PROXY VOTING POLICY

For

BlackRock Advisors, Inc.
and Its Affiliated Registered Investment Advisers

Introduction

          This Proxy Voting Policy ("Policy") for BlackRock Advisors, Inc. and its affiliated registered investment advisers ("BlackRock") reflects our duty as a fiduciary under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) to vote proxies in the best interests of our clients. In addition, the Department of Labor views the fiduciary act of managing ERISA plan assets to include the voting of proxies. Proxy voting decisions must be made solely in the best interests of the pension plan’s participants and beneficiaries. The Department of Labor has interpreted this requirement as prohibiting a fiduciary from subordinating the retirement income interests of participants and beneficiaries to unrelated objectives. The guidelines in this Policy have been formulated in a manner designed to ensure decision-making consistent with these fiduciary responsibilities.

          Any general or specific proxy voting guidelines provided by an advisory client or its designated agent in writing will supercede the specific guidelines in this Policy for that client. BlackRock will disclose to our advisory clients information about this Policy as well as disclose to our clients how they may obtain information on how we voted their proxies. Additionally, BlackRock will maintain proxy voting records for our advisory clients consistent with the Advisers Act. For those of our clients that are registered investment companies, BlackRock will disclose this Policy to the shareholders of such funds and make filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and make available to fund shareholders the specific proxy votes that we cast in shareholder meetings of issuers of portfolio securities in accordance with the rules and regulations under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

          Registered investment companies that are advised by BlackRock as well as certain of our advisory clients may participate in securities lending programs, which may reduce or eliminate the amount of shares eligible for voting by BlackRock in accordance with this Policy if such shares are out on loan and cannot be recalled in time for the vote.

          Implicit in the initial decision to retain or invest in the security of a corporation is acceptance of its existing corporate ownership structure, its management, and its

operations. Accordingly, proxy proposals that would change the existing status of a corporation will be supported only when we conclude that the proposed changes are likely to benefit the corporation and its shareholders. Notwithstanding this favorable predisposition, we will assess management on an ongoing basis both in terms of its business capability and its dedication to shareholders to seek to ensure that our continued confidence remains warranted. If we determine that management is acting on its own behalf instead of for the well being of the corporation, we will vote to support shareholder proposals, unless we determine other mitigating circumstances are present.

          Additionally, situations may arise that involve an actual or perceived conflict of interest. For example, we may manage assets of a pension plan of a company whose management is soliciting proxies, or a BlackRock employee involved with managing an account may have a close relative who serves as a director or executive of a company that is soliciting proxies regarding securities held in such account. In all cases, we seek to vote proxies based on our clients’ best interests.

          This Policy and its attendant recommendations attempt to generalize a complex subject. It should be clearly understood that specific fact situations, including differing voting practices in jurisdictions outside the United States, might warrant departure from these guidelines. In such instances, we will consider the facts we believe are relevant, and if we vote contrary to these guidelines we will record the reasons for this contrary vote.

          Section I of the Policy describes proxy proposals that may be characterized as routine and lists examples of the types of proposals we would typically support. Section II of the Policy describes various types of non-routine proposals and provides general voting guidelines. These non-routine proposals are categorized as those involving:

A.	Social Issues,
B.	Financial/Corporate Issues, and
C.	Shareholder Rights.

Finally, Section III of the Policy describes the procedures we follow in casting votes pursuant to these guidelines.

SECTION I

ROUTINE MATTERS

	Routine proxy proposals, amendments, or resolutions are typically proposed by management and meet the following criteria:
	1.	They do not measurably change the structure, management control, or operation of the corporation.
	2.	They are consistent with industry standards as well as the corporate laws of the state of incorporation.
Voting Recommendation
	BlackRock will normally support the following routine proposals:
	1.	To increase authorized common shares.
	2.	To increase authorized preferred shares as long as there are not disproportionate voting rights per preferred share.
	3.	To elect or re-elect directors, except as noted below.
	4.	To appoint or elect auditors.
	5.	To approve indemnification of directors and limitation of directors’ liability.
	6.	To establish compensation levels.
	7.	To establish employee stock purchase or ownership plans.
	8.	To set time and location of annual meeting.

          BlackRock will withhold its vote for a nominee to the board if he or she failed to attend at least 75% of the board meetings in the previous year without a valid reason. In addition, BlackRock will withhold its vote for all nominees standing for election to a board if (1) since the last annual meeting of shareholders and without shareholder approval, the board or its compensation committee has repriced underwater options; or (2) within the last year, shareholders approved by majority vote a resolution recommending that the board rescind a “poison pill” and the board has failed to take responsive action to that resolution. Responsive action would include the rescission of the “poison pill” (without a broad reservation to reinstate the “poison pill” in the event of a hostile tender offer), or public assurances that the terms of the “poison pill” would be put to a binding shareholder vote within the next five to seven years.

          BlackRock evaluates a contested election of directors on a case-by-case basis considering the long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry, management’s track record, the qualifications of the nominees for both slates and an evaluation of what each side is offering shareholders.

SECTION II

NON-ROUTINE PROPOSALS

A. Social Issues

          Proposals in this category involve issues of social conscience. They are typically proposed by shareholders who believe that the corporation’s internally adopted policies are ill-advised or misguided.

Voting Recommendation

          If we have determined that management is generally socially responsible, we will generally vote against the following shareholder proposals:

1.	To enforce restrictive energy policies.
2.	To place arbitrary restrictions on military contracting.
3.	To bar or place arbitrary restrictions on trade with other countries.
4.	To restrict the marketing of controversial products.
5.	To limit corporate political activities.
6.	To bar or restrict charitable contributions.
7.	To enforce a general policy regarding human rights based on arbitrary parameters.
8.	To enforce a general policy regarding employment practices based on arbitrary parameters.
9.	To enforce a general policy regarding animal rights based on arbitrary parameters.
10.	To place arbitrary restrictions on environmental practices.

B. Financial/Corporate Issues

          Proposals in this category are usually offered by management and seek to change a corporation’s legal, business or financial structure.

Voting Recommendation

          We will generally vote in favor of the following management proposals provided the position of current shareholders is preserved or enhanced:

1.	To change the state of incorporation.
2.	To approve mergers, acquisitions or dissolution.
3.	To institute indenture changes.
4.	To change capitalization.

C. Shareholder Rights

          Proposals in this category are made regularly both by management and shareholders. They can be generalized as involving issues that transfer or realign board or shareholder voting power.

          We typically would oppose any proposal aimed solely at thwarting potential takeover offers by requiring, for example, super-majority approval. At the same time, we believe stability and continuity promote profitability. The guidelines in this area seek to find a middle road, and they are no more than guidelines. Individual proposals may have to be carefully assessed in the context of their particular circumstances.

Voting Recommendation

          We will generally vote for the following management proposals:

1.	To require majority approval of shareholders in acquisitions of a controlling share in the corporation.
2.	To institute staggered board of directors.
3.	To require shareholder approval of not more than 66 2/3% for a proposed amendment to the corporation’s by-laws.
4.	To eliminate cumulative voting.
5.	To adopt anti-greenmail charter or by-law amendments or to otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.
6.	To create a dividend reinvestment program.
7.	To eliminate preemptive rights.
8.	To eliminate any other plan or procedure designed primarily to discourage a takeover or other similar action (commonly known as a “poison pill”).
9.	To adopt or continue a stock option or restricted stock plan if all such plans for a particular company do not involve excessive dilution.

We will generally vote against the following management proposals:

1.	To require greater than 66 2/3% shareholder approval for a proposed amendment to the corporation’s by-laws (“super-majority provisions”).
2.	To require that an arbitrary fair price be offered to all shareholders that is derived from a fixed formula (“fair price amendments”).
3.	To authorize a new class of common stock or preferred stock which may have more votes per share than the existing common stock.
4.	To prohibit replacement of existing members of the board of directors.
5.	To eliminate shareholder action by written consent without a shareholder meeting.
6.	To allow only the board of directors to call a shareholder meeting or to propose amendments to the articles of incorporation.
7.	To implement any other action or procedure designed primarily to discourage a takeover or other similar action (commonly known as a “poison pill”).

8.	To limit the ability of shareholders to nominate directors.
9.	To adopt or continue a stock option or restricted stock plan if plan contributes to excessive dilution.

We will generally vote for the following shareholder proposals:

1.	To rescind share purchases rights or require that they be submitted for shareholder approval, but only if the vote required for approval is not more than 66 2/3%.
2.	To opt out of state anti-takeover laws deemed to be detrimental to the shareholder.
3.	To change the state of incorporation for companies operating under the umbrella of anti-shareholder state corporation laws if another state is chosen with favorable laws in this and other areas.
4.	To eliminate any other plan or procedure designed primarily to discourage a takeover or other similar action.
5.	To permit shareholders to participate in formulating management’s proxy and the opportunity to discuss and evaluate management’s director nominees, and/or to nominate shareholder nominees to the board.
6.	To require that the board’s audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be comprised exclusively of independent directors.
7.	To adopt anti-greenmail charter or by-law amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.
8.	To create a dividend reinvestment program.
9.	To recommend that votes to “abstain” not be considered votes “cast” at an annual meeting or special meeting, unless required by state law.
10.	To require that “golden parachutes” be submitted for shareholder ratification.
11.	To rescind a stock option or restricted stock plan if the plan contributes to excessive dilution.

We will generally vote against the following shareholder proposals:

1.	To restore preemptive rights.
2.	To restore cumulative voting.
3.	To require annual election of directors or to specify tenure.
4.	To eliminate a staggered board of directors.
5.	To require confidential voting.
6.	To require directors to own a minimum amount of company stock in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.
7.	To dock director pay for failing to attend board meetings.
8.	To rescind a stock option or restricted stock plan if the plan does not contribute to excessive dilution.
9.	To prohibit the provision of any non-audit services by a company’s auditors to the company.

SECTION III

VOTING PROCESS

          BlackRock has engaged an independent third-party service provider to assist us in the voting of proxies. These guidelines have been provided to this service provider, who then analyzes all proxy solicitations we receive for our clients and makes recommendations to us as to how, based upon our guidelines, the relevant votes should be cast. These recommendations are set out in a report that is provided to the relevant BlackRock Portfolio Management Group team, who must approve the proxy vote in writing and return such written approval to the BlackRock Operations Group (e-mail is deemed to be a writing). If any authorized member of a Portfolio Management Group team desires to vote in a manner that differs from the third-party service provider recommendation, the reason for such differing vote shall be noted in the written approval form sent to the BlackRock Operations Group. The head of each relevant BlackRock Portfolio Management Group team is responsible for making sure that proxies are voted in a timely manner. The BlackRock Equity Investment Policy Oversight Committee (or similar or successor committee, the “EIPOC”) receives regular reports of votes cast that differ from recommendations made by the third-party service provider and votes cast that may have involved a material conflict of interest. The EIPOC also review these guidelines from time to time to determine their continued appropriateness and whether any changes to the guidelines or the proxy voting process should be made.

          Votes may involve a conflict of interest if (i) the vote is proposed to be cast in a manner that differs from the third-party service provider recommendation and (ii) the subject matter of the proxy involves a party that has a material relationship with BlackRock, or the issuer of the proxy has such a relationship, such as where the issuer soliciting the vote is a BlackRock client. The BlackRock Operations Group identifies potential conflicts of interest and then refers any potential conflict to BlackRock’s Legal and Compliance Department for review prior to a vote being cast.

          With respect to votes in connection with securities held on a particular record date but sold from a client account prior to the holding of the related meeting, BlackRock may take no action on proposals to be voted on in such meeting.

          With respect to voting proxies of non-U.S. companies, a number of logistical problems may arise that may have a detrimental effect on BlackRock’s ability to vote such proxies in the best interests of our clients. These problems include, but are not limited to, (i) untimely and/or inadequate notice of shareholder meetings, (ii) restrictions on the ability of holders outside the issuer's jurisdiction of organization to exercise votes, (iii) requirements to vote proxies in person, if not practicable, (iv) the imposition of restrictions on the sale of the securities for a period of time in proximity to the shareholder meeting, and (v) impracticable or inappropriate requirements to provide local

agents with power of attorney to facilitate the voting instructions. Accordingly, BlackRock may determine not to vote proxies if it believes that the restrictions or other detriments associated with such vote outweigh the benefits that will be derived by voting on the company's proposal.

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          Any questions regarding this Policy may be directed to the General Counsel of BlackRock.

Last Revised: November 29, 2005