

 

5.0%

 

Wages and salaries

 

3.2

 

1.2%

 

3.3

 

1.3%

 

Goods and services

 

1.1

 

0.4%

 

1.1

 

0.4%

 

Interest on public debt

 

0.9

 

0.3%

 

1.0

 

0.4%

 

Transfer payments

 

4.6

 

1.7%

 

4.7

 

1.8%

 

Transfers to social security

 

2.6

 

1.0%

 

2.7

 

1.1%

 

Others

 

0.0

 

0.0%

 

0.0

 

0.0%

 

Capital Revenues and Expenditures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Revenues

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Asset sales

 

0.0

 

0.0%

 

0.0

 

0.0%

 

Expenditures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Investment

 

0.9

 

0.4%

 

0.9

 

0.3%

 

Capital transfers

 

1.0

 

0.4%

 

1.0

 

0.4%

 

Central government balance

 

1.2

 

0.5%

 

0.1

 

0.0%

 

 


(1)         Taxes collected net of refunds.

(2)         Excludes transfers from Codelco under Law No. 13,196.  This law (Ley Reservada del Cobre), which is not publicly disclosed, earmarks 10% of Codelco’s revenues from the export of copper and related byproducts for defense spending and these funds are therefore excluded from the central government’s current revenues.  Defense spending is considered an extra-budgetary expense in accordance with IMF accounting guidelines.

Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

Government Revenue

 

Taxation

 

Tax revenues accounted for 4.6% of GDP for the first three months of 2017, compared to 5.1% of GDP for the same period in 2016.

 

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Government-owned Enterprises

 

The following table sets forth the government’s share ownership and total assets of the principal state-owned enterprises as of March 31, 2017, and revenue and net income (loss) for the three month period ended March 31, 2017:

 

 

 

Percentage of 
State Ownership 
as of March 31, 
2017

 

Total Assets as 
of March 31, 
2017 
(in millions of 
US$)

 

Revenue for the 
three month 
period ended 
March 31, 2017 
(in millions of 
US$)

 

Net Income (Loss)
for the three 
month period 
ended March 31, 
2017 (in millions of 
US$)

 

Main Public Sector Enterprises:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Banco Estado (financial)

 

100.0

 

52,456

 

497.3

 

69.2

 

Codelco (copper)

 

100.0

 

33,376

 

3,028.2

 

42.4

 

ENAP (oil and gas)

 

100.0

 

6,129

 

1,577.4

 

10.0

 

Enami (mining)

 

100.0

 

754

 

289.5

 

(9.1

)

EFE (railway)

 

100.0

 

n.a

 

n.a

 

n.a

 

Metro S.A. (Santiago’s subway)

 

100.0

 

6,902

 

112.8

 

(13.9

)

 


n.a.= Not available for the three month period ended March 31, 2017.

Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

Banco Estado

 

In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, Banco Estado recorded revenues of US$497 million, an 13.3% increase compared to the same period in 2016.  In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, Banco Estado had a net income of US$69 million, a 17.3% decrease compared to the same period in 2016.

 

Codelco

 

In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, Codelco recorded revenues of US$3,028 million, an 11.4% increase compared to the same period in 2016.  In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, Codelco had a net profit of US$42 million, a 134% increase compared to the same period in 2016.

 

ENAP

 

In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, ENAP recorded revenues of US$1,577 million, an 40.5% increase compared to the same period in 2016.  In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, ENAP had a net income of US$10 million, a 74.4% decrease compared to the same period in 2016.

 

Enami

 

In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, Enami recorded revenues of US$290 million, a 3.3% increase compared to the same period in 2016.  In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, Enami had a net loss of US$(9.1) million, a 71.7% increase compared to the same period in 2016.

 

EFE

 

In 2015, the latest available data, EFE had operating revenues derived from passenger transport (54.2%), cargo (30.0%) and real estate management (15.8%).

 

Metro

 

In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, Metro recorded revenues of US$113 million, an 8.4% increase compared to the same period in 2016.  In the three month period ended March 31, 2017, Metro had a net loss of US$14 million, a 157.5% decrease compared to the same period in 2016.

 

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CERTAIN DEFINED TERMS AND CONVENTIONS

 

Exchange Rates

 

For your convenience, Chile has provided translations of certain amounts into U.S. dollars at the rates specified below unless otherwise indicated.

 

 

 

Exchange Rate(1)

 

At December 31, 2011

 

Ps.521.46 per US$

1.00

 

Average for year ended December 31, 2011

 

Ps.483.36 per US$

1.00

 

At December 31, 2012

 

Ps.478.60 per US$

1.00

 

Average for year ended December 31, 2012

 

Ps.486.75 per US$

1.00

 

At December 31, 2013

 

Ps.523.76 per US$

1.00

 

Average for year ended December 31, 2013

 

Ps.495.00 per US$

1.00

 

At December 31, 2014

 

Ps.607.38 per US$

1.00

 

Average for year ended December 31, 2014

 

Ps.570.40 per US$

1.00

 

At December 31, 2015

 

Ps. 707.34 per US$

1.00

 

Average for year ended December 31, 2015

 

Ps. 654.25 per US$

1.00

 

At December 31, 2016

 

Ps. 667.29 per US$

1.00

 

Average for year ended December 31, 2016

 

Ps. 676.83 per US$

1.00

 

 


(1)         As reported by the Chilean Central Bank in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 44 of its Constitutional Organic Act.

 

For amounts relating to a period, Chilean pesos are translated into U.S. dollar amounts using the average exchange rate for that period.  For amounts at period end, Chilean pesos are translated into U.S. dollar amounts using the exchange rate at the period end.

 

The Chilean Central Bank reported the exchange rate for Chile’s formal exchange market at Ps.666.28 per US$1.00 as of June 9, 2017.  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York does not report a noon buying rate for Chilean pesos.

 

Presentation of Financial Information

 

All annual information presented in this prospectus is based upon January 1 to December 31 periods, unless otherwise indicated.  Totals in tables in this prospectus may differ from the sum of the individual items in those tables due to rounding.

 

Since Chile’s official financial and economic statistics are subject to review by the Central Bank, the information in this prospectus may be adjusted or revised.  The information and data contained in this prospectus for December 31, 2016 and thereafter is preliminary and subject to further revision.  The government believes that this review process is substantially similar to the practices of many industrialized nations.  The government does not expect revisions to be material, although it cannot assure you that material changes will not be made.

 

Defined Terms

 

This prospectus defines the terms set forth below as follows:

 

·                  Gross domestic product or GDP means the total value of final products and services produced in Chile during the relevant period.

 

·                  Imports are calculated based upon (i) for purposes of foreign trade, statistics reported to Chilean customs upon entry of goods into Chile on a cost, insurance and freight included, or CIF, basis and (ii) for purposes of balance of payments, statistics collected on a free on board, or FOB, basis at a given departure location.

 

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·                  Exports are calculated based upon statistics reported to Chilean customs upon departure of goods from Chile on an FOB basis.

 

·                  Rate of inflation or inflation rate is the change in the consumer price index, or CPI, for the relevant calendar year, unless otherwise specified.  The CPI is calculated on a weighted basket of consumer goods and services using a monthly averaging method.  The rate of inflation is measured by comparing the CPI indices in December of the latest year against the indices for the prior December.  See “Monetary and Financial System—Inflation.

 

·                  An Unidad de Fomento (UF) is an inflation-indexed, Chilean peso-denominated monetary unit that is set daily based on the Chilean CPI of the immediately preceding 30 days as calculated and published daily by the Chilean Central Bank.  The main use of this index is in connection with “re-adjustable” payment obligations denominated in Chilean pesos.

 

Unless otherwise indicated, all annual rates of growth are average annual compounded rates, and all financial data are presented in current prices.

 

This prospectus refers to the state-owned companies and institutions as indicated below:

 

Banco Central de Chile

 

Chilean Central Bank

Banco del Estado de Chile

 

Banco Estado

Corporación de Fomento de la Producción

 

CORFO

Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile

 

Codelco

Empresa Nacional del Petróleo

 

ENAP

Empresa de Transporte de Pasajeros Metro S.A.

 

Metro

Empresa Nacional de Minería

 

Enami

Empresa de los Ferrocarriles del Estado

 

EFE

 

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FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

 

This prospectus and any prospectus supplement may contain forward-looking statements.

 

Forward-looking statements are statements that are not about historical facts, including statements about Chile’s beliefs and expectations.  These statements are based on current plans, estimates and projections, and therefore, you should not place undue reliance on them.  Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made.  Chile undertakes no obligation to update publicly any of these forward-looking statements in light of new information or future events, including changes in Chile’s economic policy or budgeted expenditures, or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.

 

Forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties.  Chile cautions you that a number of important factors could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed in any forward-looking statement.  These factors include, but are not limited to:

 

·                  Adverse external factors, such as high international interest rates, low copper and mineral prices and recession or low growth in Chile’s trading partners.  High international interest rates could negatively affect Chile’s current account and could increase budgetary expenditures.  Low copper and mineral prices could decrease the government’s revenues and could negatively affect the current account.  Recession or low growth in Chile’s trading partners could lead to fewer exports from Chile and lower growth in Chile;

 

·                  Instability or volatility in the international financial markets, including in particular continued or increased distress in the financial markets of the European Union, could lead to domestic volatility, which may adversely affect the ability of the Chilean government to achieve its macroeconomic goals.  This could also lead to declines in foreign investment inflows, in particular portfolio investments;

 

·                  Adverse domestic factors, such as a decline in foreign direct and portfolio investment, increases in domestic inflation, high domestic interest rates and exchange rate volatility.  Each of these factors could lead to lower growth or lower international reserves; and

 

·                  Other adverse factors, such as energy deficits or restrictions, climatic or seismic events, international or domestic hostilities and political uncertainty.

 

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SUMMARY

 

This summary highlights information contained elsewhere in this prospectus.  It is not complete and may not contain all the information that you should consider before investing in the debt securities.  You should read the entire prospectus and any prospectus supplement carefully.

 

Selected Financial Information(1)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

THE ECONOMY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)(2)

 

266,971

 

278,541

 

261,147

 

242,472

 

247,074

 

Real GDP (in billions of pesos)(3)

 

132,516

 

137,876

 

140,509

 

143,674

 

145,957

 

% Change from prior year

 

5.3

%

4.0

%

1.9

%

2.3

%

1.6

%

Consumer price index (percentage change from previous year at period end)

 

1.5

%

3.0

%

4.6

%

4.4

%

2.7

%

Producer price index (percentage change from previous year at period end)

 

(0.7

)%

(2.8

)%

(3.3

)%

(10.7

)%

10.2

%

Unemployment rate (annual average)

 

6.4

%

5.9

%

6.4

%

6.2

%

6.5

%

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Trade balance(4)

 

(66

)

(1,410

)

2,769

 

47

 

2,119

 

Current account

 

(10,706

)

(11,524

)

(4,501

)

(4,670

)

(3,574

)

Financial and capital account (including change in reserves)

 

(11,962

)

(12,825

)

(5,926

)

(2,704

)

(2,948

)

Errors and omissions

 

(1,280

)

(1,323

)

(1,446

)

616

 

612

 

Chilean Central Bank, international reserves (period-end)

 

41,649

 

41,094

 

40,447

 

38,643

 

40,494

 

Number of months of import coverage(5)

 

5.5

 

5.5

 

5.8

 

6.5

 

7.1

 

PUBLIC FINANCE

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Central government revenue

 

59,107

 

58,345

 

53,691

 

51,342

 

51,772

 

% of GDP

 

22.3

%

21.0

%

20.7

%

21.4

%

21.1

%

Central government expenditure

 

57,612

 

60,009

 

57,921

 

56,555

 

58,561

 

% of GDP

 

21.7

%

21.6

%

22.4

%

23.5

%

23.9

%

Central government surplus (deficit)

 

1,495

 

(1,664

)

(4,230

)

(5,213

)

(6,790

)

% of GDP

 

0.6

%

(0.6

)%

(1.6

)%

(2.2

)%

(2.8

)%

Consolidated non-financial public sector surplus (deficit)(6)  

 

6,021

 

791

 

(1,228

)

(3,839

)

n.a

 

% of GDP

 

2.3

%

0.3

%

(0.5

)%

(1.6

)%

n.a

 

PUBLIC DEBT

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Central government external debt

 

6,135

 

5,160

 

6,544

 

7,777

 

10,081

 

Central government external debt/GDP

 

2.3

%

1.9

%

2.5

%

3.2

%

4.1

%

Central government external debt/exports(7)

 

6.5

%

5.7

%

7.4

%

9.1

%

14.0

%

 


(1)         In millions of U.S. dollars, except as otherwise indicated.

(2)         GDP in U.S. dollars calculated by translating the nominal GDP in pesos at the average exchange rate of each period.

(3)         Calculated using chained volumes at prices for the immediately preceding year.

(4)         Trade balance consists of goods and services.

(5)         Imports consist of goods and services.

(6)         The non-financial public sector includes the central government, municipalities and public-owned enterprises, but does not include Banco Estado and the Chilean Central Bank.

(7)         Exports consist of goods and services.

n.a.= Not available.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank, Chilean Budget Office and National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, or INE).

 

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MAP OF CHILE

 

 

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REPUBLIC OF CHILE

 

Area and Population

 

Chile covers an area of approximately 756,626 square kilometers (excluding the Antarctic territory, which covers approximately 1,250,000 square kilometers).  Continental Chile occupies a narrow strip of land, with an average width of 177 kilometers, extending approximately 4,270 kilometers along South America’s west coast.  It borders Peru to the north, the Antarctic territory to the south, Bolivia and Argentina to the east and the Pacific Ocean to the west.  Continental Chile’s geography is dominated by a range of Pacific coastal mountains in the west, the Andes Mountains in the east and a valley that lies between these two ranges.  Southern Chile is mostly an archipelago, with Cape Horn at its tip.  Chile’s territory also includes several islands, including Easter Island, Juan Fernández Island and Salas y Gómez Island.

 

Continental Chile has five well-defined geographic regions:  the northern desert, the high Andean sector, the central valley, the southern lakes district and the archipelago region.  Approximately 22.9% of Chile’s land area is forested, while the remaining non-urban areas consist primarily of agricultural areas, deserts and mountains.  The northern desert region is rich in mineral resources.  The climate is dry and hot in the north, temperate in the central regions and cool and wet in the south.

 

Chile’s population, industry and arable land are mainly concentrated in the central valley, which includes the nation’s capital and largest city, Santiago, and its two largest ports, San Antonio and Valparaíso.

 

According to the national census conducted in 2002, Chile’s population was approximately 15.1 million, with an annual average growth rate of 1.2% per year from June 1992 to June 2002.  The 2002 national census showed that the population in Chile was highly urbanized, with approximately 87.0% living in cities, with approximately 40.0% of urban dwellers residing in the Santiago metropolitan area, which includes the city of Santiago and the surrounding region.  Spanish is Chile’s official language.  Although a national census was conducted during the first half of 2012, the results were not satisfactory to the National Institute of Statistics. Therefore, a new national census was conducted on April 19, 2017.  The estimated population of Chile as of December 31, 2016 was 18.2 million.

 

Chile considers itself an upper-middle income economy.  The following table provides selected comparative statistics as set forth in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2016 World Factbook:

 

 

 

Argentina

 

Brazil

 

Chile

 

Colombia

 

Mexico

 

Venezuela

 

United 
States of 
America

 

Per capita GDP(1) (in US$)

 

20,200

 

14,800

 

24,000

 

14,100

 

18,900

 

15,100

 

57,300

 

Life expectancy at birth (in years)

 

77.10

 

73.80

 

78.80

 

75.70

 

75.90

 

75.80

 

79.8

 

Infant mortality (deaths per 1,000 live births)

 

10.10

 

18.00

 

6.70

 

14.10

 

11.9

 

12.5

 

5.80

 

Literacy rate

 

98.1

%

92.6

%

97.5

%

94.7

%

95.1

%

96.3

%

99.0

%(2)

 


(1)         Figures are adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP).

(2)         Data corresponds to 2003 estimation.

Source:  CIA 2016 World Factbook.

 

The Chilean Constitution and Government

 

Chile is a democratic republic.  Accordingly, the Chilean Constitution declares and guarantees principles such as the recognition and protection of human dignity, equality before the law, protection of private property and free entrepreneurship, freedom of speech and association, popular sovereignty, representative government, separation of powers and the rule of law.

 

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The Constitution was approved in a national referendum in 1980 and provides for a system of government composed of three separate and independent powers:  an executive branch headed by a President (with a non-renewable four-year term), a legislative branch consisting of a two-chambered Congress, and a judicial branch in which the Supreme Court is the highest authority for all matters not pertaining to constitutional law.  The Constitution also provides for a Constitutional Court, which is the highest authority for all matters of constitutional law.

 

The 1980 Constitution was significantly amended in 1989 and in 2005 to introduce important changes to the structure of the political system, including (i) increasing oversight powers of the lower house; (ii) decreasing the powers and status of the National Security Council, which is now an advisory body; (iii) strengthening the role of the Constitutional Court by allowing it to rule on the constitutionality of laws; and (iv) introducing a six-year presidential term limit, which has subsequently been reduced to four years.

 

The Congress consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies.  Thirty-eight senators comprise the Senate, while the Chamber of Deputies has 120 members.  Congress recently passed an electoral reform that will increase the number of representatives in each body of Congress.  See “—Political Parties.”  Once the electoral reform is fully implemented, the Senate will have 50 members and the Chamber of Deputies will have 155 members.  All members of Congress are elected by popular vote.

 

There are 21 judges on the Supreme Court, each appointed by the president (out of five candidates proposed by the Supreme Court) with the Senate’s consent, and each of whom can serve until age 75.  The Chilean Constitutional Court is composed of 10 judges, three of whom are appointed by the President, three by the Supreme Court and four by Congress, who each serve until age 75.

 

Recent Political History

 

From its independence from Spain in 1810 until 1973 (with the exception of short intervals in the early 1800s, in 1924 and in 1931), Chile had a democratically elected government.  In September 1973, a military junta, led by General Augusto Pinochet, then commander-in-chief of the army, took power and held it until 1990, when a democratic system was reinstated.

 

Former President Patricio Aylwin, a member of the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, or PDC), reinstated civilian rule when he took office for a four-year term on March 11, 1990 with the support of the Parties for Democracy Coalition (Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, or the Concertación coalition), a political coalition described below.  His election in December 1989 followed a transition from military rule that included a countrywide plebiscite in 1988, as stipulated in the 1980 Constitution.  Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, also a member of the PDC and supported by the Concertación coalition, was elected to the presidency in December 1993 for a six-year term and took office on March 11, 1994.  In January 2000, again with the support of the Concertación coalition, Ricardo Lagos, founder of the Party for Democracy (Partido por la Democracia, or PPD), was elected to the presidency for a six-year term, which ended on March 11, 2006.  His successor, Michelle Bachelet, became the first female president of Chile after being sworn into office on March 11, 2006.  Ms. Bachelet is a member of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, or PS) and was supported by the Concertación coalition.  Sebastián Piñera, member of the National Renewal Party (Renovación Nacional, or RN) at the time of his election, was elected to the presidency in January 2010 for a four-year term.  Mr. Piñera resigned from RN prior to being sworn in as President on March 11, 2010, having won the 2010 presidential elections with the support of the center-right Coalition for Change (Coalición por el Cambio).  The current president, Ms. Bachelet, was elected president for a second term of four years, ending on March 11, 2018.  Ms. Bachelet won the 2013 elections, supported by the center-left coalition, New Majority (Nueva Mayoría).

 

On April 28, 2015, President Bachelet announced the government’s intention to adopt a wide range of measures to regulate political financing and the process followed in appointing certain government officials.  The measures are intended to eradicate certain practices involving the financing of political activities and include government funding for political parties, a ban on contributions made by business entities, the elimination of anonymous and undisclosed political donations, the updating of the current public lists of members of political parties, the removal of officials elected in elections involving illegal activities and the increase of non-elected government officials appointed through a merit-based selection process carried out by the Sistema de Alta Dirección Pública. In November 2015, Law No 20,870 approved the removal of officials elected in elections involving illegal

 

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activities.  Laws No. 20,900 and 20,915 enacted in April 2016 implemented all other measures announced by President Bachelet on April 28, 2015.

 

On April 29, 2015 President Bachelet urged Congress to act on certain bills pending discussion regarding probity in public service. On September 2, 2016 Law No. 20,880 on Probity in the Public Service came into force, requiring officials to declare their economic interests and assets at the beginning, during and after their period in office. The law requires a mandatory trust for officials holding investment in shares and securities valued in excess of approximately US$1,000,000. The law also requires the President and other highly ranked officials to sell their interests in regulated companies providing services to the central government. Sanctions for violating the law range from approximately US$350 to US$70,000. A bill with a limitation on the re-election of officials elected by popular vote (senators will be subject to a maximum of two consecutive terms, while other authorities would be subject to a maximum of three consecutive terms) is pending.

 

On October 13, 2015, President Bachelet initiated a process intended to lead to a constitutional reform and the adoption of a new Constitution by 2018. The process included a series of governmental measures, which began with an initial stage of civic and constitutional education, and was followed by a second stage, referred to as “Citizen’s Dialogue” (“Diálogo Ciudadano”). The conclusions of these exchanges and proposals were laid out in a document entitled “The Citizens’ Foundations for a New Constitution” (“Bases Ciudadanas para la Nueva Constitución”) delivered to President Bachelet on January 2017.  On April 2017 President Bachelet submitted a bill to Congress proposing a Constitutional Convention (“Convención Constitucional”) to amend the current Constitution.  The bill is under discussion at the Chambers of Deputies. A 2/3 majority approval by each chamber of Congress will be required to amend the existing Constitution.

 

President Bachelet has submitted different alternatives in terms of which body would take responsibility for the drafting of the new Constitution. These alternatives are: (i) a commission comprised of members of both houses of Congress; (ii) a constitutional convention formed by citizens and members of Congress; (iii) a constitutional assembly; and (iv) a plebiscite for all voters to decide among the preceding alternatives, with a majority requirement still to be proposed.  The mechanism has to be approved by a 3/5 majority vote in Congress during 2017, after the scheduled presidential and congressional elections.  Lastly, unless the alternative for the drafting of the Constitution was determined by a plebiscite as previously described, the new Constitution must be ratified by a plebiscite, with a majority requirement still to be proposed.

 

Political Parties

 

Since the restoration of democracy in 1990, Chile has had two major political groups:  the center-left and center-right coalitions.

 

The center-left coalition was originally called Concertación, and consisted of the following political parties until the presidential and congressional elections held in November 2013:  the centrists, the PDC and the Radical Social Democratic Party (Partido Radical Socialdemócrata, or PRSD), as well as the moderate-left parties, the PPD and the PS.  For the presidential and congressional elections of 2013, the center-left coalition took the name of Nueva Mayoría and expanded to include the Communist Party (Partido Comunista, or PC) and Broad Social Movement (Movimiento Amplio Social, or MAS).

 

The center-right coalition, formerly Alliance for Chile (Alianza por Chile, successor to the Coalition for Change), consisted of the following political parties until the municipal elections held in 2016:  the center-right RN and the Independent Democratic Union Party (Unión Demócrata Independiente, or UDI).  Since the most recent congressional election in 2013, several smaller political parties have been created, with Political Evolution (Evolución Política, or Evópoli) and Amplitude (Amplitud), two center right political movements, incorporated on April 2016 and March 2016, respectively, being the most important. For the municipal elections of 2016, the center-right coalition changed its name to Chile Vamos and expanded to include Evópoli and the Independent Regionalist Party (Partido Regionalista Independiente, or PRI).

 

There are also several smaller parties, which from 1990 to date have generally not been represented in Congress, but have had elected representatives in certain municipal governments.  These parties have historically had limited success because voting for the Chamber of Deputies takes place district-by-district and candidates from minority parties have not received the most votes in any individual constituency, despite their parties receiving a

 

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significant share of the national popular vote.  In the most recent congressional election held in October 2013, however, a member of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) and three independent candidates were elected to the Chamber of Deputies, and one independent candidate was elected senator.

 

In December 2011, Congress approved an electoral reform to simplify the registration process for all eligible voters, which increased the Chilean electorate by approximately 50.0%.  Despite this increase in the number of eligible voters, the reform made voting voluntary (until then, voting was mandatory for registered electors) and, as a consequence, fewer people have voted in subsequent elections.  As an example, in the first round of the presidential elections in 2009 (when voting was still mandatory), a total of 6,977,544 valid votes were cast, while in the first round of the presidential election held in 2013 (after voluntary voting was introduced), only 6,585,808 valid votes were cast.  A similar decrease in the percentage of voters has been detected in municipal and congressional elections held since the promulgation of the reform.

 

In January 2015, Congress changed the system for the election of its members from a binomial voting system, in which each electoral territory elects two representatives regardless of its population, to a semi-proportional voting system, in which each voting district elects representatives in proportion to the size of its population.  The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies will increase from 120 to 155 and the number of senators from 38 to 50.  The reform is expected to result in greater access to Congress by candidates from smaller political parties.  The new electoral system is expected to become effective prior to the next Congressional election in November 2017.

 

Presidential and Congressional Elections

 

Presidential and congressional elections are held every four years.  Chile will hold its next presidential and congressional elections in November 2017, and the next presidential term is scheduled to begin in March 2018.  The president is elected for a four-year term and is prohibited from serving in office for consecutive terms.  Senators are elected for eight-year terms, with half the Senate’s seats up for election every four years.  Members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected to four-year terms.  There are no term limits for senators or deputies.

 

The following tables detail the results of the presidential and congressional elections held since Chile’s return to democracy in 1989:

 

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Presidential Election Vote
(in %)

 

 

 

1989

 

1993

 

1999
1
st
round

 

1999
2
nd
round
(1)

 

2005
1
st
round

 

2005
2
nd
round
(1)

 

2009
1
st
round

 

2009
2
nd
round
(1)

 

2013
1
st
round

 

2013
2
nd
round
(1)

 

Center-Left(2)  

 

55.2

 

58.0

 

48.0

 

51.3

 

46.0

 

53.5

 

29.6

 

48.4

 

46.7

 

62.2

 

Center-Right(3)  

 

29.4

 

30.6

(4)

47.5

 

48.7

 

48.6

(4)

46.5

 

44.1

 

51.6

 

25.0

 

37.8

 

Left

 

 

4.7

 

3.2

 

 

 

 

6.2

 

 

15.0

 

 

Humanist and Green Parties

 

 

6.7

 

1.0

 

 

5.4

 

 

 

 

2.4

 

 

Centrist Union

 

15.4

 

 

0.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Independent

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

20.1

 

 

10.9

 

 

 


(1)         The second round took place in January of the following year.

(2)         The center-left alliance changed its name from “Concertación” to “Nueva Mayoría” in 2013.  For the 2013 presidential election, the center-left coalition included the Partido Demócrata Cristiano, the Partido Radical Socialdemócrata, the Partido por la Democracia, the Partido Socialista, the Partido Comunista and the Movimiento Amplio Social.

(3)         For the 2013 presidential election, the center-right coalition, Alianza por Chile, included Renovación Nacional and the Unión Demócrata Independiente.

(4)         Aggregate percentage of two center-right presidential candidates.

 

Congressional Elections (Senate)
(in number of senators)

 

 

 

1989

 

1993

 

1997

 

2001

 

2005

 

2009

 

2013

 

Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Center)

 

13

 

4

 

10

 

2

 

5

 

4

 

2

 

Partido por la Democracia (Left)

 

4

 

2

 

 

3

 

1

 

3

 

3

 

Partido Radical (Center-Left)

 

2

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

 

Renovación Nacional (Center-Right)

 

5

 

5

 

2

 

4

 

3

 

6

 

2

 

Unión Demócrata Independiente (Right)

 

2

 

2

 

3

 

3

 

5

 

3

 

5

 

Independents

 

12

 

2

 

4

 

2

 

1

 

 

3

 

Partido Socialista (Left)

 

 

3

 

1

 

4

 

4

 

2

 

4

 

Movimiento Amplio Social (Left)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

Congressional Elections (Chamber of Deputies)
(in number of deputies)

 

 

 

1989

 

1993

 

1997

 

2001

 

2005

 

2009

 

2013

 

Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Center)

 

38

 

37

 

38

 

23

 

20

 

19

 

21

 

Partido por la Democracia (Left)

 

16

 

15

 

16

 

20

 

21

 

18

 

15

 

Partido Radical (Center-Left)

 

5

 

2

 

4

 

6

 

7

 

5

 

6

 

Partido Humanista (Left)

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Renovación Nacional (Center-Right)

 

29

 

29

 

23

 

18

 

19

 

18

 

19

 

Unión Demócrata Independiente (Right)

 

11

 

15

 

17

 

31

 

33

 

37

 

29

 

Independents

 

18

 

5

 

8

 

12

 

4

 

6

 

8

 

P.A.I.S. (Left)

 

2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Partido Socialista (Left)

 

 

15

 

11

 

10

 

15

 

11

 

15

 

Unión de Centro (Center)

 

 

2

 

2

 

 

 

 

 

Partido del Sur (Center-Right)

 

 

 

1

 

 

 

 

 

Partido de Acción Regionalista (Center)

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

3

 

 

Partido Comunista (Left)

 

 

 

 

 

 

3

 

6

 

Partido Liberal (Center)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1

 

 

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The following table details the composition of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies as of December 31, 2016:

 

Composition of Senate

 

 

 

Composition of Chamber of Deputies

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nueva Mayoría (Center-Left)

 

19

 

Nueva Mayoría (Center-Left)

 

64

 

Alianza por Chile (Center-Right)

 

14

 

Alianza por Chile (Center-Right)

 

44

 

Others(1)

 

5

 

Others(1)

 

12

 

Total

 

38

 

Total

 

120

 

 


(1)         Includes deputies and senators that are independent (not members of a political party) and deputies of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal) and the Independent Regionalist Party (Partido Regionalista Independiente, or PRI).

 

Municipal Elections

 

There are 345 municipalities in Chile, each administered by a mayor and a municipal council, composed of 6, 8 or 10 councilors, depending on the number of electors in each municipality.  Municipal elections are held every four years, with the most recent elections held in October 2016 and the next elections scheduled for 2020.

 

The following table details the results of the last mayoral elections by pact or alliance:

 

Municipal Elections 2016 — Mayors

 

 

 

Votes

 

Percentage

 

Nueva Mayoría (Center-Left)

 

1,760,632

 

37.06

 

Chile Vamos (Center-Right)

 

1,827,425

 

38.47

 

Independents

 

824,490

 

17.35

 

Others(1)  

 

513,750

 

7.12

 

Total

 

4,926,297

 

100.00

 

 


(1)         Partido Liberal (Left), Partido Progresista (Left), Partido Ecologista Verde (Center-Left) and Partido Humanista (Left).

 

Regional Elections

 

Chile is divided into 15 Regions, each of them governed by a regional governor designated by the president.  Each Region is administered by a regional governor and a regional council that has to approve the regional development plan and the regional budget.

 

Regional councils have between 14 and 34 members, depending on the population of the Region.  Until the enactment of Law No. 20,678 on June 13, 2013, members of regional councils were designated by members of the municipal councils.  Since such date, members of regional councils have been elected every four years for four-year terms.  These elections coincide with congressional elections.  The first election of regional council members took place in November 2013, and the next election is scheduled for November 2017.

 

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Regional Elections (Regional Council Members)

 

 

 

2013

 

Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Center)

 

45

 

Partido por la Democracia (Left)

 

32

 

Partido Radical (Center-Left)

 

12

 

Partido Regionalista de los Independientes (Center)

 

2

 

Renovación Nacional (Center-Right)

 

41

 

Unión Democráta Independiente (Right)

 

46

 

Independents

 

52

 

Partido Progresista (Center Left)

 

2

 

Partido Socialista (Left)

 

33

 

Partido Ecologista Verde (Center Left)

 

1

 

Partido Comunista (Left)

 

12

 

Total

 

278

 

 

International and Regional Relations

 

Chile maintains close ties with its neighboring countries as well as with the other Latin American countries. In recent years, Chile has been party to cases before the International Court of Justice as described below:

 

·                  On January 27, 2014, the International Court of Justice ruled in the dispute regarding the maritime boundary brought by Peru against Chile.  In furtherance of the Court’s decision, both countries jointly determined the precise coordinates of the maritime boundary and initiated the adoption of legislative amendments in conformity with the ruling and the law of the sea.

 

·                  On April 24, 2013, Bolivia filed an application with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) instituting proceedings against Chile in the matter entitled “Obligation to negotiate access to the Pacific Ocean.” On July 15, 2014, Chile filed a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the court, which was dismissed on September 24, 2015. In addition, on that same ruling, the ICJ determined that it would not pass a judgment on the outcome of a future negotiation. Chile filed its counter-memorial on July 13, 2016.

 

·                  On June 6, 2016, Chile instituted proceedings against Bolivia before the ICJ, requesting the Court to declare that the Silala River system is an international watercourse whose use by Chile and Bolivia is governed by customary international law and, consequently, Chile is entitled to equitable and reasonable use of the water. The Court established July 3, 2017 as the time limit for filing the Chilean memorial, and July 3, 2018 as the time limit for submitting the Bolivian counter-memorial.

 

Chile is a member of or party to:

 

·                  the United Nations (UN), as a founding member (Chile was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from January 2003 until the end of 2004), including many of its programmes and specialized agencies;

 

·                  the Organization of American States (OAS);

 

·                  the World Health Organization (WHO);

 

·                  the World Trade Organization (WTO);

 

·                  the International Labor Organization (ILO);

 

·                  the International Maritime Organization (IMO);

 

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·                  the International Monetary Fund (IMF);

 

·                  the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank);

 

·                  International Social Security Association (ISSA);

 

·                  the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB);

 

·                  the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD);

 

·                  the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC);

 

·                  the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR);

 

·                  the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); and

 

·                  the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC).

 

Since 1994, Chile has been a member of, and an active participant in, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.  In recent years, the Asia Pacific region has become a priority for Chilean trade policy. Chile has taken steps within the APEC framework to improve trade with the Asia pacific region, including mutual recognition agreements and free trade agreements.

 

In February 2003, the Chilean Central Bank formally became part of the credit arrangements known as the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), created by the IMF in 1998.  The NAB serves as a mechanism to provide resources to countries facing a financial crisis.  In October 2003, the Chilean Central Bank became a member of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).  The BIS is an international organization established in 1930 to pursue worldwide monetary and financial stability.

 

Chile also participates in several regional arrangements designed to promote cooperation in trade, investment and services.  Chile is a member of the Latin American Integration Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración, or ALADI), a regional trade association, and an associate member of the Mercado Común del Sur, or Mercosur, which is an economic and political trade bloc designed to promote free trade in Latin America.  Chile is also party to a number of bilateral trade arrangements.  See “Balance of Payments and Foreign Trade—Foreign Trade” for more information on these arrangements.

 

Before becoming an official member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Chile participated as an observer in the OECD for over a decade and became an active member of 20 OECD committees and working groups. In recognition of Chile’s sound policies, the OECD Board invited Chile to become a full member of the organization in May 2007. In September 2008, Chile submitted its Initial Memorandum in support of its membership application and, after completing the process for accession, Chile was invited to become a member on December 15, 2009. Chile’s membership in the OECD became effective on May 7, 2010. Upon joining this organization, Chile became its first South American member.

 

The Council’s Decision to invite Chile to become an OECD Member provided that, after accession, Chile should submit periodic reports to eight OECD Committees, listed below, or their subsidiary bodies and specify a timeline for the submission of these reports:

 

1.              Investment Committee’s Working Party on International Investment Statistics;

 

2.              Chemicals Committee;

 

3.              Environment Policy Committee: Periodically, if required;

 

4.              Steering Group on Corporate Governance;

 

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5.              Committee on Financial Markets;

 

6.              Insurance and Private Pensions Committee;

 

7.              Committee on Statistics; and

 

8.              Trade Committee.

 

As of May 26, 2017, Chile submitted these reports, although given their continuous nature, further reporting will be required, in particular to the Chemicals Committee, the Environment Policy Committee and the Corporate Governance Committee.

 

As a member of the OECD, Chile is committed to:  (i) promoting the efficient use of its economic resources; (ii) incentivizing research, development and vocational training in the scientific and technological fields; (iii) implementing policies that target economic growth and internal and external financial stability and avoiding policies that hinder such growth and stability; (iv) reducing, and to the extent possible, abolishing any obstacles to the domestic and international exchange of goods, services and payments and liberalizing the flow of capital both within Chile and between Chile and other international market participants; and (v) contributing to the sustainable economic development of both member and non-member countries, in particular, through capital flows and technical assistance and providing access to export markets.

 

Measures Implemented To Deter Terrorism and Money Laundering

 

Chile has supported initiatives against money laundering and terrorism financing promoted by various international organizations, including the UN, the OAS, the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT), the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD) and the OECD.  Chile is a member of several of these organizations.

 

To this end, in 2001 President Lagos Escobar issued Supreme Decree No. 488, which requires all authorities and public institutions to ensure the observance and enforcement of UN Security Council resolution No. 1,373 and, in 2003, in compliance with the undertakings of the “International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,” Chile modified its original counter-terrorism Law No. 18,314, enacted in 1984, by enacting Law No. 19,906, making the financing of terrorism a criminal offense.

 

In 2003, Law No.19,913 was enacted to bolster the Chilean anti-money laundering regime by increasing the penalties for money laundering and expanding the number of criminal offenses deemed as underlying crimes for the purposes of the law, such as drug dealing, arms dealing, financial offenses or any form of terrorism, including the financing of terrorism.  In addition, Law 19,913 created the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF), a governmental entity aimed at preventing the use of the financial system and other sectors of the economy for specified illegal activities, with a special focus on money laundering.  It is responsible for gathering, processing and exchanging information related to suspected money laundering and financing of terrorist-related activities.  If the UAF has reasonable belief that a financial operation is being used to launder money or to fund terrorist activities, it is required to promptly provide all relevant information to the Chilean prosecutors and courts.  With the purpose of deterring money laundering, terrorism and its financing, the UAF along with other regulatory agencies, have instructed banks and other entities under their supervision to implement preventive models consistent with recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

 

In 2005, Law No. 20,000, a new Drug Act (Ley de Drogas y Estupefacientes) was enacted.  This law contains measures to help detect money laundering by strengthening international judicial cooperation and the police’s powers of investigation.

 

In March 2006, the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, or SBIF) replaced its standards on the prevention of money laundering with the “Core principles for effective banking supervision” and “Customer due diligence standards for banks” established by the GAFILAT and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  Many of these guidelines, however, had already been implemented in practice prior to the date of formal adoption.

 

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In December 2009, Law No. 20,393 on Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities for the Crimes of Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Offenses of Bribery entered into force.  This law, which was promulgated in part to give effect to Chile’s obligations under certain international treaties, introduced a list of offenses for which private legal entities and state-owned enterprises can be held criminally liable (i.e., bribery of Chilean and foreign public officials, money laundering and financing of terrorism).  Criminal liability for legal entities in the aforementioned cases is an exception to the general Chilean criminal law principle restricting criminal liability to individuals.

 

In December 2010, GAFILAT concluded its third round evaluation of Chile’s compliance with the FATF recommendations to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.  In its report, GAFILAT provided recommendations for further improving compliance.

 

Accordingly, in December 2014, Congress amended Law No. 19,913 by Law No. 20,818, which became effective in February 2015.  Law 20,818 includes public bodies as reporting entities, expands the spectrum of underlying crimes constituting money laundering and addresses other pending issues regarding the financing of terrorism, among other modifications.

 

In 2013, Chile also adopted a National Strategy to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, and involved more than 20 public sector entities, including the Chilean Central Bank, the SBIF, the Superintendency of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones, or SP), the Superintendency for Securities and Insurance (Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros, or SVS) and the Office of the National Public Prosecutor (Fiscal Nacional) in the deployment of the Strategy.  The Strategy includes five lines of work and 50 specific tasks that will be developed until 2017.

 

On May 28, 2015, an administrative procedure was implemented to facilitate the preventive freezing of assets by the Financial Analysis Unit, which seeks to strengthen preventive action against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. In addition, Chile approved Resolution 2,253, issued on December 17, 2015, of the United Nations Security Council, of which it was a member until December 31, 2015, to strengthen measures against terrorist organizations.

 

Chile has also adopted criteria to define Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) in an effort to avoid the corruption of senior government officials.  All entities supervised by the UAF are required to register all transactions involving PEPs and report any suspicious operations.

 

On December 16, 2015, President Bachelet implemented measures to comply with the UN Security Council’s resolutions related to Al-Qaeda and associated persons and entities, and the prevention, combat and financing of terrorism. Such measures allow, among other things, (i) gathering information about suspect persons, groups, undertakings and entities, reporting any relevant findings to the UN Security Council; (ii) preventive freezing of assets belonging to persons, groups, undertakings and entities included in the UN Security Council’s lists of persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with terrorism; (iii) the requirement for certain natural and legal persons to periodically review the UN Security Council’s lists and to immediately report the identification of any person, undertaking or entity signaled in those lists.

 

On July 19, 2016, the Intersectorial Committee on the Prevention and Combat against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism was created (Intersectorial Committee). The Intersectorial Committee is entrusted with the mission of advising and coordinating the actions, plans and programs of the different institutional actors in matters related to the prevention, detection and prosecution of money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

 

In addition, during 2016, the entire public sector was instructed to implement anti-money laundering and anticorruption preventive systems, and to adopt Codes of Ethics. Currently, the majority of the central administration’s public services have fully operational Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Systems (AML/CFT), Corruption Prevention Manuals and Codes of Ethics for public employees.

 

In August 2016, the plenary meeting of representatives of the GAFILAT approved Chile’s exit from the list of countries under scrutiny in terms of money laundering and financing of terrorism.

 

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During the first quarter of 2017, Chile’s UAF published its first National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing document that analyzes the country’s threats and vulnerabilities with respect to money laundering and financing of terrorism. This document enables the authorities to design essential measures and policies to combat those crimes, and prioritize and allocate resources efficiently. In addition, the 2013-2016 Action Plan of the National Strategy to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing was evaluated as to its effectiveness in achieving its objectives. Pursuant to both reports, a new National Plan of Action is expected to be developed including strategic objectives for the period 2017-2020. The National Strategy Committee, formed by 20 public institutions and with the UAF as its Executive Secretariat, initiated its work in May 2017.

 

Earthquakes and Other Natural Disasters

 

Chile lies on the Nazca tectonic plate, making it one of the world’s most seismically active regions.  From time to time, Chile is affected by earthquakes, tsunamis, flooding, fires and other natural disasters that require investment of public funds to restore damage suffered by private and public properties and the adoption of extraordinary emergency measures to address the special needs of the affected population.  Chile has been adversely affected by powerful earthquakes in the past, including an 8.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Santiago in 1985 and a 9.5 magnitude earthquake in 1960, which was the largest earthquake ever recorded.

 

On February 27, 2010, an 8.8 magnitude earthquake struck south-central Chile.  The quake epicenter was located 200 miles southwest of Santiago and 70 miles north of Concepción, Chile’s second largest city.  The earthquake triggered a tsunami in south-central coastal areas.  Due to the severity of the earthquake and its devastating consequences, on February 28, 2010, the government declared a “state of catastrophe” in the Maule and Bío Bío Regions for a 30-day period.  On March 11, 2010, a “state of catastrophe” was also declared in the Libertador General Bernardo O’Higgins Region for a 20-day period.  Significant aftershocks followed the initial earthquake, including aftershocks of 6.2, 5.4 and 5.6 magnitudes within an hour of the initial earthquake, aftershocks of 6.9, 6.7 and 6.0 magnitudes on March 11, 2010 and a 7.2 magnitude earthquake on March 13, 2010.  The official death toll from the earthquake and tsunami was 525.

 

The Bío Bío and Maule Regions were the most severely affected Regions.  Concepción, located approximately 200 miles south of Santiago, was the most affected city, with its infrastructure and numerous buildings severely damaged.  The coastal area of Concepción, including the neighboring cities of Talcahuano and Penco, were hit by a tsunami shortly after the earthquake that significantly damaged port facilities.  Several cities in the Maule Region, including its capital city of Talca, were also seriously affected by the earthquake.  The Valparaíso Region, including the port of Valparaíso and the city of Viña del Mar, was also severely affected.  Region VI suffered serious damage as a result of the 7.2 magnitude quake on March 13, 2010, which forced President Sebastián Piñera to declare a “state of catastrophe” in that Region.  Rancagua, the capital city of Region VI, located approximately 56 miles from Santiago, also suffered significant damage.

 

The earthquake and its aftershocks, as well as tsunamis from adjacent coastal waters, caused severe damage to Chile’s infrastructure, including roads, bridges, ports and Santiago’s international airport.  Total infrastructure damage from this catastrophe has been estimated to be US$21 billion, of which US$10.4 billion corresponded to private sector infrastructure and US$10.6 billion to public sector infrastructure.  In 2010, the government estimated that public spending of US$8.4 billion would be needed between 2010 and 2013 for the government’s reconstruction efforts, as further described below, including tax revenues, budget reassignments, tapping into the copper reserves fund, donations, among other funding sources.

 

A US$8.4 billion reconstruction plan, presented to the Chamber of Deputies in May 2010, allocated resources as follows:  housing:  27.4%; health system:  25.4%; education:  14.3%; public works:  13.9%; other:  19.0%.  The Ministry of Finance funded the reconstruction plan from a variety of sources, including a US$730 million reallocation of public expenditures.  The government also encouraged private donations to help the reconstruction efforts.  A law on donations (Law No. 20,444) created tax credits for donations to a reconstruction fund managed by the government.

 

In addition, in July 2010, Law No. 20,455, the Reconstruction Financing Law, was approved by Congress.  Highlights of the initiatives contained in this law included:

 

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·                  The first category tax, applied to businesses, was increased from the then-current 17.0% to 20.0% during 2011.

 

·                  The real estate tax rate was increased by 0.275%.  This tax applies to property with a fiscal value exceeding approximately US$180,000, which represents approximately 1.5% of Chile’s real estate.

 

·                  The tax on tobacco sales was increased from 50.4% to 62.3%, and a tax of approximately US$0.10 per package of 20 cigarettes was levied.

 

·                  Tax deferral treatment of certain voluntary social security deposits (depósitos convenidos) was limited to approximately US$35,000 per year.

 

·                  Restrictions were placed on the use of tax exemptions for income derived from lease payments, which had historically been permitted by the special tax regime of Decree with Force of Law No. 2 of 1959, applicable to homes complying with certain legal requirements.

 

Mining royalties were also amended as part of the government’s reconstruction efforts.  In October 2010, Congress made mining operators with annual sales over 50,000 metric tons of fine copper subject to a tiered tax, which ranges from 5.0% to 34.5% of operating margin, depending on annual sales revenues of fine copper, and replaced the 5.0% fixed rate tax established in 2005.

 

Ministry of Women and Gender Equality

 

On March 20, 2015, Law No. 20,820 was published in the Official Gazette, creating the Ministry of Women and Gender Equality (Ministerio de la Mujer y la Equidad de Género), which became fully operational in March 2016.  This ministry is tasked with designing, coordinating and evaluating policies, plans and programs to promote gender equality and equal rights, and eliminating arbitrary discrimination against women.

 

Additionally, Law No. 20,820 created an Inter-ministerial Committee for Equal Rights and Gender Equality, which is composed of 14 ministers.  This committee is mandated to assist in the implementation of policies, plans and programs that promote equal rights between men and women.

 

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THE ECONOMY

 

History and Background

 

Chile is a country rich in natural resources and its economy has historically been oriented towards the export of primary products.  During the international economic crisis of the 1930s, however, the market for Chilean exports collapsed and international capital markets were closed to Chilean borrowers.  In response to this, successive governments sought to reduce Chile’s dependence on foreign trade by implementing import substitution policies designed to promote domestic industries and discourage imports.  The strategy was supplemented by giving the state a role in the development of key sectors, including electricity and steel.  As a result of these policies, the government’s role in the economy expanded in the decades that followed.

 

Government policy was eventually liberalized and, between 1964 and 1966, the administration of President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964 to 1970) lowered external tariffs and greatly reduced other non-administrative import barriers.  In addition, the administration sought to professionalize Chile’s monetary policy by recruiting career economists to the Chilean Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance.  Despite these more liberal economic policies, Chile’s economy remained heavily regulated into the late 1960s.

 

The socialist government of President Allende (1970 to 1973) greatly increased the government’s role in the economy by implementing a wide-ranging nationalization program, expanding the agrarian reform process that was started by previous governments, and rapidly increasing government expenditure and money supply.  By 1973, inflation reached an annual rate of more than 500.0%, industrial output fell by more than 6.0% and the Chilean Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves stood at slightly over US$40 million.

 

Following the military coup d’etat in 1973, the military government led by General Augusto Pinochet (1973 to 1990) introduced economic reforms designed to open the economy to foreign investment, liberalize foreign trade and reduce the central government’s size and influence on the economy by, among other things, eliminating long-standing and widespread price controls and undertaking a significant privatization program.  Although the military government succeeded in reducing inflation, eliminating budget deficits and initiating an economic recovery, in the early 1980s, Chile underwent a severe recession due largely to a global recession, a worsening of the terms of trade, a decrease in the availability of external credit, weak banking sector regulation, real wage inflexibility and the abandonment of the currency peg which quickly led to the depreciation of the peso and an external debt and domestic banking crisis.  In 1982, real GDP fell 13.4% compared to the previous year.  In 1983, real GDP further decreased 3.5% and unemployment peaked at 20.5% (excluding the effects of certain ad hoc emergency employment programs developed by the government).  From 1984 to 1989, however, the government’s liberalizing economic policies resulted in increased exports, average GDP growth of 6.7% per year, a 66.6% reduction in the current account deficit, and a steady rise in international reserves.

 

In addition, in 1985, the government initiated a far-reaching privatization program of state-owned companies.  These economic policies and the government’s expansionary monetary policy led to an approximately 22.8% increase in domestic spending for the two-year period from 1987 to 1989, which in turn led to a rise in inflation.  When President Patricio Aylwin took office in 1990, his administration implemented a macroeconomic policy designed to correct these economic imbalances.

 

The Concertación coalition governments of Presidents Patricio Aylwin (1990 to 1994), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994 to 2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000 to 2006), and Michelle Bachelet (2006 to 2010) all sought to provide stability and economic growth to Chile while fostering social development.  Concertación coalition administrations consistently promoted free-market economic principles, including the protection of private property, the subsidiary role of the state in economic activity, free trade, open and fair competition, and sound macroeconomic, banking and financial regulation policies.

 

In 2009, a center-right coalition, “Coalición por el cambio,” led by Sebastián Piñera won the presidential elections for the period from 2010 to 2014.  President Piñera’s administration sought to strengthen the Chilean economy and increase economic growth by expanding the investment rate, improving capital markets regulation and enhancing labor productivity through human capital investment, the promotion of innovation and entrepreneurship, and by modernizing the state.  Additionally, the Piñera administration adhered to a sustainable fiscal policy, guided by a rule referred to as the “Structural Balance Policy Rule,” which was first adopted in 2001.  In 2010, the

 

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government appointed a special commission to assess the then-prevailing fiscal balance pursuant to a new methodology, which revealed a structural fiscal deficit of 2.0% of GDP.  See “Public Sector Finances—Public Sector Accounts and Fiscal Statistics.”

 

Michelle Bachelet was elected to the presidency in 2013 for a second term of four years, which will end on March 11, 2018.  Ms. Bachelet won the elections supported by the center-left coalition Nueva Mayoría.  In 2016, the structural fiscal deficit stood at 1.6% of GDP and the government projects it will equal 1.5% of GDP in 2017.  While the Bachelet administration’s initial target was to reach a structural balance (0.0% of GDP) by 2018 by relying on increased tax revenues generated by the 2014 tax reform, as a result of changes in structural variables and external conditions, the government contemplated a reduction of the structural deficit by approximately 0.25% per year for the 2016-2018 period.  See “Public Sector Finances—Public Sector Accounts and Fiscal Statistics.”  In addition to the tax reform, in 2014 and the beginning of 2015, President Bachelet focused on electoral and educational reforms. On July 4, 2016, the Bachelet administration submitted a draft bill to Congress providing for the progressive implementation of free access to college and university, which is currently under discussion at the Chamber of Deputies.

 

Macroeconomic Performance (1990 — 2008)

 

The Chilean economy grew by an average of 8.0% per year between 1990 and 1998.  In 1999, as a result of the 1997 Asian crisis and the abandonment of the crawling exchange rate band, the Chilean economy experienced a recession.  Despite relatively strong growth in 2000 (4.5%), turmoil in the international financial markets, low copper prices and the Argentine currency and debt crisis of 2001 to 2002 combined to slow the pace of growth in Chile to 2.2% in 2001 and 3.4% in 2002.  The policies implemented to give effect to the structural balance rule introduced in 2001 were instrumental in helping the economy accelerate its growth rate.  See “Public Sector Finances—Public Sector Accounts and Fiscal Statistics—Fiscal Policy Framework—Structural Balance Policy Rule.”  In 2003, the economy grew by 3.9% and by 7.0% in 2004, 6.2% in 2005, 5.7% in 2006, 5.2% in 2007 and 3.3% in 2008.  This was accompanied by an improvement in the terms of trade, driven mainly by the price of copper, which rose from an average of US$0.707 per pound in 2002 to US$1.669 in 2005, and US$3.049, US$3.229 and US$3.155 in 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively.  Increased copper prices helped the Chilean Sovereign Wealth Funds (the Pension Reserve Fund, or FRP, by its Spanish acronym, and the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund, or FEES, by its Spanish acronym) accumulate savings which stood at US$22.7 billion as of the end of 2008.  See “Public Sector Finances—Fiscal Responsibility Law.”

 

Global Financial Crisis — Economic Performance and Policies of 2008 and 2009

 

Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2008, global trends began to negatively affect Chile’s macroeconomic performance, including the contraction in available external financing, increases in premiums for credit risk, significant capital outflows from emerging markets, reductions in interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds, lower commodity prices, including copper (US$1.39 per pound in December 2008, compared to US$3.17 per pound in September 2008) and fluctuation in the value of the dollar against other major currencies.  These factors resulted in a significant slowdown in output (from 4.7% to 1.4%) and demand (from 9.9% to 1.2%) in the fourth quarter of 2008 compared to the same period of 2007.  The export sector was similarly affected, with the terms of trade deteriorating by 27.5% in the fourth quarter of 2008 compared to the same period in 2007.  GDP growth in 2008 was 3.3% compared to 5.2% during 2007.  Domestic consumption grew 5.2% in 2008 compared to 7.6% in 2007.  This decrease resulted from a significant reduction in the demand for new cars, capital goods, new homes and inventories.  The sectors that were most affected were retail, manufacturing and construction.

 

In an effort to combat the effects of the global financial crisis and ensure sufficient liquidity in the economy, in October 2008, the Chilean Central Bank suspended its program of U.S. dollar reserve accumulation, implemented U.S. dollar repurchase transactions with weekly auctions of US$500 million and permitted banks to use currencies in addition to U.S. dollars to meet their foreign currency reserve requirements for a period of six months.

 

In light of global economic conditions, at the beginning of January 2009, the government implemented a stimulus plan aimed at boosting employment and economic growth.  This fiscal package, equivalent to 2.1% of GDP (US$4.0 billion), sought to create conditions that would allow the economy to grow in 2009 and, directly and indirectly, create more than 100,000 jobs.  See “—Employment and Labor—Employment.”  The stimulus package

 

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included:  subsidies to individuals and families, additional investments in public infrastructure, tax cuts, improved access to financing for small- and medium-sized businesses, additional capitalization of state-owned enterprises (including a US$1 billion investment in Codelco), and other initiatives to incentivize private investment, such as a US$700 million public investment plan for rural and urban roads and housing and irrigation projects aimed at supporting employment in the construction sector.

 

Primarily as a result of the fiscal stimulus plan, in 2009, government expenditures grew by 17.8%, while central government real revenue fell by 23.2% as compared to 2008 due to decreases from net tax collection and gross copper revenue, mainly from Codelco.  In 2009, the government recorded an effective deficit of 4.5% of GDP and a structural deficit of 1.1% of GDP.  See “Public Sector FinancesPublic Sector Accounts and Fiscal Statistics—Fiscal Policy Framework—Structural Balance Policy Rule.”  Financing sources for the deficit came from the issuance of government bonds in the local market, as authorized in the 2009 budget law, and from withdrawals from the FEES.  Withdrawals from the FEES in 2009 included:  US$8.0 billion to help finance part of the stimulus plan and the fiscal deficit caused by the drop in both tax revenues and income from Codelco; US$441 million to pay down public debt; and US$837 million for payment into the FRP.  Total withdrawals from the FEES in 2009 were US$9.3 billion.  See “Public Sector FinancesFiscal Responsibility Law—Economic and Social Stabilization Fund.”

 

The government sought to mitigate the effect on the exchange rate of the inflow of dollars related to the government’s withdrawal from the FEES by using domestic borrowing to finance the deficit and launching a process of daily auctions intended to provide the market with a framework of predictable and transparent sales.  Expenditures in pesos under the stimulus plan (equivalent to approximately US$3 billion), were financed through daily auctions of US$50 million held between March 27 and June 23, 2009.  Subsequently, auctions of US$40 million were held daily from July 1 to November 20, 2009, for a total of US$4 billion.

 

Gross Domestic Product (2010 to the Present)

 

In 2010, GDP grew by 5.8% mainly due to an increase in the growth of domestic consumption from a year-on-year decrease of 0.8% in 2009 to a year-on-year increase of 9.7% in 2010, a year-on-year increase in investment of 11.6% in 2010 from a year-on-year decrease of 12.1% in 2009, and a year-on-year increase of 2.3% in exports in 2010 from a year-on-year decrease of 4.5%  in 2009.  In 2010, the average price of copper increased to US$3.42 per pound compared to US$2.34 per pound in 2009, which resulted in improved international terms of trade.  Chile’s economic recovery in 2010 was partially offset by the negative impact of the earthquake and tsunami of February 27, 2010.  See “Republic of Chile—Earthquakes and Other Natural Disasters.”

 

During 2011, GDP grew by 6.1% as compared to 2010.  Aggregate domestic demand increased by 9.4%, gross fixed capital formation increased by 16.1%, consumption increased by 7.2%, exports increased by 5.5% and imports increased by 15.2%.

 

During 2012, GDP grew by 5.3% as compared to 2011.  Aggregate domestic demand increased by 7.2%, gross fixed capital formation increased by 11.3%, consumption increased by 5.7% (mainly driven by an increase in private consumption), exports increased by 0.4% and imports increased by 5.2%.

 

During 2013, GDP grew by 4.0% as compared to 2012.  Aggregate domestic demand increased by 3.6%, private consumption increased by 4.6%, gross fixed capital formation increased by 3.3%, exports increased by 3.3% and imports increased by 2.0%.  Although exports were higher in 2013, lower private consumption in comparison with 2012 resulted in a slower rate of GDP growth.

 

During 2014, GDP grew by 1.9% as compared to 2013.  Although consumption increased by 3.0% and exports increased by 0.3%, aggregate domestic demand decreased by 0.4%, gross fixed capital formation decreased by 4.8% and imports decreased by 6.6%.

 

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During 2015, GDP grew by 2.3% as compared to 2014.  Aggregate domestic demand increased by 2.0%, private consumption increased by 2.0%, gross fixed capital formation decreased by 0.8%, exports decreased by 1.8% and imports decreased by 2.7%.

 

During 2016, GDP grew by 1.6% as compared to 2015.  Aggregate domestic demand increased by 1.1%, private consumption increased by 2.4%, gross fixed capital formation decreased by 0.8%, exports decreased by 0.1% and imports decreased by 1.6%.

 

Economic Performance Indicators

 

The following table sets forth certain macroeconomic performance indicators for the fiscal quarters indicated:

 

 

 

Current
Account
(millions of US$)

 

GDP
Growth
(in %)

 

Domestic
Demand
Growth (in %)

 

2012

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

First quarter

 

(612.0

)

5.1

 

4.8

 

Second quarter

 

(1,761.9

)

5.3

 

6.3

 

Third quarter

 

(5,097.7

)

5.6

 

8.6

 

Fourth quarter

 

(3,234.2

)

5.2

 

8.9

 

2013

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

First quarter

 

(2,059.4

)

4.2

 

7.2

 

Second quarter

 

(2,328.5

)

4.2

 

4.5

 

Third quarter

 

(4,345.1

)

4.5

 

0.8

 

Fourth quarter

 

(2,791.5

)

3.3

 

2.3

 

2014

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

First quarter

 

(1,146.3

)

2.9

 

0.6

 

Second quarter

 

(708.6

)

1.8

 

(0.7

)

Third quarter

 

(1,602.3

)

1.3

 

(1.2

)

Fourth quarter

 

(1,043.7

)

1.7

 

(0.1

)

2015

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

First quarter

 

396.6

 

2.6

 

1.0

 

Second quarter

 

(561.1

)

2.1

 

2.0

 

Third quarter

 

(2,747.8

)

2.4

 

3.9

 

Fourth quarter

 

(1,757.5

)

1.9

 

1.1

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

First quarter

 

363.1

 

2.5

 

1.4

 

Second quarter

 

(1,003.7

)

1.7

 

1.2

 

Third quarter

 

(2,233.5

)

1.8

 

0.9

 

Fourth quarter

 

(700.3

)

0.5

 

1.1

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

The following tables present GDP and expenditures measured at current prices and in chained volume at previous year prices, each for the periods indicated:

 

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GDP and Expenditures
(at current prices for period indicated, in billions of Chilean pesos)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

GDP

 

129,947

 

137,876

 

148,855

 

158,637

 

167,227

 

Aggregate Domestic Demand

 

129,984

 

138,668

 

147,398

 

158,812

 

165,822

 

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

 

32,325

 

34,199

 

35,445

 

37,482

 

38,737

 

Change in Inventories

 

2,045

 

1,132

 

(862

)

(452

)

(2,638

)

Total Consumption

 

95,614

 

103,337

 

112,815

 

121,782

 

129,723

 

Private Consumption

 

80,118

 

86,377

 

93,735

 

100,870

 

107,079

 

Government Consumption

 

15,496

 

16,960

 

19,080

 

20,912

 

22,643

 

Total Exports

 

44,340

 

44,395

 

49,213

 

47,081

 

47,599

 

Total Imports

 

44,377

 

45,188

 

47,755

 

47,255

 

46,194

 

Net Exports

 

(37

)

(792

)

1,458

 

(175

)

1,405

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

GDP and Expenditure
(chained volume at previous year prices, in billions of Chilean pesos)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

GDP

 

132,516

 

137,876

 

140,509

 

143,674

 

145,957

 

Aggregate Domestic Demand

 

133,845

 

138,668

 

138,169

 

140,922

 

142,534

 

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

 

33,103

 

34,199

 

32,546

 

32,300

 

32,035

 

Change in Inventories

 

1,662

 

1,132

 

(768

)

(353

)

(1,574

)

Total Consumption

 

99,080

 

103,337

 

106,391

 

108,975

 

112,074

 

Private Consumption

 

82,597

 

86,377

 

88,683

 

90,460

 

92,603

 

Government Consumption

 

16,490

 

16,960

 

17,708

 

18,508

 

19,458

 

Total Exports

 

42,991

 

44,395

 

44,549

 

43,745

 

43,691

 

Total Imports

 

44,312

 

45,188

 

42,209

 

41,056

 

40,394

 

Net Exports

 

(1,321

)

(792

)

2,340

 

2,689

 

3,297

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Composition of Demand

 

The primary component of aggregate demand is private consumption, which as a percentage of GDP, increased from 61.7% in 2012 to 64.0% in 2016.  Another key component of demand, gross fixed capital formation, increased to 24.9% of GDP in 2012, decreasing to 24.8% of GDP in 2013, 23.8% of GDP in 2014, 23.6% of GDP in 2015 and 23.2% of GDP in 2016.

 

The following table presents GDP by categories of aggregate demand:

 

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GDP by Aggregate Demand
(percentage of total GDP, except as indicated)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

GDP (in billions of pesos)

 

129,947

 

137,876

 

148,855

 

158,637

 

167,227

 

Domestic Absorption

 

100.0

 

100.6

 

99.0

 

100.1

 

99.2

 

Total Consumption

 

73.6

 

74.9

 

75.8

 

76.8

 

77.6

 

Private Consumption

 

61.7

 

62.6

 

63.0

 

63.6

 

64.0

 

Government Consumption

 

11.9

 

12.3

 

12.8

 

13.2

 

13.5

 

Change in inventories

 

1.6

 

0.8

 

-0.6

 

(0.3

)

(1.6

)

Gross Fixed Capital Formation

 

24.9

 

24.8

 

23.8

 

23.6

 

23.2

 

Exports of goods and services

 

34.1

 

32.0

 

33.4

 

29.6

 

28.7

 

Imports of goods and services

 

34.1

 

32.8

 

32.1

 

29.8

 

27.6

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Savings and Investment

 

Between 2012 and 2016, total gross savings (or domestic gross investment) decreased as a percentage of GDP as a consequence of a decrease in national savings. Between 2012 and 2016, the decrease in national savings was partially offset by positive external savings (as reduced by the current account deficit).

 

Savings and Investment
(% of GDP)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

National Savings

 

22.4

 

21.5

 

21.5

 

21.4

 

20.2

 

External Savings

 

4.0

 

4.2

 

1.7

 

2.0

 

1.4

 

Total Gross Savings or Domestic Gross Investment

 

26.4

 

25.6

 

23.2

 

23.3

 

21.6

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank

 

Principal Sectors of the Economy

 

The Chilean economy, with a GDP of US$272.2 billion in 2012, US$278.5 billion in 2013, US$246.5 billion in 2014, US$219.6 billion in 2015 and US$215.6 billion in 2016 each as calculated based on the average exchange rate for the applicable year, has considerable natural resources, a modern export-oriented manufacturing sector and a sophisticated services sector.

 

The earthquake and tsunami that occurred on February 27, 2010 caused severe damage to productive assets in areas of the country important to Chile’s economy.  This contraction in output was largely caused by the earthquake and tsunami’s effect on industrial output and on the manufacturing sector in particular, which suffered damage to its infrastructure, machinery and equipment and experienced an increase in lost workdays among absent employees.  The manufacturing sub-sectors most affected were paper and printing products; foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco; metal products, machinery and equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing; and chemical, petroleum, rubber and plastic products.  The primary sector was also severely affected by the earthquake and tsunami.  The fishing industry suffered significant damage to vessels and processing infrastructure, while the agriculture industry experienced the destruction of storage facilities, and water restraints caused by damage to irrigation infrastructure.  The services sub-sectors most significantly and adversely affected by the earthquake and tsunami were transport and personal services.

 

In 2012, GDP grew by 5.3%, mainly due to a 6.1% increase in the services sector and a 2.0% increase in the primary sector.  In line with 2011 results, this growth was principally driven by domestic absorption, which reached 100.0% of GDP, and private consumption, which totaled 61.7% of GDP.

 

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In 2013, GDP grew by 4.0%, driven mainly by a 4.1% increase in the services sector and a 4.4% increase in the primary sector.  Domestic absorption reached 100.6% of GDP, and private consumption totaled 62.6% of GDP.

 

In 2014, GDP grew by 1.9%, primarily as a result of a 1.8% increase in the primary sector and a 2.3% increase in the services sector, while the manufacturing sector contracted by 0.3% primarily due to decreases in foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, in metal products, machinery and equipment, and in textile, cloth and leather production.  Growth in 2014 was driven by domestic absorption, which reached 99.0% of GDP, and private consumption totaled 63.0% of GDP.  The domestic absorption rate in 2014 was primarily supported by the increase in total consumption, which represented 75.8% of GDP.

 

In 2015, GDP grew by 2.3%, primarily as a result of a 2.9% increase in the services sector and a 0.2% increase in the manufacturing sector. Growth in 2015 was mainly driven by domestic absorption, which reached 100.1% of GDP. The domestic absorption rate in 2015 was primarily supported by the increase in total consumption, which totaled 76.8% of GDP.

 

In 2016, GDP grew by 1.6%, primarily as a result of a 2.5% increase in the service sector. Growth in 2016 was mainly driven by domestic absorption, which reached 99.2% of GDP. The domestic absorption rate in 2016 was primarily supported by the increase in total consumption, which totaled 77.6% of GDP.

 

The following tables present the components of Chile’s GDP and their respective growth rates for the periods indicated:

 

Nominal GDP by Sector
(% of GDP, except as indicated)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

PRIMARY SECTOR:

 

15.8

 

14.4

 

14.8

 

12.7

 

12.0

 

Agriculture, livestock and forestry

 

2.9

 

2.9

 

3.0

 

3.3

 

3.2

 

Fishing

 

0.4

 

0.5

 

0.9

 

0.6

 

0.7

 

Mining

 

12.5

 

11.0

 

10.9

 

8.8

 

8.1

 

Copper

 

11.1

 

9.8

 

9.9

 

8.0

 

7.3

 

Other

 

1.4

 

1.2

 

1.0

 

0.8

 

0.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MANUFACTURING SECTOR:

 

10.8

 

11.1

 

11.2

 

11.4

 

11.0

 

Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco

 

4.2

 

4.4

 

4.5

 

4.7

 

4.6

 

Textiles, clothing and leather

 

0.3

 

0.3

 

0.2

 

0.2

 

0.2

 

Wood products and furniture

 

0.5

 

0.6

 

0.7

 

0.7

 

0.7

 

Paper and printing products

 

0.8

 

0.9

 

1.0

 

1.1

 

1.1

 

Chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastic products

 

2.3

 

2.4

 

2.5

 

2.6

 

2.4

 

Non-metallic mineral products and base metal products

 

0.6

 

0.7

 

0.6

 

0.5

 

0.4

 

Metal products, machinery and equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing

 

2.0

 

1.9

 

1.7

 

1.7

 

1.7

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SERVICES SECTOR:

 

64.9

 

66.0

 

65.5

 

67.1

 

68.4

 

Electricity, oil and gas and water

 

2.7

 

2.6

 

2.5

 

2.8

 

3.0

 

Construction

 

6.5

 

6.5

 

6.3

 

6.6

 

6.6

 

Trade and catering

 

10.8

 

10.9

 

11.2

 

10.9

 

11.2

 

Transport

 

4.8

 

4.7

 

4.7

 

5.1

 

5.2

 

Communications

 

3.2

 

3.1

 

3.0

 

3.0

 

2.9

 

Financial services

 

15.3

 

15.7

 

15.1

 

15.3

 

15.2

 

Housing

 

6.8

 

7.1

 

7.2

 

7.5

 

7.7

 

Personal services

 

10.5

 

10.9

 

11.0

 

11.2

 

11.8

 

Public administration

 

4.3

 

4.5

 

4.6

 

4.7

 

4.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Subtotal

 

91.5

 

91.5

 

91.5

 

91.3

 

91.4

 

Net adjustments for payments made by financial institutions, VAT and import tariffs

 

8.5

 

8.5

 

8.5

 

8.7

 

8.6

 

Total GDP

 

100

 

100

 

100

 

100

 

100

 

Nominal GDP (millions of Pesos)

 

Ps.

129,947,342

 

Ps.

137,876,216

 

Ps.

148,855,347

 

Ps.

158,636,806

 

Ps.

167,227,448

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Change in GDP by Sector
(% change from previous year, except as indicated)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

PRIMARY SECTOR:

 

2.0

 

4.4

 

1.8

 

(1.5

)

(1.3

)

Agriculture, livestock and forestry

 

(7.4

)

2.5

 

(3.8

)

9.8

 

4.5

 

Fishing

 

19.3

 

(13.9

)

24.7

 

(8.3

)

(1.1

)

Mining

 

4.1

 

5.9

 

2.3

 

0.0

 

(2.9

)

Copper

 

4.3

 

6.4

 

2.7

 

0.1

 

(2.7

)

Other

 

2.5

 

1.7

 

(1.3

)

(1.8

)

(5.3

)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MANUFACTURING SECTOR:

 

3.5

 

2.0

 

(0.3

)

0.2

 

(0.9

)

Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco

 

5.3

 

(0.1

)

(0.3

)

0.7

 

(1.8

)

Textiles, clothing and leather

 

10.3

 

4.5

 

(8.4

)

7.6

 

3.4

 

Wood products and furniture

 

(2.7

)

4.7

 

3.7

 

1.1

 

1.1

 

Paper and printing products

 

(1.5

)

5.4

 

1.0

 

(2.7

)

(1.5

)

Chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastic products

 

2.3

 

5.6

 

5.6

 

2.3

 

(1.5

)

Non-metallic mineral products and base metal products

 

(1.1

)

6.6

 

(5.3

)

(4.7

)

(0.7

)

Metal products, machinery and equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing

 

5.5

 

(1.3

)

(6.8

)

(2.5

)

1.3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SERVICES SECTOR:

 

6.1

 

4.1

 

2.3

 

2.9

 

2.5

 

Electricity, oil and gas and water

 

8.5

 

6.1

 

3.8

 

3.5

 

1.6

 

Construction

 

7.2

 

5.0

 

(1.9

)

3.9

 

2.5

 

Trade and catering

 

7.4

 

7.7

 

2.8

 

2.4

 

2.8

 

Transport

 

5.6

 

3.0

 

3.0

 

3.7

 

3.3

 

Communications

 

5.3

 

2.1

 

2.5

 

6.1

 

3.1

 

Financial Services

 

6.9

 

3.6

 

1.4

 

2.5

 

(0.1

)

Housing

 

3.1

 

3.7

 

4.2

 

2.2

 

2.7

 

Personal Services

 

6.2

 

1.8

 

3.5

 

1.8

 

5.2

 

Public Administration

 

3.8

 

4.1

 

2.7

 

3.9

 

3.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Subtotal

 

5.1

 

3.9

 

1.9

 

2.3

 

1.5

 

Net adjustments for payments made by financial institutions, VAT and import tariffs

 

7.3

 

4.4

 

1.9

 

1.6

 

1.6

 

Total GDP

 

5.3

 

4.0

 

1.9

 

2.3

 

1.6

 

Real GDP (chained volume at previous year prices)

 

Ps.

132,515,940

 

Ps.

137,876,216

 

Ps.

140,509,229

 

Ps.

143,674,251

 

Ps.

145,957,267

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Primary Sector

 

The Chilean economy’s primary sector is significant due to the size of its direct contribution to GDP (14.4% in 2013, 14.8% in 2014, 12.7% in 2015 and 12.0% in 2016), and its role as a supplier of inputs to the manufacturing sector.

 

Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry

 

Agricultural production consists primarily of fruit, which includes fruit concentrates, table grapes, apples, pears, nectarines, prunes, lemons, avocados, berries, cherries and peaches.

 

The characteristics of Chile’s climate, botany and soil give the country a comparative advantage in the forestry sector. In 2013, the date of Chile’s most recent forestry census, forests covered 17.3 million hectares, making up approximately 22.9% of Chile’s surface area, and forest plantations covered approximately 3 million hectares, or 3.9% of Chile’s surface area.

 

This sector contributed US$5.8 billion in exports during 2016, or 9.5% of exports by value, compared to US$5.1 billion, or 8.2%, during 2015.

 

Fishing

 

Chile ranks among the foremost fishing nations in the world, with an estimated annual catch for 2016 of 2.29 million tons, of which sea-caught products accounted for 62.0%, while aquaculture accounted for 38.0%.  Chile’s main products include anchovies, horse mackerel and sardines.

 

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In less than a decade, Chile has become a leading farmed salmon and trout producer and exporter.  Climatic conditions around the Chiloé and Aysén Regions, including water that is continually replenished from both the Antarctic currents and run-off from the Andes, provide an ideal environment for a year-round fish farming industry.  In 2009, salmon production was adversely affected by the infectious salmon anemia, or ISA, virus, which affected numerous breeds and multiple production sites.  Producers and other affected companies downsized their labor force and, in many cases, had to restructure their debt.  In response, the government launched a support plan for this sector, including improvements in the applicable regulations and access to US$120 million in financial support for producers.  In addition, the National Fishing Authority (Servicio Nacional de Pesca, or SERNAPESCA) formed a committee of virology experts and representatives of the salmon industry to study the causes of the virus and devise a plan to limit its spread.  In 2010, total Atlantic salmon annual production amounted to 123.2 thousand tons, a 39% decrease compared to 2009, which had decreased as a result of the ISA virus and the earthquake and tsunami of 2010.  The Atlantic salmon sector began its recovery during 2011, reaching a total production of 460 thousand tons in 2016, exceeding the pre-crisis production level of 2008.

 

The Fishing Act of 1991 introduced the concept of sustainable use and was amended in April 2010 by Law No. 20,434 in response to environmental concerns over the use of medicines and pesticides on aquafarms and the production of large volumes of waste.  The amended Fishing Act also empowered SERNAPESCA to create a registry of legal entities and individuals authorized to perform environmental and sanitation evaluation services, as well as to issue certificates of compliance with the Fishing Act.

 

On February 9, 2013, Congress enacted Law No. 20,657 amending the Fishing Act to address the issue of long-term sustainability of fishing activities in light of the permanent and growing challenges presented by the overexploitation of fishing resources.  The efficiency and implementation of the conservation measures and fishing management will be assessed every five years based on the following criteria:  ecosystem protection, transparency, the avoidance of heavy exploitation and an audit process, among other factors.

 

Mining

 

Chile has large reserves of metallic and non-metallic mineral resources and is the world’s largest producer of copper.  In 2016, Chile recorded an estimated 210,000 million metric tons of copper reserves, which represented 29.2% of the world’s reserves, and produced 5,500 million metric tons of copper. Large quantities of iodine, coal, gold, silver, nitrate, iron ore and molybdenum are also found in Chile.  As a result, the mining sector is a significant contributor to the export sector and to Chile’s GDP.  Whereas non-manufactured mining exports are recorded under the mining sector, the process of mining production is included in the manufacturing sector.

 

In the 1990s, the mining sector grew fueled by increased investment, including the opening of new large mines.  During 2015 and 2016, this sector represented 8.8% and 8.1%, respectively, of GDP and accounted for approximately 52.2% and 50.9%, respectively, of Chile’s total exports totaling approximately US$32.5 billion and US$30.9 billion per year, respectively.  The decrease in 2016 reflects similar volumes exported at lower prices.  Copper exports during 2016 decreased by US$1.6 billion compared to 2015.

 

Copper is extracted by a mix of state-owned and private companies.  The state-owned copper enterprise, Codelco, is the largest copper producer in the world as well as the largest company in Chile.  Codelco contributed US$1.1 billion to government revenues in 2015, while private mining contributed US$2.0 billion in 2015. Under Chilean law, Codelco’s net earnings are subject to a special 40.0% tax in addition to the corporate income tax generally applicable to domestic companies and paid by its private sector competitors.  In addition, as a wholly state-owned enterprise, Codelco contributes all of its net income to the central government’s budget through profit transfers.  See “Public Sector Finances—Government-owned Enterprises—Codelco.”  In 2012, the copper industry contributed a total of US$8.2 billion in revenues to the government.  In 2013, as a result of decreased copper prices, government revenue from copper, including private mining, decreased to US$5.9 billion. In 2014 and 2015, government revenues from copper represented US$4.2 billion and US$3.0 billion, respectively. Copper exports totaled approximately 92.3%, 92.7% and 91.0% of all Chilean mining exports in 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively.

 

Although the mining sector continues to be the recipient of most of the foreign investment in Chile, a trend toward diversification has made the electricity and services sectors increasingly appealing to foreign investors, while mining investment has decreased in relative terms.  Foreign investment in the mining sector in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 totaled US$14.0 billion, US$4.1 billion, US$4.3 billion and US$10.7 billion, respectively. The decrease in

 

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foreign investment in the mining sector was primarily due to lower capital contributions in the mining sector caused by lower copper prices.

 

In May 2005, a mining tax, known as the mining royalty, was enacted by Congress, which initially stipulated that, in addition to any corporate income tax required to be paid, mining companies producing over 50,000 metric tons of fine copper per year were to be taxed at 5.0% of taxable income (renta imponible), while those producing between 12,000 and 50,000 metric tons were to be taxed on a sliding scale from 0.0% to 4.5%, and those producing less than 12,000 tons were to be excluded from the new tax.  The mining royalty does not infringe on any existing tax agreements between foreign firms and the Chilean government.

 

In October 2010, as part of the government’s plan to finance the reconstruction effort following the February 2010 earthquake and tsunami, Congress raised mining royalties payable to the government pursuant to Law No. 20,469.  This law establishes a new sliding scale tax on mining companies, which varies depending on annual sales of fine copper and, in the case of large companies, operating margin.  Mining operators with annual sales over 50,000 metric tons of fine copper are now subject to a tax ranging from 5.0% to 34.5% of operating margin, instead of the prior 5.0% fixed rate tax on taxable income previously established under Law 20,026 of 2005.  See “Republic of Chile—Earthquakes and Other Natural Disasters.”

 

The government is seeking to develop other mining activities such as the exploration and exploitation of lithium reserves and of gold.  An international bidding process to grant rights to explore and exploit lithium was conducted in 2012, and resulted in an initial award that was challenged by other bidders and left without effect.  No further steps have been taken by the government pending resolution of the dispute.  With respect to gold, Pascua Lama, a cross-border mining project undertaken by Barrick Gold Corp. and involving Argentina, was scheduled to commence production in 2014, but construction was enjoined in 2013 as a result of environmental claims brought by indigenous communities regarding the impact of the project on water supplies.  In May 2014, Barrick Gold Corp. signed a memorandum of understanding with a group of 15 indigenous communities in Chile, marking the first step in the dialogue to restart the Pascua Lama project.  However, the project remains suspended by enforcement procedures brought by the Superintendency of the Environment (Superintendencia del Medio Ambiente, or SMA) after the Supreme Court confirmed the Environmental Court ruling, which had annulled the sanctions imposed by the SMA for non-compliance with its environmental permits.

 

Manufacturing Sector

 

Chile’s manufacturing sector is based primarily on the processing of natural resources.  Between 2012 and 2016, this sector represented 11.1% of GDP.

 

During 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, exports from the manufacturing sector amounted to US$27.4 billion, US$29.1 billion, US$24.5 billion and US$23.8 billion, representing 35.7%, 38.7%, 39.4% and 39.3% of total exports, respectively.

 

The following table sets forth information regarding the output of manufacturing production for the periods indicated:

 

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Output of Manufactured Products
(in billions of pesos and as a percentage of total)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

(Ps.)

 

(%)

 

(Ps.)

 

(%)

 

(Ps.)

 

(%)

 

(Ps.)

 

(%)

 

(Ps.)

 

(%)

 

Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco

 

5,521

 

39.3

 

6,032

 

39.4

 

6,637

 

40.0

 

7,409

 

40.9

 

7,697

 

41.9

 

Textiles, clothing and leather

 

373

 

2.7

 

377

 

2.5

 

362

 

2.2

 

318

 

1.8

 

318

 

1.7

 

Wood products and furniture

 

696

 

5.0

 

792

 

5.2

 

1,041

 

6.3

 

1,156

 

6.4

 

1,089

 

5.9

 

Paper and printing products

 

1,070

 

7.6

 

1,214

 

7.9

 

1,461

 

8.8

 

1,716

 

9.5

 

1,770

 

9.6

 

Chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastic products

 

2,960

 

21.1

 

3,356

 

21.9

 

3,703

 

22.3

 

4,136

 

22.8

 

3,995

 

21.8

 

Non-metallic mineral products and base metal products

 

815

 

5.8

 

897

 

5.9

 

855

 

5.1

 

749

 

4.1

 

727

 

4.0

 

Metal products, machinery and equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing

 

2,607

 

18.6

 

2,658

 

17.3

 

2,552

 

15.4

 

2,619

 

14.5

 

2,762

 

15.0

 

Total

 

14,041

 

100.0

 

15,326

 

100.0

 

16,611

 

100.0

 

18,103

 

100.0

 

18,358

 

100.0

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

In 2012, the manufacturing sector grew by 3.5%, as compared to 2011 (measured using chained volumes at previous year prices), mainly as a result of an increase in exports of foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, and to a lesser extent the increase in exports of paper and printing products, non-metallic mineral products and chemicals.

 

In 2013, the manufacturing sector increased 2.0%, as compared to 2012 (measured using chained volumes at previous year prices), influenced by decreased production in non-metallic products and base metal products, which was partially offset by an increase in wood and furniture production.

 

In 2014, the manufacturing sector decreased 0.3%, as compared to 2013 (measured using chained volumes at previous year prices), mainly as a result of decreases in foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, textiles, clothing and leather, in metal products, machinery, equipment and miscellaneous manufacturing and in non-metallic mineral products and base metal products.

 

In 2015, the manufacturing sector grew by 0.2%, as compared to 2014 (measured using chained volumes at previous year prices), which was mainly as a result of  growth in chemical, petroleum, rubber and plastic products  sectors and in foodstuffs. beverages and tobacco, while the textiles, clothing and leather sectors contracted.

 

In 2016, the manufacturing sector decreased by 0.9%, as compared to 2015 (measured using chained volumes at previous year prices), which was mainly as a result of decreases in foodstuff, beverages and tobacco, paper and printing products and chemicals, petroleum, rubber and plastic products.

 

The manufacturing sector contributes to Chile’s exports of products such as fishmeal, wine, frozen fish (including processed salmon), juice and canned foods.  In 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 exports of manufactured foodstuff products totaled US$7.5 billion, US$8.2 billion, US$9.3 billion, US$8.0 billion and US$8.2 billion, respectively.

 

The chemicals, petroleum products, rubber and plastics industries had exports of approximately US$5.5 billion in 2014, US$ 4.4 billion in 2015 and US$4.1 billion in 2016, which represented 18.8%, 17.8% and 17.0% of all manufactured product exports in those years.

 

Chile has become a significant wine exporter globally. Wine exports totaled US$1.9 billion, US$1.8 billion and US$1.9 billion, in each of 2014, 2015 and 2016.

 

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Services Sector

 

Construction

 

The construction sector is composed of an infrastructure and a non-infrastructure sub-sector.  The infrastructure sub-sector includes projects such as the construction of large-scale mining facilities, energy and/or water plant projects.  Growth in the infrastructure sector until 2009 was fueled by a public works concession program implemented by the Ministry of Public Works.  See “—Privatization and Infrastructure—Public Works—Infrastructure Concessions.”  The non-infrastructure sub-sector is comprised of private sector construction projects, such as hotels, apartments and office buildings, mall centers, commercial outlets, cinemas and single-family homes.  The construction sector grew by 1.8% in 2010 as a result of Chilean reconstruction efforts after the 2010 earthquake and tsunami.  This upward trend continued during 2011 and 2012, during which the construction sector grew by 6.8% and 7.2%, respectively, mainly as a result of continued reconstruction efforts.  In 2013 the construction sector continued to grow by 5.0%, while in 2014 it decreased by 1.9% due to lower demand caused by more restrictive conditions imposed by lenders on mortgage applicants. In 2015 and 2016, the construction sector grew by 3.9% and 2.5%, respectively, fueled by a VAT exemption that was extended to construction related activities. The exemption lapsed in 2017.

 

Energy

 

General.  Energy consumption in Chile consists mainly of oil, natural gas, wood and electricity.  In 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, energy consumption represented 2.6%, 2.5%, 2.8% and 3.0% of GDP, respectively.

 

Since 2012, the government’s energy policy and initiatives have been undertaken and coordinated by the Ministry of Energy (Ministerio de Energía), which is responsible for policy, laws and regulations, plans and programs and generally the stewardship of the energy sector in the country.  The National Commission on Energy (Comisión Nacional de Energía, or CNE) is responsible for regulating the energy sector, including conducting tariff analysis, identifying technical and quality standards and carrying out competitive tender processes to supply energy to power distribution companies subject to regulated prices. And the Superintendency of Electricity and Fuels (Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles) is responsible for the supervision and enforcement of applicable regulation and technical standards.

 

Chile imports in excess of 60% of its primary energy and is exposed to international price volatility, as well as supply restrictions attributable to third-party measures that it cannot control.  Continued economic growth and the increasing demand for energy have resulted in significant increases in domestic energy prices affecting the population generally as well as industrial activities.  The government’s current energy program has short-, medium- and long-term components that focus on demand as well as supply of energy.  In the short-term, the government seeks to encourage more efficient energy use, increase energy savings and promote the use of non-conventional renewable energy, or NCRE (that is, the energy produced by geothermal, wind, solar, tidal, biomass and small hydroelectric power plants).  In the medium- and long-term, the government’s goals include (i) involving stakeholders in energy planning, (ii) improving energy transmission, (iii) continuing to promote the use of NCRE, (iv) strengthening ENAP, and (v) increasing competition within the energy sector.

 

In May 2014, the government announced its Energy Agenda (Agenda de Energía) establishing the energy policy goals for the next decade.  The main aspects of the Energy Agenda are:  (i) reducing by 30.0% the marginal costs of electricity; (ii) reducing by 25.0% the price of energy sold to distribution companies; (iii) increasing the presence of NCRE sources to 20.0% of the Chilean matrix by 2025; (iv) promoting the efficient use of energy and achieving a 20.0% savings goal; (v) designing a fossil fuels price stabilization system; (vi) strengthening the role of ENAP — a state-owned company focused on the hydrocarbon market — in the energy market; and (vii) developing a long-term energy policy by 2015. In September 2015, the government announced the 2050 Energy Pipeline (Hoja de Ruta 2050), and deployed its long-term energy strategy. For the period from 2016 to 2025 the 2050 Energy Pipeline is expected to focus on removing barriers to competition in the field of energy generation. The implementation of certain aspects of the Energy Agenda will require legislative action based on bills to be submitted by the Ministry of Energy, including among other initiatives, the interconnection of the two main electric networks:  SIC (Sistema Interconectado Central) and SING (Sistema Interconectado del Norte Grande), which together make up for over 99.2% of the total electricity generation in Chile.  The Ministry of Energy has begun implementing aspects of the Energy Agenda that do not require legislative action.

 

The government has supported the development of NCRE sources particularly through an improvement in the electricity market’s regulatory framework and the implementation of direct support mechanisms for investment initiatives in NCRE.  There has been an increasing interest by both local and international investors in the

 

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development of these projects.  On April 1, 2008, Congress enacted Law No. 20,257 aimed at fostering the development and use of NCRE.  Energy generation companies with a capacity of 200 MW or more became required to produce a certain percentage of their energy output from NCRE sources.  This obligation was initially 5.0% of the total energy output and it was stipulated that starting in 2015, the portion of NCRE-sources related generation would increase 0.5% annually up to 10.0% in 2024.  On October 22, 2013, however, Congress enacted Law No. 20,698, which increased the required percentages of NCRE-sourced energy.  Under the 2013 legislation, the 5.0% quota will reach 20.0% in 2025 through progressive increases which started in 2015. Additionally, Law No. 20,698 set forth the obligation of the Ministry of Energy to call for bids to fulfill the corresponding NCRE quota to award contracts with price stabilization mechanisms.

 

Oil and Gas.  Substantially all of Chile’s crude oil and natural gas consumption is imported.  During 2015, the latest available data, 9.8 million cubic meters of crude oil were refined in Chile, 3.8% of which was from reserves from domestic production and 96.2% of which was imported.  In 2015, the latest available data, domestic crude oil production totaled 167,391 cubic meters and crude oil imports amounted to 9.7 million cubic meters.  In addition, 902.8 million cubic meters of natural gas was processed in the same period and domestic production totaled 823.5 million cubic meters.  Although there are no legal restrictions in Chile on the refining of crude oil by private sector companies, the only refiner in Chile is ENAP.  National and international refiners sell their refined products in an open and competitive market to private distributors.

 

To overcome gas supply shortages from Argentina, ENAP, in association with private companies (Endesa, Metrogas and BG Group), developed and implemented the Quintero LNG Project, the first liquefied natural gas (LNG) import terminal in South America.  The Quintero LNG terminal has been fully operational since 2010 and has an installed capacity of 15 million cubic meters per day. During 2015 and 2016, the Quintero LNG terminal supplied 2,978 and 3,599 million cubic meters of gas, respectively. In addition, in February 2010, Codelco and Suez began operating the Mejillones LNG terminal, with an operating capacity of 5.5 million cubic meters per day, and intended to increase its operating capacity to 8.25 million cubic meters per day within two years after the expansion project begins.

 

To promote hydrocarbon exploration, the Ministry of Mining invited local and international companies to participate in a tender for exploration and production blocks located at the Magallanes Basin (south of Chile).  On November 15, 2007, the Ministry of Mining awarded nine exploration blocks to several private companies and/or consortia.  In 2009, the Ministry awarded a new exploration block to a consortium formed by ENAP and Methanex.  Since 2010, the agreements governing these exploration activities have been under the supervision of the Ministry of Energy.

 

On October 23, 2014, a consortium formed by EDF, Cheniere and local developers submitted a project for the construction of a third liquefied natural gas (LNG) port terminal in Chile to the Environmental Commission of the Bío Bío Region, for assessment of its environmental impact.  The terminal has planned capacity to host a supplying ship and a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) (i.e. a ship where gas is processed), and is be located in the borough (comuna) of Penco, in the Bío Region.

 

Electricity.  Since December 2008, 100.0% of the equity interests in the distribution and generation companies in Chile have been controlled by the private sector.  The electricity industry in Chile is divided into three sub-sectors:  generation, transmission and distribution.

 

The generation sub-sector consists of companies that generate electricity from hydroelectric, gas-fired and thermal sources.  During 2016, 73,877 GWh (gigawatt-hours) were produced in Chile by its electric networks. Chile derives 44% of its total power from coal, 26% from hydraulic generation, 17% from natural gas, 4% from biomass, 3% from petroleum, 3% from solar energy and 2% from wind energy.

 

The transmission sub-sector features companies that transmit the electricity produced by generation companies at high voltage via high-tension power lines over long distances.

 

The distribution sub-sector consists of companies that purchase electricity from generation companies to sell to regulated and unregulated customers.

 

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As of March 2017, the installed capacity comprised 29.03% hydraulic energy, 21.88% natural gas, 20.96% coal, 13.58% petroleum, 6.67% solar, 5.88% wind and 2.01% biomass sources. By 2025, NCRE sources are expected to account for approximately 20.0% of the total energy output.

 

In 2004 and 2005, the government passed two laws, the so called “Short Law I” of 2004 and “Short Law II” of 2005, intended to provide incentives for private investment in the electricity sector.  Short Law I created incentives for investments in transmission, while “Short Law II” created incentives for investments in power generation, including both conventional projects and alternative renewable energy sources by allowing distribution companies to award long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) to generators at prices determined in open bids instead of using regulated prices.  Generators compete on prices to sell energy to distributors and the price of the resulting PPA is typically indexed to each bidder’s input costs.  According to information released by the National Energy Commission, in 2006, electricity supply projects increased by 30.0% after the enactment of Short Law II.

 

On January 29, 2015, Law No. 20,805 entered into force, which is intended to improve the competitive bidding process carried out to supply energy to regulated clients and ensure electricity supply under resulting contracts.  Additional goals of this law include obtaining competitive prices and ensuring compliance with economic efficiency, competition, security and diversification objectives.  Law No.  20,805 also grants more authority to the CNE in connection with the competitive bidding process. In this regard, the CNE conducted tender processes in September 2015 and August 2016, for the supply of energy to regulated clients, resulting in the expansion of the energy offered.

 

In August 2015, the government introduced a bill to Congress, which included among its main objectives:

 

·                                          the creation of a national independent system operator;

 

·                                          increased involvement by the government in strategic planning with the aim of developing all transmission facilities (currently, the government’s strategic planning only covers trunk transmission facilities);

 

·                                          the reclassification of transmission facilities into new categories: (i) national transmission, (ii) regional transmission, (iii) dedicated transmission, (iv) development poles and (v) international transmission facilities;

 

·                                          extending the open access principle to all transmission facilities;

 

·                                          extending the return on investment guarantee (20 year period) from trunk transmission to all transmission facilities; and

 

·                                          amending the allocation of payment of transmission tolls, to ensure that all tolling fees are paid by customers to the holders of the transmission systems (currently trunk transmission fees are invoiced mostly to generators, which pass through that cost to their customers).

 

This bill was approved by the Congress on July 7, 2016 as law No.20,936.

 

Initiatives to increase power generation have encountered important hurdles primarily related to environmental concerns.

 

The HydroAysén Project to be developed in the Aysén Region, contemplates the construction of five hydroelectric power plants, two on the Baker River and three on the Pascua River.  The dams would generate a total of 2,750 megawatts (3,690,000 horsepower) with further capacity for 18,430 gigawatt-hours (66,300 terajoules) on average annually.  The HydroAysén Project encountered objections raised by certain environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and activists.  Construction was initially enjoined by the Court of Appeals of Puerto Montt, and afterwards by the Supreme Court of Chile.  In 2012, the injunctions were lifted.  However, in June 2014, the council of ministers of the government of Chile declined to approve the HydroAysén Project due to its perceived adverse environmental impact.  This decision of the council of ministers has been appealed before the environmental courts, and as of the date of this report, a decision on the appeal is pending. Additionally, in January 2015, the General Water Bureau (Dirección General de Aguas) rejected the water rights application filed for the HydroAysén Project and on May 2017, the Santiago Court of Appeals confirmed such rejection.

 

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The Alto Maipo Hydroelectric Project developed in Cajón del Maipo, 50 kilometers from Santiago, contemplates the construction of two run-of-the-river plants.  The two plants, Alfalfal II and Las Lajas, are expected to utilize water from the Volcán, Yeso and Colorado rivers and will have an installed capacity of 531 megawatts.  The Alto Maipo project also encountered objections raised by certain NGOs and activists.  The sponsors of the project obtained all necessary environmental approvals to begin construction, which began in the second half of 2014.

 

On August 28, 2012, the Supreme Court revoked certain environmental approvals granted to the Castilla project, a 2,100 MW coal and fuel-oil based power plant in the Atacama Region, near the city of Copiapó, and a related port facility.  The court sided with the plaintiffs’ arguments that the plant and port should be considered as a single project for environmental approvals, and that the contamination levels of the project considered as a whole were impermissibly high.  As a result, development efforts relating to the Castilla project were suspended and later terminated because the project developer was declared bankrupt in its home country.  The Castilla project represented a substantial portion of the expected generation projects and with its abandonment, upward pressure on the price of electricity may persist.

 

In January 2014, the Supreme Court approved the environmental permit granted for the Punta Alcalde project, a 740-MW coal-fired power plant, to be located 32 kilometers south of Huasco in the Atacama Region.  The Supreme Court’s approval requires the project developers to adopt additional air mitigation and control measures.  According to publicly available information as of the date of this report, the project has been suspended.

 

In November 2016, the Third Environmental Court of Valdivia, revoked the environmental permit granted to the Mediterraneo 210 MW run-of-the-river project to be developed in Cochamó, Los Lagos Region. The Court ruled that the environmental impact study contained methodological failures.

 

In January 2017, the Supreme Court revoked the environmental permit granted to the Penco Lirquen LNG Terminal, which was developed in conjunction with the El Campesino 640 MW natural gas power plant. The Supreme Court required a new indigenous consultation process.

 

Water

 

Private companies provide water and wastewater services in Chile since the privatization of the last three state-owned companies in June 2004.  On June 15, 2011 and May 4, 2012, the government, through CORFO, sold a portion of its ownership interest in the Aguas Andinas, ESVAL/ESSBIO and ESSAL water companies, while maintaining veto rights over decisions that affect the water rights of these companies.  See “Privatization and Infrastructure.” As of 2013, approximately 99.9% of the Chilean population living in urban areas had access to drinkable water.

 

Trade and Catering

 

The trade and catering sector is primarily composed of retail and wholesale local commerce.  Additionally, it encompasses a portion of Chile’s gross tourism income and other related services such as restaurant dining, lodging and catering.

 

The growth and liberalization of Chile’s economy during the 1990s led to the rapid expansion of this sector.  The commerce sub-sector has received significant investments in recent years, directed to a large extent at the construction and improvement of shopping malls.  As of March 31, 2017, Chile had approximately 93 shopping malls.  The supermarket industry has also experienced rapid expansion, as well as consolidation in recent years.

 

The travel and leisure industry, particularly tourism, is one of the most important contributors to the services sector.  From 2012 to 2015, the average annual number of tourists visiting Chile totaled 3.8 million. In the eight month period ended August 2016, Chile received approximately 3.6 million tourists, primarily from Argentina (51.8%), Brazil (8.0%), Peru (7.8%), Bolivia (7.8%), the United States (3.6%), Colombia (2.0%), France (1.3%), Spain (1.3%) and Germany (1.2%).  In 2011 and 2012, the latest data available, the tourism industry recorded revenues of US$7.9 billion and US$9.2 billion, respectively.

 

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Personal Services

 

Chile’s personal services sector is composed of public and private education and health services and other services (including media and other services that are not rendered by the government or any other public entity).  The personal services sector accounted for 10.5% of GDP in 2012, 10.9% in 2013, 11.0% in 2014, 11.2% in 2015 and 11.8% in 2016.

 

In Chile, parents can choose between public and private schools for their children.  All schools, however, must comply with certain educational and academic program standards and require governmental authorization.  Public schools receive monthly fund transfers from the central government based on the number of students attending, and many privately managed schools also receive government funding on the same basis.  In 2011, Congress approved the General Education Law (Ley General de Educación, or LGE), which, among other things, created the Education Quality Agency (Agencia de Calidad de la Educación), responsible for assessing schools’ performance, and the Superintendency of Education (Superintendencia de Educación), which is responsible for school inspections.  The LGE also strengthens the role of the National Council of Education (Consejo Nacional de Educación) in approving the national standards and curriculum for preschool, primary and secondary education.  See “—Poverty, Income Distribution and Social Reforms—Educational Reforms.”  Chile began implementing a new education reform in 2014, which, among other things, aims to increase all students’ access to school.  See “—Poverty, Income Distribution and Social Reforms—Educational Reforms.”

 

Chile has a dual health insurance system comprising the public National Health Fund (Fondo Nacional de Salud, or Fonasa) and licensed private insurers (Instituciones de Salud Previsional, or Isapres), which provide health insurance plans.  Since August 2011, all workers must set aside at least 7.0% of their monthly salary for the financing of a health insurance plan, up to a limit of the equivalent of UF4.62 (approximately US$182 as of December 31, 2016).  However, on August 31, 2011, Congress enacted Law No. 20,667 that (i) exempted lower-income retired workers (jubilados) from this contribution requirement and (ii) reduced the contribution obligations of middle-income retired workers as defined by Social Protection Data (Ficha de Protección Social).

 

Workers may opt between joining the Fonasa health service network (by contributing 7.0% of their salary, up to the abovementioned limit) or purchasing a health insurance policy offered by any Isapre (by paying 7.0% or more of their salary).  As of December 31, 2014, approximately 3.3 million people were covered by private health insurance policies contracted with Isapres and over 13.5 million people were covered by Fonasa.  A portion of the remaining population (approximately 1.1 million) receives health care from the armed forces and police health care systems, while the rest are uninsured.

 

Fonasa is a universal healthcare system that provides medical and health care, surgical services, and public disease prevention programs through a regionally managed health service network.  The Ministry of Health, through Fonasa, collects and distributes state and private funds for health services provided primarily in facilities managed by the state.  The government also provides health care coverage for the uninsured and the indigent.

 

Within the Fonasa system, beneficiaries can choose to pay a modest co-payment and obtain care from any provider on a pre-approved list (Modalidad de Libre Elección, or MLE), or they may choose to obtain care at public facilities at almost no cost (Modalidad de Atención Institucional, or MAI).  Within the private healthcare system, Isapres offer myriad and widely varying combinations of benefits, premiums and co-payments.  While the law allows Isapres to offer different plans according to the age and sex of individuals, no further risk segmentation is permitted.  A network of private health providers supplies most medical care under the Isapre system.

 

Plan AUGE (Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas), a public health system reform, was put into place in 2005.  This plan aims to provide full coverage over time at low or zero co-payments for a list of priority ailments.  The program has continued to expand since 2005 to include different ailments.  See “—Poverty, Income Distribution and Social Reforms—Health System Reform.”

 

Financial Services

 

Banks, pension funds, life and general insurance companies, and other institutional investors comprise Chile’s financial services sector.  The financial services sector contributed 15.3%, 15.7%, 15.1%, 15.3% and 15.2% of total GDP in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively.

 

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In September 2009, the stock exchanges of Lima (Peru), Colombia (operating in Bogota, Medellin and Cali) and Santiago (Chile) entered into a memorandum of understanding in order to create an integrated model for the market of variable rate instruments, to be managed by each participant, and compensated and liquidated by the participating entities.  In November 2010, the stock exchanges entered into an agreement to implement the first phase of the stock integration, creating the so-called Latin American Integrated Market (Mercado Integrado Latinoamericana, or MILA).  The MILA was approved by the SVS and became operative in Chile in June 2011.

 

Mexico became a member of MILA in December 2014.  As of December 31, 2016, the consolidated market capitalization of the MILA amounted to US$744 billion, according to the Iberoamerican Federation of Stock Exchange (Federación Iberoamericana de Bolsas, or FIAB).

 

As of December 31, 2016, Chile’s banking sector comprised 25 privately owned banks and one state-owned bank (Banco Estado), and total banking system assets, deposits and loans totaled US$313 billion, US$182 billion and US$221 billion, respectively.

 

Chile’s securities market is composed of three stock exchanges:  the Santiago Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago), on average accounting for 93.5% of equity trading during 2016, and the Chilean Electronic Exchange (Bolsa Electrónica de Chile) and the Valparaíso Brokers Exchange (Bolsa de Corredores de Valparaíso), which together accounted for 6.5% of equity trading during the same period.  As of December 31, 2016, the Santiago Stock Exchange had 214 companies listed and a total market capitalization of US$209.9 billion.

 

The market is regulated and supervised by the SVS, the SBIF and the Superintendency of AFP.  Regulators are entitled to impose sanctions (including suspension of licenses and fines).

 

Transport and Communications

 

Transport. Chile’s transport sector represented 4.8% of GDP in 2012, 4.7% in each of 2013 and 2014, 5.1% in 2015 and 5.2% in 2016.  Chile’s communications sector represented 3.2% of GDP in 2012, 3.1% in 2013, 3.0% in each of 2014 and 2015 and 2.9% in 2016.

 

From 2012 to 2014, the latest available data, the total amount of maritime cargo transported decreased on average by 3.3% per year, averaging approximately 134 metric tons per year.  From 2012 to 2016, the total amount of air cargo transported increased on average by 4.2% per year, averaging approximately 278 tons per year.  From 2012 to 2016, railroad freight transport decreased by 0.2%, averaging approximately 27.1 million tons per year.

 

In an effort to increase private sector participation in the transport sector, between 2010 and 2012, portions of the San Antonio, Talcahuano, Coquimbo and Valparaíso ports were opened to public bidding processes.  As a result, port concessions relating to the San Antonio port were awarded for a twenty-year period as well as for the Talcahuano and Coquimbo ports, for thirty years and twenty years, respectively.  In 2013, the bidding was completed for Terminal 2 in the Valparaíso Port, and concessions were awarded for a thirty year period.

 

In February 2007, the Ministries of Transportation and Public Works implemented a new public transport system for Santiago, known as the “Transantiago” system, by granting concessions to private bus operators.  This system was designed to be funded by a combination of the resulting bus and subway tolls and public subsidies.  The primary objectives of the Transantiago system were to improve the quality of public transportation and reduce Santiago’s high levels of atmospheric pollution and traffic congestion.

 

The Transantiago system has experienced various challenges, mainly due to design problems, which, combined with lower than projected demand and difficulties in fee collection, resulted in operational deficits of approximately US$714 million in 2012, US$718 million in 2013, US$702 million in 2014, US$654 million in 2015 and US$657 million in 2016.  In order to meet the Transantiago system’s resulting funding shortfall, the government exercised its extraordinary power under Article 32 of the Constitution, which allows it to appropriate up to 2.0% of the annual budget to fund the Transantiago system.  In August 2009, Congress approved a US$1.0 billion subsidy for the Transantiago system to be used to cover the system’s deficit until 2014, to finance tariff reductions for students, to increase capacity, to decrease users’ average waiting time and to make the system the preferred method of transportation in Santiago.  Although the subsidy was designed to permit the Transantiago system to finance its own operations, the government has been forced to increase fares several times since June 2010.

 

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Subsidies provided to the Transantiago bus operators are specified by law and any adjustment must be approved by Congress in the annual budget law.  Therefore, unless the law implementing the Transantiago system is amended by Congress, any shortfall between the subsidies and the total cost of the system to the bus operators may only be covered by fares.  In May 2012, the government submitted a bill to Congress to increase the amount of subsidies allocated to the Transantiago system in order to maintain the financial stability of the system and prevent a significant increase in tariffs.  In September 2013, Congress passed the bill and thus increased the amount of subsidies and created the Regional Development Fund to oversee the management of these subsidies by regional governments by assuring that funds designated to certain regions are invested as intended and improving information sharing between regions and the central government.

 

Since the establishment of the Transantiago system, a number of private transport companies (including most recently Inversiones Alsacia S.A. and Express de Santiago Uno S.A.) have been subject to insolvency proceedings.  Due to such problems, during the second half of 2011, the Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications renegotiated the terms of the public transportation contracts in order to improve the transportation system’s efficiency.  The new contracts became effective on June 2012 and include incorporating gradually new requirements for operation and the strengthening of oversight in order to reduce the amount of tariff evasion, one of the system’s main problems.

 

Communications.  The government has recognized the importance of information and communication technologies for Chile’s development and has consequently implemented a number of policies in various areas and formed the Committee of Ministers for Digital Development in 2007.  This committee is responsible for the design and implementation of public policies to promote a deeper and more intensive use of information and communication technologies for citizens, businesses and the state.

 

The information and communications sector represented 3.2% of GDP in 2012, 3.1% in 2013, 3.0% in each of 2014 and 2015, and 2.9% in 2016.  Annual net foreign investment in the telecommunications sector was approximately US$1,820 million in 2012, US$290 million in 2013, US$1,780 million in 2014 and US$(275) million in 2015.  This level of foreign investment is mainly due to growing domestic demand for telecommunication services flowing from the introduction of wireless broadband access technologies.

 

In line with the global trend, the number of mobile subscribers is currently approximately seven times the number of installed fixed lines.  As of December 31, 2016, the country had 23.3 million mobile subscribers and 3.4 million fixed telephone lines, representing a penetration rate of 127.5% for mobile telephone services and 18.5% for fixed-line services (including pay phones).  Since January 2012, mobile phone users are entitled by law to retain their phone numbers in the event that they change mobile service providers.

 

In June 2012, Congress passed legislation to increase regulatory oversight of the design and installation of towers and antennas used for mobile services, to improve health standards and reconcile environmental concerns with the requirements of the growing mobile services market.  The legislation makes service providers directly accountable to the communities affected by such infrastructure by allowing such communities to participate in the design and installation process.

 

In 2013, the government announced guidelines to encourage the digital and technological development in Chile through 2020, or the Digital Agenda.  The Digital Agenda turns on five strategic pillars of activity:  digital connectivity and inclusion; innovation and entrepreneurship; education and training; services; and environment for digital development.  Throughout implementation, the Digital Agenda has expanded the coverage of networks and access to digital services, supported the development of a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation, made access to new media part of the educational agenda, facilitated payment systems throughout the country and placed the issues relating to freedom of access to content and applications without arbitrary discrimination and the principle of transparency in technical information on the Congressional agenda.

 

On September 14, 2009, Chile announced that it was adopting the ISDB-T International television broadcasting standard.  On May 29, 2014, Law No. 20,750 regarding digital television was enacted.  The law seeks to create an adequate framework for the proper functioning of the television industry, introduces the ideal of pluralism and modifies the functions of the National Commission of Television (Consejo Nacional de Televisión).  Law No. 20,750 regulates the granting of concessions and limits to one the number of concessions for broadcast TV available to a single economic group within a location.  Also, the regulation seeks to promote, finance and grant

 

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subsidies to the production costs of transmission and broadcasting of high cultural level contents, as well as national, regional or local interest content with educational information or through which the civil and democratic values are encouraged.

 

On August 9, 2014, the government implemented flat rates for local and national long distance calls.

 

The following table provides a summary of certain information relating to the telecommunications sector in Chile:

 

Summary Telecommunications Sector Information

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Lines per 100 inhabitants

 

18.8

 

19.0

 

19.1

 

19.0

 

18.5

 

Cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants

 

137.0

 

134.2

 

132.2

 

128.2

 

127.5

 

Domestic long distance minutes (million)(1)

 

749.4

 

588.1

 

285.2

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

International long distance minutes (only outgoing, million)

 

122.0

 

114.0

 

106.7

 

89.1

 

65.9

 

Internet per 100 inhabitants(2) 

 

12.5

 

13.1

 

14.0

 

15.1

 

15.9

 

 


(1)         Domestic long distance data is available as of September 2014, after which the government implemented flat rates for local and national long distance calls.

(2)         Refers to the number of fixed lines in service per Chilean resident, based on annual population estimates by the INE, multiplied by a factor of 100.

Source:  Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, or SUBTEL.

 

Housing

 

The housing sector includes sales and rentals of houses and related services provided by realtors and residential real estate developers.  The sector’s contribution to GDP has remained relatively stable in recent years, representing 6.8% in 2012, 7.1% in 2013, 7.2% in 2014, 7.5% in 2015 and 7.7% in 2016.

 

Public Administration

 

The public administration sector consists of central government expenditure on public administrative services, principally personnel.  This sector’s contribution to GDP was 4.3% in 2012, 4.5% in 2013, 4.6% in 2014, 4.7% in 2015 and 4.8% in 2016.

 

Employment and Labor

 

Employment

 

In 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, the unemployment rate stood at 6.4%, 5.9%, 6.2%, 5.8% and 6.2%, respectively.  The following table sets forth information on employment and the labor force in Chile:

 

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Employment and Labor(1)
(in thousands of persons or percentages)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Nationwide:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Labor force

 

8,234

 

8,431

 

8,527

 

8,671

 

8,776

 

Employment

 

7,742

 

7,915

 

8,003

 

8,165

 

8,230

 

Participation rate (%)

 

59.7

 

60.2

 

60.0

 

60

 

59.7

 

Unemployment rate (%)

 

6.4

 

5.9

 

6.2

 

5.8

 

6.2

 

Santiago:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Labor force

 

3,019

 

3,077

 

3,161

 

3,128

 

3,216

 

Employment

 

2,863

 

2,885

 

2,954

 

2,914

 

3,007

 

Participation rate (%)

 

60.7

 

61.2

 

62.3

 

61.1

 

62.3

 

Unemployment rate (%)

 

5.2

 

6.2

 

6.5

 

6.8

 

6.5

 

 


(1)         Constitutes an average across each period indicated.

Source:  National Statistics Institute and University of Chile surveys.  Since March 2010, the National Statistics Institute survey is based on new criteria for the collection of employment data, as discussed above.

 

The unemployment rate is subject to strong seasonal fluctuations, especially in the agricultural and commerce sectors, where the labor force increases during most of the spring and summer months.

 

The manufacturing sector employed 10.8% and 10.6% of Chile’s labor force in 2015 and 2016, respectively, and contributed 11.4% and 11.0% of GDP, respectively; the agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing sectors contributed 3.3% and 3.2% of GDP in 2015 and 2016, respectively, but accounted for 10.0% and 9.9% of Chile’s labor force in 2015 and 2016, respectively, as a result of the labor-intensive nature of these sectors.  The mining sector, which in 2015 and 2016 accounted for 8.8% and 8.1% of GDP, in each of those years, employed only about 2.5% and 2.4% of Chile’s labor force, respectively.

 

The following table presents information regarding the average percentage of the labor force working in each sector of the economy for the periods indicated:

 

Employment(1)
(% by sector employed)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

PRIMARY SECTOR

 

14.2

%

12.8

%

13.1

%

12.5

%

12.3

%

Agriculture, livestock and forestry and fishing

 

10.8

 

9.7

 

10.1

 

10.0

 

9.9

 

Mining

 

3.3

 

3.1

 

3.0

 

2.5

 

2.4

 

MANUFACTURING SECTOR

 

11.2

 

11.5

 

11.1

 

10.8

 

10.6

 

SERVICES SECTOR

 

74.6

 

75.7

 

75.8

 

76.6

 

77.1

 

Electricity, gas and water

 

0.7

 

0.6

 

0.8

 

0.7

 

1.1

 

Construction

 

8.4

 

8.6

 

8.1

 

8.7

 

8.6

 

Trade and catering

 

23.6

 

23.9

 

23.7

 

24.2

 

19.7

 

Transport and communications

 

7.1

 

7.2

 

7.4

 

7.3

 

12.7

 

Financial services

 

2.0

 

2.1

 

2.2

 

2.1

 

1.9

 

Community and social services

 

32.9

 

33.3

 

33.6

 

33.6

 

33.1

 

TOTAL

 

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

 


(1)         Constitutes an average across each period indicated.

Source:  National Statistics Institute.  Since March 2010, the National Statistics Institute survey is based on new criteria for the collection of employment data, as discussed above.

 

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Women accounted for 41.0% of the labor force on average in 2016, compared to 36.0% in 2005.  By the end of 2013, approximately 11.9% of the total labor force in Chile was unionized compared to 11.1% in 2000.  Collective bargaining agreements are negotiated directly between each union and individual employers rather than on an industry-wide basis.  In accordance with labor laws, unions may go on strike during the collective bargaining negotiations.

 

Following the International Labor Organization guidelines, in 2001 an amendment to the Labor Code became effective which allows a company to engage in collective bargaining with different unions at the same time.  The collective bargaining negotiations may be extended to a group of companies upon the express consent of participating employers and unions.  The amendment fosters competition during stoppages and allows the labor market to operate more efficiently while reducing the long-term unemployment rate by introducing part-time, flexible, work-at-home, temporary, and special training contracts.

 

In 2002, Chile implemented a new unemployment insurance system based on individual accounts managed by a private fund manager, plus a state-financed solidarity fund.  The system is essentially a mandatory saving scheme financed by a combination of contributions from workers (0.6% of total wages), employers (2.4% of total wages, 1.6% to each worker’s individual account and 0.8% to the solidarity fund) and the state (approximately US$15 million per year contributed to the solidarity fund).  The unemployment insurance system seeks to guarantee the availability of emergency income for unemployed workers in search of new employment and thus reduces consumption volatility and improves labor market stability.  The system is designed to incentivize recipients to seek new employment, by setting a maximum of 5 monthly withdrawals, which become progressively smaller. As of December 31, 2016, 9.0 million workers were enrolled in the unemployment insurance system, which manages total assets valued at US$6.4 billion.

 

During 2011 and 2012, several bills concerning social welfare and wages were proposed and approved by Congress.  The main initiatives proposed by these bills included a more generous maternity coverage granted by the government to families living below the poverty line and the creation of a Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social), which replaced the Ministry of Development and Social Planning (Mideplan).  The Ministry of Social Development is empowered to design and implement public policies that reduce poverty in Chile and serves as coordinator for the social policies of all Chilean administrative entities.  The Ministry of Social Development is also tasked with fostering social integration and granting protection to vulnerable communities.

 

On August 29, 2016 Chilean Law No. 20,940 was enacted, to bring Chile’s labor regulations into compliance with international standards.  Among other changes, this law provides that:

 

·                  trainee and temporary workers may participate in collective bargaining negotiations;

 

·                  distribution of the workload schedules or employee training programs, may be collectively negotiated;

 

·                  companies cannot replace employees during a strike, while unions must provide the necessary personnel to provide basic company services (“servicios mínimos”);

 

·                  the company must report more complete information, such as financial statements, non-confidential investment policies and anonymous salaries for certain position;

 

·                  collective bargaining agreements are only available to members of the labor union, and employers are not permitted to extend the same benefits to non-unionized workers without prior approval by the applicable union; and

 

·                  unions must submit their collective bargaining agreement 45 days before its expiration, and the employer has 10 days to respond.

 

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Wages

 

Real wages grew at an average rate of 2.5% between 2012 and 2016.  The average rate of real wages increased by 4.7% in 2012, 2.4% in 2013, 2.4 in 2014, 0.8% in 2015 and 2.0% in 2016.  Labor productivity, as derived from real GDP, grew at an average annual rate of 1.4% between 2012 and 2016.

 

Real Wages
(% change on previous year)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Average real wages

 

4.7

 

2.4

 

2.4

 

0.8

 

2.0

 

Average change in productivity

 

3.4

 

1.9

 

0.4

 

0.7

 

0.5

 

 


Sources:  Chilean Central Bank and National Statistics Institute.

 

Privatization and Infrastructure

 

Privatization Program

 

Chile initiated a large-scale privatization program in 1974.  The Concertación coalition administrations introduced certain changes starting in 1989, including the public offering of interests in state-owned companies and the granting of concession rights.

 

The privatization program included three phases, which are described below:

 

·                  First, between 1974 and 1982, the government privatized most state-owned banks and manufacturing firms, which had been nationalized in the early 1970s.  By 1980, the government had privatized approximately 90.0% of the more than 500 then state-owned companies.  In addition, as describe above in “History and Background,” in 1981 the government began a comprehensive reform of the social security system.  Under this reform, the government replaced the social security system with a privately run system of individual pension plans.  This privatized pension system is based on individualized accounts with fully funded, vested and portable benefits that are entrusted to specialized fund management companies known as AFPs.  See “Monetary and Financial System—Pension Funds and the Chilean Pension System.”  During this first phase, 250 money-losing companies were privatized at no cost to selected purchasers through an agreement in which the purchasers waived their rights to initiate civil actions against the state, while an additional 232 companies were sold at specified prices.

 

·                  Second, between 1984 and 1989, the privatization efforts of the government focused on traditional state-owned companies such as telecommunications, electricity and steel production enterprises.  By the end of 1989, the government had also privatized most of the state-owned enterprises held by CORFO (33 companies).

 

·                  Third, beginning in 1990, the government modified the policy toward privatizations, increasing transparency in the process.  Since previous administrations had already undertaken a large-scale program of privatizations to reduce the overall size of the public sector, the Concertación governments decided to analyze future privatizations on a case-by-case basis, and in certain limited cases, to retain a non-controlling interest in the privatized companies.  Between 1990 and 2008, there were 30 principal privatizations (of which 15 were accomplished through concessions) in different sectors, including water supply, sewage, power utilities and transportation.

 

The privatization phase initiated in 1990 resulted in several public companies being transferred to private administration, including ESSAN, ESSCO and EMSSAT.  Further privatizations took place in 2011 and 2012, when CORFO completed a public sale of its equity shares in several water and sewage companies (Aguas Andinas, ESVAL, ESSBIO and ESSAL), which provided CORFO with approximately US$1.6 billion in proceeds.  The main purpose of these sales was to fund CORFO programs to provide credit guarantees to small- and medium-sized enterprises (PyMES), make capital contributions to state-owned companies and to strengthen CORFO’s capital basis

 

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and thus have capacity for financing initiatives which aim to encourage entrepreneurship and innovation in Chile.  CORFO formerly held an ownership interest of approximately 35.0% in Aguas Andinas, 29.4% in ESVAL, 43.4% in ESSBIO and 45.5% in ESSAL.  After the sale, CORFO maintained approximately 5.0% of its equity in each company as well as its absolute right to oppose (derecho de veto) transfers by such companies of water rights and sanitary concessions.

 

On May 6, 2016 the government submitted a draft bill to Congress providing for the creation of the Infrastructure Fund Corporation (Fondo de Infraestructura S.A.), a company that would be owned by the government and CORFO. The purpose of the Infrastructure Fund Corporation will be the construction, extension, repair, exploitation and development of private-public infrastructure projects to be financed through the securitization of future cash flows from concessions contracts.

 

Public Works — Infrastructure Concessions

 

The Concessions Act and the Financing of Infrastructure Act, both adopted in 1991 and amended in 1996 and 2010, aim to increase private investment in the infrastructure sector.  The main goal of the Concessions Act is to provide certain guarantees for and flexibility in the form of concessions to local and foreign investors.  The objective of the Financing of Infrastructure Act is to provide alternatives for the financing of infrastructure projects using direct investment from institutional and other long-term investors.

 

The government grants infrastructure concessions through the Ministry of Public Works.  The first concession was granted in 1993.  A concession may relate to any public works project.  Generally, a concessionaire undertakes to construct or improve a specific facility and then to operate, profit from via tolls, subsidies or a combination thereof, and maintain it for a specified term.  The government provides the concessionaire with the design of the facility and monitors its construction and operation.  Concessions typically last from 10 to 30 years, although the law allows for periods up to 50 years.

 

Concessionaires are allowed to charge fees for the use of the chartered public work within the limits imposed by law and the relevant concession agreement.  The government may provide on a case-by-case basis a minimum revenue guarantee to a concessionaire.  This guarantee is a percentage of the estimated revenues for a given period and helps to facilitate the financing of concession projects.  The government assesses each project to determine how the concessionaire and the government should share risks associated with the project.  A concessionaire may raise additional funds by issuing non-recourse bonds backed by revenues from the concession and the minimum revenue guarantee by the government.  See “Public Sector FinancesGovernment Expenditures—Public Contingent Liabilities.”

 

In January 2010, an amendment to the Concessions Act was enacted and became effective in April 2010.  This amendment intends, among other matters, to improve the dispute settlement mechanism through the establishment of a Technical Panel and changes to the regulation of the Arbitral Commission to resolve conflicts arising out of the concession contracts.  The amendment also created a Concession Council to advise the Minister of Public Works on policy deliberations arising from concessions.  Under certain circumstances, concessionaires have the right to apply for financial compensation following an amendment to the work or service requested by a public authority.  Additionally, the Ministry of Public Works and concessionaires can agree on changes to the work or service provided under the concession.

 

As of June 2017, 74 concession projects had been granted by the Ministry of Public Works, of which 40 are related to roads and highways, 11 are related to airports, 8 are related to public buildings, 4 are related to urban transport projects, 3 are related to prisons, 3 are related to water irrigation projects, 4 are related to hospitals and one is related to a land port.  Investment in these projects totaled more than US$16 billion. On December 13, 2013, the government announced an international bidding process to construct a bridge to connect Chiloé, Chile’s largest island, with the mainland. A bidder was selected on February 17, 2014 with an estimated cost of US$606 million. Construction commenced in 2016 and is expected to take approximately 81 months. In March 2014, the Ministry of Public Works awarded to a Spanish joint venture the concession for the construction and operation for a 45-year term of the Americo Vespucio I Highway located in Santiago, with an estimated cost of approximately US$1 billion. In April, 2015, the Ministry of Public Works awarded to a French-Italian consortium the new concession for a 20-year term and the expansion of the Santiago International Airport, with an estimated cost of approximately US$700 million.

 

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Environment

 

The Constitution grants all citizens the right to live in a pollution-free environment and requires the government to assure that this right will not be impaired and to provide for the conservation of nature.  It further provides that the law may specifically limit other legal rights in order to protect the environment.  Thus, Chile has established a framework of laws, regulations, decrees and municipal ordinances that address the protection of the environment.

 

Chile’s principal environmental concerns include industrial and urban pollution, as well as air, water and soil pollution caused by past industrial and commercial development when environmental regulation was less strict.

 

The enforcement of environmental regulations has become a significant factor affecting major investment projects, including important energy generation projects, and leading to increased debate in Chilean society.  See “—Principal Sectors of the Economy—Services Sector—Energy.”

 

On September 29, 2015, Chile submitted a new climate action plan to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change including two types of commitments:

 

- A carbon intensity target, expressed in greenhouse gas emissions per GDP unit, which includes all the sectors quantified in the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (1990-2010), except for the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector. Chile is committed to reducing its CO2 emissions per GDP unit by 30% below their 2007 levels of emissions by 2030.  Subject to obtaining international financing, Chile is committed to reducing its CO2 emissions per GDP unit by 2030 until it reaches a 35% to 45% reduction with respect to the 2007 levels of emissions.

 

- A target expressed in CO2 equivalent tons from the LULUCF sector. Chile has committed to the sustainable development and recovery of 100,000 hectares of forest land (mainly native), which will account for greenhouse gas sequestrations and reductions of an annual equivalent of approximately 600,000 of CO2 as of 2030. Chile also has committed to reforest 100,000 hectares (mostly with native species), which will amount to sequestrations of about 900,000 and 1,200,000 annual equivalent tons of CO2 as of 2030.

 

General Legal Framework

 

In 1994, Chile enacted the General Environmental Law (Law No. 19,300) and created the National Environmental Commission (Comisión Nacional del Medio Ambiente, or CONAMA).  The General Environmental Law introduced the framework and principles for a more integrated approach towards environmental protection and management, and set out the Environmental Impact Assessment System (Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, or SEIA), as well as emission and quality standards and prevention and decontamination plans.  This law also introduced a civil liability system for environmental damage, based on negligence or fault.  Strict liability systems contained in specialized environmental laws remained in force.

 

To conform to OECD standards, Chile submitted to a series of evaluations, including with respect to environmental performance, carried out via peer review, which is a non-confrontational approach oriented towards both collective learning and the generation of public policy recommendations.  In 2005, the OECD’s environmental evaluation of Chile highlighted significant progress in air, energy, water, biodiversity and habitat conservation, the integration of environmental considerations into the economic decision-making process, and international cooperation.  It also set forth a series of policy recommendations designed to improve environmental management and attain sustainable development.  In compliance with these recommendations, Chile implemented a new policy for chemical safety in 2008, and, in 2010, the new environmental institutional framework described below, entered into force.  As part of its process of admission to the OECD, Chile signed the OECD’s Declaration on Green Growth.

 

The General Environmental Law was substantially amended in January 2010 pursuant to Law No. 20,417.  The revisions provided for the establishment of a series of entities that replaced those created under the original General Environmental Law:  (i) the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente), responsible for developing environmental policies and regulations; (ii) the Environmental Assessment Service (Servicio de Evaluación Ambiental, or SEA), which replaced CONAMA and implements and administers the SEIA; and (iii) the

 

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Environmental Superintendency, entrusted with conducting environmental compliance audits of projects approved under the SEIA and enforcing emission and quality standards, prevention and decontamination plans and any other environmental instruments established by law.

 

On June 28, 2012, Congress enacted Law No. 20,600, providing for the creation of three Environmental Courts, subject to the Supreme Court’s supervision, in charge of hearing and deciding on environmental disputes.  The environmental courts, located in Santiago, Antofagasta and Valdivia, are each three-judge panels, including two lawyers and one science and environmental expert.  Environmental courts have significant autonomy because their decisions are only subject to appeal in exceptional cases, and their final decision can only be overruled by the Supreme Court in limited cases.

 

Environmental Impact Assessment System

 

In October 6, 2014, a new Regulation on the Environmental Impact Assessment System (Reglamento del Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental) became effective, replacing the 2002 Regulation, and making regulations consistent with the new legal framework explained above.

 

The SEIA is aimed at ensuring the environmental sustainability of projects and activities performed by the public and private sectors.  The Environmental Assessment Service is responsible for implementing and administrating the SEIA, and coordinating the project’s assessment with the other Chilean public environmental institutions.  Only listed investment projects or activities must submit an Environmental Impact Statement (Declaración de Impacto Ambiental, or DIA) for assessment.  If the project’s impacts are significant, an Environmental Impact Study (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, or EIA) is required.  The final approval of the statement or study, as applicable, is decided by the Regional Environmental Assessment Commissions or the National Director of the Environmental Assessment Service, depending if the project affects more than one Region of Chile.

 

The SEIA process begins with the submission of a DIA or EIA to the SEA in the Region where the project or activity will be located.  The SEIA process involves consultation with various authorities as well as with the project holder and it may involve public consultation.  The SEA is required to prepare a consolidated report, or ICE, containing the project’s description and its expected impact, together with suggested measures that would mitigate or compensate for risks related to the project.  Finally, the Regional Environmental Assessment Commission or the National Director of the Environmental Assessment Service, as applicable, must render a resolution approving or rejecting the project or activity.

 

The project owner is entitled to file a complaint (reclamación) if the final resolution rejects the DIA or EIA or imposes conditions or additional requirements.  Individuals and legal entities that took part in the public participation process may also contest the environmental approval.  Complaints must be filed with the National Director of the Environmental Assessment Service in the case of a DIA or with a committee of Ministers (Comité de Ministros) in the case of an EIA.  The rulings of the National Director or a committee of Ministers, as applicable, may be challenged before the corresponding environmental courts.

 

Project owners and individuals and legal entities that took part in the public participation process may also file a complaint with a court of appeals with jurisdiction over the competent environmental authority.  This process is called a recurso de protección and is granted by the Constitution, empowering the court of appeals to overturn resolutions that it deems to be illegal or arbitrary and order a new EIA or DIA.  The environmental courts formed in 2012 are expected to limit this remedy to exceptional circumstances.

 

Activity-specific Environmental Regulations and Initiatives

 

Among other initiatives to preserve the environment, in 2004 and 2010 the government enacted specific regulations for the adequate management of hazardous wastes and the storage of hazardous substances.  In December 2007, Congress also passed the Native Forest Law intended to preserve, renovate and restore forestry resources.  The government also provides subsidies to promote soil protection and forestation with special emphasis on the use of native species.

 

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In June 2011, a regulation was enacted to control the emission of pollutants by thermoelectric generation power plants.  In January 2012, a new air quality standard for fine particulate matter (known as PM 2.5) was issued to monitor air quality and the emission of pollutants by industries.  These regulations complemented existing quality and emission standards for air, water and noise pollution control.

 

Further, as part of its environmental policy, the government implements remediation plans including pollution control and pollution prevention projects for areas suffering the effects of copper smelters, fish processing plants and pulp processing plants.  In highly populated areas such as the Santiago metropolitan area, the Region del Libertador Bernardo O´Higgins central area and Temuco and Padre de las Casas cities, decontamination plans have also been enacted.

 

In June 2016, the Ministry of the Environment published Law No. 20,920. This law promotes the reuse or re-incorporation of products and their residues into the system as raw materials or energy.

 

International Cooperation

 

On an international level, Chile actively participates in the global agenda for sustainable development.  Accordingly, the country has signed, among other accords, the following agreements:

 

·                  Convention for the Protection of Flora, Fauna, and Natural Scenic Beauty of the Americas;

 

·                  Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources;

 

·                  Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollution;

 

·                  Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal;

 

·                  Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES);

 

·                  UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol;

 

·                  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; and

 

·                  Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitat (RAMSAR)

 

Poverty, Income Distribution and Social Reforms

 

The government has a special commitment to protect and improve disadvantaged social sectors such as the country’s poor and indigenous populations.  Responsibility for these initiatives currently lies with the Ministry of Social Development (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social).  Since 2009, the ministry has prepared a bi-annual national Social and Economic Survey, which is a comprehensive report on changes in poverty, income distribution and the implementation of the government’s social development plans.

 

The Social and Economic Survey conducted in 2011 showed that the percentage of the population living on an income below the poverty line fell from 38.6% in 1990 to 10.9% in 2011.  This reduction can be attributed to strong GDP growth, rising wages, a rapidly increasing employment rate and a significant increase in government transfers and expenditures focused on low-income groups.  The reduction in extreme poverty can be attributed to the government’s emphasis on social assistance programs, which allocate funds to poor communities based on their needs and contributed to a decrease in extreme poverty from 13.0% in 1990 to 2.8% in 2011.

 

Measures implemented by the government to decrease poverty include encouraging education, improving social spending efficiency and other financial support mechanisms intended to augment the monthly incomes of families.  In addition, in May 2012, Congress approved a bill that improved the monetary coverage granted by the government to families living below the poverty line.  See“Employment and Labor—Employment.”

 

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In the 2013 Social and Economic Survey, the Ministry of Social Development modified its methodology to provide for a higher quality of life as the baseline for measurements.   The new methodology also considers multidimensional factors, such as access to education, healthcare, labor and housing.  Based on this revised methodology, the percentage of the population living on an income below the poverty line stood at 14.4% in 2013 without regard to the new multidimensional factors, and 20.4% when taking those factors into account.

 

Using the prior methodology, extreme poverty decreased to 2.5% in 2013 from 3.1% observed in 2011, and total poverty decreased to 7.8% from 10.9% in 2011.

 

The following table presents information regarding the evolution of poverty for the periods indicated:

 

Poverty 1990-2015
(% of Population)

 

 

 

Previous Methodology

 

New Methodology

 

Year

 

Extreme Poverty

 

Total Poverty(1)

 

Extreme Poverty

 

Total Poverty(1)

 

1990

 

13.0

 

38.6

 

 

 

1992

 

9.0

 

32.9

 

 

 

1994

 

7.6

 

27.6

 

 

 

1996

 

5.7

 

23.2

 

 

 

1998

 

5.6

 

21.7

 

 

 

2000

 

5.6

 

20.2

 

 

 

2003

 

4.7

 

18.7

 

 

 

2006

 

3.2

 

13.7

 

12.6

 

29.1

 

2009

 

3.6

 

11.4

 

9.9

 

25.3

 

2011

 

3.1

 

10.9

 

8.1

 

22.2

 

2013

 

2.5

 

7.8

 

4.5

 

14.4

 

2015

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

3.5

 

11.7

 

 


(1)         Total poverty includes extreme poverty.

Source:  Ministry of Social Development—Social and Economic Survey.

 

The new methodology sets different poverty lines depending on the number of people in a household.  As of the date of the survey conducted in 2015, the official monthly basket values for defining poverty and extreme poverty using the new methodology were as presented in the table:

 

Poverty line in urban areas
(U.S. dollars)

 

Number of people per house

 

New Methodology

 

1

 

225

 

2

 

365

 

3

 

484

 

4

 

593

 

5

 

693

 

6

 

787

 

 


Source:  Ministry of Social Development—Social and Economic Survey.  November 30, 2013 exchange rate.

 

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Extreme poverty line in urban areas
(U.S. dollars)

 

Number of people per house

 

New Methodology

 

1

 

150

 

2

 

243

 

3

 

323

 

4

 

395

 

5

 

462

 

6

 

525

 

 


Source:  Ministry of Social Development—Social and Economic Survey.  November 30, 2013 exchange rate.

 

The following table presents information regarding social public spending by the government from 2012 to 2015:

 

Social Public Spending

(in billions of constant Pesos)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

Health

 

5,304

 

5,710

 

6,234

 

6,944

 

Housing

 

497

 

485

 

606

 

606

 

Social security

 

9,115

 

9,120

 

9,391

 

9,884

 

Education

 

5,849

 

6,393

 

6,677

 

7,392

 

Other social programs

 

399

 

397

 

408

 

429

 

Total

 

21,164

 

22,105

 

23,317

 

25,254

 

 


Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

Chile is highly concentrated in terms of income distribution and geographical location of wealth.  However, the disparity has decreased over recent years.  In fact, the poorest 20.0% of the population increased its share of national income from 3.9% in 2003 to 5.9% in 2015.  The share of national income of the wealthiest 20.0% of the population decreased from 56.4% in 2003 to 48.4% in 2015.  The following table presents information on income distribution in 2015 by population quintile in Chile, which is the latest available official data:

 

Income Distribution in 2015
(% of total income)

 

 

 

Population Quintile

 

 

 

I

 

II

 

III

 

IV

 

V

 

Individual Income

 

5.9

 

10.4

 

14.6

 

20.6

 

48.4

 

 


Source:  Ministry of Social Development.  Casen 2015.  The table does not include education and health subsidies.

 

In 2015, the wealthiest 10.0% of municipalities collected 64.4% of all municipal income (mainly through real estate taxes), while the poorest 10.0% collected only 0.3%.  The government created the Municipal Fund in 1979 as part of its efforts to redistribute resources across municipalities.  This fund pools a percentage of revenues from fees collected by Chile’s 345 municipal governments on annual vehicle taxes and commercial licenses, as well as a portion of the amounts allocated to municipal governments by the central government from the collection of real estate taxes.  The Municipal Fund then distributes these revenues to lower income municipalities.  The Undersecretary of Regional Development (Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional) is required to publish on the Internet information about collections and the use of funds, outstanding debts and renegotiations.  See “Public Sector FinancesGeneral—Public Sector Accounts and Fiscal Statistics.”

 

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In January 2009, Congress approved a bill to support national investment and employment, including an extraordinary contribution to the Common Municipal Fund of US$42.5 million.  As a consequence of the 2010 earthquake and tsunami, the government, the Chilean Budget Office and the Association of Municipalities obtained Congressional approval for an additional contribution of up to Ps.10,000 million to the Common Municipal Fund, to be directly distributed to the municipalities most affected by the catastrophe, excluding the wealthier municipalities of Santiago, Providencia, Vitacura and Lo Barnechea.

 

Health Care System Reform

 

The Chilean health care system is comprised of a public sector administered by the government and a private sector.  The health system confronts important challenges, of which some are general and others are specific to each subsystem (i.e., public and private sectors).  The overarching challenge is to restructure the health system to enable it to face the changing epidemiological and demographic reality of Chile’s population, which includes such factors as aging, urbanization, new lifestyles and worsening environmental conditions.  Additional difficulties result from the fact that health indicators vary significantly among the country’s different socioeconomic groups.  Specific problems of the public subsystem include dissatisfaction resulting from delays, lack of service quality, reduced or non-existent access to expensive modern therapies and inefficiency.  In the private subsystem, concerns center on price discrimination based on income, age, gender and preexisting diseases, the low levels of coverage for chronic and serious diseases and the difficulty inherent in comparing complex health plans.

 

Currently, Chile has a comprehensive rights-based health care system, known as Plan AUGE, which aims at providing full coverage over time at low or zero co-payments for a list of priority ailments.  The system was introduced in 2002, through the implementation of a pilot plan that included three ailments.  During the two subsequent years, the system incorporated 14 new pathologies.  This pilot plan covered 25.0% of the most burdensome diseases detected in Chile’s population.  In September 2004, a law was passed officially establishing Plan AUGE, guided by the principles of access, quality, financial protection and opportunity.  The full plan commenced on July 1, 2005 and covered 56 ailments by 2007.  As of December 31, 2016, Plan AUGE covered 80 ailments.  The increase in the average cost per beneficiary for the standardized benefit package defined by the reform is now capped at the rate of growth of real wages in Chile.

 

The government health care reform also included the Health Authority and Management Act in 2004, which created a health authority with greater responsibilities and two new undersecretaries in the Ministry of Health:  the Undersecretary of Health Care Networks and the Undersecretary of Public Health.  In August 2011, Congress approved a bill that reduced or eliminated contributions by retirees to the public system.  This measure became effective in November 2011.

 

From 2007, the expansion of Plan AUGE coverage and improvements in health infrastructure have implied an increase in health expenditure. The 2017 annual public budget law allocates Ps.7,294 million to health expenditure (excluding infrastructure investments), compared to Ps.6,699 million for 2016, which represents an increase of 8.9% compared to 2016. In addition, Plan AUGE also includes a US$4.0 billion public health infrastructure investment program for the period 2015-2018.

 

Educational Reforms

 

Educational reforms began in 1990 under President Aylwin’s administration.  As part of the continuing focus on educational reform, succeeding governments undertook to create the infrastructure and organizational conditions necessary to lengthen the school day at all subsidized educational establishments and to improve teacher training at university and secondary levels.  In 1994 the National Commission for the Modernization of Education was established, with the aim of delivering an analysis of Chile’s current educational system and suggestions for changes.  In accordance with the Commission’s recommendations, the government implemented a number of initiatives, including, among others:  an amendment to the teacher statute in 1995, seeking better regulation to improve the teaching profession; also in 1995, a new curriculum framework for basic education; in 1996, the creation of the National System for Performance Evaluation, as the agency in charge of evaluating subsidized educational establishments; in 1998, a new curriculum framework for secondary education was developed; in 2001, a system for evaluating teachers’ individual performances and the National Commission of Teacher Evaluation was established, a process that culminated in 2004 with the enactment of the Teacher Evaluation Act; and, in 2003, the

 

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System of School Management Quality Assurance was established, to improve institutional practices through self-evaluation.

 

In addition, a program called “Full Day at School” (Jornada Escolar Completa), established in 1997, aimed to increase the duration of the academic year from 1,200 to 1,520 hours for primary school and from 1,400 to 1,620 hours for secondary school.

 

In 2003, a constitutional amendment made it mandatory for children to attend school for twelve years.  The government also encouraged parents to enroll their children in preschool instruction, by significantly increasing subsidies for preschool enrollments in municipal and subsidized private establishments.  The expansion of access to preschool education was a policy priority for the government, and in 2013 a new constitutional amendment established the right to free universal access to quality education from age two and extended the duration of mandatory school instruction by one year to thirteen years (approved by Law No. 20,710).

 

The government has also increased access to university education by providing state guarantees for student loans, where private sector banks provide the loans and the state acts as a guarantor of up to 90.0% of the principal to resolve the credit constraint problem encountered by students.  Successive improvements were introduced to the loan programs, such as a rescheduling of principal payments; the elimination of punitive interest payments; reducing the interest rate on loans with a state guarantee (Crédito con Garantía Estatal, or CAE) to 2.0% per annum, as well as limiting loan repayments to 10.0% of income after graduation (approved by Law No. 20,634).

 

As a result of student demonstrations in 2006, a presidential advisory committee on educational matters was formed, which in 2007 drafted a bill reforming the education system.  The work of this advisory committee resulted in an agreement between the government and all political parties to reform the Constitutional Law of Education and to improve the quality of education.  In 2009, Law No. 20,370, the General Law on Education (Ley General de Educación, or LGE) was enacted to regulate primary and secondary education.  Under the LGE, the state guarantees access and financing for preschool education.  Additionally, in 2008, the government created the Bicentennial System, a program aimed at financing education of Chilean students at the world’s most prestigious universities and institutions.

 

In 2008, Law No. 20,248, established the Preferential School Subsidy (Subvención Escolar Preferencial, or SEP), a monthly financial subsidy introduced to aid elementary schools that enroll students with limited capabilities.  During 2010 the subsidy program was expanded to include high school education, and new funds were channeled through the Educational Institutions State Subsidy (Subvención Estatal a Establecimientos Educacionales) (approved by Law No. 20,637), a subsidy which funds education for children whose parents cannot afford to send them to school.

 

During the years 2011 through 2013, sparked by protests by students and certain unionized teachers, the government passed additional legislation to further educational reform, including:

 

·                  Law No. 20,501 on Quality and Equity of Education, which among other initiatives provided for the selection of school directors through the High Public Sector Managers selection process (Alta Dirección Pública, or ADP) and ending the employment stability afforded to underperforming teachers; and

 

·                  Law No. 20,529 on the Assurance of Quality in Education, which created the Superintendency of Education (Superintendencia de Educación Escolar) and the Agency for the Quality of Education (Agencia de la Calidad de la Educación), aimed at strengthening oversight education quality in Chile.  The Agency is charged with setting forth new standards of quality and allowing the Superintendency to close underperforming educational institutions.  The Superintendency is vested with the power to examine the accounts of institutions receiving public funding and their expenses.

 

In addition, in September 2012 the government established an Education Fund.  The purpose of the Education Fund is to provide further funds to advance the goals listed in Chile’s annual budget law regarding education and, especially to finance preschool education, the Preferential School Subsidy, and the creation of grants

 

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for higher education.  The government made an initial contribution to the Education Fund of US$4.0 billion.  As of December 31, 2016, the Education Fund held assets valued at US$2.9 billion.

 

In 2014, Congress passed a new education reform, one of the most important reforms for Ms. Bachelet’s administration.  The education reform includes the following measures, which are each in different stages of the process of promulgation and publication.

 

·                  Discontinuing of Public Funding of For-Profit Schools:  This law establishes a ban on profits by schools receiving public money, aiming to guarantee that resources are exclusively used for education.  The project also contemplates a stronger regulatory role for the government.

 

·                  Discontinuation of Co-Payments For Private Subsidized Schools:  In Chile, parents have three main options in terms of financing when deciding schools for their children: public free schools, private paid schools, or private subsidized schools, for which parents have to co-pay some level of tuition fees.  This law seeks to discontinue the co-payment system and thereby eliminate selection based on the financing capacity of families where public funding is involved.

 

·                  Discontinuation of Discriminatory Admissions Process in Public and Semi-Public Schools:  This measure forbids any kind of arbitrary selection process that discriminates against students on socioeconomic, academic or cultural basis.  It aims to reduce segregation and to guarantee the right of parents to choose any school for their children.

 

·                  Regulation of Preschool Education:  This law creates the Undersecretary of Preschool Education, who is tasked with defining educational policies, as well as the Superindentency of Preschool Education to regulate and oversee the attainment of the policy objectives at the preschool level.

 

·                  Provisional Administration of At-Risk Schools:  Offices of provisional administrator and closure administrator for higher education where established.  These government officials are charged with taking over higher education institutions that face challenges to their sustainability, to ensure the continuity of studies by its students.  The law containing this measure entered into force in December 2014.

 

Other educational programs and initiatives are being considered proactively by the government, such as the creation of more than 500 preschools throughout the country, the establishment of a nationwide network of technical education institutes and the creation of a new scheme to finance and administer schools currently in the hands of municipalities and the development of a national policy framework to strengthen the career paths of school teachers.

 

Law No. 20,835, enacted on May 5, 2015, as amended by Law No. 20,905,  created the Undersecretary of Pre-school Education, who is in charge of defining educational policies, at preschool level, as well as the Superindentency of Pre-school Education to regulate and oversee compliance with policy objectives at preschool level.

 

On June 8, 2015, Law No. 20,845 on School Inclusion was enacted, which regulates the admission process to school education, abolishes co-payment obligations for parents of children that attend private subsidized schools and prohibits profit in schools that receive public funds.  Law No. 20,845 became effective on March 1, 2016.

 

In November 2015, the National Public Education System (Sistema Nacional de Educación Pública) bill was submitted to Congress and was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in July 2016.  The bill seeks to strengthen the quality of education received by children, adolescents and adults who attend public educational institutions .

 

Law No. 20,890, enacted on December 26, 2015, modifies and supplements Law 20,882 (the 2016 Budget Law) and provides for allocations of funds for public and private non- profit universities (with at least four years of track record). These funds will enable students of low income families to access such institutions on a tuition fee basis and to establish a scholarship program for students attending technical educational institutions.

 

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On April 2016, Law No. 20,903 created the Sistema de Desarrollo Profesional Docente.  The law establishes a new remuneration scale for teachers taking into consideration their professional development, and it introduces new qualification requirements and a student’s evaluation system.

 

On May 2017, a bill was submitted to Congress for purposes of strengthening public universities with the creation of a Superior Council (Consejo Superior), a University Council (Consejo Universitario) and a regulatory body (Contraloría Universitaria).

 

President Bachelet’s education reform is expected to be financed, in part, with funds raised through the 2014 tax reform, which was approved by Congress in September 2014.  See “Public Sector Finances—Government Revenue—Recent Tax Reform.”

 

Modernization of the State

 

Public sector modernization is one of Chile’s top policy priorities.  Recent governments have undertaken to modernize the state by building a more efficient and transparent public administration, and by improving coordination between public institutions at different levels of government.  This program involved multiple reforms, such as:

 

·                  the creation of new public institutions in the areas of culture, infrastructure, social development, economic development, anti-trust regulation, environmental protection and public enterprise administration;

 

·                  the decentralization of public sector institutions;

 

·                  promoting competition among public institutions and improved performance in part through greater flexibility in budget allocations to those institutions;

 

·                  the increased use of information technology;

 

·                  increased citizen participation and broad protection of citizens’ rights; and

 

·                  the establishment of simpler mechanisms for disseminating information, greater accountability of public authorities and internal auditing.

 

Innovation Fund for Competitiveness

 

In 2006, the government established the Innovation Fund for Competitiveness (Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad).  The fund’s endowment must be invested in sciences, applied technology and education.  Beginning in 2008, 25% of the annual resources provided to the Innovation Fund for Competitiveness were distributed to Regions to support local initiatives.  In 2010, 2011 and 2012, the fund’s endowment grew in real terms by 10.5%, 3.0% and 2.0%, respectively, receiving contributions that in nominal terms exceeded US$224 million, US$259 million and US$262 million, respectively.  In 2013, the government’s US$197 million allocation to the fund was 13.3% lower than the allocation in 2012, in real terms.  This reduction was due to a change in the way resources are allocated to the Regions; beginning in 2013, rather than allocating funds earmarked for Regions to the Innovation Fund for Competitiveness, those funds were distributed directly to the corresponding Regional budget.  The government applied US$208 million to the Innovation Fund for Competitiveness (Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad) in 2015, US$213 million in 2016, and has allocated an estimated US$211 million for 2017.

 

Transparency

 

To control the selection process of senior public servants, a new specialized entity was created, the National Civil Service Authority (Dirección Nacional del Servicio Civil), which became fully operational in 2004.  With the implementation of these rules, the president’s power to appoint public officials decreased from 3,110 to 600 posts (with the remaining 2,510 being appointed by the National Civil Service Authority).  In addition, the role of performance-related compensation in the public sector was increased to improve productivity.

 

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Chile has regulations relating to the financing of political campaigns for public office that are designed to limit the risk of improper financial influence in the conduct of voting campaigns.  Regulations have also been adopted to ensure a competitive, standardized and transparent government procurement process that operates electronically.

 

In 2005, the principles of probity and transparency of acts of the government were formally incorporated into the Constitution.  These changes were intended to guarantee that public officials’ decisions are taken free from corruption or undue influence and that actions and decisions taken by public officials are generally open to public scrutiny.

 

Commencing in 2006, the government focused on enhancing access to public information.  In August 2008, an Access to Public Information Law was introduced, establishing a new legal framework that obliges all state administrative agencies to provide citizens with the information they request and to generally make information more available.  A four-member Transparency Council (Consejo para la Transparencia) was created to oversee the enforcement of the law, which has resulted in government agencies making public previously privileged information.

 

In January 2007, Chile acceded to the United Nations Convention against Corruption, with the purpose of participating in the first global legislative instrument against corruption.

 

During the OECD admission process in 2009, Congress passed legislation reforming the corporate governance rules applicable to Codelco and private enterprises.  In addition, the government introduced legislation to impose criminal liability on legal persons for money laundering, the financing of terrorism and bribery (Law No. 20,393 on Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities for the Crimes of Money Laundering, Financing of Terrorism and Offenses of Bribery, passed on December 2009) and to enhance access to banking information.

 

Antitrust Legislation

 

On August 30, 2016 Law No. 20,945 was published in the Official Gazette amending DL 211 of 1973, the Competition Law of Chile. The amendment, among others, increased the amount of fines for anti-competitive conducts, established criminal sanctions for cartel conduct and limited the ability of directors and relevant executives to have positions at competing firms. The law also introduced Title IV on “Concentration Transactions” requiring prior notification and approval for prospective transaction if certain thresholds are met.

 

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BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FOREIGN TRADE

 

Balance of Payments

 

Chile’s external accounts reflect the country’s high degree of financial and trade integration with the rest of the world, a state of affairs that began in the 1970s with the trade liberalization process and was consolidated in 2001 through capital account liberalization.  In terms of external accounts, Chile’s balance of payments registered a surplus between 1987 and 1997, largely attributable to dynamic exports and record capital inflows, specifically direct investments, portfolio investments and other medium- and long-term capital investments.  Between 1999 and 2004, the Chilean economy generated modest surpluses or deficits in its balance of payments, including a deficit of US$596 million in 2001 and a surplus of US$199 million in 2002.  Then, for two years, the Chilean economy produced considerable surpluses.  In 2007, the balance of payments recorded a deficit of US$3.2 billion, while in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, it recorded surpluses of US$6.4 billion, US$1.6 billion, US$3.0 billion and US$14.2 billion, respectively.  In 2012, the balance of payments recorded a deficit of US$367 million.  In 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 the balance of payments recorded surpluses of US$311 million, US$1.1 billion, US$211 million and US$1.8 billion, respectively.

 

Current Account

 

The current account involves movements of the trade balance, non-financial services (mainly trade-related services, such as insurance and transportation fees and travel services), net interest payments, dividends and transfer payments (primarily taxes).

 

The government believes that there have been and remain many economically viable investment projects and opportunities in Chile requiring the use of foreign savings.  The government also believes that given the stage of Chile’s economic development, the level of aggregate domestic demand will generally exceed the level of national income, resulting in current account trade deficits.  However, between 2004 and 2007, due to government savings resulting from copper revenues, Chile’s current account registered surpluses averaging 3.2% of GDP.  The trade balance deteriorated in 2008 resulting in a current account deficit of 3.2% of GDP, but in 2009 and 2010 the current account registered a surplus of 2.0% of GDP and 1.7% of GDP, respectively. The current account registered deficits of 3.5%, 3.7%, 1.3%, 2.0% and 1.4% of GDP in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively.

 

After reaching a merchandise trade surplus of US$24.1 billion in 2007, Chile’s merchandise trade surplus declined from 2009 onwards.  The 2009 economic crisis affected global trade, resulting in decreases in Chile’s imports and, to a lesser extent, exports during 2009.  As a result, Chile recorded a trade surplus of US$15.4 billion in 2009.  In 2010, the trade balance surplus reached US$15.9 billion, despite an increase of US$15.1 billion in imports.  The merchandise trade surplus decreased to US$11.0, US$2.3 and US$1.7 in 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively, as imports grew significantly while exports declined in 2012 and 2013 after having reached US$81.4 billion in 2011. In 2014, the merchandise trade surplus recovered to US$6.3 billion driven by a decrease in total imports. In 2016, the merchandise trade surplus increased, reaching US$5.2 billion. In 2015, the merchandise trade surplus again decreased, reaching US$3.5 billion driven by a decrease in exports at a pace that exceeded significantly the decrease of imports. In 2016, the merchandise trade surplus increased, reaching US$5.2 billion.

 

Capital Account and Financial Account

 

The capital account balance records net capital transfers (inflows and outflows) payable between residents and non-residents and net acquisitions and dispositions of non-financial assets between residents and non-residents.  The financial account records the net acquisitions and disposals of financial assets and liabilities involving residents and non-residents.

 

During the 1990s, Chile conducted a gradual process of capital account liberalization, designed to attain full integration in the international capital markets, while avoiding major disruptions that could endanger macroeconomic and financial stability during the process.  The capital account opening was fully completed in April 2001, when the Chilean Central Bank removed the remaining restrictions on foreign exchange operations, including among others, the mandatory and unremunerated reserve requirement of a portion of capital inflows (known as encaje) and the authorization requirement that was in place for a number of foreign investment inflows; though it kept the power to reinstate these measures or adopt new ones.  In addition, the government has developed a

 

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number of actions to promote greater international diversification of the portfolio of domestic investors, such as broadening the range of permitted investments abroad by regulated Chilean institutional investors.  As a result, the total volume of capital inflows and outflows has been increasing.

 

The Chilean Central Bank may request that a certain number of foreign exchange operations be made through the formal exchange market (Mercado Cambiario Formal), which is composed of banks and other entities authorized by the Chilean Central Bank, such as securities brokers, exchange bureaus and legal persons created with the exclusive purpose of participating in the market.

 

Additionally, the free trade agreement between Chile and the U.S. provides that Chile shall not be liable for damages arising from the imposition of restrictive measures with regard to payments and transfers made within a year from the date on which the restrictions were imposed, provided that such restrictive measures do not substantially impede exchange transfers.

 

In furtherance of the capital account liberalization, the government took steps to integrate foreign and domestic financial markets and encourage foreign investors to invest in the local debt market.  In 2003, Chile launched a program for the periodic domestic issuance of treasury bonds to promote the development of long-term pricing benchmarks and increase the depth of the fixed income market.  See “Public Sector DebtCentral Government Internal Bonds.”

 

In 2010, the capital account recorded a US$6.2 billion surplus resulting from insurance payments accrued to residents on account of damages suffered as a result of the earthquake and tsunami.  Between 2011 and 2014, the capital account did not record significant surpluses or deficits. The capital account registered a surplus of US$675 million in 2015 and US$7 million in 2016.

 

The financial account (excluding change in reserves) has shown volatility, registering US$(9.5) billion, US$(11.9) billion, US$(3.8) billion, US$(3.4) billion and US$(3.0) billion in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively.  This represented an amount equivalent to 3.6% of GDP, 4.3% of GDP, 1.5% of GDP, 1.4% of GDP and 1.2% of GDP in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively.  Fluctuations in the financial account are primarily driven by shifts in portfolio investments, which given Chile’s high degree of integration with the international capital markets, are largely responsive to changes in domestic and international capital market conditions.

 

The following table sets forth Chile’s Balance of Payments for the periods indicated:

 

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Balance of Payments
(in millions of US$)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Current account

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Current account, net

 

(9,375

)

(10,311

)

(3,316

)

(4,670

)

(3,574

)

Goods and Services, net

 

(411

)

(2,022

)

2,526

 

47

 

2,119

 

Merchandise Trade Balance

 

2,333

 

1,708

 

6,344

 

3,465

 

5,256

 

Exports

 

77,791

 

76,386

 

74,924

 

62,183

 

60,597

 

Imports

 

75,458

 

74,678

 

68,580

 

58,718

 

55,341

 

Services

 

(2,744

)

(3,730

)

(3,818

)

(3,418

)

(3,137

)

Credits

 

12,387

 

12,355

 

11,011

 

9,636

 

9,500

 

Debits

 

15,131

 

16,085

 

14,829

 

13,054

 

12,638

 

Interest, net

 

(11,025

)

(10,405

)

(7,692

)

(6,576

)

(7,117

)

Interest from investment

 

(10,970

)

(10,233

)

(7,538

)

(6,385

)

(6,925

)

Interest from direct investment(1)  

 

(11,888

)

(10,806

)

(7,798

)

(6,351

)

(6,813

)

Abroad

 

4,265

 

4,344

 

4,472

 

3,960

 

2,836

 

From abroad

 

16,153

 

15,150

 

12,270

 

10,311

 

9,649

 

Interest from portfolio investment

 

1,150

 

687

 

412

 

178

 

135

 

Dividends

 

1,900

 

1,619

 

1,538

 

1,709

 

1,526

 

Interest

 

(750

)

(932

)

(1,127

)

(1,531

)

(1,391

)

Interest from other investment

 

(231

)

(114

)

(151

)

(212

)

(247

)

Credits

 

706

 

764

 

654

 

609

 

682

 

Debits

 

937

 

878

 

805

 

820

 

928

 

Current transfers, net

 

2,060

 

2,115

 

1,849

 

1,858

 

1,424

 

Government transfers

 

1,995

 

2,152

 

1,992

 

1,938

 

1,616

 

Other sectors transfers

 

65

 

(37

)

(142

)

(80

)

(192

)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Capital and financial accounts

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Capital and financial accounts, net

 

(9,510

)

(11,909

)

(3,833

)

(2,704

)

(2,948

)

Capital account, net

 

12

 

11

 

10

 

675

 

7

 

Financial account, net

 

(9,521

)

(11,920

)

(3,844

)

(3,379

)

(2,955

)

Direct investment, net

 

(7,938

)

(9,490

)

(9,427

)

(3,726

)

(5,101

)

Direct investment abroad

 

20,555

 

9,872

 

12,915

 

16,742

 

7,125

 

Shares and other capital

 

9,401

 

10,188

 

7,937

 

4,918

 

3,280

 

Earnings reinvested

 

3,322

 

3,020

 

3,363

 

2,865

 

1,885

 

Other capital

 

7,833

 

(3,336

)

1,614

 

8,959

 

1,960

 

Direct investment to Chile

 

28,493

 

19,362

 

22,342

 

20,469

 

12,225

 

Shares and other capital

 

8,532

 

4,806

 

10,685

 

6,612

 

5,936

 

Earnings reinvested

 

9,085

 

5,973

 

3,234

 

3,680

 

3,485

 

Other capital(2)  

 

10,876

 

8,584

 

8,423

 

10,177

 

2,804

 

Portfolio investment, net

 

4,280

 

(4,722

)

(4,045

)

(1,413

)

(1,069

)

Assets

 

15,373

 

10,668

 

8,710

 

1,523

 

1,882

 

Liabilities

 

11,093

 

15,390

 

12,755

 

2,936

 

2,952

 

Derived financial instruments, net

 

(10

)

1,005

 

1,612

 

939

 

614

 

Other Investment, net(3)  

 

(5,486

)

976

 

6,960

 

610

 

796

 

Assets

 

(2,332

)

(1,093

)

3,814

 

(2,857

)

1,538

 

Commercial credits

 

(308

)

(909

)

(313

)

(1,674

)

352

 

Loans

 

63

 

39

 

81

 

(812

)

46

 

Currency and deposits

 

(844

)

315

 

4,046

 

(771

)

1,500

 

Other assets

 

(1,242

)

(539

)

 

400

 

(360

)

Liabilities

 

3,154

 

(2,069

)

(3,146

)

(3,467

)

742

 

Commercial credits

 

(316

)

(639

)

(1,512

)

(1,245

)

(210

)

Loans(3)  

 

2,839

 

(1,347

)

(1,534

)

(2,411

)

1,029

 

 

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2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Currency and deposits

 

618

 

(65

)

(104

)

202

 

(77

)

Other liabilities

 

14

 

(19

)

5

 

(13

)

0

 

Assets in reserve, net

 

(367

)

311

 

1,057

 

211

 

1,805

 

Errors and omissions, net

 

(158

)

(1,620

)

(537

)

616

 

612

 

Financial account (excluding change in reserves)

 

US$

(9,155

)

US$

(12,232

)

US$

(4,901

)

US$

(3,590

)

US$

(4,761

)

Total balance of payments

 

US$

(367

)

US$

311

 

US$

1,057

 

US$

211

 

US$

1,805

 

 


(1)         Includes interest.

(2)         Net flows of liabilities by loans.

(3)         Short term net flows.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Foreign Trade

 

Chile has generally followed an outward-oriented economic development strategy.  Chile’s main trade policy objective is to improve and ensure access for its goods and services to all markets, as well as to encourage domestic and foreign investment.  With a view to liberalizing the economy, all available channels have been used to give Chile’s trade policy an outward orientation, including unilaterally opening its markets and entering into bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.

 

Chile’s open trade policy covers goods, services and investments.  Pursuant to its open trade policy, Chile’s applied MFN tariff was unilaterally phased down from 11.0% to 6.0% between 1999 and 2003.  Since 2003, this uniform overall tariff has been maintained unchanged as a 6.0% ad valorem duty on imports for most products, which makes up over 98.0% of tariff lines.  This low and uniform tariff is a distinctive feature of Chile’s trade policy.

 

Chile has effectively lowered its applied tariff rate to 0.9% (the 2014 average), as compared to 2.9% in 2003 through the implementation of free trade and other agreements.

 

Chile currently has 26 bilateral agreements with 64 trading partners that represented 93% of its overall trade in 2016 (imports and exports, both MFN and preferential).  The trading partners with which Chile has signed agreements with are the P-4 (New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam), the European Union, Canada, the Republic of Korea, China, Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua), the United States, Hong Kong, Mexico, EFTA (Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), Panama, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Mercosur (Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), Bolivia, Malaysia, Japan, India, Australia, Turkey, Cuba, Vietnam and Thailand.  Chile is a founding member of the Pacific Alliance (with Colombia, Mexico and Peru).

 

Chile is a founding member of the World Trade Organization.

 

Since 1994, Chile has been a member of, and an active participant in, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.  In recent years, the Asia-Pacific region has become a priority for Chilean trade policy.  Initiatives have been launched within the APEC framework to facilitate trade, including mutual recognition agreements and free trade agreements.

 

During January 2016, Chile concluded trade negotiations with the Transpacific Partnership (P-4, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the United States and Vietnam). The corresponding agreement was signed by the member countries on February 4, 2016. Chile is also negotiating a trade agreement with Indonesia.

 

On January 5, 2016, the Senate approved an additional protocol to the Pacific Alliance, which is expected to decrease to 0% tariffs applicable to 92% of the goods traded among the members of the Alliance. The protocol was implemented by Chile on May 1, 2016.

 

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Merchandise Trade

 

Chilean trading activity is diversified among countries in the Americas, Asia and Europe.

 

The primary countries of origin of Chile’s imports in 2016 were China (from where 24.3% of total imports originated), the United States (17.2%), Brazil (8.0%), Argentina (4.0%) and Germany (4.0%).  The primary destinations of Chile’s exports in 2016 were China (which received 28.5% of total exports), the United States (14.0%), Japan (8.5%), South Korea (6.9%), Brazil (4.9%) and Mexico (2.0%).  During 2016, the proportion of Chile’s exports to Asia grew from 49.3% to 50.3%, while the proportion of Chile’s exports to North America grew from 17.2% to 18.0%, as compared to 2015.  Chile’s geographical distribution of its imports during 2016, experienced some changes, for example, imports from North America decreased from 23.4% to 21.7%, while imports from Asia increased slightly from 36.0% to 36.5%.

 

Merchandise exports (which exclude merchandise in tax free zones) amounted to US$77.8 billion in 2012, US$76.8 billion in 2013, US$75.1 billion in 2014, US$62.2 billion in 2015 and US$60.6 billion in 2016.  Traditional merchandise exports (mining products — principally copper) decreased in real terms from 59.3% to 50.9%  of total exports between 2012 and 2016, partially due to a diversification of Chilean exports as well as a decrease in international copper prices.  Since the mid-1980s, Chile has increased exports of nontraditional goods, principally seafood, agricultural products and wine.  Imports totaled US$80.1 billion in 2012, US$79.4 billion in 2013, US$72.9 billion in 2014, US$62.5 billion in 2015 and US$58.8 billion in 2016.  The fluctuations in imports are mainly explained by variations in the terms of trade and exchange rates.  The largest portion of Chile’s imports consists of intermediate goods, such as oil and others fossil fuels, which accounted for 49.0% of total imports in 2016.  The share of total imports, represented by consumer goods imports has increased since 2012, representing 24.7% of total imports in 2012, 27.0% in 2013, 27.1% in 2014, 28.8% in 2015 and 30.2% in 2016.  Imports of capital goods have remained relatively stable as a percentage of total imports since 2012, representing 21.4% in 2012, 20.0% in 2013, 18.6% in 2014, 19.7% in 2015 and 20.8% in 2016.

 

The following tables set forth information regarding exports and imports for the periods indicated:

 

Exports of Goods (FOB)
(in millions of US$ and % of total exports)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

Mining and quarrying:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Copper

 

41,954.6

 

53.7

%

39,946.3

 

52.0

%

37,317.4

 

49.7

%

30,097.3

 

48.4

%

28,091.0

 

46.4

%

Iron

 

1,338.6

 

1.7

%

1,375.1

 

1.8

%

1,096.7

 

1.5

%

664.9

 

1.1

%

813.0

 

1.3

%

Silver

 

600.7

 

0.8

%

371.5

 

0.5

%

259.1

 

0.3

%

210.6

 

0.3

%

223.5

 

0.4

%

Gold

 

1,649.3

 

2.1

%

1,379.2

 

1.8

%

1,009.8

 

1.3

%

779.2

 

1.3

%

832.7

 

1.4

%

Molybdenum

 

283.8

 

0.4

%

170.6

 

0.2

%

209.2

 

0.3

%

167.7

 

0.3

%

156.1

 

0.3

%

Other

 

433.3

 

0.6

%

457.8

 

0.6

%

545.3

 

0.7

%

550.8

 

0.9

%

754.8

 

1.2

%

Total mining and quarrying

 

46,260.4

 

59.3

%

43,700.3

 

56.9

%

40,437.5

 

53.8

%

32,470.4

 

52.5

%

30,871.1

 

50.9

%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Agriculture and livestock, forestry and fishing and aquaculture:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fruit

 

4,165.4

 

5.3

%

4,627.7

 

6.0

%

4,741.6

 

6.3

%

4,515.5

 

7.3

%

5,246.6

 

8.7

%

 

D-77



Table of Contents

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

Forestry

 

23.6

 

0.0

%

31.3

 

0.0

%

32.2

 

0.0

%

29.3

 

0.0

%

30.8

 

0.1

%

Other

 

829.9

 

1.1

%

988.2

 

1.3

%

846.9

 

1.1

%

666.7

 

1.1

%

620.2

 

1.0

%

Total agriculture and livestock, forestry and fishing and aquaculture

 

5,018.8

 

6.4

%

5,647.2

 

7.4

%

5,620.7

 

7.5

%

5,211.6

 

8.4

%

5,897.6

 

9.7

%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Industrial:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Fishmeal

 

442.7

 

0.6

%

415.9

 

0.5

%

428.3

 

0.6

%

358.1

 

0.6

%

329.7

 

0.5

%

Salmon

 

1,981.8

 

2.5

%

2,782.1

 

3.6

%

3,648.3

 

4.9

%

3,086.6

 

5.0

%

3,458.2

 

5.7

%

Beverages and Tobacco

 

2,244.2

 

2.9

%

2,335.1

 

3.0

%

2,314.4

 

3.1

%

2,275.1

 

3.7

%

2,247.3

 

3.7

%

Forestry and wooden furniture

 

2,122.6

 

2.7

%

2,262.4

 

2.9

%

2,547.9

 

3.4

%

2,290.3

 

3.7

%

2,310.7

 

3.8

%

Pulp, paper and others

 

3,276.1

 

4.2

%

3,531.8

 

4.6

%

3,558.9

 

4.7

%

3,154.8

 

5.1

%

2,919.9

 

4.8

%

Chemicals

 

6,039.7

 

7.7

%

5,365.7

 

7.0

%

5,452.3

 

7.3

%

4,367.2

 

7.0

%

4,058.3

 

6.7

%

Other

 

10,676.7

 

13.7

%

10,729.5

 

14.0

%

11,113.5

 

14.8

%

8,969.1

 

14.4

%

8,504.5

 

14.0

%

Total industrial

 

26,783.8

 

34.3

%

27,422.5

 

35.7

%

29,063.6

 

38.7

%

24,501.2

 

39.4

%

23,828.6

 

39.3

%

Total exports

 

78,063.0

 

100.0

 

76,769.9

 

100.0

 

75,121.8

 

100.0

 

62,183.1

 

100.0

 

60,597.3

 

100.0

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Table of Contents

 

Imports of Goods (CIF)(1)
(in millions of US$ and % of total imports)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

Consumer goods:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cars

 

2,920.3

 

3.6

%

3,439.3

 

4.3

%

2,881.8

 

4.0

%

2,517.8

 

4.0

%

2,573.4

 

4.4

%

Wearing apparel

 

2,646.4

 

3.3

%

2,886.0

 

3.6

%

2,904.7

 

4.0

%

2,687.1

 

4.3

%

2,632.5

 

4.5

%

Cell phone

 

1,484.2

 

1.9

%

1,809.8

 

2.3

%

1,361.1

 

1.9

%

1,567.7

 

2.5

%

1,663.1

 

2.8

%

Footwear

 

935.5

 

1.2

%

1,068.6

 

1.3

%

1,032.5

 

1.4

%

972.1

 

1.6

%

996.5

 

1.7

%

Meat

 

906.6

 

1.1

%

993.9

 

1.3

%

988.4

 

1.4

%

912.3

 

1.5

%

1,013.3

 

1.7

%

Other food

 

887.1

 

1.1

%

937.7

 

1.2

%

947.9

 

1.3

%

922.2

 

1.5

%

885.6

 

1.5

%

Televisions

 

808.3

 

1.0

%

771.9

 

1.0

%

751.4

 

1.0

%

577.9

 

0.9

%

635.5

 

1.1

%

Other

 

9,117.6

 

11.4

%

9,511.3

 

12.0

%

8,844.9

 

12.1

%

7,844.4

 

12.6

%

7,379.5

 

12.5

%

Total consumer goods

 

19,706.0

 

24.6

%

21,418.4

 

27.0

%

19,712.7

 

27.1

%

18,001.4

 

28.8

%

17,779.4

 

30.2

%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Intermediate goods:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Crude oil

 

6,107.8

 

7.6

%

6,633.4

 

8.4

%

6,040.6

 

8.3

%

2,874.4

 

4.6

%

2,272.0

 

3.9

%

Diesel

 

4,723.8

 

5.9

%

4,305.4

 

5.4

%

3,840.3

 

5.3

%

2,450.1

 

3.9

%

2,045.9

 

3.5

%

Parts and other machinery and equipment

 

3,674.9

 

4.6

%

3,784.7

 

4.8

%

3,624.2

 

5.0

%

3,485.1

 

5.6

%

3,266.1

 

5.6

%

Chemicals

 

4,109.8

 

5.1

%

3,974.0

 

5.0

%

3,780.1

 

5.2

%

3,558.2

 

5.7

%

3,099.5

 

5.3

%

Metal products

 

3,196.5

 

4.0

%

3,035.0

 

3.8

%

3,011.5

 

4.1

%

3,003.9

 

4.8

%

2,444.1

 

4.2

%

Liquefied natural gas

 

1,623.4

 

2.0

%

1,000.5

 

1.3

%

1,154.0

 

1.6

%

801.0

 

1.3

%

794.0

 

1.3

%

Carbon mineral

 

1,145.9

 

1.4

%

1,089.6

 

1.4

%

917.5

 

1.3

%

751.0

 

1.2

%

799.9

 

1.4

%

Fertilizer

 

1,027.8

 

1.3

%

1,014.3

 

1.3

%

947.1

 

1.3

%

980.6

 

1.6

%

710.1

 

1.2

%

Lubricant oil

 

1,283.5

 

1.6

%

972.9

 

1.2

%

739.1

 

1.0

%

461.1

 

0.7

%

357.8

 

0.6

%

Fiber and fabric

 

808.1

 

1.0

%

796.6

 

1.0

%

806.4

 

1.1

%

754.0

 

1.2

%

718.5

 

1.2

%

Other

 

15,516.8

 

19.4

%

15,446.8

 

19.5

%

14,760.3

 

20.3

%

13,080.1

 

20.9

%

12,317.8

 

20.9

%

Total intermediate goods

 

43,218.3

 

54.0

%

42,053.1

 

53.0

%

39,621.4

 

54.4

%

32,199.5

 

51.5

%

28,825.7

 

49.0

%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Capital goods:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Trucks and cargo vehicles

 

2,779.8

 

3.5

%

2,356.2

 

3.0

%

1,747.5

 

2.4

%

1,507.5

 

2.4

%

1,555.1

 

2.6

%

Motors, generators and electrical transformers

 

595.3

 

0.7

%

808.6

 

1.0

%

1,020.0

 

1.4

%

815.9

 

1.3

%

1,074.2

 

1.8

%

 

D-79



Table of Contents

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

Machinery for mining and construction

 

1,986

 

2.5

%

1,681.3

 

2.1

%

746.9

 

1.0

%

735.3

 

1.2

%

558.4

 

0.9

%

Medical devices

 

854.0

 

1.1

%

863.3

 

1.1

%

820.8

 

1.1

%

824.2

 

1.3

%

814.3

 

1.4

%

Other machinery

 

2,953.7

 

3.7

%

3,180.9

 

4.0

%

2,765.4

 

3.8

%

2,519.4

 

4.0

%

2,370.1

 

4.0

%

Other transport vehicles

 

2,851.1

 

3.6

%

1,547.3

 

1.9

%

1,759.3

 

2.4

%

1,156.6

 

1.9

%

1,375.7

 

2.3

%

Other

 

5,147.9

 

6.4

%

5,443.9

 

6.9

%

4,658.2

 

6.4

%

4,736.8

 

7.6

%

4,476.3

 

7.6

%

Total capital goods

 

17,168.1

 

21.4

%

15,881.4

 

20.0

%

13,518.1

 

18.6

%

12,295.7

 

19.7

%

12,224.3

 

20.8

%

Total imports

 

80,092.4

 

100.0

 

79,352.9

 

100.0

 

72,852.2

 

100.0

 

62,496.6

 

100.0

 

58,829.4

 

100.0

 

 


(1)         Only imports of general regime as classified by the Chilean Central Bank.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank

 

D-80



Table of Contents

 

Geographical Distribution of Merchandise Trade
(% of total exports/imports)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

EXPORTS (FOB)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Americas:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Argentina

 

1.4

 

1.4

 

1.3

 

1.3

 

1.2

%

Brazil

 

5.5

 

5.7

 

5.4

 

4.9

 

4.9

%

Mexico

 

1.7

 

1.7

 

1.7

 

2.2

 

2.0

%

United States

 

12.3

 

12.7

 

12.3

 

13.1

 

14.0

%

Other

 

10.6

 

11.2

 

11.1

 

11.8

 

11.0

%

Total Americas:

 

31.5

%

32.7

%

31.8

%

33.3

%

33.1

%

Europe:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

France

 

1.6

 

1.4

 

1.6

 

1.3

 

1.3

%

Germany

 

1.2

 

1.3

 

1.3

 

1.3

 

1.2

%

Italy

 

2.6

 

2.1

 

2.3

 

1.7

 

1.4

%

United Kingdom

 

0.9

 

0.9

 

0.9

 

1.1

 

1.0

%

EFTA

 

1.4

 

1.4

 

1.2

 

0.9

 

1.0

%

Other

 

10.2

 

10.1

 

9.9

 

9.3

 

8.9

%

Total Europe:

 

17.9

%

17.3

%

17.1

%

15.6

%

14.9

%

Asia:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Japan

 

10.7

 

9.8

 

9.8

 

8.5

 

8.5

%

South Korea

 

5.8

 

5.4

 

6.2

 

6.4

 

6.9

%

Taiwan

 

2.3

 

2.1

 

2.4

 

2.3

 

1.9

%

China

 

23.2

 

24.8

 

24.2

 

26.1

 

28.5

%

Other

 

5.9

 

5.6

 

6.1

 

5.9

 

4.8

%

Total Asia:

 

48.0

%

47.8

%

48.7

%

49.3

%

50.6

%

Other:(1)

 

2.6

%

2.3

%

2.4

%

1.9

%

1.5

%

Total exports:

 

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IMPORTS (CIF)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Americas:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Argentina

 

6.6

 

4.8

%

3.8

%

3.8

%

4.0

%

Brazil

 

6.5

 

6.5

%

7.9

%

7.8

%

8.0

%

United States

 

23.2

 

20.2

%

19.5

%

18.7

%

17.2

%

Other

 

16.0

 

15.9

%

15.8

%

13.2

%

12.0

%

Total Americas:

 

52.2

%

47.4

%

47.0

%

43.5

%

41.3

%

Europe:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

France

 

1.9

 

2.9

%

3.2

%

2.6

%

3.3

%

Germany

 

3.6

 

4.1

%

3.6

%

3.9

%

4.0

%

Italy

 

1.6

 

1.6

%

1.7

%

1.9

%

1.9

%

United Kingdom

 

1.1

 

1.9

%

1.2

%

0.9

%

0.8

%

EFTA

 

0.6

 

0.5

%

0.5

%

0.6

%

0.7

%

Other

 

5.5

 

6.5

%

6.2

%

7.1

%

8.0

%

Total Europe:

 

14.3

%

17.5

%

16.5

%

16.9

%

18.7

%

Asia:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Japan

 

3.2

 

2.9

%

3.1

%

3.3

%

3.3

%

South Korea

 

3.3

 

3.4

%

3.1

%

3.1

%

3.0

%

Taiwan

 

0.6

 

0.6

%

0.5

%

0.5

%

0.5

%

China

 

18.0

 

20.0

%

20.6

%

23.7

%

24.3

%

Other

 

3.4

 

3.8

%

4.2

%

5.3

%

5.4

%

Total Asia:

 

28.5

%

30.6

%

31.5

%

36.0

%

36.5

%

Other:(1)

 

4.9

%

4.5

%

5.0

%

3.6

%

3.5

%

Total imports:

 

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

 

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(1)         Includes Africa, Oceania and other countries, including those in tax free zones.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Services Trade

 

Non-financial services include transportation, passenger services, port services and the travel industry.  The travel industry, particularly tourism, is an important contributor to the service trade sector.  In 2010, exported and imported services increased by 31.3% and 24.2%, respectively.  During 2011, the exported and imported services increased by 17.5% and 24.0%, respectively, but decreased by 5.5% and 6.5%, respectively, in 2012 mainly due to declines in transportation services to Europe and Asia, and a decrease of other professional services to the Americas and Europe.  During 2013, exported services remained unchanged and imported services increased by 6.3%, while in 2014 exported and imported services decreased by 10.9% and 7.8%. In 2015, exported and imported services decreased by 11.2% and 8.4%, respectively, mainly due to a reduction in exports and imports of transportation services to Asia, the Americas and Europe. In 2016 exported services had a nominal decrease of 1.4%, mainly driven by a decrease in transport, while imported services had a nominal decrease of 3.2% in the same period, due to a decrease in transport, financial services, insurances and pension.

 

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

 

Chile’s constitutional and legal framework guarantees non-discrimination and equal treatment to foreign and local investors and gives foreign investors access to all economic sectors.  The 1974 Foreign Investment Statute, known as DL 600, or DL600, sets forth the general rules applicable to foreign investors covering repatriation of capital, withdrawal of profits and access to the formal exchange market.  It establishes different kinds of investment, including freely convertible currency, assets, technology, investment related credits and capitalized earnings.  An alternative regime under which foreign investments may be made in Chile is Chapter XIV of the Chilean Central Bank’s Compendium of Foreign Exchange Regulations (Capítulo XIV del Compendio de Normas Internacionales del Banco Central de Chile).  Under this regime, foreign investors may freely transfer into Chile capital contributions and loans through convertible foreign currency.  Investors are required to inform the Chilean Central Bank of the transactions, but are not subject to prior registration or approval requirements.

 

Under DL 600, the Chilean Foreign Investment Committee, acting as the authorized representative of the government, enters into a legally binding contract with each foreign investor, which stipulates the term for which the investment or investments must be made.  In the case of mining investments, the period during which the investments in Chile may be made is generally 8 to 12 years.  In all other economic sectors, such period is generally three years.  Between 2009 and 2012, investments made through the DL 600 mechanism amounted to approximately US$20.5 billion.  A considerable number of foreign investors (representing approximately 25.4% of the total FDI inflows during the period from 2009 to 2012) have chosen to use DL 600 instead of relying upon the Chilean Central Bank’s Compendium of Foreign Exchange Regulations.  The annual average FDI in Chile made under the DL 600 regime from 2009 to 2012 was US$5.1 billion.

 

FDI inflows made in Chile between 2009 and 2013 totaled US$100.9 billion, and primarily originated from the United States (16.7%), Netherlands (14.8%), Spain (10.4%), Canada (5.1%), United Kingdom (4.3%) and Japan (3.8%).  During that period, FDI originating from Europe and the Americas accounted in the aggregate for 36.1% and 35.9% of total FDI, respectively.

 

Between 2009 and 2013, mining accounted for 44.9% of total FDI; financial services (banking, insurance, investment companies, investment funds, risk capital investment funds and other financial services) accounted for 13.4%; electricity, gas and water supply accounted for 10.2%; and manufacturing accounted for 4.7%.

 

The 2014 tax reform enacted by Law No. 20,780 revoked DL600 effective as of January 2016.  However, existing agreements under DL600 remain in full force and effect.  In January 2015, the government submitted a bill to Congress proposing a new legal framework for the regulation of FDI, which was enacted as Law No. 20,848 published in the Official Gazette on June 25, 2015.  The new legal framework guarantee access to the “formal exchange market,” allowing banks and other authorized entities to trade in currencies, and allow entities to remit capital and profits abroad.  The legislation prohibits arbitrary discrimination and contemplates an exemption from value added tax (VAT) for sales of goods that meet certain requirements.  The law also provides for the creation of a

 

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special committee of Ministers to advise the president on the adoption of national policies regarding foreign investment, as well as an administrative agency to implement new policies on foreign investment.

 

Further, the legislation provides a transitional regime that maintains the effectiveness of agreements entered into under DL600.  This bill also ensures a stable income tax rate of 44.45% for a period of four years in exceptional cases.

 

The following table presents foreign direct investment, including capital and debt, between 2011 and 2015 by sector:

 

Stock of Foreign Direct Investment (1)
 (in millions of US$)

 

 

 

2011

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

Agriculture and Fishing

 

1,018

 

876

 

1,039

 

1,077

 

1,072

 

Mining

 

54,189

 

69,729

 

76,849

 

78,081

 

85,727

 

Manufacturing industries

 

6,938

 

9,227

 

10,942

 

13,062

 

14,486

 

Electricity, gas and water supply

 

10,319

 

10,896

 

14,126

 

18,832

 

20,108

 

Construction

 

612

 

950

 

1,214

 

1,536

 

1,401

 

Wholesale and retail trade

 

2,668

 

2,992

 

3,629

 

10,531

 

11,524

 

Hotels and restaurants

 

100

 

136

 

156

 

165

 

203

 

Transport and storage

 

3,349

 

4,962

 

5,243

 

4,503

 

4,596

 

Communications

 

4,228

 

6,161

 

5,982

 

7,588

 

7,702

 

Financial services

 

20,797

 

21,567

 

22,920

 

28,937

 

31,427

 

Engineering and business services

 

4,107

 

4,352

 

4,093

 

2,186

 

2,246

 

Other services

 

986

 

1,277

 

3,386

 

3,701

 

3,878

 

Not classified

 

66,440

 

72,916

 

63,550

 

52,913

 

44,858

 

Total

 

175,753

 

206,041

 

213,129

 

223,113

 

229,229

 

 


(1)         Including capital and debt.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

On October 26, 2016, Law No. 20,956 was published in the Official Gazette. This law provides for measures aimed at boosting productivity by expanding financing options, promoting the export of services and simplifying procedures for entrepreneurs and investors. The bill is intended to reduce the financial cost of factoring arrangements; diversify investment products available for pension funds and insurance companies by introducing new investment alternatives, including infrastructure projects; and simplify the tax collection system applied to interest accrued on local securities, to facilitate access to the Chilean securities’ market by foreign investors through foreign clearing systems; among other measures. The statute has been implemented gradually, and will be in full effect by November 2017.

 

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MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM

 

Role of the Chilean Central Bank

 

The 1980 Constitution defined the Chilean Central Bank as an autonomous legal entity.  The Chilean Central Bank is governed by the 1989 Central Bank Act, which has the rank of a constitutional organic law.  To the extent consistent with this law, the Chilean Central Bank is also subject to the private sector’s laws and regulations.  The Chilean Central Bank is prohibited from lending funds to the government or buying government debt, either directly or indirectly, except in a state of war or danger thereof.  The Chilean Central Bank is governed and managed by a Council composed of five members.  The president of the Republic, with the prior consent of the Senate, appoints each member of the Council for staggered, renewable ten-year periods.  One seat on the Council is subject to election every two years.  The president of the Republic appoints the president of the Chilean Central Bank’s Council, who serves for a period of five years, from among the Council members.  The quorum required for the Council to operate is three out of the five members, and the motions must be approved by a majority of those present.  If the Council cannot reach a decision, the president of the Council casts the deciding vote.

 

According to the Central Bank Act, the main objective of the Chilean Central Bank is to maintain the stability of the Chilean currency and the orderly functioning of Chile’s internal and external payment system.  To achieve these purposes, the Central Bank Act vests the Chilean Central Bank with the authority to set reserve requirements for banks, to regulate the amount of money and credit in circulation, to operate as a lender of last resort and to establish regulations and guidelines regarding financial institutions, the formal exchange market and bank deposit-taking activities.  These attributes allow the Chilean Central Bank to implement a wide range of policy tools for controlling monetary and exchange rate policy.

 

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy, General Overview

 

The Chilean Central Bank’s monetary policy has generally focused on protecting the value of the country’s currency and seeking to keep the inflation rate low and stable.  To fulfill this task, the Chilean Central Bank has followed a countercyclical strategy, which, in addition to preserving price stability, seeks to avoid extreme changes in domestic demand.  In this sense, the Chilean Central Bank’s monetary policy intends to achieve price stability over time, taking into account the effects this policy has on economic activity and employment in the short and medium terms.

 

The Chilean Central Bank’s focus on price stability has translated into an inflation targeting monetary approach.  Between 2001 and 2006, the Chilean Central Bank set a rolling 12-month target band for underlying inflation (which excluded goods with highly volatile prices such as fuel, oil and fresh vegetables) and a rolling 24-month target band for total inflation.  Beginning in 2007, the Chilean Central Bank began setting a rolling two-year target band for underlying inflation, although the target band has remained between 2.0% and 4.0%, as it was in 2006.

 

With regard to exchange policy, an exchange rate band was in place from the mid-1980s until September 1999, when the Chilean Central Bank adopted a free-floating exchange rate regime, after a period of favorable monetary and exchange rate conditions.  These circumstances included low and stable inflation, adequate financial regulation, an exchange rate within the set-floating band, development of exchange rate and financial hedging instruments, and improvements in private risk management.  Hence, the introduction of the free-floating regime was achieved without shocks and rapidly led the Chilean currency to reflect its actual market value.

 

During the 1990s, the Chilean Central Bank also used reserve requirements (encaje) to prevent foreign currency inflows that could have affected the value of the Chilean peso.  See “Balance of Payments and Foreign TradeBalance of Payments—Capital Account.”  A foreign exchange free-floating regime, however, does not mean the Chilean Central Bank cannot intervene in the market when it considers the currency to be moving too far from its equilibrium value, which could result in costly reversions.  Nevertheless, these interventions take the form of transparent, well-founded measures, and include clearly delineated periods and amounts involved, as well as the clear explanation of the reasons behind these exceptional actions.

 

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Monetary Policy and Interest Rate Evolution

 

The Chilean Central Bank’s monetary policy is based on an interest rate target.  Since August 2001, when the bank shifted its monetary instrument from an indexed interest rate to a nominal one, the subject of the target has been the daily interbank nominal interest rate, known as the monetary policy rate (Tasa de Política Monetaria, or TPM).  This measure was complemented by the gradual replacement of short-term inflation-indexed debt securities denominated in UF with new medium-term debt securities denominated in nominal pesos.

 

The use of nominal rather than real interest rates is part of the modernization of the Chilean Central Bank’s monetary policy framework.  This process allows a reduction in the volatility of nominal instruments, especially exchange rate and monetary liquid aggregated volatility.  It is also intended to simplify international financial integration, expedite risk management and increase the transparency of the interest rate itself.

 

To ensure that the TPM rate falls within the desired range, the Chilean Central Bank must regulate the financial system’s liquidity (measured in terms of reserves), using a set of instruments, including:  (i) liquidity deposits, lines of credits and open market transactions; and (ii) buying and selling short-term promissory notes.  These tools also incorporate the banking reserve deposits, although currently the Chilean Central Bank is not using this mechanism as an active monetary policy instrument.

 

Banks and other financial institutions maintain a liquidity deposit account with the Chilean Central Bank, where a one-day deposit can earn a predetermined interest rate.  This rate establishes an effective lower threshold for short-term interest rates.  Additionally, financial institutions have a liquidity credit line from the Chilean Central Bank for which they pay a predetermined overnight interest rate.  This credit line is divided into three tranches:  the first corresponds to 40.0% of the total credit line, and the second and third tranches are each 30.0% of the credit line.  Each succeeding tranche has a higher interest rate, and the maximum credit line allowance equals 60.0% of each bank’s reserve requirements.

 

As mentioned above, the Chilean Central Bank also conducts short-term liquidity management, mainly through repurchase agreements.  Repurchase agreements are a complementary liquidity line for banks, for which the Chilean Central Bank announces a daily rate, and banks indicate which instruments they wish to sell to the Central Bank at that rate.  To maintain the base interest rate at the desired level, the Chilean Central Bank conducts open-market transactions, buying repurchase agreements that use promissory notes with maturities of less than seven days or selling reverse repurchase agreements (which is the sale of an asset with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase the asset at a specified price).

 

The following table sets forth the Chilean Central Bank’s average interest rates for the periods indicated.

 

Chilean Central Bank Average Interest Rates
(in %)

 

 

 

BCP(1)(3)

 

BCU(2)(3)

 

 

 

Year

 

5 years

 

10 years

 

5 years

 

10 years

 

TPM

 

2012

 

5.26

 

5.42

 

2.37

 

2.44

 

5.01

 

2013

 

5.14

 

5.25

 

2.28

 

2.36

 

4.93

 

2014

 

 

 

 

 

3.75

 

2015

 

4.14

 

 

 

 

3.06

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

3.50

 

2017 (through March 31)

 

 

 

 

 

3.17

 

 


(1)         BCP:  Peso-denominated Chilean Central Bank notes.

(2)         BCU:  UF-denominated Chilean Central Bank notes.

(3)         BCU and BCP are part of the inflation-indexed and peso-denominated financial instruments issued by the Chilean Central Bank since September 2003.  See “—Monetary Policy and Interest Rate Evolution.”

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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The following table sets forth the Chilean Treasury’s average interest rates for the periods indicated.

 

Chilean Treasury Interest Rates
(in %)

 

 

 

BTP (1)

 

BTU (2)

 

Year

 

5 years

 

10 years

 

5 years

 

10 years

 

2012

 

 

5.59

 

2.36

 

2.56

 

2013

 

 

5.26

 

 

2.33

 

2014

 

4.26

 

4.71

 

 

1.70

 

2015

 

 

4.47

(3)

1.12

(4)

1.61

(5)

2016

 

4.16

 

4.60

(6)

1.24

(7)

1.43

(8)

 


(1)         BTP:  Peso-denominated Chilean Treasury notes.

(2)         BTU:  UF-denominated Chilean Treasury notes.

(3)       Issued April 22, 2015.

(4)       Issued September 2, 2015.

(5)       Issued May 20, 2015.

(6)       Issued June 22, 2016.

(7)       Issued May 11, 2016.

(8)       Issued July 21, 2016.

Source:  Ministry of Finance.

 

Inflation

 

Reversing policies from previous years, and following the Chilean Central Bank’s attainment of full autonomy in 1990, inflation was successfully curbed over the decade that followed, falling from 27.3% in 1990 to 4.5% in 2000.  In 2001 the Chilean Central Bank adopted a target inflation band of 3.0% (+/- 1.0%) inflation over a 12-24 month policy horizon, which was modified to a two-year target band in 2007.  Inflation is measured by the change in the CPI for the relevant calendar year, unless otherwise specified.

 

In 2011 inflation increased beyond the Chilean Central Bank’s acceptable tolerance range reaching 4.4%, mainly driven by higher food and fuel prices which experienced sharp increases in the first months of the year.  In 2012, prices for goods recorded negative annual inflation rates while prices for services initially increased significantly but dropped in later months resulting in an annual inflation rate of 1.5%.

 

Inflation averaged 2.0% for most of 2013, although prices for goods and energy caused the annualized rate to increase to 3.0% in December.

 

In 2014, the annual inflation rate rose to 4.6% (year-on-year) in December, reflecting the significant depreciation of the Chilean peso and the influence of other specific and transitory elements.

 

In 2015, the inflation rate stood at 4.4% (year-on-year).  The TPM, which remained at 3.0% through September 2015, increased to 3.25% in October 2015 and to 3.5% in December 2015.

 

As of December 31, 2016, the inflation rate stood at 2.7% (year-on-year).  The TPM remained stable at 3.50% throughout the year. As of March 31, 2017, the TPM stood at 3.17%.

 

One alternative metric for inflation is the Producer Price Index (PPI).  The PPI measures the average change over time in the selling prices received by domestic producers of goods and services.  While the CPI measures price change from the purchaser’s perspective, the PPI measures price change from the perspective of the producers.

 

The following table shows changes in the CPI and the PPI for the periods indicated.

 

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Inflation

 

 

 

Percentage Change from Previous 
Year at Period End

 

 

 

CPI

 

PPI(1)

 

2012

 

1.5

 

(0.7

)

2013

 

3.0

 

(2.8

)

2014

 

4.6

 

0.8

 

2015

 

4.4

 

(5.5

)

2016

 

2.7

 

(8.6

)

 


(1)         Manufacturing, mining and electricity, water, and gas distribution industries.

Source:  CPI, Chilean Central Bank.  PPI, National Institute of Statistics.

 

Exchange Rate Policy

 

Between 1990 and 1999, the Chilean Central Bank’s exchange rate policy was aimed at restraining the appreciation of the peso against a basket of currencies via a crawling exchange rate band.  From 1993 to 1997, the nominal exchange rate fluctuated within a narrow range around Ps.400/US$.  Throughout the period, however, the real exchange rate appreciated due to the positive (although decreasing) inflation differential between Chile and its trade partners.  The nominal stability of the peso resulted from two factors:  capital inflows contributing appreciation pressure to the nominal exchange rate and the Chilean Central Bank counteracting this via regular (sterilized) interventions in the foreign exchange market inside the flotation band, and occasional increases in the coverage of unremunerated reserve requirements.

 

In September 1999 the Chilean Central Bank dropped the crawling exchange rate bands for the Chilean peso, adopting a free floating exchange rate, although it retained the right to intervene when the exchange rate moved too far from its equilibrium value.

 

Between 2000 and 2006, the exchange rate presented two strong trend shifts.

 

Between 2000 and 2002, the peso was volatile and depreciated sharply because of the effects of the Argentine sovereign debt default and the disruption in international markets due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  This triggered a strong fall in copper prices, and low liquidity in the market coupled with a general uncertainty in part due to the political and economic situation in Brazil.  During this period the exchange rate reached its historical peak on October 11, 2002 of Ps.756.56/US$.  As a result, in late 2002 the Chilean Central Bank announced an exchange intervention to stabilize the currency.

 

The period 2003-2006 experienced a change in trend due to the appreciation of the peso, which was largely due to favorable financial conditions in emerging economies, a rebound in copper prices and a sharp depreciation in the dollar in international markets.

 

During 2007, the peso appreciated considerably against the U.S. dollar, trading, in December 2007 at an average exchange rate of Ps.499.28/US$, in comparison with an average exchange rate of Ps.527.6/US$ in December 2006.  The peso had not reached this level of appreciation since May 1999.

 

Beginning in the fourth quarter of 2007 and until April 2008, the peso appreciated in both nominal and real terms.  This appreciation, common to most emerging economies, was driven by both the weakening of the U.S. dollar globally and large global imbalances.

 

Taking into consideration the potential adverse effects on Chile’s financial stability that could have resulted from the worsening global economic conditions, on April 10, 2008 the Chilean Central Bank Council decided to intervene in the foreign exchange market during 2008 and announced an international reserves accumulation program of US$8 billion, to be implemented between April and December 2008.  Announcing the intervention was consistent with the transparency principles that governs the Chilean Central Bank’s policymaking and with the floating exchange rate and inflation targeting schemes currently in force.  The accumulation of reserves also modified the Chilean Central Bank’s foreign currency position, consistent with the assessment that, at the time of the

 

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intervention, the real exchange rate was below the level that would prevail in normal global real and financial conditions.

 

At the end of September 2008, the peso traded at Ps.552/US$ and the Chilean Central Bank Council announced the end of its reserve accumulation program, which had added US$5.75 billion in reserves, representing an increase of 30.0% compared to March 2008.  In line with the value of U.S. dollars in relation to other currencies, after September 2008 the peso continued to depreciate, dropping to approximately Ps.629/US$ at the end of 2008.

 

During 2009, the peso appreciated against the U.S. dollar, particularly during the fourth quarter, reaching Ps.506.4/US$ by the end of the year.  This was mainly the result of the depreciation of the U.S. dollar in international markets.  The Chilean peso may also have been affected by the inflow of dollars related to the government’s withdrawals from the Economic and Stabilization Fund (FEES) to help finance the 2009 Fiscal Plan.  See “The Economy—Global Financial Crisis—Economic Performance and Policies of 2008 and 2009.”  In line with the currencies of many emerging economies, the peso appreciated against the U.S. dollar during 2010.  In 2011 the Ps./US$ exchange rate experienced more volatility echoing the external situation.  After appreciating to nearly Ps.455.9/US$ by the end of July, the peso depreciated to close the year at Ps.521.5/US$, mainly as a result of the dollar appreciation in the international markets, greater risk aversion by global investors, the drop in copper prices, as well as the international reserves accumulation program, which added US$12 billion to the Chilean Treasury in 2011.  See “—International Reserves.”  The behavior of the Ps./US$ exchange rate during the first semester of 2012 reflected volatility attributable to the uncertainties for the European economy as a result of the global financial crisis and the fluctuations of copper prices.  After appreciating in the earlier part of 2012, the peso depreciated against the U.S. dollar to Ps.509.7/US$ in June, and again appreciated in the second half of 2012, reaching Ps.478.6/US$ in December 2012.

 

During the first nine months of 2013 the exchange rate fluctuated, mainly due to changes in the dollar’s global valuation and the increased volatility of international financial markets.  In December 2013, the Chilean peso traded at a rate of 523.8/US$, reflecting in part the lower interest rate differential between external and domestic rates brought about by the Chilean Central Bank’s decision to lower the Monetary Policy Rate (TPM) by 50 basis points in the last quarter of 2013.  The appreciation of the dollar continued during 2014 and 2015, although the Chilean Peso recovered in 2016, trading at Ps. 667.3/US$ 1.00 on December 31, 2016.

 

The strong depreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar observed between May 2013 and 2015 stems from the appreciation of the dollar internationally, however the timing of depreciation has differed in Chile vis-à-vis other emerging economies due to key factors, such as rapid adjustment of domestic spending and Chile’s implementation of an earlier, deeper expansionary cycle resulting in a year on year change of 16.0% of the dollar against the peso.

 

The following table shows the fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate since 2002.

 

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Observed Exchange Rates(1)
(pesos per US$)

 

 

 

High

 

Low

 

Average(2)

 

Period-End

 

2002

 

756.6

 

641.8

 

688.9

 

712.4

 

2003

 

758.2

 

593.1

 

691.4

 

559.4

 

2004

 

649.5

 

559.2

 

609.5

 

559.8

 

2005

 

592.8

 

509.7

 

559.8

 

514.2

 

2006

 

549.6

 

511.4

 

530.3

 

534.4

 

2007

 

548.7

 

493.1

 

522.5

 

495.8

 

2008

 

676.8

 

431.2

 

522.5

 

629.1

 

2009

 

643.9

 

491.1

 

559.6

 

506.4

 

2010

 

549.2

 

468.4

 

510.4

 

468.4

 

2011

 

533.7

 

455.9

 

483.4

 

521.5

 

2012

 

519.7

 

469.7

 

486.8

 

478.6

 

2013

 

534.0

 

466.5

 

495.0

 

523.8

 

2014

 

621.4

 

524.6

 

570.4

 

607.4

 

2015

 

715.7

 

597.1

 

654.2

 

707.3

 

2016

 

730.3

 

645.2

 

676.9

 

667.3

 

Three Months Ended March 31, 2017

 

673.4

 

638.4

 

655.2

 

662.7

 

 


(1)         The table presents the annual high, low, average and period-end observed rates for each year.

(2)         Represents the average of average monthly rates for the periods indicated.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

International Reserves

 

The Chilean Central Bank manages its international reserves according to the free-floating exchange rate regime.

 

In 2011, the Chilean Central Bank increased reserves to strengthen its international liquidity position, by engaging in periodic purchases of foreign currency, thus increasing the international reserve level by US$14.1 billion at the end of 2011, to US$42.0 billion. Since then, international reserves have remained relatively stable, and stood at approximately US$39.0 billion as of March 31, 2017.

 

The following table shows the composition of net international reserves of the Chilean Central Bank for the years indicated:

 

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Net International Reserves of the Chilean Central Bank
(in millions of US$)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Chilean Central Bank:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Assets:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Gold

 

US$

13

 

US$

10

 

US$

9

 

US$

8

 

US$

9

 

SDRs

 

1,212

 

1,147

 

1,079

 

1,058

 

728

 

Reserve position in the IMF

 

692

 

641

 

490

 

363

 

215

 

Foreign exchange and bank deposits

 

4,585

 

4,521

 

5,799

 

5,576

 

7,445

 

Securities

 

35,067

 

34,643

 

32,950

 

31,597

 

32,082

 

Other assets

 

81

 

132

 

119

 

39

 

15

 

Total

 

US$

41,649

 

US$

41,094

 

US$

40,447

 

US$

38,643

 

US$

40,494

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Liabilities:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reciprocal Credit Agreements

 

US$

28

 

US$

9

 

US$

14

 

US$

 

US$

 

Bonds and promissory notes

 

231

 

1,098

 

858

 

516

 

US$

608

 

Accounts with international organizations

 

88

 

89

 

83

 

82

 

86

 

SDR allocations

 

1,256

 

1,258

 

1,183

 

1,133

 

1,099

 

Total

 

US$

1,602

 

US$

2,454

 

US$

2,138

 

US$

1,731

 

US$

1,793

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total international reserves, net

 

US$

40,047

 

US$

38,640

 

US$

38,309

 

US$

36,912

 

US$

38,701

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Money Supply

 

The evolution of Chile’s monetary base reflects the private sector demand for monetary balances, which depend on economic growth, the alternative cost of money and inflation.  Although the Chilean Central Bank does not seek to implement monetary supply controls, these variables are under continuous monitoring to protect the economy against the effects of external shocks.

 

The following tables set forth the monthly average monetary base and the average monetary aggregates as of the dates indicated:

 

Monetary Base(1)
(in billions of pesos)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Currency in circulation

 

Ps.

4,199.1

 

Ps.

4,693.2

 

Ps.

5,160.6

 

Ps.

5,679.3

 

Ps.

6,057.7

 

Bank reserves

 

3,460.5

 

3,603.6

 

3,554.6

 

4,022.7

 

4,114.1

 

Monetary base

 

Ps.

7,659.5

 

Ps.

8,296.8

 

Ps.

8,715.2

 

Ps.

9,701.9

 

Ps.

10,171.7

 

 


(1)         There are no demand deposits at the Chilean Central Bank.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Monetary Aggregates
(in billions of pesos)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Currency in circulation

 

Ps.

4,199.1

 

Ps.

4,693.2

 

Ps.

5,160.6

 

Ps.

5,679,3

 

Ps.

6,057.7

 

Demand deposits at commercial banks

 

15,399.3

 

17,418.7

 

20,330.2

 

22,530.8

 

23,312.3

 

M1(1)

 

Ps.

19,598.4

 

Ps.

22,111.9

 

Ps.

25,490.8

 

Ps.

28,210.0

 

Ps.

29,370.0

 

Total time and savings deposits at banks

 

Ps.

51,821.0

 

Ps.

59,555.0

 

Ps.

63,623.3

 

Ps.

67,961.0

 

Ps.

74,793.6

 

Others

 

596.9

 

1,065.7

 

1,351.6

 

1,132.4

 

1,436.1

 

M2(2)

 

Ps.

72,016.3

 

Ps.

82,732.6

 

Ps.

90,465.6

 

Ps.

99,303.4

 

Ps.

105,599.6

 

Foreign currency deposits at Chilean Central Bank

 

Ps.

8,068.6

 

Ps.

9,628.8

 

Ps.

12,683.9

 

Ps.

14,524.2

 

Ps.

14,588.9

 

Documents of Chilean Central Bank

 

9,420.5

 

10,362.4

 

9,485.0

 

9,013.2

 

8,249.4

 

Letters of Credit

 

1,490.7

 

993.8

 

1,136.3

 

834.3

 

541.3

 

Private Bonds

 

16,611.0

 

17,974.3

 

18,594.2

 

18,754.9

 

20,247.4

 

Others

 

14,564.8

 

17,451.9

 

22,239.2

 

29,995.9

 

36,393.0

 

M3(3)

 

Ps.

122,171.9

 

Ps.

139,143.7

 

Ps.

154,604.2

 

Ps.

172,425.9

 

Ps.

185,619.6

 

 


(1)         M1:  Currency in circulation plus checking accounts net of float, demand deposits at commercial banks other than the former and other than demand savings deposits.

(2)         M2:  M1 plus time deposits, time savings deposits, shares of mutual funds invested in up to one-year term debt instruments and collections by saving and credit cooperatives (excluding time deposit of the mutual funds previously mentioned and of saving and credit cooperatives).

(3)         M3:  M2 plus deposits in foreign currency, documents issued by the Chilean Central Bank, Chilean treasury bonds, letters of credit, commercial papers, corporate bonds, shares of the other mutual funds and shares of pension funds in voluntary savings (excluding mutual funds’ and pension funds’ investments in M3 securities).

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

The following table shows selected monetary indicators for the periods indicated:

 

Selected Monetary Indicators
(in %)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

M1 (% change

 

8.8

 

12.8

 

15.3

 

10.7

 

4.1

 

M2 (% change)

 

7.6

 

14.9

 

9.3

 

9.8

 

6.3

 

Credit from the financial system

 

12.9

 

9.7

 

9.6

 

10.1

 

8.4

 

Average annual peso deposit rate(1)

 

3.5

 

2.9

 

1.4

 

1.1

 

1.1

 

 


(1)         Represents real interest rates for a period of 90 to 365 days.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

The following table shows liquidity and credit aggregates as of the dates indicated:

 

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Liquidity and Credit Aggregates
(in billions of pesos)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Liquidity aggregates (at period end)

 

Ps.

7,660

 

Ps.

8,297

 

Ps.

8,715

 

Ps.

9,702

 

Ps.

10,171.7

 

Monetary base:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Currency, excluding cash in vaults at banks

 

4,199

 

4,693

 

5,161

 

5,679

 

6,057.7

 

M1(1)  

 

19,598

 

22,112

 

25,491

 

28,210

 

29,370.0

 

M2(2)  

 

72,016

 

82,733

 

90,466

 

99,303

 

105,599.6

 

M3(3)  

 

122,172

 

139,144

 

154,604

 

172,426

 

185,619.6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Credit aggregates (at period end):

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Private sector credit

 

Ps.

97,419

 

Ps.

107,195

 

Ps.

118,176

 

Ps.

130,870

 

Ps.

137,643.0

 

Public sector credit

 

(349

)

1.183

 

(212

)

(657

)

(732

)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total domestic credit(4)  

 

Ps.

79,803

 

Ps.

86,751

 

Ps.

93,072

 

Ps.

102,942

 

Ps.

108,282.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Deposits:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chilean peso deposits

 

Ps.

87,900

 

Ps.

95,077

 

Ps.

103,013

 

Ps.

115,477

 

Ps.

122,747.4

 

Foreign-currency deposits

 

12,214

 

15,161

 

20,184

 

20,567

 

21,547.2

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total deposits

 

Ps.

100,114

 

Ps.

110,238

 

Ps.

123,197

 

Ps.

136,045

 

Ps.

144,294.7

 

 


(1)         Currency in circulation plus peso-denominated demand deposits.

(2)         M1 plus peso-denominated savings deposits.

(3)         M2 plus deposits in foreign currency, principally U.S. dollars.  Does not include government time deposits at Chilean Central Bank.

(4)         Includes capital reserves and other net assets and liabilities.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Financial Sector

 

General Overview of Banking System

 

The modern Chilean banking system dates from 1925 and has been characterized by periods of substantial regulation and state intervention followed by periods of deregulation.  In the early 1970s, the banking sector was controlled by the state and highly regulated.  In 1974, a process of interest rate liberalization, removal of credit controls and banking privatization began.  However, after the financial crisis that affected Chile during 1982 and 1983, the Chilean Central Bank and the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, or SBIF) established strict controls on the funding, lending and general business matters of the banking with industry in Chile.  In 1986, a new general banking act, the General Banking Act, was introduced, which had as its main objectives to improve banking system supervision and regulation.  The General Banking Act was rewritten in 1997, beginning a new era of liberalization.  Among other matters, this amendment allowed the entry of new entities into the system (SBIF granted permits to seven new banks) and the internationalization of banks.  In addition, under this new legislation, the SBIF adopted international monitoring standards, incorporating the First Basel Committee’s 1998 Capital Accord and, recently, Basel II.

 

According to the General Banking Act, banks are special stock corporations engaged in the business of receiving money or funds from the general public, in order to use them to grant loans, discount documents, make investments and financial intermediation, and generally perform any other operation permitted by law.

 

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Nevertheless, banks may conduct only those activities allowed by the General Banking Act.  Furthermore, the General Banking Act limits the amount invested in certain activities.  Directly or through subsidiaries, banks may also engage in certain specified additional activities, such as securities brokerage services; mutual funds, investment funds or foreign capital funds management; factoring; securitization; financial leases and insurance brokerage services.  Subject to certain limitations and with the prior approval of the SBIF and the Chilean Central Bank, Chilean banks may own majority or minority interests in foreign banks.  In addition, banks may operate as placement agents and underwriters of initial public offerings of shares and of cross-market products of their subsidiaries.  Banks are authorized to operate in derivatives transactions, including forwards, futures, swaps and, since 2007, options.

 

Currently, commercial banks in Chile face growing competition from several sources, which has led to consolidation in the banking industry.  Competition in the extension of credit has come increasingly from department stores, through the issue and management of credit cards, and foreign banks.  In addition, two of Chile’s largest department stores have, through related entities, obtained licenses and begun to engage in commercial banking activities, while a third has acquired an existing bank.  While these events have increased competition in consumer credit, it is not likely to be a continuing trend in the coming years.

 

As of December 31, 2016, there were 25 privately owned domestic banks and one state-owned bank (Banco Estado) operating in Chile.  Corpbanca and Itaú Bank are in the process of implementing a merger that would result in a new entity accounting for approximately 14% of the Chilean banking market (measured by loans).  In addition, there are five branches of foreign banks authorized to operate in Chile.  As of December 31, 2016, the Chilean banking system had a total amount of outstanding loans equal to US$221 billion.  Under the third capital markets reform, provided by Law No. 20,448, agencies of foreign banks would be allowed to market the loan products they offer abroad.  See “Capital Markets—Capital Markets Reforms.”

 

Two of the largest Chilean banks, Banco Santander-Chile, or Santander-Chile, and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Chile, or BBVA-Chile, are subsidiaries of Spanish banks, Banco Santander and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A., respectively.  Despite such banks having a combined 24.2% market share of the Chilean banking market (measured by loans) as of December 31, 2016, the government does not believe the Chilean financial sector or economy in general is materially exposed to adverse risks created by the European sovereign debt crisis or the difficulties affecting the Spanish economy.  Notwithstanding their foreign ownership, Santander-Chile and BBVA-Chile are licensed as Chilean banks and are subject to generally applicable Chilean banking laws and regulations, including, among other things, Chilean minimum capital and reserve requirements (encaje), which help to insulate the Chilean operations of these banks from foreign financial crises, and restrictions on capital reductions, which help to ensure that transfers of capital to the Spanish parent companies of these banks in excess of Chilean requirements are subject to the SBIF’s prior approval. See “—Banking Regulation.”

 

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The following table provides certain statistical information on the financial system:

 

Chilean Financial System
(in millions of U.S. dollars except for percentages)

 

 

 

As of December 31, 2016

 

 

 

Assets

 

Loans

 

Deposits

 

Shareholders’
Equity(1)

 

 

 

Amount

 

Market
Share

 

Amount

 

Market
Share

 

Amount

 

Market
Share

 

Amount

 

Market
Share

 

Domestically owned private-sector banks

 

260,375

 

83.3

%

190,190

 

86.1

%

147,849

 

81.0

%

23,009

 

89.2

%

Foreign- owned private-sector banks(2)  

 

989

 

0.3

%

125

 

0.1

%

194

 

0.1

%

478

 

1.9

%

Private-sector total

 

261,364

 

83.6

%

190,315

 

86.1

%

148,043

 

81.1

%

23,487

 

91.0

%

Banco Estado

 

51,398

 

16.4

%

30,651

 

13.9

%

34,442

 

18.9

%

2,313

 

9.0

%

Total banks

 

312,762

 

100.0

%

220,966

 

100.0

%

182,486

 

100.0

%

25,800

 

100.0

%

 


(1)         Corresponds to the “Capital Básico.”  This item included capital and reserves.

(2)         Foreign-owned subsidiaries of foreign banks are classified as domestically owned private-sector banks.  If they were classified as foreign-owned private-sector banks, the market share of foreign-owned private-sector banks would be as follows:  assets:  35%, loans:  36%, deposits:  31%, shareholders’ equity:  38%, with the corresponding reduction in the market share of domestically owned private-sector banks.

Source:  SBIF.

 

The following table sets forth the total assets of the four largest Chilean private-sector banks, state-owned Banco Estado and other banks in the aggregate:

 

 

 

As of December 31, 2016

 

 

 

In billions of Pesos

 

Market Share

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Banco Santander-Chile

 

Ps.

37.0

 

17.5

%

Banco Estado

 

34.8

 

16.4

%

Banco de Chile

 

31.6

 

14.9

%

Banco de Crédito e Inversiones

 

30.9

 

14.6

%

Corpbanca

 

29.1

 

13.8

%

Other banks

 

48.3

 

22.8

%

Total Banking System

 

Ps.

211.7

 

100.0

%

 


Source:  SBIF.

 

The following table sets forth information on bank operation efficiency indicators for the periods indicated:

 

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Indicators of Financial System Efficiency
(%)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Return on assets

 

1.1

 

1.2

 

1.4

 

1.1

 

0.9

 

Return on equity

 

14.6

 

14.8

 

17.2

 

14.2

 

11.0

 

Non-performing loans as a percentage of total loans

 

1.0

 

1.0

 

1.0

 

0.9

 

0.8

 

Gross operational margin/assets

 

4.6

 

4.6

 

4.8

 

4.4

 

4.2

 

Operating expenses/operating revenue

 

47.4

 

46.3

 

45.3

 

47.4

 

50.2

 

Operating expenses/average total assets

 

2.1

 

2.1

 

2.2

 

2.1

 

2.1

 

Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets

 

13.3

 

13.3

 

13.4

 

12.6

 

13.8

 

 


Source:  SBIF.

 

Banking Regulation

 

The SBIF is the main banking sector regulator.  In addition, the Chilean Central Bank oversees exchange rate policy and regulates international capital movements and certain bank operations.

 

The SBIF monitors and oversees Chile’s banks (excluding the Chilean Central Bank), as well as a subset of the cooperatives that hold savings deposits and provide credit (the larger cooperatives in terms of capital) and mutual guarantees entities, companies whose corporate purpose includes the issuance or operation of credit cards or any other similar credit system (mainly supermarkets and department store chains), and companies that issue or operates prepaid cards.  Additionally, the SBIF authorizes the incorporation and licensing of new banks and foreign banks branches, and has broad powers to issue, interpret and enforce banking regulations (both legal and regulatory).  The SBIF must also approve any bank merger, bylaw amendment, capital increase and any acquisition of 10.0% or more of the equity interests in a bank.  In case of non-compliance, the SBIF has the authority to impose a range of remedial actions.

 

The SBIF has signed several Memoranda of Understanding providing for mutual cooperation and the exchange of information in recent years, including with the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions of Canada (2010), with the China Banking Regulatory Commission (2011), with the Financial Superintendency of Colombia (2012), and with the Superintendency of Banks of Panama (2013).

 

Moreover, since June 2007 the SBIF, the SVS and the SP are allowed, by the Data Protection Law, to share information with each other, except data protected by bank privacy laws.

 

As part of its supervisory role, the SBIF examines banks at least once a year.  Banks are required to submit their financial statements to the SBIF monthly and to publish them at least four times a year in a newspaper with national coverage.  Banks must also submit to the SBIF their annual financial statements and the opinions of their independent auditors and are required to be rated by two independent rating agencies.  Finally, banks are also subject to periodic reporting obligations to the SBIF with respect to a wide range of operational and transactional data.

 

Since January 2010, all banks have been required to include in the calculation of expected losses and provisioning a percentage of off-balance sheet contingent loans, including, among others, undrawn lines of credit, unused credit card lines and stand-by letters of credit.  Since January 2011, banks have also been required to transition their systems to use models developed by the SBIF (instead of internally developed models) to determine the probability of default.

 

In September 2010, the SBIF issued regulations to protect bank customers by instituting a stricter standard for delivery instructions, and forbidding unilateral amendments to contracts or suspension of accounts and regulated products tied to mortgage agreements, such as insurance.  In addition, since October 24, 2011, a “universal lending agreement” (contratos de crédito universal) relating to mortgages, credit cards and consumer loans, became

 

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operative as part of the Third Capital Markets reform bill.  See “—Capital Markets—Third Capital Markets Reform.”

 

Deposit Insurance

 

The General Banking Act (GBA) provides for a government guarantee of up to 90.0% of the aggregate amount of certain time deposits, savings accounts and non-bearer securities issued by banks held by individuals.  This guarantee is limited to UF 108 (US$4,204 as of December 31, 2016) per person (for the system as a whole) for each calendar year.  In the event a bank is required to submit a restructuring plan to its creditors (pursuant to section 122 of the GBA) or is forced to liquidate, the Chilean Central Bank provides liquidity up to 100.0% of the amount of deposits in current accounts and other sight deposits and other sight obligations of the failed institution. Such liquidity is subject to a request from the failed institution, as well as a favorable report from the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) regarding the verification of the submission of the restructuring plan proposed to the failed institution’s creditors. Liquidity is only provided to the extent that available funds in the failed institution are insufficient to pay covered sight obligations.

 

Sight deposits and time deposits are subject to a monthly reserve requirement determined by the Chilean Central Bank. As of December 31, 2016, this requirement amounted to 9% for sight deposits and 3.6% for time deposits (with maturity from one day to one year).  In 2003, due to the free trade agreement executed with the United States, foreign currency reserve requirements were made equivalent to local currency reserve requirements.  In order to implement monetary policy, the Chilean Central Bank has statutory authority to increase these percentages to a maximum of 40.0% for sight deposits and a maximum of 20.0% for other deposits and obligations.

 

In addition, a 100.0% technical reserve requirement applies to sight deposits and obligations exceeding the regulatory capital of the bank by 2.5 times.

 

Minimum Capital; Capital Adequacy Requirements

 

The GBA provides that banks must meet a minimum paid-in capital and reserves requirement equal to UF 800,000 (approximately US$31.1 million as of December 31, 2016).

 

A minimum of 50.0% of the minimum capital shall be duly paid at the moment a bank is incorporated (or at the moment of receiving authorization to start operations, in the case of a branch of a foreign bank).  There is no legal term to pay the remaining capital.  However, until the bank reaches the required minimum capital, its regulatory capital must be no less than 12.0% of its risk weighted assets.  This requirement decreases to 10.0% of risk weighted assets after the bank’s regulatory capital reaches at least UF 600,000 (approximately US$23.4 million as of December 31, 2016).

 

The GBA also provides that paid-in capital and reserves of a bank, net of investments in subsidiaries (the “net capital base”), cannot be less than 3.0% of total assets, net of mandatory provisions, while its regulatory capital, cannot be less than 8.0% of its risk-weighted assets after the bank reaches the minimum required paid-in capital.  As of December 31, 2016, all Chilean banks met or exceeded Chile’s legal capital adequacy guidelines.

 

The amendment to the GBA of 1997 implemented a modified version of the capital adequacy guidelines issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1988 (“Basel I”).  The principal change that Chile made to the “Capital Adequacy Guidelines” was to assign a relatively greater risk-weight to mortgage loans (60.0% rather than 50.0%).

 

In 2005, the SBIF published a roadmap identifying the steps required to transition to the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards released by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 2004 (“Basel II”).  This roadmap included a proposal to increase minimum regulatory capital to 10.0% of risk weighted assets.

 

In March 2006, the money laundering and financing of terrorism rules were replaced, in accordance with the “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” and “Knowledge of Banks Customers” guidelines of the Basel Committee, and the relevant provisions of Law No. 19,913, which created the Financial Analysis Unit.

 

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In January 2015, Law No. 20,818 was enacted, amending Law No. 19,913, expanding the number of criminal offenses considered underlying crimes constituting money laundering and the financing of terrorism and granting additional powers to the UAF.  See “Republic of Chile—Measures Implemented to Deter Terrorism and Money Laundering.”

 

In November 2007, the SBIF, together with other Chilean superintendencies and regulatory bodies, required public companies in Chile to adopt over time the International Financial Reporting Standards, or IFRS, as adopted by the International Accounting Standards Boards, or IASB, in order to conform to international financial reporting standards.  Pursuant to the SBIF Compendium of Accounting Standards (Compendio de Normas Contables, or the “Compendium”), effective January 1, 2009, Chilean banks were required to adopt new accounting standards, which are more consistent with international accounting standards.  For all matters not described in the Compendium, which are not contrary to the instructions of the SBIF, banks are required to apply the technical standards, or the Technical Standards, adopted by the Chilean Accounting Association (Colegio de Contadores de Chile A.G.), which are in turn generally consistent with the international accounting and financial information standards adopted by the IASB.  If there are inconsistencies between the Technical Standards and the Compendium, the latter prevails.

 

The International Regulatory Framework for Banks released by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision between 2011 and 2013 (“Basel III”) has not yet been formally implemented by Chile, but the Ministry of Finance has announced that a bill will be submitted to Congress during 2016 to introduce necessary amendments to the GBA.  See “Recent Developments in Banking Regulation—Capital Adequacy Requirements.”

 

Recent Developments in Banking Regulation

 

Capital Adequacy Requirements, Institutional Aspects of the SBIF and Bank Resolution

 

The Ministry of Finance, in consultation with the SBIF, the Chilean Central Bank and other relevant stakeholders, is currently working on a draft bill of law to introduce amendments to the GBA along three main pillars: strengthening capital requirements, improving institutional aspects and upgrading the framework to deal with distressed banks. The first pillar encompasses the key elements included in Basel II and Basel III.  With regards to the second pillar, the bill aims to enhance the corporate governance of the SBIF, by introducing the Financial Market Commission as a regulatory entity. The third pillar seeks to expand the toolkit available for bank dissolutions, while enhancing early intervention measures.

 

After these drafts have been approved by the Ministry of Finance, a bill is expected to be submitted to Congress by June 2017.

 

Although the Chilean banking system had a capital ratio of 7.58% as of December 31, 2016 (as measured by the SBIF under the definitions of the GBA), the adoption of the Basel II and Basel III capital framework may require certain banks to inject additional capital.

 

Universal Credits

 

Banks, insurance companies, retailers and other financial institutions are now required to inform their customers of the all-in costs of the financial services they provide on standardized terms, providing customers with a useful basis on which to compare the cost of financial products and services.

 

Consumer Protection

 

In December 2011, the Consumer Protection Act was amended to include provisions applicable to financial services and products.  According to this amendment, bank agreements with consumers for financial services or products must, among other requirements:  (1) provide a detailed breakdown of all the charges, fees, costs and tariffs that form part of the price, including those which are indirectly part of the price, or that are associated with other products simultaneously contracted; (2) expressly provide the terms related to early termination of the agreement by the bank, a reasonable cure period and the method by which a consumer will receive notice of such early termination; and (3) allow for early termination of the agreement in the sole and absolute discretion of the customer, provided that the customer has paid all obligations in full, including any cost for the early termination.

 

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In addition, consumers are entitled to: (1) receive information about the total cost of the product or service; (2) receive an explanation in the case of the rejection of their credit application; and (3) know the objective requirements to access a particular financial product.  No assessment has yet been made as to the impact on the Consumer Protection Act or the financial market.

 

In February 2012, Law No. 20,575 introduced the “principle of purpose” to the use of commercial and financial personal data.  As a result, Chilean banks and other financial institutions can only use client financial and commercial personal data for the purposes of commercial risk assessment and in connection with the process of granting credits.

 

Bankruptcy Law

 

On January 9, 2014, the Chilean government published new bankruptcy legislation, Law No. 20,720, which provides for an improved legal and regulatory framework for the reorganization and liquidation of companies and the restructuring of company and consumer debts.  The law reinforces the role of the Former Superintendency of Bankruptcy (Superintendencia de Quiebras) which has been renamed the Superintendency of Insolvency and Debtor Rehabilitation (Superintendencia de Insolvencia y Reemprendimiento) and assigns it new responsibilities.

 

The new regulations are intended to facilitate proactive credit risk management and limit losses that arise from delays in the recognition and resolution of impaired loans, thereby leading to better asset quality and recoveries.  Other benefits include greater protection for secured creditors and clear guidelines on the ranking of related-party claims in insolvency proceedings.  A more efficient, structured process is also expected to be less costly in terms of management time and administrative and legal costs.  This legislation does not apply to banks, which in the case of liquidation, remain subject to the GBA.

 

Capital Markets

 

General

 

Over the last 30 years, the Chilean capital markets have grown in liquidity, market capitalization and through the emergence of new instruments and counterparties, such as institutional investors.  The regulatory environment of the capital markets in Chile is comprehensive and sophisticated.  It requires the delivery of detailed information by certain market participants, allows for a broad array of investment options, and includes a detailed set of regulations for the use of derivatives, futures, options, forwards and swaps in limiting foreign investment risks associated with variations in interest and exchange rates.

 

Capital Markets Reforms

 

Laws and regulations on capital markets are subject to continuous adjustments in order to be updated to market needs and international standards.  During the last decade, three major legal reforms have been passed seeking to modernize the capital markets:  the First Capital Market Reform, the Second Capital Market Reform and the Third Capital Market Reform.

 

In 2000, the First Capital Market Reform, a major reform of the corporate and securities laws, became effective, providing comprehensive regulation of tender offers and corporate governance.  This legislation set forth new rules regarding the necessary information that needs to be given to the public and, in general, aims to protect the interests of minority shareholders.  It also included important amendments to the Corporations Act regarding corporate governance, related party transactions, voting rights for mutual funds, the elimination of restrictions on control rights for preferred shares and the creation of audit committees.

 

For tender offers, this legislation provides that majority shareholders of publicly traded corporations must share with minority or outside shareholders the benefits of a change of control, by requiring that relevant share acquisitions be made pursuant to strictly regulated tender offer procedures.  However, controlling shareholders may freely sell their shares in some circumstances, as when the sale price of their shares is not substantially above market price, that is, no more than 10.0% to 15.0% above market price (currently 10.0%, as set by the SVS).

 

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As of 2001, foreign portfolio investors, including mutual funds and pension funds, are exempt from capital gains tax on the sale of highly traded equity and bonds made on authorized stock exchanges.

 

Based on other changes to tax regulations in 2001, foreign investors in Chile do not need to obtain a Chilean taxpayer identification number (a Rol Único Tributario, or RUT) to appoint and register a legal representative in Chile, and to use accounting practices authorized by the Chilean tax authorities.

 

In addition, in 2001, the Chilean government approved a series of measures aimed at increasing liquidity in the capital markets, promoting savings and facilitating the financing of new investment projects through both tax incentives and institutional and regulatory reforms.

 

Accordingly, the 15.0% capital gains tax for highly traded equity was eliminated as well as the tax for short-sale of equity and bonds.  The withholding tax on interest paid to non-resident entities for Chilean currency-denominated bank deposits in Chile and local currency-denominated bonds was reduced from 35.0% to 4.0% and the tax on cross-border banking intermediation was eliminated.  The categories of “general fund manager” and “qualified investor” were introduced into the regulatory scheme.  Additionally, a system of voluntary pre-tax contributions to individual pension funds (of amounts up to UF 50, or approximately US$1,946 per year as of December 31, 2016) was established; a new stock exchange segment was organized for emerging companies with significant growth potential; and the insurance and mutual fund industries were deregulated.

 

The Second Capital Markets Reform was enacted in 2007 with the primary objectives of promoting access to funding, strengthening the stock exchange market, increasing the reliability of the capital markets and developing the venture capital industry.  One of the key elements in the Second Capital Markets Reform was the introduction of various incentives to accomplish its primary objectives, which were crafted based on the Basel II standards.

 

The Third Capital Markets Reform of 2009 included measures to (i) improve the liquidity and depth of mutual funds, investment funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), (ii) increase access to the financial markets (for example, the reform permitted shelf registration for securitized bonds), and (iii) stimulate international financial integration.  The Third Capital Markets Reform also extended the types of securities on which foreign investors are able to claim capital gains tax exemptions.  This reform also sought to improve competition in the financial market through mechanisms designed to facilitate the ability of financial consumers to understand and compare credit products by establishing standardized “universal lending” agreements (contratos de crédito universal) on mortgages, credit cards and consumer loans.

 

The Bicentennial Capital Markets Agenda

 

In May 2010, the government announced a new capital markets reform entitled Bicentennial Capital Markets Agenda (Agenda del Mercado de Capitales Bicentenario), seeking to further enhance the international integration of Chile’s financial market, create a regulatory framework that fosters innovation and entrepreneurship, continue the adoption of the best international practices on competition, supervision and transparency, increase the depth and liquidity of the financial system and widen access to it.

 

Several laws included in this agenda were passed, including those covering financial system competition, the tax treatment of derivatives, the administration of funds and wealth management, a new bankruptcy statute and the creation of a Financial Stability Council (Consejo de Estabilidad Financiera).  Some bills remain under discussion in Congress, such as the bills on risk-based supervision of insurance companies, and the reform to the credit reporting system.

 

Funds and Wealth Management Law

 

Law No. 20,712, the Funds and Wealth Management Law (Ley Única de Fondos), in force since May 2014, creates a single legal body for the management of third-party funds that unites, simplifies and improves upon previous legislation and incorporates regulation for the management of individual portfolios.

 

The new legal framework entails more flexibility in administrative and investment terms, enabling wealth management providers to offer a better service and a wider range of products, while seeking to protect investors.  It also enhances the SVS’s regulatory and supervisory authority, including, for example, the power to examine

 

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individuals providing wealth management services to ensure they meet a minimum level of financial proficiency.  The law also introduces amendments to the tax regime intended to avoid double taxation as well as the application of Chilean taxes (such as the VAT) to transactions that are not connected with Chile.

 

Financial Stability Council

 

Ministry of Finance Decree No. 953 of 2011 created a Financial Stability Council.  This council is chaired by the Minister of Finance and also comprises the chairperson of the SVS, the SBIF and the SP.  The President of the Chilean Central Bank attends as a permanent advisor. In October 2014, Congress enacted Law No. 20,789 which provides a legal framework to the Financial Stability Council, as well as introducing other amendments aimed at improving the coordination and exchange of relevant information among public regulators in the financial sector.

 

The main purpose of the Financial Stability Council is to facilitate technical coordination and the exchange of information among its participants, in matters relating to the prevention and management of financial system risks, in order to maintain the financial stability of the Chilean economy. The council provides an institutional framework to enable a more comprehensive oversight of the financial market, to review and analyze relevant information and propose and coordinate regulatory improvements to promote financial stability.  During periods of economic or financial distress, the Financial Stability Council is responsible for coordinating measures to mitigate the effects and propagation of these events.  The Financial Stability Council must meet at least monthly, or more frequently if convened by the Ministry of Finance or any three of its members.

 

Law No. 20,789 also amended the organic laws of the three participating superintendencies to enable them to request information regarding other persons or firms within supervised financial conglomerates, as well as information needed to determine the property and control structure among them. In addition, solvency requirements for controlling shareholders of banks and insurance companies were tightened by the establishment of certain requisites, such as requiring consolidated net worth information for such shareholders and the implementation of certain sanctions for non-compliance.

 

Financial Markets Commission

 

On February 23, 2017, Law No. 21,000 was published, creating the Financial Markets Commission (Comisión para el Mercado Financiero or CMF) ultimately intended to serve as a single financial regulator. However, further legislation is required to fully vest such authority in the CMF.

 

First, the SVS will become a commission led by a collegiate body, with broad powers to regulate the financial markets, as well as banks and other financial institutions at a later stage. The Ministry of Finance is working on a reform to the General Banking Law, that will allow the merger of the SBIF into the CMF. A transitional provision limits CMF’s oversight to current SVS attributions.

 

The CMF will be governed by a commission of five members (four Commissioners and a Chairman) with professional or academic backgrounds in the financial sector. The Chairman will be appointed by the President of the Republic for a fixed term coinciding with its presidential period. Commissioners will also be appointed by the President of the Republic and confirmed by the Senate, and will remain in office for a fixed 6-year term. Two Commissioners will be appointed every three years in order to ensure continuity and stability. All members of the CMF will be subject to inability and incompatibility causes, in order to safeguard the independence of the commission.

 

A Special Prosecutor will lead an autonomous department within the CMF, to conduct investigations, bring enforcement proceedings and apply sanctions. The Special Prosecutor will be appointed by the Civil Service Commission, an independent government agency that transparently and impartially selects qualified candidates for high-level government positions. In addition, a new judicial revision process is established for direct review at the Santiago Court of Appeals. The law also grants additional investigative tools to the CMF, such as requesting information from supervised entities, accessing information protected under banking privacy law and access to restricted information held by other public agencies.

 

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The CMF will be empowered to cooperate with foreign jurisdictions in prosecutions and to exchange information. Furthermore, the law also introduced the concept of leniency for cooperating witnesses and the attribution to substantially increase fines in case of reoccurrence.

 

The CMF is expected to assume the current role of the SVS by the end of 2017.

 

Stock Exchanges

 

There are three stock exchanges operating in Chile:  the Santiago Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago), on average accounting for almost 93.5% of equity trading during 2016, while the Chilean Electronic Stock Exchange (Bolsa Electrónica de Chile) and the Valparaíso Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Corredores de Valparaíso) together accounted for 6.5% of equity trading in Chile during the same period.  Profits from trading shares of stock on these exchanges represent their main source of revenue.  As of December 31, 2016, the Santiago Stock Exchange had 214 listed companies and total market capitalization of US$209.9 billion.

 

The table below summarizes recent value and performance indicators for the Santiago Stock Exchange:

 

Indicators for the Santiago Stock Exchange

 

As of December 31,

 

Market
 Capitalization
 (in billions of
 US$)

 

Annual
 Trading
 Volume
 (in billions of
 US$)

 

IGPA(1)

 

IPSA(2)

 

2012

 

313.3

 

45.6

 

21,070.28

 

4,301.38

 

2013

 

266.0

 

45.8

 

18,227.05

 

3,699.19

 

2014

 

233.0

 

32.4

 

18,870.41

 

3,850.96

 

2015

 

191.0

 

20.7

 

18,151.50

 

3,680.21

 

2016

 

209.9

 

23.6

 

20,734.17

 

4,151.39

 

 


(1)         The General Stock Price Index (Índice General de Precios de Acciones, or IGPA) is an index weighted by market capitalization that measures the price variations of any stocks listed on the Santiago Stock Exchange with an annual trading volume of at least UF10,000 (US$389,272 as of December 31, 2016).

(2)         The Selective Stock Price Index (Índice de Precios Selectivo de Acciones, or IPSA) is an index tied to the stocks on the Santiago Stock Exchange with a market capitalization of at least US$200 million.

Source:  Santiago Stock Exchange.

 

The following table sets forth a summary of consolidated trading volume on the Santiago, Electronic and Valparaíso Stock Exchanges:

 

Consolidated Trading Volume on the Santiago, Electronic and Valparaíso
Stock Exchanges (in billions of US$)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Equity

 

52.4

 

53.6

 

35.9

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

Fixed income securities

 

173.2

 

206.2

 

210.8

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

Commercial paper

 

509.0

 

563.5

 

464.4

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

Total

 

734.6

 

823.3

 

711.0

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number of listed companies:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Equity

 

225

 

227

 

230

 

223

 

214

 

Bonds and other debt issuers

 

166

 

161

 

164

 

139

 

143

 

 


n.a. = Not available.

Source:  SVS, based on information from the Santiago Stock Exchange, Electronic Stock Exchange and Valparaíso Stock Exchange.

 

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Institutional Investors

 

The principal institutional investors active in Chile (listed by size of investment portfolio, in descending order) are the pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, investment funds and foreign capital investment funds.

 

The following table sets forth the amount of assets of the various types of institutional investors in Chile for the following periods:

 

Total Assets of Institutional Investors (in billions of US$)

 

As of December 31,

 

Pension
 Funds
 (AFPs)

 

Insurance
 Companies

 

Mutual
 Funds

 

Investment
 Funds
(1)

 

Foreign
 Capital
 Investment
 Funds

 

Total

 

2002

 

35.8

 

12.3

 

6.3

 

1.3

 

0.4

 

56.1

 

2003

 

49.2

 

16.7

 

8.3

 

1.9

 

0.7

 

76.8

 

2004

 

60.5

 

19.9

 

11.8

 

2.4

 

0.8

 

95.5

 

2005

 

74.5

 

23.9

 

13.6

 

2.8

 

0.8

 

115.6

 

2006

 

88.3

 

25.2

 

17.7

 

4.0

 

0.4

 

135.6

 

2007

 

111.3

 

30.8

 

24.5

 

6.7

 

0.3

 

173.5

 

2008

 

74.3

 

27.8

 

17.9

 

4.4

 

0.2

 

124.6

 

2009

 

118.1

 

35.8

 

34.3

 

6.4

 

0.4

 

195.0

 

2010

 

148.4

 

42.4

 

38.2

 

9.5

 

0.5

 

239.1

 

2011

 

135.0

 

36.8

 

33.3

 

8.7

 

0.3

 

218.8

 

2012

 

162.0

 

43.7

 

37.9

 

10.2

 

0.4

 

254.2

 

2013

 

163.0

 

43.0

 

39.4

 

9.2

 

0.3

 

254.9

 

2014

 

165.4

 

41.4

 

44.1

 

9.0

 

0.4

 

260.3

 

2015

 

155.4

 

40.6

 

40.2

 

11.1

 

n.a.

 

247.3

 

2016

 

174.5

 

46.5

 

46.4

 

n.a.

 

n.a.

 

267.5

 

 


(1)         Includes international investment funds.

Source:  SVS, SP.

 

Pension Funds and the Chilean Pension System

 

Chile began a comprehensive reform of its social security system in the early 1980s through the adoption of the Private Pensions Funds Act that eliminated many of the problems associated with the former social security system.  The Private Pensions Funds Act replaced the old social security system by a privately administered system of individual pension plans.  Under the pension system previously in place, contributions from current workers had been used to fund the pension payments of current retirees, although there was a limited correlation between the amount contributed and the amount received by each worker upon retirement.

 

The current pension system is based on individualized accounts with fully funded and portable benefits.  Since its inception, through March 31, 2017, it has averaged real annual returns on the assets under management of 8.0%.  In addition, as of December 31, 2016, the pension funds held aggregate financial assets equaling approximately US$174.5 billion.

 

The pension system creates individual savings accounts, where employees are mandated to save 10.0% of every month’s salary for retirement, which is deductible from their taxable income.  In addition, employees are free to add additional voluntary savings into the system in what is known as the “Second Account.”  These funds are managed by one of several private sector pension fund administrators (AFPs), who use long-term growth investment strategies.  All AFPs are subject to regulatory review by the SP, the main regulator, and the Chilean Central Bank.  In addition, AFPs that are listed on a stock exchange are regulated by the SVS.

 

New beneficiaries are assigned, for up to 24 months, to the AFP that offers the lowest administrative fee in a competitive tender process.  After that period, employees may choose which AFP will manage their funds and may

 

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switch if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their investments.  In 1984, the last year in which workers could elect not to participate in the new system, approximately 19.0% of the individuals who participated in the old system, principally older workers near retirement, elected to stay in the old system.  Over the years, more workers have continued to be incorporated into the AFP system and as of December 31, 2016, there were a total of 10.2 million employees in the system, although only 5.7 million of these employees contributed to their individual savings account.  As of December 31, 2016, there were only 39,503 non-retired individuals contributing to the traditional social security system.

 

Workers who participated in the traditional social security system and shifted to the new system received from the government an interest-earning past-service pension reform bond, known as the “Bono de Reconocimiento,” reflecting an estimate of the value of their previous contributions into the old system.  This bond is indexed to the CPI, has a 4.0% real annual interest rate and is held by the AFP for the benefit of the worker.  It is held separately from the amounts held in an individual’s savings account.  This pension reform bond becomes payable into the individual’s savings account at the time the individual first becomes eligible for retirement, or upon the individual’s death or disability.  Since 2004, the government has classified these obligations as “payments of non-financial liabilities.”

 

The following table sets forth the government’s cost estimate of Chile’s traditional social security program as a percentage of GDP (including the separate pension systems of the armed forces and police department) for the years indicated:

 

Expenditures of the Social Security System
(as a % of GDP)

 

 

 

Past-service
 pension reform
 bonds

 

Government
 expense for
 traditional
 pensions

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2001

 

0.69

 

4.34

 

5.04

 

2002

 

0.66

 

4.26

 

4.92

 

2003

 

0.59

 

4.10

 

4.69

 

2004

 

0.50

 

3.64

 

4.14

 

2005

 

0.43

 

3.36

 

3.79

 

2006

 

0.35

 

3.03

 

3.37

 

2007

 

0.31

 

2.97

 

3.28

 

2008

 

0.27

 

3.25

 

3.52

 

2009

 

0.26

 

3.59

 

3.85

 

2010

 

0.22

 

3.31

 

3.53

 

2011

 

0.18

 

3.20

 

3.38

 

2012

 

0.15

 

3.17

 

3.32

 

2013

 

0.12

 

3.06

 

3.19

 

2014

 

0.10

 

2.95

 

3.05

 

2015

 

0.08

 

2.95

 

3.03

 

2016

 

0.07

 

2.91

 

2.98

 

 


Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

Pension funds must meet a required minimum level of investment return, which is tied to the average performance of all funds in the pension system.  In the event that the fund managed by an AFP fails to achieve this minimum return, the AFP is required to cover the difference.  The Private Pensions Funds Act requires that each AFP maintain a capital reserve fund equal to one percent of the value of its pension funds.  The purpose of this fund is to provide a reserve to be used in the event that the performance of an individual pension fund drops below a minimum level.  If a deficit is not covered or if reserves are not replenished, the AFP will be liquidated by the SP and the government will guarantee the minimum level of investment return.  The government will then transfer the

 

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accounts to another AFP.  Historically, the required minimum return on fund investments has led to the various AFPs having similar pension fund portfolios.

 

The government also guarantees modest minimum old-age, life and disability pensions for individuals who have made contributions for a certain minimum number of years, regardless of the level of contributions actually made into the individual’s saving account at an AFP.  In the case of bankruptcy of an AFP, the government guarantees certain limited liabilities of that pension fund.  The government is liable for 100.0% of this obligation up to the amount of the legal minimum pension and for 75.0% of the pensions above the minimum and up to UF 45 per month (approximately US$1,751.7 as of December 31, 2016).

 

In 2002, a multi-fund plan for the AFPs was implemented.  This system allows each affiliate to choose among five different funds (compared with two alternatives under the old model).  Each of these funds has a different risk-return profile, determined by the percentage of its assets that can be invested in either variable or fixed income securities.  Additionally, the multi-fund plan liberalizes certain investment limits applicable to pension funds.

 

Since 2002, tax incentives have been implemented to encourage voluntary savings in the pension system.  These incentives allow workers to deduct from their taxable wage base certain voluntary contributions invested in mutual funds, investment funds and insurance plans authorized by the SVS, which are managed by different entities such as banks and life insurance companies, enlarging investment alternatives for affiliates.

 

Workers may withdraw some or all of their accumulated voluntary savings before retiring, in which case the net amount withdrawn is added to the income of the relevant tax cycle for the purpose of estimating income tax.

 

In 2008, an amendment to the Private Pension Funds Act was enacted to (i) increase competition in the AFP industry and decrease the system’s cost (mainly by assigning new beneficiaries, for up to 24 months, to the AFP that offers the lowest administrative fee in a competitive tender process — as of December 31, 2016, the lowest administration fee starts at 0.41%), (ii) assure greater pension fund profitability (by permitting AFP’s to invest in additional financial products in Chile and abroad), and (iii) foster voluntary saving (allowing employees to arrange supplementary savings agreements with their employers).  This reform established, among other things, the following benefits:

 

·                  Basic Solidarity Pension:  Its main purpose is to benefit those beneficiaries who have not accumulated a sufficient amount of funds for their retirement.  As of the implementation of the reform, beneficiaries are entitled to a Basic Solidarity Pension in the amount of Ps.60,000 (approximately US$88.6 as of December 31, 2016), which was increased to Ps.75,000 (approximately US$110.8 as of December 31, 2016) following the one year anniversary of its effectiveness.  For those beneficiaries with previously saved funds in their accounts, the reform contemplates a Solidarity Pension Contribution, allowing them to increase their retirement pension.  The Solidarity Pension has been gradually expanded, and since 2012, it benefits all contributors who earn less than Ps.255,000 (approximately US$376.8 as of December 31, 2016).  In 2016, 579,967 beneficiaries were entitled to Basic Solidarity Pensions on average each month.

 

To effect these reforms, the amendment to the Private Pension Funds Act created the Social Security Institute, which is charged with the implementation of the basic solidarity pensions, which is fully in force, among others matters.

 

·                  Benefits to Women:  Women, who are among the poorest 60.0% of the population, receive a bond per new born child, equivalent to 1.8 times the minimum salary (Ps. 463,560, or approximately US$694.6 as of December 31, 2016), which bonds are deposited in their pension saving accounts one month following the beneficiary’s 65th birthday.

 

·                  Benefits to Young Workers:  Workers aged 18 to 35 with an income lower than 1.5 times the minimum salary (Ps. 386,250, or approximately US$578.8, as of December 31, 2016) receive a subsidy, equivalent to 10.0% of the minimum salary (approximately US$39.0 as of December 31, 2016), for their first 24 contributions.  Half of this subsidy is capitalized in their individual pension accounts and the remainder is provided as an employment subsidy.

 

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·                  Benefits to Independent Workers:  Persons working independently have access to the Solidarity Pension System and other benefits contained in the reform under the same conditions as those people employed pursuant to a labor contract, with similar duties and prerogatives.  After a gradual phase-in beginning in January 2012, participation by independent workers became mandatory on January 1, 2015.

 

In addition, the 2008 reform has (i) increased the competition in the AFP industry and decreased the costs of the system (mainly by mandating that new beneficiaries would be assigned, for up to 24 months, to the AFP that offers for the lowest commission in a competitive tender process), (ii) assured greater pension fund profitability (extending the limits of AFP investment in Chile and abroad), and (iii) fostered voluntary saving (allowing employees to arrange supplementary savings agreements with their employers, in order to save larger amounts).

 

President Bachelet created the Presidential Advisory Commission on the Pension System in April 2014 through Decree No. 718.  This commission is comprised of 25 members, Chilean and foreign, and is mandated to prepare a report regarding the benefits, limitations, deficiencies and challenges of the current pension system in Chile with proposals on improvements to solve the system’s main deficiencies.  For this purpose, the commission holds meetings with civil, labor and business representatives, as well as with pension fund representatives, insurance company representatives and national and international experts.  It also conducts seminars, where international experts are convened to discuss comparative trends among international pension systems.  The commission issued a report in September 2015 and the government is taking steps to improve the current system.  The proposed measures aim at increasing the pension funds through higher contributions funded by employers and an increase of the retirement age. Part of the contributions funded by employers would be allocated to a fund for the poor segment of the population, although the allocation mechanism is currently under study.

 

Pension funds are the largest institutional investors in the Chilean market.  The volume of resources flowing into pension funds has grown steadily over time.  In 1981 (the first year the system operated), pension funds’ assets totaled US$305 million, while as of December 31, 2016, these assets totaled US$174.5 billion.

 

Insurance Companies and the Chilean Insurance System

 

The Insurance Companies Act of 1979 introduced a framework for the regulation of insurance companies.  The basic principles included market determination of rates and commissions, equal access to foreign insurance companies, rules for commencing reserve funds and minimum capital and solvency criteria.  Chilean law prescribes that life insurance companies can have liabilities equal to a maximum amount of 15 times their capital and reserves, while non-life insurance companies are limited to five times the amount of their capital and reserves.

 

Under the Insurance Companies Act, any person or entity offering insurance, either directly or indirectly, is first required to obtain authorization from the SVS.  Neither individuals nor legal entities may enter into insurance contracts in Chile with an insurer not licensed to operate in Chile.

 

In September 2011, the government submitted a draft bill to Congress proposing amendments to the Insurance Companies Act.  The bill proposes the establishment of a new monitoring system based on the evaluation of the financial risk and the risk management of insurance companies. As of the date of this report, the bill is under discussion.

 

As of December 31, 2016, there were 24 insurance companies operating in non-life insurance and 36 companies in the life insurance sector.

 

The Chilean insurance market is open to foreign investors, who are required to establish a Chilean corporation and operate it with a minimum equity capital of UF 90,000 (approximately US$3.5 million as of December 31, 2016).

 

Insurance companies are Chile’s second largest institutional investors, based on total volume of assets.  As of December 31, 2016, the combined value of the portfolios of insurance companies stood at US$46.5 billion.

 

In December 2013, a new insurance law, Law No. 20,667, was enacted amending all regulations referring to the insurance sector.  The new regulation introduced the following main changes:  the removal of many

 

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formalities regarding insurance agreements, the incorporation of a “risk statement” to be issued by the insurer regarding the risk insured, and criminal regulation about fraud in insurance matters, among other changes.

 

Mutual and Investment Funds

 

Mutual Funds

 

Mutual funds were created in Chile in the 1960s.  Their legal framework was comprehensively reformed in 1976.  The Chilean mutual fund system faced serious difficulties during the financial crisis of 1983.  However, since the early 1990s, mutual funds have had a sustained development increasing the investment alternatives in the market.

 

In 2001, legal initiatives intended to deregulate the mutual fund industry were introduced, providing the funds with more flexibility in their investment policy, and at the same time imposing higher standards for transparency and disclosure.  Also in 2001, General Funds Managers (Administradoras Generales de Fondos) were introduced, allowing mutual funds, investment funds and housing funds to be organized under a unique managing structure, permitting them to take advantage of economies of scale in the administration of funds.

 

Currently, there are eight types of mutual funds, categorized by the types and maturities of securities they are permitted to invest.  By the end of 2016, 500 mutual funds were chartered in Chile, with collective portfolios totaling approximately US$46.4 billion.

 

Investment Funds

 

Investment funds have been regulated since the early 1990s by Law No. 18,815, which established the funds’ legal structure.  By December 31, 2015, the latest available data, a total of 115 investment funds, excluding private investment funds, which are not subject to registration, were operating in Chile.  As of December 31, 2015, the latest available data, total assets of these funds equaled US$12.6 billion, distributed principally among real estate investment funds, venture capital investment funds, securities investment funds and international investment funds.

 

Like mutual funds, the General Funds Manager structure approved as part of the capital markets reform positively affected investment funds.

 

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PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCES

 

General

 

The government believes that long term economic policies have played an important role in maintaining macroeconomic stability without sacrificing the government’s commitment to reduce poverty and create equal economic opportunities for low-income families.

 

The main features of Chile’s fiscal policy are the following:

 

·                  a countercyclical policy based on a Structural Balance Policy Rule;

 

·                  using debt to finance government policies and to support the domestic market; and

 

·                  a commitment to social welfare.

 

Public Sector Accounts and Fiscal Statistics

 

Public Sector Accounts

 

Chile’s public sector accounts reflect the revenues and expenditures of the central government.  Public sector debt is comprised of all debt incurred by the central government.  Separate accounts are kept for municipalities; non-financial public sector institutions, including state-owned enterprises; and Banco Estado.  Only capital gains from privatizations, if any, are recorded as capital revenues and presented in Chile’s public sector accounts.

 

Public sector accounts do not include the Chilean Central Bank’s accounts.  The Chilean Central Bank runs deficits or surpluses principally due to currency mismatching.  In 2016, the Chilean Central Bank recorded a loss of US$(2.4) billion, compared with a gain of US$2.4 billion in 2015, mainly due to exchange rate fluctuations.  The Chilean Central Bank’s equity (patrimonio neto) was US$(6.3) billion as of December 31, 2016, compared to US$(2.8) billion as of December 31, 2015.

 

The system of local governments currently consists of 345 municipalities.  Each municipality is a separate entity responsible for managing its own assets and budget but lacks authority to levy or collect taxes or incur financial indebtedness.  Municipal budgets are funded by municipal fees and taxes collected on behalf of municipalities by the central government.

 

Fiscal Policy Framework — Structural Balance Policy Rule

 

The purpose of the current fiscal policy is to contribute to macroeconomic stability and efficiently and effectively manage public assets, create and improve opportunities and ensure social protection.  In order to fulfill these goals, this policy has focused on the efficient use of public resources and the transparency in their management.

 

Since 2001, Chilean fiscal policy has been guided by the Structural Balance Policy Rule, which requires government spending to be based on long-term revenues (known as structural fiscal revenues).  Structural fiscal revenues are determined by reference to projected economic activity based on capital and labor conditions and the price of copper, estimated in advance by independent economic experts.  By linking public spending to trends in structural fiscal revenues rather than cyclical fluctuations in economic activity, copper prices and other similar factors, this helps mitigate adjustments in public spending in face of adverse economic effects or when the government receives substantial transitory revenues.

 

In September 2006, Law No. 20,128, or the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Ley Sobre Responsabilidad Fiscal) made the Structural Balance Policy Rule mandatory for the government.  See “Public Sector Finances—Fiscal Responsibility Law.”

 

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Overall, the Structural Balance Policy Rule has effectively helped to:

 

·                  reduce the sovereign risk (the baseline risk for the private sector);

 

·                  make long-term spending sustainable, decreasing the vulnerability of fiscal spending to abrupt changes in external conditions;

 

·                  provide a source of internal savings in periods of strong growth, limiting the need for foreign capital;

 

·                  remove the traditionally cyclical effect of government spending, reducing the extent to which the Chilean Central Bank needs to raise interest rates to avoid over-heating; and

 

·                  add predictability and credibility to government policies, eliminating the potential interpretation of spending increases in recessions as populist responses to the cycle.

 

The structural balance goal was set as a surplus of 1.0% of GDP in 2001, which was reduced to 0.5% of GDP by 2008, and further reduced to a structural fiscal balance (0.0%) in 2009.  In 2010, the calculation methodology for the Structural Balance Policy Rule was adjusted, revealing a structural deficit of 3.1% of GDP and 2.1% of GDP for 2009 and 2010, respectively, using 2003 prices as a base for GDP.  See “—New Methodology for Structural Balance Policy Rule.”  Structural deficits measured in accordance with the new methodology represented 0.4% of GDP in 2012, 0.5% of GDP in 2013, 0.5 % of GDP in 2014 and 1.6% of GDP in 2015, using 2008 prices as to calculate GDP.  The government’s current estimate for 2016 is that the structural fiscal deficit represented 1.6% of GDP.  As a result of recently adopted revisions to the calculation methodology and adjustments to the presentation of the structural balance (intended to capture in the presentation on-going revisions of the structural parameters (i.e., real GDP growth and long term copper price) used in calculating the structural balance), Supreme Decree No. 1,378, issued in October 2015, set a structural fiscal deficit reduction target of 0.25% of GDP per year for the 2016-2018 period, from the 1.6% of GDP structural deficit calculated for 2015. See “—New Methodology for Structural Balance Policy Rule.

 

New Methodology for Structural Balance Policy Rule

 

In 2010, the government appointed a special committee to assess the calculation methodology of the Structural Balance Policy Rule and make recommendations for adjustment, if appropriate.  The special committee’s recommendations were adopted by the Ministry of Finance and served as a basis for the 2011 budget.  The main adjustments introduced by the new methodology consisted of excluding temporary tax adjustments from structural income, and excluding the cyclical adjustments to interest on financial assets of the public treasury applied under the initial methodology.  In addition, the elasticity of social security contributions for health care was recalculated.  In 2009 and 2010, the change in methodology resulted in structural deficits of 3.1% and 2.1% of GDP, respectively, using 2003 prices.

 

The table below sets forth the structural balance rules in the years indicated under the old and new methodologies:

 

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Comparison of Structural Balance Methodology
(% of total GDP)
(1)

 

 

 

2006

 

2007

 

2008

 

2009

 

2010

 

Effective balance

 

7.7

 

8.2

 

4.3

 

(4.5

)

(0.4

)

Structural balance (initial methodology)(2)

 

1.1

 

0.5

 

0.0

 

(1.2

)

N.A.

 

Structural balance (new methodology)(3)

 

1.4

 

1.1

 

(0.8

)

(3.0

)

(2.0

)

 


(1)         Calculated using 2003 prices as a base for GDP.

(2)         Calculated using the 2009 structural balance calculation method.

(3)         Calculated using the structural balance calculation methodology adopted in September 2010.  Certain data differs slightly with respect to published information due to recent updating of GDP data by the Chilean Central Bank.

Source:  Chilean Budget Office.  Special Committee Report.

 

The final report of the special committee was delivered during the first half of 2011 and its suggestions were implemented in the 2012 budget.

 

In July 2011, the Minister of Finance, acting on a suggestion of the special committee, created a Fiscal Advisory Board to craft a second generation of structural balance rules.  This group comprises five independent experts with experience in fiscal and budgeting topics.  The Fiscal Advisory Board’s main goal is to provide expert advice for the calculation of the structural variables of the Chilean economy, additional market confidence and increased transparency on the Structural Balance Policy Rule.

 

In September 2015, the Ministry of Finance adopted revisions to the calculation methodology and adjustments to the presentation of the structural balance (intended to capture in the presentation on-going revisions of the structural parameters (i.e., real GDP growth and long term copper price) used in calculating the structural balance), and eliminated the molybdenum price cyclical adjustment from the parameters used to determine the structural balance.

 

In January 2016, as a result of a change in international copper prices, the Minister of Finance requested the determination of a new long-term copper price, which would be factored into the calculation of the structural balance projected for 2016 (1.7% of GDP) and subsequently used for the preparation of the 2017 budget (which contemplated a structural deficit of 1.5% of GDP), in compliance with the commitment to reduce the structural deficit by 0.25% of GDP per year. The structural deficit for 2016 (1.6% of GDP) was the result of a lower level of public sector expenditures and improved tax collections.

 

The table below sets forth the variations in the structural balance calculation for the years indicated resulting from the adoption of the new methodology under currently applicable parameters:

 

 

 

2015

 

2016

 

2017

 

Structural balance (former methodology)(1)

 

(0.9

)

N.A.

 

N.A.

 

Structural balance (new methodology)(2)

 

(1.9

)

(1.6

)

(1.3

)

 


(1)         Forecast with former parameters and excluding molybdenum price adjustment.

(2)         Determination of past structural balance and forecast of 2017 structural balance made with current parameters, excluding molybdenum price adjustment and updated assumptions pursuant to the determination of the new long-term copper price in effect as of April 2017.

Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

Fiscal Responsibility Law

 

The Fiscal Responsibility Law provides the institutional framework for the Structural Balance Policy Rule that, prior to the enactment of this legislation, depended exclusively on administrative decisions and the relevant authority’s discretion.  The statute draws on recommendations made by organizations such as the IMF, the IADB,

 

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the World Bank and the OECD with respect to best international practices on fiscal responsibility and transparency.  The most important aspects of the Fiscal Responsibility Law related to the Structural Balance Policy Rule are described below.

 

Establishment of Principles of Fiscal Policy

 

Under the Fiscal Responsibility Law, each president must establish the principles of the administration’s fiscal policy within 90 days of taking office and expressly declare the implications this will have for the structural fiscal balance.  Ministry of Finance Decree No. 637 of 2010 set out the principles of President Piñera’s fiscal policy, including the goal to achieve equilibrium in the structural balance by the end of his presidential term in March 2014.  The decree committed the government to follow the Structural Fiscal Balance Rule despite the higher than expected expenses arising from the earthquake and tsunami reconstruction plan and the 2009 global economic slowdown.  However, in 2011 Decree No. 1,357 replaced and amended the target set by 2010 Ministry of Finance Decree No. 637, establishing that the goal was to achieve the equivalent of a structural deficit of 1.0% of GDP (instead of a structural balance) by 2014.

 

President Bachelet set the fiscal policy target in Decree No. 892 of July 2014, which established that the goal for the current administration is to achieve a structural balance (0.0% of GDP) by 2018.  However, in October 2015, the government set a structural fiscal deficit reduction target of 0.25% of GDP per year for the 2016-2018 period, starting in 2016.  See “—Public Sector Accounts and Financial Statistics—Fiscal Policy Framework—Structural Balance Policy Rule.”

 

Annual Calculation of Structural Balance

 

The Fiscal Responsibility Law also requires the government to report the structural situation of public finances, reflecting the sustainability of the fiscal policy to be implemented and the macroeconomic and financial implications of the government’s budgetary policy.  The calculation of the public sector structural balance for the relevant fiscal year is a mandatory component of the budgeting process.

 

Contingent Liabilities

 

The government must disclose information regarding undertakings it has entered by way of financial guarantees.  The Chilean Budget Office must report annually the total amount and nature of the liabilities for which state guarantees have been provided.

 

Pension Reserve Fund

 

The Fiscal Responsibility Law created a Pension Reserve Fund (Fondo de Reserva de Pensiones, or FRP) to cover future increases in expenditures for state-financed minimum pensions and old-age benefits.  The FRP seeks to spread over time the financial burden that these liabilities will involve for the government and, at the same time, to clarify and explicitly incorporate this liability into the budgeting process and consider this factor in establishing the structural balance target.

 

The Fiscal Responsibility Law established an FRP contribution equivalent to the previous year’s effective fiscal surplus, with an upper limit of 0.5% of GDP and a guaranteed minimum of 0.2% of GDP.  Over the first ten years of its life, no funds can be drawn.  Thereafter the FRP can be up to a third of the annual increase in total expenditures for guaranteed pensions and old-age benefits.  It is expected that the FRP will be exhausted in 2021, so long as withdrawals from the FRP in any calendar year do not exceed 5.0% of the expenditures for minimum pensions and old-age benefits envisaged in the budget for that year.

 

The FRP was created in December 2006, with an initial contribution of US$605 million.

 

The table below sets forth the contributions to and withdrawals from the FRP during the periods indicated, as well as the assets of the FRP at the end of each period:

 

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Contribution 
(in millions of 
US$)

 

Withdrawals 
(in millions of 
US$)

 

Total Assets at 
December 31, 
2016 (in millions 
of US$)

 

2006

 

604.5

 

0.0

 

604.5

 

2007

 

736.4

 

0.0

 

1,466.4

 

2008

 

909.1

 

0.0

 

2,506.8

 

2009

 

836.7

 

0.0

 

3,420.8

 

2010

 

337.3

 

0.0

 

3,836.7

 

2011

 

443.3

 

0.0

 

4,405.6

 

2012

 

1,197.4

 

0.0

 

5,883.3

 

2013

 

1,376.8

 

0.0

 

7,335.1

 

2014

 

498.9

 

0.0

 

7,943.7

 

2015

 

463.9

 

0.0

 

8,112.2

 

2016

 

462.3

 

0.0

 

8,862.1

 

 

Economic and Social Stabilization Fund

 

The law authorized the government to set up the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES) to absorb the existing Copper Income Stabilization Funds, establishing norms for the operation and management of this fund, contributions to this fund and other matters.  The FEES is designed mainly to serve as a complement to the structural fiscal balance and to provide the government with a stable financial horizon by ensuring that a portion of any fiscal surplus is saved to be used to finance the government when there is a structural deficit.  In this way, the fund is intended to insulate social spending from sharp changes in the economic cycle and in prices of copper and molybdenum, while harnessing public saving to strengthen the Chilean economy’s competitiveness.

 

The FEES was formed in March 2007, with an initial contribution of US$2.58 billion, (including US$2.56 billion that had previously been included in the Copper Income Stabilization Funds).  During 2009, US$9.3 billion were withdrawn to finance various expenditures contemplated in the 2009 budget.  See “The Economy—Global Financial Crisis—Economic Performance and Policies of 2008 and 2009.”

 

The table below sets forth the contributions to and withdrawals from the FEES during the periods indicated, as well as the assets of the FEES at the end of each period:

 

 

 

Contribution 
(in millions of 
US$)

 

Withdrawals 
(in millions of 
US$)

 

Total Assets at 
December 31, 
2016 (in millions 
of US$)

 

2007

 

13,100.0

 

0.0

 

14,032.6

 

2008

 

5,000.0

 

0.0

 

20,210.7

 

2009

 

0.0

 

9,277.7

 

11,284.8

 

2010

 

1,362.3

 

150.0

 

12,720.1

 

2011

 

0.0

 

0.0

 

13,156.6

 

2012

 

1,700.0

 

0.0

 

14,997.5

 

2013

 

603.4

 

0.0

 

15,419.1

 

2014

 

0.0

 

498.9

 

14,688.8

 

2015

 

0.0

 

463.9

 

13,966.3

 

2016

 

0.0

 

462.3

 

13,772.1

 

 

Capitalization of the Chilean Central Bank

 

Under the Fiscal Responsibility Law, the government was authorized to capitalize the Chilean Central Bank until 2010, but only to the extent of the balance of the fiscal surplus that remained after the government had made its contribution to the FRP.  In other words, the FRP has priority over other possible uses of the previous year’s fiscal surplus.  Any portion of the fiscal surplus not used to capitalize the FRP or the Central Bank can be contributed to the FEES.  Amounts equivalent to 0.5% of the annual GDP were contributed to the Chilean Central Bank in 2006,

 

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2007 and 2008.  Due to the fiscal deficit, no contribution was made in 2009 or 2010.  Since the expiration of the authorization included in the Fiscal Responsibility Law, the government has not submitted any further bill to capitalize the Chilean Central Bank.

 

Investment Portfolio

 

The Fiscal Responsibility Law regulates how the Ministry of Finance invests the assets held in these new funds and other fiscal assets.  Consistent with the rules adopted for the FRP, the Fiscal Responsibility Law establishes that portfolio managers may be hired for the FEES or, if the Ministry of Finance so decides, investments may be made directly by the Chilean Treasury Service.  In addition, the Ministry of Finance is also empowered to entrust management of part or all of these resources to the Chilean Central Bank, acting directly or, following a tender, through third parties.  If the Ministry of Finance relies on third parties for portfolio management or for certain of the transactions associated with the administration of financial assets, it must periodically commission independent audits of the condition of the funds and their management by these third parties.  In addition, the law requires the Ministry of Finance to publish quarterly reports as to the condition of these funds.

 

Similarly, the Fiscal Responsibility Law created a financial committee to advise the Ministry of Finance on decisions regarding the investment of fiscal resources and the instructions it issues.  The committee was established in 2007 with six experienced professionals in the fields of economics and finances as its members.

 

Management of Public Sector Assets and Liabilities

 

The Fiscal Responsibility Law contains rules designed to improve the management of the public sector’s assets and liabilities.  Among these, the law regulates operations that commit the government to future payments, affecting institutional financial responsibilities and those of the state as a whole, and it also empowers the Ministry of National Property to charge for the use of properties it manages in order to reflect the real institutional cost of their use and promote efficiency in the use of state properties.  The law also includes rules for the approval of information and evaluation systems that refer to investment projects.

 

Unemployment Contingency Program

 

The Anti-Unemployment Contingency Program (Programa de Contingencia contra el Desempleo) is intended to provide the government with adequate tools to address future high unemployment rates at a national, regional or local level.  In practice, the program can be activated whenever the conditions established by the law are met that is, when the national three-month rolling average unemployment rate, measured by the INE, exceeds its average for the previous five months, or when it reaches 10.0% or more.  In addition, the program can be activated when these conditions are not met but unemployment has nevertheless reached at least 10.0% in one or more Regions or specific provinces.  In those cases, its resources can be used in the Region or province with the highest unemployment rates, or when unemployment reaches at least 10.0% in a specific locality even though the rate for the corresponding Region or province is less than 10.0%.  The program became operational in June 2009 and the facilities available (direct employment as well as public investment initiatives that generate indirect employment opportunities, as well as unemployment benefits) were used in each of 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

 

Since the last quarter of 2012, official reports classify unemployment programs as follows, based on the objective pursued: (i) employment program for economic downturns, (ii) support for small business programs, (iii) work training and employment program, and (iv) public works programs.

 

Oil Prices Stabilization Funds

 

In 1991, the government created the first Oil Prices Stabilization Fund (Fondo de Estabilización de Precios del Petróleo, or OPSF) as a mechanism to mitigate the impact of fluctuations of international prices on domestic consumers of oil and related products.  OPSF was triggered whenever the parity price (provided by the average international price from the two previous weeks) falls outside the reference band (with upper and lower limits of 12.5% over or below the reference price, respectively).  Thus, when oil prices were above or below the reference band, the OPSF collected taxes or provides subsidies, to stabilize the mid-term trend in such prices. In June 2010, the OPSF was terminated.

 

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In June 2010 the government created a new two-phase tax system instead of a fund system.  The new system became effective in February 2011.  The first phase of the system was initially called Sistema de Protección al Contribuyente del Impuesto Específico a los Combustibles (SIPCO), but was later modified in June 2014 and renamed Mecanismo de Estabilización de Precios de los Combustibles (MEPCO).  This phase decreases taxes when international oil prices rise and increases taxes when such prices decline, such that the Chilean Treasury assumes the effects of stabilization on its tax revenue.  The price band was set at 5.0% in 2014 and reference prices are set in pesos.  In the second phase (Seguro de Protección al Contribuyente del Impuesto Específico a los Combustibles, or SEPCO), at the government’s discretion, the Ministry of Finance, on behalf of the Republic of Chile, is authorized to enter into derivatives to hedge oil price increases.  The cost and indemnities paid under the derivatives are transferred to the specific indemnities paid under the derivatives are transferred to the specific tax applied to oil products which decreases when international oil prices exceed the reference band and increases when prices decline below the reference band, thereby transferring the benefits of this stabilization mechanism to consumers.  Legislation approved in May 2012 improved SEPCO to avoid extreme shifts in consumer oil prices. This second phase has not been implemented.

 

Budget Law and Political Initiatives

 

Congress cannot propose legislation on taxation, social security benefits, central government spending, employment programs or public financial management.  Only the executive branch can propose bills on these matters, subject to approval or disapproval by Congress.

 

The responsibility for the preparation of the central government budget lies with the Ministry of Finance, which establishes overall targets and then works with the various ministries regarding specific allocations.  Based on this work, the President submits a budget bill to Congress no later than three months prior to its effective date (generally, each September 30).  Congress reviews the proposed budget, but is only permitted to reduce expenditures; it may not change revenue estimates, increase expenditure items, reallocate funds or change financial management regulations.  Congressional approval is normally obtained by the end of November.  If the budget bill is not passed by Congress within 60 days of its submission by the president, it is deemed approved and becomes law.  The government may submit to Congress supplementary budget bills in order to amend the budget law.

 

The following tables set forth a summary of public sector accounts (calculated on an accrual basis and as a percentage of GDP for the periods indicated):

 

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Public Sector Finances
(In billions of US$ and % of total GDP)

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

(US$)

 

(%)

 

Current Revenues and Expenditures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Revenues

 

59.0

 

22.2

 

58.3

 

21.0

 

53.6

 

20.7

 

51.3

 

21.4

 

51.7

 

20.9

 

Net taxes(1)  

 

46.8

 

17.6

 

46.4

 

16.7

 

43.0

 

16.6

 

42.3

 

17.6

 

42.8

 

17.3

 

Copper revenues (2)  

 

4.0

 

1.5

 

2.9

 

1.0

 

2.4

 

0.9

 

1.1

 

0.4

 

0.9

 

0.4

 

Social Security contributions

 

3.7

 

1.4

 

4.0

 

1.4

 

3.7

 

1.4

 

3.4

 

1.4

 

3.6

 

1.5

 

Donations

 

0.2

 

0.1

 

0.1

 

0.1

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.1

 

0.1

 

0.1

 

Real property incomes

 

1.2

 

0.5

 

1.4

 

0.5

 

1.2

 

0.5

 

1.1

 

0.4

 

1.1

 

0.5

 

Operational revenues(3)  

 

1.4

 

0.5

 

1.4

 

0.5

 

1.3

 

0.5

 

1.3

 

0.5

 

1.3

 

0.5

 

Other revenues

 

1.8

 

0.7

 

2.2

 

0.8

 

2.0

 

0.7

 

2.0

 

0.8

 

1.8

 

0.7

 

Expenditures

 

47.0

 

17.7

 

49.9

 

18.0

 

48.0

 

18.5

 

46.3

 

19.3

 

48.8

 

19.7

 

Wages and salaries

 

11.1

 

4.2

 

11.9

 

4.3

 

11.4

 

4.4

 

11.0

 

4.6

 

11.7

 

4.7

 

Goods and services

 

5.4

 

2.0

 

5.6

 

2.0

 

5.6

 

2.2

 

5.0

 

2.1

 

5.2

 

2.1

 

Interest on public debt

 

1.6

 

0.6

 

1.6

 

0.6

 

1.6

 

0.6

 

1.6

 

0.7

 

1.9

 

0.8

 

Transfer payments

 

17.7

 

6.7

 

19.4

 

7.0

 

18.8

 

7.3

 

18.6

 

7.8

 

20.3

 

8.2

 

Transfers to social security

 

11.1

 

4.2

 

11.3

 

4.1

 

10.6

 

4.0

 

9.9

 

4.1

 

9.6

 

3.9

 

Others

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Capital Revenues and Expenditures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Revenues

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Asset sales

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

0.1

 

0.0

 

Expenditures

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Investment

 

5.5

 

2.1

 

5.5

 

2.0

 

5.2

 

2.0

 

5.6

 

2.3

 

5.3

 

2.1

 

Capital transfers

 

5.1

 

1.9

 

4.7

 

1.7

 

4.7

 

1.8

 

4.7

 

0.0

 

4.5

 

1.8

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Central government balance

 

1.5

 

0.6

 

(1.7

)

(0.6

)

(4.2

)

(1.6

)

(5.2

)

(2.2

)

6.8

 

(2.7

)

Structural balance(4)  

 

(0.8

)

(0.3

)

(1.4

)

(0.5

)

(1.3

)

(0.5

)

(3.6

)

(1.6

)

(3.9

)

(1.6

)

Non-financial public institutions balance

 

4.5

 

1.7

 

2.5

 

0.9

 

3.0

 

1.2

 

n.a

 

n.a

 

n.a

 

n.a

 

Consolidated non-financial public sector surplus (deficit)

 

6.0

 

2.3

 

0.8

 

0.3

 

(1.2

)

(0.5

)

n.a

 

n.a

 

n.a

 

n.a

 

 


(1)         Taxes collected net of refunds.

(2)         Excludes transfers from Codelco under Law No. 13,196.  This law (Ley Reservada del Cobre), which is not publicly disclosed, earmarks 10% of Codelco’s revenues from the export of copper and related byproducts for defense spending and these funds are therefore excluded from the central government’s current revenues.  Defense spending is considered an extrabudgetary expense in accordance with IMF accounting guidelines.

(3)         Includes capital gains for the sale of companies in which the central government held a stake, such as Edelnor (renamed E-CL), which was sold by Codelco in 2010.

(4)         Reflects the amount that revenues and fiscal spending would have reached if GDP growth were at its trend level and the price of copper were at the medium-term price; therefore, it is intended to exclude the effects of cyclical economic activity fluctuations and the price of copper.

Source:  Chilean Budget Office

 

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Public sector revenues increased to Ps.33,548 billion (equivalent to US$51.3 billion) in 2015 from Ps. 30,571 billion (equivalent to US$53.6 billion) in 2014.  An increase in revenues from net taxes that was set off in part by a decrease in copper revenues.  Net taxes increased to Ps.27,677 billion (equivalent to US$42.3 billion) for 2015 compared to Ps. 24,485 billion (equivalent to US$43 billion) for 2014, which represented an increase of 13% (measured in pesos) as compared to 2014.  Copper revenues decreased by 48% to Ps.703 billion (equivalent to US$1.1 billion) in 2015 from Ps. 1,353 billion (equivalent to US$2.4 billion) in 2014.  This decline is attributable to a decrease in the annual average of price for copper, which was US$2.5 per pound in 2015 as compared to US$3.1 per pound in 2014.

 

Public sector revenues increased to Ps.35,004 billion (equivalent to US$51.7 billion) in 2016 from Ps.33,548 billion (equivalent to US$51.3 billion) in 2015.  An increase in revenues from net taxes was set off in part by a decrease in copper revenues.  Net taxes increased to Ps.28,998 billion (equivalent to US$42.8 billion) for 2016 compared to Ps.27,677 billion (equivalent to US$42.3 billion) for 2015, which represented a nominal increase of 4.8% (measured in pesos) as compared to 2015.  Copper revenues decreased by 14.8% to Ps.599.7 billion (equivalent to US$0.9 billion) in 2016 from Ps.703 billion (equivalent to US$1.1 billion) in 2015.  This decline is attributable to a decrease in the annual average of price for copper, which was US$2.2 per pound in 2016 as compared to US$2.5 per pound in 2015.

 

As a result, for 2016 the central government recorded a fiscal deficit equivalent to US$6.8 billion, or 2.7% of GDP, and a structural fiscal deficit of US$3.9 billion, or 1.6% of GDP, for 2016.

 

2017 Budget Bill

 

The 2017 budget law (Law No. 20,981) for the government and public sector agencies was published in the Official Gazette on December 15, 2016. Total budgeted expenditures (approximately US$60.3 billion), including transfers, goods and services, represented a 2.8% increase from the projected total expenditures for 2016.  Budgeted expenditures for 2017 reflect an increase of 4.2% in current expenditures and a (3.7)% decrease in capital spending, compared to projected current and capital spending expenditures for 2016.  As compared to 2016, budgeted expenditures for 2017 include a 3.7% increase in transfers expenditure, which include subsidies, donations and social security in furtherance of the social safety net supported by the government.

 

The following table sets forth central government budgeted and actual expenditures for 2016 and budgeted expenditures for 2017:

 

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Central Government(1)
(in billions of pesos, except percentages)

 

 

 

Budget
 Law 2016

 

Actual
 Expenditures
 2016

 

Budget
 Law 2017

 

Percentage
 Growth
(2)

 

Percentage
 Growth
(3)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Current Expenditures

 

33,868

 

33,588

 

35,000

 

3.3

%

4.2

%

Capital Expenditures

 

7,254

 

7,142

 

6,880

 

(5.2

)%

(3.7

)%

Total Expenditures

 

41,122

 

40,730

 

41,880

 

1.8

%

2.8

%

of which Transfers, Goods and Services Expenditures

 

25,152

 

24,891

 

25,805

 

2.6

%

3.7

%

 


(1)         Calculated using constant pesos of 2017.

(2)         Budget Law 2017 compared with revised budget law expenditures of 2016.

(3)         Budget Law 2017 compared with actual expenditures of 2016.

Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

The following table sets forth the assumptions used to calculate the structural fiscal revenues for the purpose of preparing the 2017 budget, submitted to Congress in September 2016:

 

2017 Budget Assumptions for Structural Balance

 

 

 

2017 Budget
 Assumptions

 

Trend Real GDP growth (Average % change for the next five years)

 

3.0

 

Long-term Copper price (US$ cents per pound) (2016-2025)

 

256

 

 

The following table sets forth the macroeconomic assumptions underlying the 2017 budget bill submitted to Congress in September 2016:

 

2017 Budget Assumptions for Effective Balance

 

 

 

2017 Budget
 Assumptions

 

Real GDP growth (% change compared to 2016)

 

2.25

 

Real domestic demand growth (% change compared to 2016)

 

2.8

 

CPI (% change December 2016 compared to December 2015)

 

3.0

 

Annual average nominal exchange rate (Ps./US$)

 

700

 

Annual average Copper price (US$ cents per pound)

 

220

 

Annual average Molybdenum price (US$ per pound)

 

n.a.

 

 


Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

Based on the macroeconomic assumptions, revenues of the central government for 2017 are estimated at US$52.1 billion, representing an increase of 1.7% compared to the revenues estimated for 2016.  This increase reflects greater expected tax revenue from non-mining companies estimated to be 0.3% higher than in 2016, which are partially offset by the expected decrease in revenues originating from Codelco (transfers and taxes), estimated to be 3.0% lower than in 2016, respectively.

 

As a result, the government budgeted a fiscal deficit of US$(8.1) billion, or 3.3% of GDP, for 2017.  The 2017 budget assumed a structural fiscal deficit of 1.5% of GDP.

 

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Government Revenue

 

Taxation

 

Government expenditures are financed principally through the collection of value-added taxes, excise taxes, income taxes, tariffs and other minor taxes, as well as operational revenues, social security revenues and transfers from state-owned companies.  Tax revenues in any given year are dependent on developments affecting the economy taken as a whole, as well as variations affecting each sector of the Chilean economy.  In 2016, tax revenues represented 17.3% of GDP, compared to 17.6% of GDP in 2015.

 

Chile’s tax structure includes indirect and direct taxes.

 

Indirect taxes represent the largest source of tax revenue and include value-added tax (VAT), specific consumption taxes and customs duties.

 

VAT is levied at a single rate of 19.0% on sales of goods and services, as well as on imports.  There are limited exemptions, principally in the area of exports of goods and services and the performance of professional and independent personal services.  VAT charged on goods sold and services rendered represents for the taxpayer a fiscal debit that must be declared and paid on a monthly basis, after deducting the fiscal credit represented by VAT borne on purchases, imports or services received for the same tax period or the accumulated unused balance from prior periods.

 

Specific consumption taxes include taxes on fuel, tobacco and beverages sales.  In 2010, the government raised the tobacco tax to approximately Ps.2.60 per cigarette, or 62.3% of the sale price per package, to help finance earthquake reconstruction efforts.  In the 2014 tax reform, corrective taxes were raised, in the case of tobacco, or introduced, in the case of certain beverages.  These changes are reflected in the tables below:

 

Corrective Taxes Rates per the 2014 Tax Reform

 

Beverages
(%)

 

 

 

2014 Specific
 Tax Rate

 

Non-alcoholic beverages

 

10.0

 

Non-alcoholic beverages containing added sugar

 

18.0

 

Alcoholic beverages, wine and beer

 

20.5

 

Other alcoholic beverages, including distilled liquor

 

31.0

 

 

Tobacco
(%)

 

 

 

2013

 

2014

 

Ad valorem tax rate

 

60.50

 

30.0

 

Per unit (UTM)(1)  

 

0.000128803

 

0.0010304240

 

 


(1) Unidad Tributaria Mensual (monthly inflation-linked unit).  As of December 31, 2014, the UTM equaled Ps.43,198.

 

Ad Valorem Tax Rate

 

Customs duties consist of an ad valorem tax on imports.  The rate is 6.0%, although the effective import tariff was 0.9% in 2014 because of the volume of imports that benefit from free trade agreements to which Chile is a party.

 

Direct taxes include the corporate income tax and personal income tax.  Under the 2014 tax reform, corporate income is annually taxed at a rate of 25.0% or 27.0%, depending on the regime companies adopt.  This

 

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reform was designed to avoid tax evasion by either taking into account accrued earnings for purposes of calculating and applying final taxes even in the absence of effective distributions, or assessing a higher tax rate if taxpayers elect to be taxed only upon effective distributions.  Under the attribution regime, which levies a 25.0% tax rate on company income for each tax year, income taxes are immediately allocated to the company’s shareholders (“Regime A”).  Under the partially integrated regime, tax is levied at a 27.0% rate on a company’s annual income (“Regime B”).  A shareholder of a company operating under Regime B may claim a personal income tax credit of up to 65.0% of the taxes paid by the company attributable to that shareholder, unless the shareholder is resident in a country with which Chile has entered into a tax treaty, in which case the shareholder may claim a tax credit of up to 100.0% of the taxes paid by the company attributable to that shareholder.

 

The increase of the corporate tax will be phased in from 2014 to 2018:

 

Attribution Regime
(%)

 

 

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

2017

 

2018

 

Corporate income tax

 

21

 

22.5

 

24

 

25

 

25

 

 

Partially Integrated Regime
(%)

 

 

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

2017

 

2018

 

Corporate income tax

 

21

 

22.5

 

24

 

25.5

 

27

 

 

Chilean residents (individuals) are subject to a personal progressive tax on gross income at a maximum rate of 35.0%.  Wages and salaries are also subject to a progressive tax with a top marginal rate of 35%.  The top marginal rate on income tax was reduced to 35% beginning January 1, 2017.  Non-domiciled and non-resident individuals and entities are subject to the so-called additional tax, a withholding tax that applies to Chilean income and to certain specific payments defined in the law.  This tax is assessed at a general rate of 35.0%.  However, certain payments are subject to lower rates or are exempt from withholding taxation.  The local taxpayer who pays these amounts is usually liable for withholding and paying the tax to the Chilean Treasury in order to ensure tax collection.

 

Generally, interest income paid to individuals or legal entities not domiciled in Chile is subject to withholding tax at a rate of 35.0%.  There is, however, a reduced rate of 4.0% applicable to interest paid to foreign banks and financial institutions, among others.  The 2014 tax reform raised the maximum stamp tax rate from 0.4% to 0.8%, effective January 1, 2016.

 

The following table sets forth the composition of the central government’s tax revenues for the periods indicated:

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Value-added tax

 

45.9

 

48.7

 

49.6

 

48.0

 

48.5

 

Income tax

 

41.8

 

39.5

 

37.9

 

42.3

 

39.4

 

Other taxes on goods and services

 

8.3

 

8.7

 

10.2

 

9.6

 

8.7

 

Foreign trade tax(1)  

 

1.4

 

1.3

 

1.4

 

1.2

 

1.1

 

Other taxes

 

2.7

 

1.8

 

1.0

 

(1.0

)

0.7

 

Total

 

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

100.0

%

 


(1)         Customs duties.

Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

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Recent Tax Reforms

 

In 2012, the government submitted to Congress a series of revisions to the tax regime designed to increase the government’s tax revenue with the intention that those additional revenues would be directed to the enhancement of education programs at all levels while permitting the government to achieve a structural deficit of 1.0% of GDP by 2014.  In April 2012, the government announced a tax reform package, which was amended and subsequently approved by Congress in September 2012.  The tax reform package made a number of changes, including:

 

·                  an increase to corporate income tax rates from 17.0% to 20.0%;

 

·                  a reduction of individual income tax rates for individuals having a monthly income between Ps.535,000 (approximately US$880.80 as of December 31, 2014) and Ps.2,779,999 (approximately US$4,577.00 as of December 31, 2014); and

 

·                  a decrease of the stamp tax applied to credit transactions and an annual tax credit of up to Ps.100,000 (approximately US$164.60 as of December 31, 2014) on education expenses per child for families with a monthly income of up to UF 66 (approximately US$2,676.10 as of December 31, 2014).

 

The tax reforms adopted in 2012 were expected to generate approximately US$1 billion in additional tax revenue for the government each year, which would be applied to fund the education reform.  See “The Economy—Poverty, Income Distribution and Social Reforms—Educational Reforms.”

 

In April 2014, to finance the education reform and increase public sector revenues to achieve a structural balance (0.0% of GDP), the Bachelet administration announced that it would submit to Congress a series of changes to the tax regime aimed primarily at increasing corporate income tax contributions to government revenues with a view to raising tax revenues by 3.0% of GDP by 2017.  After certain amendments to the tax reform package as initially proposed, Congress approved it in September 2014.  The reforms will become fully effective by 2018.

 

The 2014 tax reform included the following changes:

 

·                  Increase of the corporate income tax rate:  The corporate tax burden for Chilean companies increases after a gradual phase-in between 2014 and 2018 from the current 20.0% rate to 25.0% or 27.0%, depending on the regime adopted by the corporate taxpayer.

 

·                  Under the attribution regime, corporate income tax will be levied at a 25.0% rate on a company’s annual taxable income.  If a company selects the attribution regime, their profits will be deemed to be allocated to their shareholders, regardless of whether they are distributed or reinvested, and are considered taxable income for those shareholders.

 

·                  Under the partially integrated regime, corporate income tax will be levied at a 27.0% rate on a company’s annual taxable income.  If a company selects the partially integrated regime, dividends and profit distributions to the shareholders will be taxed in addition to the 27.0% corporate-level income tax using the Republic of Chile’s global complementary tax (personal tax on total income) or by withholding taxes directly from those distributions.  Individuals will receive a credit for 65.0% of the taxes paid by the company attributable to that shareholder, unless the shareholder is resident in a country with which Chile has entered into a tax treaty, in which case the shareholder may claim a tax credit of up to 100.0% of the taxes paid by the company attributable to that shareholder.  The tax credit is expected to ensure the progressive nature of the tax system.

 

·                  Reduction in the personal income tax rate from 40.0% to 35.0%;

 

·                  Simplified regime for partners of small- and medium-sized partnerships or stock companies, in each case constituted only by individuals and individual entrepreneurs, granting them the option to be taxed under the global complementary tax (personal tax on total income), rather than the corporate income tax regime;

 

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·                  Introduction of a general anti-avoidance and anti-fraud rule, intended to allow taxpayers to choose between legal, legitimate alternatives as long as the taxpayer’s purpose is not the avoidance of taxes;

 

·                  Introduction of a fixed-source emission tax applicable to establishments with an installed power capacity of at least 50 MW.  Establishments that use biomass as fuel will be excluded from this tax;

 

·                  Abolishing the Fondo de Utilidades Tributarias (FUT) by 2017, which is currently used to track credits tied to undistributed profits.  This system was useful in the previous fully integrated tax regime that only taxed distributions.

 

·                  Individual entrepreneurs and companies constituted only by individuals will be entitled to access a special deemed income tax regime.  Prior to the 2014 reform, partnerships could access a similar regime if their annual sales were equal to or less than UF 2,400 (US$97,312 as of December 31, 2014).  The reform raised the maximum annual sales to:

 

i.                  UF 5,000 (US$202,732 as of December 31, 2014) for businesses operating in the transport sector;

 

ii.               UF 9,000 (US$364,918 as of December 31, 2014) for businesses operating in the agriculture sector; and

 

iii.            UF 17,000 (US$689,290 as of December 31, 2014) for businesses operating in the mining sector, in each case including annual sales attributable to affiliated parties.

 

In addition, the initial capital amount for taxpayers joining the regime will be increased from the current UF 3,000 (US$118,455 as of December 31, 2016) to twice the annual sales limit of the corresponding sector.

 

Law No. 20,899, entered into force on February 8, 2016, clarifies and amends certain technical aspects of the 2014 tax reform, as well as modifies certain provisions established by the tax reform. Law No. 20,899 establishes that stock companies are not allowed to choose between the attribution regime and the partially integrated regime, and are therefore required to operate under the partially integrated regime.

 

Tax Measures for Foreign Investors

 

Foreign shareholders are generally subject to capital gains tax at a rate of 20.0% or 35.0%, depending on certain requirements.  The 2014 tax reform eliminated the two different tax rates, subjecting all general foreign shareholders to a rate of 35.0%.  Certain foreign institutional investors are exempt from capital gains tax on corporate bonds issued before May 1, 2014 and all foreign investors are exempt from capital gains tax on corporate bonds issued after May 1, 2014 as long as the issuer makes the appropriate election under article 104 of the Income Tax Law.  Generally, interest income paid to individuals or legal entities not domiciled in Chile is subject to withholding tax at a rate of 35.0% (or 4.0% in certain cases).

 

Chile applies transfer pricing rules in transactions between related parties.  In this regard, the Income Tax Law provides for the application of the following methods:  cost plus method, resale minus method and reasonable profitability method (or comparable uncontrolled price method).  Provided no domestic comparable securities exist, the Chilean tax administration may challenge transfer prices on the basis of information available in the international market regarding the value of the same type of goods or services.

 

The Chilean government has entered into, and is currently negotiating with other countries, international agreements to avoid double taxation and to prevent tax evasion.  Most of these agreements are or are expected to be based on the OECD model agreement.  The following table shows the status of these agreements as of the date of this prospectus:

 

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Status of the Agreement

 

 

In force

 

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,

 

 

Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and the United Kingdom.

Signed

 

United States and Uruguay.

 

The agreement with the United States has been approved by the Chilean Congress, but is still pending the U.S. Congress approval to become effective.

 

The 2014 tax reform established, effective January 2017, an exception to the obligation of restitution of 35% of the corporate tax credit attached to dividends or profits distributed, for residents of double taxation treaty countries in force as of such date, thereby allowing them to claim tax credit for up to 100.0% of the corporate taxes paid by dividends or profits from a company under the partially integrated regime. Law No. 20,899 establishes that such exception will apply to residents of countries with a treaty signed before 2017, even if not in force.  The exception from restitution for residents of countries with treaties signed but not in force will apply until December 31, 2019.

 

Government Expenditures

 

In recent years, central government expenditures have consisted primarily of wages, salaries and transfers to the social security system, with capital expenditures and interest on public debt accounting for most of the balance. Between 2012 and 2016, public expenditures grew in real terms at an average annual rate of 5.0% per year.

 

The largest category of the government’s expenditures has generally been social programs, particularly social security, health and education.  In 2015, the latest available data, social programs accounted for 68% of total government expenditures.  During the period from 2010 to 2015, expenditures for social programs grew in real terms at an average annual rate of 5.3%.

 

Interest payments on public debt amounted to 2.9% of the governments expenditures in 2016, representing 0.7% of GDP.

 

The following table provides a summary of government expenditures by category for the dates indicated:

 

Central Government Expenditures
(in billions of constant 2015 Pesos)

 

 

 

2011

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

National administration(1)  

 

5,880

 

6,090

 

6,216

 

6,724

 

6,875

 

Social programs

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Health

 

4,899

 

5,304

 

5,710

 

6,234

 

6,944

 

Housing

 

438

 

497

 

485

 

606

 

606

 

Social security

 

8,861

 

9,115

 

9,120

 

9,391

 

9,884

 

Education

 

5,382

 

5,849

 

6,393

 

6,677

 

7,392

 

Other social programs

 

359

 

399

 

397

 

408

 

429

 

Total

 

19,939

 

21,164

 

22,105

 

23,317

 

25,254

 

Economic programs(2)  

 

3,973

 

3,938

 

4,140

 

4,410

 

4,872

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total central government expenditures

 

29,793

 

31,192

 

32,460

 

34,451

 

37,001

 

Interest payments on public debt

 

774

 

850

 

874

 

948

 

1,052

 

 


(1)         Includes government, defense, justice and security functions.

(2)         Includes promotion and regulation of economic activities as well as the support of infrastructure projects.

Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

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Public Contingent Liabilities

 

Public contingent liabilities may materialize depending on the course of events and from a variety of sources, as described below (only direct fiscal sources are included):

 

·                  Litigation:  As explained below, the central government and other state-owned agencies face private lawsuits.  If the courts rule against the government or if a settlement is agreed, payments are required.  As of June 2016, the government had paid approximately Ps.13,436 million (approximately US$20.1 million as of December 31, 2016) in connection with final court rulings issued in the first half of 2016.

 

·                  Infrastructure Concessions Program Guarantees:  Certain contracts between the government and a concessionaire guarantee minimum revenues to the private operator.  If the effective revenues are less than this minimum, the government is required contractually to cover the shortfall.  The government estimates that approximately Ps.24.6 billion (approximately US$36.9 million as of December 31, 2016) were paid on account of program guarantees in 2016.

 

·                  Bank Time Deposit Guarantees:  Time deposits have a 90.0% government guarantee in the case of bank default, up to UF 108 (approximately US$4,264 as of December 31, 2016) per individual for the system as a whole.  There have been no bank defaults in Chile since the deposit guarantee program was put in place. The maximum estimated fiscal exposure as of June 30, 2016 under the government guarantee, assuming all banks defaulted, represented approximately 1.33% of GDP.

 

·                  Pension Guarantees:  The Chilean social security pension system provides a minimum pension guarantee to retirees that have made contributions for at least 20 years, but have not saved enough money to reach the minimum pension amount.  The shortfall is covered by the government.  In July 2008, pension reforms came into force that gradually raise the established minimum guaranteed by the state by establishing minimum pensions for the elderly and the handicapped even if they have not contributed or did so for less than 20 years.  For 2016, government payments under the pension system represented 0.74% of GDP and are expected to gradually increase to 0.78% of GDP beginning in 2019. To guarantee the sustainable financing of the pension system, the government created the Pension Reserve Fund.

 

·                  Pension Reform Bonds:  The aggregate principal amount outstanding under the pension reform bonds (Bonos de Reconocimiento) reached a peak value of 21.1% of GDP in 1997 and has decreased to 1.5% of GDP as of December 31, 2016.

 

·                  Debt Guarantees:  As of December 31, 2016, the total value of financial guarantees issued by the government, represented solely by internal guarantees for locally issued debt, equaled 1.6% of GDP.  Of these internal guarantees, 19.6% guarantee debt incurred by Metro, 34.8% guarantee the debt of EFE and 43.5% guarantee debt related to the financing of higher education (authorized by Law No. 20,207).

 

·                  University Loan Guarantees:  Since 2006, the Chilean government has undertaken to reimburse financial institutions for amounts advanced to university students that are not repaid after those students finish or otherwise terminate their studies.  The Chilean Treasury is authorized to withhold amounts due from salaries or tax reimbursements to the original student debtors to recover amounts paid to universities.  As of December 31, 2016, the government’s maximum exposure under the program was estimated to be 1.22% of GDP.

 

·                  CORFO Investment Fund:  Since 1985, the CORFO has been implementing different mechanisms to guarantee liabilities financing productive activities.  With that purpose, the 2003 budget law and Decree No. 793 of the Ministry of Finance created an investment fund (Fondo de Cobertura de Riesgos) and allowed CORFO to contract indirect liabilities up to eight times its capital.  The aggregate amount of the guaranteed liabilities as of June 30, 2016 totaled approximately

 

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Ps.1,661,460 billion (approximately US$2.5 billion as of December 31, 2016).  CORFO’s liabilities are not expressly guaranteed by the government.

 

·                  Small Enterprise Guarantees Fund (FOGAPE):  The FOGAPE is a fund designated to guarantee financing granted by public or private financial institutions to small companies.  Its potential market segment includes small companies meeting one of the following requirements:  (a) companies with maximum annual sales of UF 25,000 (approximately US$1.0 million as of December 31, 2016); (b) exporting companies with annual average sales in the two immediately preceding calendar years of no more than US$16.7 million; or (c) nonprofit legal entities and “sociedades de personas” (partnerships where the specific qualities of the partners are the reason for their business formation, such as limited liability companies) for irrigation and other infrastructure projects. However, in addition to the requirements above, Law No. 20,318 allowed, for a 24-month period beginning January 2009, the use of the fund for companies with sales between UF 25,000 and UF 500,000 (approximately from US$1.0 million to US$19.7 million as of December 31, 2016).  In 2016, guarantees issued by FOGAPE did not give rise to a material contingency, individually or in the aggregate.

 

As of December 31, 2016, the government’s total contingent liabilities were equal to approximately 4.4% of GDP.

 

Government Litigation

 

Chile and many of its governmental agencies are currently, and may in the future be, subject to lawsuits before various courts.  Although Chile is actively defending current disputes through the Council for the Defense of the State (Consejo de Defensa del Estado, or CDE), other specialized agencies and private domestic and international law firms, no assurances can be given regarding their outcome.

 

Domestically, Chile is a defendant in lawsuits before local courts seeking redress for damages allegedly caused by the actions of public institutions or civil servants.  Legal defense for these cases is mainly undertaken by the Council for the Defense of the State.  As of June 30, 2016, there were approximately 30,816 active cases throughout the country, with aggregate claims of Ps.12,344,637 million (approximately US$18.7 billion as of December 31, 2016), involving expropriation, criminal, civil, tax and other matters.

 

Claims against Chile regarding infrastructure concessions are resolved by a special arbitral system.  As of December 31, 2016, disputes pending before the arbitral system involved claims representing approximately 7.0% of GDP.  The Chilean government has made payments on approximately 26.0% of all claims brought against it since the system began operating.  See “The Economy—Privatization and Infrastructure—Public Works—Infrastructure Concessions.”

 

Government-owned Enterprises

 

The following table sets forth the government’s share ownership and total assets of the principal state-owned enterprises as of December 31, 2016, and revenue and net income (loss) for the year ended December 31, 2016:

 

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Percentage of
 State Ownership
 as of
 December 31,
 2016

 

Total Assets at
 December 31, 2016
 (in millions of US$)

 

Revenue for
 the Year
 Ended
 December 31,
 2016
 (in millions of
 US$)

 

Net Income
 (Loss) for the
 Year Ended
 December 31,
 2016
 (in millions of
 US$)

 

Main Public Sector Enterprises:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Banco Estado (financial)

 

100.0

 

52,133

 

1,861

 

240

 

Codelco (copper)

 

100.0

 

33,403

 

11,537

 

(334

)

ENAP (oil and gas)

 

100.0

 

3,374

 

4,602

 

233

 

Enami (mining)

 

100.0

 

808

 

1,044

 

(79

)

EFE (railway)

 

100.0

 

2,264

 

95

 

(92

)

Metro S.A. (Santiago’s subway)

 

100.0

 

6,332

 

480

 

(46

)

 


Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

Banco Estado

 

Banco Estado is an autonomous commercial bank, wholly owned by the state, subject to the same laws and regulations as Chilean private-sector banks and supervised by the SBIF.  It is one of the largest Chilean financial institutions.  As of December 31, 2016, Banco Estado had 392 branches and over 9.0 million term savings accounts.  It offers comprehensive financial services throughout the country, with an extensive network of electronic distribution channels and branches extending to rural areas as well.  It also contributes to the development of the local economy, playing a significant role in permitting credit access for small- and medium-sized enterprises and in savings for small investors.  Banco Estado accesses the international capital markets from time to time, as part of its financing strategy.  The government also makes capital contributions from time to time, whether in cash or by authorizing the capitalization of distributable net income.

 

Codelco

 

Codelco is a mining enterprise wholly owned by the State.  Codelco’s corporate purpose is to maximize the value of its mineral resources for the benefit of its shareholder, the Republic of Chile, by fully developing its vast mining resources on a timely basis, leveraging its experienced workforce, utilizing its advanced technological assets in key areas and executing strategic initiatives related to its (1) capital expenditure program, (2) improvement in operations, (3) exploration efforts, (4) investment in human capital and (5) mining association with third parties. As part of its strategy to increase production and revenues, Codelco has undertaken several projects, business ventures and associations with private sector mining and non-mining enterprises.

 

Under Chilean Law, Codelco’s net earnings are subject to an additional tax of 40.0% in addition to ordinary corporate income tax.  Codelco is also subject to an additional mining tax that is based on its operating income each year.  Income tax payments and other taxes paid by Codelco to the Chilean Treasury in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 were US$1.8 billion, US$0.9 billion, US$0.6 billion and US$0.2 billion, respectively. In 2016, Codelco did not pay income tax or other taxes to the Chilean Treasury.

 

In addition, the Reserved Copper Act (Ley Reservada del Cobre) sets forth the government’s obligation to contribute to defense spending (e.g., renewal of war material and equipment), an amount equal to 10.0% of Codelco’s revenues from the export of copper and related byproducts.  Such funds are directly transferred by Codelco to the General Treasury of the Republic (Tesorería General de la República, or the Chilean Treasury) and then segregated in a special extra-budgetary Treasury account.  Transfers under the Reserved Copper Act totaled US$1.3 billion (0.5% of GDP), US$1.2 billion (0.5% of GDP), US$1.0 billion (0.4% of GDP), US$0.9 billion (0.4% of GDP) and US$0.9 billion (0.4% of GDP), in 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, respectively.  In 2016, Codelco incurred in US$394.8 million indebtedness in the international capital markets, to fund in part its transfers under the Reserved Copper Act. A bill was submitted to Congress in 2011, that if passed, would create a new model for financing military expenses eliminating the contributions set forth in the Reserved Copper Act.

 

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In December 2016 and March 2017, the Ministries of Mining and Finance approved capital contributions of US$500 million and US$475 million to Codelco, respectively.  Codelco is the largest company in Chile in terms of sales.

 

Codelco accesses the international debt capital markets from time to time, to finance its operations.

 

ENAP

 

ENAP is a state-owned enterprise dedicated to the exploration, development and production of crude oil wells, both in Chile and abroad.  ENAP also engages in the refining of crude oil to be sold to private distributors.  ENAP was incorporated in 1950 and has diversified its corporate activities and business purpose from the production of crude oil wells in Chile to the refining and export of oil products, and the exploration and development of oil wells in several countries around the world.  In May 2010, the government transferred responsibility for ENAP from the Ministry of Mining to the Ministry of Energy, with the Minister of Energy now serving as chairman of ENAP’s board of directors.

 

In October 2014, the government submitted a bill to Congress to expand the business purpose of ENAP to include the electricity generation through ENAP’s affiliates.  The bill was approved by Congress and published in the Official Gazette on February 5, 2016.

 

In 2015, ENAP’s sales totaled 11.7 million cubic meters of crude oil and its by-products, of which 11.28 million cubic meters were sold to the local market, supplying 59.2% of the total national fuel demand.  Approximately 0.45 million cubic meters of crude oil and by-products were exported mainly to Peru.

 

In 2016, ENAP’s sales totaled 11.8 million cubic meters of crude oil and its by-products, of which 11.4 million cubic meters were sold to the local market, supplying 97% of the total national fuel demand.  Approximately 0.4 million cubic meters of crude oil and by-products were exported.

 

ENAP accesses local and international bank and capital markets from time to time to finance its operations.

 

Enami

 

Enami is a wholly government-owned enterprise dedicated to the development of small and medium-scale mining companies by facilitating their access to the precious metals market under competitive conditions.  To meet these goals, Enami conducts the following operations:

 

·                  Mining Development.  This operation involves mining-venture financing, technical assistance for the preparation and evaluation of projects, allocation of credit resources for the implementation of feasible projects, and access to the market by means of authorized ore purchases;

 

·                  Ore Processing.  Enami transforms sulfide and oxide ores with low copper grades into smelting products, concentrates and precipitates.  Enami began producing electrowinning (EW) cathodes from oxidized ore processing in 2003; and

 

·                  Smelters and Refinery.  This operation involves Enami’s main assets ensuring the processing of the production of small- and medium-sized mining firms, under the same terms as those offered to large-scale producers in Chile.  In 2005, the Ventanas foundry and smelting facility was transferred to Codelco.  Enami used the proceeds of this sale to pay down its debts and begin to transfer profits to the Chilean Treasury.

 

EFE

 

EFE is a wholly government-owned enterprise dedicated to the development and management of railway infrastructure.  EFE’s business is divided into three segments:  passenger, cargo transportation services and real estate management.  EFE’s passenger business is conducted through three affiliated operating companies:  Metro Regional de Valparaíso S.A. (MERVAL), Trenes Metropolitanos S.A. (TMSA), and Ferrocarriles Suburbanos de Concepción S.A. (FESUB).

 

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As of December 2015, Chile had a railroad network of approximately 2,200 kilometers that extends from Regions V to X. EFE is responsible for the maintenance of, and improvements to the tracks, the signaling, electrification and communication systems, control centers and the stations.

 

In 2015, the latest available data, EFE had operating revenues derived from passenger transport (54.2%), cargo (30.0%) and real estate management (15.8%).

 

Metro

 

Metro is a company wholly owned by the government.  Its corporate purpose is the development, construction and operation of an urban railroad network, which is mainly underground and covers the city of Santiago and includes stations and maintenance workshops.  In 2016, the railway network was composed of five interconnected lines totaling approximately 103 kilometers and 108 stations servicing approximately 670 million passenger trips per year and including 1,093 wagons and cabins.  Metro has embraced a dynamic expansion plan, which is incorporated in the Plan Transantiago.  According to the expansion plan, it is expected that by the end of 2018, the railway network will be composed of seven interconnected lines totaling approximately 140 kilometers and 136 stations.

 

Metro’s revenues derive mainly from ticket sales, leasing advertising and commercial space, leasing and selling real estate, vending machines and providing telecommunication services.  Due to large asset depreciation costs, the company historically has not recorded profits and therefore has not made contributions to the Chilean Treasury.

 

Capitalization of Public Companies

 

The capitalization of a public company must be authorized by Congress.

 

Codelco, as the main public company in Chile, is involved in a significant number of investment projects.  In this regard, the capitalization law for Codelco, approved by Congress on October 24, 2014, is expected to support its business and development plan.  The capitalization consists of Treasury transfers to Codelco of US$4.0 billion between 2014 and 2018, which will include retained profits of US$1.0 billion. The capitalization is gradual, and subject to making the improvements contemplated in Codelco’s business and development plan. Additionally, it authorizes the Republic of Chile to fund its contributions with the proceeds of debt incurred in Chile or abroad, up to US$3.0 billion. In December 2014, the government issued US$1.5 billion of external bonds. On October 28, 2015, the government contributed US$600 million to Codelco’s capital. In January, 2017 the government issued US$1.5 billion of internal bonds.  And additional capital contributions were made to Codelco on December 2016 and March 2017 for US$500 million and US$475 million, respectively.

 

On November 8, 2014, Law No. 20,792 was published in the Official Gazette, authorizing Banco Estado’s capitalization.  The capitalization law allocates US$450 million to the direct capitalization of Banco Estado and US$50 million to the Small Enterprise Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantía para Pequeños Empresarios, or FOGAPE), a fund administered by Banco Estado that grants partial financial guarantees to small businesses. As of December 31, 2016 the total amount authorized has been contributed.

 

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PUBLIC SECTOR DEBT

 

External Debt

 

Chile’s total public sector external debt was US$6.1 billion as of December 31, 2012, US$5.2 billion as of December 31, 2013, US$6.5 billion as of December 31, 2014, US$7.8 billion as of December 31, 2015 and US$10.1 billion as of December 31, 2016.  The ratio of public sector external debt to GDP stood at 2.3% in 2012, 2.0% in 2013, 2.7% in 2014, 3.5% in 2015 and 4.0% as of December 31, 2016.  Chile is current on all its obligations to the IMF and other multilateral organizations.

 

The following table sets forth the outstanding amount of public sector external debt by creditor as of the dates indicated:

 

Public Sector External Debt, By Creditor
(in millions of US$)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IDB

 

US$

562.9

 

US$

523.7

 

US$

478.6

 

US$

412.6

 

US$

581.6

 

IBRD (World Bank)

 

111.9

 

98.2

 

96.9

 

100.7

 

185.2

 

Bonds

 

5,221.1

 

4,307.2

 

5,712.7

 

7,027.6

 

8,992.1

 

IDA (World Bank)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Others

 

238.7

 

230.5

 

256.1

 

236.3

 

321.9

 

Total

 

US$

6,134.6

 

US$

5,159.6

 

US$

6,544.3

 

US$

7,777.2

 

US$

10,080.8

 

 


Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

The following table sets forth public sector external debt by currency as of the dates indicated:

 

Public Sector External Debt, by Currency
(in millions of US$)

 

 

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

United States Dollar

 

US$

4,703.7

 

US$

5,821.1

 

Euro

 

2,459.1

 

3,608.5

 

Chilean Pesos

 

614.1

 

650.9

 

Other

 

0.4

 

0.3

 

Total

 

US$

7,777.2

 

US$

10,080.8

 

 


Source:  Chilean Budget Office.

 

The following table sets forth the amortization of public sector external debt by category for the periods indicated:

 

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Amortization of Gross Total Consolidated Public Sector External Debt(1)
(in millions of US$)

 

 

 

Outstanding

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

as of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2023 to

 

 

 

December 31,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Final

 

 

 

2016

 

2017

 

2018

 

2019

 

2020

 

2021

 

2022

 

Maturity

 

Central Government:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Multilateral organizations

 

767

 

96

 

75

 

72

 

60

 

47

 

32

 

385

 

Chilean Treasury bills

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chilean Treasury bonds

 

322

 

33

 

38

 

36

 

36

 

30

 

22

 

129

 

Bilateral and Other creditors

 

8,992

 

 

 

 

1,391

 

561

 

634

 

6,406

 

Total

 

10,081

 

128

 

112

 

107

 

1,486

 

638

 

688

 

6,920

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Chilean Central Bank:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Multilateral organizations

 

86

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

86

 

Bilateral creditors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Commercial banks

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Other creditors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bonds

 

608

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

608

 

SDR allocations (IMF)(2)

 

1,099

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1,099

 

Total

 

1,793

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1,793

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Banco Estado:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Multilateral organizations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bilateral creditors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Commercial banks

 

982

 

706

 

96

 

60

 

10

 

11

 

11

 

88

 

Banco Estado NY

 

631

 

449

 

50

 

20

 

 

112

 

 

 

Subtotal

 

1,613

 

1,155

 

146

 

80

 

10

 

123

 

11

 

88

 

Other creditors

 

2,536

 

696

 

205

 

 

767

 

 

500

 

368

 

Total

 

4,149

 

1,851

 

351

 

80

 

777

 

123

 

511

 

456

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Non-financial public enterprises:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Multilateral organizations

 

1,076

 

32

 

332

 

332

 

32

 

332

 

16

 

 

Bilateral creditors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Commercial banks

 

4,099

 

1,507

 

1,306

 

329

 

157

 

447

 

56

 

297

 

Bonds

 

14,575

 

 

211

 

715

 

1,174

 

1,560

 

1,250

 

9,664

 

Other creditors

 

2,611

 

726

 

215

 

4

 

771

 

4

 

504

 

386

 

Total

 

22,361

 

2,265

 

2,064

 

1,380

 

2,135

 

2,344

 

1,826

 

10,347

 

Total Gross Public Sector External Debt

 

38,384

 

4,244

 

2,527

 

1,567

 

4,398

 

3,105

 

3,025

 

19,516

 

 


(1)         Includes medium- and long-term external debt.

(2)         Special Drawing Rights (Derechos Especiales de Giro) are an international asset reserve created by the IMF.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank, Chilean Budget Office, Banco Estado and Chilean Treasury.

 

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Private Sector External Debt Guaranteed by the Central Government

 

As a consequence of the 1982-1983 financial crisis and the subsequent privatization of public sector enterprises with outstanding external debt, the central government is the guarantor of a small portion of the private sector’s external debt.  It is the government’s policy not to guarantee new private sector obligations.  The contingent liabilities of private sector guarantees of the government fell steadily between 1999 and 2004, and ended in 2005.

 

Total Consolidated Public and Private Sector External Debt

 

The following table sets forth approximate outstanding amounts of Chile’s public and private sector external debt as of the dates indicated:

 

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Total Consolidated Public and Private Sector External Debt
(in millions of US$ except ratios and as noted)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

Medium- and long-term debt

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Public sector(1)

 

US$

23,346

 

US$

25,836

 

US$

29,217

 

US$

29,972

 

US$

33,519

 

Private sector

 

US$

73,213

 

US$

89,664

 

US$

101,307

 

US$

102,794

 

US$

113,852

 

Total medium- and long-term debt

 

US$

97,558

 

US$

115,500

 

US$

130,524

 

US$

132,766

 

US$

147,371

 

Short-term debt

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Public sector(1)

 

US$

3,411

 

US$

2,158

 

US$

2,068

 

US$

1,792

 

US$

1,791

 

Private sector

 

US$

21,699

 

US$

18,694

 

US$

19,542

 

US$

23,205

 

US$

14,628

 

Total short-term debt

 

US$

25,110

 

US$

20,851

 

US$

21,611

 

US$

24,997

 

US$

16,418

 

Total short-, medium and long-term debt

 

US$

122,668

 

US$

136,351

 

US$

152,135

 

US$

157,764

 

US$

163,789

 

Use of IMF credit

 

 

0

 

 

0

 

 

0

 

 

0

 

 

1

 

Total public(1) and private external debt, less reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars)

 

US$

81.0

 

US$

95.3

 

US$

111.7

 

US$

119.1

 

US$

123.3

 

Total public(1) and private external debt/GDP

 

45.2

%

51.8

%

62.1

%

70.3

%

65.4

%

Total public(1) and private external debt/exports(2)

 

130.0

%

150.9

%

171.2

%

183.9

%

228.1

%

 


(1)         Includes central government, Chilean Central Bank and public enterprises as well as publicly guaranteed private debt.

(2)         Exports include goods and services.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Central Government External Bonds

 

As of December 31, 2016, Chile had the following global bonds outstanding:

 

·                  3.875% US$829,467,000 Notes due August 5, 2020;

 

·                  5.5% Ps.434,345,000,000 Notes due August 5, 2020;

 

·                  3.25% US$656,027,000 Notes due September 14, 2021;

 

·                  2.25% US$750,000,000 Notes due October 30, 2022;

 

·                  1.625% €1,240,000,000 Notes due January 30, 2025;

 

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·                  3.125% US$758,262,000 Notes due March 27, 2025;

 

·                  1.875% €950,000,000 Notes due May 27, 2030;

 

·                  3.625% US$750,000,000 Notes due October 30, 2042;

 

·                  1.75% €1,200,000 Notes due January 20, 2026; and

 

·                  3.125% US$1,349,122,000 Notes due January 21, 2026.

 

Central Government Internal Bonds

 

In 2003, the Chilean Treasury issued the approximate equivalent of US$363 million long-term debt securities in UF with a 20-year term.  This issuance was part of the government financing plan and was the first issue under a program designed to develop the domestic financial market.  Since 2010, the government’s local bond issuances have primarily been intended to further develop the domestic market.  In January 2017, Chile placed Ps. 1 trillion in 4.5% bonds due 2021, of which Ps. 161 billion were placed in the international capital markets. The following table reflects the Chilean Treasury’s bond issuances since 2003:

 

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Chilean Treasury Bond Issuances in the Local Market
(in millions of US$)
(1)

 

As of 
December 
31,

 

BTP-
5(2)

 

BTP-
7(3)

 

BTP-
10(4)

 

BTP-
20(5)

 

BTP-
30(6)

 

BTU-
5(7)

 

BTU-
7(8)

 

BTU-
10(9)

 

BTU-
20(10)

 

BTU-
30(11)

 

Total

 

% of 
GDP

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2003

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

363

 

 

363

 

0.4

 

2004

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

773

 

 

773

 

0.7

 

2005

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

385

 

385

 

 

769

 

0.6

 

2006

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.0

 

2007

 

 

 

343

 

 

 

 

 

 

401

 

 

743

 

0.4

 

2008

 

 

 

318

 

 

 

 

 

 

702

 

583

 

1,603

 

1.1

 

2009

 

336

 

 

474

 

 

 

558

 

 

1,034

 

411

 

414

 

3,227

 

1.7

 

2010

 

 

 

801

 

 

 

641

 

1,099

 

1,558

 

1,374

 

1,374

 

6,847

 

2.9

 

2011

 

 

863

 

863

 

 

 

855

 

770

 

770

 

727

 

727

 

5,574

 

2.4

 

2012

 

 

 

521

 

519

 

 

483

 

229

 

455

 

516

 

638

 

3,361

 

1.2

 

2013

 

 

 

501

 

503

 

403

 

 

 

1,333

 

654

 

561

 

3,955

 

1.5

 

2014

 

247

 

 

387

 

519

 

280

 

 

 

662

 

602

 

466

 

3,163

 

1.3

 

2015

 

 

 

1,067

 

773

 

707

 

924

 

 

1,123

 

924

 

743

 

6,261

 

2.8

 

2016

 

1,049

 

 

1,445

 

734

 

 

1,481

 

 

1,448

 

746

 

746

 

7,628

 

3.1

 

2017(12)

 

2,451

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2,451

 

1.0

 

 


(1)         Using the exchange rate at December 31 of the applicable year.

(2)         Peso-denominated internal bonds with a term of 5 years

(3)         Peso-denominated internal bonds with a term of 7 years.

(4)         Peso-denominated internal bonds with a term of 10 years.

(5)         Peso-denominated internal bonds with a term of 20 years.

(6)         Peso-denominated internal bonds with a term of 30 years.

(7)         UF-denominated bonds with a term of 5 years.

(8)         UF-denominated bonds with a term of 7 years.

(9)         UF-denominated bonds with a term of 10 years.

(10)  UF-denominated bonds with a term of 20 years.

(11)  UF-denominated bonds with a term of 30 years.

(12) As of May 31, 2017. Amounts correspond to financing operations and do not include bonds issued solely to refinance outstanding bonds.

Source:  Ministry of Finance.

 

Liability Management in the Domestic Market

 

In 2016, the Republic implemented a liability management program in the local market. Through this program, the Republic sold various series of UF-denominated Chilean Central Bank notes due in 2021, 2026, 2035 and 2043; and Peso-denominated notes due in 2021, 2026, 2035 and 2044 to refinance outstanding Peso and UF denominated bonds for an aggregate amount of approximately US$16,162 million.

 

Debt Service and Debt Restructuring

 

Chile has a long-standing tradition of prompt service of its external debt obligations, which was interrupted only in the 1930s.  The regional debt crisis, which started in 1982, resulted in growing unwillingness on the part of foreign commercial banks to lend to Latin American borrowers generally.  Reduced new lending forced Chile to seek the rescheduling of certain obligations to commercial banks due in 1983 and 1984 and to obtain new loans from banks.  Chile agreed to further rescheduling with the international banking community in 1985 and 1987, which provided for the rescheduling of the remaining medium-term commercial bank loan amounts outstanding in 1983 to the Chilean public and private financial sectors.  Despite the need to enter into these rescheduling agreements, Chile did not fall into arrears in respect of principal or interest payments during this period.

 

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In an effort to reduce its public sector external debt burden, Chile carried out two substantial cash buyback operations during the second half of the 1980s.  In 1985, the Chilean authorities promulgated a debt conversion program (Chapters XVIII and XIX of the Central Bank’s International Exchange Norms), which permitted foreign investors to exchange Chilean external debt issued by Chilean financial institutions and Chilean public sector companies for equity interests in Chilean companies.  From its initiation in 1985 until its discontinuation in the mid-1990s, this debt conversion program, together with other debt reduction measures, resulted in debt reduction of more than US$11.5 billion.

 

Beginning in 1995, Chile began the process of prepaying its public sector debt rescheduled in the 1980s and new debt borrowed at that time, together with debt incurred under IMF and World Bank programs.

 

Between 1989 and 2008, the central government serviced the debt held with the Chilean Central Bank, denominated in UF and in dollars.  Until 1994, payments were generally limited to a portion of accrued interest.  The debt stock increased by US$1.2 billion between 1989 and 1994, due to the capitalization of semiannual interest.  From 1995 until 1999, the central government amortized capital by US$1.6 billion, with a debt stock reduction of US$956 million.

 

In 2007, the central government prepaid the last notes in dollars originally payable in 2013 and 2014 and, in 2008, repaid the debt stock denominated in UF.

 

In 2014, the central government prepaid US$170,533,000 of the 3.875% Notes due August 5, 2020 and US$343,973,000 of the 5.5% Notes due September 14, 2021.

 

In 2016, the central government prepaid US$89,623,000 of the 3.875% Notes due August 5, 2020; US$94,823,000 of the 3.25% Notes due September 21, 2021; US$115,881,000 of the 3.25% Notes due October 30, 2022 and US$301,869,000 of the 3.125% Notes due March 27, 2025.

 

Debt Record

 

Chile has regularly met all principal and interest obligations on its external debt for over 50 years.

 

Total Consolidated Internal and External Debt of Non-Financial Public Enterprises

 

The following tables set forth the total domestic and external debt of non-financial public enterprises for the periods indicated:

 

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Debt and Assets of Non-Financial Public Enterprises(1)
 Consolidated (in millions of pesos of each year)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Total financial debt

 

9,026,812

 

10,532,974

 

13,430,636

 

16,071,153

 

15,741,304

 

Financial debt, excluding debts owed to central government

 

9,026,812

 

10,532,974

 

13,430,636

 

16,071,153

 

15,741,304

 

Short-term(2)

 

1,181,417

 

1,127,000

 

1,100,174

 

1,342,042

 

1,068,512

 

Long-term(3)

 

7,845,395

 

9,405,974

 

12,330,462

 

14,729,110

 

14,672,792

 

Financial debt with central government(4)

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

Financial assets(5)

 

1,255,156

 

1,146,806

 

1,608,081

 

1,838,036

 

912,031

 

Net financial debt

 

7,771,656

 

9,386,168

 

11,822,555

 

14,233,117

 

14,829,272

 

Excluding central government

 

7,771,656

 

9,386,168

 

11,822,555

 

14,233,117

 

14,829,272

 

 


(1)         Includes Codelco, Enami, ENAP, Metro, EFE, Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada (Asmar), Empresa Nacional de Aeronáutica (Enaer), Casa de Moneda de Chile, Zofri S.A. and Correos de Chile; excludes Banco Estado and the Chilean Central Bank.

(2)         Includes short-term obligations with banks and financial institutions and current amounts due under long-term obligations, obligations with the public (bonds) and current amounts due to long-term credit providers.

(3)         Includes long-term obligations with banks and financial institutions, obligations with the public (bonds) and obligations owed to long-term credit providers.

(4)         Excludes tax on income and deferred taxes.

(5)         Includes cash, term deposits, net negotiable securities, financial investments in repurchase agreements.

Source:  Ministry of Finance.

 

Net Consolidated Debt of the Chilean Central Bank and Central Government (as a % of GDP)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Net Consolidated Debt

 

(7.9

)

(7.9

)

(7.4

)

(8.0

)

(2.8

)

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank, Chilean Budget Office and Comptroller General of the Republic.

 

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Net Debt of the Chilean Central Bank
(in millions of pesos of each year)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Liabilities

 

19,749,320

 

18,592,976

 

20,193,733

 

20,336,735

 

21,032,035

 

Chilean Central Bank Notes and Bonds(1)  

 

12,905,055

 

13,033,022

 

12,908,185

 

13,494,386

 

15,114,142

 

Fiscal Deposits

 

626,202

 

313,057

 

1,226,599

 

419,683

 

780,412

 

Others(2)  

 

6,218,063

 

5,246,896

 

6,058,949

 

6,422,667

 

5,137,481

 

Assets without subordinated debt

 

21,169,733

 

21,669,897

 

24,744,603

 

27,530,130

 

27,211,437

 

Net International Reserves (in US$ million)

 

41,649

 

41,094

 

40,447

 

38,643

 

40,494

 

Others(3)  

 

1,236,299

 

146,676

 

177,943

 

196,702

 

190,430

 

Total Net Debt without subordinated debt(1)(2)  

 

(1,420,413

)

(3,076,921

)

(4,550,870

)

(7,193,395

)

(6,179,401

)

 


(1)         Includes various notes and bonds of the Chilean Central Bank such as the Chilean Central Bank discountable promissory notes (PDBC), Chilean Central Bank indexed promissory notes (PRBC), Chilean Central Bank bonds in Chilean pesos (BCP), Chilean Central Bank bonds in UF (BCU), Chilean Central Bank bonds in U.S. dollars (BCD) and other instruments.

(2)         Includes other deposits and obligations, reciprocal agreements and other securities.

(3)         Includes net internal credit, excluding fiscal transfers, subordinated debt, SINAP obligations and popular capitalism, other securities from abroad, contributions to international organizations and other adjusted domestic securities.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

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Central Government Total Net Debt
(in millions of pesos of each year except as indicated)

 

 

 

As of December 31,

 

 

 

2012

 

2013

 

2014

 

2015

 

2016

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Debt in pesos

 

Ps.

13,015,967

 

Ps.

15,285,636

 

Ps.

18,681,365

 

Ps.

22,523,188

 

Ps.

29,317,723

 

External Debt

 

434,345

 

434,345

 

434,345

 

464,148

 

434,345

 

Domestic Debt

 

12,581,622

 

14,851,291

 

18,247,020

 

22,059,040

 

28,883,378

 

Assets in pesos

 

9,298,488

 

9,000,392

 

9,151,137

 

10,782,887

 

12,236,988

 

Assets in pesos, without public enterprises(1)

 

9,298,488

 

9,000,392

 

9,151,137

 

10,778,887

 

12,236,988

 

Chilean Central Bank Deposits

 

158,330

 

200,952

 

1,117,977

 

296,689

 

463,976

 

Financial debt of public enterprises with the Central government

 

0

 

0

 

0

 

4,000

 

0

 

Net debt in pesos(2)  

 

Ps.

3,717,479

 

Ps.

6,285,244

 

Ps.

9,530,228

 

Ps.

11,740,301

 

Ps.

17,080,735

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Debt in U.S. dollars (in US$ million)

 

US$

5,227

 

US$

4,330

 

US$

5,829

 

US$

7,121

 

US$

9,430

 

Treasury Bills with the Chilean Central Bank (in US$ million)

 

 

 

 

 

 

External Debt (in US$ million)

 

5,227

 

4,330

 

5,829

 

7,121

 

9,430

 

Assets in U.S. dollars, Chilean Central Bank Deposits(3) (in US$ million)

 

31,382

 

31,133

 

32,162

 

31,477

 

32,637

 

Net debt in U.S. dollars (in US$ million)

 

US$

(26,155

)

US$

(26,803

)

US$

(26,333

)

US$

(24,356

)

US$

(23,207

)

Total Financial Debt(4)

 

Ps.

15,517,618

 

Ps.

17,553,695

 

Ps.

22,221,911

 

Ps.

27,560,190

 

Ps.

35,610,201

 

Total Financial Assets(5)

 

24,317,827

 

 

25,306,676

 

 

28,685,723

 

 

33,047,936

 

 

34,015,524

 

Total Net Financial Debt

 

Ps.

(8,800,209

)

Ps.

(7,752,981

)

Ps.

(6,463,812

)

Ps.

(5,487,747

)

Ps.

1,594,677

 

 


(1)         Does not include assets of the old scholarship system.

(2)         Includes CORFO.

(3)         Includes Oil Stabilization Fund, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Infrastructure Fund and governmental term deposits.

(4)         Debt in pesos plus debt in U.S. dollars.

(5)         Assets in pesos plus assets in U.S. dollars.

Source:  Chilean Central Bank, Chilean Budget Office and Comptroller General of the Republic.

 

Public Debt Statistics

 

Public Debt Report

 

Since 2006, the Ministry of Finance has published quarterly reports on public debt records, containing data on the assets and liabilities of the central government, the Chilean Central Bank and other relevant public institutions.

 

Central Government Indebtedness

 

The most widely used international indicator of governmental liabilities is the item called “general government indebtedness,” which includes both “central government liabilities” and “local government authorized liabilities.”  In Chile, local governments are not authorized to incur any financial indebtedness; therefore, the general

 

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and central government liabilities are treated as one item.  As of December 31, 2016, central government liabilities represented 21.3% of GDP.

 

The level of general government liabilities is not an adequate indicator of Chile’s financial soundness, because it does not take account of the government’s financial assets.  “Central government net indebtedness” is used to more accurately measure the government’s financial position, by showing the difference between public debt and financial assets, that is, deposits in current accounts, time deposits and fixed income investments.  Equity investments and loans granted by the central government are disregarded, because it is very difficult to have an accurate economic valuation of them.  Net central government indebtedness totaled (6.8)% of GDP as of December 31, 2012, and 1.0% of GDP as of December 31, 2016.  This increase is largely due to the growth in the gross public debt, which rose from 11.9% of GDP in 2012 to 21.3% of GDP in 2016, in spite of growth in the government’s financial assets, which rose from 18.7% of GDP in 2012 to 20.3% of GDP in 2016.

 

Chilean Central Bank Debt and Consolidated Debt

 

The Chilean Central Bank has been an autonomous institution since 1989.  It has not engaged in quasi-fiscal transactions since that date.  During the financial crisis experienced in Chile in 1983 and 1984, the Chilean Central Bank engaged in a series of quasi-fiscal actions in order to rescue the financial system.  As a result, important changes in the level and composition of its assets and liabilities occurred, significantly affecting its current levels of global indebtedness.

 

The main liabilities of the Chilean Central Bank are its guarantees of public deposits and the securities issued by the bank itself.  The Chilean Central Bank’s main assets are the international reserves of the public with the bank, and the notes delivered to it by the government in connection with the financial crisis of 1983.  As of December 31, 2008, the government had no debt owing to the Chilean Central Bank.  See “Debt Service and Debt Restructuring.”

 

As of December 31, 2016, the assets of the Chilean Central Bank exceeded its liabilities, resulting in net indebtedness equivalent to 3.7% of GDP.  In 2014 and 2015, the Chilean Central Bank had net indebtedness of 3.1% and 4.5% of GDP, respectively.  The consolidated indebtedness, including public sector liabilities and Chilean Central Bank debt, is considered a significant macroeconomic indicator.  This debt interacts with the economy in two ways: (i) it reflects payment risk, which is minimal and explains the minor systemic risk, low domestic interest rates and high liquidity and growth that have tended to characterize the Chilean system; and (ii) in order to meet its interest payment obligations, resources must be used that could otherwise be used for public investment financing.  The net consolidated debt of the central government and the Chilean Central Bank, in the aggregate, as of December 31, 2016 represented (2.8)% of GDP compared to (8.0)% as of December 31, 2015 and (7.4)% as of December 31, 2014.

 

Other Assets and Liabilities

 

The public debt report also discloses information about the net indebtedness of public enterprises and social security debt, which is not consolidated with the rest of the public debt for economic and statistical reasons.

 

The financial indebtedness of state-owned companies, excluding indebtedness owed to the Republic of Chile, totaled approximately 9.4% of GDP as of December 31, 2016, compared to 10.2% of GDP as of December 31, 2015 and 9.1% as of December 31, 2014.  Since these companies are managed under a policy of public interdependence, they are responsible for meeting their financial liabilities using their own assets, revenues and net worth.  Only in exceptional circumstances and upon authorization provided by law, will the state guarantee such debt where a public company’s assets are not sufficient to cover its liabilities.  As of December 31, 2016, the total amount of public guarantees totaled 1.6% of GDP, as compared with 1.1% of GDP in 2015 and 1.2% in 2014.

 

Under the social security system, Chile maintains certain liabilities to workers who migrated from the state-administered pension system to the privately administered system.  The government pays this debt directly to the individual pension fund account at the time the worker retires.  The government estimates that this liability equals 1.5% of GDP, as of December 31, 2016.  This debt will be paid progressively as the workers who contributed to the old pension system retire.  See “Monetary and Financial System— Pension Funds and the Chilean Pension System.”

 

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TABLES AND SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

 

External Medium- and Long-Term Direct Debt of the Central Government

 

Currency of 
Borrowing

 

Interest Rate

 

Year 
Issued

 

Year of 
Maturity

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

Chilean Pesos

 

Fixed 5.5%

 

2010

 

2020

 

408.061

 

Chilean Pesos

 

Fixed 5.5%

 

2011

 

2021

 

242.848

 

CRS

 

Fixed 0.75%

 

1972

 

2022

 

0.302

 

Euro

 

Fixed 0.75%

 

2002

 

2042

 

6.851

 

Euro

 

Fixed 0.75%

 

2004

 

2041

 

6.239

 

Euro

 

Fixed 0.75%

 

2007

 

2047

 

8.887

 

Euro

 

Fixed 0.75%

 

2008

 

2048

 

5.234

 

Euro

 

Fixed 1.625%

 

2014

 

2025

 

1,298.022

 

Euro

 

Fixed 1.75%

 

2016

 

2026

 

1,256.150

 

Euro

 

Fixed 1.875%

 

2015

 

2030

 

994.452

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1990

 

2022

 

0.045

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1990

 

2023

 

0.494

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1990

 

2023

 

0.060

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1990

 

2023

 

0.326

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1990

 

2023

 

0.133

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1991

 

2021

 

3.584

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1993

 

2023

 

2.978

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1993

 

2023

 

4.621

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1994

 

2024

 

3.134

 

Euro

 

Fixed 2%

 

1996

 

2026

 

6.530

 

Euro

 

Fixed 5.4%

 

2007

 

2017

 

6.566

 

Euro

 

Fixed 5.49%

 

2008

 

2018

 

4.187

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 3.9%

 

2013

 

2028

 

48.258

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2033

 

2.246

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2033

 

1.532

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2034

 

0.034

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2034

 

0.736

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2034

 

0.024

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2034

 

1.570

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2035

 

0.364

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2035

 

1.843

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2035

 

0.593

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2035

 

0.807

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2036

 

0.440

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2036

 

0.048

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2036

 

0.265

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2036

 

0.006

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2037

 

0.003

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2037

 

0.018

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2038

 

0.241

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.15%

 

1995

 

2038

 

0.025

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1993

 

2025

 

1.535

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1993

 

2028

 

0.308

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1994

 

2026

 

0.559

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1994

 

2026

 

0.265

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1994

 

2026

 

0.119

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1994

 

2026

 

1.381

 

 

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Currency of 
Borrowing

 

Interest Rate

 

Year 
Issued

 

Year of 
Maturity

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1994

 

2027

 

0.066

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1994

 

2027

 

0.180

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1995

 

2025

 

0.445

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1995

 

2025

 

0.529

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.5%

 

1997

 

2027

 

0.442

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2023

 

5.523

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2024

 

3.722

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2024

 

0.086

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2024

 

0.232

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2024

 

0.038

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2025

 

2.723

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2025

 

0.128

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2025

 

0.894

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2025

 

0.041

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2025

 

0.165

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2026

 

1.083

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2026

 

3.178

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2026

 

0.100

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2026

 

4.673

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2026

 

2.147

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2026

 

0.179

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2026

 

0.082

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2027

 

0.167

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2027

 

0.022

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2027

 

0.049

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2024

 

0.063

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2026

 

0.119

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 0.96%

 

1993

 

2027

 

0.504

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 1.25%

 

1993

 

2024

 

0.031

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 2.25%

 

2012

 

2022

 

634.119

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 2.27%

 

2008

 

2020

 

22.038

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 2.87%

 

2009

 

2021

 

37.157

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 3.125%

 

2014

 

2025

 

758.262

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 3.125%

 

2016

 

2026

 

1,349.122

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 3.25%

 

2011

 

2021

 

561.204

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 3.4%

 

2014

 

2029

 

111.730

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 3.625%

 

2012

 

2042

 

750.000

 

United States Dollars

 

Fixed 3.875%

 

2010

 

2020

 

739.844

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2001

 

2021

 

25.890

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2001

 

2026

 

144.235

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2001

 

2026

 

3.320

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2001

 

2026

 

15.632

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2002

 

2022

 

5.469

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2006

 

2021

 

20.187

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2007

 

2021

 

10.526

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2011

 

2020

 

3.672

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID F.U. USD

 

2011

 

2028

 

7.484

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

1995

 

2020

 

15.877

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2004

 

2019

 

0.183

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2004

 

2019

 

1.703

 

 

D-139



Table of Contents

 

Currency of 
Borrowing

 

Interest Rate

 

Year 
Issued

 

Year of 
Maturity

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2004

 

2023

 

17.579

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2004

 

2023

 

3.553

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2004

 

2023

 

3.699

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2005

 

2024

 

6.476

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2005

 

2025

 

1.425

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2005

 

2025

 

2.021

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2006

 

2025

 

2.677

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2007

 

2021

 

13.706

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2008

 

2017

 

2.527

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2008

 

2018

 

24.364

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2008

 

2027

 

4.444

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2011

 

2017

 

0.870

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2013

 

2017

 

4.596

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2014

 

2029

 

4.137

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2015

 

2025

 

30.000

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2015

 

2030

 

61.366

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2016

 

2028

 

130.000

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BID TBL (LIBOR Base Rate)

 

2016

 

2029

 

13.956

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2002

 

2017

 

1.162

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2005

 

2020

 

10.556

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2005

 

2020

 

0.882

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2005

 

2023

 

11.855

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2007

 

2022

 

16.500

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2007

 

2022

 

4.987

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2008

 

2017

 

4.976

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2013

 

2020

 

34.557

 

United States Dollars

 

Variable BIRF Fixed Spread (FSL-USD)

 

2016

 

2028

 

99.750

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US$

10,080.810

 

 

D-140



Table of Contents

 

External Guaranteed Medium- and Long-Term Direct Debt of

State Entities Indirect Debt of the Government

 

Debtor

 

Currency of 
Borrowing

 

Interest Rate

 

Year 
Issued

 

Year of 
Maturity

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.20%

 

2001

 

2017

 

US$

5.595

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.25%

 

2001

 

2016

 

US$

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.20%

 

2007

 

2017

 

US$

60.000

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US$

65.595

 

 

External Debt of State Entities without Guarantee by the Central Government

 

Debtor

 

Currency of 
Borrowing

 

Interest Rate

 

Year 
Issued

 

Year of 
Maturity

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

7.50%

 

2009

 

2019

 

600.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

3.75%

 

2010

 

2020

 

1,000.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

3.88%

 

2011

 

2021

 

1,150.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

3.00%

 

2012

 

2022

 

1,250.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

4.50%

 

2013

 

2023

 

750.00

 

CODELCO

 

EUR

 

2.25%

 

2014

 

2024

 

819.30

 

CODELCO

 

UF

 

0.025

 

2014

 

2024

 

406.20

 

CODELCO

 

UF

 

0.04

 

2005

 

2025

 

208.50

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

4.5%

 

2015

 

2025

 

2,000.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

5.63%

 

2005

 

2035

 

500.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

6.15%

 

2006

 

2036

 

500.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

4.25%

 

2012

 

2042

 

750.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

5.63%

 

2013

 

2043

 

950.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

4.88%

 

2014

 

2044

 

980.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.65%

 

2013

 

2018

 

300.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.63%

 

2013

 

2018

 

300.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.63%

 

2013

 

2018

 

300.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.63%

 

2014

 

2018

 

300.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.55%

 

2013

 

2019

 

60.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.62%

 

2014

 

2019

 

95.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.62%

 

2014

 

2019

 

300.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.75%

 

2016

 

2021

 

250.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.62%

 

2016

 

2021

 

300.00

 

CODELCO

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.45%

 

2013

 

2022

 

176.00

 

 

D-141



Table of Contents

 

Debtor

 

Currency of 
Borrowing

 

Interest Rate

 

Year 
Issued

 

Year of 
Maturity

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

EFE

 

US$

 

6.72%

 

2009

 

2017

 

2.16

 

EFE

 

US$

 

4.86%

 

2006

 

2018

 

14.40

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.65%

 

2001

 

2018

 

32.50

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 0.20%

 

2005

 

2017

 

5.00

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

4.19%

 

2006

 

2020

 

59.10

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

3.29%

 

2006

 

2019

 

9.10

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

3.82%

 

2006

 

2019

 

9.00

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

4.14%

 

2006

 

2018

 

1.51

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

4.14%

 

2009

 

2020

 

1.00

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

4.14%

 

2009

 

2019

 

1.00

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

4.19%

 

2009

 

2020

 

0.80

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

4.14%

 

2009

 

2020

 

3.30

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

3.96%

 

2010

 

2020

 

1.40

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

3.86%

 

2010

 

2020

 

3.20

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 1.65%

 

2012

 

2017

 

60.00

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 1.50%

 

2014

 

2026

 

224.90

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 2.50%

 

2014

 

2028

 

143.10

 

Metro S.A.

 

US$

 

3.75%

 

2014

 

2024

 

500.00

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 1.25%

 

2010

 

2017

 

16.67

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

6.25%

 

2009

 

2019

 

115.30

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

5.25%

 

2010

 

2020

 

174.40

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

4.75%

 

2011

 

2021

 

410.30

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

4.07%

 

2010

 

2021

 

32.42

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 1.375%

 

2005

 

2020

 

161.51

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 1.750%

 

2004

 

2017

 

2.79

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 1.5%

 

2013

 

2018

 

200.00

 

ENAP

 

CHF$

 

2.875%

 

2013

 

2018

 

211.26

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

4.38%

 

2014

 

2024

 

600.00

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

LIBOR + 1.850%

 

2016

 

2021

 

130.00

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

4.375%

 

2016

 

2022

 

700.00

 

ENAP

 

US$

 

8.00%

 

2014

 

2017

 

26.80

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US$

18,097.91

 

 

Internal Medium and Long Term Debt of the Central Government

 

Title

 

Interest Rate

 

Year of Maturity

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

Debt of CORFO

 

0

 

0

 

US$

0

 

Chilean Treasury(1)

 

Various

 

Various

 

 

43,284.6

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

US$

43,284.6

 

 


(1)         Does not include borrowing among public entities.

 

D-142



Table of Contents

 

Internal Medium- and Long-Term Debt of Chilean Central Bank

 

Title

 

Interest 
Rate

 

Year of 
Maturity

 

Amortization
or Sinking
Fund
Provision

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

Indexed promissory notes payable in coupons (PRC)

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

US$

38.7

 

Chilean Central Bank discountable promissory notes (PDBC)

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

6,316.6

 

Indexed coupons (CERO) in indexed units UF

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

110.9

 

Chilean Central Bank bonds in Chilean pesos (BCP)

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

5,902.4

 

Chilean Central Bank bonds in indexed units UF (BCU)

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

10,023.7

 

Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US$

22,392.2

 

 


Source:  Chilean Central Bank.

 

Internal Medium- and Long-Term Debt of the Chilean Public Sector(1)

 

Title

 

Interest 
Rate

 

Year of 
Maturity

 

Amortization 
or Sinking 
Fund 
Provision

 

Principal Amount 
Outstanding as of 
December 31, 2016 
(in millions of US$)

 

Central Government(1)

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

US$

43,284.6

 

Non-Financial Public Enterprises

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

4,549.0

 

Central Bank

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

22,392.2

 

Banco Estado

 

Various

 

Various

 

None

 

5,277.2

 

Total Public Sector

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US$

75,503.0

 

 


(1)         Does not include borrowing among public entities.

 

D-143


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