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Related Party Transactions
12 Months Ended
Dec. 31, 2014
Related Party Transactions [Abstract]  
Related Party Transactions
Related Party Transactions

The Company provides relocation assistance to its employees in connection with the relocation of its corporate headquarters from Park Ridge, New Jersey to Estero, Florida. In connection with the relocation program, the Company entered into an agreement with a third-party provider of relocation services, part of which included purchases of the current residences of eligible employees on its behalf. Consistent with the practices of other, similarly-situated companies that undergo relocations, the purchase price of each of the residences was determined by obtaining multiple appraisals, which were averaged for the third party's purchase price. The total amount that the Company spent under the program during the year ended December 31, 2013 was $3 million for the executive officers. The Compensation Committee approved the program.

Agreements with the Icahn Group

On September 15, 2014, Hertz Holdings entered into a definitive Nomination and Standstill Agreement (the “Nomination and Standstill Agreement”) with Mr. Carl C. Icahn, High River Limited Partnership, Hopper Investments LLC, Barberry Corp., Icahn Partners LP, Icahn Partners Master Fund LP, Icahn Enterprises G.P. Inc., Icahn Enterprises Holdings L.P., IPH GP LLC, Icahn Capital LP, Icahn Onshore LP, Icahn Offshore LP, Beckton Corp., Vincent J. Intrieri, Samuel Merksamer and Daniel A. Ninivaggi (collectively, the “Icahn Group”).
 
Pursuant to the Nomination and Standstill Agreement, Mr. Vincent J. Intrieri, Mr. Samuel Merskamer and Mr. Daniel A. Ninivaggi (collectively, the “Icahn Designees”) were appointed to the Board of Directors of Hertz Holdings as Class II, Class I and Class I directors respectively effective as of September 15, 2014.  Messrs. Intrieri, Merksamer and Ninivaggi were also appointed to the Board of Directors of Hertz. Pursuant to the Nomination and Standstill Agreement, so long as an Icahn Designee is a member of the Board, the Board will not be expanded to greater than ten directors without the approval from the Icahn Designees then on the Board. In addition, pursuant to the Nomination and Standstill Agreement, subject to certain restrictions and requirements, the Icahn Group will have certain replacement rights in the event an Icahn Designee resigns or is otherwise unable to serve as a director (other than as a result of not being nominated by Hertz Holdings for an annual meeting subsequent to the 2015 Annual Meeting).
 
Pursuant to the Nomination and Standstill Agreement, among other things, the Icahn Group agreed not to conduct a proxy contest regarding any matter, including the election of directors, with respect to the 2015 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the “2015 Annual Meeting”).  In addition, until the later of the (x) the 2015 Annual Meeting and (y) the date that no Icahn Designee is a member of the Board (or otherwise deemed to be on the Board pursuant to the terms of the Nomination and Standstill Agreement) (the “Board Representation Period”), the Icahn Group agrees to vote all of its shares of common stock of Hertz Holdings in favor of the election of all of Hertz Holdings’ director nominees at each annual or special meeting of Hertz Holdings. Also pursuant to the Nomination and Standstill Agreement, during the Board Representation Period, and subject to limited exceptions, the Icahn Group will adhere to certain standstill obligations, including the obligation to not solicit proxies or consents or influence others with respect to the same. The Icahn Group further agrees that during the Board Representation Period, subject to certain limited exceptions, the Icahn Group will not acquire or otherwise beneficially own more than 20% of Hertz Holdings’ outstanding voting securities.
 
In addition, pursuant to the Nomination and Standstill Agreement, the Board dissolved the previously existing Executive and Finance Committee of the Board, and agreed not to create a separate executive committee of the board so long as an Icahn Designee is a member of the Board.
 
If at any time the Icahn Group ceases to hold a “net long” position, as defined in the Nomination and Standstill Agreement, in at least (A) 28,500,000 shares of Hertz Holdings’ common stock, the Icahn Group will cause one Icahn Designee to promptly resign from the Board; (B) 22,800,000 shares of Hertz Holdings’ common stock, the Icahn Group will cause two Icahn Designees to promptly resign from the Board; and (C) 19,000,000 shares of Hertz Holdings’ common stock, the Icahn Group will cause all of the Icahn Designees to promptly resign from the Board and Hertz Holdings’ obligations under the Nomination and Standstill Agreement will terminate.

Pursuant to the Nomination and Standstill Agreement, the Company and the Icahn Group entered into a confidentiality agreement pursuant to which the Icahn Group agreed to treat any and all information concerning or relating to Hertz Holdings or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates furnished to the Icahn Group or their representatives as confidential. In addition, the Company and the Icahn Group agreed to enter into a customary registration rights agreement.
Other Relationships

In connection with its car and equipment rental businesses, the Company enters into millions of rental transactions every year involving millions of customers. In order to conduct those businesses, the Company also procures goods and services from thousands of vendors. Some of those customers and vendors may be affiliated with members of the Company's Board. The Company believes that all such rental and procurement transactions have been conducted on an arms‑length basis and involved terms no less favorable to the Company than those that it believes would have been obtained in the absence of such affiliation. It is Company management’s policy to bring to the attention of its Board any transaction with a related party, even if the transaction arises in the ordinary course of business, if the terms of the transaction would be less favorable to the Company than those to which it would agree to in normal commercial circumstances.