Contingencies

The Company is involved in certain claims and pending litigation primarily arising in the normal course of business. The majority of these claims relate to workers compensation, auto collision and liability, and physical damage and cargo damage. The Company expenses legal fees as incurred and accrues for the uninsured portion of contingent losses from these and other pending claims when it is both probable that a liability has been incurred and the amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated. Based on the knowledge of the facts and, in certain cases, advice of outside counsel, management believes the resolution of claims and pending litigation, taking into account existing reserves, will not have a material adverse effect on the Company. Moreover, the results of complex legal proceedings are difficult to predict and the Company’s view of these matters may change in the future as the litigation and events related thereto unfold.

For certain cases described below, management is unable to provide a meaningful estimate of the possible loss or range of loss because, among other reasons, (i) the proceedings are in various stages; (ii) damages have not been sought; (iii) damages are unsupported and/or exaggerated; (iv) there is uncertainty as to the outcome of pending appeals and/or (v) there are significant factual issues to be resolved. For these cases, however, management does not believe, based on currently available information, that the outcomes of these proceedings will have a material adverse effect on our financial condition, though the outcomes could be material to our operating results for any particular period, depending, in part, upon the operating results for such period.

Arizona Owner-operator Class Action Litigation

On January 30, 2004, a class action lawsuit was filed by Leonel Garza on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons against Swift Transportation: Garza v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc., Case No. CV7-472 ("the Garza Complaint"). The putative class originally involved certain owner-operators who contracted with the Company under a 2001 Contractor Agreement that was in place for one year. The putative class is alleging that the Company should have reimbursed owner-operators for actual miles driven rather than the contracted and industry standard remuneration based upon dispatched miles. The trial court denied plaintiff’s petition for class certification, the plaintiff appealed and on August 6, 2008, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued an unpublished Memorandum Decision reversing the trial court’s denial of class certification and remanding the case back to the trial court. On November 14, 2008, the Company filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court regarding the issue of class certification as a consequence of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration by the Court of Appeals. On March 17, 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court granted the Company’s petition for review, and on July 31, 2009, the Arizona Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals opining that the Court of Appeals lacked automatic appellate jurisdiction to reverse the trial court’s original denial of class certification and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further evaluation and determination. Thereafter, the plaintiff renewed the motion for class certification and expanded it to include all persons who were employed by Swift as employee drivers or who contracted with Swift as owner-operators on or after January 30, 1998, in each case who were compensated by reference to miles driven. On November 4, 2010, the Maricopa County trial court entered an order certifying a class of owner-operators and expanding the class to include employees. Upon certification, the Company filed a motion to compel arbitration, as well as filing numerous motions in the trial court urging dismissal on several other grounds including, but not limited to the lack of an employee as a class representative, and because the named owner-operator class representative only contracted with the Company for a three-month period under a one-year contract that no longer exists. In addition to these trial court motions, the Company also filed a petition for special action with the Arizona Court of Appeals arguing that the trial court erred in certifying the class because the trial court relied upon the Court of Appeals ruling that was previously overturned by the Arizona Supreme Court. On April 7, 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals declined jurisdiction to hear this petition for special action and the Company filed a petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court. On August 31, 2011, the Arizona Supreme Court declined to review the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals. In April 2012, the trial court issued the following rulings with respect to certain motions filed by Swift: (1) denied Swift’s motion to compel arbitration; (2) denied Swift’s request to decertify the class; (3) granted Swift’s motion that there is no breach of contract; and (4) granted Swift’s motion to limit class size based on statute of limitations. On November 13, 2014, the court denied plaintiff's motion to add new class representatives for the employee class and therefore the employee class remains without a plaintiff class representative. Swift has two motions for summary judgment pending before the court: 1) to dismiss any claims related to the employee class since there is no class representative; and 2) to dismiss plaintiff's claim of breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Company intends to continue to pursue all available appellate relief supported by the record, which the Company believes demonstrates that the class is improperly certified and, further, that the claims raised have no merit. The Company retains all of its defenses against liability and damages. The final disposition of this case and the impact of such final disposition cannot be determined at this time.

Ninth Circuit Owner-operator Misclassification Class Action Litigation

On December 22, 2009, a class action lawsuit was filed against Swift Transportation and IEL: Virginia VanDusen, John Doe 1 and Joseph Sheer individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc., Interstate Equipment Leasing, Inc., Jerry Moyes, and Chad Killebrew, Case No. 9-CIV-10376 filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ("the Sheer Complaint"). The putative class involves owner-operators alleging that Swift Transportation misclassified owner-operators as independent contractors in violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and various New York and California state laws and that such owner-operators should be considered employees. The lawsuit also raises certain related issues with respect to the lease agreements that certain owner-operators have entered into with IEL. At present, in addition to the named plaintiffs, approximately 200 other current or former owner-operators have joined this lawsuit. Upon Swift’s motion, the matter has been transferred from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to the United States District Court in Arizona. On May 10, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion to conditionally certify an FLSA collective action and authorize notice to the potential class members. On September 23, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Swift and IEL from collecting payments from plaintiffs who are in default under their lease agreements and related relief. On September 30, 2010, the District Court granted Swift’s motion to compel arbitration and ordered that the class action be stayed pending the outcome of arbitration. The District Court further denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and motion for conditional class certification. The District Court also denied plaintiff’s request to arbitrate the matter as a class.

The plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asking that the District Court’s September 30, 2010 order be vacated. On July 27, 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus and thereafter the District Court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and certified its September 30, 2010 order. The plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn the District Court’s September 30, 2010 order to compel arbitration alleging that the agreement to arbitrate is exempt from arbitration under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) because the class of plaintiffs allegedly consists of employees exempt from arbitration agreements. On November 6, 2013, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, stating its prior published decision “expressly held that a district court must determine whether an agreement for arbitration is exempt from arbitration under Section 1 of the FAA as a threshold matter". As a consequence of this determination by the ninth Circuit Court of Appeals being different from a decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on a similar issue, on February 4, 2014, the Company filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court to address whether the district court or arbitrator should determine whether the contract is an employment contract exempt from Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act. On June 16, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Company’s petition for writ of certiorari. The Company intends to vigorously defend against any proceedings. The final disposition of this case and the impact of such final disposition cannot be determined at this time.

California Wage, Meal and Rest Employee Class Actions

On March 22, 2010, a class action lawsuit was filed by John Burnell, individually and on behalf of all other similarly situated persons against Swift Transportation: John Burnell and all others similarly situated v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc., Case No. CIVDS 1004377 filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Bernardino ("the Burnell Complaint"). On September 3, 2010, upon motion by Swift, the matter was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. EDCV10-809-VAP. The putative class includes drivers who worked for Swift during the four years preceding the date of filing alleging that Swift failed to pay the California minimum wage, failed to provide proper meal and rest periods and failed to timely pay wages upon separation from employment. The Burnell Complaint was subject to a stay of proceedings pending determination of similar issues in a case unrelated to Swift, Brinker v. Hohnbaum, which was then pending before the California Supreme Court. A ruling was entered in the Brinker matter and in August 2012 the stay in the Burnell Complaint was lifted. On April 9, 2013 the Company filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings requesting dismissal of plaintiff's claims related to alleged meal and rest break violations under the California Labor Code alleging that such claims are preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act. On May 29, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California granted the Company's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed plaintiff's claims that are based on alleged violations of meal and rest periods set forth in the California Labor Code. Plantiff has appealed. Minimum wage claims (specifically that pay per-mile fails to compensate drivers for non-driving related services) timeliness of such pay and issue of class certification remain pending.

On April 5, 2012, the Company was served with an additional class action complaint alleging facts similar to those as set forth in the Burnell Complaint. This new class action is James R. Rudsell, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC and Swift Transportation Company, Case No. CIVDS 1200255, in the Superior Court of California for the County of San Bernardino ("the Rudsell Complaint"). The Rudsell Complaint has been stayed pending a resolution in the Burnell Complaint.

The issue of class certification must first be resolved before the court will address the merits of the case, and we retain all of our defenses against liability and damages pending a determination of class certification. The Company intends to vigorously defend certification of the class in both matters, as well as the merits of these matters, should the classes be certified. The final disposition of both cases and the impact of such final dispositions of these cases cannot be determined at this time.

California Wage and Hour Class Action

On September 25, 2014, a class action lawsuit was filed by Lawrence Peck on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated persons against Swift Transportation: Peck v. Swift Transportation Co. Arizona, LLC in the Superior Court of California, County of Riverside ("the Peck Complaint"). The putative class includes current and former non-exempt employee truck drivers who performed services in California within the four-year statutory period alleging that Swift failed to pay for all hours worked (specifically that pay-per-mile fails to compensate drivers for non-driving related services), failed to pay overtime, failed to properly reimburse work-related expenses, failed to timely pay wages and failed to provide accurate wage statements.

The issue of class certification must first be resolved before the court will address the merits of the case, and the Company retains all of its defenses against liability and damages pending a determination of class certification. The Company intends to vigorously defend certification of the class, as well as the merits, should the class be certified. The final disposition of the case and the impact of such final disposition cannot be determined at this time.

Washington Overtime Class Action

On September 9, 2011, a class action lawsuit was filed by Troy Slack on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons against Swift Transportation: Troy Slack, et al v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC and Swift Transportation Corporation in the State Court of Washington, Pierce County ("the Slack Complaint"). The Slack Complaint was removed to federal court on October 12, 2011, case number 11-2-114380. The putative class includes all current and former Washington State based employee drivers during the three-year statutory period alleging that they were not paid overtime in accordance with Washington State law and that they were not properly paid for meals and rest periods. On November 23, 2013, the court entered an order on plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. The court only certified the class as it pertains to dedicated route drivers and did not certify any other class or claims, including any class related to over the road drivers (“OTR Drivers”). The court also further limited the class of dedicated drivers to only those dedicated drivers that either begin or end their shift in the state of Washington and therefore are Washington-based employees. Swift is appealing the limited certification of the Washington dedicated drivers.

The issue of class certification must first be resolved before the court will address the merits of the case, and the Company retains all of its defenses against liability and damages pending a determination of class certification. The Company intends to vigorously defend certification of the class, as well as the merits of these matters, should the class be certified. The final disposition of this case and the impact of such final disposition of this case cannot be determined at this time.

Utah Minimum Wage Collective Action

On October 8, 2013, a collective action lawsuit was filed by Jacob Roberts on behalf of himself and all similarly situated persons against Central Refrigerated Service, Inc., Jon Isaacson, Bob Baer and John Does 1-10: Jacob Roberts and Collective Action Plaintiffs John Does 1-10 v. Central Refrigerated Service, Inc., Jon Isaacson, Bob Baer and John Does 1-10 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Case No. 2;13-ev-00911-EJF ("the Roberts Complaint"). The putative nationwide class includes employees alleging that candidates for employment within the three-year statutory period in Utah were not paid proper compensation pursuant to the FLSA, specifically that the putative collective action plaintiffs were not paid the state-mandated minimum wage for orientation, travel, and training.

The issue of collective action certification in the Roberts Complaint must first be resolved before the court will address the merits of the case, and the Company retains all of its defenses against liability and damages, pending a determination of collective action certification. Central intends to vigorously defend against collective action certification, as well as the merits of this matter, should the collective action be certified. The final disposition of this case and the impact of such final disposition of this case cannot be determined at this time.

Utah Collective and Individual Arbitration

On June 1, 2012, a collective and class action complaint was filed by Gabriel Cilluffo, Kevin Shire and Bryan Ratterree individually and on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated persons against Central Refrigerated Services, Inc., Central Leasing, Inc., Jon Isaacson, and Jerry Moyes: Gabriel Cilluffo, Kevin Shire and Bryan Ratterree individually and on behalf themselves and all similarly situated persons v. Central Refrigerated Services, Inc., Central Leasing, Inc., Jon Isaacson, and Jerry Moyes in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. ED CV 12-00886 ("the Cilluffo Complaint"). The putative class involves owner-operators alleging that Central misclassified owner-operators as independent contractors in violation of the FLSA, and that such owner-operators should be considered employees. The lawsuit also raises a claim of forced labor and state law contractual claims. On September 24, 2012, the California District Court ordered that the FLSA claim proceed to collective arbitration under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (“UUAA”) and not the FAA. The September 24, 2012 order directed the arbitrator to determine the validity of proceeding as a collective arbitration under the UUAA, and then if the arbitrator determines that such collective action is permitted, then the arbitrator is to consider the plaintiff’s FLSA claim. On November 8, 2012, the California District Court entered a clarification order clarifying that the plaintiff’s FLSA claim was to proceed to collective arbitration under the UUAA, but the plaintiff’s forced labor claim and state law contractual claims were to proceed as individual arbitrations for those plaintiffs seeking to pursue those specific claims. Central filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for interlocutory appeal of the California District Court’s orders, both of which were denied and the claims are proceeding to collective and individual arbitration as originally ordered. On December 9, 2013 the arbitrator determined that the issue of misclassification as it relates to the FLSA will proceed as a collective arbitration, however the plaintiffs forced labor claim and state law claims of contractual misrepresentation and breach of contract must proceed on an individual arbitration basis and not as a class.

Central intends to vigorously defend collective arbitration in the Cilluffo Complaint, as well as the merits of the FLSA claim and any individual arbitration matters that are filed, and proceed on the forced labor and state contract law claims. The final disposition of this case and the impact of such final disposition of this case cannot be determined at this time.

Environmental Notice

On April 17, 2009, the Company received a notice from the Lower Willamette Group ("LWG"), advising that there are a total of 250 potentially responsible parties ("PRPs"), with respect to alleged environmental contamination of the Lower Willamette River in Portland, Oregon designated as the Portland Harbor Superfund site ("the Site"), and that as a previous landowner at the Site, the Company has been asked to join a group of 60 PRPs and proportionately contribute to (i) reimbursement of funds expended by LWG to investigate environmental contamination at the Site and (ii) remediation costs of the same, rather than be exposed to potential litigation. Although the Company does not believe it contributed any contaminants to the Site, the Company was at one time the owner of property at the Site and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act imposes a standard of strict liability on property owners with respect to environmental claims. Notwithstanding this standard of strict liability, the Company believes our potential proportionate exposure to be minimal and not material. No formal complaint has been filed in this matter. The Company’s pollution liability insurer has been notified of this potential claim. The Company does not believe the outcome of this matter is likely to have a material adverse effect on Swift. However, the final disposition of this matter and the impact of such final disposition cannot be determined at this time.

Other Environmental

The Company's tractors and trailers are involved in motor vehicle accidents, experience damage, mechanical failures and cargo issues as an incidental part of its normal ordinary course of operations. From time to time, these matters result in the discharge of diesel fuel, motor oil or other hazardous materials into the environment. Depending on local regulations and who is determined to be at fault, the Company is sometimes responsible for the clean-up costs associated with these discharges. As of December 31, 2014, the Company's estimate for its total legal liability for all such clean-up and remediation costs was approximately $1.0 million in the aggregate for all current and prior year claims.