Securities Act Registration No. 333-147324
Investment Company Act Registration No. 811-22143
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM |
REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 | [X] |
Pre-Effective Amendment No. __ | [ ] |
Post-Effective Amendment No. 38 | [X] |
And/or | |
REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 | [X] |
Amendment No. 39 | [X] |
(Exact Name of Registrant as Specified in Charter)
2691 Route 9, Suite 102 | |
Malta, NY | 12020 |
(Address of Principal Executive Offices) | (Zip Code) |
Registrants Telephone Number, including Area Code: (518) 371-3450 Gerard S.E. Heffernan Walthausen Funds 2691 Route 9, Suite 102 Malta, NY 12020 (Name and Address of Agent for Service) Copies to: JoAnn S. Strasser Thompson Hine, LLP 41 South High Street, Suite 1700 Columbus, Ohio 43215 |
It is proposed that this filing will become effective (check appropriate box) | ||
[ ] | Immediately upon filing pursuant to paragraph (b) | |
[X] | on | |
[ ] | 60 days after filing pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) | |
[ ] | on (date) pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) | |
[ ] | on 75 days after filing pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) | |
[ ] | on (date) pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 485. | |
If appropriate, check the following box: | ||
[ ] | this post-effective amendment designates a new effective date for a previously | |
filed post-effective amendment. |
PART A
WALTHAUSEN SMALL CAP VALUE FUND
INSTITUTIONAL CLASS TICKER
INVESTOR CLASS TICKER
For Investors Seeking Long-Term Capital Appreciation
PROSPECTUS
As with all mutual funds, the Securities and Exchange Commission has not approved or disapproved of these securities, nor has the Commission determined that this Prospectus is complete or accurate. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offense.
Table of Contents | |
Summary Section | 1 |
Investment Objective | 1 |
Fees and Expenses of the Fund | 1 |
The Principal Investment Strategy of the Fund | 2 |
The Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund | 2 |
Performance | 3 |
Management | 4 |
Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares | 4 |
Tax Information | 4 |
Payments to Broker-Dealers and Other Financial Intermediaries | 4 |
Cybersecurity | 4 |
Investment Objective, Principal Investment Strategy, | |
Related Risks, and Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings | 5 |
Investment Objective | 5 |
Principal Investment Strategy of the Fund | 5 |
The Investment Selection Process Used by the Fund | 5 |
The Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund | 6 |
Portfolio Holdings Disclosure | 7 |
Management | 7 |
The Investment Advisor | 7 |
Shareholder Information | 8 |
Pricing of Fund Shares | 8 |
Customer Identification Program | 9 |
Investing in the Fund | 9 |
Investments Made Through Brokerage Firms or Other Financial Institutions | 9 |
Minimum Investments | 9 |
Types of Account Ownership | 10 |
Instructions For Opening and Adding to an Account | 10 |
Telephone and Wire Transactions | 11 |
Tax-Deferred Plans | 11 |
Types of Tax-Deferred Accounts | 12 |
Automatic Investment Plans | 12 |
Instructions For Selling Fund Shares | 13 |
Additional Redemption Information | 14 |
Shareholder Communications | 15 |
Dividends and Distributions | 15 |
Share Classes | 15 |
Market Timing | 15 |
Taxes | 16 |
Other Fund Service Providers | 17 |
Privacy Policy | 18 |
Financial Highlights | 19 |
The Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation.
The following table describes the expenses and fees that you may pay if you buy and hold shares of the Fund. You may pay other fees, such as brokerage commissions and other fees to financial intermediaries, which are not reflected in the tables and examples below.
Institutional | Investor | |
Class | Class | |
Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Purchases | ||
Deferred Sales Charge (Load) | ||
Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Reinvested Dividends | ||
Annual Fund Operating Expenses (expenses that you pay each | ||
year as a percentage of the value of your investment) | ||
Management Fees | ||
Distribution 12b-1 Fees | ||
Other Expenses | ||
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses | ||
Fee Waiver / Expense Reimbursement (1) | ( |
( |
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waiver |
(1) |
The following example is intended to help you compare the cost of investing in the Fund with the cost of investing in other mutual funds. The example assumes that you invest $10,000 in the Fund for the time periods indicated and then redeem all of your shares at the end of those periods. The example also assumes that your investment has a 5% annual return each year and that the Funds operating expenses remain the same each year. Although your actual costs may be higher or lower, based on these assumptions your costs would be:
Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund | One Year | Three Years | Five Years | Ten Years |
Institutional Class | $ |
$ |
$ |
$ |
Investor Class | $ |
$ |
$ |
$ |
Prospectus 1
The Fund pays transaction costs, such as commissions, when it buys and sells securities (or turns over its portfolio). A higher portfolio turnover may indicate higher transaction costs and may result in higher taxes when Fund shares are held in a taxable account. These costs, which are not reflected in annual fund operating expenses or in the example, affect the Funds performance. During the most recent fiscal year, the Funds portfolio turnover rate was
The Fund invests primarily in common stocks of small capitalization companies that the Advisor believes have the potential for capital appreciation. Small capitalization companies are defined as those with market capitalizations of $2 billion or less at the time of purchase. Under normal circumstances, the Fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets plus any borrowing for investment purposes in common stocks of small capitalization companies, as defined above. The Fund emphasizes a value*investment style, investing in companies that appear under-priced according to certain financial measurements of their worth or business prospects.
As with all mutual funds, there is the risk that you could lose some or all of your investment in the Fund.
Risks of Investing in Small Capitalization Companies
The Fund invests in the stocks of small capitalization companies, which may subject the Fund to additional risks. The earnings and prospects of these companies are generally more volatile than larger companies and small capitalization companies may experience higher failure rates than do larger companies.
Risks in General
Domestic economic growth and market conditions, interest rate levels, and political events are among the factors affecting the securities markets in which the Fund invests. There is risk that these and other factors may adversely affect the Funds performance.
Additionally, unexpected local, regional or global events, such as war; acts of terrorism; financial, political or social disruptions; natural, environmental or man-made disasters; the spread of infectious illnesses or other public health issues (such as COVID-19); and recessions and depressions could have a significant impact on the Fund and its investments and may impair market liquidity. Such events can cause investor fear, which can adversely affect the economies of nations, regions and the market in general, in ways that cannot necessarily be foreseen.
Risks of Investing in Common Stocks
Overall stock market risks may affect the value of the Fund. Factors such as domestic economic growth and market conditions, interest rate levels, and political events affect the securities markets.
Value Investing Risk
Value investing attempts to identify companies selling at a discount to their intrinsic value. Value investing is subject to the risk that a companys intrinsic value may never be fully realized by the market or that a company judged by the Advisor to be undervalued may actually be appropriately priced.
Sector Risk
Sector risk is the possibility that all stocks within the same group of industries will decline in price due to sector-specific market or economic developments. The Fund may be overweight in certain sectors at various times.
Prospectus 2
Investment Management Risk
The Advisors strategy may fail to produce the intended results.
The
as of was for the Investor Class.( ) + ( )
FOR THE PERIODS ENDED 12/31/21 |
1 Year | 5 Years | 10 Years |
WALTHAUSEN SMALL CAP VALUE FUND | |||
Investor Class | |||
Return Before Taxes | |||
Return After Taxes on Distributions | |||
Return After Taxes on Distributions and Sale of Fund Shares | |||
Institutional Class* Return Before Taxes | - | - | |
Russell 2000 Value Index (does not reflect deductions for fees, | |||
expenses or taxes) | |||
* |
Prospectus 3
Management
Investment Advisor
Walthausen & Co., LLC (the Advisor)
Portfolio Manager
Gerard S.E. Heffernan has managed the Fund since March 2018. Mr. Heffernan is a Portfolio Manager and Managing Director of the Advisor.
Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares
The minimum initial and subsequent investment amounts for various types of accounts offered by the Fund are shown below.
Institutional Class | Initial | Additional |
Regular Account | $100,000 | $1,000 |
Automatic Investment Plan | $100,000 | $1,000 |
IRA Account | $100,000 | $1,000 |
Investor Class | Initial | Additional |
Regular Account | $2,500 | $100 |
Automatic Investment Plan | $2,500 | $100 |
IRA Account | $2,500 | $100 |
Investors may purchase or redeem Fund shares on any business day through a financial intermediary, by mail (Walthausen Funds, c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC, P.O. Box 46707, Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707), by wire, or by telephone at 1-888-925-8428.
Tax Information
The Funds distributions are taxable, and will be taxed as ordinary income or capital gains, unless you are investing through a tax-deferred arrangement, such as a 401(k) plan or an individual retirement account. Such tax-deferred arrangements may be taxed later upon withdrawal of monies from those arrangements.
Payments to Broker-Dealers and Other Financial Intermediaries
If you purchase the Fund through a broker-dealer or other financial intermediary (such as a financial advisor), the Fund and/or its investment advisor may pay the intermediary a fee as compensation for the services it provides, which may include performing sub-accounting services, delivering Fund documents to shareholders and providing information about the Fund. These payments may create a conflict of interest by influencing the financial intermediary and your salesperson to recommend the Fund over another investment. Ask your salesperson or visit your financial intermediarys website for more information.
Cybersecurity
The computer systems, networks and devices used by the Fund and its service providers to carry out routine business operations employ a variety of protections designed to prevent damage or interruption from computer viruses, network failures, computer and telecommunication failures, infiltration by unauthorized persons and security breaches. Despite the various protections utilized by the Fund and its service providers, systems, networks, or devices potentially can be breached. The Fund and its shareholders could be negatively impacted as a result of a cybersecurity breach.
Prospectus 4
Cybersecurity breaches can include unauthorized access to systems, networks, or devices; infection from computer viruses or other malicious software code; and attacks that shut down, disable, slow, or otherwise disrupt operations, business processes, or website access or functionality. Cybersecurity breaches may cause disruptions and impact the Funds business operations, potentially resulting in financial losses; interference with the Funds ability to calculate its NAV; impediments to trading; the inability of the Fund, the Advisor, and other service providers to transact business; violations of applicable privacy and other laws; regulatory fines, penalties, reputational damage, reimbursement or other compensation costs, or additional compliance costs; as well as the inadvertent release of confidential information.
Similar adverse consequences could result from cybersecurity breaches affecting issuers of securities in which the Fund invests; counterparties with which the Fund engages in transactions; governmental and other regulatory authorities; exchange and other financial market operators, banks, brokers, dealers, insurance companies, and other financial institutions (including financial intermediaries and service providers for the Funds shareholders); and other parties. In addition, substantial costs may be incurred by these entities in order to prevent any cybersecurity breaches in the future.
Investment Objective, Principal Investment Strategy, Related Risks, and Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings
Investment Objective
The Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation.
The Principal Investment Strategy of the Fund
The Fund invests primarily in common stocks of small capitalization companies that the Advisor believes have the potential for capital appreciation. Small capitalization companies are defined as those with market capitalizations of $2 billion or less at the time of purchase. Under normal circumstances, the Fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets plus any borrowing for investment purposes in common stocks of small capitalization companies, as defined above. The Fund emphasizes a value*investment style, investing in companies that appear under-priced according to certain financial measurements of their worth or business prospects. The Board of Trustees can change this policy without shareholder approval. The Fund will notify you in writing at least 60 days before implementing any change to this policy.
The Fund may invest in other securities as described in the Statement of Additional Information, which is available upon request.
The Investment Selection Process Used by the Fund
The Advisor searches for securities by using a proprietary valuation model to identify companies that are trading at a discount to intrinsic value. The starting universe is small capitalization companies defined as those with market capitalizations of $2 billion or less. Once investment ideas meet screening criteria, the Advisor studies public filings and constructs detailed models to project earnings and cash flows. The Advisor frequently contacts company management and/or industry experts to develop a clearer understanding of each investment idea. Final investment decisions are based on the Advisors internally prepared models and valuation metrics.
The Advisor may sell a security when it reaches the Advisors appraised value, when there is a more attractively priced company as an alternative, when the fundamentals of the business have changed, or when the Advisor determines that management of the company is not enhancing shareholder value. These portfolio reviews are conducted continuously through close monitoring of stock prices, changes in the economy, and corporate developments.
Prospectus 5
For temporary defensive purposes, the Fund may hold cash or cash-equivalents and invest without limit in obligations of the U.S. Government and its agencies, money market funds and money market securities, including high-grade commercial paper, certificates of deposit, repurchase agreements and short-term debt securities. Under these circumstances, the Fund may not participate in stock market advances or declines to the same extent it would had it remained more fully invested in common stocks.
The Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund
As with all mutual funds, there is the risk that you could lose some or all of your investment in the Fund.
Risks of Investing in Small Capitalization Companies
The Fund invests in the stocks of small capitalization companies, which may subject the Fund to additional risks. The earnings and prospects of these companies are generally more volatile than larger companies. Small capitalization companies may experience higher failure rates than do larger companies. The trading volume of securities of small capitalization companies is normally less than that of larger companies and, therefore, may disproportionately affect their market price, tending to make them fall more in response to selling pressure than is the case with larger companies. Small capitalization companies may have limited markets, product lines or financial resources and may lack management experience.
Risks in General
An investment in the Fund is not a deposit in a bank and is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency. Domestic economic growth and market conditions, interest rate levels, and political events are among the factors affecting the securities markets of the Funds investments. There is risk that these and other factors may adversely affect the Funds performance. You should consider your own investment goals, time horizon, and risk tolerance before investing in the Fund. An investment in the Fund may not be appropriate for all investors and is not intended to be a complete investment program. You may lose money by investing in the Fund.
Additionally, unexpected local, regional or global events, such as war; acts of terrorism; financial, political or social disruptions; natural, environmental or man-made disasters; the spread of infectious illnesses or other public health issues; and recessions and depressions could have a significant impact on the Fund and its investments and may impair market liquidity. Such events can cause investor fear, which can adversely affect the economies of nations, regions and the market in general, in ways that cannot necessarily be foreseen. The increasing interconnectivity between global economies and financial markets increases the likelihood that events or conditions in one region or financial market may adversely impact issuers in a different country, region or financial market. These risks may be magnified if certain events or developments adversely interrupt the global supply chain; in these and other circumstances, such risks might affect companies worldwide. As a result, local, regional or global events such as war, acts of terrorism, the spread of infectious illness or other public health issues, recessions or other events could have a significant negative impact on global economic and market conditions. The COVID-19 global pandemic and the aggressive responses taken by many governments or voluntarily imposed by private parties, including closing borders, restricting international and domestic travel, and imposing prolonged quarantines or similar restrictions, as well as the closure of, or operational changes to, many retail and other businesses, has had negative impacts, and in many cases severe negative impacts, on markets worldwide. It is not known how long such impacts, or any future impacts of other significant events described above, will or would last, but there could be a prolonged period of global economic slowdown, which may be expected to impact the Fund and its investments.
Risks of Investing in Common Stocks
The Fund invests primarily in common stocks, which subjects the Fund and its shareholders to the risks associated with common stock investing. These risks include the financial risk of selecting individual companies that do not perform as anticipated, the risk that the stock markets in which the
Prospectus 6
Fund invests may experience periods of turbulence and instability, and the general risk that domestic and global economies may go through periods of decline and cyclical change. Many factors affect the performance of each company that the Fund invests in, including the strength of the companys management or the demand for its product or services. You should be aware that a companys share price may decline as a result of poor decisions made by management or lower demand for the companys products or services. In addition, a companys share price may also decline if its earnings or revenues fall short of expectations.
There are overall stock market risks that may also affect the value of the Fund. Over time, the stock markets tend to move in cycles, with periods when stock prices rise generally and periods when stock prices decline generally. The value of the Funds investments may increase or decrease more than the stock markets in general.
Value Investing Risk
Value investing attempts to identify companies selling at a discount to their intrinsic value. Value investing is subject to the risk that a companys intrinsic value may never be fully realized by the market or that a company judged by the Advisor to be undervalued may actually be appropriately priced.
Sector Risk
Sector risk is the possibility that stocks within the same group of industries will decline in price due to sector-specific market or economic developments. If the Advisor invests a significant portion of its assets in a particular sector, the Fund is subject to the risk that companies in the same sector are likely to react similarly to legislative or regulatory changes, adverse market conditions and/or increased competition affecting that market segment. The sectors in which the Fund may be overweighted will vary.
Investment Management Risk
The Advisors strategy may fail to produce the intended results.
Portfolio Holdings Disclosure
A description of the Funds policies and procedures with respect to the disclosure of the Funds portfolio securities is available in the Funds Statement of Additional Information (SAI).
Management
The Investment Advisor
Walthausen & Co., LLC, 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020, is the investment advisor of the Fund and has responsibility for the management of the Fund's affairs, under the supervision of the Fund's Board of Trustees. The Fund's investment portfolio is managed on a day-to-day basis by Gerard S.E. Heffernan CFA. Mr. Heffernan is a Portfolio Manager and Managing Director of the Advisor. Mr. Heffernan joined the Advisor in February 2018. His involvement in the investment industry spans over 25 years, including 15 years at Lord Abbett & Co., where he was a partner and portfolio manager specializing in small cap value equities. From June 2013 until February 2018, he was self-employed managing his own portfolio. Mr. Heffernan received a B.S. in Business Administration from Villanova University.
Prospectus 7
The Funds Statement of Additional Information provides information about the portfolio managers compensation, other accounts managed by the portfolio managers, and the portfolio managers ownership of Fund shares. A discussion regarding the basis for the Board of Trustees approval of the Management Agreement between the Fund and the Advisor is available in the Annual Report to Shareholders for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022.
Under the Management Agreement, the Advisor, at its own expense and without reimbursement from the Trust, furnishes office space and all necessary office facilities, equipment and executive personnel necessary for managing the assets of the Fund. For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022, the Advisor received an investment management fee at an annual rate equal to 1.00% of the average daily net assets of the Fund. Under a Services Agreement with the Fund, the Advisor receives an additional fee of 0.45% of the Funds average daily net assets up to $100 million, 0.25% of the Funds average daily net assets between $100 million and $500 million, and 0.15% of such assets in excess of $500 million and is obligated to pay the operating expenses of the Fund excluding management fees, brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), the cost of acquired funds and extraordinary expenses. The Advisor has contractually agreed to waive Services Agreement fees and Management fees to the extent necessary to maintain total annual operating expenses of the Institutional Class Shares and Investor Class Shares, excluding brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), the cost of acquired funds and extraordinary expenses at 0.98% and 1.21% respectively, of its average daily net assets through May 31, 2023. The Advisor may not terminate the fee waiver before May 31, 2023. The Trustees may terminate the expense waiver upon notice to the Advisor.
The Advisor (not the Fund) may pay certain financial institutions (which may include banks, brokers, securities dealers and other industry professionals) a fee for providing distribution related services and/or for performing certain administrative servicing functions for Fund shareholders to the extent these institutions are allowed to do so by applicable statute, rule or regulation. The Fund may purchase securities issued by these financial institutions or their affiliates, however, the portfolio manager is prohibited from considering the services provided by the financial institution in making a decision whether to purchase or sell the securities of the financial institution or its affiliates.
An investment in the Fund is not a deposit or obligation of any bank, is not endorsed or guaranteed by any bank, and is not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other government agency. You may lose money by investing in the Fund.
Shareholder Information
Pricing of Fund Shares
The price you pay for a share of the Fund, and the price you receive upon selling or redeeming a share of the Fund, is called the Funds net asset value (NAV). The NAV is calculated by taking the total value of the Funds assets, subtracting its liabilities, and then dividing by the total number of shares outstanding, rounded to the nearest cent: NAV = Total Assets (Class) - Liabilities (Class) / Number of Shares Outstanding (Class)
The NAV is generally calculated on each day the New York Stock Exchange is open as of the close of trading on the Exchange (normally 4:00 p.m. Eastern time). The New York Stock Exchange is generally open every day other than weekends and holidays. All purchases, redemptions or reinvestments of Fund shares will be priced at the next NAV calculated after your order is received in proper form by the Funds Transfer Agent, Ultimus Fund Solutions. If you purchase shares directly from the Fund, your order must be placed with the Transfer Agent prior to the close of the trading of the New York Stock Exchange in order to be confirmed for that days NAV. The Funds assets generally are valued at their market value. Certain short-term securities may be valued at amortized cost, which approximates market value. If market prices are not available or, in the Advisors opinion, market
Prospectus 8
prices do not reflect fair value, or if an event occurs after the close of trading (but prior to the time the NAV is calculated) that materially affects fair value, the Advisor may value the Funds assets at their fair value according to written policies approved by the Funds Board of Trustees. For example, if trading in a portfolio security is halted and does not resume before the Fund calculates its NAV, the Advisor may need to price the security using the Funds fair value pricing guidelines. Without a fair value price, short term traders could take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity and dilute the NAV of long term investors. Fair valuation of a Funds portfolio securities can serve to reduce arbitrage opportunities available to short term traders, but there is no assurance that fair value pricing policies will prevent dilution of the Funds NAV by short term traders. The Fund may use pricing services to determine market value.
Customer Identification Program
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR OPENING A NEW ACCOUNT
To help the government fight the funding of terrorism and money laundering activities, Federal law requires all financial institutions to obtain, verify, and record information that identifies each person who opens an account. This means that, when you open an account, we will ask for your name, address, date of birth, and other information that will allow us to identify you. We may also ask for identifying documents, and may take additional steps to verify your identity. We may not be able to open an account or complete a transaction for you until we are able to verify your identity.
Investing in the Fund
You may purchase shares directly through the Funds transfer agent or through a brokerage firm or other financial institution that has agreed to sell the Funds shares. If you are investing directly in the Fund for the first time, you will need to establish an account by completing a Shareholder Account Application (To establish an IRA, complete an IRA Application). To request an application, call toll-free 1-888-925-8428.
Investments Made Through Brokerage Firms or Other Financial Institutions
If you invest through a brokerage firm or other financial institution, the policies and fees may be different than those described here. Financial advisors, financial supermarkets, brokerage firms, and other financial institutions may charge transaction and other fees and may set different minimum investments or limitations on buying or selling shares. Consult a representative of your financial institution if you have any questions. The Fund is deemed to have received your order when the brokerage firm or financial institution receives the order, and your purchase will be priced at the next calculated NAV. Your financial institution is responsible for transmitting your order in a timely manner.
Minimum Investments | ||
Institutional Class | Initial | Additional |
Regular Account | $100,000 | $1,000 |
Automatic Investment Plan | $100,000 | $1,000 |
IRA Account | $100,000 | $1,000 |
Investor Class | Initial | Additional |
Regular Account | $2,500 | $100 |
Automatic Investment Plan | $2,500 | $100 |
IRA Account | $2,500 | $100 |
The Fund reserves the right to change the amount of these minimums from time to time or to waive them in whole or in part for certain accounts. Investment minimums may be higher or lower to investors purchasing shares through a brokerage firm or other financial institution.
Prospectus 9
All purchases must be made in U.S. dollars and checks must be drawn on U.S. banks. No cash, money orders, travelers checks, credit cards, credit card checks, third party checks or other checks deemed to be high-risk checks will be accepted. You will be charged an annual account maintenance fee of $15 for each tax-deferred account you have with the Fund. A $20 fee will be charged against your account for any payment check returned to the transfer agent or for any incomplete electronic fund transfer, or for insufficient funds, stop payment, closed account or other reasons. If a check does not clear your bank or the Fund is unable to debit your predesignated bank account on the day of purchase, the Fund reserves the right to cancel the purchase. If your purchase is canceled, you will be responsible for any losses or fees imposed by your bank and losses that may be incurred as a result of a decline in the value of the canceled purchase. The Fund (or Funds agent) has the authority to redeem shares in your account(s) to cover any losses due to fluctuations in share price. Any profit on such cancellation will accrue to the Fund. Your investment in the Fund should be intended to serve as a long-term investment vehicle. The Fund is not designed to provide you with a means of speculating on the short-term fluctuations in the stock market. The Fund reserves the right to reject any purchase request that it regards as disruptive to the efficient management of the Fund, which includes investors with a history of excessive trading. The Fund also reserves the right to stop offering shares at any time.
Types of Account Ownership
You can establish the following types of accounts by completing a Shareholder Account Application:
Individual or Joint Ownership
Individual accounts are owned by one person. Joint accounts have two or more owners.
A Gift or Transfer to Minor
(UGMA or UTMA) An UGMA/UTMA account is a custodial account managed for the benefit of a minor. To open an UGMA or UTMA account, you must include the minors social security number on the application.
Trust
An established trust can open an account. The names of each trustee, the name of the trust and the date of the trust agreement must be included on the application.
Business Accounts
Corporation and partnerships may also open an account. The application must be signed by an authorized officer of the corporation or a general partner of a partnership.
IRA Accounts
See Tax-Deferred Plans on page 11.
Instructions For Opening and Adding to an Account
TO OPEN AN ACCOUNT
By Mail
Complete and sign the Shareholder Application or an IRA Application
Make your check payable to Walthausen Funds
For IRA accounts, please specify the year for which the contribution is made.
TO ADD TO AN ACCOUNT
By Mail
Complete the investment slip that is included with your account statement, and write your account number on your check. If you no longer have your investment slip, please reference your name, account number, and address on your check.
Prospectus 10
Mail the application and check to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 46707
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707
By overnight courier, send to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
255 Pictoria Drive, Suite 450
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246
Mail the slip and the check to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 46707
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707
TO OPEN AN ACCOUNT
By Wire
Call 1-888-925-8428 for instructions and prior to wiring to the Fund.
TO ADD TO AN ACCOUNT
By Wire
Call 1-888-925-8428 for instructions and prior to wiring to the Fund.
Telephone and Wire Transactions
With respect to all transactions made by telephone, the Fund and its transfer agent will employ reasonable procedures to confirm that instructions communicated by telephone are genuine. Such procedures may include, among others, requiring some form of personal identification prior to acting upon telephone instructions, providing written confirmation of all such transactions, and/or tape recording all telephone instructions. If reasonable procedures are followed, then neither the Fund nor the transfer agent will be liable for any loss, cost, or expense for acting upon an investors telephone instructions or for any unauthorized telephone redemption. In any instance where the Funds transfer agent is not reasonably satisfied that instructions received by telephone are genuine, neither the Fund nor the transfer agent shall be liable for any losses which may occur because of delay in implementing a transaction.
If you purchase your initial shares by wire, the transfer agent first must have received a completed account application and issued an account number to you. The account number must be included in the wiring instructions as set forth on the previous page. The transfer agent must receive your account application to establish shareholder privileges and to verify your account information. Payment of redemption proceeds may be delayed and taxes may be withheld unless the Fund receives a properly completed and executed account application.
Shares purchased by wire will be purchased at the NAV next determined after the transfer agent receives your wired funds and all required information is provided in the wire instructions. If the wire is not received by 4:00 p.m. Eastern time, the purchase will be effective at the NAV next calculated after receipt of the wire.
Tax-Deferred Plans
If you are eligible, you may set up one or more tax-deferred accounts. A tax-deferred account allows you to defer income taxes due on your investment income and capital gains. A contribution to certain of these plans may also be tax deductible. Tax-deferred accounts include retirement plans described below. Distributions from these plans are generally subject to an additional tax if withdrawn prior to age 59 1/2 or used for a nonqualifying purpose. Investors should consult their tax adviser or legal counsel before selecting a tax-deferred account.
Prospectus 11
U.S. Bank, N.A. serves as the custodian for the tax-deferred accounts offered by the Fund. You will be charged an annual account maintenance fee of $15 for each tax-deferred account you have with the Fund. You may pay the fee by check or have it automatically deducted from your account (usually in December). The custodian reserves the right to change the amount of the fee or to waive it in whole or part for certain types of accounts.
Types of Tax-Deferred Accounts
Traditional IRA
An individual retirement account. Your contribution may or may not be deductible depending on your circumstances. Assets can grow tax-deferred and distributions are taxable as income.
Roth IRA
An IRA with non-deductible contributions, tax-free growth of assets, and tax-free distributions for qualified distributions.
Spousal IRA
An IRA funded by a working spouse in the name of a non-earning spouse.
SEP-IRA
An individual retirement account funded by employer contributions. Your assets grow tax-deferred and distributions are taxable as income.
Keogh or Profit Sharing Plans
These plans allow corporations, partnerships and individuals who are self-employed to make tax-deductible contributions for each person covered by the plans.
403(b) Plans
An arrangement that allows employers of charitable or educational organizations to make voluntary salary reduction contributions to a tax-deferred account.
401(k) Plans
Allows employees of corporations of all sizes to contribute a percentage of their wages on a tax-deferred basis. These accounts need to be established by the trustee of the plan.
Automatic Investment Plans
By completing the Automatic Investment Plan section of the account application, you may make automatic monthly or quarterly investments ($100 minimum per purchase) in the Fund from your bank or savings account. Your initial investment minimum is $2,500 if you select this option. Shares of the Fund may also be purchased through direct deposit plans offered by certain employers and government agencies. These plans enable shareholders to have all or a portion of their payroll or Social Security checks transferred automatically to purchase shares of the Fund.
FOR INVESTING
Automatic Investment Plan
For making automatic investments from a designated bank account.
Payroll Direct Deposit Plan
For making automatic investments from your payroll check.
Dividend Reinvestment
All income dividends and capital gains distributions will be automatically reinvested in shares of the Fund unless you indicate otherwise on the account application or in writing.
Prospectus 12
Instructions For Selling Fund Shares
You may sell all or part of your shares on any day that the New York Stock Exchange is open for trading. Your shares will be sold at the next NAV per share calculated after your order is received in proper form by the transfer agent. The proceeds of your sale may be more or less than the purchase price of your shares, depending on the market value of the Funds securities at the time of your sale. Your order will be processed promptly and you will generally receive the proceeds within seven days after the Fund receives your properly completed request. The Fund typically expects to pay redemptions from cash, cash equivalents, proceeds from the sale of fund shares, from the sale of portfolio securities, and then from borrowing from a bank line of credit. These redemption payment methods will be used in regular and stressed market conditions. The Fund will not mail any proceeds unless your investment check has cleared the bank, which may take up to fifteen calendar days. This procedure is intended to protect the Fund and its shareholders from loss. If the dollar or share amount requested is greater than the current value of your account, your entire account balanced will be redeemed. If you choose to redeem your account in full, any automatic services currently in effect for the account will be terminated unless you indicate otherwise in writing. You will be charge a $20 fee for wire redemptions.
TO SELL SHARES
By Mail
Write a letter of instruction that includes:
Mail your request to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 46707
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707
By overnight courier, send to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
255 Pictoria Drive, Suite 450
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246
By Telephone
For specific information on how to redeem your account, and to determine if a signature guarantee or other documentation is required, please call toll-free in the U.S. 1-888-925-8428.
Prospectus 13
Additional Redemption Information
Signature Guarantees
Signature guarantees are designed to protect both you and the Fund from fraud. A signature guarantee of each account owner is required to redeem shares in the following situations:
Signature guarantees can be obtained from most banks, savings and loan associations, trust companies, credit unions, broker/dealers, and member firms of a national securities exchange. Call your financial institution to see if they have the ability to guarantee a signature. A notary public cannot provide signature guarantees.
The Fund reserves the right to require a signature guarantee under other circumstances or to delay a redemption when permitted by Federal Law. For more information pertaining to signature guarantees, please call 1-888-925-8428.
Corporate, Trust and Other Accounts
Redemption requests from corporate, trusts, and other accounts may require documents in addition to those described above, evidencing the authority of the officers, trustees or others. In order to avoid delays in processing redemption requests for these accounts, you should call the Transfer Agent at 1-888-925-8428 to determine what additional documents are required.
Address Changes
To change the address on your account, call the transfer agent at 1-888-925-8428 or send a written request signed by all account owners. Include the account number(s) and name(s) on the account and both the old and new addresses. Certain options may be suspended for a period of 15 days following an address change.
Transfer of Ownership
In order to change the account registration or transfer ownership of an account, additional documents will be required. In order to avoid delays in processing these requests, you should call the transfer agent at 1-888-925-8428 to determine what additional documents are required.
Redemption Initiated by the Fund
Because there are certain fixed costs involved with maintaining your account, the Fund may require you to redeem all of your shares if your account balance falls below $500. After your account balance falls below the minimum balance, you will receive a notification from the Fund indicating its intent to close your account along with instructions on how to increase the value of your account to the minimum amount within 60 days. If your account balance is still below $500 after 60 days, the Fund may close your account and send you the proceeds. This minimum balance requirement does not apply to accounts using automatic investment plans, to IRAs, and to other tax-sheltered investment accounts. The right of redemption by the Fund will not apply if the value of your account balance falls below $500 because of market performance. All shares of the Fund are also subject to involuntary redemption if the Board of Trustees determines to liquidate the Fund. Any involuntary redemption will create a capital gain or loss, which may have tax consequences about which you should consult your tax adviser.
Prospectus 14
Shareholder Communications
Account Statements
Every quarter, shareholders of the Fund will automatically receive regular account statements. You will also be sent a yearly statement detailing the tax characteristics of any dividends and distributions you have received.
Confirmations
Confirmation statements will be sent after each transaction that affects your account balance or account registration.
Regulatory Mailings
Financial reports will be sent at least semi-annually. Annual reports will include audited financial statements. To reduce expenses, one copy of each report will be mailed to each taxpayer identification number even though the investor may have more than one account in the Fund.
Dividends and Distributions
The Fund intends to pay distributions on an annual basis and expects that distributions will consist primarily of capital gains. You may elect to reinvest income dividends and capital gain distributions in the form of additional shares of the Fund or receive these distributions in cash. Dividends and distributions from the Fund are automatically reinvested in the Fund, unless you elect to have dividends paid in cash. Reinvested dividends and distributions receive the same tax treatment as those paid in cash. If you are interested in changing your election, you may call the transfer agent at 1-888-925-8428 or send a written notification to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 46707
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707
Share Classes
Institutional Class
Institutional Class shares of the Fund are sold at NAV. Institutional Class shares require a minimum initial investment of $100,000.
Investor Class
Investor Class shares of the Fund are sold at NAV. Investor shares require a minimum initial investment of $2,500.
Market Timing
The Fund discourages market timing. Market timing is an investment strategy using frequent purchases, redemptions, and/or exchanges in an attempt to profit from short-term market movements. Market timing may result in dilution of the value of Fund shares held by long term shareholders, disrupt portfolio management, and increase Fund expenses for all shareholders. The Board of Trustees also has adopted a policy directing the Fund to reject any purchase order with respect to one investor, a related group of investors or their agent(s), where it detects a pattern of purchases and sales of the Fund that indicates market timing or trading that it determines is abusive. This policy applies uniformly to all Fund shareholders. While the Fund attempts to deter market timing, there is no assurance that it will be able to identify and eliminate all market timers. For example, certain accounts called omnibus accounts include multiple shareholders. Omnibus accounts typically provide the Fund with a net purchase or redemption request on any given day where purchasers of
Prospectus 15
Fund shares and redeemers of Fund shares are netted against one another and the identity of individual purchasers and redeemers whose orders are aggregated are not known by the Fund. The netting effect often makes it more difficult for the Fund to detect market timing, and there can be no assurance that the Fund will be able to do so. The Fund may invest in foreign securities, and small capitalization companies, and therefore may have additional risks associated with market timing. Because the Fund may invest in securities that are, among other things, priced on foreign exchanges, thinly traded, traded infrequently or relatively illiquid, the Fund has the risk that the current market price for the securities may not accurately reflect current market values. This can create opportunities for market timing by shareholders. For example, securities trading on overseas markets present time zone arbitrage opportunities when events affecting portfolio security values occur after the close of the overseas market, but prior to the close of the U.S. market. A shareholder may seek to engage in short-term trading to take advantage of these pricing differences, and therefore could dilute the value of Fund shares held by long term shareholders, disrupt portfolio management and increase Fund expenses for all shareholders.
Taxes
Fund dividends and distributions are taxable to most investors (unless your investment is in an IRA or other tax-advantaged account). Dividends paid by the Fund out of net ordinary income and distributions of net short-term capital gains are taxable to the shareholders as ordinary income. Distributions by the Fund of net long-term capital gains to shareholders are generally taxable to the shareholders at the applicable long-term capital gains rate, regardless of how long the shareholder has held shares of the Fund.
Redemptions of shares of the Fund are taxable events which you may realize as a gain or loss. The amount of the gain or loss and the rate of tax will depend mainly upon the amount paid for the shares, the amount received from the sale, and how long the shares were held.
The Funds distributions may be subject to federal income tax whether received in cash or reinvested in additional shares. In addition to federal taxes, you may be subject to state and local taxes on distributions. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012, an additional 3.8% Medicare tax may be imposed on distributions you receive from the Fund and on gains from selling, redeeming or exchanging your shares. Because everyones tax situation is unique, always consult your tax professional about federal, state, and local tax consequences of an investment in the Fund.
Prospectus 16
Other Fund Service Providers
Distributor
Foreside Fund Services, LLC
Custodian
U.S. Bank, N.A.
Fund Administrator
Premier Fund Solutions, Inc.
Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
Cohen & Company, Ltd.
Investment Advisor
Walthausen & Co., LLC
Legal Counsel
Thompson Hine LLP
Transfer Agent
Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
Prospectus 17
PRIVACY POLICY |
The following is a description of the Funds policies regarding disclosure of nonpublic personal information that you provide to the Fund or that the Fund collects from other sources. In the event that you hold shares of the Fund through a broker-dealer or other financial intermediary, the privacy policy of your financial intermediary would govern how your nonpublic personal information would be shared with unaffiliated third parties.
Categories of Information the Fund Collects. The Fund collects the following non-public personal information about you:
Information the Fund receives from you on or in applications or other forms, correspondence, or conversations (such as your name, address, phone number, social security number, assets, income and date of birth); and
Information about your transactions with the Fund, its affiliates, or others (such as your account number and balance, payment history, parties to transactions, cost basis information, and other financial information).
Categories of Information the Fund Discloses. The Fund does not disclose any non-public personal information about their current or former shareholders to unaffiliated third parties, except as required or permitted by law. The Fund is permitted by law to disclose all of the information it collects, as described above, to its service providers (such as the Funds custodian, administrator and transfer agent) to process your transactions and otherwise provide services to you.
Confidentiality and Security. The Fund restricts access to your nonpublic personal information to those persons who require such information to provide products or services to you. The Fund maintains physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards that comply with federal standards to guard your nonpublic personal information.
Prospectus 18
Financial Highlights
The financial highlights table is intended to help you understand the Funds financial performance for the past five years. Certain information reflects financial results for a single Fund share. The total returns in the table represent the rate you would have earned (or lost) on an investment in the Fund (assuming reinvestment of all dividends and distributions). The financial information has been audited by Cohen & Company, Ltd., the Funds independent registered public accounting firm, whose report, along with the Funds financial statements, is included in the Funds annual report, which is available upon request.
Financial Highlights - Investor Class | |||||||||||||||
Selected data for a share outstanding throughout the period: | 2/1/2021 | 2/1/2020 | 2/1/2019 | 2/1/2018 | 2/1/2017 | ||||||||||
to | to | to | to | to | |||||||||||
1/31/2022 | 1/31/2021 | 1/31/2020 | 1/31/2019 | 1/31/2018 | |||||||||||
Net Asset Value - | |||||||||||||||
Beginning of Period | $ | 20.49 | $ | 18.80 | $ | 18.71 | $ | 23.87 | $ | 22.12 | |||||
Net Investment Income (Loss) (a) | (0.00 | ) + | 0.05 | 0.07 | (0.02 | ) | (0.07 | ) | |||||||
Net Gain (Loss) on Investments (Realized and Unrealized) (b) | 5.12 | 1.83 | 0.43 | (2.74 | ) | 2.99 | |||||||||
Total from Investment Operations | 5.12 | 1.88 | 0.50 | (2.76 | ) | 2.92 | |||||||||
Distributions (From Net Investment Income) | - | + | (0.19 | ) | (0.02 | ) | - | - | |||||||
Distributions (From Capital Gains) | (7.38 | ) | - | (0.39 | ) | (2.40 | ) | (1.17 | ) | ||||||
Total Distributions | (7.38 | ) | (0.19 | ) | (0.41 | ) | (2.40 | ) | (1.17 | ) | |||||
Proceeds from Redemption Fee (e) | - | + | - | + | - | + | - | + | - | + | |||||
Net Asset Value - | |||||||||||||||
End of Period | $ | 18.23 | $ | 20.49 | $ | 18.80 | $ | 18.71 | $ | 23.87 | |||||
Total Return (c) | 23.66 | % | 10.04 | % | 2.55 | % | (10.27 | )% | 13.22 | % | |||||
Ratios/Supplemental Data | |||||||||||||||
Net Assets - End of Period (Thousands) | $ | 64,007 | $ | 71,784 | $ | 177,627 | $ | 422,206 | $ | 621,122 | |||||
Before Reimbursement | |||||||||||||||
Ratio of Expenses to Average Net Assets | 1.38 | % | 1.35 | % | 1.30 | % | 1.27 | % | 1.26 | % | |||||
Ratio of Net Investment Income (Loss) to Average Net Assets | -0.17 | % | 0.16 | % | 0.27 | % | -0.09 | % | -0.32 | % | |||||
After Reimbursement (d) | |||||||||||||||
Ratio of Expenses to Average Net Assets | 1.21 | % | 1.21 | % | 1.21 | % | 1.27 | % | 1.26 | % | |||||
Ratio of Net Investment Income (Loss) to Average Net Assets | -0.00 | % + | 0.30 | % | 0.36 | % | -0.09 | % | -0.32 | % | |||||
Portfolio Turnover Rate | 71.40 | % | 65.91 | % | 56.71 | % | 45.51 | % | 45.20 | % |
+ Amount calculated is less than +/-$0.005/0.005%.
(a) Per share amounts were calculated using the average shares method.
(b) Realized and unrealized gains and losses per share in this caption are balancing amounts necessary to
reconcile the change in net asset value for the period and may not reconcile with the aggregate gains and
losses in the Statement of Operations due to share transactions for the period.
(c) Total return represents the rate that the investor would have earned or lost on an investment in the
Fund assuming reinvestment of dividends.
(d) Effective December 31, 2018, the Advisor has agreed to waive a portion of its service fees and manage-
ment fees.
(e) Prior to June 1, 2021, shares were subject to a redemption fee of 2% if redeemed after holding them for
90 days or less.
Prospectus 19
Financial Highlights - Institutional Class | ||||||||||||
Selected data for a share outstanding throughout the period: | 2/1/2021 | 2/1/2020 | 2/1/2019 | 12/31/2018* | ||||||||
to | to | to | to | |||||||||
1/31/2022 | 1/31/2021 | 1/31/2020 | 1/31/2019 | |||||||||
Net Asset Value - | ||||||||||||
Beginning of Period | $ | 20.53 | $ | 18.83 | $ | 18.70 | $ | 16.71 | ||||
Net Investment Income (Loss) (a) | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.11 | - | + | |||||||
Net Gain (Loss) on Investments (Realized and Unrealized) (b) | 5.14 | 1.84 | 0.43 | 1.99 | ||||||||
Total from Investment Operations | 5.19 | 1.93 | 0.54 | 1.99 | ||||||||
Distributions (From Net Investment Income) | (0.12 | ) | (0.23 | ) | (0.02 | ) | - | |||||
Distributions (From Capital Gains) | (7.38 | ) | - | (0.39 | ) | - | ||||||
Total Distributions | (7.50 | ) | (0.23 | ) | (0.41 | ) | - | |||||
Proceeds from Redemption Fee (e) | - | + | - | + | - | + | - | |||||
Net Asset Value - | ||||||||||||
End of Period | $ | 18.22 | $ | 20.53 | $ | 18.83 | $ | 18.70 | ||||
Total Return (c) | 23.92 | % | 10.33 | % | 2.80 | % | 11.91 | %** | ||||
Ratios/Supplemental Data | ||||||||||||
Net Assets - End of Period (Thousands) | $ | 36,005 | $ | 96,863 | $ | 132,207 | $ | 7,741 | ||||
Before Reimbursement | ||||||||||||
Ratio of Expenses to Average Net Assets | 1.38 | % | 1.35 | % | 1.30 | % | 1.37 | %*** | ||||
Ratio of Net Investment Income (Loss) to Average Net Assets | -0.20 | % | 0.15 | % | 0.23 | % | -0.23 | %*** | ||||
After Reimbursement (d) | ||||||||||||
Ratio of Expenses to Average Net Assets | 0.98 | % | 0.98 | % | 0.98 | % | 0.98 | %*** | ||||
Ratio of Net Investment Income (Loss) to Average Net Assets | 0.20 | % | 0.52 | % | 0.55 | % | 0.16 | %*** | ||||
Portfolio Turnover Rate | 71.40 | % | 65.91 | % | 56.71 | % | 45.51 | %** |
* Commencement of Class.
** Not Annualized.
*** Annualized.
+ Amount calculated is less than $0.005/0.005%.
(a) Per share amounts were calculated using the average shares method.
(b) Realized and unrealized gains and losses per share in this caption are balancing amounts necessary to
reconcile the change in net asset value for the period and may not reconcile with the aggregate gains and
losses in the Statement of Operations due to share transactions for the period.
(c) Total return represents the rate that the investor would have earned or lost on an investment in the Fund
assuming reinvestment of dividends.
(d) Effective December 31, 2018, the Advisor has agreed to waive a portion of its service fees and manage-
ment fees.
(e) Prior to June 1, 2021, shares were subject to a redemption fee of 2% if redeemed after holding them for
90 days or less.
Prospectus 20
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Prospectus 21
Where To Go For Information
For shareholder inquiries please, call toll-free in the U.S. at 1-888-925-8428. You will also find more information about the Fund on our website at www.walthausenfunds.com or in the following documents:
Statement of Additional Information
The Statement of Additional Information is on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), contains additional and more detailed information about the Fund and is incorporated into this Prospectus by reference. The Fund publishes Shareholder Reports (annual and semiannual reports) that contain additional information about the Funds investments. In the Funds annual report, you will find a discussion of the market conditions and investment strategies that significantly affected the Funds performance during its last fiscal year.
You may obtain the SAI and Shareholder Reports without charge by contacting the Fund at 1-888-925-8428 or on our Internet site at: www.walthausenfunds.com. If you purchased shares through a Financial Intermediary, you may also obtain these documents, without charge, by contacting your Financial Intermediary.
Shareholder Reports and other information about the Fund is available on the EDGAR Database on the SEC's Internet site at http://www.sec.gov, and copies of this information may be obtained, after paying a duplicating fee, by electronic request at the following e-mail address: publicinfo@sec.gov.
Walthausen Funds SEC file number 811-22143
WALTHAUSEN SMALL CAP VALUE FUND
2691 Route 9, Suite
102 Malta, NY 12020
WALTHAUSEN FOCUSED SMALL CAP VALUE FUND
INSTITUTIONAL CLASS TICKER
For Investors Seeking Long-Term Capital Appreciation
PROSPECTUS
June 1, 2022
As with all mutual funds, the Securities and Exchange Commission has not approved or disapproved of these securities, nor has the Commission determined that this Prospectus is complete or accurate. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offense.
Table of Contents | |
Summary Section | 1 |
Investment Objective | 1 |
Fees and Expenses of the Fund | 1 |
The Principal Investment Strategy of the Fund | 2 |
The Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund | 2 |
Performance | 3 |
Management | 4 |
Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares | 4 |
Tax Information | 4 |
Payments to Broker-Dealers and Other Financial Intermediaries | 4 |
Cybersecurity | 4 |
Investment Objective, Principal Investment Strategy, | |
Related Risks, and Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings | 5 |
Investment Objective | 5 |
The Principal Investment Strategy of the Fund | 5 |
The Investment Selection Process Used by the Fund | 5 |
The Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund | 6 |
Portfolio Holdings Disclosure | 7 |
Management | 8 |
The Investment Advisor | 8 |
Shareholder Information | 9 |
Pricing of Fund Shares | 9 |
Customer Identification Program | 9 |
Investing in the Fund | 9 |
Investments Made Through Brokerage Firms or Other Financial Institutions | 9 |
Minimum Investments | 10 |
Types of Account Ownership | 10 |
Instructions For Opening and Adding to an Account | 11 |
Telephone and Wire Transactions | 11 |
Tax-Deferred Plans | 12 |
Types of Tax-Deferred Accounts | 12 |
Automatic Investment Plans | 13 |
Instructions For Selling Fund Shares | 13 |
Additional Redemption Information | 14 |
Shareholder Communications | 15 |
Dividends and Distributions | 15 |
Share Classes | 16 |
Market Timing | 16 |
Taxes | 16 |
Other Fund Service Providers | 17 |
Privacy Policy | 18 |
Financial Highlights | 19 |
The Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation.
The following table describes the expenses and fees that you may pay if you buy and hold shares of the Fund. You may pay other fees, such as brokerage commissions and other fees to financial intermediaries, which are not reflected in the tables and examples below.
Institutional | |
Class | |
Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Purchases | |
Deferred Sales Charge (Load) | |
Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Reinvested Dividends | |
Annual Fund Operating Expenses (expenses that you pay each | |
year as a percentage of the value of your investment) | |
Management Fees | |
Distribution 12b-1 Fees | |
Other Expenses | |
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses | |
Fee Waiver / Expense Reimbursement (1) | ( |
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waiver |
(1) |
The following example is intended to help you compare the cost of investing in the Fund with the cost of investing in other mutual funds. The example assumes that you invest $10,000 in the Fund for the time periods indicated and then redeem all of your shares at the end of those periods. The example also assumes that your investment has a 5% annual return each year and that the Funds operating expenses remain the same each year. Although your actual costs may be higher or lower, based on these assumptions your costs would be:
Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund | One Year | Three Years | Five Years | Ten Years |
Institutional Class | $ |
$ |
$ |
$ |
The Fund pays transaction costs, such as commissions, when it buys and sells securities (or turns over its portfolio). A higher portfolio turnover may indicate higher transaction costs and may result in higher taxes when Fund shares are held in a taxable account. These costs, which are not reflected in annual fund operating expenses or in the example, affect the Funds performance. During the most recent fiscal year, the Funds portfolio turnover rate was
Prospectus 1
The Fund invests primarily in common stocks of small capitalization companies that Walthausen & Co., LLC (the "Advisor") believes have the potential for capital appreciation. The Advisor invests in small capitalization companies with market capitalizations below that of the largest member of the Russell 2000 Index at the time of purchase. As of April 30, 2022, the capitalization of the largest member of the Russell 2000 Index was $15.1 billion. The Fund typically invests in 30 to 50 companies. Under normal circumstances, the Fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets (plus any borrowings for investment purposes) in U.S. common stocks of small capitalization companies, as defined above. The Fund emphasizes a "value" investment style, investing in companies that appear underpriced according to certain financial measurements of their worth or business prospects. Financial measures which are used to assess value are Price to Book ratio and Enterprise Value to EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) ratio and other widely used valuation metrics. Those ratios are compared to similar metrics for the market and comparable securities. The Advisor defines Enterprise Value as the market value of a company's equity, debt and unfunded pension claims, less cash. EBITDA is a company's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
The Advisor may sell a company when the company reaches the Advisor's projection of the stock's future target price, as determined by applying the Advisor's understanding of historical valuation metrics, when there is a more attractively priced company as an alternative, when the fundamentals of the business have changed, or when the Advisor determines that management of the company is not enhancing shareholder value. These portfolio reviews are conducted continuously through close monitoring of stock prices, changes in the economy, and corporate developments.
As with all mutual funds, there is the risk that you could lose some or all of your investment in the Fund.
Risks of Investing in Small Capitalization Companies
The Fund invests in the stocks of small capitalization companies, which may subject the Fund to additional risks. The earnings and prospects of these companies are generally more volatile than larger companies and small capitalization companies may experience higher failure rates than do larger companies.
Risks in General
Domestic economic growth and market conditions, interest rate levels, and political events are among the factors affecting the securities markets in which the Fund invests. There is risk that these and other factors may adversely affect the Funds performance.
Additionally, unexpected local, regional or global events, such as war; acts of terrorism; financial, political or social disruptions; natural, environmental or man-made disasters; the spread of infectious illnesses or other public health issues (such as COVID-19); and recessions and depressions could have a significant impact on the Fund's investments and could impair market liquidity. Such events can cause investor fear, which can adversely affect the economies of nations, regions and the market in general, in ways that cannot necessarily be foreseen.
Risks of Investing in Common Stocks
Overall stock market risks may affect the value of the Fund. Factors such as domestic economic growth and market conditions, interest rate levels, and political events affect the securities markets.
Prospectus 2
Value Investing Risk
Value investing attempts to identify companies selling at a discount to a projected future value. Value investing is subject to the risk that a company's intrinsic value may never be fully realized by the market or that a company judged by the Adviser to be undervalued may actually be appropriately priced.
Sector Risk
Sector risk is the possibility that all stocks within the same group of industries will decline in price due to sector-specific market or economic developments. The Fund may be overweight in certain sectors at various times.
Investment Management Risk
The Advisors strategy may fail to produce the intended results.
The
as of was for the Institutional Class.( ) + ( )
FOR THE PERIODS ENDED 12/31/21 |
1 Year | 5 Years | 10 Years |
WALTHAUSEN FOCUSED SMALL CAP VALUE FUND | |||
(Institutional Class) | |||
Return Before Taxes | |||
Return After Taxes on Distributions | |||
Return After Taxes on Distributions and Sale of Fund Shares | |||
Russell 2000 Value Index (does not reflect deductions for fees, | |||
expenses or taxes) |
Prospectus 3
Management
Investment Advisor
Walthausen & Co., LLC (the Advisor)
Portfolio Managers
Gerard S.E. Heffernan has managed the Fund since March 2018. Mr. Heffernan is a Portfolio Manager and Managing Director of the Advisor.
Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares
The minimum initial and subsequent investment amounts for various types of accounts offered by the Fund are shown below.
Institutional Class | Initial | Additional |
Regular Account | $10,000 | $1,000 |
Automatic Investment Plan | $10,000 | $1,000 |
IRA Account | $5,000 | $500 |
Investors may purchase or redeem Fund shares on any business day through a financial intermediary, by mail (Walthausen Funds, c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC, P.O. Box 46707, Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707), by wire, or by telephone at 1-888-925-8428.
Tax Information
The Funds distributions are taxable, and will be taxed as ordinary income or capital gains, unless you are investing through a tax-deferred arrangement, such as a 401(k) plan or an individual retirement account. Such tax-deferred arrangements may be taxed later upon withdrawal of monies from those arrangements.
Payments to Broker-Dealers and Other Financial Intermediaries
If you purchase the Fund through a broker-dealer or other financial intermediary (such as a financial advisor), the Fund and/or its investment adviser may pay the intermediary a fee as compensation for the services it provides. These payments may create a conflict of interest by influencing the financial intermediary and your salesperson to recommend the Fund over another investment. Ask your salesperson or visit your financial intermediarys website for more information.
Cybersecurity
The computer systems, networks and devices used by the Fund and its service providers to carry out routine business operations employ a variety of protections designed to prevent damage or interruption from computer viruses, network failures, computer and telecommunication failures, infiltration by unauthorized persons and security breaches. Despite the various protections utilized by the Fund and its service providers, systems, networks, or devices potentially can be breached. The Fund and its shareholders could be negatively impacted as a result of a cybersecurity breach.
Prospectus 4
Cybersecurity breaches can include unauthorized access to systems, networks, or devices; infection from computer viruses or other malicious software code; and attacks that shut down, disable, slow, or otherwise disrupt operations, business processes, or website access or functionality. Cybersecurity breaches may cause disruptions and impact the Funds business operations, potentially resulting in financial losses; interference with the Funds ability to calculate its NAV; impediments to trading; the inability of the Fund, the Advisor, and other service providers to transact business; violations of applicable privacy and other laws; regulatory fines, penalties, reputational damage, reimbursement or other compensation costs, or additional compliance costs; as well as the inadvertent release of confidential information.
Similar adverse consequences could result from cybersecurity breaches affecting issuers of securities in which the Fund invests; counterparties with which the Fund engages in transactions; governmental and other regulatory authorities; exchange and other financial market operators, banks, brokers, dealers, insurance companies, and other financial institutions (including financial intermediaries and service providers for the Funds shareholders); and other parties. In addition, substantial costs may be incurred by these entities in order to prevent any cybersecurity breaches in the future.
Investment Objective, Principal Investment Strategy, Related Risks, and Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings
Investment Objective
The Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation.
The Principal Investment Strategy of the Fund
The Fund invests primarily in common stocks of small capitalization companies that Walthausen & Co., LLC (the "Advisor") believes have the potential for capital appreciation. The Advisor invests in small capitalization companies with market capitalizations below that of the largest member of the Russell 2000 Index at the time of purchase. As of April 30, 2022, the capitalization of the largest member of the Russell 2000 Index was $15.1 billion. The Fund typically invests in 30 to 50 companies. Under normal circumstances, the Fund will invest at least 80% of its net assets (plus any borrowings for investment purposes) in U.S. common stocks of small capitalization companies, as defined above. The Fund emphasizes a "value" investment style, investing in companies that appear underpriced according to certain financial measurements of their worth or business prospects. Financial measures which are used to assess value are Price to Book ratio and Enterprise Value to EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) ratio and other widely used valuation metrics. Those ratios are compared to similar metrics for the market and comparable securities. The Advisor defines Enterprise Value as the market value of a company's equity, debt and unfunded pension claims, less cash. EBITDA is a company's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. The Fund may invest in other securities as described in the Statement of Additional Information, which is available upon request.
The Investment Selection Process Used by the Fund
The Advisor uses a process with multiple steps to review the universe of small capitalization companies from various angles to identify a diversified pool of quality candidates. The methods used by the Adviser to search for candidates include: a proprietary scoring system that focuses on finding companies on the cusp of positive change, demonstrated by characteristics such as an acceleration in revenues, an inflection to expanding profit margins, cash flow and/or earnings growth, or an event that will reduce company debt; a screen to identify stocks that are trading at the low end of their historical valuation; tracking insider transactions for indications that management is confident of future prospects; attending investor conferences and corporate analyst events to learn details of corporate plans. The Advisor's detailed analysis involves a review of relevant regulatory filings including 10Ks, 10Qs and proxy statements and analysis of available information including credit agreements, indus-
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try publications, and news articles. The Advisor uses this information to understand the business and build financial models. Models are constructed using consistent formats that allow the Advisor to find pertinent information enabling it to compare each candidate to other companies that the Advisor has also analyzed. In constructing the models, the two critical areas for the Advisor are the cash flow statement and balance sheet because they allow the Advisor to evaluate a company's sustainable free cash flow. Given the importance that the Advisor places on a company's cash flow, the analysts pay particular attention to the accounting footnotes contained within. The portfolio managers and analysts develop a detailed projection of future earnings, cash flow and balance sheet to assist in developing an investment rational or thesis along with detailed price targets and an examination of risks inherent in the investment.
The Advisor may sell a company when the company reaches the Advisor's projection of the stock's future target price, as determined by applying the Advisor's understanding of historical valuation metrics, when there is a more attractively priced company as an alternative, when the fundamentals of the business have changed, or when the Advisor determines that management of the company is not enhancing shareholder value. These portfolio reviews are conducted continuously through close monitoring of stock prices, changes in the economy, and corporate developments.
The Advisor does not engage in market timing. For temporary defensive purposes, the Fund may hold cash or cash-equivalents and invest without limit in obligations of the U.S. Government and its agencies, money market funds and money market securities, including high-grade commercial paper, certificates of deposit, repurchase agreements and short-term debt securities. Under these circumstances, the Fund may not participate in stock market advances or declines to the same extent it would had it remained more fully invested in common stocks.
The Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund
As with all mutual funds, there is the risk that you could lose some or all of your investment in the Fund.
Risks of Investing in Small Capitalization Companies
The Fund invests in the stocks of small capitalization companies, which may subject the Fund to additional risks. The earnings and prospects of these companies are generally more volatile than larger companies and small capitalization companies may experience higher failure rates than do larger companies. The trading volume of securities of small capitalization companies is normally less than that of larger companies and, therefore, may disproportionately affect their market price, tending to make them fall more in response to selling pressure than is the case with larger companies. Small capitalization companies may have limited markets, product lines or financial resources and may lack management experience.
Risks in General
An investment in the Fund is not a deposit in a bank and is not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency. Domestic economic growth and market conditions, interest rate levels, and political events are among the factors affecting the securities markets of the Funds investments. There is risk that these and other factors may adversely affect the Funds performance. You should consider your own investment goals, time horizon, and risk tolerance before investing in the Fund. An investment in the Fund may not be appropriate for all investors and is not intended to be a complete investment program. You may lose money by investing in the Fund.
Additionally, unexpected local, regional or global events, such as war; acts of terrorism; financial, political or social disruptions; natural, environmental or man-made disasters; the spread of infectious illnesses or other public health issues (such as COVID-19); and recessions and depressions could have a significant impact on the Fund's investments and could impair market liquidity. Such events can cause investor fear, which can adversely affect the economies of nations, regions and the market in general, in ways that cannot necessarily be foreseen. The increasing interconnectivity between
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global economies and financial markets increases the likelihood that events or conditions in one region or financial market may adversely impact issuers in a different country, region or financial market. These risks may be magnified if certain events or developments adversely interrupt the global supply chain; in these and other circumstances, such risks might affect companies worldwide. As a result, local, regional or global events such as war, acts of terrorism, the spread of infectious illness or other public health issues, recessions or other events could have a significant negative impact on global economic and market conditions. The COVID-19 global pandemic and the aggressive responses taken by many governments or voluntarily imposed by private parties, including closing borders, restricting international and domestic travel, and imposing prolonged quarantines or similar restrictions, as well as the closure of, or operational changes to, many retail and other businesses, has had negative impacts, and in many cases severe negative impacts, on markets worldwide. It is not known how long such impacts, or any future impacts of other significant events described above, will or would last, but there could be a prolonged period of global economic slowdown, which may be expected to impact the Fund and its investments.
Risks of Investing in Common Stocks
The Fund invests primarily in common stocks, which subjects the Fund and its shareholders to the risks associated with common stock investing. These risks include the financial risk of selecting individual companies that do not perform as anticipated, the risk that the stock markets in which the Fund invests may experience periods of turbulence and instability, and the general risk that domestic and global economies may go through periods of decline and cyclical change. Many factors affect the performance of each company that the Fund invests in, including the strength of the companys management or the demand for its product or services. You should be aware that a companys share price may decline as a result of poor decisions made by management or lower demand for the companys products or services. In addition, a companys share price may also decline if its earnings or revenues fall short of expectations.
There are overall stock market risks that may also affect the value of the Fund. Over time, the stock markets tend to move in cycles, with periods when stock prices rise generally and periods when stock prices decline generally. The value of the Funds investments may increase or decrease more than the stock markets in general.
Value Investing Risk
Value investing attempts to identify companies selling at a discount to a projected future value. Value investing is subject to the risk that a company's intrinsic value may never be fully realized by the market or that a company judged by the Adviser to be undervalued may actually be appropriately priced.
Sector Risk
Sector risk is the possibility that stocks within the same group of industries will decline in price due to sector-specific market or economic developments. If the Advisor invests a significant portion of its assets in a particular sector, the Fund is subject to the risk that companies in the same sector are likely to react similarly to legislative or regulatory changes, adverse market conditions and/or increased competition affecting that market segment. The sectors in which the Fund may be overweighted will vary.
Investment Management Risk
The Advisors strategy may fail to produce the intended results.
Portfolio Holdings Disclosure
A description of the Funds policies and procedures with respect to the disclosure of the Funds portfolio securities is available in the Funds Statement of Additional Information (SAI).
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Management
The Investment Advisor
Walthausen & Co., LLC, 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020, is the investment advisor of the Fund and has responsibility for the management of the Fund's affairs, under the supervision of the Fund's Board of Trustees. The Fund's investment portfolio is managed on a day-to-day basis by Gerard S.E. Heffernan CFA. Mr. Heffernan is a Portfolio Manager and Managing Director of the Advisor. Mr. Heffernan joined the Advisor in February 2018. His involvement in the investment industry spans over 25 years, including 15 years at Lord Abbett & Co., where he was a partner and portfolio manager specializing in small cap value equities. From June 2013 until February 2018, he was self-employed managing his own portfolio. Mr. Heffernan received a B.S. in Business Administration from Villanova University.
The Funds SAI provides information about the portfolio managers compensation, other accounts managed by the portfolio managers, and the portfolio managers ownership of Fund shares. A discussion regarding the basis for the Board of Trustees approval of the Management Agreement between the Fund and the Advisor is available in the Annual Report to Shareholders for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022.
Under the Management Agreement, the Advisor, at its own expense and without reimbursement from the Trust, furnishes office space and all necessary office facilities, equipment and executive personnel necessary for managing the assets of the Fund. For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022, the Advisor received an investment management fee at an annual rate equal to 0.85% of the average daily net assets of the Fund. Effective October 15, 2020 the Advisor reduced the investment management fee to an annual rate equal to 0.85% of the average daily net assets of the Fund. Effective October 15, 2020 under a Services Agreement with the Fund, the Advisor receives an additional fee of 0.20% of the Funds average daily net assets and is obligated to pay the operating expenses of the Fund excluding management fees, brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), the cost of acquired funds and extraordinary expenses. The Advisor has contractually agreed to waive Services Agreement fees to the extent necessary to maintain total annual operating expenses of the Institutional Class Shares, excluding brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), the cost of acquired funds and extraordinary expenses at 0.85% of its average daily net assets through May 31, 2026. The Advisor may not terminate the fee waiver before May 31, 2026. The Trustees may terminate the expense waiver upon notice to the Advisor.
The Advisor (not the Fund) may pay certain financial institutions (which may include banks, brokers, securities dealers and other industry professionals) a fee for providing distribution related services and/or for performing certain administrative servicing functions for Fund shareholders to the extent these institutions are allowed to do so by applicable statute, rule or regulation. The Fund may purchase securities issued by these financial institutions or their affiliates, however, the portfolio manager is prohibited from considering the services provided by the financial institution in making a decision whether to purchase or sell the securities of the financial institution or its affiliates.
An investment in the Fund is not a deposit or obligation of any bank, is not endorsed or guaranteed by any bank, and is not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) or any other government agency. You may lose money by investing in the Fund.
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Shareholder Information
Pricing of Fund Shares
The price you pay for a share of the Fund, and the price you receive upon selling or redeeming a share of the Fund, is called the Funds net asset value (NAV). A separate NAV is calculated for each share class of the Fund. The NAV for a class is calculated by adding the total value of the Funds investments and other assets allocable to a class, subtracting the liabilities allocable to that class and then dividing that figure by the number of outstanding shares of the class:
NAV = Total Assets - Liabilities / Number of Shares Outstanding
The NAV is generally calculated on each day the New York Stock Exchange is open as of the close of trading on the Exchange (normally 4:00 p.m. Eastern time). The New York Stock Exchange is generally open every day other than weekends and holidays. All purchases, redemptions or reinvestments of Fund shares will be priced at the next NAV calculated after your order is received in proper form by the Funds Transfer Agent, Ultimus Fund Solutions. If you purchase shares directly from the Fund, your order must be placed with the Transfer Agent prior to the close of the trading of the New York Stock Exchange in order to be confirmed for that days NAV. The Funds assets generally are valued at their market value. Certain short-term securities may be valued at amortized cost, which approximates market value. If market prices are not available or, in the Advisors opinion, market prices do not reflect fair value, or if an event occurs after the close of trading (but prior to the time the NAV is calculated) that materially affects fair value, the Advisor may value the Funds assets at their fair value according to written policies approved by the Funds Board of Trustees. For example, if trading in a portfolio security is halted and does not resume before the Fund calculates its NAV, the Advisor may need to price the security using the Funds fair value pricing guidelines. Without a fair value price, short term traders could take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity and dilute the NAV of long term investors. Fair valuation of a Funds portfolio securities can serve to reduce arbitrage opportunities available to short term traders, but there is no assurance that fair value pricing policies will prevent dilution of the Funds NAV by short term traders. The Fund may use pricing services to determine market value.
Customer Identification Program
IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR OPENING A NEW ACCOUNT
To help the government fight the funding of terrorism and money laundering activities, Federal law requires all financial institutions to obtain, verify, and record information that identifies each person who opens an account. This means that, when you open an account, we will ask for your name, address, date of birth, and other information that will allow us to identify you. We may also ask for identifying documents, and may take additional steps to verify your identity. We may not be able to open an account or complete a transaction for you until we are able to verify your identity.
Investing in the Fund
You may purchase shares directly through the Funds transfer agent or through a brokerage firm or other financial institution that has agreed to sell the Funds shares. If you are investing directly in the Fund for the first time, you will need to establish an account by completing a Shareholder Account Application (To establish an IRA, complete an IRA Application). To request an application, call toll-free 1-888-925-8428.
Investments Made Through Brokerage Firms or Other Financial Institutions
If you invest through a brokerage firm or other financial institution, the policies and fees may be different than those described here. Financial advisers, financial supermarkets, brokerage firms, and other financial institutions may charge transaction and other fees and may set different minimum investments or
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limitations on buying or selling shares. Consult a representative of your financial institution if you have any questions. The Fund is deemed to have received your order when the brokerage firm or financial institution receives the order, and your purchase will be priced at the next calculated NAV. Your financial institution is responsible for transmitting your order in a timely manner.
Minimum Investments | ||
Institutional Class | Initial | Additional |
Regular Account | $10,000 | $1,000 |
Automatic Investment Plan | $10,000 | $1,000 |
IRA Account | $5,000 | $500 |
The Fund reserves the right to change the amount of these minimums from time to time or to waive them in whole or in part for certain accounts. Investment minimums may be higher or lower to investors purchasing shares through a brokerage firm or other financial institution.
All purchases must be made in U.S. dollars and checks must be drawn on U.S. banks. No cash, money orders, travelers checks, credit cards, credit card checks, third party checks or other checks deemed to be high-risk checks will be accepted. You will be charged an annual account maintenance fee of $15 for each tax-deferred account you have with the Fund. A $20 fee will be charged against your account for any payment check returned to the transfer agent or for any incomplete electronic fund transfer, or for insufficient funds, stop payment, closed account or other reasons. If a check does not clear your bank or the Fund is unable to debit your predesignated bank account on the day of purchase, the Fund reserves the right to cancel the purchase. If your purchase is canceled, you will be responsible for any losses or fees imposed by your bank and losses that may be incurred as a result of a decline in the value of the canceled purchase. The Fund (or Funds agent) has the authority to redeem shares in your account(s) to cover any losses due to fluctuations in share price. Any profit on such cancellation will accrue to the Fund. Your investment in the Fund should be intended to serve as a long-term investment vehicle. The Fund is not designed to provide you with a means of speculating on the short-term fluctuations in the stock market. The Fund reserves the right to reject any purchase request that it regards as disruptive to the efficient management of the Fund, which includes investors with a history of excessive trading. The Fund also reserves the right to stop offering shares at any time.
Types of Account Ownership
You can establish the following types of accounts by completing a Shareholder Account Application:
Individual or Joint Ownership
Individual accounts are owned by one person. Joint accounts have two or more owners.
A Gift or Transfer to Minor
(UGMA or UTMA) An UGMA/UTMA account is a custodial account managed for the benefit of a minor. To open an UGMA or UTMA account, you must include the minors social security number on the application.
Trust
An established trust can open an account. The names of each trustee, the name of the trust and the date of the trust agreement must be included on the application.
Business Accounts
Corporation and partnerships may also open an account. The application must be signed by an authorized officer of the corporation or a general partner of a partnership.
IRA Accounts
See Tax-Deferred Plans.
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Instructions For Opening and Adding to an Account
TO OPEN AN ACCOUNT
By Mail
Complete and sign the Shareholder Application or an IRA Application
Make your check payable to Walthausen Funds For IRA accounts, please specify the year for which the contribution is made.
Mail the application and check to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 46707
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707
By overnight courier, send to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
255 Pictoria Drive, Suite 450
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246
TO ADD TO AN ACCOUNT
By Mail
Complete the investment slip that is included with your account statement, and write your account number on your check. If you no longer have your investment slip, please reference your name, account number, and address on your check.
Mail the slip and the check to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 46707
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707
TO OPEN AN ACCOUNT
By Wire
Call 1-888-925-8428 for instructions and prior to wiring to the Fund.
TO ADD TO AN ACCOUNT
By Wire
Call 1-888-925-8428 for instructions and prior to wiring to the Fund.
Telephone and Wire Transactions
With respect to all transactions made by telephone, the Fund and its transfer agent will employ reasonable procedures to confirm that instructions communicated by telephone are genuine. Such procedures may include, among others, requiring some form of personal identification prior to acting upon telephone instructions, providing written confirmation of all such transactions, and/or tape recording all telephone instructions. If reasonable procedures are followed, then neither the Fund nor the transfer agent will be liable for any loss, cost, or expense for acting upon an investors telephone instructions or for any unauthorized telephone redemption. In any instance where the Funds transfer agent is not reasonably satisfied that instructions received by telephone are genuine, neither the Fund nor the transfer agent shall be liable for any losses which may occur because of delay in implementing a transaction.
If you purchase your initial shares by wire, the transfer agent first must have received a completed account application and issued an account number to you. The account number must be included in the wiring instructions as set forth on the previous page. The transfer agent must receive your account application to establish shareholder privileges and to verify your account information. Payment of redemption proceeds may be delayed and taxes may be withheld unless the Fund receives a properly completed and executed account application.
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Shares purchased by wire will be purchased at the NAV next determined after the transfer agent receives your wired funds and all required information is provided in the wire instructions. If the wire is not received by 4:00 p.m. Eastern time, the purchase will be effective at the NAV next calculated after receipt of the wire.
Tax-Deferred Plans
If you are eligible, you may set up one or more tax-deferred accounts. A tax-deferred account allows you to defer income taxes due on your investment income and capital gains. A contribution to certain of these plans may also be tax deductible. Tax-deferred accounts include retirement plans described below. Distributions from these plans are generally subject to an additional tax if withdrawn prior to age 59 1/2 or used for a nonqualifying purpose. Investors should consult their tax adviser or legal counsel before selecting a tax-deferred account.
U.S. Bank, N.A. serves as the custodian for the tax-deferred accounts offered by the Fund. You will be charged an annual account maintenance fee of $15 for each tax-deferred account you have with the Fund. You may pay the fee by check or have it automatically deducted from your account (usually in December). The custodian reserves the right to change the amount of the fee or to waive it in whole or part for certain types of accounts.
Types of Tax-Deferred Accounts
Traditional IRA
An individual retirement account. Your contribution may or may not be deductible depending on your circumstances. Assets can grow tax-deferred and distributions are taxable as income.
Roth IRA
An IRA with non-deductible contributions, tax-free growth of assets, and tax-free distributions for qualified distributions.
Spousal IRA
An IRA funded by a working spouse in the name of a non-earning spouse.
SEP-IRA
An individual retirement account funded by employer contributions. Your assets grow tax-deferred and distributions are taxable as income.
Keogh or Profit Sharing Plans
These plans allow corporations, partnerships and individuals who are self-employed to make tax-deductible contributions for each person covered by the plans.
403(b) Plans
An arrangement that allows employers of charitable or educational organizations to make voluntary salary reduction contributions to a tax-deferred account.
401(k) Plans
Allows employees of corporations of all sizes to contribute a percentage of their wages on a tax-deferred basis. These accounts need to be established by the trustee of the plan.
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Automatic Investment Plans
By completing the Automatic Investment Plan section of the account application, you may make automatic monthly or quarterly investments ($1,000 minimum per purchase) in the Fund from your bank or savings account. Your initial investment minimum is $10,000 if you select this option. Shares of the Fund may also be purchased through direct deposit plans offered by certain employers and government agencies. These plans enable shareholders to have all or a portion of their payroll or Social Security checks transferred automatically to purchase shares of the Fund.
FOR INVESTING
Automatic Investment Plan
For making automatic investments from a designated bank account.
Payroll Direct Deposit Plan
For making automatic investments from your payroll check.
Dividend Reinvestment
All income dividends and capital gains distributions will be automatically reinvested in shares of the Fund unless you indicate otherwise on the account application or in writing.
Instructions For Selling Fund Shares
You may sell all or part of your shares on any day that the New York Stock Exchange is open for trading. Your shares will be sold at the next NAV per share calculated after your order is received in proper form by the transfer agent as described in the section TO*SELL SHARES in the below section. The proceeds of your sale may be more or less than the purchase price of your shares, depending on the market value of the Funds securities at the time of your sale. Your order will be processed promptly and you will generally receive the proceeds within seven days after the Fund receives your properly completed request. The Fund typically expects to pay redemptions from cash, cash equivalents, proceeds from the sale of fund shares, from the sale of portfolio securities, and then from borrowing from a bank line of credit. These redemption payment methods will be used in regular and stressed market conditions. The Fund will not mail any proceeds unless your investment check has cleared the bank, which may take up to fifteen calendar days. This procedure is intended to protect the Fund and its shareholders from loss. If the dollar or share amount requested is greater than the current value of your account, your entire account balanced will be redeemed. If you choose to redeem your account in full, any automatic services currently in effect for the account will be terminated unless you indicate otherwise in writing. You will be charge a $20 fee for wire redemptions.
TO SELL SHARES
By Mail
Write a letter of instruction that includes:
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Mail your request to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 46707
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707
By overnight courier, send to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
255 Pictoria Drive, Suite 450
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246
By Telephone
For specific information on how to redeem your account, and to determine if a signature guarantee or other documentation is required, please call toll-free in the U.S.1-888-925-8428.
Additional Redemption Information
Signature Guarantees
Signature guarantees are designed to protect both you and the Fund from fraud. A signature guarantee of each account owner is required to redeem shares in the following situations:
Signature guarantees can be obtained from most banks, savings and loan associations, trust companies, credit unions, broker/dealers, and member firms of a national securities exchange. Call your financial institution to see if they have the ability to guarantee a signature. A notary public cannot provide signature guarantees.
The Fund reserves the right to require a signature guarantee under other circumstances or to delay a redemption when permitted by Federal Law. For more information pertaining to signature guarantees, please call 1-888-925-8428.
Corporate, Trust and Other Accounts
Redemption requests from corporate, trusts, and other accounts may require documents in addition to those described above, evidencing the authority of the officers, trustees or others. In order to avoid delays in processing redemption requests for these accounts, you should call the Transfer Agent at 1-888-925-8428 to determine what additional documents are required.
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Address Changes
To change the address on your account, call the transfer agent at 1-888-925-8428 or send a written request signed by all account owners. Include the account number(s) and name(s) on the account and both the old and new addresses. Certain options may be suspended for a period of 15 days following an address change.
Transfer of Ownership
In order to change the account registration or transfer ownership of an account, additional documents will be required. In order to avoid delays in processing these requests, you should call the transfer agent at 1-888-925-8428 to determine what additional documents are required.
Redemption Initiated by the Fund
Because there are certain fixed costs involved with maintaining your account, the Fund may require you to redeem all of your shares if your account balance falls below $500. After your account balance falls below the minimum balance, you will receive a notification from the Fund indicating its intent to close your account along with instructions on how to increase the value of your account to the minimum amount within 60 days. If your account balance is still below $500 after 60 days, the Fund may close your account and send you the proceeds. This minimum balance requirement does not apply to accounts using automatic investment plans, to IRAs, and to other tax-sheltered investment accounts. The right of redemption by the Fund will not apply if the value of your account balance falls below $500 because of market performance. All shares of the Fund are also subject to involuntary redemption if the Board of Trustees determines to liquidate the Fund. Any involuntary redemption will create a capital gain or loss, which may have tax consequences about which you should consult your tax adviser.
Shareholder Communications
Account Statements
Every quarter, shareholders of the Fund will automatically receive regular account statements. You will also be sent a yearly statement detailing the tax characteristics of any dividends and distributions you have received.
Confirmations
Confirmation statements will be sent after each transaction that affects your account balance or account registration.
Regulatory Mailings
Financial reports will be sent at least semi-annually. Annual reports will include audited financial statements. To reduce expenses, one copy of each report will be mailed to each taxpayer identification number even though the investor may have more than one account in the Fund.
Dividends and Distributions
The Fund intends to pay distributions on an annual basis and expects that distributions will consist primarily of capital gains. You may elect to reinvest income dividends and capital gain distributions in the form of additional shares of the Fund or receive these distributions in cash. Dividends and distributions from the Fund are automatically reinvested in the Fund, unless you elect to have dividends paid in cash. Reinvested dividends and distributions receive the same tax treatment as those paid in cash. If you are interested in changing your election, you may call the transfer agent at 1-888-925-8428 or send a written notification to:
Walthausen Funds
c/o Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
P.O. Box 46707
Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707
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Share Classes
Institutional Class
Institutional Class shares of the Fund are sold at NAV and are not subject to 12b-1 distribution fees. Institutional Class shares require a minimum initial investment of $10,000.
Market Timing
The Fund discourages market timing. Market timing is an investment strategy using frequent purchases, redemptions, and/or exchanges in an attempt to profit from short-term market movements. Market timing may result in dilution of the value of Fund shares held by long term shareholders, disrupt portfolio management, and increase Fund expenses for all shareholders. The Board of Trustees also has adopted a policy directing the Fund to reject any purchase order with respect to one investor, a related group of investors or their agent(s), where it detects a pattern of purchases and sales of the Fund that indicates market timing or trading that it determines is abusive. This policy applies uniformly to all Fund shareholders. While the Fund attempts to deter market timing, there is no assurance that it will be able to identify and eliminate all market timers. For example, certain accounts called omnibus accounts include multiple shareholders. Omnibus accounts typically provide the Fund with a net purchase or redemption request on any given day where purchasers of Fund shares and redeemers of Fund shares are netted against one another and the identity of individual purchasers and redeemers whose orders are aggregated are not known by the Fund. The netting effect often makes it more difficult for the Fund to detect market timing, and there can be no assurance that the Fund will be able to do so. The Fund may invest in foreign securities, and small capitalization companies, and therefore may have additional risks associated with market timing. Because the Fund may invest in securities that are, among other things, priced on foreign exchanges, thinly traded, traded infrequently or relatively illiquid, the Fund has the risk that the current market price for the securities may not accurately reflect current market values. This can create opportunities for market timing by shareholders. For example, securities trading on overseas markets present time zone arbitrage opportunities when events affecting portfolio security values occur after the close of the overseas market, but prior to the close of the U.S. market. A shareholder may seek to engage in short-term trading to take advantage of these pricing differences, and therefore could dilute the value of Fund shares held by long term shareholders, disrupt portfolio management and increase Fund expenses for all shareholders.
Taxes
Fund dividends and distributions are taxable to most investors (unless your investment is in an IRA or other tax-advantaged account). Dividends paid by the Fund out of net ordinary income and distributions of net short-term capital gains are taxable to the shareholders as ordinary income.
Distributions by the Fund of net long-term capital gains to shareholders are generally taxable to the shareholders at the applicable long-term capital gains rate, regardless of how long the shareholder has held shares of the Fund.
Redemptions of shares of the Fund are taxable events which you may realize as a gain or loss. The amount of the gain or loss and the rate of tax will depend mainly upon the amount paid for the shares, the amount received from the sale, and how long the shares were held.
The Funds distributions may be subject to federal income tax whether received in cash or reinvested in additional shares. In addition to federal taxes, you may be subject to state and local taxes on distributions. For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012, an additional 3.8% Medicare tax may be imposed on distributions you receive from the Fund and on gains from selling, redeeming or exchanging your shares.
Because everyones tax situation is unique, always consult your tax professional about federal, state, and local tax consequences of an investment in the Fund.
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Other Fund Service Providers
Distributor
Foreside Fund Services, LLC
Custodian
U.S. Bank, N.A.
Fund Administrator
Premier Fund Solutions, Inc.
Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
Cohen &*Company, Ltd.
Investment Advisor
Walthausen & Co., LLC
Legal Counsel
Thompson Hine LLP
Transfer Agent
Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC
Prospectus 17
PRIVACY POLICY |
The following is a description of the Funds policies regarding disclosure of nonpublic personal information that you provide to the Fund or that the Fund collects from other sources. In the event that you hold shares of the Fund through a broker-dealer or other financial intermediary, the privacy policy of your financial intermediary would govern how your nonpublic personal information would be shared with unaffiliated third parties.
Categories of Information the Fund Collects. The Fund collects the following nonpublic personal information about you:
Information the Fund receives from you on or in applications or other forms, correspondence, or conversations (such as your name, address, phone number, social security number, assets, income and date of birth); and
Information about your transactions with the Fund, its affiliates, or others (such as your account number and balance, payment history, parties to transactions, cost basis information, and other financial information).
Categories of Information the Fund Discloses. The Fund does not disclose any non-public personal information about their current or former shareholders to unaffiliated third parties, except as required or permitted by law. The Fund is permitted by law to disclose all of the information it collects, as described above, to its service providers (such as the Funds custodian, administrator and transfer agent) to process your transactions and otherwise provide services to you.
Confidentiality and Security. The Fund restricts access to your nonpublic personal information to those persons who require such information to provide products or services to you. The Fund maintains physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards that comply with federal standards to guard your nonpublic personal information.
Prospectus 18
Financial Highlights
The financial highlights table is intended to help you understand the Funds financial performance for the past five years. Prior to October 15, 2020 the Fund was called the Walthausen Select Value Fund. Certain information reflects financial results for a single Fund share. The total returns in the table represent the rate you would have earned (or lost) on an investment in the Fund (assuming reinvestment of all dividends and distributions). The financial information has been audited by Cohen & Company, Ltd., the Funds independent registered public accounting firm, whose report, along with the Funds financial statements, is included in the Funds annual report, which is available upon request.
Financial Highlights - Institutional Class | |||||||||||||||
Selected data for a share outstanding | 2/1/2021 | 2/1/2020 | 2/1/2019 | 2/1/2018 | 2/1/2017 | ||||||||||
throughout the period: | to | to | to | to | to | ||||||||||
1/31/2022 | 1/31/2021 | 1/31/2020 | 1/31/2019 | 1/31/2018 | |||||||||||
Net Asset Value - | |||||||||||||||
Beginning of Period | $ | 11.77 | $ | 11.77 | $ | 10.97 | $ | 19.22 | $ | 16.26 | |||||
Net Investment Income (Loss) (a) | 0.10 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.10 | ||||||||||
Net Gain (Loss) on Investments (Realized | |||||||||||||||
and Unrealized) (b) | 2.58 | 0.20 | 1.36 | (2.17 | ) | 3.02 | |||||||||
Total from Investment Operations | 2.68 | 0.31 | 1.46 | (2.13 | ) | 3.12 | |||||||||
Distributions (From Net Investment Income) | (0.13 | ) | (0.06 | ) | (0.22 | ) | - | (0.11 | ) | ||||||
Distributions (From Capital Gains) | (2.45 | ) | (0.25 | ) | (0.44 | ) | (6.12 | ) | (0.05 | ) | |||||
Total Distributions | (2.58 | ) | (0.31 | ) | (0.66 | ) | (6.12 | ) | (0.16 | ) | |||||
Proceeds from Redemption Fee (d) | - | - | + | - | - | + | - | + | |||||||
Net Asset Value - | |||||||||||||||
End of Period | $ | 11.87 | $ | 11.77 | $ | 11.77 | $ | 10.97 | $ | 19.22 | |||||
Total Return (c) | 22.41 | % | 2.67 | % | 13.19 | % | (7.07 | )% | 19.23 | % | |||||
Ratios/Supplemental Data | |||||||||||||||
Net Assets - End of Period (Thousands) | $ | 8,935 | $ | 11,375 | $ | 8,534 | $ | 10,463 | $ | 68,955 | |||||
Before Reimbursement | |||||||||||||||
Ratio of Expenses to Average Net Assets | 1.05 | % | 1.25 | % | 1.35 | % | 1.35 | % | 1.35 | % | |||||
Ratio of Net Investment Income (Loss) to | |||||||||||||||
Average Net Assets | 0.53 | % | 0.80 | % | 0.62 | % | -0.03 | % | 0.33 | % | |||||
After Reimbursement | |||||||||||||||
Ratio of Expenses to Average Net Assets | 0.85 | % | 1.01 | % | 1.10 | % | 1.10 | % | 1.10 | % | |||||
Ratio of Net Investment Income (Loss) to | |||||||||||||||
Average Net Assets | 0.73 | % | 1.04 | % | 0.87 | % | 0.22 | % | 0.58 | % | |||||
Portfolio Turnover Rate | 59.71 | % | 72.53 | % | 49.95 | % | 39.38 | % | 63.12 | % |
+ Amount less than $0.005 per share.
(a) Per share amounts were calculated using the average shares method.
(b) Realized and unrealized gains and losses per share in this caption are balancing amounts necessary to
reconcile the change in net asset value for the period and may not reconcile with the aggregate gains and
losses in the Statement of Operations due to share transactions for the period.
(c) Total return represents the rate that the investor would have earned or lost on an investment in the Fund
assuming reinvestment of dividends.
(d) Prior to October 15, 2020, shares of the Fund were subject to a redemption fee of 2% if redeemed after
holding them for 90 days or less.
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Prospectus 21
Where To Go For Information
For shareholder inquiries please, call toll-free in the U.S. at 1-888-925-8428. You will also find more information about the Fund on our website at www.walthausenfunds.com or in the following documents:
Statement of Additional Information
The Statement of Additional Information is on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), contains additional and more detailed information about the Fund and is incorporated into this Prospectus by reference. The Fund publishes Shareholder Reports (annual and semiannual reports) that contain additional information about the Funds investments. In the Funds annual report, you will find a discussion of the market conditions and investment strategies that significantly affected the Funds performance during its last fiscal year.
You may obtain the SAI and Shareholder Reports without charge by contacting the Fund at 1-888-925-8428 or on our Internet site at: www.walthausenfunds.com. If you purchased shares through a Financial Intermediary, you may also obtain these documents, without charge, by contacting your Financial Intermediary.
Shareholder Reports and other information about the Fund is available on the EDGAR Database on the SEC's Internet site at http://www.sec.gov, and copies of this information may be obtained, after paying a duplicating fee, by electronic request at the following e-mail address: publicinfo@sec.gov.
Walthausen Funds SEC file number 811-22143
WALTHAUSEN FOCUSED SMALL CAP VALUE FUND
2691 Route 9, Suite
102 Malta, NY 12020
PART B
WALTHAUSEN FUNDS
WALTHAUSEN SMALL CAP VALUE FUND
Institutional Class (WFICX)
Investor Class (WSCVX)
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
June 1, 2022
This Statement of Additional Information ("SAI") is not a prospectus. It should be read in conjunction with the Prospectus of Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund dated June 1, 2022. The Funds Annual Report to Shareholders, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2022, has been incorporated by reference into this SAI. A free copy of the Prospectus can be obtained by writing the Transfer Agent at P.O. Box 46707, Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707 or by calling 1-888-925-8428.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST AND THE FUND | 1 |
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT FUND INVESTMENTS AND RISK CONSIDERATIONS | 1 |
INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS | 6 |
THE INVESTMENT ADVISOR | 7 |
THE PORTFOLIO MANAGERS | 9 |
TRUSTEES AND OFFICERS | 9 |
BOARD INTEREST IN THE FUND | 12 |
COMPENSATION | 13 |
CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES | 13 |
AUDIT COMMITTEE | 14 |
PORTFOLIO TRANSACTIONS AND BROKERAGE | 14 |
ADDITIONAL TAX INFORMATION | 15 |
PRICING OF FUND SHARES | 17 |
PURCHASES AND SALES THROUGH BROKER DEALERS | 17 |
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAM | 18 |
CUSTODIAN | 18 |
FUND SERVICES | 18 |
INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM | 18 |
DISTRIBUTOR | 19 |
DISCLOSURE OF PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS | 19 |
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS | 19 |
PROXY VOTING POLICIES | 20 |
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DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST AND THE FUND
Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund (the "Fund") was organized as a diversified series of Walthausen Funds (the "Trust"), on January 14, 2008 and commenced operations on February 1, 2008. The Trust is an open-end investment company established under the laws of Ohio by an Agreement and Declaration of Trust dated October 10, 2007 (the "Trust Agreement"). The Trust Agreement permits the Trustees to issue an unlimited number of shares of beneficial interest of separate series without par value. The Fund is currently one of two series authorized by the Trustees. The investment adviser to the Fund is Walthausen & Co., LLC (the "Advisor").
The Fund does not issue share certificates. All shares are held in non-certificate form registered on the books of the Fund and the Fund's transfer agent for the account of the shareholder. Each share of a series represents an equal proportionate interest in the assets and liabilities belonging to that series with each other share of that series and is entitled to such dividends and distributions out of income belonging to the series as are declared by the Trustees. The shares do not have cumulative voting rights or any preemptive or conversion rights, and the Trustees have the authority from time to time to divide or combine the shares of any series into a greater or lesser number of shares of that series so long as the proportionate beneficial interest in the assets belonging to that series and the rights of shares of any other series are in no way affected. In case of any liquidation of a series, the holders of shares of the series being liquidated will be entitled to receive as a class a distribution out of the assets, net of the liabilities, belonging to that series. Expenses attributable to any series are borne by that series. Any general expenses of the Trust not readily identifiable as belonging to a particular series are allocated by or under the direction of the Trustees in such manner as the Trustees determine to be fair and equitable. No shareholder is liable to further calls or to assessment by the Trust without his or her express consent.
For information concerning the purchase and redemption of shares of the Fund, see "How to Buy Shares and Sell Shares" in the Prospectus. For a description of the methods used to determine the share price and value of the Fund's assets, see "Pricing of Fund Shares" in the Prospectus and in this Statement of Additional Information.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT FUND INVESTMENTS AND RISK CONSIDERATIONS
This section contains a discussion of some of the investments the Fund may make and some of the techniques it may use.
A. Equity Securities. The Fund may invest in equity securities such as common stock, preferred stock, convertible securities, rights and warrants. Common stocks, the most familiar type, represent an equity (ownership) interest in a corporation. Warrants are options to purchase equity securities at a specified price for a specific time period. Rights are similar to warrants, but normally have a short duration and are distributed by the issuer to its shareholders. Although equity securities have a history of long term growth in value, their prices fluctuate based on changes in a company's financial condition and on overall market and economic conditions.
Equity securities also include exchange traded funds (ETFs). To the extent the Fund invests in a sector product, the Fund is subject to the risks associated with that sector. Additionally, the Fund may invest in new exchange traded shares as they become available. When the Fund invests in ETFs or other investment companies, it will indirectly bear its proportionate share of any fees and expenses payable directly by the investment company.
Many ETFs are organized as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the 1940 Act). Investments in the securities of other investment companies may involve duplication of advisory fees and certain other expenses. By investing in another investment company, a Fund becomes a shareholder of that investment company. As a result, the Fund's shareholders indirectly will bear the Fund's proportionate share of the fees and expenses paid by shareholders of the other investment company, in addition to the fees and expenses the Fund's shareholders directly bear in connection with the Fund's own operations.
Under Section 12(d)(1) of the 1940Act, the Fund may invest only up to 5% of its total assets in the securities of any one investment company (ETF or other mutual funds), but may not own more than 3% of the outstanding voting stock of any one investment company (the "3% Limitation") or invest more than 10% of its total assets in the securities of other investment companies. However, Section 12(d)(1)(F) of the 1940 Act provides that the provisions of paragraph 12(d)(1) shall not apply to securities purchased or otherwise acquired by a Fund if (i) immediately after such purchase or acquisition not more than 3% of the total outstanding stock of such registered investment company is owned by the Fund and all affiliated persons of the Fund; and (ii) the Fund has not offered or sold after January 1, 1971, and is not proposing to offer or sell any security issued by it
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through a principal underwriter or otherwise at a public or offering price which includes a sales load of more than 1 ½% percent. An investment company that issues shares to the Fund pursuant to paragraph 12(d)(1)(F) shall not be required to redeem its shares in an amount exceeding 1% of such investment companys total outstanding shares in any period of less than thirty days. The Fund (or the Advisor acting on behalf of the Fund) must comply with the following voting restrictions: when the Fund exercises voting rights, by proxy or otherwise, with respect to investment companies owned by the Fund, the Fund will either seek instruction from the Fund's shareholders with regard to the voting of all proxies and vote in accordance with such instructions, or vote the shares held by the Fund in the same proportion as the vote of all other holders of such security. Because other investment companies employ an investment adviser, such investments by the Fund may cause shareholders to bear duplicate fees.
In addition, the Fund is subject to the 3% Limitation unless (i) the ETF or the Fund has received an order for exemptive relief from the 3% limitation from the SEC that is applicable to the Fund; and (ii) the ETF and the Fund take appropriate steps to comply with any conditions in such order. In the alternative, the Fund may rely on Rule 12d1-3, which allows unaffiliated mutual funds to exceed the 5% Limitation and the 10% Limitation, provided the aggregate sales loads any investor pays (i.e., the combined distribution expenses of both the acquiring fund and the acquired funds) does not exceed the limits on sales loads established by the FINRA for a fund of funds.
The Fund may invest in tracking stocks. A tracking stock is a type of common stock that "tracks" or depends on the financial performance of a specific business unit or operating division of a company rather than the operations of the company as a whole. Tracking stocks trade as separate securities. As a result, if the unit or division does poorly, the value of the tracking stock may decrease even if the company as a whole performs well. The opposite may also be true. Shareholders of tracking stocks have a financial interest only in that unit or division of the company. Unlike the common stock of the company itself, a tracking stock usually has limited or no voting rights. In the event of a companys liquidation, tracking stock shareholders typically do not have a legal claim on the companys assets. If a tracking stock pays dividends, the amounts paid will solely depend on the performance of the business unit or division.
B. Foreign Securities. The Fund may invest in foreign equity securities including American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and ETFs that hold foreign securities. ADRs are certificates evidencing ownership of shares of a foreign-based issuer held in trust by a bank or similar financial institution. They are alternatives to the direct purchase of the underlying securities in their national markets and currencies. ADRs are subject to risks similar to those associated with direct investment in foreign securities.
Foreign investments can involve significant risks in addition to the risks inherent in U.S. investments. The value of securities denominated in or indexed to foreign currencies, and of dividends and interest from such securities, can change significantly when foreign currencies strengthen or weaken relative to the U.S. dollar. Foreign securities markets generally have less trading volume and less liquidity than U.S. markets, and prices on some foreign markets can be highly volatile. Many foreign countries lack uniform accounting and disclosure standards comparable to those applicable to U.S. companies, and it may be more difficult to obtain reliable information regarding an issuers financial condition and operations. In addition, the costs of foreign investing, including withholding taxes, brokerage commissions, and custodial costs, generally are higher than for U.S. investments.
Foreign markets may offer less protection to investors than U.S. markets. Foreign issuers, brokers, and securities markets may be subject to less government supervision. Foreign security trading practices, including those involving the release of assets in advance of payment, may invoke increased risks in the event of a failed trade or the insolvency of a broker-dealer, and may involve substantial delays. It also may be difficult to enforce legal rights in foreign countries.
Investing abroad also involves different political and economic risks. Foreign investments may be affected by actions of foreign governments adverse to the interests of U.S. investors, including the possibility of expropriation or nationalization of assets, confiscatory taxation, restrictions on U.S. investment or on the ability to repatriate assets or convert currency into U.S. dollars, or other government intervention. There may be a greater possibility of default by foreign governments or foreign government-sponsored enterprises. Investments in foreign countries also involve a risk of local political, economic or social instability, military action or unrest, or adverse diplomatic developments. There is no assurance that an advisor will be able to anticipate or counter these potential events and their impacts on the Funds share price.
The considerations noted above generally are intensified for investments in developing countries. Developing countries may have relatively unstable governments, economies based on only a few industries and securities markets that trade a small number of securities.
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C. Short Sales. The Fund may sell a security short in anticipation of a decline in the market value of the security. When the Fund engages in a short sale, it sells a security which it does not own. To complete the transaction, the Fund must borrow the security in order to deliver it to the buyer. The Fund must replace the borrowed security by purchasing it at the market price at the time of replacement, which may be more or less than the price at which the Fund sold the security. The Fund will incur a loss as a result of the short sale if the price of the security increases between the date of the short sale and the date on which the Fund replaces the borrowed security. The Fund will realize a profit if the security declines in price between those dates. Any potential gain is limited to the price at which the Fund sold the security short, and any potential loss is unlimited in size.
In connection with its short sales, the Fund will be required to maintain a segregated account with the Fund's custodian of cash or liquid assets equal to (i) the current market value of the securities sold short, less (ii) any collateral deposited with its broker (not including the proceeds from the short sales). Depending on arrangements made with the broker or custodian, the Fund may not receive any payments (including interest) on collateral deposited with the broker or custodian.
The Fund may also sell short against the box. Short sales against the box are short sales of securities that a fund owns or has the right to obtain (equivalent in kind or amount to the securities sold short). If the Fund enters into a short sale against the box, it will be required to set aside securities equivalent in kind and amount to the securities sold short (or securities convertible or exchangeable into such securities) and will be required to hold such securities while the short sale is outstanding. The Fund will incur transaction costs, including interest expenses, in connection with opening, maintaining, and closing short sales against the box.
D. Securities Lending. The Fund may make long and short term loans of its portfolio securities to parties such as broker-dealers, banks, or institutional investors. Securities lending allows a Fund to retain ownership of the securities loaned and, at the same time, to earn additional income. Since there may be delays in the recovery of loaned securities, or even a loss of rights in collateral supplied, should the borrower fail financially, loans will be made only to parties whose creditworthiness has been reviewed and deemed satisfactory by the Advisor. Furthermore, loans will only be made if, in the judgment of the Advisor, the consideration to be earned from such loans would justify the risk.
The Advisor understands that it is the current view of the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") that a Fund may engage in loan transactions only under the following conditions: (1) a Fund must receive 100% collateral in the form of cash, cash equivalents (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills or notes) or other high grade liquid debt instruments from the borrower; (2) the borrower must increase the collateral whenever the market value of the securities loaned (determined on a daily basis) rises above the value of the collateral; (3) after giving notice, the Fund must be able to terminate the loan at any time; (4) the Fund must receive reasonable interest on the loan or a flat fee from the borrower, as well as amounts equivalent to any dividends, interest, or other distributions on the securities loaned and to any increase in market value; (5) the Fund may pay only reasonable custodian fees in connection with the loan; and (6) the Board of Trustees must be able to vote proxies on the securities loaned, either by terminating the loan or by entering into an alternative arrangement with the borrower.
Cash received through loan transactions may be invested in any security in which the Fund is authorized to invest. Investing this cash subjects that investment, as well as the security loaned, to market forces (i.e., capital appreciation or depreciation).
E. Restricted and Illiquid Securities. The portfolio of the Fund may contain illiquid securities. Illiquid securities generally include securities which cannot be disposed of promptly and in the ordinary course of business without taking a reduced price. Securities may be illiquid due to contractual or legal restrictions on resale or lack of a ready market. The following securities are considered to be illiquid: repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase agreements maturing in more than seven days, nonpublicly offered securities and restricted securities. Restricted securities are securities where the resale of which is subject to legal or contractual restrictions. Restricted securities may be sold only in privately negotiated transactions, in a public offering with respect to which a registration statement is in effect under the Securities Act of 1933 or pursuant to Rule 144 or Rule 144A promulgated under such Act. Where registration is required, the Fund may be obligated to pay all or part of the registration expense, and a considerable period may elapse between the time of the decision to sell and the time such security may be sold under an effective registration statement. If during such a period adverse market conditions were to develop, a Fund might obtain a less favorable price than the price it could have obtained when it decided to sell. The Fund will not invest more than 15% of its net assets in illiquid securities.
With respect to Rule 144A securities, these restricted securities are treated as exempt from the 15% limit on illiquid securities, provided that a dealer or institutional trading market in such securities exists. The Fund will not, however, invest more than 10% of its net assets in Rule 144A securities. Under the supervision of the Board of Trustees, the Advisor determines the liquidity of
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restricted securities and, through reports from the Advisor, the Board of Trustees will monitor trading activity in restricted securities. If institutional trading in restricted securities were to decline, the liquidity of a Fund could be adversely affected.
F. U.S. Government Securities. U.S. government securities are high-quality debt securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury or by an agency or instrumentality of the U.S. government. Not all U.S. government securities are backed by the full faith and credit of, or guaranteed by the United States Treasury. For example, securities issued by the Farm Credit Banks or by the Federal National Mortgage Association are supported by the instrumentality's right to borrow money from the U.S. Treasury under certain circumstances. Moreover, securities issued by other agencies or instrumentalities are supported only by the credit of the entity that issued them.
G. Corporate Debt Securities. Corporate debt securities are long and short term debt obligations issued by companies (such as publicly issued and privately placed bonds, notes and commercial paper). The Advisor considers corporate debt securities to be of investment grade quality if they are rated BBB or higher by S&P or Baa or higher by Moody's, or if unrated, determined by the Advisor to be of comparable quality. Investment grade debt securities generally have adequate to strong protection of principal and interest payments. In the lower end of this category, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity to pay interest and repay principal than in higher rated categories.
H. Fixed Income Securities. The Fund may invest in all types of fixed income securities, including when-issued, delayed delivery, or forward commitment basis. Fixed income securities are subject to credit risk and interest rate risk. Credit risk is the risk that the Fund could lose money if an issuer of a fixed income security cannot meet its financial obligations or goes bankrupt. Interest rate risk is the risk that the Fund's investments in fixed income securities may fall when interest rates rise.
Investments in high-yield bonds (commonly known as junk bonds) are considered to be more speculative than higher quality fixed income securities. They are more susceptible to credit risk than investment-grade securities, especially during periods of economic uncertainty or economic downturns. The value of lower quality securities are subject to greater volatility and are generally more dependent on the ability of the issuer to meet interest and principal payments than higher quality securities. Issuers of high-yield securities may not be as strong financially as those issuing bonds with higher credit ratings.
I. Financial Services Industry Obligations. The Fund may invest in each of the following obligations of the financial services industry:
(1) Certificate of Deposit. Certificates of deposit are negotiable certificates evidencing the indebtedness of a commercial bank or a savings and loan association to repay funds deposited with it for a definite period of time (usually from fourteen days to one year) at a stated or variable interest rate.
(2) Time Deposits. Time deposits are non-negotiable deposits maintained in a banking institution or a savings and loan association for a specified period of time at a stated interest rate.
(3) Bankers' Acceptances. Bankers' acceptances are credit instruments evidencing the obligation of a bank to pay a draft which has been drawn on it by a customer, which instruments reflect the obligation both of the bank and of the drawer to pay the face amount of the instrument upon maturity.
J. Repurchase Agreements. The Fund may invest in repurchase agreements fully collateralized by obligations issued by the U.S. government or agencies of the U.S. government ("U.S. Government Obligations"). A repurchase agreement is a short term investment in which the purchaser (i.e., a Fund) acquires ownership of a U.S. Government Obligation (which may be of any maturity) and the seller agrees to repurchase the obligation at a future time at a set price, thereby determining the yield during the purchaser's holding period (usually not more than 7 days from the date of purchase). Any repurchase transaction in which a Fund engages will require full collateralization of the seller's obligation during the entire term of the repurchase agreement. In the event of a bankruptcy or other default of the seller, a Fund could experience both delays in liquidating the underlying security and losses in value. However, the Fund intends to enter into repurchase agreements only with the custodian, other banks with assets of $1 billion or more and registered securities dealers determined by the Advisor to be creditworthy. The Advisor monitors the creditworthiness of the banks and securities dealers with which a Fund engages in repurchase transactions.
K. Borrowing. The Fund is permitted to borrow money up to one-third of the value of its total assets. Borrowing is a speculative technique that increases both investment opportunity and a Fund's ability to achieve greater diversification. However, it also increases investment risk. Because the Fund's investments will fluctuate in value, whereas the interest obligations on
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borrowed funds may be fixed, during times of borrowing, the Fund's net asset value may tend to increase more when its investments increase in value, and decrease more when its investments decrease in value. In addition, interest costs on borrowings may fluctuate with changing market interest rates and may partially offset or exceed the return earned on the borrowed funds. Also, during times of borrowing under adverse market conditions, the Fund might have to sell portfolio securities to meet interest or principal payments at a time when fundamental investment considerations would not favor such sales.
L. Options Transactions. The Fund may engage in option transactions involving individual securities and stock indexes. An option involves either: (a) the right or the obligation to buy or sell a specific instrument at a specific price until the expiration date of the option; or (b) the right to receive payments or the obligation to make payments representing the difference between the closing price of a stock index and the exercise price of the option expressed in dollars times a specified multiple until the expiration date of the option. Options are sold (written) on securities and stock indexes. The purchaser of an option on a security pays the seller (the writer) a premium for the right granted but is not obligated to buy or sell the underlying security. The purchaser of an option on a stock index pays the seller a premium for the right granted, and in return the seller of such an option is obligated to make the payment. A writer of an option may terminate the obligation prior to expiration of the option by making an offsetting purchase of an identical option. Options are traded on organized exchanges and in the over-the-counter market. To cover the potential obligations involved in writing options, a Fund will either: (a) own the underlying security, or in the case of an option on a market index, will hold a portfolio of stocks substantially replicating the movement of the index; or (b) the Fund will segregate with the custodian liquid assets sufficient to purchase the underlying security or equal to the market value of the stock index option, marked to market daily.
The purchase and writing of options requires additional skills and techniques beyond normal portfolio management, and involves certain risks. The purchase of options limits a Fund's potential loss to the amount of the premium paid and can afford the Fund the opportunity to profit from favorable movements in the price of an underlying security to a greater extent than if transactions were effected in the security directly. However, the purchase of an option could result in the Fund losing a greater percentage of its investment than if the transaction were effected directly. When the Fund writes a call option, it will receive a premium, but it will give up the opportunity to profit from a price increase in the underlying security above the exercise price as long as its obligation as a writer continues, and it will retain the risk of loss should the price of the security decline. When the Fund writes a put option, it will assume the risk that the price of the underlying security or instrument will fall below the exercise price, in which case the Fund may be required to purchase the security or instrument at a higher price than the market price of the security or instrument. In addition, there can be no assurance that the Fund can effect a closing transaction on a particular option it has written. Further, the total premium paid for any option may be lost if the Fund does not exercise the option or, in the case of over-the-counter options, the writer does not perform its obligations.
M. Publicly Traded Partnerships/Master Limited Partnerships. The Fund may invest in publicly traded partnerships, including Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs). These are limited partnerships the interests in which (known as "units") are traded on public exchanges, just like corporate stock. Such limited partnerships provide an investor with a direct interest in a group of assets (generally, oil and gas properties). Publicly traded partnership units typically trade publicly, like stock, and thus may provide the investor more liquidity than ordinary limited partnerships. Publicly traded partnerships are also called master limited partnerships and public limited partnerships. A limited partnership has one or more general partners (they may be individuals, corporations, partnerships or another entity) which manage the partnership, and limited partners, which provide capital to the partnership but have no role in its management. When an investor buys units in a publicly traded partnership, he or she becomes a limited partner. Publicly traded partnerships are formed in several ways. A non-traded partnership may decide to go public. Several non-traded partnerships may "roll up" into a single publicly traded partnership. A corporation may spin off a group of assets or part of its business into a partnership of which it is the general partner, either to realize what it believes to be the assets' full value or as an alternative to issuing debt. A corporation may fully convert to a partnership, although since 1986 the tax consequences have made this an unappealing; or, a newly formed company may operate as a publicly traded partnership from its inception.
There are different types of risks to investing in publicly traded partnerships including regulatory risks and interest rate risks. Currently most partnerships enjoy pass through taxation of their income to partners, which avoids double taxation of earnings. If the government were to change publicly traded partnerships business tax structure, unitholders would not be able to enjoy the relatively high yields in the sector for long. In addition, publicly traded partnerships which charge government-regulated fees for transportation of oil and gas products through their pipelines are subject to unfavorable changes in government-approved rates and fees, which would affect a publicly traded partnerships revenue stream negatively. Publicly traded partnerships also
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carry some interest rate risks. During increases in interest rates, publicly traded partnerships may not produce meaningful returns to shareholders.
N. Real Estate Investment Trusts. The Fund may invest in the securities of real estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs offer investors greater liquidity and diversification than direct ownership of properties. A REIT is a corporation or business trust that invests substantially all of its assets in interests in real estate. Equity REITs are those which purchase or lease land and buildings and generate income primarily from rental income. Equity REITs may also realize capital gains (or losses) when selling property that has appreciated (or depreciated) in value. Mortgage REITs are those that invest in real estate mortgages and generate income primarily from interest payments on mortgage loans. Hybrid REITs generally invest in both real property and mortgages. Unlike corporations, REITs do not pay income taxes if they meet certain IRS requirements. Real estate related equity securities also include those insured by real estate developers, companies with substantial real estate holdings (for investment or as part of their operations), as well as companies whose products and services are directly related to the real estate industry, such as building supply manufacturers, mortgage lenders or mortgage servicing companies. Like any investment in real estate, though, a REITs performance depends on several factors, such as its ability to find tenants, renew leases and finance property purchases and renovations. Other risks associated with REIT investments include the fact that equity and mortgage REITs are dependent upon specialized management skills and are not fully diversified. These characteristics subject REITs to the risks associated with financing a limited number of projects. They are also subject to heavy cash flow dependency, defaults by borrowers, and self-liquidation. Additionally, equity REITs may be affected by any changes in the value of the underlying property owned by the trusts, and mortgage REITs may be affected by the quality of any credit extended. By investing in REITs indirectly through the Fund, a shareholder bears not only a proportionate share of the expenses of the Fund, but also may indirectly bear similar expenses of some of the REITs in which it invests.
INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS
Fundamental. The investment limitations described below have been adopted by the Trust with respect to the Fund and are fundamental ("Fundamental"), i.e., they may not be changed without the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding shares of the Fund. As used in the Prospectus and the Statement of Additional Information, the term "majority" of the outstanding shares of the Fund means the lesser of: (1) 67% or more of the outstanding shares of the Fund present at a meeting, if the holders of more than 50% of the outstanding shares of the Fund are present or represented at such meeting; or (2) more than 50% of the outstanding shares of the Fund. Other investment practices which may be changed by the Board of Trustees without the approval of shareholders to the extent permitted by applicable law, regulation or regulatory policy are considered non-fundamental ("Non-Fundamental").
1. Borrowing Money. The Fund will not borrow money, except: (a) from a bank, provided that immediately after such borrowing there is an asset coverage of 300% for all borrowings of the Fund; or (b) from a bank or other persons for temporary purposes only, provided that such temporary borrowings are in an amount not exceeding 5% of the Fund's total assets at the time when the borrowing is made. This limitation does not preclude the Fund from entering into reverse repurchase transactions, provided that the Fund has an asset coverage of 300% for all borrowings and repurchase commitments of the Fund pursuant to reverse repurchase transactions.
2. Senior Securities. The Fund will not issue senior securities. This limitation is not applicable to activities that may be deemed to involve the issuance or sale of a senior security by the Fund, provided that the Fund's engagement in such activities is consistent with or permitted by the 1940 Act, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder or interpretations of the SEC or its staff.
3. Underwriting. The Fund will not act as underwriter of securities issued by other persons. This limitation is not applicable to the extent that, in connection with the disposition of portfolio securities (including restricted securities), a Fund may be deemed an underwriter under certain federal securities laws.
4. Real Estate. The Fund will not purchase or sell real estate. This limitation is not applicable to investments in marketable securities which are secured by or represent interests in real estate. This limitation does not preclude the Fund from investing in mortgage-related securities or investing in companies engaged in the real estate business or that have a significant portion of their assets in real estate (including real estate investment trusts).
5. Commodities. The Fund will not purchase or sell commodities unless acquired as a result of ownership of securities or other investments. This limitation does not preclude the Fund from purchasing or selling options or futures contracts, from
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investing in securities or other instruments backed by commodities or from investing in companies which are engaged in a commodities business or have a significant portion of their assets in commodities.
6. Loans. The Fund will not make loans to other persons, except: (a) by loaning portfolio securities; (b) by engaging in repurchase agreements; or (c) by purchasing nonpublicly offered debt securities. For purposes of this limitation, the term "loans" shall not include the purchase of a portion of an issue of publicly distributed bonds, debentures or other securities.
7. Concentration. The Fund will not invest 25% or more of its total assets in a particular industry. This limitation is not applicable to investments in obligations issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies and instrumentalities or repurchase agreements with respect thereto.
With respect to the percentages adopted by the Trust as maximum limitations on its investment policies and limitations, an excess above the fixed percentage will not be a violation of the policy or limitation unless the excess results immediately and directly from the acquisition of any security or the action taken. This paragraph does not apply to the borrowing policy set forth in paragraph 1 above.
Notwithstanding any of the foregoing limitations, any investment company, whether organized as a trust, association or corporation, or a personal holding company, may be merged or consolidated with or acquired by the Trust, provided that if such merger, consolidation or acquisition results in an investment in the securities of any issuer prohibited by said paragraphs, the Trust shall, within ninety days after the consummation of such merger, consolidation or acquisition, dispose of all of the securities of such issuer so acquired or such portion thereof as shall bring the total investment therein within the limitations imposed by said paragraphs above as of the date of consummation.
Non-Fundamental. The following limitations have been adopted by the Trust with respect to the Fund and are Non-Fundamental (see "Investment Limitations - Fundamental" above).
1. Pledging. The Fund will not mortgage, pledge, hypothecate or in any manner transfer, as security for indebtedness, any assets of the Fund except as may be necessary in connection with borrowings described in limitation (1) above. Margin deposits, security interests, liens and collateral arrangements with respect to transactions involving options, futures contracts, short sales and other permitted investments and techniques are not deemed to be a mortgage, pledge or hypothecation of assets for purposes of this limitation.
2. Borrowing. The Fund will not purchase any security while borrowings (including reverse repurchase agreements) representing more than one third of its total assets are outstanding.
3. Margin Purchases. The Fund will not purchase securities or evidences of interest thereon on "margin." This limitation is not applicable to short term credit obtained by a Fund for the clearance of purchases and sales or redemption of securities, or to arrangements with respect to transactions involving options, futures contracts, short sales and other permitted investments and techniques.
4. Options. The Funds will not purchase or sell puts, calls, options or straddles, except as described in the Statement of Additional Information.
5. Illiquid Investments. The Fund will not invest more than 15% of its net assets in securities for which there are legal or contractual restrictions on resale and other illiquid securities.
6. 80% Investment Policy. Under normal circumstances, at least 80% of the Funds assets (defined as net assets plus the amount of any borrowing for investment purposes) will be invested in small capitalization companies. The Fund will not change this policy unless the Funds shareholders are provided with at least 60 days prior written notice.
THE INVESTMENT ADVISOR
The Advisor is Walthausen & Co., LLC, located at 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020. Certain owners of the Advisor also serve as officers of the Trust.
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Under the terms of the Management Agreement, the Advisor manages the investment portfolio of the Fund, subject to policies adopted by the Trusts Board of Trustees. Under the Management Agreement, the Advisor, at its own expense and without reimbursement from the Trust, furnishes office space and all necessary office facilities, equipment and executive personnel necessary for managing the assets of the Fund. For its services, the Advisor receives an annual investment management fee of 1.00% of the average daily net assets of the Fund. For the fiscal years ended January 31, 2020, 2021, and 2022, the Advisor earned management fees equal to $3,825,006, $1,927,500 and $1,545,977, respectively.
The Advisor retains the right to use the name "Walthausen Small Cap Value" or any derivative thereof in connection with another investment company or business enterprise with which the Advisor is or may become associated. The Trust's right to use the name "Walthausen Small Cap Value" or any derivative thereof automatically ceases ninety days after termination of the Management Agreement and may be withdrawn by the Advisor on ninety days written notice.
The Advisor may make payments to banks or other financial institutions that provide shareholder services and administer shareholder accounts. If a bank or other financial institution were prohibited from continuing to perform all or a part of such services, management of the Fund believes that there would be no material impact on the Fund or their shareholders. Financial institutions may charge their customers fees for offering these services to the extent permitted by applicable regulatory authorities, and the overall return to those shareholders availing themselves of the financial institutions services will be lower than to those shareholders who do not. The Fund may from time to time purchase securities issued by financial institutions that provide such services; however, in selecting investments for the Fund, no preference will be shown for such securities.
Under a Services Agreement, the Advisor assumes and pays all ordinary expenses of the Fund, except that the Fund pays all management fees, brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), underlying fund fees and expenses, and extraordinary or non-recurring expenses. Under the Services Agreement, the Advisor receives an annual Services Agreement fee of 0.45% of the average daily net assets of the Fund up to $100 million, 0.25% of the Funds average daily net assets between $100 million and $500 million, and 0.15% of such assets in excess of $500 million. The Advisor has contractually agreed to waive Services Agreement fees and Management fees to the extent necessary to maintain total annual operating expenses of the Institutional Class Shares and Investor Class Shares, excluding brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), the cost of acquired funds and extraordinary expenses at 0.98% and 1.21% respectively, of its average daily net assets through May 31, 2023. The Fund may also pay expenses which it is authorized to pay pursuant to Rule 12b-1 under the Act (none are authorized at present). For the fiscal years ended January 31, 2020, 2021, and 2022, the Advisor earned services agreement fees equal to $1,156,203, $681,922 and $585,921, respectively. For the fiscal years ending January 31, 2020, 2021 and 2022, the Advisor waived Services Agreement fees and Management fees for the Investor Class Shares totaling $266,242, $128,150 and $135,919, respectively. For the fiscal year ending January 31, 2020, 2021 and 2022 the Advisor waived Services Agreement fees and Management fees for the Institutional Class Shares totaling $292,613, $385,194 and $303,619, respectively.
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THE PORTFOLIO MANAGER
Mr. Gerard S.E. Heffernan (the Portfolio Manager) is the portfolio manager responsible for the day-to-day management of the Fund. The following provides information regarding other accounts managed by the Portfolio Manager as of January 31, 2022:
Gerard S.E. Heffernan
Account Type | Number of Accounts by Account Type | Total Assets By Account Type | Number of Accounts by Type Subject to a Performance Fee | Total Assets By Account Type Subject to a Performance Fee |
Registered Investment Companies | 2 | $131 million | 0 | $0 |
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles | 2 | $83 million | 0 | $0 |
Other Accounts | 8 | $182 million | 0 | $0 |
As of January 31, 2022, the Portfolio Manager managed the accounts listed above. The Portfolio Manager has not identified any material conflicts between the Fund and other accounts managed by the Portfolio Manager. However, actual or apparent conflicts of interest may arise in connection with the day-to-day management of the Fund and other accounts. The management of the Fund and other accounts may result in unequal time and attention being devoted to the Fund and other accounts. Another potential conflict of interest may arise where another account has the same investment objective as the Fund, whereby the Portfolio Manager could favor one account over another.
Further, a potential conflict could include the Portfolio Managers knowledge about the size, timing and possible market impact of Fund trades, whereby the Portfolio Managers could use this information to the advantage of other accounts and to the disadvantage of the Fund. These potential conflicts of interest could create the appearance that the Portfolio Manager is favoring one investment vehicle over another.
Gerard S.E. Heffernan is compensated in the form of salary, bonus and profit sharing related to the firm as a whole. It is not based specifically on work done on behalf of or performance of the Fund, or any other account.
The following table shows the dollar range of equity securities beneficially owned by the Portfolio Managers in the Fund as of January 31, 2022.
Portfolio Manager | Dollar Range of Equity Securities in the Fund |
Gerard S.E. Heffernan | $100,001-$1,000,000 |
TRUSTEES AND OFFICERS
The Board of Trustees supervises the business activities of the Trust. Each Trustee serves as a trustee until the termination of the Trust unless the Trustee dies, resigns, retires or is removed.
The Board has engaged the Advisor to manage and/or administer the Trust and is responsible for overseeing the Advisor and other service providers to the Trust and the Fund. The Board is currently composed of four Trustees, including three Trustees who are not "interested persons" of the Fund, as that term is defined in the 1940 Act (each an Independent Trustee). In addition to four regularly scheduled meetings per year, the Board holds special meetings or informal conference calls to discuss specific matters that may require action prior to the next regular meeting. The Board of Trustees has established an Audit Committee comprised entirely of Trustees who are Independent Trustees. The Audit Committee is generally responsible for (i) overseeing and monitoring the Trust's internal accounting and control structure, its auditing function and its financial reporting process, (ii) selecting and recommending to the full Board of Trustees the appointment of auditors for the Trust, (iii) reviewing audit plans, fees, and other material arrangements with respect to the engagement of auditors, including permissible non-audit services performed; (iv) reviewing the qualifications of the auditor's key personnel involved in the foregoing activities and (v) monitoring the auditor's independence.
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The Chairman of the Board of Trustees is Mr. Hany A. Shawky, who is an independent person of the Trust, within the meaning of the 1940 Act. The use of an independent Chairman balanced by an independent Audit Committee allows the Board to access the expertise necessary to oversee the Trust, identify risks, recognize shareholder concerns and needs and highlight opportunities. The Audit Committee is able to focus Board time and attention to matters of interest to shareholders and, through its private sessions with the Trusts auditor, Chief Compliance Officer and legal counsel, stay fully informed regarding management decisions. Considering the size of the Trust and its shareholder base, the Trustees have determined that an independent Chairman balanced by an independent Audit Committee is the appropriate leadership structure for the Board of Trustees.
Mutual funds face a number of risks, including investment risk, compliance risk and valuation risk. The Board oversees management of the Funds risks directly and through its officers. While day-to-day risk management responsibilities rest with the Funds Chief Compliance Officer, investment adviser and other service providers, the Board monitors and tracks risk by: (1) receiving and reviewing quarterly reports related to the performance and operations of the Funds; (2) reviewing and approving, as applicable, the compliance policies and procedures of the Trust, including the Trusts valuation policies and transaction procedures; (3) periodically meeting with the portfolio manager to review investment strategies, techniques and related risks; (4) meeting with representatives of key service providers, including the Funds investment adviser, administrator, transfer agent and the independent registered public accounting firm, to discuss the activities of the Fund; (5) engaging the services of the Chief Compliance Officer of the Fund to test the compliance procedures of the Trust and its service providers; (6) receiving and reviewing reports from the Trusts independent registered public accounting firm regarding the Funds financial condition and the Trusts internal controls; and (7) receiving and reviewing an annual written report prepared by the Chief Compliance Officer reviewing the adequacy of the Trusts compliance policies and procedures and the effectiveness of their implementation. The Board has concluded that its general oversight of the investment adviser and other service providers as implemented through the reporting and monitoring process outlined above allows the Board to effectively administer its risk oversight function.
Each Trustee was nominated to serve on the Board of Trustees based on their particular experiences, qualifications, attributes and skills. The characteristics that have led the Board to conclude that each of the Trustees should continue to serve as a Trustee of the Trust are discussed below.
Edward A. LaVarnway. Mr. LaVarnway has served on the Board of Trustees since the Trusts inception in 2008. He brings 30 years experience in the banking and investment industries in various capacities, including conducting and supervising the creation of investment research, oversight of securities trading, equity research sales and municipal credit analysis. In addition, from 1989 to 2005 he served as a securities industry arbitrator for the NASD.
John P. Mastriani. Mr. Mastriani has served as a Trustee since July 2014. Mr. Mastriani has extensive management experience in the financial services business working in a variety of roles within several specialty firms. Mr. Mastriani has served as (i) Executive Vice President of The Ayco Company, L.P. (Ayco) a Goldman Sachs Company that provides financial consulting and education services (May 2012 March 2014), (ii) Senior Vice President of Ayco (December 2003 May 2012), (iii) Vice President of Ayco (May 1999 December 2003), (iv) Executive Vice President of CL King and Associates (October 1994 May 1999) (v) President of the Trust and Investment Management Group and a variety of other positions of KeyCorp and its affiliates (July 1974 October 1994). He brings to the Board a strong knowledge of the finance industry, and substantial leadership skills.
Hany
A. Shawky. Mr. Shawky joined the Board of Trustees in 2009. Mr. Shawky was the founding Director of the Center for Institutional
Investment Management at the School of Business, University at Albany, NY in 2002 and continued in that role until 2007. He began his
academic career at University at Albany in 1978, and is currently a full Professor of Finance and Economics. He brings to the Board a
strong knowledge of the finance industry, including the investment management and mutual fund industries.
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The following table provides information regarding each Trustee who is an interested person of the Trust, as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, and each officer of the Trust.
Interested Trustees and Officers
Name, Address(1), and Year of Birth |
Position with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years |
Number of Portfolios Overseen By Trustee |
Other Directorships Held By Trustee During the Past 5 Years |
Gerard
S. E. Heffernan Year of Birth: 1963 |
President | Indefinite
Term, Since 2021 |
Portfolio Manager (2018 to Present) and Managing Director (2020 to Present), Walthausen & Co., LLC. Investment Consultant, Linde Hansen & Co. (2013 to 2018). | N/A | None |
Mark
L. Hodge Year of Birth: 1958 |
Secretary and Chief Compliance Officer | Indefinite
Term, Since 2008 |
Chief Compliance Officer (2007 to Present) and Managing Director (2013 to Present), Walthausen & Co., LLC. | N/A | N/A |
Stanley M. Westhoff Jr. Year of Birth: 1969 | Treasurer | Indefinite Term, Since 2011 | Equity Analyst (2007 to Present) and Managing Director (2013 to Present), Walthausen & Co., LLC. | N/A | N/A |
(1) | The address of each Trustee and Officer is c/o Walthausen Funds, 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020. |
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The following table provides information regarding the Trustees who are not interested persons of the Trust, as defined in the 1940 Act.
Independent Trustees
Name, Address(1), and Year of Birth |
Position with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years |
Number of Portfolios Overseen By Trustee |
Other Directorships Held By Trustee During the Past 5 Years |
Edward
A. LaVarnway Year of Birth: 1951 |
Trustee | Indefinite
Term, Since 2008 |
Retired as of 5/10/13. Executive Director, Fredric Remington Art Museum, 8/15/05 to 5/10/13. | 2 | None |
John P. Mastriani Year of Birth: 1952
|
Trustee | Indefinite Term, Since July 2014 |
Retired as of 3/1/14 serving as Executive Vice President of The Ayco Company, L.P. (Ayco), a Goldman Sachs Company affiliate. Board Member and Chair of the Investment Committee of the Goldman Sachs Philanthropic Fund (11/2020 to Present) & The Ayco Charitable Foundation (4/2014 to Present).
|
2 | None |
Hany A. Shawky Year of Birth: 1947 | Trustee | Indefinite
Term, Since 2009 |
Professor of Finance at the University at Albany, N.Y. Oct. 2007 to present. | 2 | None |
(1) | The address of each Trustee is c/o Walthausen Funds, 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020. |
BOARD INTEREST IN THE FUND
As of December 31, 2021 the Trustees owned the following amounts in the Fund:
Name of Trustee or Officer |
Dollar Range of Securities In Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund |
Aggregate Dollar Range of Securities in the Trust* |
Edward A. LaVarnway John P. Mastriani Hany A. Shawky |
Over
$100,000 None None |
Over
$100,000 None None |
*Includes the Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund and the Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund.
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COMPENSATION
Officers and Trustees of the Fund who are deemed "interested persons" of the Trust receive no compensation from the Fund. Trustee fees are paid by the Advisor. The following table shows Trustee compensation for the Fund's fiscal year ended January 31, 2022.
Name
|
Aggregate Compensation from Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund | Total Compensation from Trust |
Edward A. LaVarnway | $5,000 | $10,000 |
John P. Mastriani | $5,000 | $10,000 |
Hany A. Shawky | $5,000 | $10,000 |
CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES
A principal shareholder is any person who owns (either of record or beneficially) 5% or more of the outstanding shares of the Fund. A control person is one who owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the voting securities of a company or acknowledges the existence of such control. A controlling shareholder could control the outcome of any proposal submitted to the shareholders for approval, including changes to the Funds fundamental policies or the terms of the management agreement with the Advisor. As of May 3, 2022, each of the following shareholders was considered to be either a control person or principal shareholder of the Fund:
WALTHAUSEN SMALL CAP VALUE FUND INVESTOR CLASS
Name and Address | Shares | Percent Ownership | Type of Ownership |
National Financial Services FBO Customers 200 Liberty Street New York, NY 10281-1033 |
1,738,083.474 | 55.04% | Record |
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. FBO Customers 101 Montgomery St. San Francisco, CA 94104-4122 |
901,030.432 | 28.53% | Record |
Ameritrade Inc. FBO Customers PO Box 2226 Omaha, NE 68103-2226 |
241,082.732 | 7.63% | Record |
As of May 3, 2022, the Trustees and Officers as a group owned 1.1% of the outstanding shares of the Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund Investor Class.
WALTHAUSEN SMALL CAP VALUE FUND INSTITUTIONAL CLASS
Name and Address | Shares | Percent Ownership | Type of Ownership |
National Financial Services FBO Customers 200 Liberty Street New York, NY 10281-1033 |
1,166,822.000 | 63.75% | Record |
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. FBO Customers 101 Montgomery St. San Francisco, CA 94104-4122 |
603,030.62 | 32.95% | Record |
As of May 3, 2022, the Trustees and Officers did not own any shares of the Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund Institutional Class.
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AUDIT COMMITTEE
The Audit Committee is responsible for advising the full Board with respect to accounting, auditing and financial matters affecting the Trust and meets at least once annually. The Audit Committee is comprised of the Independent Trustees as follows: Edward A. LaVarnway, John P. Mastriani and Hany A. Shawky. During the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022, the Audit Committee met three times.
PORTFOLIO TRANSACTIONS AND BROKERAGE
Subject to policies established by the Board of Trustees, the Advisor is responsible for the Fund's portfolio decisions and the placing of the Fund's portfolio transactions. In placing portfolio transactions, the Advisor seeks the best qualitative execution for the Fund, taking into account such factors as price (including the applicable brokerage commission or dealer spread), the execution capability, financial responsibility and responsiveness of the broker or dealer and the brokerage and research services provided by the broker or dealer. The Advisor generally seeks favorable prices and commission rates that are reasonable in relation to the benefits received. The Advisor may not give consideration to sales of shares of the Trust as a factor in the selection of brokers and dealers to execute portfolio transactions. However, the Advisor may place portfolio transactions with brokers or dealers that promote or sell the Funds shares so long as such placements are made pursuant to policies approved by the Funds Board of Trustees that are designed to ensure that the selection is based on the quality of the brokers execution and not on its sales efforts. For the fiscal years ended January 31, 2020, 2021, and 2022, the Fund paid brokerage commissions of $628,103, $480,021 and $317,037, respectively.
The portfolio turnover rate for the Fund is calculated by dividing the lesser of amounts of purchases or sales of portfolio securities for the reporting period by the monthly average value of the portfolio securities owned during the reporting period. The calculation excludes all securities, whose maturities or expiration dates at the time of acquisition are one year or less. Portfolio turnover may vary greatly from year to year as well as within a particular year and may be affected by cash requirements for redemption of shares and by requirements which enables the Fund to receive favorable tax treatment. Portfolio turnover will not be a limiting factor in making portfolio decisions, and the Fund may engage in short-term trading to achieve its investment objective. The portfolio turnover rate for the Fund for the two fiscal years ended January 31, 2021 and 2022 were 65.91% and 71.40%.
The Advisor is specifically authorized to select brokers or dealers who also provide brokerage and research services to the Fund and/or the other accounts over which the Advisor exercises investment discretion and to pay such brokers or dealers a commission in excess of the commission another broker or dealer would charge if the Advisor determines in good faith that the commission is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided. The determination may be viewed in terms of a particular transaction or the Advisor's overall responsibilities with respect to the Trust and to other accounts over which it exercises investment discretion.
Research services include supplemental research, securities and economic analyses, statistical services and information with respect to the availability of securities or purchasers or sellers of securities and analyses of reports concerning performance of accounts. The research services and other information furnished by brokers through whom the Fund effect securities transactions may also be used by the Advisor in servicing all of its accounts. Similarly, research and information provided by brokers or dealers serving other clients may be useful to the Advisor in connection with its services to the Fund. Although research services and other information are useful to the Fund and the Advisor, it is not possible to place a dollar value on the research and other information received. It is the opinion of the Board of Trustees and the Advisor that the review and study of the research and other information will not reduce the overall cost to the Advisor of performing its duties to the Fund under the Management Agreement. Due to research services provided by brokers, the Fund may direct trades to certain brokers.
Over-the-counter transactions will be placed either directly with principal market makers or with broker-dealers, if the same or a better price, including commissions and executions, is available. Fixed income securities are normally purchased directly from the issuer, an underwriter or a market maker. Purchases include a concession paid by the issuer to the underwriter and the purchase price paid to a market maker may include the spread between the bid and asked prices.
When the Fund and another of the Advisor's clients seek to purchase or sell the same security at or about the same time, the Advisor may execute the transaction on a combined ("blocked") basis. Blocked transactions can produce better execution for the Fund because of the increased volume of the transaction. If the entire blocked order is not filled, the Fund may not be able to acquire as large a position in such security as it desires or it may have to pay a higher price for the security. Similarly, the
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Fund may not be able to obtain as large an execution of an order to sell or as high a price for any particular portfolio security if the other client desires to sell the same portfolio security at the same time. In the event that the entire blocked order is not filled, the purchase or sale will normally be allocated on a pro rata basis. The allocation may be adjusted by the Advisor, taking into account such factors as the size of the individual orders and transaction costs, when the Advisor believes an adjustment is reasonable.
The Trust and the Advisor have each adopted a Code of Ethics under Rule 17j-1 of the 1940 Act. The personnel subject to the Code of Ethics are permitted to invest in securities, including securities that may be purchased or held by the Fund. You may obtain a copy of the Code of Ethics from the SEC.
ADDITIONAL TAX INFORMATION
The following discussion of certain U.S. federal income tax consequences is general in nature and should not be regarded as an exhaustive presentation of all possible tax ramifications. Each shareholder should consult a qualified tax advisor regarding the tax consequences of an investment in the Fund. The tax considerations relevant to a specific shareholder depend upon the shareholders specific circumstances, and the following general summary does not attempt to discuss all potential tax considerations that could be relevant to a prospective shareholder with respect to the Fund or its investments. This general summary is based on the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code), the U.S. federal income tax regulations promulgated thereunder, and administrative and judicial interpretations thereof as of the date hereof, all of which are subject to change (potentially on a retroactive basis).
The Fund intends to qualify each year as a regulated investment company under Subchapter M of the Code, which requires compliance with certain requirements concerning the sources of its income, diversification of its assets, and the amount and timing of its distributions to shareholders. Such qualification does not involve supervision of management or investment practices or policies by any government agency or bureau. By so qualifying, the Fund should not be subject to federal income or excise tax on its net investment income or net realized capital gain, which are distributed to shareholders in accordance with the applicable timing requirements.
The Fund intends to distribute substantially all of its net investment income (including any excess of net short-term capital gains over net long-term capital losses) and net realized capital gain (that is, any excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term capital losses) in accordance with the timing requirements imposed by the Code and therefore should not be required to pay any federal income or excise taxes. Net realized capital gain for a fiscal year is computed by taking into account any capital loss carryforward of the Fund.
To be treated as a regulated investment company under Subchapter M of the Code, the Fund must also (a) derive at least 90% of its gross income from dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans, net income from certain publicly traded partnerships and gains from the sale or other disposition of securities or foreign currencies, or other income (including, but not limited to, gains from options, futures or forward contracts) derived with respect to the business of investing in such securities or currencies, and (b) diversify its holding so that, at the end of each fiscal quarter, (i) at least 50% of the market value of a Funds assets is represented by cash, U.S. government securities and securities of other regulated investment companies, and other securities (for purposes of this calculation, generally limited in respect of any one issuer, to an amount not greater than 5% of the market value of a Funds assets and 10% of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer) and (ii) not more than 25% of the value of its assets is invested in the securities (other than U.S. government securities or the securities of other regulated investment companies) of any one issuer, two or more issuers which a Fund controls and which are determined to be engaged in the same or similar trades or businesses, or the securities of certain publicly traded partnerships.
If a Fund fails to qualify as a regulated investment company under Subchapter M in any fiscal year, it may be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. As such, a Fund would be required to pay income taxes on its net investment income and net realized capital gains, if any, at the rates generally applicable to corporations. Shareholders of a Fund generally would not be liable for income tax on a Funds net investment income or net realized capital gains in their individual capacities. However, distributions to shareholders, whether from a Funds net investment income or net realized capital gains, would be treated as taxable dividends to the extent of current or accumulated earnings and profits of a Fund.
As a regulated investment company, a Fund is subject to a 4% nondeductible excise tax on certain undistributed amounts of ordinary income and net realized capital gain under a prescribed formula contained in Section 4982 of the Code. The formula requires payment to shareholders during a calendar year of distributions representing at least 98% of a Funds ordinary income
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for the calendar year and at least 98.2% of its net realized capital gain (i.e., the excess of its capital gains over capital losses) realized during the one-year period ending October 31 during such year plus 100% of any income that was neither distributed nor taxed to a Fund during the preceding calendar year. Under ordinary circumstances, a Fund expects to time its distributions so as to avoid liability for this tax.
The following discussion of U.S. federal income tax consequences is for the general information of shareholders that are subject to tax. Shareholders that are invested in IRAs or other qualified retirement plans are exempt from income taxation under the Code.
Distributions of taxable net investment income (including the excess of net short-term capital gain over net long-term realized capital loss) generally are taxable to shareholders as ordinary income. However, distributions by the Fund to a non-corporate shareholder may be subject to income tax at the shareholders applicable tax rate for long-term capital gain, to the extent that the Fund receives qualified dividend income on the securities it holds, the Fund properly designates the distribution as qualified dividend income, and the Fund and the non-corporate shareholder receiving the distribution meets certain holding period and other requirements. Distributions of net realized capital gain (capital gain dividends) generally are taxable to shareholders as long-term capital gain, regardless of the length of time the shares of the Trust have been held by such shareholders. Under current law, capital gain dividends recognized by a non-corporate shareholder generally will be taxed at a maximum income tax rate of 20%. Capital gains of corporate shareholders are taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.
Distributions of taxable net investment income and net realized capital gain will be taxable as described above, whether received in additional cash or shares. All distributions of taxable net investment income and net realized capital gain, whether received in shares or in cash, must be reported by each taxable shareholder on his or her federal income tax return. Dividends or distributions declared in October, November or December as of a record date in such a month, if any, will be deemed to have been received by shareholders on December 31, if paid during January of the following year. Redemptions of shares may result in tax consequences (gain or loss) to the shareholder and are also subject to these reporting requirements.
Redemption of Fund shares by a shareholder will result in the recognition of taxable gain or loss in an amount equal to the difference between the amount realized and the shareholders tax basis in the shareholder's Fund shares. Such gain or loss is treated as a capital gain or loss if the shares are held as capital assets. However, any loss realized upon the redemption of shares within six months from the date of their purchase will be treated as a long-term capital loss to the extent of any amounts treated as capital gain dividends during such six-month period. All or a portion of any loss realized upon the redemption of shares may be disallowed to the extent shares are purchased (including shares acquired by means of reinvested dividends) within 30 days before or after such redemption.
Under the Code, a Fund will be required to report to the Internal Revenue Service all distributions of taxable income and net realized capital gains as well as gross proceeds from the redemption or exchange of Fund shares, except in the case of certain exempt shareholders. Under the backup withholding provisions of Section 3406 of the Code, distributions of taxable net investment income and net realized capital gain and proceeds from the redemption or exchange of the shares of a regulated investment company may be subject to withholding of federal income tax (currently, at a rate of 28%) in the case of non-exempt shareholders who fail to furnish the investment company with their taxpayer identification numbers and with required certifications regarding their status under the federal income tax law, or if a Fund is notified by the IRS or a broker that withholding is required due to an incorrect TIN or a previous failure to report taxable interest or dividends. If the withholding provisions are applicable, any such distributions and proceeds, whether taken in cash or reinvested in additional shares, will be reduced by the amounts required to be withheld.
For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012, an additional 3.8% Medicare tax generally will be imposed on certain net investment income (including ordinary dividends and capital gain distributions received from the Fund and net gains from redemptions or other taxable dispositions of Fund shares) of U.S. individuals, estates and trusts to the extent that any such persons modified adjusted gross income (in the case of an individual) or adjusted gross income (in the case of an estate or trust) exceeds certain threshold amounts.
The Fund does not currently accept investments from foreign investors. However, payments to a shareholder that is either a foreign financial institution (FFI) or a non-financial foreign entity (NFFE) within the meaning of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) may be subject to a generally nonrefundable 30% withholding tax on: (a) income dividends paid by a Fund after June 30, 2014 and (b) certain capital gain distributions and the proceeds arising from the sale of Fund shares paid by the Fund after December 31, 2016. FATCA withholding tax generally can be avoided: (a) by an FFI, subject to any
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applicable intergovernmental agreement or other exemption, if it enters into a valid agreement with the IRS to, among other requirements, report required information about certain direct and indirect ownership of foreign financial accounts held by U.S. persons with the FFI and (b) by an NFFE, if it: (i) certifies that it has no substantial U.S. persons as owners or (ii) if it does have such owners, reports information relating to them. A Fund may disclose the information that it receives from its shareholders to the IRS, non-U.S. taxing authorities or other parties as necessary to comply with FATCA. Withholding also may be required if a foreign entity that is a shareholder of a Fund fails to provide the Fund with appropriate certifications or other documentation concerning its status under FATCA.
Shareholders should consult their tax advisers about the application of federal, state, local and foreign tax law in light of their particular situation.
Should
additional series, or funds, be created by the Trustees, each fund would be treated as a separate tax entity for federal income tax purposes.
PRICING OF FUND SHARES
The price (net asset value) of the shares of the Fund is determined at the close of trading
(normally 4:00 p.m., Eastern time) on each day the New York Stock Exchange is open for business (the Exchange is closed on weekends, most
federal holidays, and Good Friday). For a description of the methods used to determine the net asset value (share price), see "Determination
of Net Asset Value" in the Prospectus.
Equity securities generally are valued by using market quotations, but may be valued on the basis of prices furnished by a pricing service when the Advisor believes such prices more accurately reflect the fair market value of such securities. Securities that are traded on any stock exchange or on the NASDAQ over-the-counter market are generally valued by the pricing service at the last quoted sale price. Lacking a last sale price, an equity security is generally valued by the pricing service at its last bid price. When market quotations are not readily available, when the Advisor determines that the market quotation or the price provided by the pricing service does not accurately reflect the current market value, or when restricted or illiquid securities are being valued, such securities are valued as determined in good faith by the Advisor, in conformity with guidelines adopted by and subject to review of the Board of Trustees of the Trust. Foreign markets in which the Fund buys securities may be open on days the U.S. markets are closed, causing the Funds NAV to change even though the Fund is closed.
Fixed income securities generally are valued by using market quotations, but may be valued on the basis of prices furnished by a pricing service when the Advisor believes such prices accurately reflect the fair market value of such securities. A pricing service utilizes electronic data processing techniques based on yield spreads relating to securities with similar characteristics to determine prices for normal institutional-size trading units of debt securities without regard to sale or bid prices. If the Advisor decides that a price provided by the pricing service does not accurately reflect the fair market value of the securities, when prices are not readily available from a pricing service, or when restricted or illiquid securities are being valued, securities are valued at fair value as determined in good faith by the Advisor, subject to review of the Board of Trustees. Short term investments in fixed income securities with maturities of less than 60 days when acquired, or which subsequently are within 60 days of maturity, may be valued by using the amortized cost method of valuation, when the Board has determined such valuation will represent fair value.
PURCHASES AND SALES THROUGH BROKER DEALERS
The Fund may be purchased through broker dealers and other intermediaries. Each Fund has authorized one or more brokers to receive on its behalf purchase and redemption orders. Such brokers are authorized to designate other intermediaries to receive purchase and redemption orders on each Fund's behalf. The Fund will be deemed to have received a purchase or redemption order when an authorized broker or, if applicable, a broker's authorized designee, received the order. Customer orders will be priced at the Fund's net asset value next computed after they are received by an authorized broker or the broker's authorized designee.
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ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAM
The Trust has established an Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program (the "Program") as required by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act"). To ensure compliance with this law, the Trust's Program provides for the development of internal practices, procedures and controls, designation of anti-money laundering compliance officers, an ongoing training program and an independent audit function to determine the effectiveness of the Program.
Procedures to implement the Program include, but are not limited to, determining that the Fund's transfer agent has established proper anti-money laundering procedures, reporting suspicious and/or fraudulent activity and a complete and thorough review of all new opening account applications. The Fund will not transact business with any person or entity whose identity cannot be adequately verified under the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
CUSTODIAN
U.S. Bank, N.A. is custodian of the Fund's investments. The custodian acts as the Fund's depository, safekeeps its portfolio securities, collects all income and other payments with respect thereto, disburses funds at the Fund's request and maintains records in connection with its duties.
FUND SERVICES
Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC (the Ultimus), 225 Pictoria Drive, Suite 450, Cincinnati, OH 45246, provides the Fund with pricing, accounting, dividend disbursing, shareholder servicing and transfer agent services. Ultimus maintains the records of each shareholders account, answers shareholders inquiries concerning their accounts, processes purchases and redemptions of the Funds shares, acts as dividend and distribution disbursing agent and performs other shareholder service functions. Ultimus also provides accounting and pricing services to the Fund and maintains the accounting books and records for the Fund, supplies non-investment related statistical and research data, and provides accounting information for the preparation of tax returns and reports to shareholders of the Fund. For the performance of these services, the Advisor pays Ultimus a monthly fee based upon the average value of the Funds daily net assets, subject to a minimum monthly fee, plus a shareholder recordkeeping fee (on a per shareholder basis) for shareholder accounts. In addition, the Advisor pays out-of-pocket expenses, including but not limited to, postage, envelopes, checks, drafts, forms, reports, record storage, communication lines and all costs of external pricing services. For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2020, the Advisor paid Ultimus $88,572 for transfer agent and accounting services. For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2021, the Advisor paid Ultimus $80,790 for transfer agent and accounting services. For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022, the Advisor paid Ultimus $66,977 for transfer agent and accounting services.
Premier Fund Solutions, Inc. (PFS), 1939 Friendship Drive, Suite C, El Cajon, CA 92020, provides the Fund with administrative services. PFS acts as a liaison among the Funds service providers; supplies necessary office equipment, personnel and facilities; provides non-investment-related statistical and research data as needed; assists in layout and printing of semi-annual and annual reports to shareholders and in the layout and printing of prospectuses; makes required SEC filings; advises the Fund regarding compliance with the 1940 Act and with its investment policies and limitations; coordinates board communications; and monitors filings of the Funds tax returns. The Advisor pays out-of-pocket expenses, including but not limited to, postage, envelopes, printing, reports, and record storage. For the performance of these services, the Advisor pays PFS a monthly fee based upon the average value of the Funds daily net assets. For the fiscal years ended January 31, 2020, 2021, and 2022, the Advisor paid PFS $173,344, $99,507 and $81,051, respectively, for administrative services for the Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund.
INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
The firm of Cohen & Company, Ltd., 342 N. Water St., Suite 830, Milwaukee, WI 53202, has been selected as independent registered public accounting firm for the Fund for the fiscal year ending January 31, 2023. The independent registered public accounting firm performs an annual audit of the Fund's financial statements and provides financial, tax and accounting consulting services as requested.
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DISTRIBUTOR
Foreside Fund Services, LLC (Foreside), Three Canal Plaza, Suite 100, Portland, ME 04101, serves as the Funds agent to be the principal underwriter in connection with the offer and sale of the Funds shares. Foreside also reviews and files all proposed advertisements and sales literature with appropriate regulators. Compensation for the services performed by Foreside is paid by the Advisor from its own resources, not the Fund.
DISCLOSURE OF PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
The Fund is required to include a schedule of portfolio holdings in its annual and semi-annual reports to shareholders, which is sent to shareholders within 60 days of the end of the second and fourth fiscal quarters and which is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) on Form N-CSR within 70 days of the end of the second and fourth fiscal quarters. The Fund also is required to file a schedule of portfolio holdings with the SEC on Form N-PORT within 60 days of the end of the first and third fiscal quarters. The Fund must provide a copy of the complete schedule of portfolio holdings as filed with the SEC to any shareholder of the Fund, upon request, free of charge. This policy is applied uniformly to all shareholders of the Fund without regard to the type of requesting shareholder (i.e., regardless of whether the shareholder is an individual or institutional investor). Information contained in annual and semi-annual reports mailed to shareholders, as well as information filed with the SEC on Form N-PORT and information posted on the Funds website, is public information. All other information is non-public information.
The Fund has an ongoing relationship with third party servicing agents to release portfolio holdings information on a daily basis in order for those parties to perform their duties on behalf of the Fund. These third party servicing agents are the Advisor, Transfer Agent, Fund Accounting Agent, Administrator and Custodian. The Fund also may disclose portfolio holdings, as needed, to auditors, legal counsel, proxy voting services (if applicable), pricing services, printers, parties to merger and reorganization agreements and their agents, and prospective or newly hired investment advisors or sub-advisors. The Funds Chief Compliance Officer must authorize all disclosures of portfolio holdings. The lag between the date of the information and the date on which the information is disclosed will vary based on the identity of the party to whom the information is disclosed. For instance, the information may be provided to auditors within days of the end of an annual period, while the information may be given to legal counsel or prospective sub-advisors at any time. This information is disclosed to all such third parties under conditions of confidentiality. Conditions of confidentiality include (i) confidentiality clauses in written agreements, (ii) confidentiality implied by the nature of the relationship (e.g., attorney-client relationship), (iii) confidentiality required by fiduciary or regulatory principles (e.g., custody relationships) or (iv) understandings or expectations between the parties that the information will be kept confidential. The Fund also releases information to Morningstar or other entities that track and rank mutual fund performance on a delayed basis after the information has been filed with the SEC or otherwise made public. The Fund believes, based upon its size and history, that these are reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality of the Funds portfolio holdings and will provide sufficient protection against personal trading based on the information.
The Fund is prohibited from entering into any arrangements with any person to make available information about the Funds portfolio holdings without the specific approval of the Board. The Advisor must submit any proposed arrangement pursuant to which the Advisor intends to disclose the Funds portfolio holdings to the Board, which will review such arrangement to determine (i) whether it is in the best interests of Fund shareholders, (ii) whether the information will be kept confidential and (iii) whether the disclosure presents a conflict of interest between the interests of Fund shareholders and those of the Advisor, or any affiliated person of the Fund, or the Advisor. Additionally, the Fund, the Advisor, and any affiliated persons of the Advisor, are prohibited from receiving compensation or other consideration, for themselves or on behalf of the Fund, as a result of disclosing the Funds portfolio holdings.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The financial statements and independent registered public accounting firms report required to be included in the Statement of Additional Information are incorporated herein by reference to the Funds Annual Report to Shareholders for the year ended January 31, 2022. You may obtain a copy of the Annual Report without charge by writing the Transfer Agent at P.O. Box 46707, Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707 or by calling 1-888-925-8428.
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PROXY VOTING POLICIES
The Board of Trustees of the Trust has delegated responsibilities for decisions regarding proxy voting for securities held by the Fund to the Funds Advisor. The Advisor will vote such proxies in accordance with its proxy policies and procedures. It is the Advisors policy to vote client shares primarily in conformity with Glass-Lewis & Co. recommendations in order to limit conflict of interest issues between the Advisor and its clients. Glass-Lewis & Co. and the Advisor retain a record of all recommendations. Glass-Lewis & Co. is a neutral third party that issues recommendations based on its own internal guidelines. The Advisor may vote client shares inconsistent with Glass-Lewis & Co. recommendations if it believes it is in the best interest of its clients and such a vote does not create a conflict of interest between the Advisor and its clients. In such a case, the Advisor will retain on file a written disclosure detailing why they believe Glass-Lewis & Co.s recommendation was not in the clients best interest. The Trusts Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures are attached as Exhibit A. The Advisors Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures are attached as Exhibit B. Glass-Lewis & Co.s Proxy Voting Guidelines are attached as Exhibit C.
MORE INFORMATION. The actual voting records relating to portfolio securities during the most recent 12-Month period ended June 30 will be available after August 31 without charge, upon request by calling toll-free, 1-888-925-8428 or by accessing the SECs website at www.sec.gov. In addition, a copy of the Funds proxy voting policies and procedures are also available by calling 1-888-925-8428 and will be sent within three business days of receipt of a request.
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Exhibit A
WALTHAUSEN FUNDS |
PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
The Board of Trustees of the Trust (the Funds) has approved the delegation of the authority to vote proxies related to securities held in the portfolios of the Funds to the Funds Adviser (the Adviser). The Advisers goal in performing this service is to make proxy voting decisions in a manner that serves the best economic interest of the Funds, and that avoid the influence of conflicts of interest. To implement this goal, the Adviser has adopted proxy voting guidelines (the Proxy Voting Guidelines) to assist in making proxy voting decisions and in developing procedures for effecting those decisions. The Proxy Voting Guidelines are designed to ensure that, where the Adviser has the authority to vote proxies, all legal, fiduciary and contractual obligations will be met.
The Proxy Voting Guidelines address a wide variety of topics, including amongst other things, shareholder voting rights, anti-takeover defenses, board structures and the election of directors, executive compensation, reorganizations, mergers, and various shareholder proposals.
Policies
The Adviser has an agreement with Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Broadridge), an independent service provider, to handle the administration of proxy voting for the Funds portfolios securities managed by the Adviser, subject to oversight by the Advisers Proxy Manager. The Adviser votes proxies related to Fund securities via ProxyEdge, an electronic voting platform provided by Broadridge. ProxyEdge retains a record of proxy voting for the Funds.
It is the Advisers policy to primarily vote on shareholder proposals in conformity with recommendations from Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (Glass Lewis), an independent proxy advisory firm. Glass Lewis assists the firm in proxy voting and the corporate fund governance oversight process by developing and updating Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines which are incorporated into the Advisers and the Proxy Voting Guidelines by reference, and by providing research and analysis, and recommendations regarding voting Funds securities.
The decision by the Adviser to retain the services of Glass Lewis is based principally on the view that the services that Glass Lewis provides, subject to oversight by the Adviser, generally will result in proxy voting decisions which serve the best economic interests of the Funds, as well as limiting conflicts of interest between the Adviser and the Funds. The Adviser may vote Funds securities inconsistent with Glass Lewis recommendations if it believes that it is in the best economic interest of the Funds, and there is no conflict of interest present between the Adviser and the Funds. In such cases, Walthausen will retain a written record of the basis for the decision to vote against the Glass Lewis recommendation in the Funds best interests.
Conflicts of Interest
The Adviser does not engage in investment banking, administration of corporate retirement plans, does not purchase securities of any corporate client for client accounts, nor engages in any other activity that is likely to create a potential conflict of interest. Neither the Funds Distributor, nor any other service provider to the Funds, are affiliated with the Adviser, and as such do not create
1
a potential conflict of interest when voting Funds securities. In addition, because Funds proxies are primarily voted by Broadridge pursuant to the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines, the Adviser generally does not make an actual determination of how to vote a particular proxy, which therefore reduces the likelihood of any conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the Proxy Voting Guidelines address the issue of handling any conflict of interest that may arise.
If a proxy proposal creates a conflict of interest between the interests of the Funds and those of the Adviser, the proxy should be voted in conformity with the recommendation of Glass Lewis. To monitor compliance with this policy, any proposed or actual deviation from a recommendation from Glass Lewis must be reported to the Proxy Manager and the Advisers Chief Compliance Officer (CCO). The CCO will then provide guidance concerning the proposed deviation and whether it presents any potential conflict of interest. The Adviser, working with the Funds administrator, will ensure that the Form N-PX is filed with the SEC prior to August 31 of each year.
Procedures
The Proxy Manager, with oversight from the CCO, is responsible for confirming that all proxy voting is consistent with the Proxy Voting Guidelines. The Proxy Manager and the CCO will review, at least annually, the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines. In addition, the CCO will review whether Glass Lewis has the capacity, competency, and resources to adequately analyze proxy voting issues, as well as their conflict of interest policy. Any potential conflicts should be identified and addressed.
The actual voting records relating to portfolio securities during the most recent 12-Month period ended June 30 will be made available to shareholders without charge, upon request by calling toll-free, 1-888-925-8428 or by accessing the SECs website at www.sec.gov. In addition, a copy of the Funds proxy voting policies and procedures will be made available to shareholders by calling 1-888-925-8428 and will be sent within three business days of receipt of a request. Disclosure regarding this availability will be made in the Funds registration statement and each annual and semi-annual report to shareholders.
2
Exhibit B
WALTHAUSEN & CO. |
PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Purpose
The purpose of these Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures is to memorialize the policies and procedures adopted by Walthausen & Co. to enable it to comply with its responsibilities and the requirements of Rule 206(4)-6 of the Advisors Act. According to the Act, the firm has a fiduciary duty to adopt and implement written policies and procedures that are designed so that client securities are voted in the best interest of clients, including how to address material conflicts that arise between the firms interests and clients. The Act also requires disclosure to clients regarding how they may obtain information on how the firm voted their securities, guidelines for proxy voting clients securities, and furnishing a copy of policies and procedures on request from a client.
Walthausen has adopted proxy voting guidelines (the Proxy Voting Guidelines) to assist in making proxy voting decisions and in developing procedures for effecting those decisions. The Proxy Voting Guidelines are designed to ensure that, where Walthausen has the authority to vote proxies, all legal, fiduciary and contractual obligations will be met.
The Proxy Voting Guidelines address a wide variety of topics, including amongst other things, shareholder voting rights, anti-takeover defenses, board structures and the election of directors, executive compensation, reorganizations, mergers, and various shareholder proposals.
Policies
Walthausen has an agreement with Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Broadridge), an independent service provider, to handle the administration of proxy voting for client portfolios securities managed by Walthausen, subject to oversight by the firms Proxy Manager. Walthausen votes proxies related to clients securities via ProxyEdge, an electronic voting platform provided by Broadridge. Walthausen also votes client securities for certain accounts that use the services of ProxyTrust, via ProxyTrust.com, an electronic voting platform provided by ProxyTrust. Both ProxyEdge and ProxyTrust.com retain a record of proxy voting for each client.
It is Walthausens policy to primarily vote on shareholder proposals in conformity with recommendations from Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (Glass Lewis), an independent proxy advisory firm. Glass Lewis assists the firm in proxy voting and the corporate fund governance oversight process by developing and updating Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines which are incorporated into Walthausens Proxy Voting Guidelines by reference, and by providing research and analysis, and recommendations regarding voting client securities.
The decision by Walthausen to retain the services of Glass Lewis is based principally on the view that the services that Glass Lewis provides, subject to oversight by Walthausen, generally will result in proxy voting decisions which serve the best economic interests of the firms clients, as well as limiting conflicts of interest between Walthausen and its clients. Walthausen may vote client securities inconsistent with Glass Lewis recommendations if it believes that it is in the best economic interest of its clients, and there is no conflict of interest present between the firm and its
1
clients. In such cases, Walthausen will retain a written record of the basis for the decision to vote against the Glass Lewis recommendation in the client best interests.
Conflicts of Interest
Walthausen does not engage in investment banking, administration of corporate retirement plans, does not purchase securities of any corporate client for client accounts, nor engages in any other activity that is likely to create a potential conflict of interest. In addition, because client proxies are primarily voted by Broadridge pursuant to the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines, Walthausen generally does not make an actual determination of how to vote a particular proxy, which therefore reduces the likelihood of any conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the Proxy Voting Guidelines address the issue of handling any conflict of interest that may arise.
If a proxy proposal creates a conflict of interest between the interest of a client and those of the firm, the proxy should be voted in conformity with the recommendation of Glass Lewis. To monitor compliance with this policy, any proposed or actual deviation from a recommendation from Glass Lewis must be reported to the Proxy Manager and the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO). The CCO will then provide guidance concerning the proposed deviation and whether it presents any potential conflict of interest.
Procedures
The Proxy Manager, with oversight from the CCO, is responsible for confirming that all proxy voting is consistent with the Proxy Voting Guidelines. The Proxy Manager and the CCO will review, at least annually, the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines. In addition, the CCO will review whether Glass Lewis has the capacity, competency, and resources to adequately analyze proxy voting issues, as well as their conflict of interest policy. Any potential conflicts should be identified and addressed.
Walthausens Part 2A of Form ADV discloses in Item 17 Voting Client Securities how clients may obtain a copy of the firms complete proxy voting policies and procedures, as well as how they can obtain information on how their proxy shares were voted. If any client requests a copy of our complete proxy policies and procedures or how proxies were voted for their account(s), we will promptly (within three business days) provide such information to the client. Any requests will be recorded, and will include the firms response.
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Exhibit C Glass Lewis Proxy Voting Guidelines
UNITED STATES
GLASS LEWIS
2022 Policy Guidelines
www.glasslewis.com
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 1 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Table of Contents | |
About Glass Lewis | 6 |
Guidelines Introduction | 7 |
Summary of Changes for 2022 | 7 |
A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest | 13 |
Election of Directors | 13 |
Independence | 13 |
Committee Independence | 16 |
Independent Chair | 16 |
Performance | 18 |
Board Responsiveness | 19 |
The Role of a Committee Chair | 20 |
Audit Committees and Performance | 20 |
Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee | 21 |
Compensation Committee Performance | 23 |
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance | 25 |
Board-level Risk Management Oversight | 28 |
Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues | 29 |
Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance | 30 |
Director Commitments | 30 |
Other Considerations | 31 |
Controlled Companies | 32 |
Significant Shareholders | 34 |
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off, or Direct Listing | 34 |
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company | 35 |
Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies | 36 |
OTC-listed Companies | 36 |
Mutual Fund Boards | 37 |
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 2 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Table of Contents | |
About Glass Lewis | 6 |
Guidelines Introduction | 7 |
Summary of Changes for 2022 | 7 |
A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest | 13 |
Election of Directors | 13 |
Independence | 13 |
Committee Independence | 16 |
Independent Chair | 16 |
Performance | 18 |
Board Responsiveness | 19 |
The Role of a Committee Chair | 20 |
Audit Committees and Performance | 20 |
Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee | 21 |
Compensation Committee Performance | 23 |
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance | 25 |
Board-level Risk Management Oversight | 28 |
Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues | 29 |
Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance | 30 |
Director Commitments | 30 |
Other Considerations | 31 |
Controlled Companies | 32 |
Significant Shareholders | 34 |
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off, or Direct Listing | 34 |
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company | 35 |
Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies | 36 |
OTC-listed Companies | 36 |
Mutual Fund Boards | 37 |
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 3 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Recoupment Provisions (Clawbacks) | 58 |
Hedging of Stock | 59 |
Pledging of Stock | 59 |
Compensation Consultant Independence | 60 |
CEO Pay Ratio | 60 |
Frequency of Say-on-Pay | 60 |
Vote on Golden Parachute Arrangements | 61 |
Equity-Based Compensation Plan Proposals | 61 |
Option Exchanges and Repricing | 62 |
Option Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging | 63 |
Director Compensation Plans | 64 |
Employee Stock Purchase Plans | 65 |
Executive Compensation Tax Deductability — Amendment to IRC 162(M) | 65 |
Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise | 67 |
Anti-Takeover Measures | 67 |
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans) | 67 |
NOL Poison Pills | 67 |
Fair Price Provisions | 68 |
Quorum Requirements | 69 |
Director and Officer Indemnification | 69 |
Reincorporation | 69 |
Exclusive Forum and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions | 70 |
Authorized Shares | 71 |
Advance Notice Requirements | 72 |
Virtual Shareholder Meetings | 72 |
Voting Structure | 73 |
Multi-Class Share Structures | 73 |
Cumulative Voting | 74 |
Supermajority Vote Requirements | 74 |
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 4 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Transaction of Other Business | 75 |
Anti-Greenmail Proposals | 75 |
Mutual Funds: Investment Policies and Advisory Agreements | 75 |
Real Estate Investment Trusts | 76 |
Preferred Stock Issuances at REITs | 76 |
Business Development Companies | 76 |
Authorization to Sell Shares at a Price Below Net Asset Value | 77 |
Auditor Ratification and Below-NAV Issuances | 77 |
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies | 77 |
Extension of Business Combination Deadline | 78 |
SPAC Board Independence | 78 |
Director Commitments of SPAC Executives | 78 |
Shareholder Proposals | 78 |
Overall Approach to Environmental, Social & Governance | 80 |
Connect with Glass Lewis | 82 |
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 5 |
GLASS LEWIS |
About Glass Lewis
Glass Lewis is the world’s choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make sustainable decisions based on research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.
Our customers include the majority of the world’s largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset
managers, collectively managing over $40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States,
Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.
Investors around the world depend on Glass Lewis’ Viewpoint platform to manage their proxy voting, policy implementation, recordkeeping, and reporting. Our industry leading Proxy Paper product provides comprehensive environmental, social, and governance research and voting recommendations weeks ahead of voting deadlines. Public companies can also use our innovative Report Feedback Statement to deliver their opinion on our proxy research directly to the voting decision makers at every investor client in time for voting decisions to be made or changed.
The research team engages extensively with public companies, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.
Join the Conversation
Glass Lewis is committed to ongoing engagement with all market participants.
info@glasslewis.com | www.glasslewis.com
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 6 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Guidelines Introduction
Summary of Changes for 2022
Glass Lewis evaluates these guidelines on an ongoing basis and formally updates them on an annual basis. This year we’ve made noteworthy revisions in the following areas, which are summarized below but discussed in greater detail in the relevant section of this document:
Board Gender Diversity
We have expanded our policy on board gender diversity. Beginning in 2022, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than two gender diverse directors, or the entire nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside of the Russell 3000 index, and all boards with six or fewer total directors, our existing policy requiring a minimum of one gender diverse director will remain in place.
Our voting recommendations in 2022 will be based on the above requirements for the number of gender diverse board members. However, beginning with shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2023, we will transition from a fixed numerical approach to a percentage-based approach and will generally recommend voting against the nominating committee chair of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse at companies within
the Russell 3000 index.
Additionally, when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company’s disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors of companies when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board.
We have also replaced references in our guidelines to female directors with “gender diverse directors,” defined
as women and directors that identify with a gender other than male or female.
State Laws on Gender Diversity
We have revised our discussion regarding state laws on diversity to include two sections regarding state laws on gender diversity and state laws on underrepresented community diversity. In addition to our standard policy on board diversity, we will recommend in accordance with mandated board composition requirements set forth in applicable state laws when they come into effect. We have removed references to any state’s individual laws.
We will generally refrain from recommending against directors when applicable state laws do not mandate board composition requirements, are non-binding, or solely impose disclosure or reporting requirements in filings made with each respective state annually.
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State Laws on Underrepresented Community Diversity
We have included a new section discussing state laws on underrepresented community diversity. In addition to board gender diversity, several states have also begun to encourage board diversity beyond gender through legislation. We will generally recommend in line with applicable state laws mandating board composition requirements for underrepresented community diversity or other diversity measures beyond gender when they come into effect.
Stock Exchange Diversity Disclosure Requirements
We have included a new section regarding our approach to a recent disclosure rule adopted by the Nasdaq stock exchange. On August 6, 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure for Nasdaq-listed companies. Beginning in 2022, companies listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange will be required to disclose certain board diversity statistics annually in a standardized format in the proxy statement or on the company's website. Nasdaq-listed companies are required to provide this disclosure by the later of (i) August 8, 2022, or (ii) the date the company files its proxy statement for its 2022 annual meeting. Accordingly, for annual meetings held after August 8, 2022, of applicable Nasdaq- listed companies, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee when the required disclosure has not been provided.
Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills
We have revised our discussion on disclosure of director diversity and skills in company proxy statements. Beginning in 2022, for companies in the S&P 500 index with particularly poor disclosure (i.e., those failing to provide any disclosure in each of the tracked categories), we may recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee. Beginning in 2023, when companies in the S&P 500 index have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority demographic information, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.
Environmental and Social Risk Oversight
We have updated our guidelines with respect to board-level oversight of environmental and social (E&S) issues. Beginning in 2022, Glass Lewis will note as a concern when boards of companies in the Russell 1000 index do not provide clear disclosure concerning the board-level oversight afforded to environmental and/or social issues. For shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2022, we will generally recommend voting against the governance committee chair of a company in the S&P 500 index who fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board’s role in overseeing these issues. While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee.
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The Role of a Committee Chair
We have revised our approach to the role of a committee chair in cases where there is a designated committee chair and the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair, but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered. Beginning in 2022, in cases where the committee chair is not up for election due to a staggered board, and where we have identified multiple concerns, we will generally recommend voting against other members of the committee who are up for election, on a case-by-case basis.
Multi-Class Share Structures with Unequal Voting Rights
We have updated our approach to companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights. Beginning in 2022, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company
We have included a new section to address governance concerns at companies following a business combination with a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC). We believe that the business combination of a private company with a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company facilitates the private entity becoming a publicly traded corporation. Thus, the business combination represents the private company’s de- facto IPO. We believe that some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that has completed a business combination with a SPAC within the past year.
In cases where Glass Lewis determines that the company has adopted overly restrictive governing documents, where, preceding the company becoming publicly traded, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the company becoming publicly traded if the board: (i) did not also submit these provisions to a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination; (ii) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the company becoming publicly traded; or (iii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure).
Director Commitments of SPAC Executives
We have included a new discussion of our approach to director commitments for directors when their only executive role is at a special purpose acquisition company. We believe the primary role of executive officers at SPACs is identifying acquisition targets for the SPAC and consummating a business combination. Given the nature of these executive roles and the limited business operations of SPACs, when a directors’ only executive role is at a SPAC, we will generally apply our higher limit for company directorships. As a result, we generally
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recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves in an executive role only at a SPAC while serving on more than five public company boards.
Waiver of Age and Tenure Policies
We have revised our approach to boards waiving self-imposed age and/or tenure policies. Beginning in 2022, in cases where the board has waived its term/age limits for two or more consecutive years, Glass Lewis will generally recommend shareholders vote against the nominating and or governance committee chair, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board is proposing to waive this rule, such as consummation of a corporate transaction.
Clarifying Amendments
The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:
Overall Approach to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)
We have expanded our discussion of environmental, social & governance initiatives in a new section titled Glass Lewis’ Overall Approach to ESG. Here we provide additional details of our considerations when evaluating these topics. To summarize, Glass Lewis evaluates all environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. We believe that companies should be considering material environmental and social factors in all aspects of their operations and that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that allow them to understand how these factors are being considered and how attendant risks are being mitigated.
For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposals, please refer to our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.
Shareholder Proposals
In the section titled Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise, we have added a sub-section titled Shareholder Proposals, summarizing our existing approach to analyzing these proposals. Specifically, we evaluate all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis with a view to promoting long-term shareholder value. While we are generally supportive of those that promote board accountability, shareholder rights, and transparency, we consider all proposals in the context of a company’s unique operations and risk profile.
Please refer to our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives for additional detail.
Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria
We have outlined our current approach to the use of E&S metrics in the variable incentive programs for named executive officers. Glass Lewis highlights the use of E&S metrics in our analysis of the advisory vote on executive compensation. However, Glass Lewis does not maintain a policy on the inclusion of such metrics or whether
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these metrics should be used in either a company's short- or long-term incentive program. As with other types of metrics, where E&S metrics are included, as determined by the company, we expect robust disclosure on the metrics selected, the rigor of performance targets, and the determination of corresponding payout opportunities. For qualitative E&S metrics, the company should provide shareholders with a thorough understanding of how these metrics will be or were assessed.
Short- and Long-Term Incentives
Our guidance related to Glass Lewis' analysis of the short-term incentive awards has been clarified to note that Glass Lewis will consider adjustments to GAAP financial results in its assessment of the incentive’s effectiveness at tying executive pay to performance. As with the short-term incentive awards, our analysis of long-term incentive grants also considers the basis for any adjustments to metrics or results. Thus, clear disclosure from companies is equally important for long-term incentive awards.
Grants of Front-Loaded Awards
We have clarified our guidance related to Glass Lewis' analysis of so-called front-loaded incentive awards. Specifically, while we continue to examine the quantum of award on an annualized basis for the full vesting period of the awards, Glass Lewis also considers the impact of the overall size of awards on dilution of shareholder wealth.
Authorizations/Increases in Authorized Preferred Stock
With regard to authorizations of requested increases in authorized preferred stock, we have clarified that we will generally recommend voting against preferred stock authorizations or increases, unless the company discloses a commitment to not use such shares as an anti-takeover defense or in a shareholder rights plan, or discloses a commitment to submit any shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote prior to its adoption.
Federal Forum Provisions
We have clarified our approach to companies that have adopted federal exclusive forum provisions designating federal courts as the sole jurisdiction for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933. When boards have adopted federal exclusive forum provisions without seeking shareholder approval, we will generally take the same approach as when boards have adopted exclusive forum provisions designating state courts as exclusive jurisdiction for certain matters and will generally recommend voting against chairs of governance committees.
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off or Direct Listing
We have clarified our approach to director recommendations on the basis of post-IPO corporate governance concerns to include references to companies that have gone public by way of direct listing. When evaluating governance following a direct listing, we will apply the same approach as our existing policy on IPOs and spin- offs.
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Director Independence
In the section outlining our approach to director independence, we have added a sentence clarifying that for material financial transactions, we apply a three-year look back, and for former employment relationships, we apply a five-year look back.
Related-Party Transaction Materiality Thresholds
In the section defining “material” transactions, we added a sentence clarifying that the $50,000 threshold for individual transactions also applies to directors who are the majority or principal owner of a firm that receives such payments.
Lastly, we have made several minor edits of a housekeeping nature, including the removal of several redundant
and/or outdated footnotes.
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A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest
Election of Directors
The purpose of Glass Lewis’ proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that a board can best protect and enhance the interests of shareholders if it is sufficiently independent, has a record of positive performance, and consists of individuals with diverse backgrounds and a breadth and depth of relevant experience.
Independence
The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director’s track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.
We look at each director nominee to examine the director’s relationships with the company, the company’s executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director’s decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders’ interests above the director’s or the related party’s interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board, and therefore believe such a director’s independence may be hampered, in particular when serving on the audit committee.
Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:
Independent Director — An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years1 before the
1 NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look- back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard for former employment relationships is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look-back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.
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inquiry are usually considered “current” for purposes of this test. For material financial relationships with the company, we apply a three-year look back, and for former employment relationships with the company, we apply a five-year look back.
Affiliated Director — An affiliated director has, (or within the past three years, had) a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.2 This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the company.3 In addition, we view a director who either owns or controls 20% or more of the company’s voting stock, or is an employee or affiliate of an entity that controls such amount, as an affiliate.4
We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.
Glass Lewis applies a three-year look back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look back.
Definition of “Material”: A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds:
· | $50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services. This threshold also applies to directors who are the majority or principal owner of a firm that receives such payments; or |
· | $120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm and the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services.5 This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;6 and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director’s firm; or |
2 If a company does not consider a non-employee director to be independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an
affiliate.
3 We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after
this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of “material.”
4 This includes a director who serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an investment firm with greater than 20% ownership. However, while we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated, we will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.
5 We may deem such a transaction to be immaterial where the amount represents less than 1% of the firm’s annual revenues and the board provides a compelling rationale as to why the director’s independence is not affected by the relationship.
6 We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company’s size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director’s role at the charity. However, unlike for other types
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· | 1% of either company’s consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).7 |
Definition of “Familial” — Familial relationships include a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person’s home. A director is an affiliate if: i) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and receives more than $120,000 in annual compensation; or, ii) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and the company does not disclose this individual’s compensation.
Definition of “Company” — A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.
Inside Director — An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a board chair who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director’s own best interests.
Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.
Additionally, we believe a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of the director’s resignation or departure from the interim management position.
Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Board Independence
Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders’ interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically8 recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.
of related party transactions, Glass Lewis generally does not apply a look-back period to affiliated relationships involving charitable contributions; if the relationship between the director and the school or charity ceases, or if the company discontinues its donations to the entity, we will consider the director to be independent.
7 This includes cases where a director is employed by, or closely affiliated with, a private equity firm that profits from an acquisition made by the company. Unless disclosure suggests otherwise, we presume the director is affiliated.
8 With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the other affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence. However, we will consider recommending voting against the directors subject to our concern at their next election if the issue giving rise to the concern is not resolved.
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In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chair’s presence.
In addition, we scrutinize avowedly “independent” chairs and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent or the company should not tout them as such.
Committee Independence
We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company’s audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.9 We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.
Pursuant to Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require that boards apply enhanced standards of independence when making an affirmative determination of the independence of compensation committee members. Specifically, when making this determination, in addition to the factors considered when assessing general director independence, the board’s considerations must include: (i) the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the listed company to the director (the “Fees Factor”); and (ii) whether the director is affiliated with the listing company, its subsidiaries, or affiliates of its subsidiaries (the “Affiliation Factor”).
Glass Lewis believes it is important for boards to consider these enhanced independence factors when assessing compensation committee members. However, as discussed above in the section titled Independence, we apply our own standards when assessing the independence of directors, and these standards also take into account consulting and advisory fees paid to the director, as well as the director’s affiliations with the company and its subsidiaries and affiliates. We may recommend voting against compensation committee members who are not independent based on our standards.
Independent Chair
Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chair creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chair position. An executive manages the business according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals set by the board. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chair presumably will have a significant influence over the board.
9 We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is composed of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.
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While many companies have an independent lead or presiding director who performs many of the same functions of an independent chair (e.g., setting the board meeting agenda), we do not believe this alternate form of independent board leadership provides as robust protection for shareholders as an independent chair.
It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/chair controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.
A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board’s approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO’s vision for accomplishing the board’s objectives. Failure to achieve the board’s objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.
Likewise, an independent chair can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.
Further, it is the board’s responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.
Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chair is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chair fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior management. Encouragingly, many companies appear to be moving in this direction — one study indicates that only 10 percent of incoming CEOs in 2014 were awarded the chair title, versus 48 percent in 2002.10 Another study finds that 53 percent of S&P 500 boards now separate the CEO and chair roles, up from 37 percent in 2009, although the same study found that only 34 percent of S&P 500 boards have truly independent chairs.11
We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically recommend that our clients support separating the roles of chair and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.
Further, where the company has neither an independent chair nor independent lead director, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.
10 Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary L. Nelson. “The $112 Billion CEO Succession Problem.” (Strategy+Business, Issue
79, Summer 2015).
11 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 6.
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Performance
The most crucial test of a board’s commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.
We find that a director’s past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred serving on the boards of companies with similar problems. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of directors serving at over 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.
Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Performance
We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders. We will reevaluate such directors based on, among other factors, the length of time passed since the incident giving rise to the concern, shareholder support for the director, the severity of the issue, the director’s role (e.g., committee membership), director tenure at the subject company, whether ethical lapses accompanied the oversight lapse, and evidence of strong oversight at other companies.
Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.
We believe shareholders should avoid electing directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:
1. A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings,
calculated in the aggregate.>12
2. | A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late |
filing was the director’s fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).
3. | A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements. |
4. | A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed). |
Furthermore, with consideration given to the company’s overall corporate governance, pay-for-performance alignment and board responsiveness to shareholders, we may recommend voting against directors who served
12 However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.
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throughout a period in which the company performed significantly worse than peers and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.
Board Responsiveness
Glass Lewis believes that any time 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management, the board should, depending on the issue, demonstrate some level of responsiveness to address the concerns of shareholders. These include instances when 20% or more of shareholders: (i) withhold votes from (or vote against) a director nominee; (ii) vote against a management-sponsored proposal; or (iii) vote for a shareholder proposal. In our view, a 20% threshold is significant enough to warrant a close examination of the underlying issues and an evaluation of whether or not a board response was warranted and, if so, whether the board responded appropriately following the vote, particularly in the case of a compensation or director election proposal. While the 20% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote recommendation from Glass Lewis on a future proposal (e.g., to recommend against a director nominee, against a say-on-pay proposal, etc.), it may be a contributing factor to our recommendation to vote against
management’s recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately. While Glass Lewis may note instances of significant support for shareholder proposals, we believe clear action is warranted when such proposals receive support from a majority of votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes).
With regard to companies where voting control is held through a multi-class share structure with disproportionate voting and economic rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. Where vote results indicate that a majority of unaffiliated shareholders supported a shareholder proposal or opposed a management proposal, we believe the board should demonstrate an appropriate level of responsiveness.
As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of publicly available disclosures (e.g., the proxy statement, annual report, 8-Ks, company website, etc.) released following the date of the company’s last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most current Proxy Paper. Depending on the specific issue, our focus typically includes, but is not limited to, the following:
· | At the board level, any changes in directorships, committee memberships, disclosure of related party transactions, meeting attendance, or other responsibilities; |
· | Any revisions made to the company’s articles of incorporation, bylaws or other governance documents; |
· | Any press or news releases indicating changes in, or the adoption of, new company policies, business practices or special reports; and |
· | Any modifications made to the design and structure of the company’s compensation program, as well as an assessment of the company’s engagement with shareholders on compensation issues as discussed in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A), particularly following a material vote against a company’s say-on-pay. |
Our Proxy Paper analysis will include a case-by-case assessment of the specific elements of board responsiveness that we examined along with an explanation of how that assessment impacts our current voting recommendations.
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The Role of a Committee Chair
Glass Lewis believes that a designated committee chair maintains primary responsibility for the actions of his or her respective committee. As such, many of our committee-specific voting recommendations are against the applicable committee chair rather than the entire committee (depending on the seriousness of the issue). In cases where the committee chair is not up for election due to a staggered board, and where we have identified multiple concerns, we will generally recommend voting against other members of the committee who are up for election, on a case-by-case basis.
In cases where we would ordinarily recommend voting against a committee chair but the chair is not specified, we apply the following general rules, which apply throughout our guidelines:
· | If there is no committee chair, we recommend voting against the longest-serving committee member or, if the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, the longest-serving board member serving on the committee (i.e., in either case, the “senior director”); and |
· | If there is no committee chair, but multiple senior directors serving on the committee, we recommend |
voting against both (or all) such senior directors.
In our view, companies should provide clear disclosure of which director is charged with overseeing each committee. In cases where that simple framework is ignored and a reasonable analysis cannot determine which committee member is the designated leader, we believe shareholder action against the longest serving committee member(s) is warranted. Again, this only applies if we would ordinarily recommend voting against the committee chair but there is either no such position or no designated director in such role.
Audit Committees and Performance
Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because stable capital markets depend on reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. Audit committees play a vital role in providing this disclosure to shareholders.
When assessing an audit committee’s performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:
A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting — the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors — form a ‘three legged stool’ that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be ‘first among equals’ in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.
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Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee
For an audit committee to function effectively on investors’ behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said “members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters.”13
We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller, or similar experience. While we will not necessarily recommend voting against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to recommend voting against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.
Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.
When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and generally recommend voting in favor of its members. However, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:
1. All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.
2. | The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee’s financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies. |
3. | The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least four times during the year. |
4. | The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members. |
5. | Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member’s attendance at all board and committee meetings.14 |
6. | All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor. |
13 Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.
14 Glass Lewis may exempt certain audit committee members from the above threshold if, upon further analysis of relevant factors such as the director’s experience, the size, industry-mix and location of the companies involved and the director’s attendance at all the companies, we can reasonably determine that the audit committee member is likely not hindered by multiple audit committee commitments.
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7. | The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor). |
8. | The audit committee chair when fees paid to the auditor are not disclosed. |
9. | All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are prohibited by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). |
10. | All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions. |
11. | All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry. |
12. | The audit committee chair if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee. |
13. | All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A15 |
letter has been issued.
14. | All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the |
company.16
15. | All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:17 |
a. | The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders; |
b. | The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation; |
c. | The restatement involves revenue recognition; |
d. | The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or |
e. | The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities. |
16. | All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last five quarters. |
15 Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.
16 Research indicates that revenue fraud now accounts for over 60% of SEC fraud cases, and that companies that engage in fraud experience significant negative abnormal stock price declines—facing bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do non-fraud firms (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007.” May 2010).
17 The SEC issued guidance in March 2021 related to classification of warrants as liabilities at special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs). We will generally refrain from recommending against audit committee members when the restatement in question is solely as a result of the aforementioned SEC guidance.
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17. | All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). |
18. | All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor |
disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.
19. | All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed (e.g., the company receives an adverse opinion on its financial statements from the auditor). |
20. All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor’s liability to the company for damages.18
21. All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company’s last annual meeting, and when, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected, or, when the company has an ongoing material weakness from a prior year that has not yet been corrected.
We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, we take into consideration, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee, the transparency of the audit committee report.
Compensation Committee Performance
Compensation committees have a critical role in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business’s long-term shareholders returns.
Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the board’s compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.
Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. For example, the use of a compensation consultant who maintains a business relationship with company management may cause the committee to
18 The Council of Institutional Investors. “Corporate Governance Policies,” p. 4, April 5, 2006; and “Letter from Council of
Institutional Investors to the AICPA,” November 8, 2006.
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make decisions based on information that is compromised by the consultant’s conflict of interests. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring- loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.
Central to understanding the actions of compensation committee is a careful review of the CD&A report included in each company’s proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as advisory votes on executive compensation, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company’s top executives.
When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will consider recommending that
shareholders vote against the following:
1. All members of a compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to address shareholder concerns following majority shareholder rejection of the say-on-pay proposal in the previous year. Where the proposal was approved but there was a significant shareholder vote (i.e., greater than 20% of votes cast) against the say-on-pay proposal in the prior year, if the board did not respond sufficiently to the vote including actively engaging shareholders on this issue, we will also consider recommending voting against the chair of the compensation committee or all members of the compensation committee, depending on the severity and history of the compensation problems and the level of shareholder opposition.
2. | All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served when the company failed to align pay with performance if shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation at the annual meeting.19 |
3. | Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that have consistently failed to align pay with performance and whose oversight of compensation at the company in question is suspect. |
4. | All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements. |
5. | All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained. |
6. | All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits |
were allowed.
7. | The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year. |
8. | All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options or completed a “self tender offer” without shareholder approval within the past two years. |
9. | All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated. |
19 If a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal, we will initially only recommend voting against the company's say-on-pay proposal and will not recommend voting against the members of the compensation committee unless there is a pattern of failing to align pay and performance and/or the company exhibits egregious compensation practices. For cases in which the disconnect between pay and performance is marginal and the company has outperformed its peers, we will consider not recommending against compensation committee members.
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10. | All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in |
option backdating.
11. | All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information. |
12. | All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud. |
13. | The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets. |
14. | All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.20 |
15. | All members of the compensation committee when the board has materially decreased proxy statement disclosure regarding executive compensation policies and procedures in a manner which substantially impacts shareholders’ ability to make an informed assessment of the company’s executive pay practices. |
16. | All members of the compensation committee when new excise tax gross-up provisions are adopted in employment agreements with executives, particularly in cases where the company previously committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future. |
17. | All members of the compensation committee when the board adopts a frequency for future advisory votes on executive compensation that differs from the frequency approved by shareholders. |
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance
The nominating and governance committee is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the committee is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote. At most companies, a single committee is charged with these oversight functions; at others, the governance and nominating responsibilities are apportioned among two separate committees.
Consistent with Glass Lewis’ philosophy that boards should have diverse backgrounds and members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience, we believe that nominating and governance committees should consider diversity when making director nominations within the context of each specific company and its industry. In our view, shareholders are best served when boards make an effort to ensure a constituency that is
20 In all other instances (i.e., a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we
recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.
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not only reasonably diverse on the basis of age, race, gender and ethnicity, but also on the basis of geographic knowledge, industry experience, board tenure and culture.
Regarding the committee responsible for governance, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote
against the following:
1. All members of the governance committee21 during whose tenure a shareholder proposal relating to important shareholder rights received support from a majority of the votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes) and the board has not begun to implement or enact the proposal’s subject matter.22 Examples of such shareholder proposals include those seeking a declassified board structure, a majority vote standard for director elections, or a right to call a special meeting. In determining whether a board has sufficiently implemented such a proposal, we will examine the quality of the right enacted or proffered by the board for any conditions that may unreasonably interfere with the shareholders’ ability to exercise the right (e.g., overly restrictive procedural requirements for calling a special
meeting).
2. | All members of the governance committee when a shareholder resolution is excluded from the meeting agenda but the SEC has declined to state a view on whether such resolution should be excluded, or when the SEC has verbally permitted a company to exclude a shareholder proposal but there is no written record provided by the SEC about such determination and the company has not provided any disclosure concerning this no-action relief. |
3. | The governance committee chair when the chair is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.23 |
4. | The governance committee chair at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less). |
5. | In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are fewer than five, or the whole governance committee when there are more than 20 members on the board. |
6. | The governance committee chair when the committee fails to meet at all during the year. |
7. | The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be “inadequate” related party transaction disclosure (i.e., the nature of such transactions and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing a share- |
21 If the board does not have a committee responsible for governance oversight and the board did not implement a shareholder proposal that received the requisite support, we will recommend voting against the entire board. If the shareholder proposal at issue requested that the board adopt a declassified structure, we will recommend voting against all director nominees up for election.
22 Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.
23 We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against the governance committee chair as we believe the lack of fixed lead or presiding director means that, effectively, the board does not have an independent board leader.
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holder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock exchange listing requirements).
8. | The governance committee chair, when during the past year the board adopted a forum selection clause (i.e., an exclusive forum provision)24 designating either a state's courts for intra-corporate disputes, and/or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933 without shareholder approval,25 or if the board is currently seeking shareholder approval of a forum selection clause |
pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal.
9. | All members of the governance committee during whose tenure the board adopted, without shareholder approval, provisions in its charter or bylaws that, through rules on director compensation, may inhibit the ability of shareholders to nominate directors. |
10. | The governance committee chair when the board takes actions to limit shareholders’ ability to vote on matters material to shareholder rights (e.g., through the practice of excluding a shareholder proposal by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal). |
11. | The governance committee chair when directors’ records for board and committee meeting attendance are not disclosed, or when it is indicated that a director attended less than 75% of board and committee meetings but disclosure is sufficiently vague that it is not possible to determine which specific director’s attendance was lacking. |
12. | The governance committee chair when a detailed record of proxy voting results from the prior annual |
meeting has not been disclosed.
In addition, we may recommend that shareholders vote against the chair of the governance committee, or the entire committee, where the board has amended the company’s governing documents to reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right, and has done so without seeking shareholder approval. Examples of board actions that may cause such a recommendation include: the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent; an increase to the ownership threshold required for shareholders to call a special meeting; an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments; the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse — such as bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims
or that require shareholder plaintiffs to pay the company’s legal expenses in the absence of a court victory (i.e., “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws); the adoption of a classified board structure; and the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.
Regarding the nominating committee, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the
following:
24 A forum selection clause is a bylaw provision stipulating that a certain state or federal jurisdiction is the exclusive forum for specified legal matters. Such a clause effectively limits a shareholder's legal remedy regarding appropriate choice of venue and related relief.
25 Glass Lewis will evaluate the circumstances surrounding the adoption of any forum selection clause as well as the general provisions contained therein. Where it can be reasonably determined that a forum selection clause is narrowly crafted to suit the particular circumstances facing the company and/or a reasonable sunset provision is included, we may make an exception to this policy.
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1. All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated
an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.
2. | The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year. |
3. | In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair when the chair is not |
independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.
4. | The nominating committee chair, when there are fewer than five, or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board. |
5. | The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.26 |
6. | The chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than two gender diverse directors,27 or all members of the nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies |
within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside of the Russell 3000 index, and all boards with six or fewer total directors, we will recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee if there are no gender diverse directors.
7. | The nominating committee chair when, alongside other governance or board performance concerns, the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new independent directors have joined the board in the past five years. We will not be making voting recommendations solely on this basis; rather, insufficient board refreshment may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified. |
In addition, we may consider recommending shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating committee where the board’s failure to ensure the board has directors with relevant experience, either through periodic director assessment or board refreshment, has contributed to a company’s poor performance. Where these issues warrant an against vote in the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the board chair, unless the chair also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the longest-serving director.
Board-level Risk Management Oversight
Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to
26 Considering that shareholder disapproval clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the severity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern as well as company responsiveness to such matters, and will only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 20% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.
27 Women and directors that identify with a gender other than male or female.
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financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firms have complex hedging or trading strategies, those firms
should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.
Our views on risk oversight are consistent with those expressed by various regulatory bodies. In its December 2009 Final Rule release on Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, the SEC noted that risk oversight is a key competence of the board and that additional disclosures would improve investor and shareholder understanding of the role of the board in the organization’s risk management practices. The final rules, which became effective on February 28, 2010, now explicitly require companies and mutual funds to describe (while allowing for some degree of flexibility) the board’s role in the oversight of risk.
When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company’s board-level risk committee’s poor oversight contributed to the loss, we will recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise),28 we will consider recommending to vote against the board chair on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chair/CEO, except in egregious cases.
Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues
Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring the sustainability of companies’ operations. We believe that insufficient oversight of material environmental and social issues can present direct legal, financial, regulatory and reputational risks that could serve to harm shareholder interests. Therefore, we believe that these issues should be carefully monitored and managed by companies, and that all companies should have an appropriate oversight structure in place to ensure that they are mitigating attendant risks and capitalizing on related opportunities to the best extent possible.
To that end, Glass Lewis believes that companies should ensure that boards maintain clear oversight of material risks to their operations, including those that are environmental and social in nature. These risks could include, but are not limited to, matters related to climate change, human capital management, diversity, stakeholder relations, and health, safety & environment.
For companies in the Russell 1000 index and in instances where we identify material oversight concerns, Glass Lewis will review a company’s overall governance practices and identify which directors or board-level committees have been charged with oversight of environmental and/or social issues. Furthermore, given the importance of the board’s role in overseeing environmental and social risks, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the governance committee chair of a company in the S&P 500 index that fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board’s role in overseeing these issues.
28 A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, the audit committee, or the finance committee, depending on a given company’s board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.
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While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee.
When evaluating the board’s role in overseeing environmental and/or social issues, we will examine a company’s proxy statement and governing documents (such as committee charters) to determine if directors maintain a meaningful level of oversight of and accountability for a company’s material environmental and social impacts.
Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance
Glass Lewis carefully monitors companies’ performance with respect to environmental and social issues, including those related to climate and human capital management. In situations where we believe that a company has not properly managed or mitigated material environmental or social risks to the detriment of shareholder value, or when such mismanagement has threatened shareholder value, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the board who are responsible for oversight of environmental and social risks. In the absence of explicit board oversight of environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against members of the audit committee. In making these determinations, Glass Lewis will carefully review the situation, its effect on shareholder value, as well as any corrective action or other response made by the company.
For more information on how Glass Lewis evaluates environmental and social issues, please see Glass Lewis’ Overall Approach to ESG as well as our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.
Director Commitments
We believe that directors should have the necessary time to fulfill their duties to shareholders. In our view, an overcommitted director can pose a material risk to a company’s shareholders, particularly during periods of crisis. In addition, recent research indicates that the time commitment associated with being a director has been on a significant upward trend in the past decade.29 As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves as an executive officer of any public company30 while serving on more than two public company boards and any other director who serves on more than five public company boards.
29 For example, the 2015-2016 NACD Public Company Governance Survey states that, on average, directors spent a total of
248.2 hours annual on board-related matters during the past year, which it describes as a “historically high level” that is significantly above the average hours recorded in 2006. Additionally, the 2020 Spencer Stuart Board Index indicates that, while 39% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on one additional public board, just 2% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on two additional public boards and only one CEO serves on three.
30 When the executive officer in question serves only as an executive at a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) we will generally apply the higher threshold of five public company directorships.
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Because we believe that executives will primarily devote their attention to executive duties, we generally will not recommend that shareholders vote against overcommitted directors at the companies where they serve as an executive.
When determining whether a director’s service on an excessive number of boards may limit the ability of the director to devote sufficient time to board duties, we may consider relevant factors such as the size and location of the other companies where the director serves on the board, the director’s board roles at the companies in question, whether the director serves on the board of any large privately-held companies, the director’s tenure on the boards in question, and the director’s attendance record at all companies. In the case of directors who serve in executive roles other than CEO (e.g., executive chair), we will evaluate the specific duties and responsibilities of that role in determining whether an exception is warranted.
We may also refrain from recommending against certain directors if the company provides sufficient rationale for their continued board service. The rationale should allow shareholders to evaluate the scope of the directors’ other commitments, as well as their contributions to the board including specialized knowledge of the company’s industry, strategy or key markets, the diversity of skills, perspective and background they provide, and other relevant factors. We will also generally refrain from recommending to vote against a director who
serves on an excessive number of boards within a consolidated group of companies or a director that represents a firm whose sole purpose is to manage a portfolio of investments which include the company.
Other Considerations
In addition to the three key characteristics — independence, performance, experience — that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues as well as the size of the board of directors when making voting recommendations.
Conflicts of Interest
We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of directors:
1. | A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Due to the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it. |
2. | A director who provides — or a director who has an immediate family member who provides — material consulting or other material professional services to the company. These services may include legal, consulting,31 or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company’s decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional |
31 We will generally refrain from recommending against a director who provides consulting services for the company if the director is excluded from membership on the board’s key committees and we have not identified significant governance concerns with the board.
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services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company’s directors.
3. | A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting to more than $50,000. Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests. |
4. | Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other’s boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.32 |
5. | All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.33 In the event a board is classified and shareholders are therefore unable to vote against all directors, we will recommend voting against the remaining directors the next year they are up for a shareholder vote. If a poison pill with a term of one year or less was adopted without shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee. If the board has, without seeking shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, extended the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the entire board. |
Size of the Board of Directors
While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimal board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of “too many cooks in the kitchen” and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.
To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee) at a board with fewer than five directors or more than 20 directors.
Controlled Companies
We believe controlled companies warrant certain exceptions to our independence standards. The board’s function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual, entity (or group of shareholders party to a formal agreement) owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders
32 We do not apply a look-back period for this situation. The interlock policy applies to both public and private companies. We will also evaluate multiple board interlocks among non-insiders (i.e., multiple directors serving on the same boards at other companies), for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.
33 Refer to the “Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise” section for further discussion of our policies regarding anti-takeover measures, including poison pills.
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are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds board independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.
Independence Exceptions
The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:
1. We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.
2. | The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely |
of independent directors.
a. | We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company’s shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant. |
b. | Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choice for approving and monitoring senior executives’ pay, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. As such, we believe that having affiliated directors on a controlled company’s compensation committee is acceptable. However, given that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee. |
3. | Controlled companies do not need an independent chair or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board — such as chair or presiding director — can best carry out the board’s duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. |
Size of the Board of Directors
We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.
Audit Committee Independence
Despite a controlled company’s status, unlike for the other key committees, we nevertheless believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company’s controlled status, the interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company’s financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.
Board Responsiveness at Multi-Class Companies
With regard to companies where voting control is held through a multi-class share structure with disproportionate voting and economic rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. Where
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vote results indicate that a majority of unaffiliated shareholders supported a shareholder proposal or opposed a management proposal, we believe the board should demonstrate an appropriate level of responsiveness.
Significant Shareholders
Where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company’s voting power, we believe it is reasonable to allow proportional representation on the board and committees (excluding the audit committee) based on the individual or entity’s percentage of ownership.
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off, or Direct Listing
We believe companies that have recently completed an initial public offering (IPO), spin-off, or direct listing should be allowed adequate time to fully comply with marketplace listing requirements and meet basic corporate governance standards. Generally speaking, Glass Lewis refrains from making recommendations on the basis of governance standards (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.) during the one-year period following an IPO.
However, some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year. When evaluating companies that have recently gone public, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents in order to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely. We believe boards that approve highly restrictive governing documents have demonstrated that they may subvert shareholder interests following the IPO. In conducting this evaluation, Glass Lewis will consider:
1. The adoption of anti-takeover provisions such as a poison pill or classified board
2. | Supermajority vote requirements to amend governing documents |
3. | The presence of exclusive forum or fee-shifting provisions |
4. | Whether shareholders can call special meetings or act by written consent |
5. | The voting standard provided for the election of directors |
6. | The ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause |
7. | The presence of evergreen provisions in the company’s equity compensation arrangements |
8. | The presence of a multi-class share structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power |
that is aligned with their economic interest
In cases where Glass Lewis determines that the board has approved overly restrictive governing documents, we will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee. If there is no governance committee, or if a portion of such committee members are not standing for election due to a classified board structure, we will expand our recommendations to additional director nominees, based on who is standing for election.
In cases where, preceding an IPO, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to
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five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure). In the case of a multi-class share structure, if these provisions are put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.
In our view, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest. This notion is strengthened when a board adopts a classified board with an infinite duration or a poison pill with a five- to ten-year term immediately prior to going public, thereby insulating management for a substantial amount of time.
In addition, shareholders should also be wary of companies that adopt supermajority voting requirements before their IPO. Absent explicit provisions in the articles or bylaws stipulating that certain policies will be phased out over a certain period of time, long-term shareholders could find themselves in the predicament of having to attain a supermajority vote to approve future proposals seeking to eliminate such policies.
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company
The business combination of a private company with a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) facilitates the private entity becoming a publicly traded corporation. Thus, the business combination represents the private company’s de-facto IPO. We believe that some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed a business combination with a SPAC within the past year.
At meetings where shareholders vote on the business combination of a SPAC with a private company, shareholders are generally voting on a new corporate charter for the post-combination company as a condition to approval of the business combination. In many cases, shareholders are faced with the dilemma of having to approve corporate charters that severely restrict shareholder rights to facilitate the business combination.
Therefore, when shareholders are required to approve binding charters as a condition to approval of a business combination with a SPAC, we believe shareholders should also be provided with advisory votes on material charter amendments as a means to voice their opinions on such restrictive governance provisions.
When evaluating companies that have recently gone public via business combination with a SPAC, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely and whether these restrictive provisions were put forth for a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination.
In cases where, prior to the combined company becoming publicly traded, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the combined company becoming publicly traded if the board: (i) did not also submit these provisions to a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination; (ii) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the company becoming publicly traded; or (iii) did not provide for
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a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure).
Consistent with our view on IPOs, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest.
Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies
For companies that trade on multiple exchanges or are incorporated in foreign jurisdictions but trade only in the U.S., we will apply the governance standard most relevant in each situation. We will consider a number of factors in determining which Glass Lewis country-specific policy to apply, including but not limited to: (i) the corporate governance structure and features of the company including whether the board structure is unique to a particular market; (ii) the nature of the proposals; (iii) the location of the company’s primary listing, if one can be determined; (iv) the regulatory/governance regime that the board is reporting against; and (v) the availability and completeness of the company’s SEC filings.
OTC-listed Companies
Companies trading on the OTC Bulletin Board are not considered “listed companies” under SEC rules and therefore not subject to the same governance standards as listed companies. However, we believe that more stringent corporate governance standards should be applied to these companies given that their shares are still publicly traded.
When reviewing OTC companies, Glass Lewis will review the available disclosure relating to the shareholder meeting to determine whether shareholders are able to evaluate several key pieces of information, including: (i) the composition of the board’s key committees, if any; (ii) the level of share ownership of company insiders or directors; (iii) the board meeting attendance record of directors; (iv) executive and non-employee director compensation; (v) related-party transactions conducted during the past year; and (vi) the board’s leadership structure and determinations regarding director independence.
We are particularly concerned when company disclosure lacks any information regarding the board’s key committees. We believe that committees of the board are an essential tool for clarifying how the responsibilities of the board are being delegated, and specifically for indicating which directors are accountable for ensuring: (i) the independence and quality of directors, and the transparency and integrity of the nominating process; (ii) compensation programs that are fair and appropriate; (iii) proper oversight of the company’s accounting, financial reporting, and internal and external audits; and (iv) general adherence to principles of good corporate governance.
In cases where shareholders are unable to identify which board members are responsible for ensuring oversight of the above-mentioned responsibilities, we may consider recommending against certain members of the board. Ordinarily, we believe it is the responsibility of the corporate governance committee to provide thorough disclosure of the board’s governance practices. In the absence of such a committee, we believe it is appropriate to hold the board’s chair or, if such individual is an executive of the company, the longest-serving non-executive board member accountable.
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Mutual Fund Boards
Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund’s advisor are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.
The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:
1. Size of the board of directors — The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.
2. | The CFO on the board — Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund’s registered investment advisor should serve on the board. |
3. | Independence of the audit committee — The audit committee should consist solely of independent |
directors.
4. | Audit committee financial expert — At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert. |
The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:
1. Independence of the board — We believe that three-fourths of an investment company’s board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into “proposed rule” status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.
2. | When the auditor is not up for ratification — We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification. Due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) |
does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.
3. | Non-independent chair — The SEC has proposed that the chair of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund’s chair and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chair of an investment company’s nominating committee as well as the board chair if the chair and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chair and we agree with them that “an independent board chair would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of fund shareholders than would a chair who is an executive of the advisor.” (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf.) |
4. | Multiple funds overseen by the same director — Unlike service on a public company board, mutual |
fund boards require much less of a time commitment. Mutual fund directors typically serve on dozens of other mutual fund boards, often within the same fund complex. The Investment Company Institute’s
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(ICI) Overview of Fund Governance Practices, 1994-2012, indicates that the average number of funds served by an independent director in 2012 was 53. Absent evidence that a specific director is hindered from being an effective board member at a fund due to service on other funds’ boards, we refrain from maintaining a cap on the number of outside mutual fund boards that we believe a director can serve on.
Declassified Boards
Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.
Empirical studies have shown: (i) staggered boards are associated with a reduction in a firm’s valuation; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.
In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Some research has indicated that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction; further, when a staggered board negotiates a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premium occurs.34 Additional research found that charter-based staggered boards “reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization” and that “staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value.”35 A subsequent study reaffirmed that classified boards reduce shareholder value, finding “that the ongoing process of dismantling staggered boards, encouraged by institutional investors, could well contribute to increasing shareholder wealth.”36
Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2019, 90% of S&P 500 companies had declassified boards, up from 68% in 2009.37 Management proposals to declassify boards are approved with near unanimity and shareholder proposals on the topic also receive strong shareholder support; in 2014, shareholder proposals requesting that companies declassify their boards received average support of 84% (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes), whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.38 Further, a growing number of companies, nearly half of all those targeted by shareholder proposals requesting that all directors stand for election annually, either recommended shareholders support the proposal or made
34 Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,” 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002).
35 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards” (2004).
36 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang, “Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,”
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806 (2010), p. 26.
37 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.
38 Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy”.
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no recommendation, a departure from the more traditional management recommendation to vote against shareholder proposals.
Given our belief that declassified boards promote director accountability, the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company’s value and the established shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.
Board Composition and Refreshment
Glass Lewis strongly supports routine director evaluation, including independent external reviews, and periodic board refreshment to foster the sharing of diverse perspectives in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. Further, we believe the board should evaluate the need for changes to board composition based on an analysis of skills and experience necessary for the company, as well as the results of the director evaluations, as opposed to relying solely on age or tenure limits. When necessary, shareholders can address concerns regarding proper board composition through director elections.
In our view, a director’s experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. This said, we recognize that in rare circumstances, a lack of refreshment can contribute to a lack of board responsiveness to poor company performance.
We will note as a potential concern instances where the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new directors have joined the board in the past five years. While we will be highlighting this as a potential area of concern, we will not be making voting recommendations strictly on this basis, unless we have identified other governance or board performance concerns.
On occasion, age or term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change in such circumstances.
While we understand that age limits can aid board succession planning, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board’s overall composition, including the diversity of its members, the alignment of the board’s areas of expertise with a company’s strategy, the board’s approach to corporate governance, and its stewardship of company performance, rather than imposing inflexible rules that don’t necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.
However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. In cases where the board waives its term/age limits for two or more consecutive years, Glass Lewis will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committee chair, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board is proposing to waive this rule, such as consummation of a corporate transaction.
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Board Diversity
Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring that the board is composed of directors who have a diversity of skills, thought and experience, as such diversity benefits companies by providing a broad range of perspectives and insights. Glass Lewis closely reviews the composition of the board for representation of diverse director candidates. Beginning in 2022, we will generally recommend voting against the nominating committee chair of a board that has fewer than two gender diverse directors, or the entire nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside the Russell 3000 index, and all boards with six or fewer total directors, our existing policy requiring a minimum of one gender diverse director will remain in place.
Beginning with shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2023, we will transition from a fixed numerical approach to a percentage-based approach and will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse at companies within the Russell 3000 index.
We may extend our gender diversity recommendations to additional members of the nominating committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company’s size and industry, applicable laws in its state of headquarters, and its overall governance profile. Additionally, when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company’s disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board.
State Laws on Gender Diversity
Several states have begun to encourage board diversity through legislation. For example, companies headquartered in California are now subject to mandatory board composition requirements. Other states have enacted or are considering legislation that encourages companies to diversify their boards but does not mandate board composition requirements. Furthermore, several states have enacted or are considering legislation that mandates certain disclosure or reporting requirements in filings made with each respective state annually.
Glass Lewis will recommend in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in applicable state laws when they come into effect. We will generally refrain from recommending against directors when applicable state laws do not mandate board composition requirements, are non-binding, or solely impose disclosure or reporting requirements.
State Laws on Underrepresented Community Diversity
Several states have also begun to encourage board diversity beyond gender through legislation. For example, companies headquartered in California are required to have one director from an “underrepresented community” on their board by the end of 2021 (defined as an individual who self-identifies as Black, African American, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaska Native, or who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender). And, by the end of 2022, California companies must
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have at least two such individuals on boards of five to eight members, and three such individuals on boards of nine or more members.
Accordingly, for meetings held after December 31, 2021, if a company headquartered in California does not have at least one director from an underrepresented community on its board or does not provide adequate
disclosure to make this determination, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee.
Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills
Because company disclosure is critical when measuring the mix of diverse attributes and skills of directors, Glass Lewis assesses the quality of such disclosure in companies’ proxy statements. Accordingly, we reflect how a company’s proxy statement presents: (i) the board’s current percentage of racial/ethnic diversity; (ii) whether the board’s definition of diversity explicitly includes gender and/or race/ethnicity; (iii) whether the board has adopted a policy requiring women and minorities to be included in the initial pool of candidates when selecting new director nominees (aka “Rooney Rule”); and (iv) board skills disclosure. Such ratings will help inform our assessment of a company’s overall governance and may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified.
Beginning in 2022, for companies in the S&P 500 index with particularly poor disclosure (i.e., those failing to provide any disclosure in each of the above categories), we may recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee. Beginning in 2023, when companies in the S&P 500 index have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority board demographic information, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee.
Stock Exchange Diversity Disclosure Requirements
On August 6, 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure for Nasdaq-listed companies. Beginning in 2022, companies listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange will be required to disclose certain board diversity statistics annually in a standardized format in the proxy statement or on the company's website. Nasdaq-listed companies are required to provide this disclosure by the later of (i) August 8, 2022, or (ii) the date the company files its proxy statement for its 2022 annual meeting. Accordingly, for annual meetings held after August 8, 2022, of applicable Nasdaq-listed companies, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee when the required disclosure has not been provided.
Proxy Access
In lieu of running their own contested election, proxy access would not only allow certain shareholders to nominate directors to company boards but the shareholder nominees would be included on the company’s ballot, significantly enhancing the ability of shareholders to play a meaningful role in selecting their representatives. Glass Lewis generally supports affording shareholders the right to nominate director candidates to management’s proxy as a means to ensure that significant, long-term shareholders have an ability to nominate candidates to the board.
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Companies generally seek shareholder approval to amend company bylaws to adopt proxy access in response to shareholder engagement or pressure, usually in the form of a shareholder proposal requesting proxy access, although some companies may adopt some elements of proxy access without prompting. Glass Lewis considers several factors when evaluating whether to support proposals for companies to adopt proxy access including the specified minimum ownership and holding requirement for shareholders to nominate one or more directors, as well as company size, performance and responsiveness to shareholders.
For a discussion of recent regulatory events in this area, along with a detailed overview of the Glass Lewis approach to shareholder proposals regarding Proxy Access, refer to Glass Lewis’ Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives, available at www.glasslewis.com.
Majority Vote for Election of Directors
Majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the de facto standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.
While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.
The number of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a majority voting standard has declined significantly during the past decade, largely as a result of widespread adoption of majority voting or director resignation policies at U.S. companies. In 2019, 89% of the S&P 500 Index had implemented a resignation policy for directors failing to receive majority shareholder support, compared to 65% in 2009.39
The Plurality Vote Standard
Today, most U.S. companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including that director, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee “wins” the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard is the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in “failed elections.”
Advantages of a Majority Vote Standard
If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. Given that so few directors (less than 100 a year) do not receive majority support from shareholders, we think that a majority vote standard is reasonable since it will neither result in
39 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.
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many failed director elections nor reduce the willingness of qualified, shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future. Further, most directors who fail to receive a majority shareholder vote in favor of their election do not step down, underscoring the need for true majority voting.
We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Although shareholders only rarely fail to support directors, the occasional majority vote against a director’s election will likely deter the election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests. Glass Lewis will therefore generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote, excepting contested director elections.
In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (i.e., a resignation policy) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors.
We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director’s replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.
Conflicting and Excluded Proposals
SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(9) allows companies to exclude shareholder proposals “if the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company’s own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.” On October 22, 2015, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (SLB 14H) clarifying its rule concerning the exclusion of certain shareholder proposals when similar items are also on the ballot. SLB 14H increased the burden on companies to prove to SEC staff that a conflict exists; therefore, many companies still chose to place management proposals alongside similar shareholder proposals in many cases.
During the 2018 proxy season, a new trend in the SEC’s interpretation of this rule emerged. Upon submission of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a lower special meeting threshold, several companies petitioned the SEC for no-action relief under the premise that the shareholder proposals conflicted with management’s own special meeting proposals, even though the management proposals set a higher threshold than those requested by the proponent. No-action relief was granted to these companies; however, the SEC stipulated that the companies must state in the rationale for the management proposals that a vote in favor of management’s proposal was tantamount to a vote against the adoption of a lower special meeting threshold. In certain instances, shareholder proposals to lower an existing special meeting right threshold were excluded on the basis that they conflicted with management proposals seeking to ratify the existing special meeting rights. We find the exclusion of these shareholder proposals to be especially problematic as, in these instances, shareholders are not offered any enhanced shareholder right, nor would the approval (or rejection) of the ratification proposal initiate any type of meaningful change to shareholders’ rights.
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In instances where companies have excluded shareholder proposals, such as those instances where special meeting shareholder proposals are excluded as a result of “conflicting” management proposals, Glass Lewis will take a case-by-case approach, taking into account the following issues:
· | The threshold proposed by the shareholder resolution; |
· | The threshold proposed or established by management and the attendant rationale for the threshold; |
· | Whether management’s proposal is seeking to ratify an existing special meeting right or adopt a bylaw that would establish a special meeting right; and |
· | The company’s overall governance profile, including its overall responsiveness to and engagement with |
shareholders.
Glass Lewis generally favors a 10-15% special meeting right. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting for management or shareholder proposals that fall within this range. When faced with conflicting proposals, Glass Lewis will generally recommend in favor of the lower special meeting right and will recommend voting against the proposal with the higher threshold. However, in instances where there are conflicting management and shareholder proposals and a company has not established a special meeting right, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote in favor of the shareholder proposal and that they abstain from a management-proposed bylaw amendment seeking to establish a special meeting right. We believe that an abstention is appropriate in this instance in order to ensure that shareholders are sending a clear signal regarding their preference for the appropriate threshold for a special meeting right, while not directly opposing the establishment of such a right.
In cases where the company excludes a shareholder proposal seeking a reduced special meeting right by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal, we will generally recommend voting against the chair or members of the governance committee.
In other instances of conflicting management and shareholder proposals, Glass Lewis will consider the following:
· | The nature of the underlying issue; |
· | The benefit to shareholders of implementing the proposal; |
· | The materiality of the differences between the terms of the shareholder proposal and management proposal; |
· | The context of a company’s shareholder base, corporate structure and other relevant circumstances; |
and
· | A company’s overall governance profile and, specifically, its responsiveness to shareholders as evidenced by a company’s response to previous shareholder proposals and its adoption of progressive shareholder rights provisions. |
In recent years, we have seen the dynamic nature of the considerations given by the SEC when determining whether companies may exclude certain shareholder proposals. We understand that not all shareholder proposals serve the long-term interests of shareholders, and value and respect the limitations placed on shareholder proponents, as certain shareholder proposals can unduly burden companies. However, Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should be able to vote on issues of material importance.
We view the shareholder proposal process as an important part of advancing shareholder rights and encouraging responsible and financially sustainable business practices. While recognizing that certain proposals
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cross the line between the purview of shareholders and that of the board, we generally believe that companies should not limit investors’ ability to vote on shareholder proposals that advance certain rights or promote beneficial disclosure. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will make note of instances where a company has successfully petitioned the SEC to exclude shareholder proposals. If after review we believe that the exclusion of a shareholder proposal is detrimental to shareholders, we may, in certain very limited circumstances, recommend against members of the governance committee.
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Transparency and Integrity in Financial Reporting
Auditor Ratification
The auditor’s role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company’s books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company’s financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company’s fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:
“The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence.”
As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor’s interests and the public’s interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor’s performance and to annually ratify a board’s auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that “to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability ... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement.”40
On August 16, 2011, the PCAOB issued a Concept Release seeking public comment on ways that auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism could be enhanced, with a specific emphasis on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB convened several public roundtable meetings during 2012 to further discuss such matters. Glass Lewis believes auditor rotation can ensure both the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the audit; we will typically recommend supporting proposals to require auditor rotation when
the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years), particularly at companies with a history of accounting problems.
On June 1, 2017, the PCAOB adopted new standards to enhance auditor reports by providing additional important information to investors. For companies with fiscal year end dates on or after December 15, 2017,
40 “Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.” p. VIII:20,
October 6, 2008.
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reports were required to include the year in which the auditor began serving consecutively as the company’s auditor. For large accelerated filers with fiscal year ends of June 30, 2019 or later, and for all other companies with fiscal year ends of December 15, 2020 or later, communication of critical audit matters (CAMs) will also be required. CAMs are matters that have been communicated to the audit committee, are related to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements, and involve especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment.
Glass Lewis believes the additional reporting requirements are beneficial for investors. The additional disclosures can provide investors with information that is critical to making an informed judgment about an auditor’s independence and performance. Furthermore, we believe the additional requirements are an important step toward enhancing the relevance and usefulness of auditor reports, which too often are seen as boilerplate compliance documents that lack the relevant details to provide meaningful insight into a particular audit.
Voting Recommendations on Auditor Ratification
We generally support management’s choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor’s independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chair. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weaknesses in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.
Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:
1. When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.
2. | Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in the reporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.41 |
3. | When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, |
or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.
4. | When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same |
industry.
5. | When the company has aggressive accounting policies. |
6. | When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements. |
7. | Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures without adequate justification. |
8. | We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between |
the auditor’s interests and shareholder interests.
9. | In determining whether shareholders would benefit from rotating the company’s auditor, where relevant we will consider factors that may call into question an auditor’s effectiveness, including auditor |
41 An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.
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tenure, a pattern of inaccurate audits, and any ongoing litigation or significant controversies. When Glass Lewis considers ongoing litigation and significant controversies, it is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such lawsuits or other significant controversies reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.”
Pension Accounting Issues
A pension accounting question occasionally raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company’s net income. This issue often arises in the executive- compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.
Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company’s discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company’s performance.
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The Link Between Compensation and Performance
Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives, as we believe that this is an important area in which the board’s priorities are revealed. Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. We believe the most effective compensation arrangements provide for an appropriate mix of performance-based short- and long-term incentives in addition to fixed pay elements while promoting a prudent and sustainable level of risk-taking.
Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which pay is aligned with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. We recognize performance metrics must necessarily vary depending on the company and industry, among other factors, and may include a wide variety of financial measures as well as industry-specific performance indicators. However, we believe companies should disclose why the specific performance metrics were selected and how the actions they are designed to incentivize will lead to better corporate performance.
Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders’ interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. While we favor full disclosure for senior executives and we view pay disclosure at the aggregate level (e.g., the number of employees being paid over a certain amount or in certain categories) as potentially useful, we do not believe shareholders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives.
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay)
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) required companies to hold an advisory vote on executive compensation at the first shareholder meeting that occurs six months after enactment of the bill (January 21, 2011).
This practice of allowing shareholders a non-binding vote on a company’s compensation report is standard practice in many non-U.S. countries, and has been a requirement for most companies in the United Kingdom since 2003 and in Australia since 2005. Although say-on-pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of
“against” or “abstain” votes indicates substantial shareholder concern about a company’s compensation policies and procedures.
Given the complexity of most companies’ compensation programs, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. We review each company’s compensation on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that each company must be examined in the context of industry, size,
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maturity, performance, financial condition, its historic pay for performance practices, and any other relevant internal or external factors.
We believe that each company should design and apply specific compensation policies and practices that are appropriate to the circumstances of the company and, in particular, will attract and retain competent executives and other staff, while motivating them to grow the company’s long-term shareholder value.
Where we find those specific policies and practices serve to reasonably align compensation with performance, and such practices are adequately disclosed, Glass Lewis will recommend supporting the company’s approach.
If, however, those specific policies and practices fail to demonstrably link compensation with performance, Glass
Lewis will generally recommend voting against the say-on-pay proposal.
Glass Lewis reviews say-on-pay proposals on both a qualitative basis and a quantitative basis, with a focus on several main areas:
· | The overall design and structure of the company’s executive compensation programs including selection and challenging nature of performance metrics; |
· | The implementation and effectiveness of the company’s executive compensation programs including pay mix and use of performance metrics in determining pay levels; |
· | The quality and content of the company’s disclosure; |
· | The quantum paid to executives; and |
· | The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the company’s current and past pay- for-performance grades. |
We also review any significant changes or modifications, including post fiscal year-end changes and one-time
awards, particularly where the changes touch upon issues that are material to Glass Lewis recommendations.
Say-on-Pay Voting Recommendations
In cases where we find deficiencies in a company’s compensation program’s design, implementation or management, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. Generally such instances include evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (i.e., deficient or failing pay-for- performance grades), unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.), questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or other egregious compensation practices.
Although not an exhaustive list, the following issues when weighed together may cause Glass Lewis to
recommend voting against a say-on-pay vote:
· | Inappropriate or outsized self-selected peer groups and/or benchmarking issues such as compensation |
targets set well above the median without adequate justification;
· | Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments, including golden handshakes and golden parachutes; |
· | Insufficient response to low shareholder support; |
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· | Problematic contractual payments, such as guaranteed bonuses; |
· | Insufficiently challenging performance targets and/or high potential payout opportunities; |
· | Performance targets lowered without justification; |
· | Discretionary bonuses paid when short- or long-term incentive plan targets were not met; |
· | Executive pay high relative to peers not justified by outstanding company performance; and |
· | The terms of the long-term incentive plans are inappropriate (please see “Long-Term Incentives”). |
The aforementioned issues may also influence Glass Lewis’ assessment of the structure of a company’s compensation program. We evaluate structure on a “Good, Fair, Poor” rating scale whereby a “Good” rating represents a compensation program with little to no concerns, a “Fair” rating represents a compensation program with some concerns and a “Poor” rating represents a compensation program that deviates significantly from best practice or contains one or more egregious compensation practices.
We believe that it is important for companies to provide investors with clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements. Similar to structure, we evaluate disclosure on a “Good, Fair, Poor” rating scale whereby a “Good” rating represents a thorough discussion of all elements of compensation, a “Fair” rating represents an adequate discussion of all or most elements of compensation and a “Poor” rating represents an incomplete or absent discussion of compensation. In instances where a company has simply failed to provide sufficient disclosure of its policies, we may recommend shareholders vote against this proposal solely on this basis, regardless of the appropriateness of compensation levels.
In general, most companies will fall within the “Fair” range for both structure and disclosure, and Glass Lewis largely uses the “Good” and “Poor” ratings to highlight outliers.
Where we identify egregious compensation practices, we may also recommend voting against the compensation committee based on the practices or actions of its members during the year. Such practices may include: approving large one-off payments, the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion, or sustained poor pay for performance practices. (Refer to the section on "Compensation Committee Performance" for more
information.)
Company Responsiveness
For companies that receive a significant level of shareholder opposition (20% or greater) to the say-on-pay proposal at the previous annual meeting, we believe the board should demonstrate some level of engagement and responsiveness to the shareholder concerns behind the disapproval, particularly in response to shareholder feedback.
While we recognize that sweeping changes cannot be made to a compensation program without due consideration, and that often a majority of shareholders may have voted in favor of the proposal, given that the average approval rate for say-on-pay proposals is about 90%, we believe the compensation committee should provide some level of response to a significant vote against. In general, our expectations regarding the minimum appropriate levels of responsiveness will correspond with the level of shareholder opposition, as expressed both through the magnitude of opposition in a single year, and through the persistence of shareholder disapproval over time.
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Responses we consider appropriate include engaging with large shareholders to identify their concerns, and, where reasonable, implementing changes that directly address those concerns within the company’s compensation program. In the absence of any evidence that the board is actively engaging shareholders on these issues and responding accordingly, we may recommend holding compensation committee members accountable for failing to adequately respond to shareholder opposition. Regarding such recommendations, careful consideration will be given to the level of shareholder protest and the severity and history of compensation.
Pay for Performance
Glass Lewis believes an integral part of a well-structured compensation package is a successful link between pay and performance. Our proprietary pay-for-performance model was developed to better evaluate the link between pay and performance. Generally, compensation and performance are measured against a peer group of appropriate companies that may overlap, to a certain extent, with a company’s self-disclosed peers. This quantitative analysis provides a consistent framework and historical context for our clients to determine how well companies link executive compensation to relative performance. Companies that demonstrate a weaker link are more likely to receive a negative recommendation; however, other qualitative factors such as overall incentive structure, significant forthcoming changes to the compensation program or reasonable long-term payout levels may mitigate our concerns to a certain extent.
While we assign companies a letter grade of A, B, C, D or F based on the alignment between pay and performance, the grades derived from the Glass Lewis pay-for-performance analysis do not follow the traditional U.S. school letter grade system. Rather, the grades are generally interpreted as follows:
Grade of A: The company’s percentile rank for pay is significantly less than its percentile rank for performance Grade of B: The company’s percentile rank for pay is moderately less than its percentile rank for performance Grade of C: The company’s percentile rank for pay is approximately aligned with its percentile rank for
performance
Grade of D: The company’s percentile rank for pay is higher than its percentile rank for performance
Grade of F: The company’s percentile rank for pay is significantly higher than its percentile rank for performance
For the avoidance of confusion, the above grades encompass the relationship between a company’s percentile rank for pay and its percentile rank in performance. Separately, a specific comparison between the company’s executive pay and its peers’ executive pay levels is discussed in the analysis for additional insight into the grade. Likewise, a specific comparison between the company’s performance and its peers’ performance is reflected in the analysis for further context.
We also use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on say-on-pay proposals. As such, if a company receives a “D” or “F” from our proprietary model, we are more likely to recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. However, other qualitative factors such as an effective overall incentive structure, the relevance of selected performance metrics, significant forthcoming enhancements or reasonable long-term payout levels may give us cause to recommend in favor of a proposal even when we have identified a disconnect between pay and performance.
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In determining the peer groups used in our A-F pay-for-performance letter grades, Glass Lewis utilizes a proprietary methodology that considers both country-based and sector-based peers, along with each company’s network of self-disclosed peers. Each component is considered on a weighted basis and is subject to size-based ranking and screening. The peer groups used are provided to Glass Lewis by Diligent Intel based on Glass Lewis’ methodology and using Diligent Intel’s data.
Selecting an appropriate peer group to analyze a company’s compensation program is a subjective determination, requiring significant judgment and on which there is not a “correct” answer. Since the peer group used is based on an independent, proprietary technique, it will often differ from the one used by the company which, in turn, will affect the resulting analyses. While Glass Lewis believes that the independent, rigorous methodology it uses provides a valuable perspective on the company’s compensation program, the company’s self-selected peer group is also presented in the Proxy Paper for comparative purposes.
Short-Term Incentives
A short-term bonus or incentive (STI) should be demonstrably tied to performance. Whenever possible, we believe a mix of corporate and individual performance measures is appropriate. We would normally expect performance measures for STIs to be based on company-wide or divisional financial measures as well as non- financial factors such as those related to safety, environmental issues, and customer satisfaction. While we recognize that companies operating in different sectors or markets may seek to utilize a wide range of metrics, we expect such measures to be appropriately tied to a company’s business drivers.
Further, the threshold, target and maximum performance goals and corresponding payout levels that can be achieved under STI plans should be disclosed. Shareholders should expect stretching performance targets for the maximum award to be achieved. Any increase in the potential target and maximum award should be clearly justified to shareholders, as should any decrease in target and maximum performance levels from the previous year.
Glass Lewis recognizes that disclosure of some measures or performance targets may include commercially confidential information. Therefore, we believe it may be reasonable to exclude such information in some cases as long as the company provides sufficient justification for non-disclosure. However, where a short-term bonus has been paid, companies should disclose the extent to which performance has been achieved against relevant targets, including disclosure of the actual target achieved.
Where management has received significant short-term incentive payments but overall performance and/or the shareholder experience over the measurement year prima facie appears to be poor or negative, we believe the company should provide a clear explanation of why these significant short-term payments were made. We also believe any significant changes to the program structure should be accompanied by rationalizing disclosure.
Further, where a company has applied upward discretion, which includes lowering goals mid-year, increasing calculated payouts or retroactively pro-rating performance periods, we expect a robust discussion of why the decision was necessary. In addition, we believe that where companies use non-GAAP or bespoke metrics, clear reconciliations between these figures and GAAP figures in audited financial statement should be provided.
Adjustments to GAAP figures may be considered in Glass Lewis’ assessment of the effectiveness of the incentive at tying executive pay with performance.
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Given the pervasiveness of non-formulaic plans in this market, we do not generally recommend against a pay program on this basis alone. If a company has chosen to rely primarily on a subjective assessment or the board’s discretion in determining short-term bonuses, we believe that the proxy statement should provide a meaningful discussion of the board’s rationale in determining the bonuses paid as well as a rationale for the use of a non- formulaic mechanism. Particularly where the aforementioned disclosures are substantial and satisfactory, such a structure will not provoke serious concern in our analysis on its own. However, in conjunction with other significant issues in a program’s design or operation, such as a disconnect between pay and performance, the absence of a cap on payouts, or a lack of performance-based long-term awards, the use of a non-formulaic bonus may help drive a negative recommendation.
Long-Term Incentives
Glass Lewis recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs, which are often the primary long-term incentive for executives. When used appropriately, they can provide a vehicle for linking an executive’s pay to company performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation can be an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.
There are certain elements that Glass Lewis believes are common to most well-structured long-term incentive
(LTI) plans. These include:
· | No re-testing or lowering of performance conditions; |
· | Performance metrics that cannot be easily manipulated by management; |
· | Two or more performance metrics; |
· | At least one relative performance metric that compares the company’s performance to a relevant peer group or index; |
· | Performance periods of at least three years; |
· | Stretching metrics that incentivize executives to strive for outstanding performance while not |
encouraging excessive risk-taking;
· | Individual award limits expressed as a percentage of base salary; and |
· | Equity granting practices that are clearly disclosed. |
In evaluating long-term incentive grants, Glass Lewis generally believes that a significant portion of the grant should consist of performance-based awards, putting a portion of executive compensation at-risk and demonstrably linked to the performance of the company. While we will consistently raise concern with programs that do not meet this criterion, we may refrain from a negative recommendation in the absence of other significant issues with the program’s design or operation. However, in cases where performance-based awards are significantly rolled back or eliminated from a company’s long-term incentive plan, such decisions will generally be viewed negatively outside of exceptional circumstances, and may lead to a recommendation against the proposal.
Performance measures should be carefully selected and should relate to the specific business/industry in which the company operates and, especially, to the key value drivers of the company’s business. As with short-term incentive plans, the basis for any adjustments to metrics or results should be clearly explained, as should the company’s judgment on the use of discretion and any significant changes to the performance program structure.
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While cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass Lewis generally believes that measuring a company’s performance with multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the company’s performance than a single metric. Further, reliance on just one metric may focus too much management attention on a single target and is therefore more susceptible to manipulation. When utilized for relative measurements, external benchmarks such as a sector index or peer group should be disclosed and transparent. The rationale behind the selection of a specific index or peer group should also be disclosed.
Internal performance benchmarks should also be disclosed and transparent, unless a cogent case for confidentiality is made and fully explained. Similarly, actual performance and vesting levels for previous grants earned during the fiscal year should be disclosed.
We also believe shareholders should evaluate the relative success of a company’s compensation programs, particularly with regard to existing equity-based incentive plans, in linking pay and performance when evaluating potential changes to LTI plans and determining the impact of additional stock awards. We will therefore review the company’s pay-for-performance grade (see below for more information) and specifically the proportion of total compensation that is stock-based.
Grants of Front-Loaded Awards
Many U.S. companies have chosen to provide large grants, usually in the form of equity awards, that are intended to serve as compensation for multiple years. This practice, often called front-loading, is taken up either in the regular course of business or as a response to specific business conditions and with a predetermined objective. We believe shareholders should generally be wary of this approach, and we accordingly weigh these grants with particular scrutiny.
While the use of front-loaded awards is intended to lock-in executive service and incentives, the same rigidity also raises the risk of effectively tying the hands of the compensation committee. As compared with a more responsive annual granting schedule program, front-loaded awards may preclude improvements or changes to reflect evolving business strategies. The considerable emphasis on a single grant can place intense pressures on every facet of its design, amplifying any potential perverse incentives and creating greater room for unintended consequences. In particular, provisions around changes of control or separations of service must ensure that executives do not receive excessive payouts that do not reflect shareholder experience or company performance.
We consider a company’s rationale for granting awards under this structure and also expect any front-loaded awards to include a firm commitment not to grant additional awards for a defined period, as is commonly associated with this practice. Even when such a commitment is provided, unexpected circumstances may lead the board to make additional payments or awards for retention purposes, or to incentivize management towards more realistic goals or a revised strategy. If a company breaks its commitment not to grant further awards, we may recommend against the pay program unless a convincing rationale is provided.
The multiyear nature of these awards generally lends itself to significantly higher compensation figures in the year of grant than might otherwise be expected. In our qualitative analysis of the grants of front-loaded awards to executives, Glass Lewis considers the quantum of the award on an annualized basis and may compare this result to the prior practice and peer data, among other benchmarks. Additionally, for awards that are granted in the form of equity, Glass Lewis may consider the total potential dilutive effect of such award on shareholders.
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Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria
Glass Lewis believes that explicit environmental and/or social (E&S) criteria in executive incentive plans, when used appropriately, can serve to provide both executives and shareholders a clear line of sight into a company’s ESG strategy, ambitions, and targets. Although we are strongly supportive of companies’ incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in compensation programs should be predicated on each company’s unique circumstances. In order to establish a meaningful link between pay and performance, companies must consider factors including their industry, size, risk profile, maturity, performance, financial condition, and any other relevant internal or external factors.
When a company is introducing E&S criteria into executive incentive plans, we believe it is important that companies provide shareholders with sufficient disclosure to allow them to understand how these criteria align with its strategy. Additionally, Glass Lewis recognizes that there may be situations where certain E&S performance criteria are reasonably viewed as prerequisites for executive performance, as opposed to behaviors and conditions that need to be incentivized. For example, we believe that shareholders should interrogate the use of metrics that award executives for ethical behavior or compliance with policies and regulations. It is our view that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, particularly in the case of qualitative metrics, we believe that shareholders should be provided with a clear understanding of the basis on which the criteria will be assessed. Where quantitative targets have been set, we believe that shareholders are best served when these are disclosed on an ex-ante basis, or the board should outline why it believes it is unable to do so.
While we believe that companies should generally set long-term targets for their environmental and social ambitions, we are mindful that not all compensation schemes lend themselves to the inclusion of E&S metrics. We also are of the view that companies should retain flexibility in not only choosing to incorporate E&S metrics in their compensation plans, but also in the placement of these metrics. For example, some companies may resolve that including E&S criteria in the annual bonus may help to incentivize the achievement of short-term milestones and allow for more maneuverability in strategic adjustments to long-term goals. Other companies may determine that their long-term sustainability targets are best achieved by incentivizing executives through metrics included in their long-term incentive plans.
One-Time Awards
Glass Lewis believes shareholders should generally be wary of awards granted outside of the standard incentive schemes, as such awards have the potential to undermine the integrity of a company’s regular incentive plans or the link between pay and performance, or both. We generally believe that if the existing incentive programs fail to provide adequate incentives to executives, companies should redesign their compensation programs rather than make additional grants.
However, we recognize that in certain circumstances, additional incentives may be appropriate. In these cases, companies should provide a thorough description of the awards, including a cogent and convincing explanation of their necessity and why existing awards do not provide sufficient motivation. Further, such awards should be tied to future service and performance whenever possible.
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Additionally, we believe companies making supplemental or one-time awards should also describe if and how the regular compensation arrangements will be affected by these additional grants. In reviewing a company’s use of supplemental awards, Glass Lewis will evaluate the terms and size of the grants in the context of the company’s overall incentive strategy and granting practices, as well as the current operating environment.
Contractual Payments and Arrangements
Beyond the quantum of contractual payments, Glass Lewis will also consider the design of any entitlements. Certain executive employment terms may help to drive a negative recommendation, including, but not limited to:
· | Excessively broad change in control triggers; |
· | Inappropriate severance entitlements; |
· | Inadequately explained or excessive sign-on arrangements; |
· | Guaranteed bonuses (especially as a multiyear occurrence); and |
· | Failure to address any concerning practices in amended employment agreements. |
In general, we are wary of terms that are excessively restrictive in favor of the executive, or that could potentially incentivize behaviors that are not in a company’s best interest.
Sign-on Awards and Severance Benefits
We acknowledge that there may be certain costs associated with transitions at the executive level. In evaluating the size of severance and sign-on arrangements, we may consider the executive’s regular target compensation level, or the sums paid to other executives (including the recipient’s predecessor, where applicable) in evaluating the appropriateness of such an arrangement.
We believe sign-on arrangements should be clearly disclosed and accompanied by a meaningful explanation of the payments and the process by which the amounts were reached. Further, the details of and basis for any “make-whole” payments (paid as compensation for awards forfeited from a previous employer) should be provided.
With respect to severance, we believe companies should abide by predetermined payouts in most circumstances. While in limited circumstances some deviations may not be inappropriate, we believe shareholders should be provided with a meaningful explanation of any additional or increased benefits agreed upon outside of regular arrangements. However, where Glass Lewis determines that such predetermined payouts are particularly problematic or unfavorable to shareholders, we may consider the execution of such payments in a negative recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation.
In the U.S. market, most companies maintain severance entitlements based on a multiple of salary and, in many cases, bonus. In almost all instances we see, the relevant multiple is three or less, even in the case of a change in control. We believe the basis and total value of severance should be reasonable and should not exceed the upper limit of general market practice. We consider the inclusion of long-term incentives in cash severance calculations to be inappropriate, particularly given the commonality of accelerated vesting and the proportional weight of long-term incentives as a component of total pay. Additional considerations, however, will be accounted for when reviewing atypically structured compensation approaches.
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Change in Control
Glass Lewis considers double-trigger change in control arrangements, which require both a change in control and termination or constructive termination, to be best practice. Any arrangement that is not explicitly double- trigger may be considered a single-trigger or modified single-trigger arrangement.
Further, we believe that excessively broad definitions of change in control are potentially problematic as they may lead to situations where executives receive additional compensation where no meaningful change in status or duties has occurred.
Excise Tax Gross-ups
Among other entitlements, Glass Lewis is strongly opposed to excise tax gross-ups related to IRC § 4999 and their expansion, especially where no consideration is given to the safe harbor limit. We believe that under no normal circumstance is the inclusion of excise tax gross-up provisions in new agreements or the addition of such provisions to amended agreements acceptable. In consideration of the fact that minor increases in change-in- control payments can lead to disproportionately large excise taxes, the potential negative impact of tax gross- ups far outweighs any retentive benefit.
Depending on the circumstances, the addition of new gross-ups around this excise tax may lead to negative recommendations for a company’s say-on-pay proposal, the chair of the compensation committee, or the entire committee, particularly in cases where a company had committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future. For situations in which the addition of new excise tax gross ups will be provided in connection with a specific change-in-control transaction, this policy may be applied to the say-on-pay proposal, the golden parachute proposal and recommendations related to the compensation committee for all involved corporate parties, as appropriate.
Amended Employment Agreements
Any contractual arrangements providing for problematic pay practices which are not addressed in materially amended employment agreements will potentially be viewed by Glass Lewis as a missed opportunity on the part of the company to align its policies with current best practices. Such problematic pay practices include, but are not limited to, excessive change in control entitlements, modified single-trigger change in control entitlements, excise tax gross-ups, and multi-year guaranteed awards.
Recoupment Provisions (Clawbacks)
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to create a rule requiring listed companies to adopt policies for recouping certain compensation during a three-year look-back period. The rule is more stringent than Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and applies to incentive-based compensation paid to current or former executives in the case of a financial restatement — specifically, the recoupment provision applies in cases where the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to erroneous data resulting from material
non-compliance with any financial reporting requirements under the securities laws. Although the SEC has yet to finalize the relevant rules, we believe it is prudent for boards to adopt detailed bonus recoupment policies that
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go beyond Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to prevent executives from retaining performance-based awards that were not truly earned.
We are increasingly focusing attention on the specific terms of recoupment policies beyond whether a company maintains a clawback that simply satisfies the minimum legal requirements. We believe that clawbacks should be triggered, at a minimum, in the event of a restatement of financial results or similar revision of performance indicators upon which bonuses were based. Such policies allow the board to review all performance-related bonuses and awards made to senior executives during a specified lookback period and, to the extent feasible, allow the company to recoup such bonuses where appropriate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in cases where a company maintains only a bare-minimum clawback, the absence of more expansive recoupment tools may inform our overall view of the compensation program.
Hedging of Stock
Glass Lewis believes that the hedging of shares by executives in the shares of the companies where they are employed severs the alignment of interests of the executive with shareholders. We believe companies should adopt strict policies to prohibit executives from hedging the economic risk associated with their share ownership in the company.
Pledging of Stock
Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should examine the facts and circumstances of each company rather than apply a one-size-fits-all policy regarding employee stock pledging. Glass Lewis believes that shareholders benefit when employees, particularly senior executives, have meaningful financial interest in the success of the
company under their management, and therefore we recognize the benefits of measures designed to encourage employees to both buy shares out of their own pocket and to retain shares they have been granted; blanket policies prohibiting stock pledging may discourage executives and employees from doing either.
However, we also recognize that the pledging of shares can present a risk that, depending on a host of factors, an executive with significant pledged shares and limited other assets may have an incentive to take steps to avoid a forced sale of shares in the face of a rapid stock price decline. Therefore, to avoid substantial losses from a forced sale to meet the terms of the loan, the executive may have an incentive to boost the stock price in the short term in a manner that is unsustainable, thus hurting shareholders in the long-term. We also recognize concerns regarding pledging may not apply to less senior employees, given the latter group’s significantly more limited influence over a company’s stock price. Therefore, we believe that the issue of pledging shares should be reviewed in that context, as should policies that distinguish between the two groups.
Glass Lewis believes that the benefits of stock ownership by executives and employees may outweigh the risks of stock pledging, depending on many factors. As such, Glass Lewis reviews all relevant factors in evaluating proposed policies, limitations and prohibitions on pledging stock, including:
· | The number of shares pledged; |
· | The percentage executives’ pledged shares are of outstanding shares; |
· | The percentage executives’ pledged shares are of each executive’s shares and total assets; |
· | Whether the pledged shares were purchased by the employee or granted by the company; |
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· | Whether there are different policies for purchased and granted shares; |
· | Whether the granted shares were time-based or performance-based; |
· | The overall governance profile of the company; |
· | The volatility of the company’s stock (in order to determine the likelihood of a sudden stock price drop); |
· | The nature and cyclicality, if applicable, of the company’s industry; |
· | The participation and eligibility of executives and employees in pledging; |
· | The company’s current policies regarding pledging and any waiver from these policies for employees and executives; and |
· | Disclosure of the extent of any pledging, particularly among senior executives. |
Compensation Consultant Independence
As mandated by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require compensation committees to consider six factors (https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/33-9330.pdf, p.31-32) in assessing compensation advisor independence. According to the SEC, “no one factor should be viewed as a determinative factor.” Glass Lewis believes this six- factor assessment is an important process for every compensation committee to undertake but believes companies employing a consultant for board compensation, consulting and other corporate services should provide clear disclosure beyond just a reference to examining the six points, in order to allow shareholders to review the specific aspects of the various consultant relationships.
We believe compensation consultants are engaged to provide objective, disinterested, expert advice to the compensation committee. When the consultant or its affiliates receive substantial income from providing other services to the company, we believe the potential for a conflict of interest arises and the independence of the consultant may be jeopardized. Therefore, Glass Lewis will, when relevant, note the potential for a conflict of interest when the fees paid to the advisor or its affiliates for other services exceeds those paid for compensation consulting.
CEO Pay Ratio
As mandated by Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer and Protection Act, beginning in 2018, issuers will be required to disclose the median annual total compensation of all employees except the CEO, the total annual compensation of the CEO or equivalent position, and the ratio between the two amounts. Glass Lewis will display the pay ratio as a data point in our Proxy Papers, as available. While we recognize that the pay ratio has the potential to provide additional insight when assessing a company’s pay practices, at this time it will not be a determinative factor in our voting recommendations.
Frequency of Say-on-Pay
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the frequency of say- on-pay votes (i.e., every one, two or three years). Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires companies to hold such votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes at least once every six years.
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We believe companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year. We believe that the time and financial burdens to a company with regard to an annual vote are relatively small and incremental and are outweighed by the benefits to shareholders through more frequent accountability. Implementing biannual or triennial votes on executive compensation limits shareholders’ ability to hold the board accountable for its compensation practices through means other than voting against the compensation committee. Unless a company provides a compelling rationale or unique circumstances for say-on-pay votes less frequent than annually, we will generally recommend that shareholders support annual votes on compensation.
Vote on Golden Parachute Arrangements
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to provide shareholders with a separate non-binding vote on approval of golden parachute compensation arrangements in connection with certain change-in-control transactions. However, if the golden parachute arrangements have previously been subject to a say-on-pay vote which shareholders approved, then this required vote is waived.
Glass Lewis believes the narrative and tabular disclosure of golden parachute arrangements benefits all shareholders. Glass Lewis analyzes each golden parachute arrangement on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, among other items: the nature of the change-in-control transaction, the ultimate value of the payments particularly compared to the value of the transaction, any excise tax gross-up obligations, the tenure and position of the executives in question before and after the transaction, any new or amended employment agreements entered into in connection with the transaction, and the type of triggers involved (i.e., single vs. double). In cases where new problematic features, such as excise tax gross-up obligations, are introduced in a golden parachute proposal, such features may contribute to a negative recommendation not only for the golden parachute proposal under review, but for the next say-on-pay proposal of any involved corporate parties, as well as recommendations against their compensation committee as appropriate.
Equity-Based Compensation Plan Proposals
We believe that equity compensation awards, when not abused, are useful for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance. Glass Lewis recognizes that equity-based compensation plans are critical components of a company’s overall compensation program, and we analyze such plans accordingly based on both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Our quantitative analysis assesses the plan’s cost and the company’s pace of granting utilizing a number of different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company’s financial performance. Each of the analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.
We compare the program’s expected annual expense with the business’s operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the plan’s expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers
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and directors of the firm contribute to the creation of enterprise value but not necessarily market capitalization (the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because, in addition to creeping averages serving to inflate compensation, we believe that some absolute limits are warranted.
We then consider qualitative aspects of the plan such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions. We also closely review the choice and use of, and difficulty in meeting, the awards’ performance metrics and targets, if any. We believe significant changes to the terms of a plan should be explained for shareholders and clearly indicated.
Other factors such as a company’s size and operating environment may also be relevant in assessing the severity of concerns or the benefits of certain changes. Finally, we may consider a company’s executive compensation practices in certain situations, as applicable.
We evaluate equity plans based on certain overarching principles:
· | Companies should seek more shares only when needed; |
· | Requested share amounts should be small enough that companies seek shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently); |
· | If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members; |
· | Dilution of annual net share count or voting power, along with the “overhang” of incentive plans, should be limited; |
· | Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a |
percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group;
· | The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business’s value; |
· | The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business’s financial results; |
· | Plans should not permit re-pricing of stock options; |
· | Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms; |
· | Plans should not count shares in ways that understate the potential dilution, or cost, to common |
shareholders. This refers to “inverse” full-value award multipliers;
· | Selected performance metrics should be challenging and appropriate, and should be subject to relative performance measurements; and |
· | Stock grants should be subject to minimum vesting and/or holding periods sufficient to ensure sustainable performance and promote retention. |
Option Exchanges and Repricing
Glass Lewis is generally opposed to the repricing of employee and director options regardless of how it is accomplished. Employees should have some downside risk in their equity-based compensation program and repricing eliminates any such risk. As shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock, we believe that the equity compensation of employees and directors should be similarly situated to align their interests with those of shareholders. We believe this will facilitate appropriate risk- and opportunity-taking for the company by employees.
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We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be “rescued” from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option’s value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.
In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck.
There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program may be acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends, rather than specific company issues, cause a stock’s value to decline dramatically and the repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In viewing the company’s stock decline as part of a larger trend, we would expect the impact to approximately reflect the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and magnitude. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original “bargain” was struck. In such a scenario, we may opt to support a repricing or option exchange program only if sufficient conditions are met.
We are largely concerned with the inclusion of the following features:
· | Officers and board members cannot participate in the program; and |
· | The exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders using very conservative assumptions. |
· | In our evaluation of the appropriateness of the program design, we also consider the inclusion of the following features: |
· | The vesting requirements on exchanged or repriced options are extended beyond one year; |
· | Shares reserved for options that are reacquired in an option exchange will permanently retire (i.e., will |
not be available for future grants) so as to prevent additional shareholder dilution in the future; and
· | Management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market. |
Option Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging
Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to repricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return.
Backdating an option is the act of changing an option’s grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. In past studies, Glass Lewis identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.
Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock’s price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.
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The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.
A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company’s compensation and governance practices.42
Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis
will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have failed to act in the best interests of shareholders.
Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company’s financial reports.
When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.
Director Compensation Plans
Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive reasonable and appropriate compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. However, a balance is required. Fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals, but excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and potentially compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. We will consider recommending support for compensation plans that include option grants or other equity- based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. However, to
ensure directors are not incentivized in the same manner as executives but rather serve as a check on imprudent risk-taking in executive compensation plan design, equity grants to directors should not be performance-based.
42 Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. “LUCKY CEOs.” November, 2006.
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Where an equity plan exclusively or primarily covers non-employee directors as participants, we do not believe
that the plan should provide for performance-based awards in any capacity.
When non-employee director equity grants are covered by the same equity plan that applies to a company’s broader employee base, we will use our proprietary model and analyst review of this model to guide our voting recommendations. If such a plan broadly allows for performance-based awards to directors or explicitly provides for such grants, we may recommend against the overall plan on this basis, particularly if the company has granted performance-based awards to directors in past.
Employee Stock Purchase Plans
Glass Lewis believes that employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) can provide employees with a sense of ownership in their company and help strengthen the alignment between the interests of employees and shareholders. We evaluate ESPPs by assessing the expected discount, purchase period, expected purchase activity (if previous activity has been disclosed) and whether the plan has a “lookback” feature. Except for the most extreme cases, Glass Lewis will generally support these plans given the regulatory purchase limit of
$25,000 per employee per year, which we believe is reasonable. We also look at the number of shares requested to see if a ESPP will significantly contribute to overall shareholder dilution or if shareholders will not have a chance to approve the program for an excessive period of time. As such, we will generally recommend against ESPPs that contain “evergreen” provisions that automatically increase the number of shares available under the ESPP each year.
Executive Compensation Tax Deductibility — Amendment to IRC 162(M)
The “Tax Cut and Jobs Act” had significant implications on Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision that allowed companies to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO, if the compensation is performance-based and is paid under shareholder-approved plans. Glass Lewis does not generally view amendments to equity plans and changes to compensation programs in response to the elimination of tax deductions under 162(m) as problematic. This specifically holds true if such modifications contribute to the maintenance of a sound performance-based compensation program.
As grandfathered contracts may continue to be eligible for tax deductions under the transition rule for Section 162(m), companies may therefore submit incentive plans for shareholder approval to take of advantage of the tax deductibility afforded under 162(m) for certain types of compensation.
We believe the best practice for companies is to provide robust disclosure to shareholders so that they can make fully informed judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that disclosure should include specific performance metrics, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company’s peers.
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We typically recommend voting against a 162(m) proposal where: (i) a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; (ii) a company fails to provide one of either a total maximum or an individual maximum; or
(iii) he proposed plan or individual maximum award limit is excessive when compared with the plans of the company’s peers.
The company’s record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for- performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of setting reasonable pay relative to business performance, we generally recommend voting in favor of a plan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.
As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders’ best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards; it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.
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Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise
Anti-Takeover Measures
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)
Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders’ best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.
We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company’s course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders’ financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan’s implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.
In certain circumstances, we will support a poison pill that is limited in scope to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes each of the following attributes:
· | The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction; |
· | The offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days; |
· | The offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms; |
· | There is no fairness opinion requirement; and |
· | There is a low to no premium requirement. |
Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.
NOL Poison Pills
Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382
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of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies’ ability to use NOLs in the event of a “change of ownership.”43 In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill (NOL pill) in order to prevent an inadvertent change of ownership by multiple investors purchasing small chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.
Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis taking into consideration, among other factors, the value of the NOLs to the company, the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holding and the nature of the larger shareholders, the trigger threshold and whether the term of the plan is limited in duration (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable “sunset” provision) or is subject to periodic board review and/or shareholder ratification. In many cases, companies will propose the adoption of bylaw amendments specifically restricting certain share transfers, in addition to proposing the adoption of a NOL pill. In general, if we support the terms of a particular NOL pill, we will generally support the additional protective amendment in the absence of significant concerns with the specific terms of that proposal.
Furthermore, we believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.
Fair Price Provisions
Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation’s common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority shareholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of ”continuing directors” and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.
The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an “interested shareholder” by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested shareholder. An interested shareholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company’s outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.
Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested shareholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential
43 Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a “change of ownership” of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the “trafficking” of net operating losses.
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costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger
or other transaction at a later time.
Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.
Quorum Requirements
Glass Lewis believes that a company’s quorum requirement should be set at a level high enough to ensure that a broad range of shareholders are represented in person or by proxy, but low enough that the company can transact necessary business. Companies in the U.S. are generally subject to quorum requirements under the
laws of their specific state of incorporation. Additionally, those companies listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market are required to specify a quorum in their bylaws, provided however that such quorum may not be less than one- third of outstanding shares. Prior to 2013, the New York Stock Exchange required a quorum of 50% for listed companies, although this requirement was dropped in recognition of individual state requirements and potential confusion for issuers. Delaware, for example, required companies to provide for a quorum of no less than one-third of outstanding shares; otherwise such quorum shall default to a majority.
We generally believe a majority of outstanding shares entitled to vote is an appropriate quorum for the transaction of business at shareholder meetings. However, should a company seek shareholder approval of a lower quorum requirement we will generally support a reduced quorum of at least one-third of shares entitled to vote, either in person or by proxy. When evaluating such proposals, we also consider the specific facts and circumstances of the company, such as size and shareholder base.
Director and Officer Indemnification
While Glass Lewis strongly believes that directors and officers should be held to the highest standard when carrying out their duties to shareholders, some protection from liability is reasonable to protect them against certain suits so that these officers feel comfortable taking measured risks that may benefit shareholders. As such, we find it appropriate for a company to provide indemnification and/or enroll in liability insurance to cover its directors and officers so long as the terms of such agreements are reasonable.
Reincorporation
In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. When examining a management proposal to reincorporate to a different state
or country, we review the relevant financial benefits, generally related to improved corporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, resulting
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from the change in domicile. Where the financial benefits are de minimis and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, we will recommend voting against the transaction.
However, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways would the company benefit from shifting jurisdictions including the following:
· | Is the board sufficiently independent? |
· | Does the company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place? |
· | Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)? |
· | Do shareholders have the right to call special meetings of shareholders? |
· | Are there other material governance issues of concern at the company? |
· | Has the company’s performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years? |
· | How has the company ranked in Glass Lewis’ pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years? |
· | Does the company have an independent chair? |
We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company’s place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.
Exclusive Forum and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions
Glass Lewis recognizes that companies may be subject to frivolous and opportunistic lawsuits, particularly in conjunction with a merger or acquisition, that are expensive and distracting. In response, companies have sought ways to prevent or limit the risk of such suits by adopting bylaws regarding where the suits must be brought or shifting the burden of the legal expenses to the plaintiff, if unsuccessful at trial.
Glass Lewis believes that charter or bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder’s choice of legal venue are not in the best interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of shareholder claims by increasing their associated costs and making them more difficult to pursue. As such, shareholders should be wary about approving any limitation on their legal recourse including limiting themselves to a single jurisdiction (e.g., Delaware or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933) without compelling evidence that it will benefit shareholders.
For this reason, we recommend that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision unless the company: (i) provides a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders; (ii) provides evidence of abuse of legal process in other, non- favored jurisdictions; (iii) narrowly tailors such provision to the risks involved; and (iv) maintains a strong record of good corporate governance practices.
Moreover, in the event a board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, we will weigh the importance of the other bundled
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provisions when determining the vote recommendation on the proposal. We will nonetheless recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee for bundling disparate proposals into a single proposal (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines).
Similarly, some companies have adopted bylaws requiring plaintiffs who sue the company and fail to receive a judgment in their favor pay the legal expenses of the company. These bylaws, also known as “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws, will likely have a chilling effect on even meritorious shareholder lawsuits as shareholders would face an strong financial disincentive not to sue a company. Glass Lewis therefore strongly opposes the adoption of such fee-shifting bylaws and, if adopted without shareholder approval, will recommend voting against the governance committee. While we note that in June of 2015 the State of Delaware banned the adoption of fee-shifting bylaws, such provisions could still be adopted by companies incorporated in other states.
Authorized Shares
Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company’s operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:
1. Stock Split — We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company’s most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.
2. | Shareholder Defenses — Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses. |
3. | Financing for Acquisitions — We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy. |
4. | Financing for Operations — We review the company’s cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company’s history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital. |
Issuing additional shares generally dilutes existing holders in most circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares. Similar concerns may also lead us to recommend against a proposal to conduct a reverse stock split if the board does not state that it will reduce the number of authorized common shares in a ratio proportionate to the split.
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With regard to authorizations and/or increases in preferred shares, Glass Lewis is generally against such authorizations, which allow the board to determine the preferences, limitations and rights of the preferred shares (known as “blank-check preferred stock”). We believe that granting such broad discretion should be of concern to common shareholders, since blank-check preferred stock could be used as an anti-takeover device or in some other fashion that adversely affects the voting power or financial interests of common shareholders.
Therefore, we will generally recommend voting against such requests, unless the company discloses a commitment to not use such shares as an anti-takeover defense or in a shareholder rights plan, or discloses a commitment to submit any shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote prior to its adoption.
While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.
Advance Notice Requirements
We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.
These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.
We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.
Virtual Shareholder Meetings
A growing contingent of companies have elected to hold shareholder meetings by virtual means only. Glass Lewis believes that virtual meeting technology can be a useful complement to a traditional, in-person shareholder meeting by expanding participation of shareholders who are unable to attend a shareholder meeting in person (i.e. a “hybrid meeting”). However, we also believe that virtual-only meetings have the potential to curb the ability of a company’s shareholders to meaningfully communicate with the company’s management.
Prominent shareholder rights advocates, including the Council of Institutional Investors, have expressed concerns that such virtual-only meetings do not approximate an in-person experience and may serve to reduce the board’s accountability to shareholders. When analyzing the governance profile of companies that choose to hold virtual-only meetings, we look for robust disclosure in a company’s proxy statement which assures
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shareholders that they will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in- person meeting.
Examples of effective disclosure include: (i) addressing the ability of shareholders to ask questions during the meeting, including time guidelines for shareholder questions, rules around what types of questions are allowed, and rules for how questions and comments will be recognized and disclosed to meeting participants; (ii) procedures, if any, for posting appropriate questions received during the meeting and the company’s answers, on the investor page of their website as soon as is practical after the meeting; (iii) addressing technical and logistical issues related to accessing the virtual meeting platform; and (iv) procedures for accessing technical support to assist in the event of any difficulties accessing the virtual meeting.
We will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee where the board is
planning to hold a virtual-only shareholder meeting and the company does not provide such disclosure.
Voting Structure
Multi-Class Share Structures
Glass Lewis believes multi-class voting structures are typically not in the best interests of common shareholders. Allowing one vote per share generally operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board.
Furthermore, we believe that the economic stake of each shareholder should match their voting power and that no small group of shareholders, family or otherwise, should have voting rights different from those of other shareholders. On matters of governance and shareholder rights, we believe shareholders should have the power to speak and the opportunity to effect change. That power should not be concentrated in the hands of a few for reasons other than economic stake.
We generally consider a multi-class share structure to reflect negatively on a company’s overall corporate governance. Because we believe that companies should have share capital structures that protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders as well as any controlling entity, we typically recommend that shareholders vote in favor of recapitalization proposals to eliminate dual-class share structures. Similarly, we will generally recommend against proposals to adopt a new class of common stock. Beginning in 2022, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).
In the case of a board that adopts a multi-class share structure in connection with an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting the multi-class structure to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class structure (generally seven years or less). If the multi-class share structure is put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.
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When analyzing voting results from meetings of shareholders at companies controlled through multi-class structures, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. Where vote results indicate that a majority of unaffiliated shareholders supported a shareholder proposal or opposed a management proposal, we believe the board should demonstrate an appropriate level of responsiveness.
Cumulative Voting
Cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of the stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. As companies generally have multiple nominees up for election, cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. It can be important when a board is controlled
by insiders or affiliates and where the company’s ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.
Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of
large holders.
We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company’s governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.
Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted anti-takeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.
Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.
Supermajority Vote Requirements
Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This
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in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover,
we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.
Transaction of Other Business
We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before an annual or special meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.
Anti-Greenmail Proposals
Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder.
Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.
Mutual Funds: Investment Policies and Advisory Agreements
Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund’s structure and/or a fund’s relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:
· | The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement; |
· | Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and |
· | Any material changes to the fund’s investment objective or strategy. |
We generally support amendments to a fund’s investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement or fund reorganization. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund’s advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.
In matters pertaining to a fund’s investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund’s objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments
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to a fund’s investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally purchased, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors’ diversification strategies.
Real Estate Investment Trusts
The complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) provide for a unique shareholder evaluation. In simple terms, a REIT must have a minimum of 100 shareholders (the 100 Shareholder Test) and no more than 50% of the value of its shares can be held by five or fewer individuals (the “5/50 Test”). At least 75% of a REITs’ assets must be in real estate, it must derive 75% of its gross income from rents or mortgage interest, and it must pay out 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends. In addition, as a publicly traded security listed on a stock exchange, a REIT must comply with the same general listing requirements as a publicly traded equity.
In order to comply with such requirements, REITs typically include percentage ownership limitations in their organizational documents, usually in the range of 5% to 10% of the REITs outstanding shares. Given the complexities of REITs as an asset class, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach in our evaluation of REIT proposals, especially regarding changes in authorized share capital, including preferred stock.
Preferred Stock Issuances at REITs
Glass Lewis is generally against the authorization of "blank-check preferred stock." However, given the requirement that a REIT must distribute 90% of its net income annually, it is inhibited from retaining capital to make investments in its business. As such, we recognize that equity financing likely plays a key role in a REIT’s growth and creation of shareholder value. Moreover, shareholder concern regarding the use of preferred stock as an anti-takeover mechanism may be allayed by the fact that most REITs maintain ownership limitations in their certificates of incorporation. For these reasons, along with the fact that REITs typically do not engage in private placements of preferred stock (which result in the rights of common shareholders being adversely impacted), we may support requests to authorize shares of blank-check preferred stock at REITs.
Business Development Companies
Business Development Companies (BDCs) were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980; they are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are taxed as regulated investment companies (RICs) under the Internal Revenue Code. BDCs typically operate as publicly traded private equity firms that invest in early stage to mature private companies as well as small public companies. BDCs realize operating income when their investments are sold off, and therefore maintain complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements that are similar to those of REITs—the most evident of which is that BDCs must distribute at least 90% of their taxable earnings as dividends.
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Authorization to Sell Shares at a Price Below Net Asset Value
Considering that BDCs are required to distribute nearly all their earnings to shareholders, they sometimes need
to offer additional shares of common stock in the public markets to finance operations and acquisitions. However, shareholder approval is required in order for a BDC to sell shares of common stock at a price below Net Asset Value (NAV). Glass Lewis evaluates these proposals using a case-by-case approach, but will recommend supporting such requests if the following conditions are met:
· | The authorization to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date of one year or less from the date that shareholders approve the underlying proposal (i.e. the meeting date); |
· | The proposed discount below NAV is minimal (ideally no greater than 20%); |
· | The board specifies that the issuance will have a minimal or modest dilutive effect (ideally no greater than 25% of the company’s then-outstanding common stock prior to the issuance); and |
· | A majority of the company’s independent directors who do not have a financial interest in the issuance approve the sale. |
In short, we believe BDCs should demonstrate a responsible approach to issuing shares below NAV, by proactively addressing shareholder concerns regarding the potential dilution of the requested share issuance, and explaining if and how the company’s past below-NAV share issuances have benefitted the company.
Auditor Ratification and Below-NAV Issuances
When a BDC submits a below-NAV issuance for shareholder approval, we will refrain from recommending against the audit committee chair for not including auditor ratification on the same ballot. Because of the unique way these proposals interact, votes may be tabulated in a manner that is not in shareholders’ interests. In cases where these proposals appear on the same ballot, auditor ratification is generally the only “routine proposal,” the presence of which triggers a scenario where broker non-votes may be counted toward shareholder quorum, with unintended consequences.
Under the 1940 Act, below-NAV issuance proposals require relatively high shareholder approval. Specifically, these proposals must be approved by the lesser of: (i) 67% of votes cast if a majority of shares are represented at the meeting; or (ii) a majority of outstanding shares. Meanwhile, any broker non-votes counted toward quorum will automatically be registered as “against” votes for purposes of this proposal. The unintended result can be a case where the issuance proposal is not approved, despite sufficient voting shares being cast in favor. Because broker non-votes result from a lack of voting instruction by the shareholder, we do not believe shareholders’ ability to weigh in on the selection of auditor outweighs the consequences of failing to approve an issuance proposal due to such technicality.
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), also known as “blank check companies,” are publicly traded entities with no commercial operations and are formed specifically to pool funds in order to complete a merger or acquisition within a set time frame. In general, the acquisition target of a SPAC is either not yet identified or otherwise not explicitly disclosed to the public even when the founders of the SPAC may have at least one target in mind. Consequently, IPO investors often do not know what company they will ultimately be investing in.
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SPACs are therefore very different from typical operating companies. Shareholders do not have the same expectations associated with an ordinary publicly traded company and executive officers of a SPAC typically do not continue in employment roles with an acquired company.
Extension of Business Combination Deadline
Governing documents of SPACs typically provide for the return of IPO proceeds to common shareholders if no qualifying business combination is consummated before a certain date. Because the time frames for the consummation of such transactions are relatively short, SPACs will sometimes hold special shareholder meetings at which shareholders are asked to extend the business combination deadline. In such cases, an acquisition target will typically have been identified, but additional time is required to allow management of the SPAC to finalize the terms of the deal.
Glass Lewis believes management and the board are generally in the best position to determine when the extension of a business combination deadline is needed. We therefore generally defer to the recommendation of management and support reasonable extension requests.
SPAC Board Independence
The board of directors of a SPAC’s acquisition target is in many cases already established prior to the business combination. In some cases, however, the board’s composition may change in connection with the business combination, including the potential addition of individuals who served in management roles with the SPAC. The role of a SPAC executive is unlike that of a typical operating company executive. Because the SPAC’s only business is identifying and executing an acquisition deal, the interests of a former SPAC executive are also different. Glass Lewis does not automatically consider a former SPAC executive to be affiliated with the acquired operating entity when their only position on the board of the combined entity is that of an otherwise independent director. Absent any evidence of an employment relationship or continuing material financial interest in the combined entity, we will therefore consider such directors to be independent.
Director Commitments of SPAC Executives
We believe the primary role of executive officers at SPACs is identifying acquisition targets for the SPAC and consummating a business combination. Given the nature of these executive roles and the limited business operations of SPACs, when a directors’ only executive role is at a SPAC, we will generally apply our higher limit for company directorships. As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves in an executive role only at a SPAC while serving on more than five public company boards.
Shareholder Proposals
Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders, support effective ESG oversight and reporting, and encourage director accountability. Accordingly, Glass Lewis places a significant emphasis on promoting transparency, robust governance structures and companies’ responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders. We also believe that companies should be transparent on
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how they are mitigating material ESG risks, including those related to climate change, human capital management, and stakeholder relations.
To that end, we evaluate all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis with a view to promoting long-term shareholder value. While we are generally supportive of those that promote board accountability, shareholder rights, and transparency, we consider all proposals in the context of a company’s unique operations and risk profile.
For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposals, please refer to our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.
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Overall Approach to
Environmental, Social & Governance
Glass Lewis evaluates all environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. We believe that companies should be considering material environmental and social factors in all aspects of their operations and that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that allow them to understand how these factors are being considered and how attendant risks are being mitigated. We also are of the view that governance is a critical factor in how companies manage environmental and social risks and opportunities and that a well-governed company will be generally managing these issues better than one without a governance structure that promotes board independence and accountability.
We believe part of the board’s role is to ensure that management conducts a complete risk analysis of company operations, including those that have material environmental and social implications. We believe that directors should monitor management’s performance in both capitalizing on environmental and social opportunities and mitigating environmental and social risks related to operations in order to best serve the interests of shareholders. Companies face significant financial, legal and reputational risks resulting from poor environmental and social practices, or negligent oversight thereof. Therefore, in cases where the board or management has neglected to take action on a pressing issue that could negatively impact shareholder value, we believe that shareholders should take necessary action in order to effect changes that will safeguard their financial interests.
Given the importance of the role of the board in executing a sustainable business strategy that allows for the realization of environmental and social opportunities and the mitigation of related risks, relating to environmental risks and opportunities, we believe shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental or social risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental and social risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. In such instances, we will generally recommend against responsible members of the board that are specifically charged with oversight of the issue
in question.
When evaluating environmental and social factors that may be relevant to a given company, Glass Lewis does so in the context of the financial materiality of the issue to the company’s operations. We believe that all companies face risks associated with environmental and social issues. However, we recognize that these risks manifest themselves differently at each company as a result of a company’s operations, workforce, structure, and geography, among other factors. Accordingly, we place a significant emphasis on the financial implications of a company’s actions with regard to impacts on its stakeholders and the environment.
When evaluating environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis examines companies’:
Direct environmental and social risk — Companies should evaluate financial exposure to direct environmental risks associated with their operations. Examples of direct environmental risks include those associated with oil or gas spills, contamination, hazardous leakages, explosions, or reduced water or air quality, among others.
Social risks may include non-inclusive employment policies, inadequate human rights policies, or issues that
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adversely affect the company’s stakeholders. Further, we believe that firms should consider their exposure to risks emanating from a broad range of issues, over which they may have no or only limited control, such as insurance companies being affected by increased storm severity and frequency resulting from climate change or membership in trade associations with controversial political ties.
Risk due to legislation and regulation — Companies should evaluate their exposure to changes or potential changes in regulation that affect current and planned operations. Regulation should be carefully monitored in all jurisdictions in which the company operates. We look closely at relevant and proposed legislation and evaluate whether the company has responded proactively.
Legal and reputational risk — Failure to take action on important environmental or social issues may carry the risk of inciting negative publicity and potentially costly litigation. While the effect of high-profile campaigns on shareholder value may not be directly measurable, we believe it is prudent for companies to carefully evaluate the potential impacts of the public perception of their impacts on stakeholders and the environment. When considering investigations and lawsuits, Glass Lewis is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations or other charges that have not been resolved. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or charges or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such concerns, lawsuits or investigations reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.
Governance risk — Inadequate oversight of environmental and social issues carries significant risks to companies. When leadership is ineffective or fails to thoroughly consider potential risks, such risks are likely unmitigated and could thus present substantial risks to the company, ultimately leading to loss of shareholder value.
Glass Lewis believes that one of the most crucial factors in analyzing the risks presented to companies in the form of environmental and social issues is the level and quality of oversight over such issues. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. When companies have not provided for explicit, board-level oversight of environmental and social matters and/or when a
substantial environmental or social risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against members of the board. In addition, or alternatively, depending on the proposals presented, we may also consider recommending voting in favor of relevant shareholder proposals or against other relevant
management-proposed items, such as the ratification of auditor, a company’s accounts and reports, or
ratification of management and board acts.
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Connect with Glass Lewis
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DISCLAIMER
© 2021 Glass, Lewis & Co., and/or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
This document is intended to provide an overview of Glass Lewis’ proxy voting guidelines. It is not intended to
be exhaustive and does not address all potential voting issues. Glass Lewis’ proxy voting guidelines, as they apply to certain issues or types of proposals, are further explained in supplemental guidelines and reports that are made available on Glass Lewis’ website – http://www.glasslewis.com. These guidelines have not been set or approved by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or any other regulatory body. Additionally, none of the information contained herein is or should be relied upon as investment advice. The content of this
document has been developed based on Glass Lewis’ experience with proxy voting and corporate governance issues, engagement with clients and issuers, and review of relevant studies and surveys, and has not been tailored to any specific person or entity.
Glass Lewis’ proxy voting guidelines are grounded in corporate governance best practices, which often exceed minimum legal requirements. Accordingly, unless specifically noted otherwise, a failure to meet these guidelines should not be understood to mean that the company or individual involved has failed to meet applicable legal requirements.
No representations or warranties express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of any information included herein. In addition, Glass Lewis shall not be liable for any losses or damages arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use, reliance on, or inability to use any such information. Glass Lewis expects its subscribers possess sufficient experience and knowledge to make their own decisions entirely independent of any information contained in this document.
All information contained in this report is protected by law, including, but not limited to, copyright law, and none of such information may be copied or otherwise reproduced, repackaged, further transmitted, transferred, disseminated, redistributed or resold, or stored for subsequent use for any such purpose, in whole or in part, in any form or manner, or by any means whatsoever, by any person without Glass Lewis’ prior written consent.
WALTHAUSEN FUNDS
WALTHAUSEN
FOCUSED SMALL CAP VALUE FUND
Institutional Class (WSVIX)
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
June
1, 2022
This Statement of Additional Information ("SAI") is not a prospectus. It should be read in conjunction with the Prospectus of Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund dated June 1, 2022. The Funds Annual Report to Shareholders, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2022, has been incorporated by reference into this SAI. A free copy of the Prospectus can be obtained by writing the Transfer Agent at P.O. Box 46707, Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707 or by calling 1-888-925-8428.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST AND THE FUND | 1 |
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT FUND INVESTMENTS AND RISK CONSIDERATIONS | 1 |
INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS | 6 |
THE INVESTMENT ADVISOR | 7 |
THE PORTFOLIO MANAGER | 8 |
TRUSTEES AND OFFICERS | 9 |
BOARD INTEREST IN THE FUND | 12 |
COMPENSATION | 13 |
CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES | 13 |
AUDIT COMMITTEE | 13 |
PORTFOLIO TRANSACTIONS AND BROKERAGE | 13 |
ADDITIONAL TAX INFORMATION | 14 |
PRICING OF FUND SHARES | 16 |
PURCHASES AND SALES THROUGH BROKER DEALERS | 17 |
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAM | 17 |
CUSTODIAN | 17 |
FUND SERVICES | 17 |
INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM | 18 |
DISTRIBUTOR | 18 |
DISCLOSURE OF PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS | 18 |
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS | 19 |
PROXY VOTING POLICIES | 19 |
-i-
DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST AND THE FUND
Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund (the "Fund"), formerly the Walthausen Select Value Fund up until October 15, 2020, was organized as a diversified series of Walthausen Funds (the "Trust"), on December 1, 2010 and commenced operations on December 27, 2010. The Trust is an open-end investment company established under the laws of Ohio by an Agreement and Declaration of Trust dated October 10, 2007 (the "Trust Agreement"). The Trust Agreement permits the Trustees to issue an unlimited number of shares of beneficial interest of separate series without par value. The Fund is currently one of two series authorized by the Trustees. The investment adviser to the Fund is Walthausen & Co., LLC (the "Advisor").
The Fund does not issue share certificates. All shares are held in non-certificate form registered on the books of the Fund and the Fund's transfer agent for the account of the shareholder. Each share of a series represents an equal proportionate interest in the assets and liabilities belonging to that series with each other share of that series and is entitled to such dividends and distributions out of income belonging to the series as are declared by the Trustees. The shares do not have cumulative voting rights or any preemptive or conversion rights, and the Trustees have the authority from time to time to divide or combine the shares of any series into a greater or lesser number of shares of that series so long as the proportionate beneficial interest in the assets belonging to that series and the rights of shares of any other series are in no way affected. In case of any liquidation of a series, the holders of shares of the series being liquidated will be entitled to receive as a class a distribution out of the assets, net of the liabilities, belonging to that series. Expenses attributable to any series are borne by that series. Any general expenses of the Trust not readily identifiable as belonging to a particular series are allocated by or under the direction of the Trustees in such manner as the Trustees determine to be fair and equitable. No shareholder is liable to further calls or to assessment by the Trust without his or her express consent.
For information concerning the purchase and redemption of shares of the Fund, see "How to Buy Shares and Sell Shares" in the Prospectus. For a description of the methods used to determine the share price and value of the Fund's assets, see "Pricing of Fund Shares" in the Prospectus and in this Statement of Additional Information.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT FUND INVESTMENTS AND RISK CONSIDERATIONS
This section contains a discussion of some of the investments the Fund may make and some of the techniques it may use.
A. Equity Securities. The Fund may invest in equity securities such as common stock, preferred stock, convertible securities, rights and warrants. Common stocks, the most familiar type, represent an equity (ownership) interest in a corporation. Warrants are options to purchase equity securities at a specified price for a specific time period. Rights are similar to warrants, but normally have a short duration and are distributed by the issuer to its shareholders. Although equity securities have a history of long term growth in value, their prices fluctuate based on changes in a company's financial condition and on overall market and economic conditions.
Equity securities also include exchange traded funds (ETFs). To the extent the Fund invests in a sector product, the Fund is subject to the risks associated with that sector. Additionally, the Fund may invest in new exchange traded shares as they become available. When the Fund invests in ETFs or other investment companies, it will indirectly bear its proportionate share of any fees and expenses payable directly by the investment company.
Many ETFs are organized as investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the 1940 Act). Investments in the securities of other investment companies may involve duplication of advisory fees and certain other expenses. By investing in another investment company, a Fund becomes a shareholder of that investment company. As a result, the Fund's shareholders indirectly will bear the Fund's proportionate share of the fees and expenses paid by shareholders of the other investment company, in addition to the fees and expenses the Fund's shareholders directly bear in connection with the Fund's own operations.
Under Section 12(d)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, a Fund may invest only up to 5% of its total assets in the securities of any one investment company (ETF or other mutual funds), but may not own more than 3% of the outstanding voting stock of any one investment company (the "3% Limitation") or invest more than 10% of its total assets in the securities of other investment companies. However, Section 12(d)(1)(F) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended provides that the provisions of paragraph 12(d)(1) shall not apply to securities purchased or otherwise acquired by a Fund if (i) immediately after such purchase or acquisition not more than 3% of the total outstanding stock of such registered investment company is owned by the Fund and all affiliated persons of the Fund; and (ii) the Fund has not offered or sold after January 1, 1971, and is not proposing to offer or sell any security issued by it through a principal underwriter or otherwise at a public or offering price which includes a sales load of more than 1 ½% percent. An investment company that issues shares to the Fund
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pursuant to paragraph 12(d)(1)(F) shall not be required to redeem its shares in an amount exceeding 1% of such investment companys total outstanding shares in any period of less than thirty days. The Fund (or the Advisor acting on behalf of the Fund) must comply with the following voting restrictions: when the Fund exercises voting rights, by proxy or otherwise, with respect to investment companies owned by the Fund, the Fund will either seek instruction from the Fund's shareholders with regard to the voting of all proxies and vote in accordance with such instructions, or vote the shares held by the Fund in the same proportion as the vote of all other holders of such security. Because other investment companies employ an investment adviser, such investments by the Fund may cause shareholders to bear duplicate fees.
In addition, the Fund is subject to the 3% Limitation unless (i) the ETF or the Fund has received an order for exemptive relief from the 3% limitation from the SEC that is applicable to the Fund; and (ii) the ETF and the Fund take appropriate steps to comply with any conditions in such order. In the alternative, the Fund may rely on Rule 12d1-3, which allows unaffiliated mutual funds to exceed the 5% Limitation and the 10% Limitation, provided the aggregate sales loads any investor pays (i.e., the combined distribution expenses of both the acquiring fund and the acquired funds) does not exceed the limits on sales loads established by the FINRA for a fund of funds.
The Fund may invest in tracking stocks. A tracking stock is a type of common stock that "tracks" or depends on the financial performance of a specific business unit or operating division of a company rather than the operations of the company as a whole. Tracking stocks trade as separate securities. As a result, if the unit or division does poorly, the value of the tracking stock may decrease even if the company as a whole performs well. The opposite may also be true. Shareholders of tracking stocks have a financial interest only in that unit or division of the company. Unlike the common stock of the company itself, a tracking stock usually has limited or no voting rights. In the event of a companys liquidation, tracking stock shareholders typically do not have a legal claim on the companys assets. If a tracking stock pays dividends, the amounts paid will solely depend on the performance of the business unit or division.
B. Foreign Securities. The Fund may invest in foreign equity securities including American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and ETFs that hold foreign securities. ADRs are certificates evidencing ownership of shares of a foreign-based issuer held in trust by a bank or similar financial institution. They are alternatives to the direct purchase of the underlying securities in their national markets and currencies. ADRs are subject to risks similar to those associated with direct investment in foreign securities.
Foreign investments can involve significant risks in addition to the risks inherent in U.S. investments. The value of securities denominated in or indexed to foreign currencies, and of dividends and interest from such securities, can change significantly when foreign currencies strengthen or weaken relative to the U.S. dollar. Foreign securities markets generally have less trading volume and less liquidity than U.S. markets, and prices on some foreign markets can be highly volatile. Many foreign countries lack uniform accounting and disclosure standards comparable to those applicable to U.S. companies, and it may be more difficult to obtain reliable information regarding an issuers financial condition and operations. In addition, the costs of foreign investing, including withholding taxes, brokerage commissions, and custodial costs, generally are higher than for U.S. investments.
Foreign markets may offer less protection to investors than U.S. markets. Foreign issuers, brokers, and securities markets may be subject to less government supervision. Foreign security trading practices, including those involving the release of assets in advance of payment, may invoke increased risks in the event of a failed trade or the insolvency of a broker-dealer, and may involve substantial delays. It also may be difficult to enforce legal rights in foreign countries.
Investing abroad also involves different political and economic risks. Foreign investments may be affected by actions of foreign governments adverse to the interests of U.S. investors, including the possibility of expropriation or nationalization of assets, confiscatory taxation, restrictions on U.S. investment or on the ability to repatriate assets or convert currency into U.S. dollars, or other government intervention. There may be a greater possibility of default by foreign governments or foreign government-sponsored enterprises. Investments in foreign countries also involve a risk of local political, economic or social instability, military action or unrest, or adverse diplomatic developments. There is no assurance that an advisor will be able to anticipate or counter these potential events and their impacts on the Funds share price.
The considerations noted above generally are intensified for investments in developing countries. Developing countries may have relatively unstable governments, economies based on only a few industries and securities markets that trade a small number of securities.
C. Short Sales. The Fund may sell a security short in anticipation of a decline in the market value of the security. When the Fund engages in a short sale, it sells a security which it does not own. To complete the transaction, the Fund must borrow the security in order to deliver it to the buyer. The Fund must replace the borrowed security by purchasing it at the market price at the time of replacement, which may be more or less than the price at which the Fund sold the security. The Fund will incur a
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loss as a result of the short sale if the price of the security increases between the date of the short sale and the date on which the Fund replaces the borrowed security. The Fund will realize a profit if the security declines in price between those dates. Any potential gain is limited to the price at which the Fund sold the security short, and any potential loss is unlimited in size.
In connection with its short sales, the Fund will be required to maintain a segregated account with the Fund's custodian of cash or liquid assets equal to (i) the current market value of the securities sold short, less (ii) any collateral deposited with its broker (not including the proceeds from the short sales). Depending on arrangements made with the broker or custodian, the Fund may not receive any payments (including interest) on collateral deposited with the broker or custodian.
The Fund may also sell short against the box. Short sales against the box are short sales of securities that a fund owns or has the right to obtain (equivalent in kind or amount to the securities sold short). If the Fund enters into a short sale against the box, it will be required to set aside securities equivalent in kind and amount to the securities sold short (or securities convertible or exchangeable into such securities) and will be required to hold such securities while the short sale is outstanding. The Fund will incur transaction costs, including interest expenses, in connection with opening, maintaining, and closing short sales against the box.
D. Securities Lending. The Fund may make long and short term loans of its portfolio securities to parties such as broker-dealers, banks, or institutional investors. Securities lending allows a Fund to retain ownership of the securities loaned and, at the same time, to earn additional income. Since there may be delays in the recovery of loaned securities, or even a loss of rights in collateral supplied, should the borrower fail financially, loans will be made only to parties whose creditworthiness has been reviewed and deemed satisfactory by the Advisor. Furthermore, loans will only be made if, in the judgment of the Advisor, the consideration to be earned from such loans would justify the risk.
The Advisor understands that it is the current view of the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") that a Fund may engage in loan transactions only under the following conditions: (1) a Fund must receive 100% collateral in the form of cash, cash equivalents (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills or notes) or other high grade liquid debt instruments from the borrower; (2) the borrower must increase the collateral whenever the market value of the securities loaned (determined on a daily basis) rises above the value of the collateral; (3) after giving notice, the Fund must be able to terminate the loan at any time; (4) the Fund must receive reasonable interest on the loan or a flat fee from the borrower, as well as amounts equivalent to any dividends, interest, or other distributions on the securities loaned and to any increase in market value; (5) the Fund may pay only reasonable custodian fees in connection with the loan; and (6) the Board of Trustees must be able to vote proxies on the securities loaned, either by terminating the loan or by entering into an alternative arrangement with the borrower.
Cash received through loan transactions may be invested in any security in which the Fund is authorized to invest. Investing this cash subjects that investment, as well as the security loaned, to market forces (i.e., capital appreciation or depreciation).
E. Restricted and Illiquid Securities. The portfolio of the Fund may contain illiquid securities. Illiquid securities generally include securities which cannot be disposed of promptly and in the ordinary course of business without taking a reduced price. Securities may be illiquid due to contractual or legal restrictions on resale or lack of a ready market. The following securities are considered to be illiquid: repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase agreements maturing in more than seven days, nonpublicly offered securities and restricted securities. Restricted securities are securities where the resale of which is subject to legal or contractual restrictions. Restricted securities may be sold only in privately negotiated transactions, in a public offering with respect to which a registration statement is in effect under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended or pursuant to Rule 144 or Rule 144A promulgated under such Act. Where registration is required, the Fund may be obligated to pay all or part of the registration expense, and a considerable period may elapse between the time of the decision to sell and the time such security may be sold under an effective registration statement. If during such a period adverse market conditions were to develop, a Fund might obtain a less favorable price than the price it could have obtained when it decided to sell. The Fund will not invest more than 15% of its net assets in illiquid securities.
With respect to Rule 144A securities, these restricted securities are treated as exempt from the 15% limit on illiquid securities, provided that a dealer or institutional trading market in such securities exists. The Fund will not, however, invest more than 10% of its net assets in Rule 144A securities. Under the supervision of the Board of Trustees, the Advisor determines the liquidity of restricted securities and, through reports from the Advisor, the Board of Trustees will monitor trading activity in restricted securities. If institutional trading in restricted securities were to decline, the liquidity of a Fund could be adversely affected.
F. U.S. Government Securities. U.S. government securities are high-quality debt securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury or by an agency or instrumentality of the U.S. government. Not all U.S. government securities are backed by the full faith and credit of, or guaranteed by the United States Treasury. For example, securities issued by the Farm Credit Banks or by
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the Federal National Mortgage Association are supported by the instrumentality's right to borrow money from the U.S. Treasury under certain circumstances. Moreover, securities issued by other agencies or instrumentalities are supported only by the credit of the entity that issued them.
G. Corporate Debt Securities. Corporate debt securities are long and short term debt obligations issued by companies (such as publicly issued and privately placed bonds, notes and commercial paper). The Advisor considers corporate debt securities to be of investment grade quality if they are rated BBB or higher by S&P or Baa or higher by Moody's, or if unrated, determined by the Advisor to be of comparable quality. Investment grade debt securities generally have adequate to strong protection of principal and interest payments. In the lower end of this category, adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity to pay interest and repay principal than in higher rated categories.
H. Fixed Income Securities. The Fund may invest in all types of fixed income securities, including when-issued, delayed delivery, or forward commitment basis. Fixed income securities are subject to credit risk and interest rate risk. Credit risk is the risk that the Fund could lose money if an issuer of a fixed income security cannot meet its financial obligations or goes bankrupt. Interest rate risk is the risk that the Fund's investments in fixed income securities may fall when interest rates rise.
Investments in high-yield bonds are considered to be more speculative than higher quality fixed income securities. They are more susceptible to credit risk than investment-grade securities, especially during periods of economic uncertainty or economic downturns. The value of lower quality securities are subject to greater volatility and are generally more dependent on the ability of the issuer to meet interest and principal payments than higher quality securities. Issuers of high-yield securities may not be as strong financially as those issuing bonds with higher credit ratings.
I. Financial Services Industry Obligations. The Fund may invest in each of the following obligations of the financial services industry:
(1) Certificate of Deposit. Certificates of deposit are negotiable certificates evidencing the indebtedness of a commercial bank or a savings and loan association to repay funds deposited with it for a definite period of time (usually from fourteen days to one year) at a stated or variable interest rate.
(2) Time Deposits. Time deposits are non-negotiable deposits maintained in a banking institution or a savings and loan association for a specified period of time at a stated interest rate.
(3) Bankers' Acceptances. Bankers' acceptances are credit instruments evidencing the obligation of a bank to pay a draft which has been drawn on it by a customer, which instruments reflect the obligation both of the bank and of the drawer to pay the face amount of the instrument upon maturity.
J. Repurchase Agreements. The Fund may invest in repurchase agreements fully collateralized by obligations issued by the U.S. government or agencies of the U.S. government ("U.S. Government Obligations"). A repurchase agreement is a short term investment in which the purchaser (i.e., a Fund) acquires ownership of a U.S. Government Obligation (which may be of any maturity) and the seller agrees to repurchase the obligation at a future time at a set price, thereby determining the yield during the purchaser's holding period (usually not more than 7 days from the date of purchase). Any repurchase transaction in which a Fund engages will require full collateralization of the seller's obligation during the entire term of the repurchase agreement. In the event of a bankruptcy or other default of the seller, a Fund could experience both delays in liquidating the underlying security and losses in value. However, the Fund intends to enter into repurchase agreements only with the custodian, other banks with assets of $1 billion or more and registered securities dealers determined by the Advisor to be creditworthy. The Advisor monitors the creditworthiness of the banks and securities dealers with which a Fund engages in repurchase transactions.
K. Borrowing. The Fund is permitted to borrow money up to one-third of the value of its total assets. Borrowing is a speculative technique that increases both investment opportunity and a Fund's ability to achieve greater diversification. However, it also increases investment risk. Because the Fund's investments will fluctuate in value, whereas the interest obligations on borrowed funds may be fixed, during times of borrowing, the Fund's net asset value may tend to increase more when its investments increase in value, and decrease more when its investments decrease in value. In addition, interest costs on borrowings may fluctuate with changing market interest rates and may partially offset or exceed the return earned on the borrowed funds. Also, during times of borrowing under adverse market conditions, the Fund might have to sell portfolio securities to meet interest or principal payments at a time when fundamental investment considerations would not favor such sales.
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L. Options Transactions. The Fund may engage in option transactions involving individual securities and stock indexes. An option involves either: (a) the right or the obligation to buy or sell a specific instrument at a specific price until the expiration date of the option; or (b) the right to receive payments or the obligation to make payments representing the difference between the closing price of a stock index and the exercise price of the option expressed in dollars times a specified multiple until the expiration date of the option. Options are sold (written) on securities and stock indexes. The purchaser of an option on a security pays the seller (the writer) a premium for the right granted but is not obligated to buy or sell the underlying security. The purchaser of an option on a stock index pays the seller a premium for the right granted, and in return the seller of such an option is obligated to make the payment. A writer of an option may terminate the obligation prior to expiration of the option by making an offsetting purchase of an identical option. Options are traded on organized exchanges and in the over-the-counter market. To cover the potential obligations involved in writing options, a Fund will either: (a) own the underlying security, or in the case of an option on a market index, will hold a portfolio of stocks substantially replicating the movement of the index; or (b) the Fund will segregate with the custodian liquid assets sufficient to purchase the underlying security or equal to the market value of the stock index option, marked to market daily.
The purchase and writing of options requires additional skills and techniques beyond normal portfolio management, and involves certain risks. The purchase of options limits a Fund's potential loss to the amount of the premium paid and can afford the Fund the opportunity to profit from favorable movements in the price of an underlying security to a greater extent than if transactions were effected in the security directly. However, the purchase of an option could result in the Fund losing a greater percentage of its investment than if the transaction were effected directly. When the Fund writes a call option, it will receive a premium, but it will give up the opportunity to profit from a price increase in the underlying security above the exercise price as long as its obligation as a writer continues, and it will retain the risk of loss should the price of the security decline. When the Fund writes a put option, it will assume the risk that the price of the underlying security or instrument will fall below the exercise price, in which case the Fund may be required to purchase the security or instrument at a higher price than the market price of the security or instrument. In addition, there can be no assurance that the Fund can effect a closing transaction on a particular option it has written. Further, the total premium paid for any option may be lost if the Fund does not exercise the option or, in the case of over-the-counter options, the writer does not perform its obligations.
M. Publicly Traded Partnerships/Master Limited Partnerships. The Fund may invest in publicly traded partnerships, including Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs). These are limited partnerships the interests in which (known as "units") are traded on public exchanges, just like corporate stock. Such limited partnerships provide an investor with a direct interest in a group of assets (generally, oil and gas properties). Publicly traded partnership units typically trade publicly, like stock, and thus may provide the investor more liquidity than ordinary limited partnerships. Publicly traded partnerships are also called master limited partnerships and public limited partnerships. A limited partnership has one or more general partners (they may be individuals, corporations, partnerships or another entity) which manage the partnership, and limited partners, which provide capital to the partnership but have no role in its management. When an investor buys units in a publicly traded partnership, he or she becomes a limited partner. Publicly traded partnerships are formed in several ways. A non-traded partnership may decide to go public. Several non-traded partnerships may "roll up" into a single publicly traded partnership. A corporation may spin off a group of assets or part of its business into a partnership of which it is the general partner, either to realize what it believes to be the assets' full value or as an alternative to issuing debt. A corporation may fully convert to a partnership, although since 1986 the tax consequences have made this an unappealing; or, a newly formed company may operate as a publicly traded partnership from its inception.
There are different types of risks to investing in publicly traded partnerships including regulatory risks and interest rate risks. Currently most partnerships enjoy pass through taxation of their income to partners, which avoids double taxation of earnings. If the government were to change publicly traded partnerships business tax structure, unitholders would not be able to enjoy the relatively high yields in the sector for long. In addition, publicly traded partnerships which charge government-regulated fees for transportation of oil and gas products through their pipelines are subject to unfavorable changes in government-approved rates and fees, which would affect a publicly traded partnerships revenue stream negatively. Publicly traded partnerships also carry some interest rate risks. During increases in interest rates, publicly traded partnerships may not produce meaningful returns to shareholders.
N. Real Estate Investment Trusts. The Fund may invest in the securities of real estate investment trusts (REITs). REITs offer investors greater liquidity and diversification than direct ownership of properties. A REIT is a corporation or business trust that invests substantially all of its assets in interests in real estate. Equity REITs are those which purchase or lease land and buildings and generate income primarily from rental income. Equity REITs may also realize capital gains (or losses) when selling property that has appreciated (or depreciated) in value. Mortgage REITs are those that invest in real estate mortgages and generate income primarily from interest payments on mortgage loans. Hybrid REITs generally invest in both real property and mortgages. Unlike corporations, REITs do not pay income taxes if they meet certain IRS requirements. Real estate related
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equity securities also include those insured by real estate developers, companies with substantial real estate holdings (for investment or as part of their operations), as well as companies whose products and services are directly related to the real estate industry, such as building supply manufacturers, mortgage lenders or mortgage servicing companies. Like any investment in real estate, though, a REITs performance depends on several factors, such as its ability to find tenants, renew leases and finance property purchases and renovations. Other risks associated with REIT investments include the fact that equity and mortgage REITs are dependent upon specialized management skills and are not fully diversified. These characteristics subject REITs to the risks associated with financing a limited number of projects. They are also subject to heavy cash flow dependency, defaults by borrowers, and self-liquidation. Additionally, equity REITs may be affected by any changes in the value of the underlying property owned by the trusts, and mortgage REITs may be affected by the quality of any credit extended. By investing in REITs indirectly through the Fund, a shareholder bears not only a proportionate share of the expenses of the Fund, but also may indirectly bear similar expenses of some of the REITs in which it invests.
INVESTMENT LIMITATIONS
Fundamental. The investment limitations described below have been adopted by the Trust with respect to the Fund and are fundamental ("Fundamental"), i.e, they may not be changed without the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding shares of the Fund. As used in the Prospectus and the Statement of Additional Information, the term "majority" of the outstanding shares of the Fund means the lesser of: (1) 67% or more of the outstanding shares of the Fund present at a meeting, if the holders of more than 50% of the outstanding shares of the Fund are present or represented at such meeting; or (2) more than 50% of the outstanding shares of the Fund. Other investment practices which may be changed by the Board of Trustees without the approval of shareholders to the extent permitted by applicable law, regulation or regulatory policy are considered non-fundamental ("Non-Fundamental").
1. Borrowing Money. The Fund will not borrow money, except: (a) from a bank, provided that immediately after such borrowing there is an asset coverage of 300% for all borrowings of the Fund; or (b) from a bank or other persons for temporary purposes only, provided that such temporary borrowings are in an amount not exceeding 5% of the Fund's total assets at the time when the borrowing is made. This limitation does not preclude the Fund from entering into reverse repurchase transactions, provided that the Fund has an asset coverage of 300% for all borrowings and repurchase commitments of the Fund pursuant to reverse repurchase transactions.
2. Senior Securities. The Fund will not issue senior securities. This limitation is not applicable to activities that may be deemed to involve the issuance or sale of a senior security by the Fund, provided that the Fund's engagement in such activities is consistent with or permitted by the 1940 Act, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder or interpretations of the SEC or its staff.
3. Underwriting. The Fund will not act as underwriter of securities issued by other persons. This limitation is not applicable to the extent that, in connection with the disposition of portfolio securities (including restricted securities), a Fund may be deemed an underwriter under certain federal securities laws.
4. Real Estate. The Fund will not purchase or sell real estate. This limitation is not applicable to investments in marketable securities which are secured by or represent interests in real estate. This limitation does not preclude the Fund from investing in mortgage-related securities or investing in companies engaged in the real estate business or that have a significant portion of their assets in real estate (including real estate investment trusts).
5. Commodities. The Fund will not purchase or sell commodities unless acquired as a result of ownership of securities or other investments. This limitation does not preclude the Fund from purchasing or selling options or futures contracts, from investing in securities or other instruments backed by commodities or from investing in companies which are engaged in a commodities business or have a significant portion of their assets in commodities.
6. Loans. The Fund will not make loans to other persons, except: (a) by loaning portfolio securities; (b) by engaging in repurchase agreements; or (c) by purchasing nonpublicly offered debt securities. For purposes of this limitation, the term "loans" shall not include the purchase of a portion of an issue of publicly distributed bonds, debentures or other securities.
7. Concentration. The Fund will not invest 25% or more of its total assets in a particular industry or group of industries. This limitation is not applicable to investments in obligations issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies and instrumentalities or repurchase agreements with respect thereto.
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With respect to the percentages adopted by the Trust as maximum limitations on its investment policies and limitations, an excess above the fixed percentage will not be a violation of the policy or limitation unless the excess results immediately and directly from the acquisition of any security or the action taken. This paragraph does not apply to the borrowing policy set forth in paragraph 1 above.
Notwithstanding any of the foregoing limitations, any investment company, whether organized as a trust, association or corporation, or a personal holding company, may be merged or consolidated with or acquired by the Trust, provided that if such merger, consolidation or acquisition results in an investment in the securities of any issuer prohibited by said paragraphs, the Trust shall, within ninety days after the consummation of such merger, consolidation or acquisition, dispose of all of the securities of such issuer so acquired or such portion thereof as shall bring the total investment therein within the limitations imposed by said paragraphs above as of the date of consummation.
Non-Fundamental. The following limitations have been adopted by the Trust with respect to the Fund and are Non-Fundamental (see "Investment Limitations - Fundamental" above).
1. Pledging. The Fund will not mortgage, pledge, hypothecate or in any manner transfer, as security for indebtedness, any assets of the Fund except as may be necessary in connection with borrowings described in limitation (1) above. Margin deposits, security interests, liens and collateral arrangements with respect to transactions involving options, futures contracts, short sales and other permitted investments and techniques are not deemed to be a mortgage, pledge or hypothecation of assets for purposes of this limitation.
2. Borrowing. The Fund will not purchase any security while borrowings (including reverse repurchase agreements) representing more than one third of its total assets are outstanding.
3. Margin Purchases. The Fund will not purchase securities or evidences of interest thereon on "margin." This limitation is not applicable to short term credit obtained by a Fund for the clearance of purchases and sales or redemption of securities, or to arrangements with respect to transactions involving options, futures contracts, short sales and other permitted investments and techniques.
4. Options. The Funds will not purchase or sell puts, calls, options or straddles, except as described in the Statement of Additional Information.
5. Illiquid Investments. The Fund will not invest more than 15% of its net assets in securities for which there are legal or contractual restrictions on resale and other illiquid securities.
THE INVESTMENT ADVISOR
The Advisor is Walthausen & Co., LLC, located at 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020. Certain owners of the Advisor also serve as officers of the Trust.
Under the terms of the Management Agreement, the Advisor manages the investment portfolio of the Fund, subject to policies adopted by the Trusts Board of Trustees. Under the Management Agreement, the Advisor, at its own expense and without reimbursement from the Trust, furnishes office space and all necessary office facilities, equipment and executive personnel necessary for managing the assets of the Fund. For its services, the Advisor receives an investment management fee equal to 0.85% of the average daily net assets of the Fund. Prior to October 15, 2020, the Advisor received an investment management fee equal to 0.90% of the average daily net assets of the Fund. For the fiscal years ended January 31, 2020, 2021, and 2022, the Advisor earned management fees equal to $107,944, $88,013 and $107,751, respectively.
The Advisor retains the right to use the name "Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value" or any derivative thereof in connection with another investment company or business enterprise with which the Advisor is or may become associated. The Trust's right to use the name "Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value" or any derivative thereof automatically ceases ninety days after termination of the Management Agreement and may be withdrawn by the Advisor on ninety days written notice.
The Advisor may make payments to banks or other financial institutions that provide shareholder services and administer shareholder accounts. If a bank or other financial institution were prohibited from continuing to perform all or a part of such services, management of the Fund believes that there would be no material impact on the Fund or their shareholders. Financial institutions may charge their customers fees for offering these services to the extent permitted by applicable regulatory authorities, and the overall return to those shareholders availing themselves of the financial institutions services will be lower
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than to those shareholders who do not. The Fund may from time to time purchase securities issued by financial institutions that provide such services; however, in selecting investments for the Fund, no preference will be shown for such securities.
Under a Services Agreement, the Advisor assumes and pays all ordinary expenses of the Fund, except that the Fund pays all management fees, brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), underlying fund fees and expenses, and extraordinary or non-recurring expenses. Effective October 15, 2020 under the Services Agreement, the Advisor receives an annual Services Agreement fee of 0.20% of the average daily net assets of the Fund. Prior to October 15, 2020 under the Services Agreement, the Advisor received an annual Services Agreement fee of 0.45% of the average daily net assets of the Fund up to $100 million, 0.25% of the Funds average daily net assets between $100 million and $500 million, and 0.15% of such assets in excess of $500 million. For the fiscal years ended January 31, 2020, 2021, and 2022, the Advisor earned services agreement fees equal to $53,973, $36,772 and $25,353, respectively. Effective June 1, 2021 Advisor has contractually agreed to waive the Services Agreement fees to the extent necessary to maintain total annual operating expenses of the Institutional Class Shares, excluding brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), the cost of acquired funds and extraordinary expenses at 0.85% of its average daily net assets through May 31, 2026. The Advisor may not terminate the fee waiver before May 1, 2026. The Advisor waived Services Agreement fees for the Institutional Class Shares totaling $20,802 during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2020. The Advisor waived Services Agreement fees for the Institutional Class Shares totaling $21,470 during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2021. The Advisor waived Services Agreement fees for the Institutional Class Shares totaling $25,353 during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022. Prior to May 15, 2020, the Fund offered R6 Class shares and Retail Class shares. Effective May 15, 2020, R6 Class shares and Retail Class shares were no longer available for purchase, and all outstanding shares of R6 Class shares and Retail Class shares were converted to Institutional Class shares. The Advisor contractually agreed to waive Services Agreement fees to the extent necessary to maintain total annual operating expenses of the R6 Class Shares, excluding brokerage fees and commissions, taxes, borrowing costs (such as (a) interest and (b) dividend expenses on securities sold short), the cost of acquired funds and extraordinary expenses at 0.98% of its average daily net assets through the date of the share conversion. The Advisor waived Services Agreement fees for the R6 Class Shares totaling $1,099 during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2020. The Advisor waived Services Agreement fees for the R6 Class Shares totaling $254 during the fiscal year ended January 31, 2021.
The Fund may also pay expenses, which it is authorized to pay pursuant to Rule 12b-1 under the Act; however, the Fund does not currently pay or accrue any distribution fees, but it reserves the right to pay or accrue such fees in the future upon notice to shareholders. See section Distribution Plan for more information.
THE PORTFOLIO MANAGER
Mr. Gerard S.E. Heffernan (the Portfolio Manager) is the portfolio managers responsible for the day-to-day management of the Fund. The following provides information regarding other accounts managed by the Portfolio Manager as of January 31, 2022:
Gerard S.E. Heffernan
Account Type | Number of Accounts by Account Type | Total Assets By Account Type | Number of Accounts by Type Subject to a Performance Fee | Total Assets By Account Type Subject to a Performance Fee |
Registered Investment Companies | 2 | $223 million | 0 | $0 |
Other Pooled Investment Vehicles | 2 | $83 million | 0 | $0 |
Other Accounts | 8 | $182 million | 0 | $0 |
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As of January 31, 2022, the Portfolio Manager managed the accounts listed above. The Portfolio Manager have not identified any material conflicts between the Fund and other accounts managed by the Portfolio Manager. However, actual or apparent conflicts of interest may arise in connection with the day-to-day management of the Fund and other accounts. The management of the Fund and other accounts may result in unequal time and attention being devoted to the Fund and other accounts. Another potential conflict of interest may arise where another account has the same investment objective as the Fund, whereby the Portfolio Manager could favor one account over another.
Further, a potential conflict could include the Portfolio Managers knowledge about the size, timing and possible market impact of Fund trades, whereby the Portfolio Managers could use this information to the advantage of other accounts and to the disadvantage of the Fund. These potential conflicts of interest could create the appearance that the Portfolio Manager is favoring one investment vehicle over another.
Gerard S.E. Heffernan is compensated in the form of salary, bonus and profit sharing related to the firm as a whole. It is not based specifically on work done on behalf of or performance of the Fund, or any other account.
The following table shows the dollar range of equity securities beneficially owned by the Portfolio Manager in the Fund as of January 31, 2022.
Portfolio Manager | Dollar Range of Equity Securities in the Fund |
Gerard S.E. Heffernan | $100,001-$1,000,000 |
TRUSTEES AND OFFICERS
The Board of Trustees supervises the business activities of the Trust. Each Trustee serves as a trustee until the termination of the Trust unless the Trustee dies, resigns, retires or is removed.
The Board has engaged the Advisor to manage and/or administer the Trust and is responsible for overseeing the Advisor and other service providers to the Trust and the Fund. The Board is currently composed of four Trustees, including three Trustees who are not "interested persons" of the Fund, as that term is defined in the 1940 Act (each an Independent Trustee). In addition to four regularly scheduled meetings per year, the Board holds special meetings or informal conference calls to discuss specific matters that may require action prior to the next regular meeting. The Board of Trustees has established an Audit Committee comprised entirely of Trustees who are Independent Trustees. The Audit Committee is generally responsible for (i) overseeing and monitoring the Trust's internal accounting and control structure, its auditing function and its financial reporting process, (ii) selecting and recommending to the full Board of Trustees the appointment of auditors for the Trust, (iii) reviewing audit plans, fees, and other material arrangements with respect to the engagement of auditors, including permissible non-audit services performed; (iv) reviewing the qualifications of the auditor's key personnel involved in the foregoing activities and (v) monitoring the auditor's independence.
The Chairman of the Board of Trustees is Mr. Hany A. Shawky, who is an independent person of the Trust, within the meaning of the 1940 Act. The use of an independent Chairman balanced by an independent Audit Committee allows the Board to access the expertise necessary to oversee the Trust, identify risks, recognize shareholder concerns and needs and highlight opportunities. The Audit Committee is able to focus Board time and attention to matters of interest to shareholders and, through its private sessions with the Trusts auditor, Chief Compliance Officer and legal counsel, stay fully informed regarding management decisions. Considering the size of the Trust and its shareholder base, the Trustees have determined that an independent Chairman balanced by an independent Audit Committee is the appropriate leadership structure for the Board of Trustees.
Mutual funds face a number of risks, including investment risk, compliance risk and valuation risk. The Board oversees management of the Funds risks directly and through its officers. While day-to-day risk management responsibilities rest with the Funds Chief Compliance Officer, investment adviser and other service providers, the Board monitors and tracks risk by: (1) receiving and reviewing quarterly reports related to the performance and operations of the Funds; (2) reviewing and approving, as applicable, the compliance policies and procedures of the Trust, including the Trusts valuation policies and transaction procedures; (3) periodically meeting with the portfolio manager to review investment strategies, techniques and related risks; (4) meeting with representatives of key service providers, including the Funds investment adviser, administrator, transfer agent and the independent registered public accounting firm, to discuss the activities of the Fund; (5) engaging the services of the Chief Compliance Officer of the Fund to test the compliance procedures of the Trust and its service providers; (6) receiving and reviewing reports from the Trusts independent registered public accounting firm regarding the Funds financial condition and
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the Trusts internal controls; and (7) receiving and reviewing an annual written report prepared by the Chief Compliance Officer reviewing the adequacy of the Trusts compliance policies and procedures and the effectiveness of their implementation. The Board has concluded that its general oversight of the investment adviser and other service providers as implemented through the reporting and monitoring process outlined above allows the Board to effectively administer its risk oversight function.
Each Trustee was nominated to serve on the Board of Trustees based on their particular experiences, qualifications, attributes and skills. The characteristics that have led the Board to conclude that each of the Trustees should continue to serve as a Trustee of the Trust are discussed below.
Edward A. LaVarnway. Mr. LaVarnway has served on the Board of Trustees since the Trusts inception in 2008. He brings 30 years experience in the banking and investment industries in various capacities, including conducting and supervising the creation of investment research, oversight of securities trading, equity research sales and municipal credit analysis. In addition, from 1989 to 2005 he served as a securities industry arbitrator for the NASD.
John P. Mastriani. Mr. Mastriani has served as a Trustee since July 2014. Mr. Mastriani has extensive management experience in the financial services business working in a variety of roles within several specialty firms. Mr. Mastriani has served as (i) Executive Vice President of The Ayco Company, L.P. (Ayco) a Goldman Sachs Company that provides financial consulting and education services (May 2012 March 2014), (ii) Senior Vice President of Ayco (December 2003 May 2012), (iii) Vice President of Ayco (May 1999 December 2003), (iv) Executive Vice President of CL King and Associates (October 1994 May 1999) (v) President of the Trust and Investment Management Group and a variety of other positions of KeyCorp and its affiliates (July 1974 October 1994). He brings to the Board a strong knowledge of the finance industry, and substantial leadership skills.
Hany A. Shawky. Mr. Shawky joined the Board of Trustees in 2009. Mr. Shawky was the founding Director of the Center for Institutional Investment Management at the School of Business, University at Albany, NY in 2002 and continued in that role until 2007. He began his academic career at University at Albany in 1978, and is currently a full Professor of Finance and Economics. He brings to the Board a strong knowledge of the finance industry, including the investment management and mutual fund industries.
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The following table provides information regarding each Trustee who is an interested person of the Trust, as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, and each officer of the Trust.
Interested Trustees and Officers
Name, Address(1), and Year of Birth |
Position with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years |
Number of Portfolios Overseen By Trustee |
Other Directorships Held By Trustee During the Past 5 Years |
Gerard
S. E. Heffernan Year of Birth: 1963 |
President | Indefinite
Term, Since 2021 |
Portfolio Manager (2018 to Present) and Managing Director (2020 to Present), Walthausen & Co., LLC. Investment Consultant, Linde Hansen & Co. (2013 to 2018). | N/A | None |
Mark
L. Hodge Year of Birth: 1958 |
Secretary and Chief Compliance Officer | Indefinite
Term, Since 2008 |
Chief Compliance Officer (2007 to Present) and Managing Director (2013 to Present), Walthausen & Co., LLC. | N/A | N/A |
Stanley M. Westhoff Jr. Year of Birth: 1969 | Treasurer | Indefinite Term, Since 2011 | Equity Analyst (2007 to Present) and Managing Director (2013 to Present), Walthausen & Co., LLC. | N/A | N/A |
(1) | The address of each Trustee and Officer is c/o Walthausen Funds, 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020. |
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The following table provides information regarding the Trustees who are not interested persons of the Trust, as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Independent Trustees
Name, Address(1), and Year of Birth |
Position with the Trust |
Term of Office and Length of Time Served |
Principal Occupation(s) During Past 5 Years |
Number of Portfolios Overseen By Trustee |
Other Directorships Held By Trustee During the Past 5 Years |
Edward
A. LaVarnway Year of Birth: 1951 |
Trustee | Indefinite
Term, Since 2008 |
Retired as of 5/10/13. Executive Director, Fredric Remington Art Museum, 8/15/05 to 5/10/13. | 2 | None |
John P. Mastriani Year of Birth: 1952
|
Trustee | Indefinite Term, Since July 2014 |
Retired as of 3/1/14 serving as Executive Vice President of The Ayco Company, L.P. (Ayco), a Goldman Sachs Company affiliate. Board Member and Chair of the Investment Committee of the Goldman Sachs Philanthropic Fund (11/2020 to Present) & The Ayco Charitable Foundation (4/2014 to Present).
|
2 | None |
Hany A. Shawky Year of Birth: 1947 | Trustee | Indefinite
Term, Since 2009 |
Professor of Finance at the University at Albany, N.Y. Oct. 2007 to present. | 2 | None |
(1) | The address of each Trustee is c/o Walthausen Funds, 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020. |
BOARD INTEREST IN THE FUND
As of December 31, 2021 the Trustees owned the following amounts in the Fund:
Name of Trustee or Officer |
Dollar Range of Securities In Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund |
Aggregate Dollar Range of Securities In Trust* |
Edward A. LaVarnway John P. Mastriani |
$1$10,000 None None |
Over $100,000 None |
*Includes the Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund and the Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund.
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COMPENSATION
Officers and Trustees of the Fund who are deemed "interested persons" of the Trust receive no compensation from the Fund. Trustee fees are paid by the Advisor. The following table shows Trustee compensation for the Fund's fiscal year ended January 31, 2022.
Name
|
Aggregate Compensation from Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund | Total Compensation from Trust |
Edward A. LaVarnway | $5,000 | $10,000 |
John P. Mastriani | $5,000 | $10,000 |
Hany A. Shawky | $5,000 | $10,000 |
CONTROL PERSONS AND PRINCIPAL HOLDERS OF SECURITIES
A principal shareholder is any person who owns (either of record or beneficially) 5% or more of the outstanding shares of the Fund. A control person is one who owns, either directly or indirectly, more than 25% of the voting securities of a company or acknowledges the existence of such control. A controlling shareholder could control the outcome of any proposal submitted to the shareholders for approval, including changes to the Funds fundamental policies or the terms of the management agreement with the Advisor. As of May 3, 2022, each of the following shareholders was considered to be either a control person or principal shareholder of the Fund:
Name and Address | Shares | Percent Ownership | Type of Ownership |
National Financial Services FBO Customers 200 Liberty Street New York, NY 10281-1033 |
423,463.127 | 63.09% | Record |
Ameritrade Inc. FBO Customers PO Box 2226 Omaha, NE 68103-2226 |
136,208.191 | 20.29% | Record |
Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. FBO Customers 101 Montgomery St. |
75,245.591 | 11.21% | Record |
As of May 3, 2022, the Trustees and Officers as a group owned 3.9% of the outstanding shares of the Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund Institutional Class.
AUDIT COMMITTEE
The Audit Committee is responsible for advising the full Board with respect to accounting, auditing and financial matters affecting the Trust and meets at least once annually. The Audit Committee is comprised of the Independent Trustees as follows: Edward A. LaVarnway, John P. Mastriani and Hany A. Shawky. During the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022, the Audit Committee met three times.
PORTFOLIO TRANSACTIONS AND BROKERAGE
Subject to policies established by the Board of Trustees, the Advisor is responsible for the Fund's portfolio decisions and the placing of the Fund's portfolio transactions. In placing portfolio transactions, the Advisor seeks the best qualitative execution for the Fund, taking into account such factors as price (including the applicable brokerage commission or dealer spread), the execution capability, financial responsibility and responsiveness of the broker or dealer and the brokerage and research services provided by the broker or dealer. The Advisor generally seeks favorable prices and commission rates that are reasonable in relation to the benefits received. The Advisor may not give consideration to sales of shares of the Trust as a factor in the selection of brokers and dealers to execute portfolio transactions. However, the Advisor may place portfolio transactions with brokers or dealers that promote or sell the Funds shares so long as such placements are made pursuant to policies approved by the Funds Board of Trustees that are designed to ensure that the selection is based on the quality of the brokers execution and not on its
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sales efforts. For the fiscal years ended January 31, 2020, 2021, and 2022, the Fund paid brokerage commissions of $10,945, $9,654 and $11,065, respectively.
The portfolio turnover rate for the Fund is calculated by dividing the lesser of amounts of purchases or sales of portfolio securities for the reporting period by the monthly average value of the portfolio securities owned during the reporting period. The calculation excludes all securities, whose maturities or expiration dates at the time of acquisition are one year or less. Portfolio turnover may vary greatly from year to year as well as within a particular year and may be affected by cash requirements for redemption of shares and by requirements which enables the Fund to receive favorable tax treatment. Portfolio turnover will not be a limiting factor in making portfolio decisions, and the Fund may engage in short-term trading to achieve its investment objective. The portfolio turnover rate for the Fund for the two fiscal years ended January 31, 2021 and 2022 were 72.53% and 59.71%.
The Advisor is specifically authorized to select brokers or dealers who also provide brokerage and research services to the Fund and/or the other accounts over which the Advisor exercises investment discretion and to pay such brokers or dealers a commission in excess of the commission another broker or dealer would charge if the Advisor determines in good faith that the commission is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided. The determination may be viewed in terms of a particular transaction or the Advisor's overall responsibilities with respect to the Trust and to other accounts over which it exercises investment discretion.
Research services include supplemental research, securities and economic analyses, statistical services and information with respect to the availability of securities or purchasers or sellers of securities and analyses of reports concerning performance of accounts. The research services and other information furnished by brokers through whom the Fund effect securities transactions may also be used by the Advisor in servicing all of its accounts. Similarly, research and information provided by brokers or dealers serving other clients may be useful to the Advisor in connection with its services to the Fund. Although research services and other information are useful to the Fund and the Advisor, it is not possible to place a dollar value on the research and other information received. It is the opinion of the Board of Trustees and the Advisor that the review and study of the research and other information will not reduce the overall cost to the Advisor of performing its duties to the Fund under the Management Agreement. Due to research services provided by brokers, the Fund may direct trades to certain brokers.
Over-the-counter transactions will be placed either directly with principal market makers or with broker-dealers, if the same or a better price, including commissions and executions, is available. Fixed income securities are normally purchased directly from the issuer, an underwriter or a market maker. Purchases include a concession paid by the issuer to the underwriter and the purchase price paid to a market maker may include the spread between the bid and asked prices.
When the Fund and another of the Advisor's clients seek to purchase or sell the same security at or about the same time, the Advisor may execute the transaction on a combined ("blocked") basis. Blocked transactions can produce better execution for the Fund because of the increased volume of the transaction. If the entire blocked order is not filled, the Fund may not be able to acquire as large a position in such security as it desires or it may have to pay a higher price for the security. Similarly, the Fund may not be able to obtain as large an execution of an order to sell or as high a price for any particular portfolio security if the other client desires to sell the same portfolio security at the same time. In the event that the entire blocked order is not filled, the purchase or sale will normally be allocated on a pro rata basis. The allocation may be adjusted by the Advisor, taking into account such factors as the size of the individual orders and transaction costs, when the Advisor believes an adjustment is reasonable.
The Trust and the Advisor have each adopted a Code of Ethics under Rule 17j-1 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The personnel subject to the Code of Ethics are permitted to invest in securities, including securities that may be purchased or held by the Fund. You may obtain a copy of the Code of Ethics from the SEC.
ADDITIONAL TAX INFORMATION
The following discussion of certain U.S. federal income tax consequences is general in nature and should not be regarded as an exhaustive presentation of all possible tax ramifications. Each shareholder should consult a qualified tax advisor regarding the tax consequences of an investment in the Fund. The tax considerations relevant to a specific shareholder depend upon the shareholders specific circumstances, and the following general summary does not attempt to discuss all potential tax considerations that could be relevant to a prospective shareholder with respect to the Fund or its investments. This general summary is based on the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code), the U.S. federal income tax regulations promulgated thereunder, and administrative and judicial interpretations thereof as of the date hereof, all of which are subject to change (potentially on a retroactive basis).
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The Fund intends to qualify each year as a regulated investment company under Subchapter M of the Code, which requires compliance with certain requirements concerning the sources of its income, diversification of its assets, and the amount and timing of its distributions to shareholders. Such qualification does not involve supervision of management or investment practices or policies by any government agency or bureau. By so qualifying, the Fund should not be subject to federal income or excise tax on its net investment income or net realized capital gain, which are distributed to shareholders in accordance with the applicable timing requirements.
The Fund intends to distribute substantially all of its net investment income (including any excess of net short-term capital gains over net long-term capital losses) and net realized capital gain (that is, any excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term capital losses) in accordance with the timing requirements imposed by the Code and therefore should not be required to pay any federal income or excise taxes. Net realized capital gain for a fiscal year is computed by taking into account any capital loss carryforward of the Fund.
To be treated as a regulated investment company under Subchapter M of the Code, the Fund must also (a) derive at least 90% of its gross income from dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans, net income from certain publicly traded partnerships and gains from the sale or other disposition of securities or foreign currencies, or other income (including, but not limited to, gains from options, futures or forward contracts) derived with respect to the business of investing in such securities or currencies, and (b) diversify its holding so that, at the end of each fiscal quarter, (i) at least 50% of the market value of a Funds assets is represented by cash, U.S. government securities and securities of other regulated investment companies, and other securities (for purposes of this calculation, generally limited in respect of any one issuer, to an amount not greater than 5% of the market value of a Funds assets and 10% of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer) and (ii) not more than 25% of the value of its assets is invested in the securities (other than U.S. government securities or the securities of other regulated investment companies) of any one issuer, two or more issuers which a Fund controls and which are determined to be engaged in the same or similar trades or businesses, or the securities of certain publicly traded partnerships.
If a Fund fails to qualify as a regulated investment company under Subchapter M in any fiscal year, it may be treated as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. As such, a Fund would be required to pay income taxes on its net investment income and net realized capital gains, if any, at the rates generally applicable to corporations. Shareholders of a Fund generally would not be liable for income tax on a Funds net investment income or net realized capital gains in their individual capacities. However, distributions to shareholders, whether from a Funds net investment income or net realized capital gains, would be treated as taxable dividends to the extent of current or accumulated earnings and profits of a Fund.
As a regulated investment company, a Fund is subject to a 4% nondeductible excise tax on certain undistributed amounts of ordinary income and net realized capital gain under a prescribed formula contained in Section 4982 of the Code. The formula requires payment to shareholders during a calendar year of distributions representing at least 98% of a Funds ordinary income for the calendar year and at least 98.2% of its net realized capital gain (i.e., the excess of its capital gains over capital losses) realized during the one-year period ending October 31 during such year plus 100% of any income that was neither distributed nor taxed to a Fund during the preceding calendar year. Under ordinary circumstances, a Fund expects to time its distributions so as to avoid liability for this tax.
The following discussion of U.S. federal income tax consequences is for the general information of shareholders that are subject to tax. Shareholders that are invested in IRAs or other qualified retirement plans are exempt from income taxation under the Code.
Distributions of taxable net investment income (including the excess of net short-term capital gain over net long-term realized capital loss) generally are taxable to shareholders as ordinary income. However, distributions by the Fund to a non-corporate shareholder may be subject to income tax at the shareholders applicable tax rate for long-term capital gain, to the extent that the Fund receives qualified dividend income on the securities it holds, the Fund properly designates the distribution as qualified dividend income, and the Fund and the non-corporate shareholder receiving the distribution meets certain holding period and other requirements. Distributions of net realized capital gain (capital gain dividends) generally are taxable to shareholders as long-term capital gain, regardless of the length of time the shares of the Trust have been held by such shareholders. Under current law, capital gain dividends recognized by a non-corporate shareholder generally will be taxed at a maximum income tax rate of 20%. Capital gains of corporate shareholders are taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.
Distributions of taxable net investment income and net realized capital gain will be taxable as described above, whether received in additional cash or shares. All distributions of taxable net investment income and net realized capital gain, whether received in shares or in cash, must be reported by each taxable shareholder on his or her federal income tax return. Dividends or
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distributions declared in October, November or December as of a record date in such a month, if any, will be deemed to have been received by shareholders on December 31, if paid during January of the following year. Redemptions of shares may result in tax consequences (gain or loss) to the shareholder and are also subject to these reporting requirements.
Redemption of Fund shares by a shareholder will result in the recognition of taxable gain or loss in an amount equal to the difference between the amount realized and the shareholders tax basis in the shareholder's Fund shares. Such gain or loss is treated as a capital gain or loss if the shares are held as capital assets. However, any loss realized upon the redemption of shares within six months from the date of their purchase will be treated as a long-term capital loss to the extent of any amounts treated as capital gain dividends during such six-month period. All or a portion of any loss realized upon the redemption of shares may be disallowed to the extent shares are purchased (including shares acquired by means of reinvested dividends) within 30 days before or after such redemption.
Under the Code, a Fund will be required to report to the Internal Revenue Service all distributions of taxable income and net realized capital gains as well as gross proceeds from the redemption or exchange of Fund shares, except in the case of certain exempt shareholders. Under the backup withholding provisions of Section 3406 of the Code, distributions of taxable net investment income and net realized capital gain and proceeds from the redemption or exchange of the shares of a regulated investment company may be subject to withholding of federal income tax (currently, at a rate of 28%) in the case of non-exempt shareholders who fail to furnish the investment company with their taxpayer identification numbers and with required certifications regarding their status under the federal income tax law, or if a Fund is notified by the IRS or a broker that withholding is required due to an incorrect TIN or a previous failure to report taxable interest or dividends. If the withholding provisions are applicable, any such distributions and proceeds, whether taken in cash or reinvested in additional shares, will be reduced by the amounts required to be withheld.
For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2012, an additional 3.8% Medicare tax generally will be imposed on certain net investment income (including ordinary dividends and capital gain distributions received from the Fund and net gains from redemptions or other taxable dispositions of Fund shares) of U.S. individuals, estates and trusts to the extent that any such persons modified adjusted gross income (in the case of an individual) or adjusted gross income (in the case of an estate or trust) exceeds certain threshold amounts.
The Fund does not currently accept investments from foreign investors. However, payments to a shareholder that is either a foreign financial institution (FFI) or a non-financial foreign entity (NFFE) within the meaning of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) may be subject to a generally nonrefundable 30% withholding tax on: (a) income dividends paid by a Fund after June 30, 2014 and (b) certain capital gain distributions and the proceeds arising from the sale of Fund shares paid by the Fund after December 31, 2016. FATCA withholding tax generally can be avoided: (a) by an FFI, subject to any applicable intergovernmental agreement or other exemption, if it enters into a valid agreement with the IRS to, among other requirements, report required information about certain direct and indirect ownership of foreign financial accounts held by U.S. persons with the FFI and (b) by an NFFE, if it: (i) certifies that it has no substantial U.S. persons as owners or (ii) if it does have such owners, reports information relating to them. A Fund may disclose the information that it receives from its shareholders to the IRS, non-U.S. taxing authorities or other parties as necessary to comply with FATCA. Withholding also may be required if a foreign entity that is a shareholder of a Fund fails to provide the Fund with appropriate certifications or other documentation concerning its status under FATCA.
Shareholders should consult their tax advisers about the application of federal, state, local and foreign tax law in light of their particular situation.
Should additional series, or funds, be created by the Trustees, each fund would be treated as a separate tax entity for federal income tax purposes.
PRICING OF FUND SHARES
The price (net asset value) of the shares of the Fund is determined at the close of trading (normally 4:00 p.m., Eastern time) on each day the New York Stock Exchange is open for business (the Exchange is closed on weekends, most federal holidays, and Good Friday). For a description of the methods used to determine the net asset value (share price), see "Determination of Net Asset Value" in the Prospectus.
Equity securities generally are valued by using market quotations, but may be valued on the basis of prices furnished by a pricing service when the Advisor believes such prices more accurately reflect the fair market value of such securities. Securities that are traded on any stock exchange or on the NASDAQ over-the-counter market are generally valued by the pricing service at the last
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quoted sale price. Lacking a last sale price, an equity security is generally valued by the pricing service at its last bid price. When market quotations are not readily available, when the Advisor determines that the market quotation or the price provided by the pricing service does not accurately reflect the current market value, or when restricted or illiquid securities are being valued, such securities are valued as determined in good faith by the Advisor, in conformity with guidelines adopted by and subject to review of the Board of Trustees of the Trust.
Fixed income securities generally are valued by using market quotations, but may be valued on the basis of prices furnished by a pricing service when the Advisor believes such prices accurately reflect the fair market value of such securities. A pricing service utilizes electronic data processing techniques based on yield spreads relating to securities with similar characteristics to determine prices for normal institutional-size trading units of debt securities without regard to sale or bid prices. If the Advisor decides that a price provided by the pricing service does not accurately reflect the fair market value of the securities, when prices are not readily available from a pricing service, or when restricted or illiquid securities are being valued, securities are valued at fair value as determined in good faith by the Advisor, subject to review of the Board of Trustees. Short term investments in fixed income securities with maturities of less than 60 days when acquired, or which subsequently are within 60 days of maturity, may be valued by using the amortized cost method of valuation, when the Board has determined such valuation will represent fair value.
PURCHASES AND SALES THROUGH BROKER DEALERS
The Fund may be purchased through broker dealers and other intermediaries. Each Fund has authorized one or more brokers to receive on its behalf purchase and redemption orders. Such brokers are authorized to designate other intermediaries to receive purchase and redemption orders on each Fund's behalf. The Fund will be deemed to have received a purchase or redemption order when an authorized broker or, if applicable, a broker's authorized designee, received the order. Customer orders will be priced at the Fund's net asset value next computed after they are received by an authorized broker or the broker's authorized designee.
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAM
The Trust has established an Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Program (the "Program") as required by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act"). To ensure compliance with this law, the Trust's Program provides for the development of internal practices, procedures and controls, designation of anti-money laundering compliance officers, an ongoing training program and an independent audit function to determine the effectiveness of the Program.
Procedures to implement the Program include, but are not limited to, determining that the Fund's transfer agent has established proper anti-money laundering procedures, reporting suspicious and/or fraudulent activity and a complete and thorough review of all new opening account applications. The Fund will not transact business with any person or entity whose identity cannot be adequately verified under the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act.
CUSTODIAN
U.S. Bank, N.A. is custodian of the Fund's investments. The custodian acts as the Fund's depository, safekeeps its portfolio securities, collects all income and other payments with respect thereto, disburses funds at the Fund's request and maintains records in connection with its duties.
FUND SERVICES
Effective July 20, 2015, the Trust retained Ultimus Fund Solutions, LLC (the Ultimus), 225 Pictoria Drive, Suite 450, Cincinnati, OH 45246, to provide the Fund with pricing, accounting, dividend disbursing, shareholder servicing and transfer agent services. Ultimus maintains the records of each shareholders account, answers shareholders inquiries concerning their accounts, processes purchases and redemptions of the Funds shares, acts as dividend and distribution disbursing agent and performs other shareholder service functions. Ultimus also provides accounting and pricing services to the Fund and maintains the accounting books and records for the Fund, supplies non-investment related statistical and research data, and provides accounting information for the preparation of tax returns and reports to shareholders of the Fund. For the performance of these services, the Advisor pays Ultimus a monthly fee based upon the average value of the Funds daily net assets, subject to a minimum monthly fee, plus a shareholder recordkeeping fee (on a per shareholder basis) for shareholder accounts. In addition, the Advisor pays out-of-pocket expenses, including but not limited to, postage, envelopes, checks, drafts, forms, reports, record storage, communication lines and all costs of external pricing services. For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2020, the Advisor
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paid Ultimus $63,527 for transfer agent and accounting services. For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2021, the Advisor paid Ultimus $52,906 for transfer agent and accounting services. For the fiscal year ended January 31, 2022, the Advisor paid Ultimus $45,000 for transfer agent and accounting services.
Premier Fund Solutions, Inc. (PFS), 1939 Friendship Drive, Suite C, El Cajon, CA 92020, provides the Fund with administrative services. PFS acts as a liaison among the Funds service providers; supplies necessary office equipment, personnel and facilities; provides non-investment-related statistical and research data as needed; assists in layout and printing of semi-annual and annual reports to shareholders and in the layout and printing of prospectuses; makes required SEC filings; advises the Fund regarding compliance with the 1940 Act and with its investment policies and limitations; coordinates board communications; and monitors filings of the Funds tax returns. The Advisor pays out-of-pocket expenses, including but not limited to, postage, envelopes, printing, reports, and record storage. For the performance of these services, the Advisor pays PFS a monthly fee based upon the average value of the Funds daily net assets. For the fiscal years ended January 31, 2020, 2021 and 2022, the Advisor paid PFS $22,500, $22,500 and $22,500, respectively, for administrative services for the Walthausen Focused Small Cap Value Fund.
INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM
The firm of Cohen & Company, Ltd., 342 N. Water St., Suite 830, Milwaukee, WI 53202, has been selected as independent registered public accounting firm for the Fund for the fiscal year ending January 31, 2023. The independent registered public accounting firm performs an annual audit of the Fund's financial statements and provides financial, tax and accounting consulting services as requested.
DISTRIBUTOR
Foreside Fund Services, LLC (Foreside), Three Canal Plaza, Suite 100, Portland, ME 04101, serves as the Funds agent to be the principal underwriter in connection with the offer and sale of the Funds shares. Foreside also reviews and files all proposed advertisements and sales literature with appropriate regulators. Compensation for the services performed by Foreside is paid by the Advisor from its own resources, not the Fund.
DISCLOSURE OF PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
The Fund is required to include a schedule of portfolio holdings in its annual and semi-annual reports to shareholders, which is sent to shareholders within 60 days of the end of the second and fourth fiscal quarters and which is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) on Form N-CSR within 70 days of the end of the second and fourth fiscal quarters. The Fund also is required to file a schedule of portfolio holdings with the SEC on Form N-PORT within 60 days of the end of the first and third fiscal quarters. The Fund must provide a copy of the complete schedule of portfolio holdings as filed with the SEC to any shareholder of the Fund, upon request, free of charge. This policy is applied uniformly to all shareholders of the Fund without regard to the type of requesting shareholder (i.e., regardless of whether the shareholder is an individual or institutional investor). Information contained in annual and semi-annual reports mailed to shareholders, as well as information filed with the SEC on Form N-PORT and information posted on the Funds website, is public information. All other information is non-public information.
The Fund has an ongoing relationship with third party servicing agents to release portfolio holdings information on a daily basis in order for those parties to perform their duties on behalf of the Fund. These third party servicing agents are the Advisor, Transfer Agent, Fund Accounting Agent, Administrator and Custodian. The Fund also may disclose portfolio holdings, as needed, to auditors, legal counsel, proxy voting services (if applicable), pricing services, printers, parties to merger and reorganization agreements and their agents, and prospective or newly hired investment advisors or sub-advisors. The Funds Chief Compliance Officer must authorize all disclosures of portfolio holdings. The lag between the date of the information and the date on which the information is disclosed will vary based on the identity of the party to whom the information is disclosed. For instance, the information may be provided to auditors within days of the end of an annual period, while the information may be given to legal counsel or prospective sub-advisors at any time. This information is disclosed to all such third parties under conditions of confidentiality. Conditions of confidentiality include (i) confidentiality clauses in written agreements, (ii) confidentiality implied by the nature of the relationship (e.g., attorney-client relationship), (iii) confidentiality required by fiduciary or regulatory principles (e.g., custody relationships) or (iv) understandings or expectations between the parties that the information will be kept confidential. The Fund also releases information to Morningstar or other entities that track and rank mutual fund performance on a delayed basis after the information has been filed with the SEC or otherwise made public. The Fund believes, based upon its size and history, that these are reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality of the Funds portfolio holdings and will provide sufficient protection against personal trading based on the information.
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The Fund is prohibited from entering into any arrangements with any person to make available information about the Funds portfolio holdings without the specific approval of the Board. The Advisor must submit any proposed arrangement pursuant to which the Advisor intends to disclose the Funds portfolio holdings to the Board, which will review such arrangement to determine (i) whether it is in the best interests of Fund shareholders, (ii) whether the information will be kept confidential and (iii) whether the disclosure presents a conflict of interest between the interests of Fund shareholders and those of the Advisor, or any affiliated person of the Fund, or the Advisor. Additionally, the Fund, the Advisor, and any affiliated persons of the Advisor, are prohibited from receiving compensation or other consideration, for themselves or on behalf of the Fund, as a result of disclosing the Funds portfolio holdings.
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The financial statements and independent registered public accounting firms report required to be included in the Statement of Additional Information are incorporated herein by reference to the Funds Annual Report to Shareholders for the year ended January 31, 2022. You may obtain a copy of the Annual Report and Semi-Annual Report without charge by writing the Transfer Agent at P.O. Box 46707, Cincinnati, Ohio 45246-0707 or by calling 1-888-925-8428.
PROXY VOTING POLICIES
The Board of Trustees of the Trust has delegated responsibilities for decisions regarding proxy voting for securities held by the Fund to the Funds Advisor. The Advisor will vote such proxies in accordance with its proxy policies and procedures. It is the Advisors policy to vote client shares primarily in conformity with Glass-Lewis & Co. recommendations in order to limit conflict of interest issues between the Advisor and its clients. Glass-Lewis & Co. and the Advisor retain a record of all recommendations. Glass-Lewis & Co. is a neutral third party that issues recommendations based on its own internal guidelines. The Advisor may vote client shares inconsistent with Glass-Lewis & Co. recommendations if it believes it is in the best interest of its clients and such a vote does not create a conflict of interest between the Advisor and its clients. In such a case, the Advisor will retain on file a written disclosure detailing why they believe Glass-Lewis & Co.s recommendation was not in the clients best interest. The Trusts Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures are attached as Exhibit A. The Advisors Proxy Voting Policy and Procedures are attached as Exhibit B. Glass-Lewis & Co.s Proxy Voting Guidelines are attached as Exhibit C.
MORE INFORMATION. The actual voting records relating to portfolio securities during the most recent 12-Month period ended June 30 will be available after August 31 without charge, upon request by calling toll-free, 1-888-925-8428 or by accessing the SECs website at www.sec.gov. In addition, a copy of the Funds proxy voting policies and procedures are also available by calling 1-888-925-8428 and will be sent within three business days of receipt of a request.
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Exhibit
A
WALTHAUSEN FUNDS |
PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
The Board of Trustees of the Trust (the Funds) has approved the delegation of the authority to vote proxies related to securities held in the portfolios of the Funds to the Funds Adviser (the Adviser). The Advisers goal in performing this service is to make proxy voting decisions in a manner that serves the best economic interest of the Funds, and that avoid the influence of conflicts of interest. To implement this goal, the Adviser has adopted proxy voting guidelines (the Proxy Voting Guidelines) to assist in making proxy voting decisions and in developing procedures for effecting those decisions. The Proxy Voting Guidelines are designed to ensure that, where the Adviser has the authority to vote proxies, all legal, fiduciary and contractual obligations will be met.
The Proxy Voting Guidelines address a wide variety of topics, including amongst other things, shareholder voting rights, anti-takeover defenses, board structures and the election of directors, executive compensation, reorganizations, mergers, and various shareholder proposals.
Policies
The Adviser has an agreement with Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Broadridge), an independent service provider, to handle the administration of proxy voting for the Funds portfolios securities managed by the Adviser, subject to oversight by the Advisers Proxy Manager. The Adviser votes proxies related to Fund securities via ProxyEdge, an electronic voting platform provided by Broadridge. ProxyEdge retains a record of proxy voting for the Funds.
It is the Advisers policy to primarily vote on shareholder proposals in conformity with recommendations from Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (Glass Lewis), an independent proxy advisory firm. Glass Lewis assists the firm in proxy voting and the corporate fund governance oversight process by developing and updating Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines which are incorporated into the Advisers and the Proxy Voting Guidelines by reference, and by providing research and analysis, and recommendations regarding voting Funds securities.
The decision by the Adviser to retain the services of Glass Lewis is based principally on the view that the services that Glass Lewis provides, subject to oversight by the Adviser, generally will result in proxy voting decisions which serve the best economic interests of the Funds, as well as limiting conflicts of interest between the Adviser and the Funds. The Adviser may vote Funds securities inconsistent with Glass Lewis recommendations if it believes that it is in the best economic interest of the Funds, and there is no conflict of interest present between the Adviser and the Funds. In such cases, Walthausen will retain a written record of the basis for the decision to vote against the Glass Lewis recommendation in the Funds best interests.
Conflicts of Interest
The Adviser does not engage in investment banking, administration of corporate retirement plans, does not purchase securities of any corporate client for client accounts, nor engages in any other activity that is likely to create a potential conflict of interest. Neither the Funds Distributor, nor any other service provider to the Funds, are affiliated with the Adviser, and as such do not create
1
a potential conflict of interest when voting Funds securities. In addition, because Funds proxies are primarily voted by Broadridge pursuant to the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines, the Adviser generally does not make an actual determination of how to vote a particular proxy, which therefore reduces the likelihood of any conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the Proxy Voting Guidelines address the issue of handling any conflict of interest that may arise.
If a proxy proposal creates a conflict of interest between the interests of the Funds and those of the Adviser, the proxy should be voted in conformity with the recommendation of Glass Lewis. To monitor compliance with this policy, any proposed or actual deviation from a recommendation from Glass Lewis must be reported to the Proxy Manager and the Advisers Chief Compliance Officer (CCO). The CCO will then provide guidance concerning the proposed deviation and whether it presents any potential conflict of interest. The Adviser, working with the Funds administrator, will ensure that the Form N-PX is filed with the SEC prior to August 31 of each year.
Procedures
The Proxy Manager, with oversight from the CCO, is responsible for confirming that all proxy voting is consistent with the Proxy Voting Guidelines. The Proxy Manager and the CCO will review, at least annually, the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines. In addition, the CCO will review whether Glass Lewis has the capacity, competency, and resources to adequately analyze proxy voting issues, as well as their conflict of interest policy. Any potential conflicts should be identified and addressed.
The actual voting records relating to portfolio securities during the most recent 12-Month period ended June 30 will be made available to shareholders without charge, upon request by calling toll-free, 1-888-925-8428 or by accessing the SECs website at www.sec.gov. In addition, a copy of the Funds proxy voting policies and procedures will be made available to shareholders by calling 1-888-925-8428 and will be sent within three business days of receipt of a request. Disclosure regarding this availability will be made in the Funds registration statement and each annual and semi-annual report to shareholders.
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Exhibit B
WALTHAUSEN & CO. |
PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
Purpose
The purpose of these Proxy Voting Policies and Procedures is to memorialize the policies and procedures adopted by Walthausen & Co. to enable it to comply with its responsibilities and the requirements of Rule 206(4)-6 of the Advisors Act. According to the Act, the firm has a fiduciary duty to adopt and implement written policies and procedures that are designed so that client securities are voted in the best interest of clients, including how to address material conflicts that arise between the firms interests and clients. The Act also requires disclosure to clients regarding how they may obtain information on how the firm voted their securities, guidelines for proxy voting clients securities, and furnishing a copy of policies and procedures on request from a client.
Walthausen has adopted proxy voting guidelines (the Proxy Voting Guidelines) to assist in making proxy voting decisions and in developing procedures for effecting those decisions. The Proxy Voting Guidelines are designed to ensure that, where Walthausen has the authority to vote proxies, all legal, fiduciary and contractual obligations will be met.
The Proxy Voting Guidelines address a wide variety of topics, including amongst other things, shareholder voting rights, anti-takeover defenses, board structures and the election of directors, executive compensation, reorganizations, mergers, and various shareholder proposals.
Policies
Walthausen has an agreement with Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Broadridge), an independent service provider, to handle the administration of proxy voting for client portfolios securities managed by Walthausen, subject to oversight by the firms Proxy Manager. Walthausen votes proxies related to clients securities via ProxyEdge, an electronic voting platform provided by Broadridge. Walthausen also votes client securities for certain accounts that use the services of ProxyTrust, via ProxyTrust.com, an electronic voting platform provided by ProxyTrust. Both ProxyEdge and ProxyTrust.com retain a record of proxy voting for each client.
It is Walthausens policy to primarily vote on shareholder proposals in conformity with recommendations from Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC (Glass Lewis), an independent proxy advisory firm. Glass Lewis assists the firm in proxy voting and the corporate fund governance oversight process by developing and updating Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines which are incorporated into Walthausens Proxy Voting Guidelines by reference, and by providing research and analysis, and recommendations regarding voting client securities.
The decision by Walthausen to retain the services of Glass Lewis is based principally on the view that the services that Glass Lewis provides, subject to oversight by Walthausen, generally will result in proxy voting decisions which serve the best economic interests of the firms clients, as well as limiting conflicts of interest between Walthausen and its clients. Walthausen may vote client securities inconsistent with Glass Lewis recommendations if it believes that it is in the best economic interest of its clients, and there is no conflict of interest present between the firm and its
1
clients. In such cases, Walthausen will retain a written record of the basis for the decision to vote against the Glass Lewis recommendation in the client best interests.
Conflicts of Interest
Walthausen does not engage in investment banking, administration of corporate retirement plans, does not purchase securities of any corporate client for client accounts, nor engages in any other activity that is likely to create a potential conflict of interest. In addition, because client proxies are primarily voted by Broadridge pursuant to the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines, Walthausen generally does not make an actual determination of how to vote a particular proxy, which therefore reduces the likelihood of any conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the Proxy Voting Guidelines address the issue of handling any conflict of interest that may arise.
If a proxy proposal creates a conflict of interest between the interest of a client and those of the firm, the proxy should be voted in conformity with the recommendation of Glass Lewis. To monitor compliance with this policy, any proposed or actual deviation from a recommendation from Glass Lewis must be reported to the Proxy Manager and the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO). The CCO will then provide guidance concerning the proposed deviation and whether it presents any potential conflict of interest.
Procedures
The Proxy Manager, with oversight from the CCO, is responsible for confirming that all proxy voting is consistent with the Proxy Voting Guidelines. The Proxy Manager and the CCO will review, at least annually, the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines. In addition, the CCO will review whether Glass Lewis has the capacity, competency, and resources to adequately analyze proxy voting issues, as well as their conflict of interest policy. Any potential conflicts should be identified and addressed.
Walthausens Part 2A of Form ADV discloses in Item 17 Voting Client Securities how clients may obtain a copy of the firms complete proxy voting policies and procedures, as well as how they can obtain information on how their proxy shares were voted. If any client requests a copy of our complete proxy policies and procedures or how proxies were voted for their account(s), we will promptly (within three business days) provide such information to the client. Any requests will be recorded, and will include the firms response.
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Exhibit C Glass Lewis Proxy Voting Guidelines
UNITED STATES
GLASS LEWIS
2022 Policy Guidelines
www.glasslewis.com
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 1 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Table of Contents | |
About Glass Lewis | 6 |
Guidelines Introduction | 7 |
Summary of Changes for 2022 | 7 |
A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest | 13 |
Election of Directors | 13 |
Independence | 13 |
Committee Independence | 16 |
Independent Chair | 16 |
Performance | 18 |
Board Responsiveness | 19 |
The Role of a Committee Chair | 20 |
Audit Committees and Performance | 20 |
Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee | 21 |
Compensation Committee Performance | 23 |
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance | 25 |
Board-level Risk Management Oversight | 28 |
Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues | 29 |
Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance | 30 |
Director Commitments | 30 |
Other Considerations | 31 |
Controlled Companies | 32 |
Significant Shareholders | 34 |
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off, or Direct Listing | 34 |
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company | 35 |
Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies | 36 |
OTC-listed Companies | 36 |
Mutual Fund Boards | 37 |
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 2 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Table of Contents | |
About Glass Lewis | 6 |
Guidelines Introduction | 7 |
Summary of Changes for 2022 | 7 |
A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest | 13 |
Election of Directors | 13 |
Independence | 13 |
Committee Independence | 16 |
Independent Chair | 16 |
Performance | 18 |
Board Responsiveness | 19 |
The Role of a Committee Chair | 20 |
Audit Committees and Performance | 20 |
Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee | 21 |
Compensation Committee Performance | 23 |
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance | 25 |
Board-level Risk Management Oversight | 28 |
Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues | 29 |
Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance | 30 |
Director Commitments | 30 |
Other Considerations | 31 |
Controlled Companies | 32 |
Significant Shareholders | 34 |
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off, or Direct Listing | 34 |
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company | 35 |
Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies | 36 |
OTC-listed Companies | 36 |
Mutual Fund Boards | 37 |
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 3 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Recoupment Provisions (Clawbacks) | 58 |
Hedging of Stock | 59 |
Pledging of Stock | 59 |
Compensation Consultant Independence | 60 |
CEO Pay Ratio | 60 |
Frequency of Say-on-Pay | 60 |
Vote on Golden Parachute Arrangements | 61 |
Equity-Based Compensation Plan Proposals | 61 |
Option Exchanges and Repricing | 62 |
Option Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging | 63 |
Director Compensation Plans | 64 |
Employee Stock Purchase Plans | 65 |
Executive Compensation Tax Deductability — Amendment to IRC 162(M) | 65 |
Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise | 67 |
Anti-Takeover Measures | 67 |
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans) | 67 |
NOL Poison Pills | 67 |
Fair Price Provisions | 68 |
Quorum Requirements | 69 |
Director and Officer Indemnification | 69 |
Reincorporation | 69 |
Exclusive Forum and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions | 70 |
Authorized Shares | 71 |
Advance Notice Requirements | 72 |
Virtual Shareholder Meetings | 72 |
Voting Structure | 73 |
Multi-Class Share Structures | 73 |
Cumulative Voting | 74 |
Supermajority Vote Requirements | 74 |
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 4 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Transaction of Other Business | 75 |
Anti-Greenmail Proposals | 75 |
Mutual Funds: Investment Policies and Advisory Agreements | 75 |
Real Estate Investment Trusts | 76 |
Preferred Stock Issuances at REITs | 76 |
Business Development Companies | 76 |
Authorization to Sell Shares at a Price Below Net Asset Value | 77 |
Auditor Ratification and Below-NAV Issuances | 77 |
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies | 77 |
Extension of Business Combination Deadline | 78 |
SPAC Board Independence | 78 |
Director Commitments of SPAC Executives | 78 |
Shareholder Proposals | 78 |
Overall Approach to Environmental, Social & Governance | 80 |
Connect with Glass Lewis | 82 |
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 5 |
GLASS LEWIS |
About Glass Lewis
Glass Lewis is the world’s choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make sustainable decisions based on research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.
Our customers include the majority of the world’s largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset
managers, collectively managing over $40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States,
Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.
Investors around the world depend on Glass Lewis’ Viewpoint platform to manage their proxy voting, policy implementation, recordkeeping, and reporting. Our industry leading Proxy Paper product provides comprehensive environmental, social, and governance research and voting recommendations weeks ahead of voting deadlines. Public companies can also use our innovative Report Feedback Statement to deliver their opinion on our proxy research directly to the voting decision makers at every investor client in time for voting decisions to be made or changed.
The research team engages extensively with public companies, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.
Join the Conversation
Glass Lewis is committed to ongoing engagement with all market participants.
info@glasslewis.com | www.glasslewis.com
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 6 |
GLASS LEWIS |
Guidelines Introduction
Summary of Changes for 2022
Glass Lewis evaluates these guidelines on an ongoing basis and formally updates them on an annual basis. This year we’ve made noteworthy revisions in the following areas, which are summarized below but discussed in greater detail in the relevant section of this document:
Board Gender Diversity
We have expanded our policy on board gender diversity. Beginning in 2022, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than two gender diverse directors, or the entire nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside of the Russell 3000 index, and all boards with six or fewer total directors, our existing policy requiring a minimum of one gender diverse director will remain in place.
Our voting recommendations in 2022 will be based on the above requirements for the number of gender diverse board members. However, beginning with shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2023, we will transition from a fixed numerical approach to a percentage-based approach and will generally recommend voting against the nominating committee chair of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse at companies within
the Russell 3000 index.
Additionally, when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company’s disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors of companies when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board.
We have also replaced references in our guidelines to female directors with “gender diverse directors,” defined
as women and directors that identify with a gender other than male or female.
State Laws on Gender Diversity
We have revised our discussion regarding state laws on diversity to include two sections regarding state laws on gender diversity and state laws on underrepresented community diversity. In addition to our standard policy on board diversity, we will recommend in accordance with mandated board composition requirements set forth in applicable state laws when they come into effect. We have removed references to any state’s individual laws.
We will generally refrain from recommending against directors when applicable state laws do not mandate board composition requirements, are non-binding, or solely impose disclosure or reporting requirements in filings made with each respective state annually.
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 7 |
GLASS LEWIS |
State Laws on Underrepresented Community Diversity
We have included a new section discussing state laws on underrepresented community diversity. In addition to board gender diversity, several states have also begun to encourage board diversity beyond gender through legislation. We will generally recommend in line with applicable state laws mandating board composition requirements for underrepresented community diversity or other diversity measures beyond gender when they come into effect.
Stock Exchange Diversity Disclosure Requirements
We have included a new section regarding our approach to a recent disclosure rule adopted by the Nasdaq stock exchange. On August 6, 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure for Nasdaq-listed companies. Beginning in 2022, companies listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange will be required to disclose certain board diversity statistics annually in a standardized format in the proxy statement or on the company's website. Nasdaq-listed companies are required to provide this disclosure by the later of (i) August 8, 2022, or (ii) the date the company files its proxy statement for its 2022 annual meeting. Accordingly, for annual meetings held after August 8, 2022, of applicable Nasdaq- listed companies, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee when the required disclosure has not been provided.
Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills
We have revised our discussion on disclosure of director diversity and skills in company proxy statements. Beginning in 2022, for companies in the S&P 500 index with particularly poor disclosure (i.e., those failing to provide any disclosure in each of the tracked categories), we may recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee. Beginning in 2023, when companies in the S&P 500 index have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority demographic information, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.
Environmental and Social Risk Oversight
We have updated our guidelines with respect to board-level oversight of environmental and social (E&S) issues. Beginning in 2022, Glass Lewis will note as a concern when boards of companies in the Russell 1000 index do not provide clear disclosure concerning the board-level oversight afforded to environmental and/or social issues. For shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2022, we will generally recommend voting against the governance committee chair of a company in the S&P 500 index who fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board’s role in overseeing these issues. While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee.
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 8 |
GLASS LEWIS |
The Role of a Committee Chair
We have revised our approach to the role of a committee chair in cases where there is a designated committee chair and the recommendation is to vote against the committee chair, but the chair is not up for election because the board is staggered. Beginning in 2022, in cases where the committee chair is not up for election due to a staggered board, and where we have identified multiple concerns, we will generally recommend voting against other members of the committee who are up for election, on a case-by-case basis.
Multi-Class Share Structures with Unequal Voting Rights
We have updated our approach to companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights. Beginning in 2022, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company
We have included a new section to address governance concerns at companies following a business combination with a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC). We believe that the business combination of a private company with a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company facilitates the private entity becoming a publicly traded corporation. Thus, the business combination represents the private company’s de- facto IPO. We believe that some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that has completed a business combination with a SPAC within the past year.
In cases where Glass Lewis determines that the company has adopted overly restrictive governing documents, where, preceding the company becoming publicly traded, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the company becoming publicly traded if the board: (i) did not also submit these provisions to a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination; (ii) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the company becoming publicly traded; or (iii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure).
Director Commitments of SPAC Executives
We have included a new discussion of our approach to director commitments for directors when their only executive role is at a special purpose acquisition company. We believe the primary role of executive officers at SPACs is identifying acquisition targets for the SPAC and consummating a business combination. Given the nature of these executive roles and the limited business operations of SPACs, when a directors’ only executive role is at a SPAC, we will generally apply our higher limit for company directorships. As a result, we generally
2022 Policy Guidelines — United States 9 |
GLASS LEWIS |
recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves in an executive role only at a SPAC while serving on more than five public company boards.
Waiver of Age and Tenure Policies
We have revised our approach to boards waiving self-imposed age and/or tenure policies. Beginning in 2022, in cases where the board has waived its term/age limits for two or more consecutive years, Glass Lewis will generally recommend shareholders vote against the nominating and or governance committee chair, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board is proposing to waive this rule, such as consummation of a corporate transaction.
Clarifying Amendments
The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:
Overall Approach to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG)
We have expanded our discussion of environmental, social & governance initiatives in a new section titled Glass Lewis’ Overall Approach to ESG. Here we provide additional details of our considerations when evaluating these topics. To summarize, Glass Lewis evaluates all environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. We believe that companies should be considering material environmental and social factors in all aspects of their operations and that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that allow them to understand how these factors are being considered and how attendant risks are being mitigated.
For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposals, please refer to our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.
Shareholder Proposals
In the section titled Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise, we have added a sub-section titled Shareholder Proposals, summarizing our existing approach to analyzing these proposals. Specifically, we evaluate all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis with a view to promoting long-term shareholder value. While we are generally supportive of those that promote board accountability, shareholder rights, and transparency, we consider all proposals in the context of a company’s unique operations and risk profile.
Please refer to our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives for additional detail.
Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria
We have outlined our current approach to the use of E&S metrics in the variable incentive programs for named executive officers. Glass Lewis highlights the use of E&S metrics in our analysis of the advisory vote on executive compensation. However, Glass Lewis does not maintain a policy on the inclusion of such metrics or whether
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these metrics should be used in either a company's short- or long-term incentive program. As with other types of metrics, where E&S metrics are included, as determined by the company, we expect robust disclosure on the metrics selected, the rigor of performance targets, and the determination of corresponding payout opportunities. For qualitative E&S metrics, the company should provide shareholders with a thorough understanding of how these metrics will be or were assessed.
Short- and Long-Term Incentives
Our guidance related to Glass Lewis' analysis of the short-term incentive awards has been clarified to note that Glass Lewis will consider adjustments to GAAP financial results in its assessment of the incentive’s effectiveness at tying executive pay to performance. As with the short-term incentive awards, our analysis of long-term incentive grants also considers the basis for any adjustments to metrics or results. Thus, clear disclosure from companies is equally important for long-term incentive awards.
Grants of Front-Loaded Awards
We have clarified our guidance related to Glass Lewis' analysis of so-called front-loaded incentive awards. Specifically, while we continue to examine the quantum of award on an annualized basis for the full vesting period of the awards, Glass Lewis also considers the impact of the overall size of awards on dilution of shareholder wealth.
Authorizations/Increases in Authorized Preferred Stock
With regard to authorizations of requested increases in authorized preferred stock, we have clarified that we will generally recommend voting against preferred stock authorizations or increases, unless the company discloses a commitment to not use such shares as an anti-takeover defense or in a shareholder rights plan, or discloses a commitment to submit any shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote prior to its adoption.
Federal Forum Provisions
We have clarified our approach to companies that have adopted federal exclusive forum provisions designating federal courts as the sole jurisdiction for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933. When boards have adopted federal exclusive forum provisions without seeking shareholder approval, we will generally take the same approach as when boards have adopted exclusive forum provisions designating state courts as exclusive jurisdiction for certain matters and will generally recommend voting against chairs of governance committees.
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off or Direct Listing
We have clarified our approach to director recommendations on the basis of post-IPO corporate governance concerns to include references to companies that have gone public by way of direct listing. When evaluating governance following a direct listing, we will apply the same approach as our existing policy on IPOs and spin- offs.
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Director Independence
In the section outlining our approach to director independence, we have added a sentence clarifying that for material financial transactions, we apply a three-year look back, and for former employment relationships, we apply a five-year look back.
Related-Party Transaction Materiality Thresholds
In the section defining “material” transactions, we added a sentence clarifying that the $50,000 threshold for individual transactions also applies to directors who are the majority or principal owner of a firm that receives such payments.
Lastly, we have made several minor edits of a housekeeping nature, including the removal of several redundant
and/or outdated footnotes.
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A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest
Election of Directors
The purpose of Glass Lewis’ proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that a board can best protect and enhance the interests of shareholders if it is sufficiently independent, has a record of positive performance, and consists of individuals with diverse backgrounds and a breadth and depth of relevant experience.
Independence
The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director’s track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.
We look at each director nominee to examine the director’s relationships with the company, the company’s executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director’s decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders’ interests above the director’s or the related party’s interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board, and therefore believe such a director’s independence may be hampered, in particular when serving on the audit committee.
Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:
Independent Director — An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years1 before the
1 NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look- back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard for former employment relationships is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look-back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.
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inquiry are usually considered “current” for purposes of this test. For material financial relationships with the company, we apply a three-year look back, and for former employment relationships with the company, we apply a five-year look back.
Affiliated Director — An affiliated director has, (or within the past three years, had) a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.2 This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the company.3 In addition, we view a director who either owns or controls 20% or more of the company’s voting stock, or is an employee or affiliate of an entity that controls such amount, as an affiliate.4
We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.
Glass Lewis applies a three-year look back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look back.
Definition of “Material”: A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds:
· | $50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services. This threshold also applies to directors who are the majority or principal owner of a firm that receives such payments; or |
· | $120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm and the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services.5 This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;6 and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director’s firm; or |
2 If a company does not consider a non-employee director to be independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an
affiliate.
3 We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after
this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of “material.”
4 This includes a director who serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an investment firm with greater than 20% ownership. However, while we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated, we will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.
5 We may deem such a transaction to be immaterial where the amount represents less than 1% of the firm’s annual revenues and the board provides a compelling rationale as to why the director’s independence is not affected by the relationship.
6 We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company’s size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director’s role at the charity. However, unlike for other types
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· | 1% of either company’s consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).7 |
Definition of “Familial” — Familial relationships include a person’s spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person’s home. A director is an affiliate if: i) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and receives more than $120,000 in annual compensation; or, ii) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and the company does not disclose this individual’s compensation.
Definition of “Company” — A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.
Inside Director — An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a board chair who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director’s own best interests.
Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.
Additionally, we believe a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of the director’s resignation or departure from the interim management position.
Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Board Independence
Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders’ interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically8 recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.
of related party transactions, Glass Lewis generally does not apply a look-back period to affiliated relationships involving charitable contributions; if the relationship between the director and the school or charity ceases, or if the company discontinues its donations to the entity, we will consider the director to be independent.
7 This includes cases where a director is employed by, or closely affiliated with, a private equity firm that profits from an acquisition made by the company. Unless disclosure suggests otherwise, we presume the director is affiliated.
8 With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the other affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence. However, we will consider recommending voting against the directors subject to our concern at their next election if the issue giving rise to the concern is not resolved.
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In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chair’s presence.
In addition, we scrutinize avowedly “independent” chairs and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent or the company should not tout them as such.
Committee Independence
We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company’s audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.9 We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.
Pursuant to Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require that boards apply enhanced standards of independence when making an affirmative determination of the independence of compensation committee members. Specifically, when making this determination, in addition to the factors considered when assessing general director independence, the board’s considerations must include: (i) the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the listed company to the director (the “Fees Factor”); and (ii) whether the director is affiliated with the listing company, its subsidiaries, or affiliates of its subsidiaries (the “Affiliation Factor”).
Glass Lewis believes it is important for boards to consider these enhanced independence factors when assessing compensation committee members. However, as discussed above in the section titled Independence, we apply our own standards when assessing the independence of directors, and these standards also take into account consulting and advisory fees paid to the director, as well as the director’s affiliations with the company and its subsidiaries and affiliates. We may recommend voting against compensation committee members who are not independent based on our standards.
Independent Chair
Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chair creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chair position. An executive manages the business according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals set by the board. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chair presumably will have a significant influence over the board.
9 We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is composed of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company’s stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.
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While many companies have an independent lead or presiding director who performs many of the same functions of an independent chair (e.g., setting the board meeting agenda), we do not believe this alternate form of independent board leadership provides as robust protection for shareholders as an independent chair.
It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/chair controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.
A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board’s approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO’s vision for accomplishing the board’s objectives. Failure to achieve the board’s objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.
Likewise, an independent chair can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.
Further, it is the board’s responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.
Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chair is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chair fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior management. Encouragingly, many companies appear to be moving in this direction — one study indicates that only 10 percent of incoming CEOs in 2014 were awarded the chair title, versus 48 percent in 2002.10 Another study finds that 53 percent of S&P 500 boards now separate the CEO and chair roles, up from 37 percent in 2009, although the same study found that only 34 percent of S&P 500 boards have truly independent chairs.11
We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically recommend that our clients support separating the roles of chair and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.
Further, where the company has neither an independent chair nor independent lead director, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.
10 Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary L. Nelson. “The $112 Billion CEO Succession Problem.” (Strategy+Business, Issue
79, Summer 2015).
11 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 6.
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Performance
The most crucial test of a board’s commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.
We find that a director’s past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred serving on the boards of companies with similar problems. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of directors serving at over 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.
Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Performance
We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders. We will reevaluate such directors based on, among other factors, the length of time passed since the incident giving rise to the concern, shareholder support for the director, the severity of the issue, the director’s role (e.g., committee membership), director tenure at the subject company, whether ethical lapses accompanied the oversight lapse, and evidence of strong oversight at other companies.
Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.
We believe shareholders should avoid electing directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:
1. A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings,
calculated in the aggregate.>12
2. | A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late |
filing was the director’s fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).
3. | A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements. |
4. | A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed). |
Furthermore, with consideration given to the company’s overall corporate governance, pay-for-performance alignment and board responsiveness to shareholders, we may recommend voting against directors who served
12 However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.
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throughout a period in which the company performed significantly worse than peers and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.
Board Responsiveness
Glass Lewis believes that any time 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management, the board should, depending on the issue, demonstrate some level of responsiveness to address the concerns of shareholders. These include instances when 20% or more of shareholders: (i) withhold votes from (or vote against) a director nominee; (ii) vote against a management-sponsored proposal; or (iii) vote for a shareholder proposal. In our view, a 20% threshold is significant enough to warrant a close examination of the underlying issues and an evaluation of whether or not a board response was warranted and, if so, whether the board responded appropriately following the vote, particularly in the case of a compensation or director election proposal. While the 20% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote recommendation from Glass Lewis on a future proposal (e.g., to recommend against a director nominee, against a say-on-pay proposal, etc.), it may be a contributing factor to our recommendation to vote against
management’s recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately. While Glass Lewis may note instances of significant support for shareholder proposals, we believe clear action is warranted when such proposals receive support from a majority of votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes).
With regard to companies where voting control is held through a multi-class share structure with disproportionate voting and economic rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. Where vote results indicate that a majority of unaffiliated shareholders supported a shareholder proposal or opposed a management proposal, we believe the board should demonstrate an appropriate level of responsiveness.
As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of publicly available disclosures (e.g., the proxy statement, annual report, 8-Ks, company website, etc.) released following the date of the company’s last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most current Proxy Paper. Depending on the specific issue, our focus typically includes, but is not limited to, the following:
· | At the board level, any changes in directorships, committee memberships, disclosure of related party transactions, meeting attendance, or other responsibilities; |
· | Any revisions made to the company’s articles of incorporation, bylaws or other governance documents; |
· | Any press or news releases indicating changes in, or the adoption of, new company policies, business practices or special reports; and |
· | Any modifications made to the design and structure of the company’s compensation program, as well as an assessment of the company’s engagement with shareholders on compensation issues as discussed in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A), particularly following a material vote against a company’s say-on-pay. |
Our Proxy Paper analysis will include a case-by-case assessment of the specific elements of board responsiveness that we examined along with an explanation of how that assessment impacts our current voting recommendations.
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The Role of a Committee Chair
Glass Lewis believes that a designated committee chair maintains primary responsibility for the actions of his or her respective committee. As such, many of our committee-specific voting recommendations are against the applicable committee chair rather than the entire committee (depending on the seriousness of the issue). In cases where the committee chair is not up for election due to a staggered board, and where we have identified multiple concerns, we will generally recommend voting against other members of the committee who are up for election, on a case-by-case basis.
In cases where we would ordinarily recommend voting against a committee chair but the chair is not specified, we apply the following general rules, which apply throughout our guidelines:
· | If there is no committee chair, we recommend voting against the longest-serving committee member or, if the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, the longest-serving board member serving on the committee (i.e., in either case, the “senior director”); and |
· | If there is no committee chair, but multiple senior directors serving on the committee, we recommend |
voting against both (or all) such senior directors.
In our view, companies should provide clear disclosure of which director is charged with overseeing each committee. In cases where that simple framework is ignored and a reasonable analysis cannot determine which committee member is the designated leader, we believe shareholder action against the longest serving committee member(s) is warranted. Again, this only applies if we would ordinarily recommend voting against the committee chair but there is either no such position or no designated director in such role.
Audit Committees and Performance
Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because stable capital markets depend on reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. Audit committees play a vital role in providing this disclosure to shareholders.
When assessing an audit committee’s performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:
A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting — the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors — form a ‘three legged stool’ that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be ‘first among equals’ in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.
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Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee
For an audit committee to function effectively on investors’ behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said “members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters.”13
We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller, or similar experience. While we will not necessarily recommend voting against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to recommend voting against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.
Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.
When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and generally recommend voting in favor of its members. However, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:
1. All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.
2. | The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee’s financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies. |
3. | The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least four times during the year. |
4. | The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members. |
5. | Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member’s attendance at all board and committee meetings.14 |
6. | All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor. |
13 Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.
14 Glass Lewis may exempt certain audit committee members from the above threshold if, upon further analysis of relevant factors such as the director’s experience, the size, industry-mix and location of the companies involved and the director’s attendance at all the companies, we can reasonably determine that the audit committee member is likely not hindered by multiple audit committee commitments.
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7. | The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor). |
8. | The audit committee chair when fees paid to the auditor are not disclosed. |
9. | All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are prohibited by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). |
10. | All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions. |
11. | All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry. |
12. | The audit committee chair if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee. |
13. | All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A15 |
letter has been issued.
14. | All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the |
company.16
15. | All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:17 |
a. | The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders; |
b. | The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation; |
c. | The restatement involves revenue recognition; |
d. | The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or |
e. | The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities. |
16. | All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last five quarters. |
15 Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.
16 Research indicates that revenue fraud now accounts for over 60% of SEC fraud cases, and that companies that engage in fraud experience significant negative abnormal stock price declines—facing bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do non-fraud firms (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007.” May 2010).
17 The SEC issued guidance in March 2021 related to classification of warrants as liabilities at special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs). We will generally refrain from recommending against audit committee members when the restatement in question is solely as a result of the aforementioned SEC guidance.
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17. | All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). |
18. | All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor |
disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.
19. | All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed (e.g., the company receives an adverse opinion on its financial statements from the auditor). |
20. All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor’s liability to the company for damages.18
21. All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company’s last annual meeting, and when, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected, or, when the company has an ongoing material weakness from a prior year that has not yet been corrected.
We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, we take into consideration, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee, the transparency of the audit committee report.
Compensation Committee Performance
Compensation committees have a critical role in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business’s long-term shareholders returns.
Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the board’s compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.
Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. For example, the use of a compensation consultant who maintains a business relationship with company management may cause the committee to
18 The Council of Institutional Investors. “Corporate Governance Policies,” p. 4, April 5, 2006; and “Letter from Council of
Institutional Investors to the AICPA,” November 8, 2006.
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make decisions based on information that is compromised by the consultant’s conflict of interests. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring- loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.
Central to understanding the actions of compensation committee is a careful review of the CD&A report included in each company’s proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as advisory votes on executive compensation, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company’s top executives.
When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will consider recommending that
shareholders vote against the following:
1. All members of a compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to address shareholder concerns following majority shareholder rejection of the say-on-pay proposal in the previous year. Where the proposal was approved but there was a significant shareholder vote (i.e., greater than 20% of votes cast) against the say-on-pay proposal in the prior year, if the board did not respond sufficiently to the vote including actively engaging shareholders on this issue, we will also consider recommending voting against the chair of the compensation committee or all members of the compensation committee, depending on the severity and history of the compensation problems and the level of shareholder opposition.
2. | All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served when the company failed to align pay with performance if shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation at the annual meeting.19 |
3. | Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that have consistently failed to align pay with performance and whose oversight of compensation at the company in question is suspect. |
4. | All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements. |
5. | All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained. |
6. | All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits |
were allowed.
7. | The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year. |
8. | All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options or completed a “self tender offer” without shareholder approval within the past two years. |
9. | All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated. |
19 If a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal, we will initially only recommend voting against the company's say-on-pay proposal and will not recommend voting against the members of the compensation committee unless there is a pattern of failing to align pay and performance and/or the company exhibits egregious compensation practices. For cases in which the disconnect between pay and performance is marginal and the company has outperformed its peers, we will consider not recommending against compensation committee members.
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10. | All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in |
option backdating.
11. | All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information. |
12. | All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud. |
13. | The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets. |
14. | All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.20 |
15. | All members of the compensation committee when the board has materially decreased proxy statement disclosure regarding executive compensation policies and procedures in a manner which substantially impacts shareholders’ ability to make an informed assessment of the company’s executive pay practices. |
16. | All members of the compensation committee when new excise tax gross-up provisions are adopted in employment agreements with executives, particularly in cases where the company previously committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future. |
17. | All members of the compensation committee when the board adopts a frequency for future advisory votes on executive compensation that differs from the frequency approved by shareholders. |
Nominating and Governance Committee Performance
The nominating and governance committee is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the committee is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote. At most companies, a single committee is charged with these oversight functions; at others, the governance and nominating responsibilities are apportioned among two separate committees.
Consistent with Glass Lewis’ philosophy that boards should have diverse backgrounds and members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience, we believe that nominating and governance committees should consider diversity when making director nominations within the context of each specific company and its industry. In our view, shareholders are best served when boards make an effort to ensure a constituency that is
20 In all other instances (i.e., a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we
recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.
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not only reasonably diverse on the basis of age, race, gender and ethnicity, but also on the basis of geographic knowledge, industry experience, board tenure and culture.
Regarding the committee responsible for governance, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote
against the following:
1. All members of the governance committee21 during whose tenure a shareholder proposal relating to important shareholder rights received support from a majority of the votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes) and the board has not begun to implement or enact the proposal’s subject matter.22 Examples of such shareholder proposals include those seeking a declassified board structure, a majority vote standard for director elections, or a right to call a special meeting. In determining whether a board has sufficiently implemented such a proposal, we will examine the quality of the right enacted or proffered by the board for any conditions that may unreasonably interfere with the shareholders’ ability to exercise the right (e.g., overly restrictive procedural requirements for calling a special
meeting).
2. | All members of the governance committee when a shareholder resolution is excluded from the meeting agenda but the SEC has declined to state a view on whether such resolution should be excluded, or when the SEC has verbally permitted a company to exclude a shareholder proposal but there is no written record provided by the SEC about such determination and the company has not provided any disclosure concerning this no-action relief. |
3. | The governance committee chair when the chair is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.23 |
4. | The governance committee chair at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less). |
5. | In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are fewer than five, or the whole governance committee when there are more than 20 members on the board. |
6. | The governance committee chair when the committee fails to meet at all during the year. |
7. | The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be “inadequate” related party transaction disclosure (i.e., the nature of such transactions and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing a share- |
21 If the board does not have a committee responsible for governance oversight and the board did not implement a shareholder proposal that received the requisite support, we will recommend voting against the entire board. If the shareholder proposal at issue requested that the board adopt a declassified structure, we will recommend voting against all director nominees up for election.
22 Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.
23 We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against the governance committee chair as we believe the lack of fixed lead or presiding director means that, effectively, the board does not have an independent board leader.
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holder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock exchange listing requirements).
8. | The governance committee chair, when during the past year the board adopted a forum selection clause (i.e., an exclusive forum provision)24 designating either a state's courts for intra-corporate disputes, and/or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933 without shareholder approval,25 or if the board is currently seeking shareholder approval of a forum selection clause |
pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal.
9. | All members of the governance committee during whose tenure the board adopted, without shareholder approval, provisions in its charter or bylaws that, through rules on director compensation, may inhibit the ability of shareholders to nominate directors. |
10. | The governance committee chair when the board takes actions to limit shareholders’ ability to vote on matters material to shareholder rights (e.g., through the practice of excluding a shareholder proposal by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal). |
11. | The governance committee chair when directors’ records for board and committee meeting attendance are not disclosed, or when it is indicated that a director attended less than 75% of board and committee meetings but disclosure is sufficiently vague that it is not possible to determine which specific director’s attendance was lacking. |
12. | The governance committee chair when a detailed record of proxy voting results from the prior annual |
meeting has not been disclosed.
In addition, we may recommend that shareholders vote against the chair of the governance committee, or the entire committee, where the board has amended the company’s governing documents to reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right, and has done so without seeking shareholder approval. Examples of board actions that may cause such a recommendation include: the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent; an increase to the ownership threshold required for shareholders to call a special meeting; an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments; the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse — such as bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims
or that require shareholder plaintiffs to pay the company’s legal expenses in the absence of a court victory (i.e., “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws); the adoption of a classified board structure; and the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.
Regarding the nominating committee, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the
following:
24 A forum selection clause is a bylaw provision stipulating that a certain state or federal jurisdiction is the exclusive forum for specified legal matters. Such a clause effectively limits a shareholder's legal remedy regarding appropriate choice of venue and related relief.
25 Glass Lewis will evaluate the circumstances surrounding the adoption of any forum selection clause as well as the general provisions contained therein. Where it can be reasonably determined that a forum selection clause is narrowly crafted to suit the particular circumstances facing the company and/or a reasonable sunset provision is included, we may make an exception to this policy.
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1. All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated
an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.
2. | The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year. |
3. | In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair when the chair is not |
independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.
4. | The nominating committee chair, when there are fewer than five, or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board. |
5. | The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.26 |
6. | The chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than two gender diverse directors,27 or all members of the nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies |
within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside of the Russell 3000 index, and all boards with six or fewer total directors, we will recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee if there are no gender diverse directors.
7. | The nominating committee chair when, alongside other governance or board performance concerns, the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new independent directors have joined the board in the past five years. We will not be making voting recommendations solely on this basis; rather, insufficient board refreshment may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified. |
In addition, we may consider recommending shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating committee where the board’s failure to ensure the board has directors with relevant experience, either through periodic director assessment or board refreshment, has contributed to a company’s poor performance. Where these issues warrant an against vote in the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the board chair, unless the chair also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the longest-serving director.
Board-level Risk Management Oversight
Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to
26 Considering that shareholder disapproval clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the severity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern as well as company responsiveness to such matters, and will only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 20% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.
27 Women and directors that identify with a gender other than male or female.
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financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firms have complex hedging or trading strategies, those firms
should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.
Our views on risk oversight are consistent with those expressed by various regulatory bodies. In its December 2009 Final Rule release on Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, the SEC noted that risk oversight is a key competence of the board and that additional disclosures would improve investor and shareholder understanding of the role of the board in the organization’s risk management practices. The final rules, which became effective on February 28, 2010, now explicitly require companies and mutual funds to describe (while allowing for some degree of flexibility) the board’s role in the oversight of risk.
When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company’s board-level risk committee’s poor oversight contributed to the loss, we will recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise),28 we will consider recommending to vote against the board chair on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chair/CEO, except in egregious cases.
Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues
Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring the sustainability of companies’ operations. We believe that insufficient oversight of material environmental and social issues can present direct legal, financial, regulatory and reputational risks that could serve to harm shareholder interests. Therefore, we believe that these issues should be carefully monitored and managed by companies, and that all companies should have an appropriate oversight structure in place to ensure that they are mitigating attendant risks and capitalizing on related opportunities to the best extent possible.
To that end, Glass Lewis believes that companies should ensure that boards maintain clear oversight of material risks to their operations, including those that are environmental and social in nature. These risks could include, but are not limited to, matters related to climate change, human capital management, diversity, stakeholder relations, and health, safety & environment.
For companies in the Russell 1000 index and in instances where we identify material oversight concerns, Glass Lewis will review a company’s overall governance practices and identify which directors or board-level committees have been charged with oversight of environmental and/or social issues. Furthermore, given the importance of the board’s role in overseeing environmental and social risks, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the governance committee chair of a company in the S&P 500 index that fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board’s role in overseeing these issues.
28 A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, the audit committee, or the finance committee, depending on a given company’s board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.
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While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee.
When evaluating the board’s role in overseeing environmental and/or social issues, we will examine a company’s proxy statement and governing documents (such as committee charters) to determine if directors maintain a meaningful level of oversight of and accountability for a company’s material environmental and social impacts.
Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance
Glass Lewis carefully monitors companies’ performance with respect to environmental and social issues, including those related to climate and human capital management. In situations where we believe that a company has not properly managed or mitigated material environmental or social risks to the detriment of shareholder value, or when such mismanagement has threatened shareholder value, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the board who are responsible for oversight of environmental and social risks. In the absence of explicit board oversight of environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against members of the audit committee. In making these determinations, Glass Lewis will carefully review the situation, its effect on shareholder value, as well as any corrective action or other response made by the company.
For more information on how Glass Lewis evaluates environmental and social issues, please see Glass Lewis’ Overall Approach to ESG as well as our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.
Director Commitments
We believe that directors should have the necessary time to fulfill their duties to shareholders. In our view, an overcommitted director can pose a material risk to a company’s shareholders, particularly during periods of crisis. In addition, recent research indicates that the time commitment associated with being a director has been on a significant upward trend in the past decade.29 As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves as an executive officer of any public company30 while serving on more than two public company boards and any other director who serves on more than five public company boards.
29 For example, the 2015-2016 NACD Public Company Governance Survey states that, on average, directors spent a total of
248.2 hours annual on board-related matters during the past year, which it describes as a “historically high level” that is significantly above the average hours recorded in 2006. Additionally, the 2020 Spencer Stuart Board Index indicates that, while 39% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on one additional public board, just 2% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on two additional public boards and only one CEO serves on three.
30 When the executive officer in question serves only as an executive at a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) we will generally apply the higher threshold of five public company directorships.
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Because we believe that executives will primarily devote their attention to executive duties, we generally will not recommend that shareholders vote against overcommitted directors at the companies where they serve as an executive.
When determining whether a director’s service on an excessive number of boards may limit the ability of the director to devote sufficient time to board duties, we may consider relevant factors such as the size and location of the other companies where the director serves on the board, the director’s board roles at the companies in question, whether the director serves on the board of any large privately-held companies, the director’s tenure on the boards in question, and the director’s attendance record at all companies. In the case of directors who serve in executive roles other than CEO (e.g., executive chair), we will evaluate the specific duties and responsibilities of that role in determining whether an exception is warranted.
We may also refrain from recommending against certain directors if the company provides sufficient rationale for their continued board service. The rationale should allow shareholders to evaluate the scope of the directors’ other commitments, as well as their contributions to the board including specialized knowledge of the company’s industry, strategy or key markets, the diversity of skills, perspective and background they provide, and other relevant factors. We will also generally refrain from recommending to vote against a director who
serves on an excessive number of boards within a consolidated group of companies or a director that represents a firm whose sole purpose is to manage a portfolio of investments which include the company.
Other Considerations
In addition to the three key characteristics — independence, performance, experience — that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues as well as the size of the board of directors when making voting recommendations.
Conflicts of Interest
We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of directors:
1. | A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Due to the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it. |
2. | A director who provides — or a director who has an immediate family member who provides — material consulting or other material professional services to the company. These services may include legal, consulting,31 or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company’s decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional |
31 We will generally refrain from recommending against a director who provides consulting services for the company if the director is excluded from membership on the board’s key committees and we have not identified significant governance concerns with the board.
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services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company’s directors.
3. | A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting to more than $50,000. Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests. |
4. | Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other’s boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.32 |
5. | All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.33 In the event a board is classified and shareholders are therefore unable to vote against all directors, we will recommend voting against the remaining directors the next year they are up for a shareholder vote. If a poison pill with a term of one year or less was adopted without shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee. If the board has, without seeking shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, extended the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the entire board. |
Size of the Board of Directors
While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimal board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of “too many cooks in the kitchen” and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.
To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee) at a board with fewer than five directors or more than 20 directors.
Controlled Companies
We believe controlled companies warrant certain exceptions to our independence standards. The board’s function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual, entity (or group of shareholders party to a formal agreement) owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders
32 We do not apply a look-back period for this situation. The interlock policy applies to both public and private companies. We will also evaluate multiple board interlocks among non-insiders (i.e., multiple directors serving on the same boards at other companies), for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.
33 Refer to the “Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise” section for further discussion of our policies regarding anti-takeover measures, including poison pills.
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are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds board independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.
Independence Exceptions
The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:
1. We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.
2. | The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely |
of independent directors.
a. | We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company’s shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant. |
b. | Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choice for approving and monitoring senior executives’ pay, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. As such, we believe that having affiliated directors on a controlled company’s compensation committee is acceptable. However, given that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee. |
3. | Controlled companies do not need an independent chair or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board — such as chair or presiding director — can best carry out the board’s duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. |
Size of the Board of Directors
We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.
Audit Committee Independence
Despite a controlled company’s status, unlike for the other key committees, we nevertheless believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company’s controlled status, the interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company’s financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.
Board Responsiveness at Multi-Class Companies
With regard to companies where voting control is held through a multi-class share structure with disproportionate voting and economic rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. Where
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vote results indicate that a majority of unaffiliated shareholders supported a shareholder proposal or opposed a management proposal, we believe the board should demonstrate an appropriate level of responsiveness.
Significant Shareholders
Where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company’s voting power, we believe it is reasonable to allow proportional representation on the board and committees (excluding the audit committee) based on the individual or entity’s percentage of ownership.
Governance Following an IPO, Spin-off, or Direct Listing
We believe companies that have recently completed an initial public offering (IPO), spin-off, or direct listing should be allowed adequate time to fully comply with marketplace listing requirements and meet basic corporate governance standards. Generally speaking, Glass Lewis refrains from making recommendations on the basis of governance standards (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.) during the one-year period following an IPO.
However, some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year. When evaluating companies that have recently gone public, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents in order to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely. We believe boards that approve highly restrictive governing documents have demonstrated that they may subvert shareholder interests following the IPO. In conducting this evaluation, Glass Lewis will consider:
1. The adoption of anti-takeover provisions such as a poison pill or classified board
2. | Supermajority vote requirements to amend governing documents |
3. | The presence of exclusive forum or fee-shifting provisions |
4. | Whether shareholders can call special meetings or act by written consent |
5. | The voting standard provided for the election of directors |
6. | The ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause |
7. | The presence of evergreen provisions in the company’s equity compensation arrangements |
8. | The presence of a multi-class share structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power |
that is aligned with their economic interest
In cases where Glass Lewis determines that the board has approved overly restrictive governing documents, we will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee. If there is no governance committee, or if a portion of such committee members are not standing for election due to a classified board structure, we will expand our recommendations to additional director nominees, based on who is standing for election.
In cases where, preceding an IPO, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to
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five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure). In the case of a multi-class share structure, if these provisions are put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.
In our view, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest. This notion is strengthened when a board adopts a classified board with an infinite duration or a poison pill with a five- to ten-year term immediately prior to going public, thereby insulating management for a substantial amount of time.
In addition, shareholders should also be wary of companies that adopt supermajority voting requirements before their IPO. Absent explicit provisions in the articles or bylaws stipulating that certain policies will be phased out over a certain period of time, long-term shareholders could find themselves in the predicament of having to attain a supermajority vote to approve future proposals seeking to eliminate such policies.
Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company
The business combination of a private company with a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) facilitates the private entity becoming a publicly traded corporation. Thus, the business combination represents the private company’s de-facto IPO. We believe that some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed a business combination with a SPAC within the past year.
At meetings where shareholders vote on the business combination of a SPAC with a private company, shareholders are generally voting on a new corporate charter for the post-combination company as a condition to approval of the business combination. In many cases, shareholders are faced with the dilemma of having to approve corporate charters that severely restrict shareholder rights to facilitate the business combination.
Therefore, when shareholders are required to approve binding charters as a condition to approval of a business combination with a SPAC, we believe shareholders should also be provided with advisory votes on material charter amendments as a means to voice their opinions on such restrictive governance provisions.
When evaluating companies that have recently gone public via business combination with a SPAC, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely and whether these restrictive provisions were put forth for a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination.
In cases where, prior to the combined company becoming publicly traded, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the combined company becoming publicly traded if the board: (i) did not also submit these provisions to a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination; (ii) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the company becoming publicly traded; or (iii) did not provide for
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a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure).
Consistent with our view on IPOs, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest.
Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies
For companies that trade on multiple exchanges or are incorporated in foreign jurisdictions but trade only in the U.S., we will apply the governance standard most relevant in each situation. We will consider a number of factors in determining which Glass Lewis country-specific policy to apply, including but not limited to: (i) the corporate governance structure and features of the company including whether the board structure is unique to a particular market; (ii) the nature of the proposals; (iii) the location of the company’s primary listing, if one can be determined; (iv) the regulatory/governance regime that the board is reporting against; and (v) the availability and completeness of the company’s SEC filings.
OTC-listed Companies
Companies trading on the OTC Bulletin Board are not considered “listed companies” under SEC rules and therefore not subject to the same governance standards as listed companies. However, we believe that more stringent corporate governance standards should be applied to these companies given that their shares are still publicly traded.
When reviewing OTC companies, Glass Lewis will review the available disclosure relating to the shareholder meeting to determine whether shareholders are able to evaluate several key pieces of information, including: (i) the composition of the board’s key committees, if any; (ii) the level of share ownership of company insiders or directors; (iii) the board meeting attendance record of directors; (iv) executive and non-employee director compensation; (v) related-party transactions conducted during the past year; and (vi) the board’s leadership structure and determinations regarding director independence.
We are particularly concerned when company disclosure lacks any information regarding the board’s key committees. We believe that committees of the board are an essential tool for clarifying how the responsibilities of the board are being delegated, and specifically for indicating which directors are accountable for ensuring: (i) the independence and quality of directors, and the transparency and integrity of the nominating process; (ii) compensation programs that are fair and appropriate; (iii) proper oversight of the company’s accounting, financial reporting, and internal and external audits; and (iv) general adherence to principles of good corporate governance.
In cases where shareholders are unable to identify which board members are responsible for ensuring oversight of the above-mentioned responsibilities, we may consider recommending against certain members of the board. Ordinarily, we believe it is the responsibility of the corporate governance committee to provide thorough disclosure of the board’s governance practices. In the absence of such a committee, we believe it is appropriate to hold the board’s chair or, if such individual is an executive of the company, the longest-serving non-executive board member accountable.
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Mutual Fund Boards
Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund’s advisor are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.
The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:
1. Size of the board of directors — The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.
2. | The CFO on the board — Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund’s registered investment advisor should serve on the board. |
3. | Independence of the audit committee — The audit committee should consist solely of independent |
directors.
4. | Audit committee financial expert — At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert. |
The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:
1. Independence of the board — We believe that three-fourths of an investment company’s board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into “proposed rule” status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.
2. | When the auditor is not up for ratification — We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification. Due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) |
does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.
3. | Non-independent chair — The SEC has proposed that the chair of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund’s chair and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chair of an investment company’s nominating committee as well as the board chair if the chair and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chair and we agree with them that “an independent board chair would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of fund shareholders than would a chair who is an executive of the advisor.” (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf.) |
4. | Multiple funds overseen by the same director — Unlike service on a public company board, mutual |
fund boards require much less of a time commitment. Mutual fund directors typically serve on dozens of other mutual fund boards, often within the same fund complex. The Investment Company Institute’s
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(ICI) Overview of Fund Governance Practices, 1994-2012, indicates that the average number of funds served by an independent director in 2012 was 53. Absent evidence that a specific director is hindered from being an effective board member at a fund due to service on other funds’ boards, we refrain from maintaining a cap on the number of outside mutual fund boards that we believe a director can serve on.
Declassified Boards
Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.
Empirical studies have shown: (i) staggered boards are associated with a reduction in a firm’s valuation; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.
In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Some research has indicated that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction; further, when a staggered board negotiates a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premium occurs.34 Additional research found that charter-based staggered boards “reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization” and that “staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value.”35 A subsequent study reaffirmed that classified boards reduce shareholder value, finding “that the ongoing process of dismantling staggered boards, encouraged by institutional investors, could well contribute to increasing shareholder wealth.”36
Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2019, 90% of S&P 500 companies had declassified boards, up from 68% in 2009.37 Management proposals to declassify boards are approved with near unanimity and shareholder proposals on the topic also receive strong shareholder support; in 2014, shareholder proposals requesting that companies declassify their boards received average support of 84% (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes), whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.38 Further, a growing number of companies, nearly half of all those targeted by shareholder proposals requesting that all directors stand for election annually, either recommended shareholders support the proposal or made
34 Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants,” 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002).
35 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, “The Costs of Entrenched Boards” (2004).
36 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang, “Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,”
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806 (2010), p. 26.
37 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.
38 Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, “The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy”.
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no recommendation, a departure from the more traditional management recommendation to vote against shareholder proposals.
Given our belief that declassified boards promote director accountability, the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company’s value and the established shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.
Board Composition and Refreshment
Glass Lewis strongly supports routine director evaluation, including independent external reviews, and periodic board refreshment to foster the sharing of diverse perspectives in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. Further, we believe the board should evaluate the need for changes to board composition based on an analysis of skills and experience necessary for the company, as well as the results of the director evaluations, as opposed to relying solely on age or tenure limits. When necessary, shareholders can address concerns regarding proper board composition through director elections.
In our view, a director’s experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. This said, we recognize that in rare circumstances, a lack of refreshment can contribute to a lack of board responsiveness to poor company performance.
We will note as a potential concern instances where the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new directors have joined the board in the past five years. While we will be highlighting this as a potential area of concern, we will not be making voting recommendations strictly on this basis, unless we have identified other governance or board performance concerns.
On occasion, age or term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change in such circumstances.
While we understand that age limits can aid board succession planning, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board’s overall composition, including the diversity of its members, the alignment of the board’s areas of expertise with a company’s strategy, the board’s approach to corporate governance, and its stewardship of company performance, rather than imposing inflexible rules that don’t necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.
However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. In cases where the board waives its term/age limits for two or more consecutive years, Glass Lewis will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committee chair, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board is proposing to waive this rule, such as consummation of a corporate transaction.
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Board Diversity
Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring that the board is composed of directors who have a diversity of skills, thought and experience, as such diversity benefits companies by providing a broad range of perspectives and insights. Glass Lewis closely reviews the composition of the board for representation of diverse director candidates. Beginning in 2022, we will generally recommend voting against the nominating committee chair of a board that has fewer than two gender diverse directors, or the entire nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside the Russell 3000 index, and all boards with six or fewer total directors, our existing policy requiring a minimum of one gender diverse director will remain in place.
Beginning with shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2023, we will transition from a fixed numerical approach to a percentage-based approach and will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse at companies within the Russell 3000 index.
We may extend our gender diversity recommendations to additional members of the nominating committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company’s size and industry, applicable laws in its state of headquarters, and its overall governance profile. Additionally, when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company’s disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board.
State Laws on Gender Diversity
Several states have begun to encourage board diversity through legislation. For example, companies headquartered in California are now subject to mandatory board composition requirements. Other states have enacted or are considering legislation that encourages companies to diversify their boards but does not mandate board composition requirements. Furthermore, several states have enacted or are considering legislation that mandates certain disclosure or reporting requirements in filings made with each respective state annually.
Glass Lewis will recommend in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in applicable state laws when they come into effect. We will generally refrain from recommending against directors when applicable state laws do not mandate board composition requirements, are non-binding, or solely impose disclosure or reporting requirements.
State Laws on Underrepresented Community Diversity
Several states have also begun to encourage board diversity beyond gender through legislation. For example, companies headquartered in California are required to have one director from an “underrepresented community” on their board by the end of 2021 (defined as an individual who self-identifies as Black, African American, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaska Native, or who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender). And, by the end of 2022, California companies must
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have at least two such individuals on boards of five to eight members, and three such individuals on boards of nine or more members.
Accordingly, for meetings held after December 31, 2021, if a company headquartered in California does not have at least one director from an underrepresented community on its board or does not provide adequate
disclosure to make this determination, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee.
Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills
Because company disclosure is critical when measuring the mix of diverse attributes and skills of directors, Glass Lewis assesses the quality of such disclosure in companies’ proxy statements. Accordingly, we reflect how a company’s proxy statement presents: (i) the board’s current percentage of racial/ethnic diversity; (ii) whether the board’s definition of diversity explicitly includes gender and/or race/ethnicity; (iii) whether the board has adopted a policy requiring women and minorities to be included in the initial pool of candidates when selecting new director nominees (aka “Rooney Rule”); and (iv) board skills disclosure. Such ratings will help inform our assessment of a company’s overall governance and may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified.
Beginning in 2022, for companies in the S&P 500 index with particularly poor disclosure (i.e., those failing to provide any disclosure in each of the above categories), we may recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee. Beginning in 2023, when companies in the S&P 500 index have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority board demographic information, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee.
Stock Exchange Diversity Disclosure Requirements
On August 6, 2021, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure for Nasdaq-listed companies. Beginning in 2022, companies listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange will be required to disclose certain board diversity statistics annually in a standardized format in the proxy statement or on the company's website. Nasdaq-listed companies are required to provide this disclosure by the later of (i) August 8, 2022, or (ii) the date the company files its proxy statement for its 2022 annual meeting. Accordingly, for annual meetings held after August 8, 2022, of applicable Nasdaq-listed companies, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee when the required disclosure has not been provided.
Proxy Access
In lieu of running their own contested election, proxy access would not only allow certain shareholders to nominate directors to company boards but the shareholder nominees would be included on the company’s ballot, significantly enhancing the ability of shareholders to play a meaningful role in selecting their representatives. Glass Lewis generally supports affording shareholders the right to nominate director candidates to management’s proxy as a means to ensure that significant, long-term shareholders have an ability to nominate candidates to the board.
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Companies generally seek shareholder approval to amend company bylaws to adopt proxy access in response to shareholder engagement or pressure, usually in the form of a shareholder proposal requesting proxy access, although some companies may adopt some elements of proxy access without prompting. Glass Lewis considers several factors when evaluating whether to support proposals for companies to adopt proxy access including the specified minimum ownership and holding requirement for shareholders to nominate one or more directors, as well as company size, performance and responsiveness to shareholders.
For a discussion of recent regulatory events in this area, along with a detailed overview of the Glass Lewis approach to shareholder proposals regarding Proxy Access, refer to Glass Lewis’ Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives, available at www.glasslewis.com.
Majority Vote for Election of Directors
Majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the de facto standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.
While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.
The number of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a majority voting standard has declined significantly during the past decade, largely as a result of widespread adoption of majority voting or director resignation policies at U.S. companies. In 2019, 89% of the S&P 500 Index had implemented a resignation policy for directors failing to receive majority shareholder support, compared to 65% in 2009.39
The Plurality Vote Standard
Today, most U.S. companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including that director, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee “wins” the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard is the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in “failed elections.”
Advantages of a Majority Vote Standard
If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. Given that so few directors (less than 100 a year) do not receive majority support from shareholders, we think that a majority vote standard is reasonable since it will neither result in
39 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.
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many failed director elections nor reduce the willingness of qualified, shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future. Further, most directors who fail to receive a majority shareholder vote in favor of their election do not step down, underscoring the need for true majority voting.
We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Although shareholders only rarely fail to support directors, the occasional majority vote against a director’s election will likely deter the election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests. Glass Lewis will therefore generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote, excepting contested director elections.
In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (i.e., a resignation policy) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors.
We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director’s replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.
Conflicting and Excluded Proposals
SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(9) allows companies to exclude shareholder proposals “if the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company’s own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.” On October 22, 2015, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (SLB 14H) clarifying its rule concerning the exclusion of certain shareholder proposals when similar items are also on the ballot. SLB 14H increased the burden on companies to prove to SEC staff that a conflict exists; therefore, many companies still chose to place management proposals alongside similar shareholder proposals in many cases.
During the 2018 proxy season, a new trend in the SEC’s interpretation of this rule emerged. Upon submission of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a lower special meeting threshold, several companies petitioned the SEC for no-action relief under the premise that the shareholder proposals conflicted with management’s own special meeting proposals, even though the management proposals set a higher threshold than those requested by the proponent. No-action relief was granted to these companies; however, the SEC stipulated that the companies must state in the rationale for the management proposals that a vote in favor of management’s proposal was tantamount to a vote against the adoption of a lower special meeting threshold. In certain instances, shareholder proposals to lower an existing special meeting right threshold were excluded on the basis that they conflicted with management proposals seeking to ratify the existing special meeting rights. We find the exclusion of these shareholder proposals to be especially problematic as, in these instances, shareholders are not offered any enhanced shareholder right, nor would the approval (or rejection) of the ratification proposal initiate any type of meaningful change to shareholders’ rights.
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In instances where companies have excluded shareholder proposals, such as those instances where special meeting shareholder proposals are excluded as a result of “conflicting” management proposals, Glass Lewis will take a case-by-case approach, taking into account the following issues:
· | The threshold proposed by the shareholder resolution; |
· | The threshold proposed or established by management and the attendant rationale for the threshold; |
· | Whether management’s proposal is seeking to ratify an existing special meeting right or adopt a bylaw that would establish a special meeting right; and |
· | The company’s overall governance profile, including its overall responsiveness to and engagement with |
shareholders.
Glass Lewis generally favors a 10-15% special meeting right. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting for management or shareholder proposals that fall within this range. When faced with conflicting proposals, Glass Lewis will generally recommend in favor of the lower special meeting right and will recommend voting against the proposal with the higher threshold. However, in instances where there are conflicting management and shareholder proposals and a company has not established a special meeting right, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote in favor of the shareholder proposal and that they abstain from a management-proposed bylaw amendment seeking to establish a special meeting right. We believe that an abstention is appropriate in this instance in order to ensure that shareholders are sending a clear signal regarding their preference for the appropriate threshold for a special meeting right, while not directly opposing the establishment of such a right.
In cases where the company excludes a shareholder proposal seeking a reduced special meeting right by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal, we will generally recommend voting against the chair or members of the governance committee.
In other instances of conflicting management and shareholder proposals, Glass Lewis will consider the following:
· | The nature of the underlying issue; |
· | The benefit to shareholders of implementing the proposal; |
· | The materiality of the differences between the terms of the shareholder proposal and management proposal; |
· | The context of a company’s shareholder base, corporate structure and other relevant circumstances; |
and
· | A company’s overall governance profile and, specifically, its responsiveness to shareholders as evidenced by a company’s response to previous shareholder proposals and its adoption of progressive shareholder rights provisions. |
In recent years, we have seen the dynamic nature of the considerations given by the SEC when determining whether companies may exclude certain shareholder proposals. We understand that not all shareholder proposals serve the long-term interests of shareholders, and value and respect the limitations placed on shareholder proponents, as certain shareholder proposals can unduly burden companies. However, Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should be able to vote on issues of material importance.
We view the shareholder proposal process as an important part of advancing shareholder rights and encouraging responsible and financially sustainable business practices. While recognizing that certain proposals
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cross the line between the purview of shareholders and that of the board, we generally believe that companies should not limit investors’ ability to vote on shareholder proposals that advance certain rights or promote beneficial disclosure. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will make note of instances where a company has successfully petitioned the SEC to exclude shareholder proposals. If after review we believe that the exclusion of a shareholder proposal is detrimental to shareholders, we may, in certain very limited circumstances, recommend against members of the governance committee.
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Transparency and Integrity in Financial Reporting
Auditor Ratification
The auditor’s role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company’s books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company’s financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company’s fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:
“The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence.”
As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor’s interests and the public’s interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor’s performance and to annually ratify a board’s auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that “to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability ... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement.”40
On August 16, 2011, the PCAOB issued a Concept Release seeking public comment on ways that auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism could be enhanced, with a specific emphasis on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB convened several public roundtable meetings during 2012 to further discuss such matters. Glass Lewis believes auditor rotation can ensure both the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the audit; we will typically recommend supporting proposals to require auditor rotation when
the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years), particularly at companies with a history of accounting problems.
On June 1, 2017, the PCAOB adopted new standards to enhance auditor reports by providing additional important information to investors. For companies with fiscal year end dates on or after December 15, 2017,
40 “Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.” p. VIII:20,
October 6, 2008.
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reports were required to include the year in which the auditor began serving consecutively as the company’s auditor. For large accelerated filers with fiscal year ends of June 30, 2019 or later, and for all other companies with fiscal year ends of December 15, 2020 or later, communication of critical audit matters (CAMs) will also be required. CAMs are matters that have been communicated to the audit committee, are related to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements, and involve especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment.
Glass Lewis believes the additional reporting requirements are beneficial for investors. The additional disclosures can provide investors with information that is critical to making an informed judgment about an auditor’s independence and performance. Furthermore, we believe the additional requirements are an important step toward enhancing the relevance and usefulness of auditor reports, which too often are seen as boilerplate compliance documents that lack the relevant details to provide meaningful insight into a particular audit.
Voting Recommendations on Auditor Ratification
We generally support management’s choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor’s independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chair. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weaknesses in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.
Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:
1. When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.
2. | Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in the reporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.41 |
3. | When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, |
or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.
4. | When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same |
industry.
5. | When the company has aggressive accounting policies. |
6. | When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements. |
7. | Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures without adequate justification. |
8. | We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between |
the auditor’s interests and shareholder interests.
9. | In determining whether shareholders would benefit from rotating the company’s auditor, where relevant we will consider factors that may call into question an auditor’s effectiveness, including auditor |
41 An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.
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tenure, a pattern of inaccurate audits, and any ongoing litigation or significant controversies. When Glass Lewis considers ongoing litigation and significant controversies, it is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such lawsuits or other significant controversies reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.”
Pension Accounting Issues
A pension accounting question occasionally raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company’s net income. This issue often arises in the executive- compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.
Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company’s discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company’s performance.
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The Link Between Compensation and Performance
Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives, as we believe that this is an important area in which the board’s priorities are revealed. Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. We believe the most effective compensation arrangements provide for an appropriate mix of performance-based short- and long-term incentives in addition to fixed pay elements while promoting a prudent and sustainable level of risk-taking.
Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which pay is aligned with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. We recognize performance metrics must necessarily vary depending on the company and industry, among other factors, and may include a wide variety of financial measures as well as industry-specific performance indicators. However, we believe companies should disclose why the specific performance metrics were selected and how the actions they are designed to incentivize will lead to better corporate performance.
Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders’ interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. While we favor full disclosure for senior executives and we view pay disclosure at the aggregate level (e.g., the number of employees being paid over a certain amount or in certain categories) as potentially useful, we do not believe shareholders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives.
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay)
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) required companies to hold an advisory vote on executive compensation at the first shareholder meeting that occurs six months after enactment of the bill (January 21, 2011).
This practice of allowing shareholders a non-binding vote on a company’s compensation report is standard practice in many non-U.S. countries, and has been a requirement for most companies in the United Kingdom since 2003 and in Australia since 2005. Although say-on-pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of
“against” or “abstain” votes indicates substantial shareholder concern about a company’s compensation policies and procedures.
Given the complexity of most companies’ compensation programs, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. We review each company’s compensation on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that each company must be examined in the context of industry, size,
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maturity, performance, financial condition, its historic pay for performance practices, and any other relevant internal or external factors.
We believe that each company should design and apply specific compensation policies and practices that are appropriate to the circumstances of the company and, in particular, will attract and retain competent executives and other staff, while motivating them to grow the company’s long-term shareholder value.
Where we find those specific policies and practices serve to reasonably align compensation with performance, and such practices are adequately disclosed, Glass Lewis will recommend supporting the company’s approach.
If, however, those specific policies and practices fail to demonstrably link compensation with performance, Glass
Lewis will generally recommend voting against the say-on-pay proposal.
Glass Lewis reviews say-on-pay proposals on both a qualitative basis and a quantitative basis, with a focus on several main areas:
· | The overall design and structure of the company’s executive compensation programs including selection and challenging nature of performance metrics; |
· | The implementation and effectiveness of the company’s executive compensation programs including pay mix and use of performance metrics in determining pay levels; |
· | The quality and content of the company’s disclosure; |
· | The quantum paid to executives; and |
· | The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the company’s current and past pay- for-performance grades. |
We also review any significant changes or modifications, including post fiscal year-end changes and one-time
awards, particularly where the changes touch upon issues that are material to Glass Lewis recommendations.
Say-on-Pay Voting Recommendations
In cases where we find deficiencies in a company’s compensation program’s design, implementation or management, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. Generally such instances include evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (i.e., deficient or failing pay-for- performance grades), unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.), questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or other egregious compensation practices.
Although not an exhaustive list, the following issues when weighed together may cause Glass Lewis to
recommend voting against a say-on-pay vote:
· | Inappropriate or outsized self-selected peer groups and/or benchmarking issues such as compensation |
targets set well above the median without adequate justification;
· | Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments, including golden handshakes and golden parachutes; |
· | Insufficient response to low shareholder support; |
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· | Problematic contractual payments, such as guaranteed bonuses; |
· | Insufficiently challenging performance targets and/or high potential payout opportunities; |
· | Performance targets lowered without justification; |
· | Discretionary bonuses paid when short- or long-term incentive plan targets were not met; |
· | Executive pay high relative to peers not justified by outstanding company performance; and |
· | The terms of the long-term incentive plans are inappropriate (please see “Long-Term Incentives”). |
The aforementioned issues may also influence Glass Lewis’ assessment of the structure of a company’s compensation program. We evaluate structure on a “Good, Fair, Poor” rating scale whereby a “Good” rating represents a compensation program with little to no concerns, a “Fair” rating represents a compensation program with some concerns and a “Poor” rating represents a compensation program that deviates significantly from best practice or contains one or more egregious compensation practices.
We believe that it is important for companies to provide investors with clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements. Similar to structure, we evaluate disclosure on a “Good, Fair, Poor” rating scale whereby a “Good” rating represents a thorough discussion of all elements of compensation, a “Fair” rating represents an adequate discussion of all or most elements of compensation and a “Poor” rating represents an incomplete or absent discussion of compensation. In instances where a company has simply failed to provide sufficient disclosure of its policies, we may recommend shareholders vote against this proposal solely on this basis, regardless of the appropriateness of compensation levels.
In general, most companies will fall within the “Fair” range for both structure and disclosure, and Glass Lewis largely uses the “Good” and “Poor” ratings to highlight outliers.
Where we identify egregious compensation practices, we may also recommend voting against the compensation committee based on the practices or actions of its members during the year. Such practices may include: approving large one-off payments, the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion, or sustained poor pay for performance practices. (Refer to the section on "Compensation Committee Performance" for more
information.)
Company Responsiveness
For companies that receive a significant level of shareholder opposition (20% or greater) to the say-on-pay proposal at the previous annual meeting, we believe the board should demonstrate some level of engagement and responsiveness to the shareholder concerns behind the disapproval, particularly in response to shareholder feedback.
While we recognize that sweeping changes cannot be made to a compensation program without due consideration, and that often a majority of shareholders may have voted in favor of the proposal, given that the average approval rate for say-on-pay proposals is about 90%, we believe the compensation committee should provide some level of response to a significant vote against. In general, our expectations regarding the minimum appropriate levels of responsiveness will correspond with the level of shareholder opposition, as expressed both through the magnitude of opposition in a single year, and through the persistence of shareholder disapproval over time.
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Responses we consider appropriate include engaging with large shareholders to identify their concerns, and, where reasonable, implementing changes that directly address those concerns within the company’s compensation program. In the absence of any evidence that the board is actively engaging shareholders on these issues and responding accordingly, we may recommend holding compensation committee members accountable for failing to adequately respond to shareholder opposition. Regarding such recommendations, careful consideration will be given to the level of shareholder protest and the severity and history of compensation.
Pay for Performance
Glass Lewis believes an integral part of a well-structured compensation package is a successful link between pay and performance. Our proprietary pay-for-performance model was developed to better evaluate the link between pay and performance. Generally, compensation and performance are measured against a peer group of appropriate companies that may overlap, to a certain extent, with a company’s self-disclosed peers. This quantitative analysis provides a consistent framework and historical context for our clients to determine how well companies link executive compensation to relative performance. Companies that demonstrate a weaker link are more likely to receive a negative recommendation; however, other qualitative factors such as overall incentive structure, significant forthcoming changes to the compensation program or reasonable long-term payout levels may mitigate our concerns to a certain extent.
While we assign companies a letter grade of A, B, C, D or F based on the alignment between pay and performance, the grades derived from the Glass Lewis pay-for-performance analysis do not follow the traditional U.S. school letter grade system. Rather, the grades are generally interpreted as follows:
Grade of A: The company’s percentile rank for pay is significantly less than its percentile rank for performance Grade of B: The company’s percentile rank for pay is moderately less than its percentile rank for performance Grade of C: The company’s percentile rank for pay is approximately aligned with its percentile rank for
performance
Grade of D: The company’s percentile rank for pay is higher than its percentile rank for performance
Grade of F: The company’s percentile rank for pay is significantly higher than its percentile rank for performance
For the avoidance of confusion, the above grades encompass the relationship between a company’s percentile rank for pay and its percentile rank in performance. Separately, a specific comparison between the company’s executive pay and its peers’ executive pay levels is discussed in the analysis for additional insight into the grade. Likewise, a specific comparison between the company’s performance and its peers’ performance is reflected in the analysis for further context.
We also use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on say-on-pay proposals. As such, if a company receives a “D” or “F” from our proprietary model, we are more likely to recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. However, other qualitative factors such as an effective overall incentive structure, the relevance of selected performance metrics, significant forthcoming enhancements or reasonable long-term payout levels may give us cause to recommend in favor of a proposal even when we have identified a disconnect between pay and performance.
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In determining the peer groups used in our A-F pay-for-performance letter grades, Glass Lewis utilizes a proprietary methodology that considers both country-based and sector-based peers, along with each company’s network of self-disclosed peers. Each component is considered on a weighted basis and is subject to size-based ranking and screening. The peer groups used are provided to Glass Lewis by Diligent Intel based on Glass Lewis’ methodology and using Diligent Intel’s data.
Selecting an appropriate peer group to analyze a company’s compensation program is a subjective determination, requiring significant judgment and on which there is not a “correct” answer. Since the peer group used is based on an independent, proprietary technique, it will often differ from the one used by the company which, in turn, will affect the resulting analyses. While Glass Lewis believes that the independent, rigorous methodology it uses provides a valuable perspective on the company’s compensation program, the company’s self-selected peer group is also presented in the Proxy Paper for comparative purposes.
Short-Term Incentives
A short-term bonus or incentive (STI) should be demonstrably tied to performance. Whenever possible, we believe a mix of corporate and individual performance measures is appropriate. We would normally expect performance measures for STIs to be based on company-wide or divisional financial measures as well as non- financial factors such as those related to safety, environmental issues, and customer satisfaction. While we recognize that companies operating in different sectors or markets may seek to utilize a wide range of metrics, we expect such measures to be appropriately tied to a company’s business drivers.
Further, the threshold, target and maximum performance goals and corresponding payout levels that can be achieved under STI plans should be disclosed. Shareholders should expect stretching performance targets for the maximum award to be achieved. Any increase in the potential target and maximum award should be clearly justified to shareholders, as should any decrease in target and maximum performance levels from the previous year.
Glass Lewis recognizes that disclosure of some measures or performance targets may include commercially confidential information. Therefore, we believe it may be reasonable to exclude such information in some cases as long as the company provides sufficient justification for non-disclosure. However, where a short-term bonus has been paid, companies should disclose the extent to which performance has been achieved against relevant targets, including disclosure of the actual target achieved.
Where management has received significant short-term incentive payments but overall performance and/or the shareholder experience over the measurement year prima facie appears to be poor or negative, we believe the company should provide a clear explanation of why these significant short-term payments were made. We also believe any significant changes to the program structure should be accompanied by rationalizing disclosure.
Further, where a company has applied upward discretion, which includes lowering goals mid-year, increasing calculated payouts or retroactively pro-rating performance periods, we expect a robust discussion of why the decision was necessary. In addition, we believe that where companies use non-GAAP or bespoke metrics, clear reconciliations between these figures and GAAP figures in audited financial statement should be provided.
Adjustments to GAAP figures may be considered in Glass Lewis’ assessment of the effectiveness of the incentive at tying executive pay with performance.
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Given the pervasiveness of non-formulaic plans in this market, we do not generally recommend against a pay program on this basis alone. If a company has chosen to rely primarily on a subjective assessment or the board’s discretion in determining short-term bonuses, we believe that the proxy statement should provide a meaningful discussion of the board’s rationale in determining the bonuses paid as well as a rationale for the use of a non- formulaic mechanism. Particularly where the aforementioned disclosures are substantial and satisfactory, such a structure will not provoke serious concern in our analysis on its own. However, in conjunction with other significant issues in a program’s design or operation, such as a disconnect between pay and performance, the absence of a cap on payouts, or a lack of performance-based long-term awards, the use of a non-formulaic bonus may help drive a negative recommendation.
Long-Term Incentives
Glass Lewis recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs, which are often the primary long-term incentive for executives. When used appropriately, they can provide a vehicle for linking an executive’s pay to company performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation can be an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.
There are certain elements that Glass Lewis believes are common to most well-structured long-term incentive
(LTI) plans. These include:
· | No re-testing or lowering of performance conditions; |
· | Performance metrics that cannot be easily manipulated by management; |
· | Two or more performance metrics; |
· | At least one relative performance metric that compares the company’s performance to a relevant peer group or index; |
· | Performance periods of at least three years; |
· | Stretching metrics that incentivize executives to strive for outstanding performance while not |
encouraging excessive risk-taking;
· | Individual award limits expressed as a percentage of base salary; and |
· | Equity granting practices that are clearly disclosed. |
In evaluating long-term incentive grants, Glass Lewis generally believes that a significant portion of the grant should consist of performance-based awards, putting a portion of executive compensation at-risk and demonstrably linked to the performance of the company. While we will consistently raise concern with programs that do not meet this criterion, we may refrain from a negative recommendation in the absence of other significant issues with the program’s design or operation. However, in cases where performance-based awards are significantly rolled back or eliminated from a company’s long-term incentive plan, such decisions will generally be viewed negatively outside of exceptional circumstances, and may lead to a recommendation against the proposal.
Performance measures should be carefully selected and should relate to the specific business/industry in which the company operates and, especially, to the key value drivers of the company’s business. As with short-term incentive plans, the basis for any adjustments to metrics or results should be clearly explained, as should the company’s judgment on the use of discretion and any significant changes to the performance program structure.
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While cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass Lewis generally believes that measuring a company’s performance with multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the company’s performance than a single metric. Further, reliance on just one metric may focus too much management attention on a single target and is therefore more susceptible to manipulation. When utilized for relative measurements, external benchmarks such as a sector index or peer group should be disclosed and transparent. The rationale behind the selection of a specific index or peer group should also be disclosed.
Internal performance benchmarks should also be disclosed and transparent, unless a cogent case for confidentiality is made and fully explained. Similarly, actual performance and vesting levels for previous grants earned during the fiscal year should be disclosed.
We also believe shareholders should evaluate the relative success of a company’s compensation programs, particularly with regard to existing equity-based incentive plans, in linking pay and performance when evaluating potential changes to LTI plans and determining the impact of additional stock awards. We will therefore review the company’s pay-for-performance grade (see below for more information) and specifically the proportion of total compensation that is stock-based.
Grants of Front-Loaded Awards
Many U.S. companies have chosen to provide large grants, usually in the form of equity awards, that are intended to serve as compensation for multiple years. This practice, often called front-loading, is taken up either in the regular course of business or as a response to specific business conditions and with a predetermined objective. We believe shareholders should generally be wary of this approach, and we accordingly weigh these grants with particular scrutiny.
While the use of front-loaded awards is intended to lock-in executive service and incentives, the same rigidity also raises the risk of effectively tying the hands of the compensation committee. As compared with a more responsive annual granting schedule program, front-loaded awards may preclude improvements or changes to reflect evolving business strategies. The considerable emphasis on a single grant can place intense pressures on every facet of its design, amplifying any potential perverse incentives and creating greater room for unintended consequences. In particular, provisions around changes of control or separations of service must ensure that executives do not receive excessive payouts that do not reflect shareholder experience or company performance.
We consider a company’s rationale for granting awards under this structure and also expect any front-loaded awards to include a firm commitment not to grant additional awards for a defined period, as is commonly associated with this practice. Even when such a commitment is provided, unexpected circumstances may lead the board to make additional payments or awards for retention purposes, or to incentivize management towards more realistic goals or a revised strategy. If a company breaks its commitment not to grant further awards, we may recommend against the pay program unless a convincing rationale is provided.
The multiyear nature of these awards generally lends itself to significantly higher compensation figures in the year of grant than might otherwise be expected. In our qualitative analysis of the grants of front-loaded awards to executives, Glass Lewis considers the quantum of the award on an annualized basis and may compare this result to the prior practice and peer data, among other benchmarks. Additionally, for awards that are granted in the form of equity, Glass Lewis may consider the total potential dilutive effect of such award on shareholders.
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Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria
Glass Lewis believes that explicit environmental and/or social (E&S) criteria in executive incentive plans, when used appropriately, can serve to provide both executives and shareholders a clear line of sight into a company’s ESG strategy, ambitions, and targets. Although we are strongly supportive of companies’ incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in compensation programs should be predicated on each company’s unique circumstances. In order to establish a meaningful link between pay and performance, companies must consider factors including their industry, size, risk profile, maturity, performance, financial condition, and any other relevant internal or external factors.
When a company is introducing E&S criteria into executive incentive plans, we believe it is important that companies provide shareholders with sufficient disclosure to allow them to understand how these criteria align with its strategy. Additionally, Glass Lewis recognizes that there may be situations where certain E&S performance criteria are reasonably viewed as prerequisites for executive performance, as opposed to behaviors and conditions that need to be incentivized. For example, we believe that shareholders should interrogate the use of metrics that award executives for ethical behavior or compliance with policies and regulations. It is our view that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, particularly in the case of qualitative metrics, we believe that shareholders should be provided with a clear understanding of the basis on which the criteria will be assessed. Where quantitative targets have been set, we believe that shareholders are best served when these are disclosed on an ex-ante basis, or the board should outline why it believes it is unable to do so.
While we believe that companies should generally set long-term targets for their environmental and social ambitions, we are mindful that not all compensation schemes lend themselves to the inclusion of E&S metrics. We also are of the view that companies should retain flexibility in not only choosing to incorporate E&S metrics in their compensation plans, but also in the placement of these metrics. For example, some companies may resolve that including E&S criteria in the annual bonus may help to incentivize the achievement of short-term milestones and allow for more maneuverability in strategic adjustments to long-term goals. Other companies may determine that their long-term sustainability targets are best achieved by incentivizing executives through metrics included in their long-term incentive plans.
One-Time Awards
Glass Lewis believes shareholders should generally be wary of awards granted outside of the standard incentive schemes, as such awards have the potential to undermine the integrity of a company’s regular incentive plans or the link between pay and performance, or both. We generally believe that if the existing incentive programs fail to provide adequate incentives to executives, companies should redesign their compensation programs rather than make additional grants.
However, we recognize that in certain circumstances, additional incentives may be appropriate. In these cases, companies should provide a thorough description of the awards, including a cogent and convincing explanation of their necessity and why existing awards do not provide sufficient motivation. Further, such awards should be tied to future service and performance whenever possible.
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Additionally, we believe companies making supplemental or one-time awards should also describe if and how the regular compensation arrangements will be affected by these additional grants. In reviewing a company’s use of supplemental awards, Glass Lewis will evaluate the terms and size of the grants in the context of the company’s overall incentive strategy and granting practices, as well as the current operating environment.
Contractual Payments and Arrangements
Beyond the quantum of contractual payments, Glass Lewis will also consider the design of any entitlements. Certain executive employment terms may help to drive a negative recommendation, including, but not limited to:
· | Excessively broad change in control triggers; |
· | Inappropriate severance entitlements; |
· | Inadequately explained or excessive sign-on arrangements; |
· | Guaranteed bonuses (especially as a multiyear occurrence); and |
· | Failure to address any concerning practices in amended employment agreements. |
In general, we are wary of terms that are excessively restrictive in favor of the executive, or that could potentially incentivize behaviors that are not in a company’s best interest.
Sign-on Awards and Severance Benefits
We acknowledge that there may be certain costs associated with transitions at the executive level. In evaluating the size of severance and sign-on arrangements, we may consider the executive’s regular target compensation level, or the sums paid to other executives (including the recipient’s predecessor, where applicable) in evaluating the appropriateness of such an arrangement.
We believe sign-on arrangements should be clearly disclosed and accompanied by a meaningful explanation of the payments and the process by which the amounts were reached. Further, the details of and basis for any “make-whole” payments (paid as compensation for awards forfeited from a previous employer) should be provided.
With respect to severance, we believe companies should abide by predetermined payouts in most circumstances. While in limited circumstances some deviations may not be inappropriate, we believe shareholders should be provided with a meaningful explanation of any additional or increased benefits agreed upon outside of regular arrangements. However, where Glass Lewis determines that such predetermined payouts are particularly problematic or unfavorable to shareholders, we may consider the execution of such payments in a negative recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation.
In the U.S. market, most companies maintain severance entitlements based on a multiple of salary and, in many cases, bonus. In almost all instances we see, the relevant multiple is three or less, even in the case of a change in control. We believe the basis and total value of severance should be reasonable and should not exceed the upper limit of general market practice. We consider the inclusion of long-term incentives in cash severance calculations to be inappropriate, particularly given the commonality of accelerated vesting and the proportional weight of long-term incentives as a component of total pay. Additional considerations, however, will be accounted for when reviewing atypically structured compensation approaches.
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Change in Control
Glass Lewis considers double-trigger change in control arrangements, which require both a change in control and termination or constructive termination, to be best practice. Any arrangement that is not explicitly double- trigger may be considered a single-trigger or modified single-trigger arrangement.
Further, we believe that excessively broad definitions of change in control are potentially problematic as they may lead to situations where executives receive additional compensation where no meaningful change in status or duties has occurred.
Excise Tax Gross-ups
Among other entitlements, Glass Lewis is strongly opposed to excise tax gross-ups related to IRC § 4999 and their expansion, especially where no consideration is given to the safe harbor limit. We believe that under no normal circumstance is the inclusion of excise tax gross-up provisions in new agreements or the addition of such provisions to amended agreements acceptable. In consideration of the fact that minor increases in change-in- control payments can lead to disproportionately large excise taxes, the potential negative impact of tax gross- ups far outweighs any retentive benefit.
Depending on the circumstances, the addition of new gross-ups around this excise tax may lead to negative recommendations for a company’s say-on-pay proposal, the chair of the compensation committee, or the entire committee, particularly in cases where a company had committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future. For situations in which the addition of new excise tax gross ups will be provided in connection with a specific change-in-control transaction, this policy may be applied to the say-on-pay proposal, the golden parachute proposal and recommendations related to the compensation committee for all involved corporate parties, as appropriate.
Amended Employment Agreements
Any contractual arrangements providing for problematic pay practices which are not addressed in materially amended employment agreements will potentially be viewed by Glass Lewis as a missed opportunity on the part of the company to align its policies with current best practices. Such problematic pay practices include, but are not limited to, excessive change in control entitlements, modified single-trigger change in control entitlements, excise tax gross-ups, and multi-year guaranteed awards.
Recoupment Provisions (Clawbacks)
Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to create a rule requiring listed companies to adopt policies for recouping certain compensation during a three-year look-back period. The rule is more stringent than Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and applies to incentive-based compensation paid to current or former executives in the case of a financial restatement — specifically, the recoupment provision applies in cases where the company is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to erroneous data resulting from material
non-compliance with any financial reporting requirements under the securities laws. Although the SEC has yet to finalize the relevant rules, we believe it is prudent for boards to adopt detailed bonus recoupment policies that
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go beyond Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to prevent executives from retaining performance-based awards that were not truly earned.
We are increasingly focusing attention on the specific terms of recoupment policies beyond whether a company maintains a clawback that simply satisfies the minimum legal requirements. We believe that clawbacks should be triggered, at a minimum, in the event of a restatement of financial results or similar revision of performance indicators upon which bonuses were based. Such policies allow the board to review all performance-related bonuses and awards made to senior executives during a specified lookback period and, to the extent feasible, allow the company to recoup such bonuses where appropriate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in cases where a company maintains only a bare-minimum clawback, the absence of more expansive recoupment tools may inform our overall view of the compensation program.
Hedging of Stock
Glass Lewis believes that the hedging of shares by executives in the shares of the companies where they are employed severs the alignment of interests of the executive with shareholders. We believe companies should adopt strict policies to prohibit executives from hedging the economic risk associated with their share ownership in the company.
Pledging of Stock
Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should examine the facts and circumstances of each company rather than apply a one-size-fits-all policy regarding employee stock pledging. Glass Lewis believes that shareholders benefit when employees, particularly senior executives, have meaningful financial interest in the success of the
company under their management, and therefore we recognize the benefits of measures designed to encourage employees to both buy shares out of their own pocket and to retain shares they have been granted; blanket policies prohibiting stock pledging may discourage executives and employees from doing either.
However, we also recognize that the pledging of shares can present a risk that, depending on a host of factors, an executive with significant pledged shares and limited other assets may have an incentive to take steps to avoid a forced sale of shares in the face of a rapid stock price decline. Therefore, to avoid substantial losses from a forced sale to meet the terms of the loan, the executive may have an incentive to boost the stock price in the short term in a manner that is unsustainable, thus hurting shareholders in the long-term. We also recognize concerns regarding pledging may not apply to less senior employees, given the latter group’s significantly more limited influence over a company’s stock price. Therefore, we believe that the issue of pledging shares should be reviewed in that context, as should policies that distinguish between the two groups.
Glass Lewis believes that the benefits of stock ownership by executives and employees may outweigh the risks of stock pledging, depending on many factors. As such, Glass Lewis reviews all relevant factors in evaluating proposed policies, limitations and prohibitions on pledging stock, including:
· | The number of shares pledged; |
· | The percentage executives’ pledged shares are of outstanding shares; |
· | The percentage executives’ pledged shares are of each executive’s shares and total assets; |
· | Whether the pledged shares were purchased by the employee or granted by the company; |
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· | Whether there are different policies for purchased and granted shares; |
· | Whether the granted shares were time-based or performance-based; |
· | The overall governance profile of the company; |
· | The volatility of the company’s stock (in order to determine the likelihood of a sudden stock price drop); |
· | The nature and cyclicality, if applicable, of the company’s industry; |
· | The participation and eligibility of executives and employees in pledging; |
· | The company’s current policies regarding pledging and any waiver from these policies for employees and executives; and |
· | Disclosure of the extent of any pledging, particularly among senior executives. |
Compensation Consultant Independence
As mandated by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require compensation committees to consider six factors (https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/33-9330.pdf, p.31-32) in assessing compensation advisor independence. According to the SEC, “no one factor should be viewed as a determinative factor.” Glass Lewis believes this six- factor assessment is an important process for every compensation committee to undertake but believes companies employing a consultant for board compensation, consulting and other corporate services should provide clear disclosure beyond just a reference to examining the six points, in order to allow shareholders to review the specific aspects of the various consultant relationships.
We believe compensation consultants are engaged to provide objective, disinterested, expert advice to the compensation committee. When the consultant or its affiliates receive substantial income from providing other services to the company, we believe the potential for a conflict of interest arises and the independence of the consultant may be jeopardized. Therefore, Glass Lewis will, when relevant, note the potential for a conflict of interest when the fees paid to the advisor or its affiliates for other services exceeds those paid for compensation consulting.
CEO Pay Ratio
As mandated by Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer and Protection Act, beginning in 2018, issuers will be required to disclose the median annual total compensation of all employees except the CEO, the total annual compensation of the CEO or equivalent position, and the ratio between the two amounts. Glass Lewis will display the pay ratio as a data point in our Proxy Papers, as available. While we recognize that the pay ratio has the potential to provide additional insight when assessing a company’s pay practices, at this time it will not be a determinative factor in our voting recommendations.
Frequency of Say-on-Pay
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the frequency of say- on-pay votes (i.e., every one, two or three years). Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires companies to hold such votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes at least once every six years.
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We believe companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year. We believe that the time and financial burdens to a company with regard to an annual vote are relatively small and incremental and are outweighed by the benefits to shareholders through more frequent accountability. Implementing biannual or triennial votes on executive compensation limits shareholders’ ability to hold the board accountable for its compensation practices through means other than voting against the compensation committee. Unless a company provides a compelling rationale or unique circumstances for say-on-pay votes less frequent than annually, we will generally recommend that shareholders support annual votes on compensation.
Vote on Golden Parachute Arrangements
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to provide shareholders with a separate non-binding vote on approval of golden parachute compensation arrangements in connection with certain change-in-control transactions. However, if the golden parachute arrangements have previously been subject to a say-on-pay vote which shareholders approved, then this required vote is waived.
Glass Lewis believes the narrative and tabular disclosure of golden parachute arrangements benefits all shareholders. Glass Lewis analyzes each golden parachute arrangement on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, among other items: the nature of the change-in-control transaction, the ultimate value of the payments particularly compared to the value of the transaction, any excise tax gross-up obligations, the tenure and position of the executives in question before and after the transaction, any new or amended employment agreements entered into in connection with the transaction, and the type of triggers involved (i.e., single vs. double). In cases where new problematic features, such as excise tax gross-up obligations, are introduced in a golden parachute proposal, such features may contribute to a negative recommendation not only for the golden parachute proposal under review, but for the next say-on-pay proposal of any involved corporate parties, as well as recommendations against their compensation committee as appropriate.
Equity-Based Compensation Plan Proposals
We believe that equity compensation awards, when not abused, are useful for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance. Glass Lewis recognizes that equity-based compensation plans are critical components of a company’s overall compensation program, and we analyze such plans accordingly based on both quantitative and qualitative factors.
Our quantitative analysis assesses the plan’s cost and the company’s pace of granting utilizing a number of different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company’s financial performance. Each of the analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.
We compare the program’s expected annual expense with the business’s operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the plan’s expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers
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and directors of the firm contribute to the creation of enterprise value but not necessarily market capitalization (the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because, in addition to creeping averages serving to inflate compensation, we believe that some absolute limits are warranted.
We then consider qualitative aspects of the plan such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions. We also closely review the choice and use of, and difficulty in meeting, the awards’ performance metrics and targets, if any. We believe significant changes to the terms of a plan should be explained for shareholders and clearly indicated.
Other factors such as a company’s size and operating environment may also be relevant in assessing the severity of concerns or the benefits of certain changes. Finally, we may consider a company’s executive compensation practices in certain situations, as applicable.
We evaluate equity plans based on certain overarching principles:
· | Companies should seek more shares only when needed; |
· | Requested share amounts should be small enough that companies seek shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently); |
· | If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members; |
· | Dilution of annual net share count or voting power, along with the “overhang” of incentive plans, should be limited; |
· | Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a |
percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group;
· | The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business’s value; |
· | The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business’s financial results; |
· | Plans should not permit re-pricing of stock options; |
· | Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms; |
· | Plans should not count shares in ways that understate the potential dilution, or cost, to common |
shareholders. This refers to “inverse” full-value award multipliers;
· | Selected performance metrics should be challenging and appropriate, and should be subject to relative performance measurements; and |
· | Stock grants should be subject to minimum vesting and/or holding periods sufficient to ensure sustainable performance and promote retention. |
Option Exchanges and Repricing
Glass Lewis is generally opposed to the repricing of employee and director options regardless of how it is accomplished. Employees should have some downside risk in their equity-based compensation program and repricing eliminates any such risk. As shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock, we believe that the equity compensation of employees and directors should be similarly situated to align their interests with those of shareholders. We believe this will facilitate appropriate risk- and opportunity-taking for the company by employees.
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We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be “rescued” from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option’s value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.
In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck.
There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program may be acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends, rather than specific company issues, cause a stock’s value to decline dramatically and the repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In viewing the company’s stock decline as part of a larger trend, we would expect the impact to approximately reflect the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and magnitude. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original “bargain” was struck. In such a scenario, we may opt to support a repricing or option exchange program only if sufficient conditions are met.
We are largely concerned with the inclusion of the following features:
· | Officers and board members cannot participate in the program; and |
· | The exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders using very conservative assumptions. |
· | In our evaluation of the appropriateness of the program design, we also consider the inclusion of the following features: |
· | The vesting requirements on exchanged or repriced options are extended beyond one year; |
· | Shares reserved for options that are reacquired in an option exchange will permanently retire (i.e., will |
not be available for future grants) so as to prevent additional shareholder dilution in the future; and
· | Management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market. |
Option Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging
Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to repricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return.
Backdating an option is the act of changing an option’s grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. In past studies, Glass Lewis identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.
Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock’s price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.
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The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.
A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company’s compensation and governance practices.42
Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis
will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have failed to act in the best interests of shareholders.
Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company’s financial reports.
When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.
Director Compensation Plans
Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive reasonable and appropriate compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. However, a balance is required. Fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals, but excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and potentially compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. We will consider recommending support for compensation plans that include option grants or other equity- based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. However, to
ensure directors are not incentivized in the same manner as executives but rather serve as a check on imprudent risk-taking in executive compensation plan design, equity grants to directors should not be performance-based.
42 Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. “LUCKY CEOs.” November, 2006.
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Where an equity plan exclusively or primarily covers non-employee directors as participants, we do not believe
that the plan should provide for performance-based awards in any capacity.
When non-employee director equity grants are covered by the same equity plan that applies to a company’s broader employee base, we will use our proprietary model and analyst review of this model to guide our voting recommendations. If such a plan broadly allows for performance-based awards to directors or explicitly provides for such grants, we may recommend against the overall plan on this basis, particularly if the company has granted performance-based awards to directors in past.
Employee Stock Purchase Plans
Glass Lewis believes that employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) can provide employees with a sense of ownership in their company and help strengthen the alignment between the interests of employees and shareholders. We evaluate ESPPs by assessing the expected discount, purchase period, expected purchase activity (if previous activity has been disclosed) and whether the plan has a “lookback” feature. Except for the most extreme cases, Glass Lewis will generally support these plans given the regulatory purchase limit of
$25,000 per employee per year, which we believe is reasonable. We also look at the number of shares requested to see if a ESPP will significantly contribute to overall shareholder dilution or if shareholders will not have a chance to approve the program for an excessive period of time. As such, we will generally recommend against ESPPs that contain “evergreen” provisions that automatically increase the number of shares available under the ESPP each year.
Executive Compensation Tax Deductibility — Amendment to IRC 162(M)
The “Tax Cut and Jobs Act” had significant implications on Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision that allowed companies to deduct compensation in excess of $1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO, if the compensation is performance-based and is paid under shareholder-approved plans. Glass Lewis does not generally view amendments to equity plans and changes to compensation programs in response to the elimination of tax deductions under 162(m) as problematic. This specifically holds true if such modifications contribute to the maintenance of a sound performance-based compensation program.
As grandfathered contracts may continue to be eligible for tax deductions under the transition rule for Section 162(m), companies may therefore submit incentive plans for shareholder approval to take of advantage of the tax deductibility afforded under 162(m) for certain types of compensation.
We believe the best practice for companies is to provide robust disclosure to shareholders so that they can make fully informed judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that disclosure should include specific performance metrics, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company’s peers.
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We typically recommend voting against a 162(m) proposal where: (i) a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; (ii) a company fails to provide one of either a total maximum or an individual maximum; or
(iii) he proposed plan or individual maximum award limit is excessive when compared with the plans of the company’s peers.
The company’s record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for- performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of setting reasonable pay relative to business performance, we generally recommend voting in favor of a plan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.
As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders’ best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards; it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.
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Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise
Anti-Takeover Measures
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)
Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders’ best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.
We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company’s course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders’ financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan’s implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.
In certain circumstances, we will support a poison pill that is limited in scope to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes each of the following attributes:
· | The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction; |
· | The offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days; |
· | The offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms; |
· | There is no fairness opinion requirement; and |
· | There is a low to no premium requirement. |
Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.
NOL Poison Pills
Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382
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of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies’ ability to use NOLs in the event of a “change of ownership.”43 In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill (NOL pill) in order to prevent an inadvertent change of ownership by multiple investors purchasing small chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.
Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis taking into consideration, among other factors, the value of the NOLs to the company, the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holding and the nature of the larger shareholders, the trigger threshold and whether the term of the plan is limited in duration (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable “sunset” provision) or is subject to periodic board review and/or shareholder ratification. In many cases, companies will propose the adoption of bylaw amendments specifically restricting certain share transfers, in addition to proposing the adoption of a NOL pill. In general, if we support the terms of a particular NOL pill, we will generally support the additional protective amendment in the absence of significant concerns with the specific terms of that proposal.
Furthermore, we believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.
Fair Price Provisions
Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation’s common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority shareholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of ”continuing directors” and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.
The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an “interested shareholder” by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested shareholder. An interested shareholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company’s outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.
Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested shareholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential
43 Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a “change of ownership” of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the “trafficking” of net operating losses.
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costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger
or other transaction at a later time.
Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.
Quorum Requirements
Glass Lewis believes that a company’s quorum requirement should be set at a level high enough to ensure that a broad range of shareholders are represented in person or by proxy, but low enough that the company can transact necessary business. Companies in the U.S. are generally subject to quorum requirements under the
laws of their specific state of incorporation. Additionally, those companies listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market are required to specify a quorum in their bylaws, provided however that such quorum may not be less than one- third of outstanding shares. Prior to 2013, the New York Stock Exchange required a quorum of 50% for listed companies, although this requirement was dropped in recognition of individual state requirements and potential confusion for issuers. Delaware, for example, required companies to provide for a quorum of no less than one-third of outstanding shares; otherwise such quorum shall default to a majority.
We generally believe a majority of outstanding shares entitled to vote is an appropriate quorum for the transaction of business at shareholder meetings. However, should a company seek shareholder approval of a lower quorum requirement we will generally support a reduced quorum of at least one-third of shares entitled to vote, either in person or by proxy. When evaluating such proposals, we also consider the specific facts and circumstances of the company, such as size and shareholder base.
Director and Officer Indemnification
While Glass Lewis strongly believes that directors and officers should be held to the highest standard when carrying out their duties to shareholders, some protection from liability is reasonable to protect them against certain suits so that these officers feel comfortable taking measured risks that may benefit shareholders. As such, we find it appropriate for a company to provide indemnification and/or enroll in liability insurance to cover its directors and officers so long as the terms of such agreements are reasonable.
Reincorporation
In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. When examining a management proposal to reincorporate to a different state
or country, we review the relevant financial benefits, generally related to improved corporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, resulting
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from the change in domicile. Where the financial benefits are de minimis and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, we will recommend voting against the transaction.
However, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways would the company benefit from shifting jurisdictions including the following:
· | Is the board sufficiently independent? |
· | Does the company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place? |
· | Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)? |
· | Do shareholders have the right to call special meetings of shareholders? |
· | Are there other material governance issues of concern at the company? |
· | Has the company’s performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years? |
· | How has the company ranked in Glass Lewis’ pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years? |
· | Does the company have an independent chair? |
We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company’s place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.
Exclusive Forum and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions
Glass Lewis recognizes that companies may be subject to frivolous and opportunistic lawsuits, particularly in conjunction with a merger or acquisition, that are expensive and distracting. In response, companies have sought ways to prevent or limit the risk of such suits by adopting bylaws regarding where the suits must be brought or shifting the burden of the legal expenses to the plaintiff, if unsuccessful at trial.
Glass Lewis believes that charter or bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder’s choice of legal venue are not in the best interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of shareholder claims by increasing their associated costs and making them more difficult to pursue. As such, shareholders should be wary about approving any limitation on their legal recourse including limiting themselves to a single jurisdiction (e.g., Delaware or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933) without compelling evidence that it will benefit shareholders.
For this reason, we recommend that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision unless the company: (i) provides a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders; (ii) provides evidence of abuse of legal process in other, non- favored jurisdictions; (iii) narrowly tailors such provision to the risks involved; and (iv) maintains a strong record of good corporate governance practices.
Moreover, in the event a board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, we will weigh the importance of the other bundled
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provisions when determining the vote recommendation on the proposal. We will nonetheless recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee for bundling disparate proposals into a single proposal (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines).
Similarly, some companies have adopted bylaws requiring plaintiffs who sue the company and fail to receive a judgment in their favor pay the legal expenses of the company. These bylaws, also known as “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws, will likely have a chilling effect on even meritorious shareholder lawsuits as shareholders would face an strong financial disincentive not to sue a company. Glass Lewis therefore strongly opposes the adoption of such fee-shifting bylaws and, if adopted without shareholder approval, will recommend voting against the governance committee. While we note that in June of 2015 the State of Delaware banned the adoption of fee-shifting bylaws, such provisions could still be adopted by companies incorporated in other states.
Authorized Shares
Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company’s operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:
1. Stock Split — We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company’s most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.
2. | Shareholder Defenses — Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses. |
3. | Financing for Acquisitions — We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy. |
4. | Financing for Operations — We review the company’s cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company’s history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital. |
Issuing additional shares generally dilutes existing holders in most circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares. Similar concerns may also lead us to recommend against a proposal to conduct a reverse stock split if the board does not state that it will reduce the number of authorized common shares in a ratio proportionate to the split.
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With regard to authorizations and/or increases in preferred shares, Glass Lewis is generally against such authorizations, which allow the board to determine the preferences, limitations and rights of the preferred shares (known as “blank-check preferred stock”). We believe that granting such broad discretion should be of concern to common shareholders, since blank-check preferred stock could be used as an anti-takeover device or in some other fashion that adversely affects the voting power or financial interests of common shareholders.
Therefore, we will generally recommend voting against such requests, unless the company discloses a commitment to not use such shares as an anti-takeover defense or in a shareholder rights plan, or discloses a commitment to submit any shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote prior to its adoption.
While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.
Advance Notice Requirements
We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.
These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.
We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.
Virtual Shareholder Meetings
A growing contingent of companies have elected to hold shareholder meetings by virtual means only. Glass Lewis believes that virtual meeting technology can be a useful complement to a traditional, in-person shareholder meeting by expanding participation of shareholders who are unable to attend a shareholder meeting in person (i.e. a “hybrid meeting”). However, we also believe that virtual-only meetings have the potential to curb the ability of a company’s shareholders to meaningfully communicate with the company’s management.
Prominent shareholder rights advocates, including the Council of Institutional Investors, have expressed concerns that such virtual-only meetings do not approximate an in-person experience and may serve to reduce the board’s accountability to shareholders. When analyzing the governance profile of companies that choose to hold virtual-only meetings, we look for robust disclosure in a company’s proxy statement which assures
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shareholders that they will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in- person meeting.
Examples of effective disclosure include: (i) addressing the ability of shareholders to ask questions during the meeting, including time guidelines for shareholder questions, rules around what types of questions are allowed, and rules for how questions and comments will be recognized and disclosed to meeting participants; (ii) procedures, if any, for posting appropriate questions received during the meeting and the company’s answers, on the investor page of their website as soon as is practical after the meeting; (iii) addressing technical and logistical issues related to accessing the virtual meeting platform; and (iv) procedures for accessing technical support to assist in the event of any difficulties accessing the virtual meeting.
We will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee where the board is
planning to hold a virtual-only shareholder meeting and the company does not provide such disclosure.
Voting Structure
Multi-Class Share Structures
Glass Lewis believes multi-class voting structures are typically not in the best interests of common shareholders. Allowing one vote per share generally operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board.
Furthermore, we believe that the economic stake of each shareholder should match their voting power and that no small group of shareholders, family or otherwise, should have voting rights different from those of other shareholders. On matters of governance and shareholder rights, we believe shareholders should have the power to speak and the opportunity to effect change. That power should not be concentrated in the hands of a few for reasons other than economic stake.
We generally consider a multi-class share structure to reflect negatively on a company’s overall corporate governance. Because we believe that companies should have share capital structures that protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders as well as any controlling entity, we typically recommend that shareholders vote in favor of recapitalization proposals to eliminate dual-class share structures. Similarly, we will generally recommend against proposals to adopt a new class of common stock. Beginning in 2022, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).
In the case of a board that adopts a multi-class share structure in connection with an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting the multi-class structure to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class structure (generally seven years or less). If the multi-class share structure is put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.
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When analyzing voting results from meetings of shareholders at companies controlled through multi-class structures, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. Where vote results indicate that a majority of unaffiliated shareholders supported a shareholder proposal or opposed a management proposal, we believe the board should demonstrate an appropriate level of responsiveness.
Cumulative Voting
Cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of the stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. As companies generally have multiple nominees up for election, cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. It can be important when a board is controlled
by insiders or affiliates and where the company’s ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.
Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of
large holders.
We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company’s governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.
Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted anti-takeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.
Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.
Supermajority Vote Requirements
Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This
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in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover,
we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.
Transaction of Other Business
We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before an annual or special meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.
Anti-Greenmail Proposals
Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder.
Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.
Mutual Funds: Investment Policies and Advisory Agreements
Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund’s structure and/or a fund’s relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:
· | The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement; |
· | Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and |
· | Any material changes to the fund’s investment objective or strategy. |
We generally support amendments to a fund’s investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement or fund reorganization. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund’s advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.
In matters pertaining to a fund’s investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund’s objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments
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to a fund’s investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally purchased, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors’ diversification strategies.
Real Estate Investment Trusts
The complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) provide for a unique shareholder evaluation. In simple terms, a REIT must have a minimum of 100 shareholders (the 100 Shareholder Test) and no more than 50% of the value of its shares can be held by five or fewer individuals (the “5/50 Test”). At least 75% of a REITs’ assets must be in real estate, it must derive 75% of its gross income from rents or mortgage interest, and it must pay out 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends. In addition, as a publicly traded security listed on a stock exchange, a REIT must comply with the same general listing requirements as a publicly traded equity.
In order to comply with such requirements, REITs typically include percentage ownership limitations in their organizational documents, usually in the range of 5% to 10% of the REITs outstanding shares. Given the complexities of REITs as an asset class, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach in our evaluation of REIT proposals, especially regarding changes in authorized share capital, including preferred stock.
Preferred Stock Issuances at REITs
Glass Lewis is generally against the authorization of "blank-check preferred stock." However, given the requirement that a REIT must distribute 90% of its net income annually, it is inhibited from retaining capital to make investments in its business. As such, we recognize that equity financing likely plays a key role in a REIT’s growth and creation of shareholder value. Moreover, shareholder concern regarding the use of preferred stock as an anti-takeover mechanism may be allayed by the fact that most REITs maintain ownership limitations in their certificates of incorporation. For these reasons, along with the fact that REITs typically do not engage in private placements of preferred stock (which result in the rights of common shareholders being adversely impacted), we may support requests to authorize shares of blank-check preferred stock at REITs.
Business Development Companies
Business Development Companies (BDCs) were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980; they are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are taxed as regulated investment companies (RICs) under the Internal Revenue Code. BDCs typically operate as publicly traded private equity firms that invest in early stage to mature private companies as well as small public companies. BDCs realize operating income when their investments are sold off, and therefore maintain complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements that are similar to those of REITs—the most evident of which is that BDCs must distribute at least 90% of their taxable earnings as dividends.
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Authorization to Sell Shares at a Price Below Net Asset Value
Considering that BDCs are required to distribute nearly all their earnings to shareholders, they sometimes need
to offer additional shares of common stock in the public markets to finance operations and acquisitions. However, shareholder approval is required in order for a BDC to sell shares of common stock at a price below Net Asset Value (NAV). Glass Lewis evaluates these proposals using a case-by-case approach, but will recommend supporting such requests if the following conditions are met:
· | The authorization to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date of one year or less from the date that shareholders approve the underlying proposal (i.e. the meeting date); |
· | The proposed discount below NAV is minimal (ideally no greater than 20%); |
· | The board specifies that the issuance will have a minimal or modest dilutive effect (ideally no greater than 25% of the company’s then-outstanding common stock prior to the issuance); and |
· | A majority of the company’s independent directors who do not have a financial interest in the issuance approve the sale. |
In short, we believe BDCs should demonstrate a responsible approach to issuing shares below NAV, by proactively addressing shareholder concerns regarding the potential dilution of the requested share issuance, and explaining if and how the company’s past below-NAV share issuances have benefitted the company.
Auditor Ratification and Below-NAV Issuances
When a BDC submits a below-NAV issuance for shareholder approval, we will refrain from recommending against the audit committee chair for not including auditor ratification on the same ballot. Because of the unique way these proposals interact, votes may be tabulated in a manner that is not in shareholders’ interests. In cases where these proposals appear on the same ballot, auditor ratification is generally the only “routine proposal,” the presence of which triggers a scenario where broker non-votes may be counted toward shareholder quorum, with unintended consequences.
Under the 1940 Act, below-NAV issuance proposals require relatively high shareholder approval. Specifically, these proposals must be approved by the lesser of: (i) 67% of votes cast if a majority of shares are represented at the meeting; or (ii) a majority of outstanding shares. Meanwhile, any broker non-votes counted toward quorum will automatically be registered as “against” votes for purposes of this proposal. The unintended result can be a case where the issuance proposal is not approved, despite sufficient voting shares being cast in favor. Because broker non-votes result from a lack of voting instruction by the shareholder, we do not believe shareholders’ ability to weigh in on the selection of auditor outweighs the consequences of failing to approve an issuance proposal due to such technicality.
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), also known as “blank check companies,” are publicly traded entities with no commercial operations and are formed specifically to pool funds in order to complete a merger or acquisition within a set time frame. In general, the acquisition target of a SPAC is either not yet identified or otherwise not explicitly disclosed to the public even when the founders of the SPAC may have at least one target in mind. Consequently, IPO investors often do not know what company they will ultimately be investing in.
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SPACs are therefore very different from typical operating companies. Shareholders do not have the same expectations associated with an ordinary publicly traded company and executive officers of a SPAC typically do not continue in employment roles with an acquired company.
Extension of Business Combination Deadline
Governing documents of SPACs typically provide for the return of IPO proceeds to common shareholders if no qualifying business combination is consummated before a certain date. Because the time frames for the consummation of such transactions are relatively short, SPACs will sometimes hold special shareholder meetings at which shareholders are asked to extend the business combination deadline. In such cases, an acquisition target will typically have been identified, but additional time is required to allow management of the SPAC to finalize the terms of the deal.
Glass Lewis believes management and the board are generally in the best position to determine when the extension of a business combination deadline is needed. We therefore generally defer to the recommendation of management and support reasonable extension requests.
SPAC Board Independence
The board of directors of a SPAC’s acquisition target is in many cases already established prior to the business combination. In some cases, however, the board’s composition may change in connection with the business combination, including the potential addition of individuals who served in management roles with the SPAC. The role of a SPAC executive is unlike that of a typical operating company executive. Because the SPAC’s only business is identifying and executing an acquisition deal, the interests of a former SPAC executive are also different. Glass Lewis does not automatically consider a former SPAC executive to be affiliated with the acquired operating entity when their only position on the board of the combined entity is that of an otherwise independent director. Absent any evidence of an employment relationship or continuing material financial interest in the combined entity, we will therefore consider such directors to be independent.
Director Commitments of SPAC Executives
We believe the primary role of executive officers at SPACs is identifying acquisition targets for the SPAC and consummating a business combination. Given the nature of these executive roles and the limited business operations of SPACs, when a directors’ only executive role is at a SPAC, we will generally apply our higher limit for company directorships. As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves in an executive role only at a SPAC while serving on more than five public company boards.
Shareholder Proposals
Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders, support effective ESG oversight and reporting, and encourage director accountability. Accordingly, Glass Lewis places a significant emphasis on promoting transparency, robust governance structures and companies’ responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders. We also believe that companies should be transparent on
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how they are mitigating material ESG risks, including those related to climate change, human capital management, and stakeholder relations.
To that end, we evaluate all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis with a view to promoting long-term shareholder value. While we are generally supportive of those that promote board accountability, shareholder rights, and transparency, we consider all proposals in the context of a company’s unique operations and risk profile.
For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposals, please refer to our comprehensive Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.
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Overall Approach to
Environmental, Social & Governance
Glass Lewis evaluates all environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. We believe that companies should be considering material environmental and social factors in all aspects of their operations and that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that allow them to understand how these factors are being considered and how attendant risks are being mitigated. We also are of the view that governance is a critical factor in how companies manage environmental and social risks and opportunities and that a well-governed company will be generally managing these issues better than one without a governance structure that promotes board independence and accountability.
We believe part of the board’s role is to ensure that management conducts a complete risk analysis of company operations, including those that have material environmental and social implications. We believe that directors should monitor management’s performance in both capitalizing on environmental and social opportunities and mitigating environmental and social risks related to operations in order to best serve the interests of shareholders. Companies face significant financial, legal and reputational risks resulting from poor environmental and social practices, or negligent oversight thereof. Therefore, in cases where the board or management has neglected to take action on a pressing issue that could negatively impact shareholder value, we believe that shareholders should take necessary action in order to effect changes that will safeguard their financial interests.
Given the importance of the role of the board in executing a sustainable business strategy that allows for the realization of environmental and social opportunities and the mitigation of related risks, relating to environmental risks and opportunities, we believe shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental or social risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental and social risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. In such instances, we will generally recommend against responsible members of the board that are specifically charged with oversight of the issue
in question.
When evaluating environmental and social factors that may be relevant to a given company, Glass Lewis does so in the context of the financial materiality of the issue to the company’s operations. We believe that all companies face risks associated with environmental and social issues. However, we recognize that these risks manifest themselves differently at each company as a result of a company’s operations, workforce, structure, and geography, among other factors. Accordingly, we place a significant emphasis on the financial implications of a company’s actions with regard to impacts on its stakeholders and the environment.
When evaluating environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis examines companies’:
Direct environmental and social risk — Companies should evaluate financial exposure to direct environmental risks associated with their operations. Examples of direct environmental risks include those associated with oil or gas spills, contamination, hazardous leakages, explosions, or reduced water or air quality, among others.
Social risks may include non-inclusive employment policies, inadequate human rights policies, or issues that
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adversely affect the company’s stakeholders. Further, we believe that firms should consider their exposure to risks emanating from a broad range of issues, over which they may have no or only limited control, such as insurance companies being affected by increased storm severity and frequency resulting from climate change or membership in trade associations with controversial political ties.
Risk due to legislation and regulation — Companies should evaluate their exposure to changes or potential changes in regulation that affect current and planned operations. Regulation should be carefully monitored in all jurisdictions in which the company operates. We look closely at relevant and proposed legislation and evaluate whether the company has responded proactively.
Legal and reputational risk — Failure to take action on important environmental or social issues may carry the risk of inciting negative publicity and potentially costly litigation. While the effect of high-profile campaigns on shareholder value may not be directly measurable, we believe it is prudent for companies to carefully evaluate the potential impacts of the public perception of their impacts on stakeholders and the environment. When considering investigations and lawsuits, Glass Lewis is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations or other charges that have not been resolved. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or charges or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such concerns, lawsuits or investigations reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.
Governance risk — Inadequate oversight of environmental and social issues carries significant risks to companies. When leadership is ineffective or fails to thoroughly consider potential risks, such risks are likely unmitigated and could thus present substantial risks to the company, ultimately leading to loss of shareholder value.
Glass Lewis believes that one of the most crucial factors in analyzing the risks presented to companies in the form of environmental and social issues is the level and quality of oversight over such issues. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. When companies have not provided for explicit, board-level oversight of environmental and social matters and/or when a
substantial environmental or social risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against members of the board. In addition, or alternatively, depending on the proposals presented, we may also consider recommending voting in favor of relevant shareholder proposals or against other relevant
management-proposed items, such as the ratification of auditor, a company’s accounts and reports, or
ratification of management and board acts.
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Connect with Glass Lewis
Corporate Website | www.glasslewis.com
Email | info@glasslewis.com
@glasslewis Glass, Lewis & Co.
Global Locations
North America |
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DISCLAIMER
© 2021 Glass, Lewis & Co., and/or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
This document is intended to provide an overview of Glass Lewis’ proxy voting guidelines. It is not intended to
be exhaustive and does not address all potential voting issues. Glass Lewis’ proxy voting guidelines, as they apply to certain issues or types of proposals, are further explained in supplemental guidelines and reports that are made available on Glass Lewis’ website – http://www.glasslewis.com. These guidelines have not been set or approved by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or any other regulatory body. Additionally, none of the information contained herein is or should be relied upon as investment advice. The content of this
document has been developed based on Glass Lewis’ experience with proxy voting and corporate governance issues, engagement with clients and issuers, and review of relevant studies and surveys, and has not been tailored to any specific person or entity.
Glass Lewis’ proxy voting guidelines are grounded in corporate governance best practices, which often exceed minimum legal requirements. Accordingly, unless specifically noted otherwise, a failure to meet these guidelines should not be understood to mean that the company or individual involved has failed to meet applicable legal requirements.
No representations or warranties express or implied, are made as to the accuracy or completeness of any information included herein. In addition, Glass Lewis shall not be liable for any losses or damages arising from or in connection with the information contained herein or the use, reliance on, or inability to use any such information. Glass Lewis expects its subscribers possess sufficient experience and knowledge to make their own decisions entirely independent of any information contained in this document.
All information contained in this report is protected by law, including, but not limited to, copyright law, and none of such information may be copied or otherwise reproduced, repackaged, further transmitted, transferred, disseminated, redistributed or resold, or stored for subsequent use for any such purpose, in whole or in part, in any form or manner, or by any means whatsoever, by any person without Glass Lewis’ prior written consent.
PART C
OTHER INFORMATION
Item 28. Financial Statements and Exhibits.
(c) Instruments Defining Rights of Security Holder. None.
(d) Investment Advisory Contracts.
(e.2) Distribution Agreement with Foreside Fund Services, LLC is filed herewith.
(f) Bonus or Profit Sharing Contracts. None.
(h) Other Material Contracts.
(i) Legal Opinion.
(i.2) Consent of Thompson Hine LLP is filed herewith.
(j) Other Opinions. Consent of Cohen & Company, Ltd is filed herewith.
(k) Omitted Financial Statements. None.
(o) Reserved.
(q.4) Power of Attorney for Gerard S. E. Heffernan, a President of the Trust, is filed herewith.
Item 29. Control Persons.
None.
Item 30. Indemnification.
Reference is made to Article VI of the Registrant's Agreement and Declaration of Trust which is included. The application of these provisions is limited by the following undertaking set forth in the rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 may be permitted to trustees, officers and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to the foregoing provisions, or otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission such indemnification is against public policy as expressed in such Act and is, therefore, unenforceable. In the event that a claim for indemnification against such liabilities (other than the payment by the registrant of expenses incurred or paid by a trustee, officer or controlling person of the registrant in the successful defense of any action, suit or proceeding) is asserted by such trustee, officer or controlling person in connection with the securities being registered, the registrant will, unless in the opinion of its counsel the matter has been settled by controlling precedent, submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question whether such indemnification by it is against public policy as expressed in such Act and will be governed by the final adjudication of such issue. The Registrant may maintain a standard mutual fund and investment advisory professional and directors and officers liability policy. The policy, if maintained, would provide coverage to the Registrant, its Trustees and officers, and could cover its advisors, among others. Coverage under the policy would include losses by reason of any act, error, omission, misstatement, misleading statement, neglect or breach of duty.
Item 31. Activities of Investment Advisor.
(a) Walthausen & Co., LLC (the "Advisor") located at 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020 is a registered investment advisor. It has engaged in no other business during the past two fiscal years.
ITEM 32. | Principal Underwriter. |
Item 32(a) | Foreside Fund Services, LLC (the “Distributor”) serves as principal underwriter for the following investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended: |
1. | ABS Long/Short Strategies Fund |
2. | Absolute Shares Trust |
3. | Adaptive Core ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
4. | AdvisorShares Trust |
5. | AFA Multi-Manager Credit Fund |
6. | AGF Investments Trust |
7. | AIM ETF Products Trust |
8. | Alexis Practical Tactical ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
9. | Alpha Intelligent – Large Cap Growth ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
10. | Alpha Intelligent – Large Cap Value ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
11. | AlphaCentric Prime Meridian Income Fund |
12. | American Century ETF Trust |
13. | American Customer Satisfaction ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
14. | Amplify ETF Trust |
15. | Applied Finance Core Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
16. | Applied Finance Explorer Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
17. | Applied Finance Select Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
18. | ARK ETF Trust |
19. | ASYMmetric ETFs Trust |
20. | Bluestone Community Development Fund |
21. | BondBloxx ETF Trust |
22. | Braddock Multi-Strategy Income Fund, Series of Investment Managers Series Trust |
23. | Bridgeway Funds, Inc. |
24. | Brinker Capital Destinations Trust |
25. | Brookfield Real Assets Income Fund Inc. |
26. | Build Funds Trust |
27. | Calamos Convertible and High Income Fund |
28. | Calamos Convertible Opportunities and Income Fund |
29. | Calamos Dynamic Convertible and Income Fund |
30. | Calamos Global Dynamic Income Fund |
31. | Calamos Global Total Return Fund |
32. | Calamos Strategic Total Return Fund |
33. | Carlyle Tactical Private Credit Fund |
34. | Cboe Vest Bitcoin Strategy Managed Volatility Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
35. | Cboe Vest S&P 500® Dividend Aristocrats Target Income Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
36. | Cboe Vest US Large Cap 10% Buffer Strategies Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
37. | Cboe Vest US Large Cap 10% Buffer VI Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
38. | Cboe Vest US Large Cap 20% Buffer Strategies Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
39. | Cboe Vest US Large Cap 20% Buffer VI Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
40. | Center Coast Brookfield MLP & Energy Infrastructure Fund |
41. | Changebridge Capital Long/Short ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
42. | Changebridge Capital Sustainable Equity ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
43. | Clifford Capital Focused Small Cap Value Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
44. | Clifford Capital International Value Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
45. | Clifford Capital Partners Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
46. | Cliffwater Corporate Lending Fund |
47. | Cliffwater Enhanced Lending Fund |
48. | Cohen & Steers Infrastructure Fund, Inc. |
49. | Convergence Long/Short Equity ETF, Series of Trust for Professional Managers |
50. | CornerCap Group of Funds |
51. | CrossingBridge Pre-Merger SPAC ETF, Series of Trust for Professional Managers |
52. | Curasset Capital Management Core Bond Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
53. | Curasset Capital Management Limited Term Income Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
54. | Davis Fundamental ETF Trust |
55. | Defiance Digital Revolution ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
56. | Defiance Hotel, Airline, and Cruise ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
57. | Defiance Nasdaq Junior Biotechnology ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
58. | Defiance Next Gen Altered Experience ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
59. | Defiance Next Gen Connectivity ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
60. | Defiance Next Gen H2 ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
61. | Defiance Next Gen SPAC Derived ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
62. | Defiance Quantum ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
63. | Direxion Shares ETF Trust |
64. | Dividend Performers ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
65. | Dodge & Cox Funds |
66. | DoubleLine ETF Trust |
67. | DoubleLine Opportunistic Credit Fund |
68. | DoubleLine Yield Opportunities Fund |
69. | Eaton Vance NextShares Trust |
70. | Eaton Vance NextShares Trust II |
71. | EIP Investment Trust |
72. | Ellington Income Opportunities Fund |
73. | Esoterica Thematic ETF Trust |
74. | ETF Opportunities Trust |
75. | Evanston Alternative Opportunities Fund |
76. | Exchange Listed Funds Trust |
77. | Fiera Capital Series Trust |
78. | FlexShares Trust |
79. | FOMO ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
80. | Forum Funds |
81. | Forum Funds II |
82. | Friess Brandywine Blue Fund, Series of Managed Portfolio Series |
83. | Friess Brandywine Fund, Series of Managed Portfolio Series |
84. | Friess Small Cap Growth Fund, Series of Managed Portfolio Series |
85. | Goose Hollow Tactical Allocation ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
86. | Grayscale Future of Finance ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
87. | Grizzle Growth ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
88. | Guinness Atkinson Funds |
89. | Harbor ETF Trust |
90. | Horizon Kinetics Inflation Beneficiaries ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
91. | IDX Funds |
92. | Infusive US Trust |
93. | Innovator ETFs Trust |
94. | Ironwood Institutional Multi-Strategy Fund LLC |
95. | Ironwood Multi-Strategy Fund LLC |
96. | John Hancock Exchange-Traded Fund Trust |
97. | Kelly Strategic ETF Trust |
98. | LifeGoal Conservative Wealth Builder ETF, Series of Northern Lights Fund Trust II |
99. | LifeGoal Home Down Payment ETF, Series of Northern Lights Fund Trust II |
100. | LifeGoal Wealth Builder ETF, Series of Northern Lights Fund Trust II |
101. | Mairs & Power Balanced Fund, Series of Trust for Professional Managers |
102. | Mairs & Power Growth Fund, Series of Trust for Professional Managers |
103. | Mairs & Power Minnesota Municipal Bond ETF, Series of Trust for Professional Managers |
104. | Mairs & Power Small Cap Fund, Series of Trust for Professional Managers |
105. | Manor Investment Funds |
106. | Merk Stagflation ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
107. | Milliman Variable Insurance Trust |
108. | Mindful Conservative ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
109. | Moerus Worldwide Value Fund, Series of Northern Lights Fund Trust IV |
110. | Mohr Growth ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
111. | Morgan Creek - Exos Active SPAC Arbitrage ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
112. | Morgan Creek - Exos SPAC Originated ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
113. | Morningstar Funds Trust |
114. | OSI ETF Trust |
115. | OTG Latin American Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
116. | Overlay Shares Core Bond ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
117. | Overlay Shares Foreign Equity ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
118. | Overlay Shares Hedged Large Cap Equity ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
119. | Overlay Shares Large Cap Equity ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
120. | Overlay Shares Municipal Bond ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
121. | Overlay Shares Short Term Bond ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
122. | Overlay Shares Small Cap Equity ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
123. | Palmer Square Opportunistic Income Fund |
124. | Partners Group Private Income Opportunities, LLC |
125. | PENN Capital Funds Trust |
126. | Performance Trust Mutual Funds, Series of Trust for Professional Managers |
127. | Perkins Discovery Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
128. | Philotimo Focused Growth and Income Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
129. | Plan Investment Fund, Inc. |
130. | PMC Funds, Series of Trust for Professional Managers |
131. | Point Bridge GOP Stock Tracker ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
132. | Preferred-Plus ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
133. | Putnam ETF Trust |
134. | Quaker Investment Trust |
135. | Rareview Dynamic Fixed Income ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
136. | Rareview Inflation/Deflation ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
137. | Rareview Systematic Equity ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
138. | Rareview Tax Advantaged Income ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
139. | REMS Real Estate Value-Opportunity Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
140. | Renaissance Capital Greenwich Funds |
141. | Revere Sector Opportunity ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
142. | Reverse Cap Weighted U.S. Large Cap ETF, Series of ETF Series Solutions |
143. | Reynolds Funds, Inc. |
144. | RiverNorth Patriot ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust (f/k/a RiverNorth Volition America Patriot ETF) |
145. | RMB Investors Trust |
146. | Robinson Opportunistic Income Fund, Series of Investment Managers Series Trust |
147. | Robinson Tax Advantaged Income Fund, Series of Investment Managers Series Trust |
148. | Roundhill Ball Metaverse ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
149. | Roundhill BITKRAFT Esports & Digital Entertainment ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
150. | Roundhill Cannabis ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
151. | Roundhill IO Digital Infrastructure ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
152. | Roundhill MEME ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
153. | Roundhill Sports Betting & iGaming ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
154. | Rule One Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
155. | Salient MF Trust |
156. | Securian AM Balanced Stabilization Fund, Series of Investment Managers Series Trust |
157. | Securian AM Equity Stabilization Fund, Series of Investment Managers Series Trust |
158. | Securian AM Real Asset Income Fund, Series of Investment Managers Series Trust |
159. | SHP ETF Trust |
160. | Six Circles Trust |
161. | Sound Shore Fund, Inc. |
162. | Sparrow Funds |
163. | Spear Alpha ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
164. | STF Tactical Growth & Income ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
165. | STF Tactical Growth ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
166. | Strategy Shares |
167. | Swan Hedged Equity US Large Cap ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
168. | Syntax ETF Trust |
169. | Teucrium Agricultural Strategy No K-1 ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
170. | The B.A.D. ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
171. | The Chartwell Funds |
172. | The Community Development Fund |
173. | The De-SPAC ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
174. | The Finite Solar Finance Fund |
175. | The NextGen Trend and Defend ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
176. | The Private Shares Fund (f/k/a SharesPost 100 Fund) |
177. | The Short De-SPAC ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
178. | The SPAC and New Issue ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
179. | Third Avenue Trust |
180. | Third Avenue Variable Series Trust |
181. | Tidal ETF Trust |
182. | TIFF Investment Program |
183. | Timothy Plan High Dividend Stock Enhanced ETF, Series of The Timothy Plan |
184. | Timothy Plan High Dividend Stock ETF, Series of The Timothy Plan |
185. | Timothy Plan International ETF, Series of The Timothy Plan |
186. | Timothy Plan US Large/Mid Cap Core ETF, Series of The Timothy Plan |
187. | Timothy Plan US Large/Mid Core Enhanced ETF, Series of The Timothy Plan |
188. | Timothy Plan US Small Cap Core ETF, Series of The Timothy Plan |
189. | Total Fund Solution |
190. | TrueShares ESG Active Opportunities ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
191. | TrueShares Low Volatility Equity Income ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
192. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (April) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
193. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (August) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
194. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (December) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
195. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (February) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
196. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (January) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
197. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (July) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
198. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (June) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
199. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (March) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
200. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (May) ETF, Listed Funds Trust |
201. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (November) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
202. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (October) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
203. | TrueShares Structured Outcome (September) ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
204. | TrueShares Technology, AI & Deep Learning ETF, Series of Listed Funds Trust |
205. | Tuttle Capital Short Innovation ETF, Series of Collaborative Investment Series Trust |
206. | U.S. Global Investors Funds |
207. | Union Street Partners Value Fund, Series of World Funds Trust |
208. | Variant Alternative Income Fund |
209. | Variant Impact Fund |
210. | VictoryShares Developed Enhanced Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
211. | VictoryShares Dividend Accelerator ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
212. | VictoryShares Emerging Market High Div Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
213. | VictoryShares International High Div Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
214. | VictoryShares International Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
215. | VictoryShares NASDAQ Next 50 ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
216. | VictoryShares Protect America ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
217. | VictoryShares Top Veteran Employers ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
218. | VictoryShares US 500 Enhanced Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
219. | VictoryShares US 500 Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
220. | VictoryShares US Discovery Enhanced Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
221. | VictoryShares US EQ Income Enhanced Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
222. | VictoryShares US Large Cap High Div Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
223. | VictoryShares US Multi-Factor Minimum Volatility ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
224. | VictoryShares US Small Cap High Div Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
225. | VictoryShares US Small Cap Volatility Wtd ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
226. | VictoryShares USAA Core Intermediate-Term Bond ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
227. | VictoryShares USAA Core Short-Term Bond ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
228. | VictoryShares USAA MSCI Emerging Markets Value Momentum ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
229. | VictoryShares USAA MSCI International Value Momentum ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
230. | VictoryShares USAA MSCI USA Small Cap Value Momentum ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
231. | VictoryShares USAA MSCI USA Value Momentum ETF, Series of Victory Portfolios II |
232. | Walthausen Funds |
233. | West Loop Realty Fund, Series of Investment Managers Series Trust |
234. | WisdomTree Trust |
235. | WST Investment Trust |
236. | XAI Octagon Floating Rate & Alternative Income Term Trust |
Item 32(b) | The following are the Officers and Manager of the Distributor, the Registrant’s underwriter. The Distributor’s main business address is Three Canal Plaza, Suite 100, Portland, Maine 04101. |
Name | Address | Position with Underwriter |
Position with Registrant
|
Richard J. Berthy | Three Canal Plaza, Suite 100, Portland, ME 04101 | President, Treasurer and Manager | None |
Mark A. Fairbanks | Three Canal Plaza, Suite 100, Portland, ME 04101 | Vice President | None |
Teresa Cowan | 111 E. Kilbourn Ave, Suite 2200, Milwaukee, WI 53202 | Vice President | None |
Nanette K. Chern | Three Canal Plaza, Suite 100, Portland, ME 04101 | Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer | None |
Kelly B. Whetstone | Three Canal Plaza, Suite 100, Portland, ME 04101 | Secretary | None |
Item 32(c) | Not applicable. |
Item 33. Location of Accounts and Records.
All accounts, books and documents required to be maintained by the Registrant pursuant to Section 31(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Rules 31a-1 through 31a-3 thereunder are maintained at the office of the Registrant and the Transfer Agent at 225 Pictoria Drive, Suite 450, Cincinnati, OH 45246, except that all records relating to the activities of the Fund's Custodian are maintained at the office of the U.S. Bank, 425 Walnut Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202.
Item 34. Management Services. Not applicable.
Item 35. Undertakings. None.
SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Fund certifies that it meets all of the requirements for effectiveness of this registration statement under Rule 485(b) under the Securities Act of 1933 and has duly caused this registration statement to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized, in the City of El Cajon, State of California on the 27th day of May, 2022.
WALTHAUSEN FUNDS
By: /s/ Jeffrey R. Provence
Jeffrey R. Provence, Attorney-in-Fact
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, this Amendment to Registration Statement has been signed below by the following persons in the capacities indicated on the 27th day of May, 2022.
Signature | Title | Date |
Gerard S. E. Heffernan* | President and Principal Executive Officer | |
Edward A. LaVarnway* | Trustee | |
John P. Mastriani* | Trustee | |
Hany A. Shawky* | Trustee | |
/s/ Stanley M. Westhoff Jr. | Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer / | May 27, 2022 |
Stanley M. Westhoff Jr. | Principal Financial Officer | |
*By: /s/ Jeffrey R. Provence | ||
Jeffrey R. Provence, Attorney-in-Fact | ||
Date: May 27, 2022 |
EXHIBIT INDEX
1. Letter Agreement with respect to Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund Institutional | EX-99.28.d.5 |
Class Shares and Investor Class Shares | |
2. Distribution Agreement with Foreside Fund Services, LLC | EX-99.23.e.2 |
3. Consent of Thompson Hine LLP | EX-99.28.i.2 |
4. Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm | EX-99.28.j |
(Cohen & Company, Ltd.) | |
5. Power of Attorney for Gerard S. E. Heffernan, a President of the Trust. | EX-99.28.q.4 |