0001370368-22-000025.txt : 20220317 0001370368-22-000025.hdr.sgml : 20220317 20220317060510 ACCESSION NUMBER: 0001370368-22-000025 CONFORMED SUBMISSION TYPE: 6-K PUBLIC DOCUMENT COUNT: 10 CONFORMED PERIOD OF REPORT: 20211231 FILED AS OF DATE: 20220317 DATE AS OF CHANGE: 20220317 FILER: COMPANY DATA: COMPANY CONFORMED NAME: CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG CENTRAL INDEX KEY: 0001159510 STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: SECURITY BROKERS, DEALERS & FLOTATION COMPANIES [6211] IRS NUMBER: 000000000 STATE OF INCORPORATION: V8 FISCAL YEAR END: 1231 FILING VALUES: FORM TYPE: 6-K SEC ACT: 1934 Act SEC FILE NUMBER: 001-15244 FILM NUMBER: 22746625 BUSINESS ADDRESS: STREET 1: PARADEPLATZ 8 CITY: ZURICH STATE: V8 ZIP: 8001 BUSINESS PHONE: 01141442721616 MAIL ADDRESS: STREET 1: P.O. BOX 1 CITY: ZURICH STATE: V8 ZIP: 8070 FORMER COMPANY: FORMER CONFORMED NAME: CREDIT SUISSE GROUP DATE OF NAME CHANGE: 20010921 6-K 1 a220317bs-6k.htm 6-K 6-K
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

Form 6-K
REPORT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUER PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-16 OR 15d-16 UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
March 17, 2022
Commission File Number 001-15244
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG
(Translation of registrant’s name into English)
Paradeplatz 8, CH 8001 Zurich, Switzerland
(Address of principal executive office)

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant files or will file annual reports under cover of Form 20-F or Form 40-F.
   Form 20-F      Form 40-F   
Indicate by check mark if the registrant is submitting the Form 6-K in paper as permitted by Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(1):
Note: Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(1) only permits the submission in paper of a Form 6-K if submitted solely to provide an attached annual report to security holders.
Indicate by check mark if the registrant is submitting the Form 6-K in paper as permitted by Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(7):
Note: Regulation S-T Rule 101(b)(7) only permits the submission in paper of a Form 6-K if submitted to furnish a report or other document that the registrant foreign private issuer must furnish and make public under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the registrant is incorporated, domiciled or legally organized (the registrant’s “home country”), or under the rules of the home country exchange on which the registrant’s securities are traded, as long as the report or other document is not a press release, is not required to be and has not been distributed to the registrant’s security holders, and, if discussing a material event, has already been the subject of a Form 6-K submission or other Commission filing on EDGAR.
Indicate by check mark whether the registrant by furnishing the information contained in this Form is also thereby furnishing the information to the Commission pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
   Yes      No   
If “Yes” is marked, indicate below the file number assigned to the registrant in connection with Rule 12g3-2(b): 82-.






Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.
CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG
 (Registrant)
Date: March 17, 2022
By:
/s/ David Wildermuth
David Wildermuth
Chief Risk Officer
By:
/s/ David R. Mathers
David R. Mathers
Chief Financial Officer












For purposes of this report, unless the context otherwise requires, the terms “Credit Suisse,” the “Group,” “we,” “us” and “our” mean Credit Suisse Group AG and its consolidated subsidiaries. The business of Credit Suisse AG, the direct bank subsidiary of the Group, is substantially similar to the Group, and we use these terms to refer to both when the subject is the same or substantially similar. We use the term the “Bank” when we are only referring to Credit Suisse AG and its consolidated subsidiaries.
Abbreviations are explained in the List of abbreviations in the back of this report.
Publications referenced in this report, whether via website links or otherwise, are not incorporated into this report.
In various tables, use of “–” indicates not meaningful or not applicable.


Pillar 3 and regulatory disclosures 4Q21
Credit Suisse Group AG

Introduction
Swiss capital requirements
Overview of risk management
Risk-weighted assets
Linkages between financial statements and regulatory exposures
Credit risk
Counterparty credit risk
Securitization
Market risk
Interest rate risk in the banking book
Additional regulatory disclosures
List of abbreviations
Cautionary statement regarding forward-looking information






Introduction
General
This report as of December 31, 2021 is based on the revised Circular 2016/1 “Disclosure – banks” (FINMA circular) issued by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA (FINMA).
This report is produced and published quarterly, in accordance with FINMA requirements. The reporting frequency for each disclosure requirement is either annual, semi-annual or quarterly. This document should be read in conjunction with the Pillar 3 and regulatory disclosures – Credit Suisse Group AG 2Q21 and 3Q21 as well as the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021, which include important information on regulatory capital, risk management (specific references have been made herein to these documents) and regulatory developments and proposals.
Credit Suisse Group is the highest consolidated entity to which the FINMA circular applies.
These disclosures were verified and approved internally in line with our board-approved policy on disclosure controls and procedures. The level of internal control processes for these disclosures is similar to those applied to the Group’s quarterly and annual financial reports. This report has not been audited by the Group’s external auditors.
For certain prescribed table formats where line items have zero balances, such line items have not been presented.
This report reflects certain updates and corrections to prior period metrics, which have been noted in the relevant tabular disclosures, where applicable.
Other regulatory disclosures
In connection with the implementation of Basel III, certain regulatory disclosures for the Group and certain of its subsidiaries are required. The Group’s Pillar 3 disclosure, regulatory disclosures, additional information on capital instruments, including the main features of regulatory capital instruments and total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC)-eligible instruments that form part of the eligible capital base and TLAC resources, Global systemically important bank (G-SIB) financial indicators, reconciliation requirements, leverage ratios and certain liquidity disclosures as well as regulatory disclosures for subsidiaries can be found on our website.
> Refer to credit-suisse.com/regulatorydisclosures for additional information.
Regulatory developments
> Refer to “Regulatory developments” (pages 124) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Capital management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information.
Location of disclosure
This report provides the Pillar 3 and regulatory disclosures required by the FINMA circular for the Group to the extent that these disclosures are not included in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 or in the regulatory disclosures on our website.
> Refer to “Annual Report” under credit-suisse.com/ar for disclosures included in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021.
2

Location of disclosures   
FINMA disclosure requirements Location Page number
Overview of risk management, key prudential metrics and risk-weighted assets      
Key prudential metrics [Table KM1] / [Table KM2] Qualitative disclosures: "Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet" 114 - 132
Risk management approach [Table OVA] "Risk management oversight"
"Risk appetite framework"
"Risk coverage and management"
141 - 144
144 - 147
147 - 165
Overview of risk-weighted assets [Table OV1] Qualitative disclosures: "Risk-weighted assets" 128 - 130
Linkages between financial statements and regulatory exposures      
Valuation process [Table LIA] "Fair valuations"
"Critical accounting estimates - Fair value"
"Note 36 - Financial instruments"
69
105
383 - 409
Composition of capital and TLAC      
Differences in basis of consolidation [Table CC2] List of significant subsidiaries and associated entities:
"Note 41 - Significant subsidiaries and equity method investments"
Changes in scope of consolidation:
"Note 3 - Business developments, significant shareholders and subsequent events"
 
425 - 428
 
302 - 304
Main features of regulatory capital instruments and TLAC-eligible instruments [Table CCA] Refer to "Capital instruments" under credit-suisse.com/regulatorydisclosures 1
Macroprudential supervisor measures      
Disclosure of G-SIBs indicators [Table GSIB1] Refer to "G-SIB Indicators" under credit-suisse.com/regulatorydisclosures 1
Credit risk      
General qualitative information [Table CRA] "Credit risk" 151 - 154
Additional disclosure related to credit quality
of assets [Table CRB a), b), c) and d)]
"Note 1 - Summary of significant accounting policies"
"Note 20 - Financial instruments measured at amortized cost and credit losses"
296 - 297
315 - 327
Qualitative disclosure requirements related to credit
risk mitigation techniques [Table CRC a)]: Netting
"Derivative instruments"
"Note 1 - Summary of significant accounting policies"
"Note 28 - Offsetting of financial assets and financial liabilities"
171 - 173
294 - 295
338 - 341
Counterparty credit risk      
Qualitative disclosure requirements [Table CCRA] Transaction rating, credit limits and provisioning: "Credit risk"
Effect of a credit rating downgrade: "Credit ratings"
151 - 154
119 - 120
Securitization      
Qualitative disclosure requirements [Table SECA] "Note 35 - Transfers of financial assets and variable interest entities" 373 - 282
Market risk      
Qualitative disclosure requirements [Table MRA] "Market risk"
"Note 1 - Summary of significant accounting policies"
"Note 33 - Derivatives and hedging activities"
154 - 158
294 - 295
363 - 369
Leverage metrics      
Qualitative disclosures [Table LR2] "Leverage metrics"
"Swiss metrics"
131
131 - 132
Liquidity coverage ratio      
Liquidity risk management [Table LIQA] "Liquidity and funding management" 112 - 120
Liquidity Coverage Ratio [Table LIQ1] Qualitative disclosures: "Liquidity metrics" 115
Liquidity: information on the NSFR [Table LIQ2] Qualitative disclosures: "Liquidity metrics" 116
Remuneration      
Remuneration policy [Table REMA] "Compensation" 239 - 280
Remuneration awarded during the financial
year [table REM1] / Special payments [table REM2] /
Deferred remuneration [table REM3]
Senior management: "Executive Board compensation"

Other material risk takers: "Group compensation"
246 - 257

258 - 266
Operational risk      
Qualitative disclosures [Table ORA] "Non-financial risk regulatory capital measurement" 160
Corporate Governance      
Corporate Governance [Appendix 4] "Corporate Governance" 183 - 238
Climate-related financial risks      
Climate-related financial risks [Appendix 5] "Climate-related risks" 163 - 164
1
The disclosure will be available by the end of April 2022.
3

Swiss capital requirements
FINMA requires the Group to comply fully with the special requirements for systemically important financial institutions operating internationally. The following tables present the Swiss capital and leverage requirements and metrics as required by FINMA.
> Refer to “Swiss requirements” (pages 122 to 124) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Capital management – Regulatory framework and “Swiss metrics” (pages 131 to 132) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Capital management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on general Swiss requirements and the related metrics.
Swiss capital requirements and metrics

end of 4Q21

CHF million
in %
of RWA
Swiss risk-weighted assets          
Swiss risk-weighted assets 268,418
Risk-based capital requirements (going-concern) based on Swiss capital ratios          
Total 1 40,288 15.01
   of which CET1: minimum  12,079 4.5
   of which CET1: buffer  14,763 5.5
   of which CET1: countercyclical buffers  75 0.028
   of which additional tier 1: minimum  9,395 3.5
   of which additional tier 1: buffer  2,147 0.8
Swiss eligible capital (going-concern)          
Swiss CET1 capital and additional tier 1 capital 2 54,372 20.3
   of which CET1 capital 3 38,529 14.4
   of which additional tier 1 high-trigger capital instruments  11,398 4.2
   of which additional tier 1 low-trigger capital instruments 4 4,445 1.7
Risk-based requirements for additional total loss-absorbing capacity (gone-concern) based on Swiss capital ratios          
Total according to size and market share 5 38,384 14.3
Reductions due to rebates in accordance with article 133 of the CAO (8,415) (3.135)
Reductions due to the holding of additional instruments in the form of convertible capital in accordance with Art. 132 para 4 CAO (1,198) (0.446)
Total, net 28,771 10.719
Eligible additional total loss-absorbing capacity (gone-concern)          
Total 6 46,648 17.4
   of which bail-in instruments 7 44,251 16.5
   of which tier 2 low-trigger capital instruments  2,397 0.9
Rounding differences may occur.
1
The total requirement includes the FINMA Pillar 2 capital add-on of CHF 1,829 million relating to the supply chain finance funds matter. This Pillar 2 capital add-on equates to an additional Swiss CET1 capital ratio requirement of 68 basis points.
2
Excludes tier 1 capital that is used to fulfill gone-concern requirements.
3
Excludes CET1 capital that is used to fulfill gone-concern requirements.
4
If issued before July 1, 2016, such capital instruments qualify as additional tier 1 high-trigger capital instruments until their first call date according to the transitional Swiss "Too Big to Fail" rules.
5
Consists of a base requirement of 12.86%, or CHF 34,519 million, and a surcharge of 1.44%, or CHF 3,865 million.
6
Amounts are shown on a look-through basis. Certain tier 2 capital instruments were subject to phase out and are no longer be eligible as of January 1, 2022. As of 4Q21, total eligible gone-concern capital was CHF 46,897 million, including CHF 249 million of such instruments.
7
Includes instruments issued in 1Q21, which are eligible as gone-concern capacity, where the Group used the proceeds of CHF 4,931 million to offset an exposure that Credit Suisse AG has from providing net senior funding to the Group. As of the end of 4Q21, the Group had a net funding liability against Credit Suisse AG of CHF 1,367 million, resulting from existing net senior funding provided by Credit Suisse AG to the Group of CHF 7,443 million, offset by CHF 6,076 million of funding provided by the Group to Credit Suisse AG.
4

Swiss leverage requirements and metrics

end of 4Q21

CHF million
in %
of LRD
Leverage exposure          
Leverage ratio denominator 889,137
Unweighted capital requirements (going-concern) based on Swiss leverage ratio          
Total 1 46,286 5.2
   of which CET1: minimum  13,337 1.5
   of which CET1: buffer  17,783 2.0
   of which additional tier 1: minimum  13,337 1.5
Swiss eligible capital (going-concern)          
Swiss CET1 capital and additional tier 1 capital 2 54,372 6.1
   of which CET1 capital 3 38,529 4.3
   of which additional tier 1 high-trigger capital instruments  11,398 1.3
   of which additional tier 1 low-trigger capital instruments 4 4,445 0.5
Unweighted requirements for additional total loss-absorbing capacity (gone-concern) based on the Swiss leverage ratio          
Total according to size and market share 5 44,457 5.0
Reductions due to rebates in accordance with article 133 of the CAO (9,781) (1.1)
Reductions due to the holding of additional instruments in the form of convertible capital in accordance with Art. 132 para 4 CAO (1,198) (0.135)
Total, net 33,478 3.765
Eligible additional total loss-absorbing capacity (gone-concern)          
Total 6 46,648 5.2
   of which bail-in instruments 7 44,251 5.0
   of which tier 2 low-trigger capital instruments  2,397 0.3
Rounding differences may occur.
1
The total requirement includes the FINMA Pillar 2 capital add-on of CHF 1,829 million relating to the supply chain finance funds matter. This Pillar 2 capital add-on equates to an additional Swiss CET1 leverage ratio requirement of 21 basis points.
2
Excludes tier 1 capital that is used to fulfill gone-concern requirements.
3
Excludes CET1 capital that is used to fulfill gone-concern requirements.
4
If issued before July 1, 2016, such capital instruments qualify as additional tier 1 high-trigger capital instruments until their first call date according to the transitional Swiss "Too Big to Fail" rules.
5
Consists of a base requirement of 4.5%, or CHF 39,379 million, and a surcharge of 0.5%, or CHF 4,375 million.
6
Amounts are shown on a look-through basis. Certain tier 2 capital instruments were subject to phase out and are no longer be eligible as of January 1, 2022. As of 4Q21, total eligible gone-concern capital was CHF 46,897 million, including CHF 249 million of such instruments.
7
Includes instruments issued in 1Q21, which are eligible as gone-concern capacity, where the Group used the proceeds of CHF 4,931 million to offset an exposure that Credit Suisse AG has from providing net senior funding to the Group. As of the end of 4Q21, the Group had a net funding liability against Credit Suisse AG of CHF 1,367 million, resulting from existing net senior funding provided by Credit Suisse AG to the Group of CHF 7,443 million, offset by CHF 6,076 million of funding provided by the Group to Credit Suisse AG.
5

Overview of risk management
General
Fundamental to our business is the prudent taking of risk in line with our strategic priorities. The primary objectives of risk management are to protect our financial strength and reputation, while ensuring that capital is well deployed to support business activities. Our risk management framework is based on transparency, management accountability and independent oversight. Risk management is an integral part of our business planning process with strong involvement of senior management and the Board of Directors. Risk measurement models are reviewed by the Model Risk Management team, an independent validation function, and regularly presented to and approved by the relevant oversight committee.
> Refer to “Risk management oversight” (pages 141 to 144), “Risk appetite framework” (pages 144 to 147) and “Risk coverage and management” (pages 147 to 165) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for information on risk management oversight including risk culture, risk governance, risk organization, risk types, risk appetite, risk limits, stress testing and strategies/processes to manage, hedge and mitigate risks.
Risk reporting
Risk reporting is performed regularly and there are numerous internal control procedures in place, in particular the standard operating procedures, risk and control assessment and independent report review. These ensure the reporting and measurement systems are up to date and are working as intended. They cover: validation and authorization of risk measurement data, status summary reports, data reconciliation, independent checks/validation and error reports to capture any failings. Senior management and the Board of Directors are informed about key risk metrics aligned to our Strategic Risk Objectives in the monthly Group Risk Report.
Key risks
The Group is exposed to several key banking risks such as:
Credit risk (refer to section “Credit risk” on pages 12 to 43);
Counterparty credit risk (refer to section “Counterparty credit risk” on pages 44 to 53);
Securitization risk (refer to section “Securitization risk” on pages 54 to 61);
Market risk (refer to section “Market risk” on pages 62 to 66);
Interest rate risk in the banking book (refer to section “Interest rate risk in the banking book” on pages 67 to 70); and
Operational risk.
> Refer to “Non-financial risk regulatory capital measurement” (page 160) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk coverage and management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for information on operational risk.
The Basel framework prescribes various approaches for determining capital requirements which banks have to abide by in order maintain regulatory compliance. For the majority of the types of risks, Credit Suisse uses internally developed models for both regulatory and internal purposes, in order to ensure our capital resources are appropriate to our risk profile.
6

Risk-weighted assets
With the adoption of the revised FINMA circular, risk-weighted assets (RWA) presented in this report, including prior period comparisons, are based on the Swiss capital requirements.
> Refer to “Swiss requirements” (pages 122 to 124) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Capital management – Regulatory framework in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on Swiss capital requirements.
The following table presents an overview of total Swiss RWA forming the denominator of the risk-based capital requirements. Further breakdowns of RWA are presented in subsequent sections of this report.
RWA were CHF 268.4 billion as of the end of 4Q21, a 4% decrease compared to the end of 3Q21. The decrease in RWA was mainly related to movements in risk levels, primarily in credit risk, and the foreign exchange impact, primarily in credit risk and operational risk.
RWA flow statements for credit risk, counterparty credit risk (CCR) and market risk are presented in subsequent parts of this report.
> Refer to “Risk-weighted assets” (pages 128 to 130) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Capital management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on risk-weighted assets movements in 2021.
OV1 – Overview of Swiss risk-weighted assets and capital requirements 
     
Risk-weighted assets
Capital
requirement
1
end of 4Q21 3Q21 4Q20 4Q21
CHF million  
Credit risk (excluding counterparty credit risk) 126,878 130,486 134,648 10,150
   of which standardized approach (SA)  25,591 26,366 26,237 2,047
   of which supervisory slotting approach  4,040 3,788 4,246 323
   of which advanced internal ratings-based (A-IRB) approach  97,247 100,332 104,165 7,780
Counterparty credit risk 15,640 17,244 22,577 1,251
   of which standardized approach for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR)  3,064 3,630 4,283 245
   of which internal model method (IMM)  11,536 12,453 16,589 923
   of which other counterparty credit risk 2 1,040 1,161 1,705 83
Credit valuation adjustments (CVA) 5,046 6,033 8,498 404
Equity positions in the banking book under the simple risk weight approach 7,071 7,886 4,427 566
Equity investments in funds - look-through approach 2,431 2,397 2,998 194
Equity investments in funds - mandate-based approach 21 19 71 2
Equity investments in funds - fall-back approach 505 452 506 40
Settlement risk 465 278 249 37
Securitization exposures in the banking book 13,396 14,221 12,962 1,072
   of which securitization internal ratings-based approach (SEC-IRBA)  7,736 7,844 7,322 619
   of which securitization external ratings-based approach (SEC-ERBA), including internal assessment approach (IAA)  1,429 1,455 1,285 114
   of which securitization standardized approach (SEC-SA)  4,231 4,922 4,355 339
Market risk 16,355 17,637 18,317 1,308
   of which standardized approach (SA)  1,648 1,747 1,478 132
   of which internal models approach (IMA)  14,707 15,890 16,839 1,176
Operational risk (AMA) 67,627 69,115 58,655 5,410
Amounts below the thresholds for deduction (subject to 250% risk weight) 12,983 13,033 11,668 1,039
Total  268,418 278,801 275,576 21,473
1
Calculated as 8% of Swiss risk-weighted assets, based on total capital minimum requirements, excluding capital conservation buffer and G-SIB buffer requirements.
2
Includes RWA for contributions to the default fund of a central counterparty and loans hedged by centrally cleared CDS.
7

Linkages between financial statements and regulatory exposures
This section shows the various sources of differences between the carrying values presented in the Group’s financial statements prepared in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the US (US GAAP) and the exposure amounts used for regulatory purposes. The identification, classification and presentation of these sources of differences requires a significant amount of management judgement and is based on the information available at the time. As such, reclassifications have been made compared to the prior year. Management believes that the estimates and assumptions used in the preparation of these disclosures are prudent, reasonable and consistently applied.
The following table shows the differences between the scope of accounting consolidation and the scope of regulatory consolidation, broken down by how the amounts reported in the Group’s financial statements correspond to regulatory risk categories. The column about the securitization framework includes securitizations in the banking book, whereas securitizations in the trading book are included in the column about market risk. Foreign exchange risk in the banking book is captured by the Internal Model Approach (IMA) in market risk. Positions with foreign exchange risk in the banking book are not included in the column about market risk. Cash collateral is excluded from market risk. However, the cash leg of securities financing transactions (SFT) in the trading book is included in the column about market risk.
LI1 - Differences between accounting and regulatory scopes of consolidation and mapping of financial statements with regulatory risk categories
   Carrying values Carrying values of items subject to:

end of 4Q21




Published
financial
statements




Regulatory
scope of
consolidation



Credit
risk
frame-
work

Counter-
party
credit
risk
frame-
work



Securiti-
zation
frame-
work



Market
risk
frame-
work
Not subject
to capital
require-
ments or
subject to
deduction
from capital
Assets (CHF million)  
Cash and due from banks 164,818 164,524 163,292 0 0 0 1,232
Interest-bearing deposits with banks 1,323 1,590 1,498 92 0 0 0
Central bank funds sold, securities purchased under resale agreements and securities borrowing transactions 103,906 103,900 0 103,900 0 81,295 0
Securities received as collateral, at fair value 15,017 15,017 0 15,017 0 15,017 0
Trading assets, at fair value 1 111,141 110,246 9,327 47,737 2 944 110,544 0
Investment securities 1,005 1,005 1,002 0 3 0 0
Other investments 5,826 5,770 3,705 0 289 0 1,776
Net loans 291,686 292,126 259,842 201 30,842 1,473 0
Goodwill 2,917 2,921 0 0 0 0 2,921
Other intangible assets 276 276 0 0 0 0 276
Brokerage receivables 16,687 16,687 2,071 12,941 0 0 1,675
Other assets 41,231 40,701 19,801 8,161 938 3,984 8,107
Total assets  755,833 754,763 460,538 188,049 33,016 212,313 15,987
Liabilities (CHF million)  
Due to banks 18,965 19,016 0 0 0 0 19,016
Customer deposits 392,819 392,784 0 0 0 0 392,784
Central bank funds purchased, securities sold under repurchase agreements and securities lending transactions 35,274 35,274 0 35,274 0 18,307 0
Obligation to return securities received as collateral, at fair value 15,017 15,017 0 15,017 0 15,017 0
Trading liabilities, at fair value 1 27,535 27,563 42 10,865 0 44,144 439
Short-term borrowings 19,393 19,473 0 0 0 11,816 7,657
Long-term debt 166,896 165,670 1,487 0 0 41,801 122,382
Brokerage payables 13,060 13,060 0 8,810 0 0 4,250
Other liabilities 22,644 22,606 407 6,053 0 1,388 14,871
Total liabilities  711,603 710,463 1,936 76,019 0 132,473 561,399
There are items in the table which attract capital charges according to more than one risk category framework. As an example, derivatives assets/liabilities held in the regulatory trading book are shown in the column about market risk and in the column about counterparty credit risk.
1
Trading assets/liabilities on the balance sheet reflect the balance after considering netting benefit of cash collateral hence reflect a lower balance than disclosed in the market risk column as cash collateral is not part of the market risk framework.
2
Includes assets pledged as collateral since collateral posted is subject to counterparty credit risk.
8

LI1 - Differences between accounting and regulatory scopes of consolidation and mapping of financial statements with regulatory risk categories (continued)
   Carrying values Carrying values of items subject to:

end of 4Q20




Published
financial
statements




Regulatory
scope of
consolidation



Credit
risk
frame-
work

Counter-
party
credit
risk
frame-
work



Securiti-
zation
frame-
work



Market
risk
frame-
work
Not subject
to capital
require-
ments or
subject to
deduction
from capital
Assets (CHF million)  
Cash and due from banks 139,112 138,641 137,374 0 0 0 1,267
Interest-bearing deposits with banks 1,298 1,737 1,555 182 0 0 0
Central bank funds sold, securities purchased under resale agreements and securities borrowing transactions   1 92,276 92,276 0 92,276 0 68,629 0
Securities received as collateral, at fair value 50,773 50,773 0 50,773 0 50,666 0
Trading assets, at fair value 2 157,338 151,391 7,528 69,103 3 1,050 158,304 0
Investment securities 607 607 597 0 10 0 0
Other investments 5,412 5,593 2,978 0 335 244 2,036
Net loans 291,908 291,534 262,862 178 27,766 906 0
Goodwill 4,426 4,430 0 0 0 0 4,430
Other intangible assets 237 237 0 0 0 0 237
Brokerage receivables 35,941 35,941 2,074 30,285 0 0 3,582
Other assets 39,637 38,347 18,711 8,160 949 3,921 6,812
Total assets  818,965 811,507 433,679 250,957 30,110 282,670 18,364
Liabilities (CHF million)  
Due to banks 16,423 16,765 0 0 0 0 16,765
Customer deposits 390,921 390,765 0 0 0 0 390,765
Central bank funds purchased, securities sold under repurchase agreements and securities lending transactions   1 36,994 40,948 0 40,948 0 22,980 0
Obligation to return securities received as collateral, at fair value 50,773 50,773 0 50,773 0 50,666 0
Trading liabilities, at fair value 2 45,871 45,905 61 17,770 0 70,539 1,193
Short-term borrowings 20,868 16,608 0 0 0 11,876 4,732
Long-term debt 161,087 159,341 0 0 0 51,090 108,251
Brokerage payables 21,653 21,653 0 17,150 0 0 4,503
Other liabilities 31,434 25,746 340 8,376 0 709 16,326
Total liabilities  776,024 768,504 401 135,017 0 207,860 542,535
There are items in the table which attract capital charges according to more than one risk category framework. As an example, derivatives assets/liabilities held in the regulatory trading book are shown in the column about market risk and in the column about counterparty credit risk.
1
Prior period has been revised.
2
Trading assets/liabilities on the balance sheet reflect the balance after considering netting benefit of cash collateral hence reflect a lower balance than disclosed in the market risk column as cash collateral is not part of the market risk framework.
3
Includes assets pledged as collateral since collateral posted is subject to counterparty credit risk.
For financial reporting purposes, our consolidation principles comply with US GAAP. For capital adequacy reporting purposes, however, entities that are not active in banking and finance are not subject to consolidation (i.e. insurance, commercial and certain real estate companies). Also, FINMA does not require consolidating private equity and other fund type vehicles for capital adequacy reporting. Further differences in consolidation principles between US GAAP and capital adequacy reporting relate to special purpose entities (SPEs) that are consolidated under a control-based approach for US GAAP but are assessed under a risk-based approach for capital adequacy reporting. In addition, FINMA requires us to consolidate companies which form an economic unit with Credit Suisse or if Credit Suisse is obliged to provide compulsory financial support to a company. The investments into such entities, which are not material to the Group, are treated in accordance with the regulatory rules and are either subject to a risk-weighted capital requirement or a deduction from regulatory capital.
All significant equity method investments represent investments in the capital of banking, financial and insurance entities and are subject to a threshold calculation in accordance with the Basel framework and the Swiss Capital Adequacy Ordinance (CAO).
> Refer to “Note 41 – Significant subsidiaries and equity method investments” (pages 425 to 428) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for a list of significant subsidiaries and associated entities.
9

In addition to the differences between accounting and regulatory scopes of consolidation as shown in table LI1 there are further main sources of differences between the financial statements’ carrying value amounts and the exposure amounts used for regulatory purposes.
LI2 - Main sources of differences between regulatory exposure amounts and carrying values in financial statements
   Items subject to:

end of


Credit
risk
frame-
work
Counter-
party
credit
risk
frame-
work
1

Securiti-
zation
frame-
work


Market
risk
frame-
work
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Asset carrying value amount under regulatory scope of consolidation 460,538 188,049 33,016 212,313
Liabilities carrying value amount under regulatory scope of consolidation 1,936 76,019 0 132,473
Total net amount under regulatory scope of consolidation 458,602 112,030 33,016 79,840
Off-balance sheet amounts 65,075 0 33,158 0
Differences due to consideration of valuation adjustments and provisions 507 0 64 0
Derivatives: Differences due to application of internal models (IMM) and SA-CCR 0 30,489 0 0
SFT: Differences due to the application of internal models (VaR) 0 (76,949) 0 0
Other differences not classified above (6,042) 3,649 (3,247) 0
Exposure amounts considered for regulatory purposes  518,142 69,219 62,991 2
4Q20 (CHF million)  
Asset carrying value amount under regulatory scope of consolidation 433,679 250,957 3 30,110 282,670 3
Liabilities carrying value amount under regulatory scope of consolidation 401 135,017 3 0 207,860 3
Total net amount under regulatory scope of consolidation 433,278 115,940 30,110 74,810 3
Off-balance sheet amounts 65,796 0 29,269 0
Differences due to consideration of valuation adjustments and provisions 556 0 82 0
Derivatives: Differences due to application of internal models (IMM) and SA-CCR 0 34,204 0 0
SFT: Differences due to the application of internal models (VaR) 0 (60,778) 0 0
Other differences not classified above (2,668) 4,065 (2,717) 0
Exposure amounts considered for regulatory purposes  496,962 93,431 56,744 2
The funded portion of the default funds for clearing houses are recorded as a brokerage receivable in accounting. For these positions there is no exposure amount considered for regulatory purposes.
1
Counterparty credit risk includes client cleared exposures, whereas such agency exposures are not reported in the financial statements. Additionally, the column counterparty credit risk and the column market risk take into account the impact of collateral pledges received in SFTs.
2
The concept of “exposure amounts considered for regulatory purposes” is not applicable for market risk as for example for the VaR model.
3
Prior period has been revised.
> Refer to “Comparison of the standardized and internal model approaches” (pages 19 to 23) in Credit risk – Credit risk under the standardized approach for further information on the origins of differences between carrying values and amounts considered for regulatory purposes shown in the table above.
10

Valuation process
The Basel capital adequacy framework and the Swiss regulation provide guidance for systems and controls, valuation methodologies and valuation adjustments and reserves to provide prudent and reliable valuation estimates.
Financial instruments in the trading book are carried at fair value. The fair value of the majority of these financial instruments is marked to market based on quoted prices in active markets or observable inputs. Additionally, the Group holds financial instruments which are marked to models where the determination of fair values requires subjective assessment and varying degrees of judgment depending on liquidity, pricing assumptions, the current economic and competitive environment and the risks affecting the specific instrument.
Control processes are applied to ensure that the reported fair values of the financial instruments, including those derived from pricing models, are appropriate and determined on a reasonable basis. These control processes include approval of new instruments, timely review of profit and loss, risk monitoring, price verification procedures and validation of models used to estimate the fair value. These functions are managed by senior management and personnel with relevant expertise, independent of the trading and investment functions.
In particular, the price verification function is performed by Product Control, independent from the trading and investment functions, reporting directly to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), a member of the Executive Board.
The valuation process is governed by separate policies and procedures. To arrive at fair values, the following type of valuation adjustments are typically considered and regularly assessed for appropriateness: model, parameter, credit and exit-risk-related adjustments.
Management believes it complies with the relevant valuation guidance and that the estimates and assumptions used in valuation of financial instruments are prudent, reasonable and consistently applied.
> Refer to “Fair valuations” (page 69) in II – Operating and financial review – Credit Suisse – Other information, to “Fair value” (page 105) in II – Operating and financial review – Critical accounting estimates and to “Note 36 – Financial instruments” (pages 383 to 409) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on fair value measurement.
11

Credit risk
General
This section covers credit risk as defined by the Basel framework. CCR, including those that are in the banking book for regulatory purposes, and all positions subject to the securitization framework are presented in separate sections.
> Refer to “Counterparty credit risk” (pages 44 to 53) for further information on the capital requirements relating to counterparty credit risk.
> Refer to “Securitization” (pages 54 to 61) for further information on the securitization framework.
The Basel framework permits banks to choose between two broad methodologies in calculating their capital requirements for credit risk: the standardized approach (SA) or the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach. Off-balance-sheet items are converted into credit exposure equivalents through the use of credit conversion factors (CCF).
The reported credit risk arises from the execution of the Group’s business strategy through the divisions and is predominantly driven by cash and balances with central banks, loans and commitments provided to corporate and institutional clients, loans to private clients including residential mortgages and lending against financial collateral.
Risk management objectives and policies for credit risk
> Refer to “Credit risk” (pages 151 to 154) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk coverage and management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for information on risk management objectives and policies for credit risk, including our credit risk profile, the setting of credit risk limits, the structure and organization of credit risk management.
Credit risk reporting
Credit risk is subject to daily monitoring and reporting, and is governed by internal policies & procedures and a framework of limits and controls. The Group’s credit risk exposure is subject to formal monthly reporting through the Group Risk Report which provides summary information in relation to the credit risk portfolio composition, rating profile, and the largest single name loans and commitments. The Group Risk Report also provides qualitative commentary on key credit risk matters and developments, and is discussed at Board of Directors Risk Committee and distributed to the Board of Directors and Executive Board members.
Credit quality of assets
The amounts shown in the following tables are the US GAAP carrying values according to the regulatory scope of consolidation that are subject to the credit risk framework.
The following tables present a breakdown of exposures by geographical areas, industry and residual maturity.
CRB - Geographic concentration of gross credit exposures

end of

Switzerland

Americas
Asia
Pacific

EMEA

Total
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Loans and debt securities 222,872 69,927 39,977 122,844 455,620
Off-balance sheet exposures 1 18,444 41,595 5,696 27,913 93,648
Total  241,316 111,522 45,673 150,757 549,268
4Q20 (CHF million)  
Loans and debt securities 225,614 55,529 39,504 107,178 427,825
Off-balance sheet exposures 1 16,154 45,995 5,005 28,534 95,688
Total  241,768 101,524 44,509 135,712 523,513
The geographic distribution is based on the domicile of the counterparty, shown pre-substitution.
1
Revocable loan commitments, which are excluded from the disclosed exposures, can attract risk-weighted assets.
12

CRB - Industry concentration of gross credit exposures

end of
Financial
institutions
1
Commercial

Consumer
Public
authorities

Total
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Loans and debt securities 228,794 79,468 142,656 4,702 455,620
Off-balance sheet exposures 2 32,794 57,391 1,701 1,762 93,648
Total  261,588 136,859 144,357 6,464 549,268
4Q20 (CHF million)  
Loans and debt securities 200,311 84,318 138,984 4,212 427,825
Off-balance sheet exposures 2 27,839 65,921 843 1,085 95,688
Total  228,150 150,239 139,827 5,297 523,513
Exposures are shown pre-substitution.
1
Includes exposures to central banks of CHF 155.0 billion and CHF 125.2 billion as of the end of 4Q21 and 4Q20, respectively.
2
Revocable loan commitments, which are excluded from the disclosed exposures, can attract risk-weighted assets.
CRB - Remaining contractual maturity of gross credit exposures

end of
within
1 year
1 within
1-5 years

Thereafter

Total
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Loans and debt securities 221,907 174,971 58,742 455,620
Off-balance sheet exposures 2 36,388 48,791 8,469 93,648
Total  258,295 223,762 67,211 549,268
4Q20 (CHF million)  
Loans and debt securities 188,838 179,972 59,015 427,825
Off-balance sheet exposures 2 33,267 55,057 7,364 95,688
Total  222,105 235,029 66,379 523,513
1
Includes positions without agreed residual contractual maturity.
2
Revocable loan commitments, which are excluded from the disclosed exposures, can attract risk-weighted assets.
13

The following tables show the amounts of impaired exposures and related allowances and write-offs, broken down by geographical areas and industry.
CRB - Geographic concentration of allowances, impaired loans and write-offs

end of


Allowances
individually
evaluated


Allowances
collectively
evaluated



Total
allowances

Impaired
loans with
specific
allowances
Impaired
loans
without
specific
allowances


Total
impaired
loans


Gross
write-
offs
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Switzerland 472 319 791 1,090 300 1,390 252
EMEA 31 52 83 339 129 468 22
Americas 4,218 108 4,326 268 19 287 25
Asia Pacific 216 32 248 624 0 624 0
Total  4,937 511 5,448 2,321 448 2,769 299
4Q20 (CHF million)  
Switzerland 572 402 974 1,251 316 1,567 184
EMEA 46 63 109 320 173 493 13
Americas 101 167 268 465 0 465 94
Asia Pacific 147 40 187 675 0 675 39
Total  866 672 1,538 2,711 489 3,200 330
CRB - Industry concentration of allowances, impaired loans and write-offs

end of


Allowances
individually
evaluated


Allowances
collectively
evaluated



Total
allowances

Impaired
loans with
specific
allowances
Impaired
loans
without
specific
allowances


Total
impaired
loans


Gross
write-
offs
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Financial institutions 4,187 65 4,252 42 44 86 0
Commercial 473 360 833 1,396 193 1,589 242
Consumer 273 84 357 873 202 1,075 57
Public authorities 4 2 6 10 9 19 0
Total  4,937 511 5,448 2,321 448 2,769 299
4Q20 (CHF million)  
Financial institutions 36 70 106 91 24 115 0
Commercial 600 509 1,109 1,841 326 2,167 238
Consumer 230 90 320 779 129 908 92
Public authorities 0 3 3 0 10 10 0
Total  866 672 1,538 2,711 489 3,200 330
14

The following table presents a comprehensive picture of the credit quality of the Group’s on and off-balance sheet assets.
CR1 – Credit quality of assets
      of which CECL-related
provisions on SA exposures

end of

Defaulted
exposures
Non-
defaulted
exposures

Gross
exposures

Allowances/
impairments
Regulatory
category
– specific
Regulatory
category
– general
of which CECL-
related provisions
on IRB exposures

Net
exposures
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Loans 1 7,965 437,722 445,687 (5,334) (45) 0 (468) 440,353
Debt securities 17 9,916 9,933 0 0 0 0 9,933
Off-balance sheet exposures 2 391 93,257 93,648 (211) (13) 0 (189) 93,437
Total  8,373 540,895 549,268 (5,545) (58) 0 (657) 543,723
2Q21 (CHF million)  
Loans 1 8,408 429,911 438,319 (5,684) (31) 0 (422) 432,635
Debt securities 22 8,824 8,846 0 0 0 0 8,846
Off-balance sheet exposures 2 389 101,840 102,229 (212) (12) 0 (188) 102,017
Total  8,819 540,575 549,394 (5,896) (43) 0 (610) 543,498
1
Loans include all on-balance sheet exposures that give rise to a credit risk charge and are not limited to exposures that are recognized as net loans under US GAAP. Loans exclude debt securities, derivatives, securities financing transactions and off-balance sheet exposures.
2
Revocable loan commitments, which are excluded from the disclosed exposures, can attract risk-weighted assets.
The definitions of “past due” and “impaired” are aligned between accounting and regulatory purposes. However, there are some exemptions for impaired positions related to troubled debt restructurings where the default definition is different for accounting and regulatory purposes.
> Refer to “Note 1 – Summary of significant accounting policies – Loans” (pages 296 to 297) and “Note 20 – Financial instruments measured at amortized cost and credit losses” (pages 315 to 327) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on the CECL model under US GAAP, the classification of CECL-related provisions and the credit quality of loans, including past due and impaired loans.
The following table presents the changes in the Group’s defaulted loans, debt securities and off-balance sheet exposures, the flows between non-defaulted and defaulted exposure categories and reductions in the defaulted exposures due to write-offs.
CR2 – Changes in defaulted exposures
2H21
CHF million  
Defaulted exposures at beginning of period  8,819
Exposures that have defaulted since the last reporting period 523
Returned to non-defaulted status (204)
Amounts written-off (159)
Other changes (606)
Defaulted exposures at end of period  8,373
15

The following table shows the aging analysis of accounting past-due exposures.
CRB - Aging analysis of accounting past-due exposures 
   Current Past due

end of

Up to
30 days
31–60
days
61–90
days
More than
90 days

Total

Total
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Financial institutions 20,815 61 7 1 41 110 20,925
Commercial 93,009 167 18 12 797 994 94,003
Consumer 165,734 350 148 107 713 1,318 167,052
Public authorities 1,253 16 0 0 19 35 1,288
Gross loans held at amortized cost  280,811 594 173 120 1,570 2,457 283,268
Gross loans held at fair value 10,243
Gross loans  293,511
4Q20 (CHF million)  
Financial institutions 14,315 42 15 72 46 175 14,490
Commercial 97,161 684 57 148 759 1,648 98,809
Consumer 167,035 275 141 82 635 1,133 168,168
Public authorities 969 37 4 0 0 41 1,010
Gross loans held at amortized cost  279,480 1,038 217 302 1,440 2,997 282,477
Gross loans held at fair value 11,409
Gross loans  293,886
Troubled debt restructurings, also referred to as restructured loans, are considered impaired credit exposures in line with the Group’s policies and subject to individual assessment and provisioning for expected credit losses by the Group’s recovery functions. Restructured loans that defaulted again within 12 months from the last restructuring remain impaired or are impaired if they were considered non-impaired at the time of the subsequent default. As of December 31, 2021, CHF 465 million were reported as restructured loans.
> Refer to “Note 20 – Financial instruments measured at amortized cost and credit losses” (pages 326 to 327) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on restructured exposure.
Credit risk mitigation
Credit Suisse actively mitigates credit exposure through the use of legal netting agreements, security over supporting financial and non-financial collateral or financial guarantees and through the use of credit hedging techniques, primarily credit default swaps (CDS). The recognition of credit risk mitigation (CRM) against exposures is governed by a robust set of policies and processes that ensure enforceability and effectiveness.
Netting
> Refer to “Derivative instruments” (pages 171 to 173) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk portfolio analysis and to “Note 1 – Summary of significant accounting policies – Derivatives” (pages 294 to 295) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for information on policies and procedures for on- and off-balance sheet netting.
> Refer to “Note 28 – Offsetting of financial assets and financial liabilities” (pages 338 to 341) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on the offsetting of derivatives, reverse repurchase and repurchase agreements, and securities lending and borrowing transactions.
Collateral valuation and management
The policies and processes for collateral valuation and management are driven by:
a legal document framework that is bilaterally agreed with our clients;
a collateral management risk framework enforcing transparency through self-assessment and management reporting; and
any prevailing regulatory terms which must be complied with.
For exposures collateralized by financial collateral (e.g. marketable securities), collateral valuations are performed on a daily basis and any requirement for additional collateral (e.g. frequency and process for margin calls) is governed by the legal documentation. The market prices used for daily collateral valuation are a combination of internal pricing sources, as well as market prices sourced from trading platforms and external service providers where appropriate.
For exposures collateralized by non-financial collateral (e.g. real estate, ships, aircraft), valuations are performed at the time of credit approval and periodically thereafter depending on the type of collateral and the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in accordance with documented internal policies and controls. Valuations are based on a combination of internal and external reference price sources.
16

Primary types of collateral
The primary types of collateral are described below.
Collateral securing foreign exchange transactions and over-the-counter (OTC) trading activities primarily includes:
Cash and US Treasury instruments;
G-10 government securities; and
Other assets that are eligible as per the uncleared margin rules (including supranationals and equities).
Collateral securing loan transactions primarily includes:
Financial collateral pledged against loans collateralized by securities of clients of the private, corporate and institutional banking businesses (primarily cash, marketable securities and unlisted securities);
Real estate property for mortgages, mainly residential, but also multi-family buildings, offices and commercial properties; and
Other types of lending collateral, such as accounts receivable, inventory, plant and equipment.
Concentrations within risk mitigation
Credit Suisse, primarily through its Investment Bank division, is an active participant in the credit derivatives market and trades with a variety of market participants, principally commercial and investment banks. Credit derivatives are primarily used to mitigate investment grade credit exposures. Where required or practicable, these trades are cleared through central counterparties (CCP), reducing the potential risk against individual CRM providers.
As a result of a strong domestic franchise, Credit Suisse has a significant volume of residential mortgage lending in Switzerland and a resultant concentration of residential real estate collateral. Credit Suisse has clear underwriting standards with regard to mortgage lending and ensures that the composition of the real estate portfolio is subject to ongoing monitoring, periodic revaluation, and assessment of the geographical and borrower composition of the portfolio.
Credit Suisse provides loan facilities to private clients against financial collateral such as cash and marketable securities (e.g. equities, bonds, or funds). The financial collateral portfolio within risk mitigation is generally diversified and the portfolio is subject to ongoing monitoring and reporting to identify any concentrations, which may result in lower LTV ratios or other mitigating actions.
> Refer to “Credit risk” (pages 166 to 176) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk portfolio analysis in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on credit derivatives, including a breakdown by rating class.
CRM techniques – overview
The following table presents the use of CRM techniques. Credit Suisse recognizes the CRM effect of eligible collateral either as a reduction from the exposure at default (EAD) value of the secured instrument or as an adjustment to the probability of default (PD) or loss given default (LGD) associated with the exposure. All exposures that are secured through eligible collateral are disclosed as “Net exposures partially or fully secured”. Eligible collateral amounts, regardless of which CRM technique has been applied, are disclosed as “Exposures secured by collateral”. Exposures secured by credit derivatives do not include certain immaterial positions, where the credit derivative is recognized with an adjustment to the LGD.
CR3 – CRM techniques
   Net exposures Exposures secured by

end of


Unsecured
Partially
or fully
secured


Total


Collateral

Financial
guarantees

Credit
derivatives
4Q21 (CHF million)    
Loans 1 208,561 231,792 440,353 193,549 6,970 0
Debt securities 9,622 311 9,933 274 0 0
Total  218,183 232,103 450,286 193,823 6,970 0
   of which defaulted  1,612 1,550 3,162 1,355 143 0
2Q21 (CHF million)  
Loans 1 194,165 238,470 432,635 197,437 7,364 6
Debt securities 8,477 369 8,846 272 46 0
Total  202,642 238,839 441,481 197,709 7,410 6
   of which defaulted  1,379 1,820 3,199 1,605 119 0
1
Loans include all on-balance sheet exposures that give rise to a credit risk charge and are not limited to exposures that are recognized as net loans under US GAAP. Loans exclude debt securities, derivatives, securities financing transactions and off-balance sheet exposures.
17

Credit risk under the standardized approach
General
Under the standardized approach, risk weights are determined according to credit ratings provided by recognized external credit assessment institutions (ECAI) or by using the applicable regulatory risk weights for unrated exposures. Credit Suisse is using credit ratings provided by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings for calculating risk-weighted assets associated with exposures classified as sovereigns, banks and securities dealer, other institutions and corporates. Only issuer rating are applied to calculate risk-weighted assets.
Credit risk exposure and CRM effects
The following table presents the effect of CRM (comprehensive and simple approach) on the standardized approach capital requirements’ calculations. RWA density provides a synthetic metric on the riskiness of each portfolio.
CR4 – Credit risk exposure and CRM effects
   Exposures pre-CCF and CRM Exposures post-CCF and CRM

end of
On-balance
sheet
Off-balance
sheet

Total
On-balance
sheet
Off-balance
sheet

Total

RWA
RWA
density
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Sovereigns 90,453 238 90,691 89,959 82 90,041 190 0%
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer 3,002 761 3,763 2,741 382 3,123 1,108 35%
Institutions - Other institutions 497 2,020 2,517 497 221 718 498 69%
Corporates 7,742 9,579 17,321 7,053 2,519 9,572 8,465 88%
Retail 2,758 1,381 4,139 2,494 363 2,857 2,413 84%
Other exposures 13,996 1,109 15,105 13,740 1,086 14,826 12,917 87%
   of which non-counterparty related assets  7,317 0 7,317 7,317 0 7,317 7,317 100%
Total  118,448 15,088 133,536 116,484 4,653 121,137 25,591 21%
2Q21 (CHF million)  
Sovereigns 81,589 155 81,744 82,294 86 82,380 87 0%
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer 2,801 754 3,555 2,801 357 3,158 943 30%
Institutions - Other institutions 1,290 2,091 3,381 585 239 824 561 68%
Corporates 8,661 11,221 19,882 7,757 2,801 10,558 9,181 87%
Retail 2,376 1,285 3,661 2,107 339 2,446 2,091 85%
Other exposures 15,371 1,111 16,482 15,119 1,086 16,205 14,142 87%
   of which non-counterparty related assets  7,337 0 7,337 7,337 0 7,337 7,337 100%
Total  112,088 16,617 128,705 110,663 4,908 115,571 27,005 23%
Exposures by asset class and risk weight
The following table presents the breakdown of credit exposures by asset class and risk weight, which corresponds to the riskiness attributed to the exposure according to the standardized approach.
18

CR5 – Exposures by asset class and risk weight
   Risk weight

end of


0%


20%


35%


50%


75%


100%


150%


Others
Exposures
post-CCF
and CRM
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Sovereigns 89,801 51 0 19 0 170 0 0 90,041
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer 0 2,071 0 719 0 328 5 0 3,123
Institutions - Other institutions 0 0 0 440 0 278 0 0 718
Corporates 0 966 27 1,050 1 7,110 418 0 9,572
Retail 0 0 115 0 1,694 940 108 0 2,857
Other exposures 2,013 0 0 0 0 12,804 0 9 14,826
   of which non-counterparty related assets  0 0 0 0 0 7,317 0 0 7,317
Total  91,814 3,088 142 2,228 1,695 21,630 531 9 121,137
   of which secured by real estate  0 0 142 0 3 270 0 0 415
   of which past due  0 0 0 0 0 384 99 0 483
2Q21 (CHF million)  
Sovereigns 82,238 55 0 22 0 65 0 0 82,380
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer 0 2,322 0 718 0 113 5 0 3,158
Institutions - Other institutions 0 0 0 525 0 299 0 0 824
Corporates 0 1,306 26 997 1 7,864 364 0 10,558
Retail 0 0 148 0 1,107 1,154 37 0 2,446
Other exposures 2,165 0 0 0 0 14,031 0 9 16,205
   of which non-counterparty related assets  0 0 0 0 0 7,337 0 0 7,337
Total  84,403 3,683 174 2,262 1,108 23,526 406 9 115,571
   of which secured by real estate  0 0 174 0 3 662 0 0 839
   of which past due  0 0 0 0 0 502 92 0 594
Comparison of the standardized and internal model approaches
Background
We have regulatory approval to use a number of internal models for calculating our Pillar 1 capital charge for credit risk (default risk). These include the advanced-internal ratings-based (A-IRB) approach for risk weights, Internal Models Method (IMM) for derivatives credit exposure, and repo VaR for SFTs. These modelled based approaches are used for the majority of credit risk exposures, with the standardized approaches used for only a relatively small proportion of credit exposures.
Regulators and investors are interested in the differences between capital requirements under modelled and standardized approaches. This is due, in part, to ongoing and future regulatory changes by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), such as the new standardized approaches for counterparty credit risk (SA-CCR) and credit risk as well as the future restrictions on the use of internal models for certain portfolios. As such, FINMA requires us to disclose information on differences between credit risk RWA computed under internal modelled approaches, and current standardized approaches. FINMA also requires us to disclose the differences between the EAD based on internal modelled approaches and the EAD used in the leverage ratio.
Key methodological differences
The differences between credit risk RWA calculated under the internal modelled approaches and the standardized approaches are driven by the risk weights applied to counterparties and the calculations used for measuring EAD.
Risk weights: Under the A-IRB approach, the maturity of a transaction, and internal estimates of the PD and downturn LGD are used as inputs to the Basel risk-weight formula for calculating RWA. In the standardized approach, risk weights are less granular and are driven by ratings provided by ECAI.
EAD calculations: Under the IMM and repo VaR methods, counterparty exposure is computed using monte-carlo simulation models or VaR models. These models allow for the recognition of netting impacts at exposure and collateral levels for each counterparty portfolio. The standardized approach is based on market values at the balance sheet date plus conservative add-ons to account for potential market movements. This approach gives very limited recognition to netting benefits and portfolio effects.
19

The following table provides a summary of the key conceptual differences between the internal models approach and the current standardized approach.
Key differences between the standardized approach and the internal model approach
Standardized approach Internal model approach Key impact
EAD for
derivatives    
SA-CCR is calculated as the replacement costs
plus regulatory add-ons that take into account
potential future market moves at predetermined
fixed rates.
Internal Models Method (IMM)
allows Monte-Carlo simulation to
estimate exposure.
For large diversified derivatives portfolios,
standardized EAD is higher than model EAD.

Differentiates add-ons by five exposure
types and three maturity buckets only.
Application of multiplier on IMM exposure
estimate.

Limited ability to net.
Variability in holding period applied to collateralized
transactions, reflecting liquidity risks.

Risk
weighting   
Reliance on ECAIs: where no rating is
available a 100% risk weight is applied (i.e. for
most small and medium-size enterprises and funds).
Reliance on internal ratings where each
counterparty/transaction receives a rating.
Model approach produces lower RWA
for high-quality short-term transactions.
Crude risk weight differentiation with 4 key weights:
20%, 50%, 100%, 150% (and 0% for AAA
sovereigns; 35%, 75% or 100% for mortgages;
75% or 100% for retail).
Granular risk sensitive risk weights differentiation
via individual PDs and LGDs.

Standardized approach produces lower RWA
for non-investment grade and long-term
transactions.
No differentiation for transaction features.
LGD captures transaction quality features
incl. collateralization.
Impact relevant across all asset classes.
Application of a 1.06 scaling factor.
Risk
mitigation   
Limited recognition of risk mitigation.

Risk mitigation recognized via
risk sensitive LGD or EAD.
Standardized approach RWA
higher than model approach RWA
for most collaterals.
Restricted list of eligible collateral.
Wider variety of collateral types eligible.
Impact particularly relevant for lombard
lending and SFTs.
Conservative and crude regulatory haircuts.


Repo VaR allows use of VaR models to
estimate exposure and collateral for SFTs.
Approach permits full diversification
and netting across all collateral types.



Maturity
in risk
weight   
No differentiation for maturity of transactions,
except for interbank exposures in a coarse
manner.
No internal modelling of maturity.

Model approach produces lower RWA
for high-quality short-term transactions.



Regulatory RWA function considers
maturity: the longer the maturity
the higher the risk weight
(see chart "Risk weight by maturity").



The following chart shows standardized risk weights, and model based (A-IRB) risk weights for loans of varying maturity. The graphs are plotted for a AA-rated corporate senior unsecured loan with a LGD of 45% (consistent with Foundation-IRB, F-IRB), and a AA-rated corporate senior secured loan with a LGD of 36%. The graphs show that standardized risk weights are not sensitive to maturity, whereas A-IRB risk weights are sensitive to maturity. In particular, under A-IRB, lower maturity loans receive lower risk weights reflecting an increased likelihood of repayment for loans with a shorter maturity.
20

Key methodological differences between internally modelled EAD and EAD used in leverage ratio
The exposure measure used in the leverage ratio also differs from the exposure measure used in the internal modelled approach. The main methodological difference is that leverage ratio exposure estimates do not take into account physical or financial collateral, guarantees or other CRM techniques to reduce the credit risk. Leverage ratio exposures also do not fully reflect netting and portfolio diversification. As a result, leverage ratio exposures are typically larger than model based exposures.
The following table shows the internal model-based EAD, along with average risk weight, compared to an estimate of the exposure measure used in the leverage ratio calculation. Estimates are provided at Basel asset class level. As expected, leverage exposure measures exceed internal model-based EAD for banks and corporates where the impacts of netting, diversification and CRM are large.
Leverage exposure estimate
   Internal model approach

EAD
Risk
weight
Leverage
exposures
1
Basel asset class (CHF billion, except where indicated)  
Corporates 144 50% 274
Banks 27 25% 55
Sovereigns 72 2% 69
Retail 200 16% 200
1
The leverage exposure estimates only consider those exposures which are comparable to the credit risk RWA calculation under internal model approach and hence excludes exposures such as trading book, securitization and non-credit exposures. Asset class leverage ratio based exposures are approximate and provided on a best efforts basis.
It should be noted that credit risk capital requirements based on the internal model based approach are not directly comparable to capital requirements under the leverage ratio. The reason for this is that the 3% leverage ratio capital requirement can be met with total tier 1 capital, including capital for market risk and operational risk.
Risk-weighted assets under the standardized and internal model approaches
Credit risk RWA computed under the standardized approach are higher than those based on the internal models for which we have received regulatory approval. Higher risk-weights under the standardized approach rules are a material driver of the higher RWA for all Basel asset classes. The standardized exposure calculations also lead to some higher RWA, with the corporate and bank asset classes being most significantly affected.
Corporate asset class
The table “Leverage exposure estimate” shows that the EAD for corporates computed under the internal model approach is CHF 144 billion. The EAD for corporates under the standardized approach is significantly higher. This difference is driven mainly by the standardized exposure calculations for OTC derivatives and secured financing transactions. For these products, exposures calculated under the standardized approach are higher than the model based exposures because the standardized approach does not fully recognize the benefits of netting, portfolio diversification and collateral. The exposure calculated under the leverage ratio is higher than the EAD computed using internal models. This is because CRM, netting and portfolio diversification are not reflected in the leverage ratio exposure calculation.
Another significant driver of the increase in credit risk RWA under the standardized approach is higher risk weights. The exposure weighted-average risk weight under the internal model approach is 50%. This is significantly lower than the risk weights assigned to corporates under the standardized approach.
The following graph shows the risk weights assigned to counterparties under the A-IRB approach and the standardized approach. For the IRB risk weight curve, an LGD value of 45% and a maturity adjustment of 2.5 years are chosen, as these are the Basel Foundation IRB parameters. For counterparties in the AAA to BB+ range (based on external ratings), higher risk weights (20%, 50% and 100%) are assigned under the standardized approach than under the A-IRB approach. For the corporate asset class, approximately three-quarters of the Group’s exposures are in this range (based on internal ratings), and this is a key driver for the higher RWA under the standardized approach. The different treatments of loan maturity in the model based approach and standardized approach are not a material cause of RWA differences.
The Group’s exposure weighted-average maturity of its corporate portfolio is lower than the foundation IRB value of 2.5 years, and lower maturities would result in a lower model-based risk weight curve than shown in the graph. In addition, the PD for each rating shown in the graph are consistent with the Group’s PD masterscale.
21

An additional driver of higher risk weights within the corporate asset class are counterparties without an external rating. Under the standardized approach, counterparties without an external rating receive a fixed risk weight of 100%. This applies to a large proportion of the Group’s exposures, among them non-banking financial institutions and specialized lending.
> Refer to “CR6 – Credit exposures by portfolio and PD range” (pages 28 to 35) for further information on EAD and risk weights for each credit rating for the corporate asset class.
Bank asset class
The table “Leverage exposure estimate” shows that the EAD for banks under the internal model approach is CHF 27 billion. The EAD for banks calculated under the standardized approach is significantly higher. This is driven predominantly by the exposure calculations for both OTC derivatives and secured financing transactions and, to a lesser extent, the exposure calculations for listed and centrally cleared derivatives. For these products, exposures calculated under the standardized approach are much higher than the model based exposures because the standardized approach does not fully recognize the benefits of netting, portfolio diversification and collateral. The exposures calculated under the leverage ratio are significantly higher than the EAD computed using internal models. This is because CRM, netting and portfolio diversification are not reflected in the leverage ratio exposure calculation.
In addition, there is a significant increase in credit risk RWA under the standardized approach due to higher credit risk-weights. The exposure weighted-average risk-weight under the internal model approach is 25%. This is significantly lower than the risk weights assigned to banks under the standardized approach where a significant amount of the Group’s exposures would attract a risk weight of 50%.
The following graph shows the risk weights assigned to counterparties under the A-IRB approach and the standardized approach. For the IRB risk weight curve, an LGD value of 45% and a maturity adjustment of 2.5 years are chosen, as these are the Basel Foundation IRB parameters. The graph shows that counterparties in the AAA to BBB+ range (based on external ratings) attract higher risk weights (20% and 50%) under the standardized approach than under the A-IRB approach. In excess of three-quarters of the Group’s exposures fall in this range (based on internal ratings) and this leads to higher RWA under the standardized approach for these counterparties. The different treatments of loan maturity in the model based approach and standardized approach are not a material cause of RWA differences.
> Refer to “CR6 – Credit exposures by portfolio and PD range” (pages 28 to 35) for further information on EAD and risk weights for each credit rating for the bank asset class.
The Group’s exposure weighted-average maturity of its bank portfolio is lower than the foundation IRB value of 2.5 years, and lower maturities would result in a lower model based risk weight curve than shown in the graph. In addition, the PD for each rating shown in the graph are consistent with the Group’s PD masterscale.
Sovereign asset class
The table “Leverage exposure estimate” shows that the EAD for sovereigns under the internal model approach is CHF 72 billion. This is comparable to the EAD calculated under the standardized approach and the leverage ratio exposure. This is because the majority of the sovereign exposure is in the form of uncollateralized loans, i.e. there are no material differences in the exposure calculation.
The impact of employing standardized credit risk weights to the sovereign portfolio is an overall increase in credit risk RWA. The exposure weighted-average risk weight under the internal model approach is less than 3%. This is lower than the risk weights assigned to counterparties under the standardized approach.
The following graph shows the risk weights assigned to counterparties under the A-IRB approach and the standardized approach. For the IRB risk weight curve, an LGD value of 45% and a maturity adjustment of 2.5 years are chosen, as these are the Basel Foundation IRB parameters. The graph shows that counterparties in the AAA to A range (based on external ratings) would attract lower risk weights (0% and 20%) under the standardized approach than under the A-IRB approach. The majority of the Group’s exposures have extremely low risk-weights under the A-IRB approach and would attract risk weights of 0% under the standardized approach. The remaining exposures would receive higher risk weights under the standardized approach (20%, 50% or 100%) than under the A-IRB approach. Overall, this would lead to higher RWA under the standardized approach. The different treatments of loan maturity in the model based approach and standardized approach are not a material cause of RWA differences.
> Refer to “CR6 – Credit exposures by portfolio and PD range” (pages 28 to 35) for further information on EAD and risk weights for each credit rating for the sovereign asset class.
22

The Group’s exposure weighted-average maturity of its sovereign portfolio is lower than the foundation IRB value of 2.5 years, and lower maturities would result in a lower model-based risk weight curve than shown in the following graph. In addition, the PD for each rating shown in the graph are consistent with the Group’s PD masterscale.
Retail asset class
The EAD of the retail asset class under the internal model approach is CHF 200 billion, which is comparable to the EAD calculated under the standardized approach and the leverage ratio. This is because the majority of retail exposure is on-balance sheet exposure.
The application of the standardized approach would lead to higher credit risk RWA. The exposure weighted-average risk weight is 16% using internal model approach. This is lower than the risk weights assigned to counterparties under the standardized approach. The maturity of the loan has no impact on the modelled risk weights in the retail asset class.
The retail portfolio consists mainly of residential mortgage loans, lombard lending and other retail exposures, and further analysis for each of these portfolios is provided below:
Residential mortgages: Under the standardized approach, fixed risk weights are applied depending on the LTV, i.e. risk weight of 100% for LTV > 80%, risk weight of 75% for 80% > LTV > 67% and risk weight of 35% for LTV < 67%. The internal model-based approach however takes into account borrowers’ ability to service debt more accurately, including mortgage affordability and calibration to large amounts of historic data. The Group’s residential mortgage portfolio is focused on the Swiss market and the Group has robust review processes over borrowers’ ability to repay. This results in the Group’s residential mortgage portfolio having a low average LTV and results in an average risk weight of 17% under the A-IRB approach.
Lombard lending: For lombard lending, the average risk weight using internal models is 12%. RWA under the standardized approach would be higher for these exposures.
Other retail exposures: Other retail exposures are risk-weighted at 75% or 100% under the standardized approach. This yields higher RWA compared to the A-IRB approach where the average risk-weight is 35%.
Conclusion
Overall, the Group’s credit risk RWA would be significantly higher under the standardized approach than under the internal model based approach. For most Basel asset classes, this is due to standardized risk weights being much higher than the IRB risk weights for high quality investment grade lending, which is where the majority of the Group’s exposures are. For certain asset classes, standardized exposure calculations also lead to significantly higher RWA. This is where the standardized exposure methods give limited recognition to economic offsetting and diversification for derivatives and SFTs at a portfolio level.
The credit risk RWA under the standardized approaches described above is not reflective of the capital charges under the new standardized approach for credit risk on which the BCBS published new rules in December 2017. This new standardized approach for credit risk is more risk sensitive and employs a different approach for incorporating external ratings. This regulatory change could potentially lead to very different results to the ones described above.
The credit risk RWA computed under the internal model-based approach provide a more risk-sensitive indication of the credit risk capital requirements and are more reflective of the economic risk of the Group. The use of models produces a strong link between capital requirements and business drivers, and promotes a proactive risk culture at the origination of a transaction and strong capital consciousness within the organization. A rigorous monitoring and control framework also ensures compliance with internal as well as regulatory standards.
23

Credit risk under internal ratings-based approaches
General
Under the IRB approach, risk weights are determined by using internal risk parameters and applying an asset value correlation multiplier uplift where exposures are to financial institutions meeting regulatory defined criteria. We have received approval from FINMA to use, and have fully implemented, the A-IRB approach whereby we provide our own estimates for PD, LGD and EAD.
PD parameters capture the risk of a counterparty defaulting over a one-year time horizon. PD estimates are mainly derived from models tailored to the specific business of the respective obligor. The models are calibrated to the long run average of annual internal or external default rates where applicable. For portfolios with a small number of empirical defaults, low default portfolio techniques are used.
LGD parameters consider seniority, collateral, counterparty industry and in certain cases fair value markdowns. LGD estimates are mainly based on an empirical analysis of historical loss rates. To reflect time value of money, recovered amounts on defaulted obligations are discounted to the time of default and to account for potential adverse outcomes in a downturn environment, final parameters are chosen such as they reflect periods where economic downturns have been observed and/or where increased losses manifested. For portfolios with limited empirical data available conservative values are chosen based on proxy analysis and expert judgement. For much of the private, corporate and institutional banking businesses loan portfolio, the LGD is primarily dependent upon the type and amount of collateral pledged. The credit approval and collateral monitoring processes are based on LTV limits. For mortgages (residential or commercial), recovery rates are differentiated by type of property.
EAD for a non-defaulted facility is an estimate of the expected exposure upon default of the obligor. Estimates are derived based on a CCF approach using default-weighted averages of historical realized conversion factors on defaulted loans by facility type. Estimates are calibrated to capture negative operating environment effects. To comply with regulatory guidance in deriving individual observed CCF values as basis for the estimation are floored at zero, i.e. it is assumed that drawn exposure can never become lower in the run to default.
> Refer to “Credit risk” (pages 151 to 154) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk coverage and management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on PD and LGD.
Risk weights are calculated using either the PD/LGD approach or the supervisory risk weights approach for certain types of specialized lending.
Reporting related to credit risk models
> Refer to “Model validation” (pages 25 to 26), “Use of internal ratings” (page 27) and “Credit Risk Review” (page 27) for further information on the scope and main content of the reporting related to credit risk models.
Rating models
The majority of the credit rating models used in Credit Suisse are developed internally by Core Credit Models, a specialized unit within the Quantitative Analysis and Technology area in the risk organization. These models are independently validated by Model Risk Management team prior to use in the Basel III regulatory capital calculation, and thereafter on a regular basis. Credit Suisse also uses models purchased from recognized data and model providers (e.g. credit rating agencies). These models are owned by Core Credit Models and are validated internally following the same governance process as models developed internally.
All new or material changes to rating models are subject to a robust governance process. Post development and validation of a rating model or model change, the model is taken through a number of committees where model developers, validators and users of the models discuss the technical and regulatory aspects of the model. The relevant committees opine on the information provided and decide to either approve or reject the model or model change. The ultimate decision making committee is the Risk Processes & Standards Committee (RPSC). The responsible Executive Board Member for the RPSC is the Chief Risk Officer (CRO). The RPSC sub-group responsible for credit risk models is the Model Approval and Controls Committee (MACC). MACC also reviews and monitors the continued use of existing models on an annual basis.
The following table provides an overview of the main PD and LGD models used by Credit Suisse. It reflects the portfolio segmentation from a credit risk model point of view, showing the RWA, type and number of the most significant models, and the data history available for model development by portfolio. As the table follows an internal risk segmentation and captures the most significant models only, these figures do not match regulatory asset class or other A-IRB based segmentation.
Some of the portfolios shown in the table sum up multiple rating models. The distinction criteria determining which model applies, differs from portfolio to portfolio. Corporates, banks and non-banking financial institutions are split by turnover and geography. For funds, the distinction criteria is the different form of funds e.g. mutual-, hedge-funds etc., whereas for income producing real estate (IPRE), it is corporate vs. private counterparties.
24

CRE - Main PD and LGD models used by Credit Suisse
   PD    LGD   

Portfolio


Asset class
RWA (in
CHF billion)
as of 3Q21

Data
history

No. of
models


Model comment

No. of
models


Model comment
Statistical and hybrid models using e.g. industry and counterparty segmentation, collateral types and amounts, seniority and other transaction specific factors with granularity enhancements by public research and expert judgement
Corporates Corporates, retail 45 >15 years 2 Statistical scorecards using e.g. balance sheet, P&L data and qualitative factors 2
Banks and other financial institutions Banks, corporates 9 >30 years 5 Statistical scorecard and constrained expert judgement using e.g. balance sheet, P&L data and qualitative factors
Funds Corporates

10

>10 years

4

Statistical scorecards using e.g. net
asset value, volatility of returns and
qualitative factors


Statistical model using e.g. counterparty segmentation, collateral types and amounts
Residential mortgages & other wealth- management financing Retail, corporates 16 >15 years 2 Statistical scorecard using e.g. LTV, affordability, assets and qualitative factors 2
Income producing real estate Specialized lending, retail 19 >15 years 2 Statistical scorecards using e.g. LTV, debt service coverage and qualitative factors
Commodity
traders
Corporates,
specialized lending
2

>15 years

1

Statistical scorecard using e.g.
volume, liquidity and duration of
financed commodity transactions


Sovereign Sovereign,
corporates

2


>15 years


1


Statistical scorecards using e.g.
GDP, financials and qualitative
factors
1


Statistical models using e.g. industry
and counterparty segmentation,
seniority and other transaction
specific factors
Ship
finance
Specialized
lending

2


>15 years


1


Statistical scorecard using e.g.
freight rates, ship market values,
operational expenses and group
information
1


Statistical model using e.g. LTV
and counterparty attributes

Lombard,
Securities
Borrowing &
Lending
Retail,
corporates

12


>15 years


1


Merton type model using e.g.
LTV, collateral volatility and
counterparty attributes
1


Merton type model using e.g.
LTV, collateral volatility and
counterparty attributes
Model development
The techniques to develop models are carefully selected by Core Credit Models to meet industry standards in the banking industry as well as regulatory requirements. The models are developed to exhibit “through-the-cycle” characteristics, reflecting a PD in a 12 month period across the credit cycle.
All models have clearly defined model owners who have primary responsibility for development, enhancement, review, maintenance and documentation. The models have to pass statistical performance tests, where feasible, followed by usability tests by designated Credit Risk Management experts to proceed to formal approval and implementation. The development process of a new model is thoroughly documented and foresees a separate schedule for model updates.
The level of calibration of the models is based on a range of inputs, including internal and external benchmarks where available. Additionally, the calibration process ensures that the estimated calibration level accounts for variations of default rates through the economic cycle and that the underlying data contains a representative mix of economic states. Conservatism is incorporated in the model development process to compensate for any known or suspected limitations and uncertainties.
Model validation
Model validation for risk capital models is performed by the Model Risk Management function. Model governance is subject to clear and objective internal standards as outlined in the Model Risk Management policy and the Model Validation Policy. The governance framework ensures a consistent and meaningful approach for the validation of models in scope across the bank. All models whose outputs fall into the scope of the Basel internal model framework are subject to full independent validation. Externally developed models are subject to the same governance and validation standards as internal models.
The governance process requires each in scope model to be validated and approved before go-live; the same process is followed for material changes to an existing model. Existing models are subject to an ongoing governance process which requires each model to be periodically validated and the performance to be monitored annually. The validation process is a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment with goals that include:
to confirm that the model remains conceptually sound and the model design is suitable for its intended purpose;
to verify that the assumptions are still valid and weaknesses and limitations are known and mitigated;
to determine that the model outputs are accurate compared to realized outcome;
25

to establish whether the model is accepted by the users and used as intended with appropriate data governance;
to check whether a model is implemented correctly;
to ensure that the model is fully transparent and sufficiently documented.
To meet these goals, models are validated against a series of quantitative and qualitative criteria. Quantitative analyses may include a review of model performance (comparison of model output against realized outcome), calibration accuracy against the longest time series available, assessment of a model’s ability to rank order risk and performance against available benchmarks. Qualitative assessment typically includes a review of the appropriateness of the key model assumptions, the identification of the model limitations and their mitigation, and ensuring appropriate model use. The modeling approach is re-assessed in light of developments in the academic literature and industry practice.
Results and conclusions are presented to senior risk management and relevant committees; shortcomings and required improvements identified during validation must be remediated within an agreed deadline. The Model Risk Management function is independent of model developers and users and has the final say on the content of each validation report.
Model governance at Credit Suisse follows the “three lines of defense” principle. Model developers and owners provide the first line of defense, Model Risk Management the second line, and Internal Audit the third line of defense. Organization independence ensures that these functions are able to provide appropriate oversight. For Credit Risk models, the development and validation functions are independent up to the CRO (Executive Board level). Internal Audit has fully independent reporting into the Chair of the Board of Directors Audit Committee.
Stress testing of parameters
The potential biases in PD estimates in unusual market conditions are accounted for by the use of long run average estimates. For specific models, Credit Suisse additionally uses stress-testing when back-testing PD models. When predefined thresholds are breached during back-testing, a review of the calibration level is undertaken. For LGD/CCF calibration stress testing can be applied in defining Downturn LGD/CCF values, reflecting potentially increased losses during stressed periods.
Descriptions of the rating processes
All counterparties that Credit Suisse is exposed to are assigned an internal credit rating. The rating is assigned at the time of initial credit approval and subsequently reviewed and updated regularly. Where available, Credit Risk Management employs rating models relative to the counterparty type that incorporate qualitative and quantitative factors. Expert judgement may further be applied through a well governed model override process in the assignment of a credit rating or PD, which measures the counterparty’s risk of default over a one-year period.
Corporates (excluding corporates managed on the Swiss platform), banks and sovereigns (primarily in the investment banking businesses)
Where used, rating models are an integral part of the rating process. To ensure all relevant information is considered when rating a counterparty, experienced credit officers complement the outputs from the models with other relevant information not otherwise captured via a robust model-override framework. Other relevant information may include, but is not limited to peer analysis, industry comparisons, external ratings and research and the judgment of credit experts. This analysis emphasizes a forward looking approach, concentrating on economic trends and financial fundamentals.
For structured and asset finance deals, the approach is more quantitative. The focus is on the performance of the underlying assets, which represent the collateral of the deal. The ultimate rating is dependent upon the expected performance of the underlying assets and the level of credit enhancement of the specific transaction. Additionally, a review of the originator and/or servicer is performed. External ratings and research (rating agency and/or fixed income and equity), where available, are incorporated into the rating justification, as is any available market information (e.g., bond spreads, equity performance).
Transaction ratings are based on the analysis and evaluation of both quantitative and qualitative factors. The specific factors analyzed include seniority, industry and collateral.
Corporates managed on the Swiss platform, mortgages and other retail (primarily in the private, corporate and institutional banking businesses)
For corporates managed on the Swiss platform and mortgage lending, the PD is calculated directly by proprietary statistical rating models, which are based on internally compiled data comprising both quantitative factors (primarily LTV ratio and the borrower’s income level for mortgage lending and balance sheet information for corporates) and qualitative factors (e.g., credit histories from credit reporting bureaus, management quality). Collateral loans (margin lending), which form the largest part of “Other retail”, is also following an individual PD and LGD approach. The approach is calibrated to historical loss experience. Most of the collateral loans are loans collateralized by securities.
The internal rating grades are mapped to the Credit Suisse Internal Masterscale. The PDs assigned to each rating grade are reflected in the following table.
26

CRE - Credit Suisse counterparty ratings
Ratings PD bands (%) 1 Definition S&P Fitch Moody's Details
AAA 0.000 - 0.021
Substantially
risk free
AAA
AAA
Aaa
Extremely low risk, very high long-term
stability, still solvent under extreme conditions
AA+
AA
AA-
0.021 - 0.027
0.027 - 0.034
0.034 - 0.044
Minimal risk

AA+
AA
AA-
AA+
AA
AA-
Aa1
Aa2
Aa3
Very low risk, long-term stability, repayment
sources sufficient under lasting adverse
conditions, extremely high medium-term stability
A+
A
A-
0.044 - 0.056
0.056 - 0.068
0.068 - 0.097
Modest risk


A+
A
A-
A+
A
A-
A1
A2
A3
Low risk, short- and mid-term stability, small adverse
developments can be absorbed long term, short- and
mid-term solvency preserved in the event of serious
difficulties
BBB+
BBB
BBB-
0.097 - 0.167
0.167 - 0.285
0.285 - 0.487
Average risk

BBB+
BBB
BBB-
BBB+
BBB
BBB-
Baa1
Baa2
Baa3
Medium to low risk, high short-term stability, adequate
substance for medium-term survival, very stable short
term
BB+
BB
BB-
0.487 - 0.839
0.839 - 1.442
1.442 - 2.478
Acceptable risk


BB+
BB
BB-
BB+
BB
BB-
Ba1
Ba2
Ba3
Medium risk, only short-term stability, only capable of
absorbing minor adverse developments in the medium term,
stable in the short term, no increased credit risks expected
within the year
B+
B
B-
2.478 - 4.259
4.259 - 7.311
7.311 - 12.550
High risk

B+
B
B-
B+
B
B-
B1
B2
B3
Increasing risk, limited capability to absorb
further unexpected negative developments
CCC+
CCC
CCC-
CC
12.550 - 21.543
21.543 - 100.00
21.543 - 100.00
21.543 - 100.00
Very high
risk

CCC+
CCC
CCC-
CC
CCC+
CCC
CCC-
CC
Caa1
Caa2
Caa3
Ca
High risk, very limited capability to absorb
further unexpected negative developments

C
D1
D2
100
Risk of default
has materialized
Imminent or
actual loss

C
D

C
D

C


Substantial credit risk has materialized, i.e. counterparty
is distressed and/or non-performing. Adequate specific
provisions must be made as further adverse developments
will result directly in credit losses.
Transactions rated C are potential problem loans; those rated D1 are non-performing assets and those rated D2 are non-interest earning.
1
For Ratings AAA to CCC+, the PD bands are exclusive of the left-hand side and inclusive of the right-hand side PD band boundary. For Ratings CCC to CC, the PD bands are exclusive of the left-hand and exclusive of the right-hand side. For Rating C, the PD equals 100%.
Use of internal ratings
Internal ratings play an essential role in the decision-making and the credit approval processes. The portfolio credit quality is set in terms of the proportion of investment and non-investment grade exposures. Investment/non-investment grade is determined by the internal rating assigned to a counterparty.
Internal counterparty ratings (and associated PDs), transaction ratings (and associated LGDs) and CCF for loan commitments are inputs to RWA and economic risk capital calculations. Model outputs are the basis for risk-adjusted-pricing or assignment of credit competency levels.
The internal ratings are also integrated into the risk management reporting infrastructure and are reviewed in senior risk management committees.
Credit Risk Review
Governance and supervisory checks within credit risk management are supplemented by the credit risk review function. The credit risk review function is independent from credit risk management with a direct functional reporting line to the Risk Committee Chair, administratively reporting to the Group CRO. Credit risk review’s primary responsibility is to provide timely and independent assessments of the Group’s credit exposures and credit risk management processes and practices. Any findings and agreed actions are reported to senior management and, as necessary, to the Risk Committee.
EAD covered by the various approaches
The following table shows the part of EAD covered by the standardized and the A-IRB approach for each of the asset classes. The F-IRB approach is currently not applied.
CRE - EAD covered by the various approaches

end of 4Q21
Standardized
approach
A-IRB
approach
1
EAD (in %)  
Sovereigns 56 44
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer 19 81
Institutions - Other institutions 43 57
Corporates 8 92
Residential mortgages 0 100
Retail 3 97
Other exposures 100 0
Total  23 77
1
Includes EAD related to the supervisory slotting approach.
27

Credit risk exposures by portfolio and PD range
The following table presents the main parameters used for the calculation of capital requirements for IRB models.
CR6 – Credit risk exposures by portfolio and PD range (continued)

end of 4Q21
Original
on-balance
sheet gross exposure
Off-balance
sheet exposures
pre CCF

Total
exposures

Average
CCF
EAD post-
CRM and
post-CCF
1
Average
PD
Number of
obligors
(thousands)

Average
LGD
Average
maturity
(years)


RWA
2
RWA
density

Expected
loss


Provisions
Sovereigns (CHF million, except where indicated)  
0.00% to <0.15% 69,257 861 70,118 57% 69,846 0.02% < 0.1 2% 1.1 621 1% 1
0.15% to <0.25% 0 0 0 0% 0 0.22% < 0.1 58% 2.5 0 63% 0
0.25% to <0.50% 131 9 140 100% 140 0.37% < 0.1 54% 2.1 100 72% 0
0.50% to <0.75% 17 0 17 0% 17 0.64% < 0.1 58% 1.9 16 96% 0
0.75% to <2.50% 78 3 81 45% 80 1.10% < 0.1 42% 3.0 79 100% 0
2.50% to <10.00% 281 30 311 14% 143 6.01% < 0.1 44% 2.1 238 166% 4
10.00% to <100.00% 182 0 182 0% 22 28.23% < 0.1 60% 2.3 76 351% 4
100.00% (Default) 416 0 416 0% 135 100.00% < 0.1 57% 1.8 144 106% 176
Sub-total  70,362 903 71,265 56% 70,383 0.24% 0.1 3% 1.1 1,274 2% 185 176
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer  
0.00% to <0.15% 8,891 2,159 11,050 57% 11,800 0.06% 1.6 53% 0.7 1,820 15% 4
0.15% to <0.25% 281 286 567 45% 377 0.22% 0.1 50% 0.8 149 40% 0
0.25% to <0.50% 764 173 937 51% 611 0.37% 0.1 55% 0.7 412 67% 1
0.50% to <0.75% 176 211 387 51% 225 0.64% < 0.1 49% 1.8 189 84% 1
0.75% to <2.50% 154 155 309 48% 242 1.62% 0.1 51% 0.8 275 114% 2
2.50% to <10.00% 728 259 987 43% 389 4.79% 0.2 50% 1.0 605 156% 9
10.00% to <100.00% 8 1 9 30% 1 18.01% < 0.1 53% 1.9 2 281% 0
100.00% (Default) 7 0 7 0% 7 100.00% < 0.1 51% 2.5 8 106% 0
Sub-total  11,009 3,244 14,253 54% 13,652 0.30% 2.1 53% 0.7 3,460 25% 17 0
Institutions - Other institutions  
0.00% to <0.15% 455 1,769 2,224 1% 572 0.05% < 0.1 41% 4.3 174 30% 0
0.15% to <0.25% 5 50 55 8% 9 0.20% < 0.1 23% 2.4 3 30% 0
0.25% to <0.50% 17 2 19 45% 18 0.40% < 0.1 54% 2.8 14 82% 0
0.50% to <0.75% 5 2 7 45% 5 0.72% < 0.1 44% 2.0 4 79% 0
0.75% to <2.50% 1 0 1 0% 1 1.05% < 0.1 17% 2.5 1 55% 0
2.50% to <10.00% 140 454 594 45% 344 4.66% < 0.1 8% 4.8 111 32% 1
Sub-total  623 2,277 2,900 10% 949 1.74% 0.1 29% 4.5 307 32% 1 0
Corporates - Specialized lending  
0.00% to <0.15% 7,549 2,204 9,753 44% 8,512 0.06% 0.8 28% 2.4 1,775 21% 1
0.15% to <0.25% 3,871 1,523 5,394 36% 4,421 0.19% 0.7 30% 2.3 1,603 36% 3
0.25% to <0.50% 2,177 1,904 4,081 37% 2,878 0.37% 0.4 27% 2.0 1,280 44% 3
0.50% to <0.75% 2,924 1,447 4,371 32% 3,393 0.58% 0.3 24% 1.9 1,446 43% 5
0.75% to <2.50% 8,084 2,388 10,472 41% 9,069 1.38% 0.6 21% 2.2 4,856 54% 26
2.50% to <10.00% 1,274 30 1,304 52% 1,289 3.72% 0.1 14% 2.7 627 49% 7
10.00% to <100.00% 48 0 48 45% 48 14.74% < 0.1 18% 1.8 44 91% 1
100.00% (Default) 19 0 19 27% 19 100.00% < 0.1 44% 2.4 20 106% 45
Sub-total  25,946 9,496 35,442 39% 29,629 0.82% 3.0 25% 2.2 11,651 39% 91 45
1
CRM is reflected by shifting the counterparty exposure from the underlying obligor to the protection provider.
2
Reflects RWA post CCF.
28 / 29

CR6 – Credit risk exposures by portfolio and PD range (continued)

end of 4Q21
Original
on-balance
sheet gross exposure
Off-balance
sheet exposures
pre CCF

Total
exposures

Average
CCF
EAD post-
CRM and
post-CCF
1
Average
PD
Number of
obligors
(thousands)

Average
LGD
Average
maturity
(years)


RWA
2
RWA
density

Expected
loss


Provisions
Corporates without specialized lending (CHF million, except where indicated)  
0.00% to <0.15% 13,420 43,915 57,335 38% 31,874 0.07% 2.7 42% 2.3 7,466 23% 9
0.15% to <0.25% 3,691 10,656 14,347 39% 7,748 0.21% 1.2 44% 2.1 3,710 48% 7
0.25% to <0.50% 5,476 7,304 12,780 33% 7,763 0.37% 1.5 42% 2.3 4,381 56% 12
0.50% to <0.75% 2,872 4,396 7,268 38% 4,173 0.61% 0.8 40% 2.2 2,788 67% 10
0.75% to <2.50% 9,703 8,322 18,025 43% 12,409 1.45% 1.8 34% 2.7 10,630 86% 61
2.50% to <10.00% 8,229 14,672 22,901 45% 13,406 5.96% 1.6 34% 3.0 17,313 129% 266
10.00% to <100.00% 585 714 1,299 43% 776 18.04% 0.1 22% 2.9 904 116% 32
100.00% (Default) 5,910 491 6,401 46% 1,588 100.00% 0.2 63% 1.9 1,676 106% 4,704
Sub-total  49,886 90,470 140,356 39% 79,737 3.51% 9.9 39% 2.5 48,868 61% 5,101 4,704
Residential mortgages  
0.00% to <0.15% 30,080 1,768 31,848 43% 30,833 0.09% 43.7 14% 3.1 2,194 7% 4
0.15% to <0.25% 33,017 1,749 34,766 40% 33,716 0.18% 38.1 15% 3.1 4,384 13% 9
0.25% to <0.50% 36,369 2,033 38,402 41% 37,179 0.30% 51.1 14% 3.2 7,085 19% 16
0.50% to <0.75% 5,050 466 5,516 44% 5,257 0.58% 6.0 17% 2.9 1,662 32% 5
0.75% to <2.50% 5,888 874 6,762 39% 6,227 1.30% 6.1 17% 2.8 2,899 47% 13
2.50% to <10.00% 1,524 46 1,570 43% 1,544 4.53% 0.7 16% 2.3 1,076 70% 11
10.00% to <100.00% 63 0 63 70% 61 18.19% < 0.1 16% 2.6 76 125% 2
100.00% (Default) 406 7 413 83% 412 100.00% 0.3 46% 1.7 436 106% 34
Sub-total  112,397 6,943 119,340 41% 115,229 0.70% 146.0 15% 3.1 19,812 17% 94 34
Qualifying revolving retail  
0.75% to <2.50% 373 5,376 5,749 0% 395 1.30% 745.9 50% 1.0 98 25% 3
100.00% (Default) 0 0 0 0% 100.00% < 0.1 50% 1.0 0 106% 0
Sub-total  373 5,376 5,749 0% 395 1.30% 745.9 50% 1.0 98 25% 3 0
Other retail  
0.00% to <0.15% 53,778 148,359 202,137 6% 62,676 0.04% 50.5 63% 1.3 4,835 8% 14
0.15% to <0.25% 3,091 7,558 10,649 9% 3,784 0.20% 3.9 46% 1.4 735 19% 3
0.25% to <0.50% 2,151 2,383 4,534 12% 2,427 0.36% 3.5 34% 1.5 524 22% 3
0.50% to <0.75% 1,394 1,168 2,562 22% 1,646 0.60% 1.3 37% 1.4 519 32% 4
0.75% to <2.50% 4,896 2,125 7,021 22% 5,361 1.62% 96.0 36% 2.2 2,489 46% 32
2.50% to <10.00% 3,303 1,172 4,475 25% 3,593 5.52% 81.8 38% 3.3 2,144 60% 77
10.00% to <100.00% 32 35 67 2% 33 17.93% 0.2 50% 2.0 37 112% 3
100.00% (Default) 427 17 444 24% 380 100.00% 4.9 86% 1.5 403 106% 337
Sub-total  69,072 162,817 231,889 7% 79,900 0.90% 242.1 58% 1.5 11,686 15% 473 337
Sub-total (all portfolios)  
0.00% to <0.15% 183,430 201,035 384,465 14% 216,113 0.05% 99.5 31% 1.7 18,885 9% 33
0.15% to <0.25% 43,956 21,822 65,778 28% 50,055 0.18% 44.1 23% 2.7 10,584 21% 22
0.25% to <0.50% 47,085 13,808 60,893 31% 51,016 0.32% 56.7 21% 2.9 13,796 27% 35
0.50% to <0.75% 12,438 7,690 20,128 35% 14,716 0.60% 8.4 28% 2.3 6,624 45% 25
0.75% to <2.50% 29,177 19,243 48,420 28% 33,784 1.43% 850.4 28% 2.5 21,327 63% 137
2.50% to <10.00% 15,479 16,663 32,142 44% 20,708 5.59% 84.5 32% 2.9 22,114 107% 375
10.00% to <100.00% 918 750 1,668 41% 941 18.11% 0.3 23% 2.7 1,139 121% 42
100.00% (Default) 7,185 515 7,700 46% 2,541 100.00% 5.3 63% 1.8 2,687 106% 5,296
Sub-total (all portfolios)  339,668 281,526 621,194 20% 389,874 1.23% 1,149.2 29% 2.1 97,156 25% 5,965 5,296
Alternative treatment  
Exposures from free deliveries applying standardized risk weights or 100% under the alternative treatment 3 3
IRB - maturity and export finance buffer 88
Total (all portfolios and alternative treatment)  339,668 281,526 621,194 20% 389,877 1.23% 1,149.2 29% 2.1 97,247 25% 5,965 5,296
1
CRM is reflected by shifting the counterparty exposure from the underlying obligor to the protection provider.
2
Reflects RWA post CCF.
30 / 31

CR6 – Credit risk exposures by portfolio and PD range

end of 2Q21
Original
on-balance
sheet gross exposure
Off-balance
sheet exposures
pre CCF

Total
exposures

Average
CCF
EAD post-
CRM and
post-CCF
1
Average
PD
Number of
obligors
(thousands)
2
Average
LGD
Average
maturity
(years)


RWA
3
RWA
density

Expected
loss


Provisions
Sovereigns (CHF million, except where indicated)  
0.00% to <0.15% 55,712 826 56,538 56% 56,269 0.02% < 0.1 3% 1.1 511 1% 1
0.15% to <0.25% 1 0 1 1 0.22% < 0.1 58% 0.4 0 35% 0
0.25% to <0.50% 90 20 110 100% 99 0.37% < 0.1 53% 2.7 78 79% 0
0.50% to <0.75% 18 0 18 18 0.64% < 0.1 58% 2.4 19 105% 0
0.75% to <2.50% 98 3 101 45% 99 1.17% < 0.1 43% 3.0 103 104% 1
2.50% to <10.00% 320 15 335 20% 140 5.56% < 0.1 44% 2.4 239 171% 4
10.00% to <100.00% 193 0 193 47 22.54% < 0.1 60% 3.7 165 354% 6
100.00% (Default) 415 0 415 199 100.00% < 0.1 57% 1.5 211 106% 113
Sub-total  56,847 864 57,711 56% 56,872 0.41% 0.1 3% 1.1 1,326 2% 125 113
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer  
0.00% to <0.15% 10,241 2,198 12,439 55% 12,912 0.06% 1.7 53% 0.6 1,887 15% 4
0.15% to <0.25% 395 248 643 26% 456 0.22% 0.1 47% 0.9 189 41% 0
0.25% to <0.50% 711 221 932 42% 669 0.37% 0.1 52% 0.8 423 63% 2
0.50% to <0.75% 64 108 172 39% 101 0.64% < 0.1 51% 1.0 82 80% 0
0.75% to <2.50% 257 170 427 50% 317 1.66% 0.1 45% 0.7 321 101% 2
2.50% to <10.00% 502 268 770 36% 396 4.83% 0.2 50% 1.1 625 158% 9
10.00% to <100.00% 7 0 7 20% 2 21.53% < 0.1 53% 0.3 5 269% 0
100.00% (Default) 7 0 7 7 100.00% < 0.1 51% 1.0 8 106% 0
Sub-total  12,184 3,213 15,397 49% 14,860 0.29% 2.2 52% 0.6 3,540 24% 17 0
Institutions - Other institutions  
0.00% to <0.15% 517 1,228 1,745 1% 608 0.05% < 0.1 41% 3.9 170 28% 0
0.15% to <0.25% 3 63 66 5% 7 0.21% < 0.1 27% 1.3 1 20% 0
0.25% to <0.50% 13 2 15 45% 13 0.37% < 0.1 57% 2.4 11 80% 0
0.50% to <0.75% 5 5 10 45% 7 0.72% < 0.1 44% 2.8 6 88% 0
2.50% to <10.00% 103 329 432 45% 251 5.08% < 0.1 8% 4.8 83 33% 1
Sub-total  641 1,627 2,268 10% 886 1.49% 0.1 32% 4.1 271 31% 1 0
Corporates - Specialized lending  
0.00% to <0.15% 6,661 2,099 8,760 44% 7,583 0.06% 0.8 29% 2.5 1,676 22% 1
0.15% to <0.25% 4,285 1,830 6,115 36% 4,951 0.20% 0.7 29% 2.3 1,887 38% 3
0.25% to <0.50% 2,733 1,201 3,934 39% 3,203 0.37% 0.4 30% 2.0 1,581 49% 4
0.50% to <0.75% 2,848 1,415 4,263 34% 3,315 0.58% 0.3 29% 1.3 1,628 49% 6
0.75% to <2.50% 8,133 2,674 10,807 38% 9,142 1.46% 0.6 19% 2.5 4,566 50% 24
2.50% to <10.00% 2,359 45 2,404 45% 2,379 4.31% 0.1 11% 3.2 946 40% 11
10.00% to <100.00% 122 48 170 45% 144 13.49% < 0.1 10% 3.8 75 53% 2
100.00% (Default) 236 0 236 27% 104 100.00% < 0.1 51% 1.5 110 106% 132
Sub-total  27,377 9,312 36,689 38% 30,821 1.31% 3.1 25% 2.4 12,469 40% 183 132
1
CRM is reflected by shifting the counterparty exposure from the underlying obligor to the protection provider.
2
Prior period has been revised.
3
Reflects RWA post CCF.
32 / 33

CR6 – Credit risk exposures by portfolio and PD range (continued)

end of 2Q21
Original
on-balance
sheet gross exposure
Off-balance
sheet exposures
pre CCF

Total
exposures

Average
CCF
EAD post-
CRM and
post-CCF
1
Average
PD
Number of
obligors
(thousands)
2
Average
LGD
Average
maturity
(years)


RWA
3
RWA
density

Expected
loss


Provisions
Corporates without specialized lending (CHF million, except where indicated)  
0.00% to <0.15% 15,460 46,649 62,109 36% 33,952 0.07% 2.9 41% 2.3 7,804 23% 9
0.15% to <0.25% 4,589 11,673 16,262 38% 8,952 0.20% 1.3 43% 1.9 3,717 42% 8
0.25% to <0.50% 5,344 8,734 14,078 36% 8,396 0.37% 1.5 39% 2.4 4,468 53% 12
0.50% to <0.75% 3,519 4,560 8,079 41% 5,054 0.62% 0.9 39% 2.4 3,407 67% 12
0.75% to <2.50% 11,412 9,058 20,470 42% 14,618 1.43% 1.9 33% 2.6 12,123 83% 71
2.50% to <10.00% 7,872 16,446 24,318 39% 13,086 6.03% 1.8 34% 2.8 16,545 126% 261
10.00% to <100.00% 932 779 1,711 53% 1,061 18.20% 0.1 26% 2.8 1,530 144% 52
100.00% (Default) 6,211 533 6,744 42% 1,508 100.00% 0.2 59% 2.2 1,588 105% 4,959
Sub-total  55,339 98,432 153,771 38% 86,627 3.24% 10.6 38% 2.4 51,182 59% 5,384 4,960
Residential mortgages  
0.00% to <0.15% 29,855 1,855 31,710 43% 30,644 0.09% 43.8 14% 3.0 2,192 7% 4
0.15% to <0.25% 32,423 1,962 34,385 39% 33,180 0.18% 38.1 15% 3.0 4,314 13% 9
0.25% to <0.50% 36,474 2,176 38,650 40% 37,344 0.30% 52.1 14% 3.1 7,124 19% 16
0.50% to <0.75% 5,305 359 5,664 52% 5,461 0.58% 6.3 17% 2.9 1,743 32% 5
0.75% to <2.50% 6,277 726 7,003 29% 6,489 1.32% 6.6 17% 2.8 3,123 48% 14
2.50% to <10.00% 1,666 19 1,685 50% 1,676 4.55% 0.8 16% 2.5 1,149 69% 12
10.00% to <100.00% 97 0 97 70% 97 18.93% < 0.1 16% 2.8 126 129% 3
100.00% (Default) 355 7 362 84% 329 100.00% 0.2 19% 1.6 349 106% 33
Sub-total  112,452 7,104 119,556 40% 115,220 0.64% 147.9 15% 3.0 20,120 17% 96 32
Qualifying revolving retail  
0.75% to <2.50% 360 5,431 5,791 380 1.30% 752.1 50% 1.0 94 25% 2
100.00% (Default) 0 0 0 0 100.00% < 0.1 50% 1.0 0 106% 0
Sub-total  360 5,431 5,791 380 1.30% 752.1 50% 1.0 94 25% 2 0
Other retail  
0.00% to <0.15% 55,322 146,743 202,065 6% 64,633 0.04% 50.6 63% 1.3 5,079 8% 16
0.15% to <0.25% 3,277 7,526 10,803 9% 3,958 0.20% 3.8 48% 1.5 822 21% 4
0.25% to <0.50% 2,250 5,410 7,660 9% 2,756 0.36% 3.6 34% 1.5 580 21% 3
0.50% to <0.75% 964 1,709 2,673 8% 1,110 0.62% 1.4 41% 1.6 389 35% 3
0.75% to <2.50% 4,999 2,027 7,026 16% 5,335 1.60% 89.3 33% 2.2 2,298 43% 29
2.50% to <10.00% 4,236 897 5,133 30% 4,503 5.17% 82.7 36% 2.9 2,541 56% 88
10.00% to <100.00% 27 11 38 9% 28 17.52% 0.2 43% 2.0 27 95% 2
100.00% (Default) 507 73 580 12% 387 100.00% 4.7 88% 1.5 410 106% 326
Sub-total  71,582 164,396 235,978 7% 82,710 0.92% 236.3 58% 1.5 12,146 15% 471 326
Sub-total (all portfolios)  
0.00% to <0.15% 173,768 201,598 375,366 15% 206,601 0.05% 100.0 34% 1.7 19,319 9% 35
0.15% to <0.25% 44,973 23,302 68,275 29% 51,505 0.19% 44.0 24% 2.6 10,930 21% 24
0.25% to <0.50% 47,615 17,764 65,379 29% 52,480 0.32% 57.7 21% 2.8 14,265 27% 37
0.50% to <0.75% 12,723 8,156 20,879 34% 15,066 0.60% 9.0 29% 2.3 7,274 48% 26
0.75% to <2.50% 31,536 20,089 51,625 27% 36,380 1.44% 850.6 27% 2.5 22,628 62% 143
2.50% to <10.00% 17,058 18,019 35,077 39% 22,431 5.53% 85.6 30% 2.8 22,128 99% 386
10.00% to <100.00% 1,378 838 2,216 52% 1,379 17.90% 0.4 26% 2.9 1,928 140% 65
100.00% (Default) 7,731 613 8,344 39% 2,534 100.00% 5.2 58% 1.9 2,676 106% 5,563
Sub-total (all portfolios)  336,782 290,379 627,161 20% 388,376 1.29% 1,152.5 30% 2.1 101,148 26% 6,279 5,563
Alternative treatment  
Exposures from free deliveries applying standardized risk weights or 100% under the alternative treatment 16 12
IRB - maturity and export finance buffer 393
Total (all portfolios and alternative treatment)  336,782 290,379 627,161 20% 388,392 1.29% 1,152.5 30% 2.1 101,553 26% 6,279 5,563
1
CRM is reflected by shifting the counterparty exposure from the underlying obligor to the protection provider.
2
Prior period has been revised.
3
Reflects RWA post CCF.
34 / 35

Credit derivatives used as CRM techniques
The following table presents the effect on RWA of credit derivatives used as CRM techniques by portfolio.
For exposures covered by recognized credit derivatives, the substitution approach is applied, which means the risk weight of the obligor is substituted with the risk weight of the protection provider. The CRM effect is reflected according to the actual post-risk mitigation asset class for pre-credit derivatives and actual RWA. The table does not include the impact of certain immaterial positions where the credit derivative was recognized with an adjustment to LGD.
CR7 – Effect on risk-weighted assets of credit derivatives used as CRM techniques
   4Q21 2Q21

end of
Pre-credit
derivatives
RWA

Actual
RWA
Pre-credit
derivatives
RWA

Actual
RWA
CHF million  
Sovereigns - A-IRB 1,274 1,274 1,326 1,326
Institutions - Banks and securities dealers - A-IRB 3,521 3,460 3,583 3,544
Institutions - Other institutions - A-IRB 307 307 271 271
Corporates - Specialized lending - A-IRB 15,691 15,691 16,757 16,757
Corporates without specialized lending - A-IRB 48,932 48,871 51,308 51,191
Residential mortgages 19,812 19,812 20,120 20,120
Qualifying revolving retail 98 98 94 94
Other retail 11,686 11,686 12,146 12,146
Maturity and export finance buffer - IRB 88 88 393 393
Total  101,409 101,287 105,998 105,842
Includes RWA related to the A-IRB approach and supervisory slotting approach.
RWA flow statement of credit risk exposures under IRB
The following table presents the 4Q21 flow statement explaining the variations in the credit risk RWA determined under the IRB approach.
Credit risk RWA under IRB decreased CHF 2.8 billion to CHF 101.3 billion compared to the end of 3Q21. The decrease was primarily driven by movement in risk levels attributable to asset size and asset quality as well as negative foreign exchange impact mainly from USD and EURO denominated portfolios. These decreases were partially offset by an increase in model and parameter updates driven by updated LGDs to account for updated loss experience in recent years. The decrease in risk levels was mainly attributable to reduced mortgages exposures for asset size and improvement in asset quality due to phase-out of a regulatory add-on in the corporate asset class.
CR8 – Risk-weighted assets flow statements of credit risk exposures under IRB
4Q21
CHF million  
Risk-weighted assets at beginning of period  104,120
Asset size (905)
Asset quality (480)
Model and parameter updates 294
Foreign exchange impact (1,742)
Risk-weighted assets at end of period  101,287
Includes RWA related to the A-IRB approach and supervisory slotting approach.
36

Definition of risk-weighted assets movement components related to credit risk and CCR
Description Definition
Asset size    Represents changes on the portfolio size arising in the ordinary course of business (including
new businesses). Asset size also includes movements arising from the application of the
comprehensive approach with regard to the treatment of financial collateral
Asset quality/credit quality of counterparties  Represents changes in average risk weighting across credit risk classes
Model and parameter updates   Represents movements arising from internally driven or externally mandated updates to models
and recalibrations of model parameters specific only to Credit Suisse
Methodology and policy changes    Represents movements arising from externally mandated regulatory methodology and policy
changes to accounting and exposure classification and treatment policies not specific only
to Credit Suisse
Acquisitions and disposals  Represents changes in book sizes due to acquisitions and disposals of entities
Foreign exchange impact  Represents changes in exchange rates of the transaction currencies compared to the Swiss franc
Other  Represents changes that cannot be attributed to any other category
Model performance
The A-IRB models are subject to a comprehensive backtesting process to demonstrate that model performance can be confirmed annually during the entire lifecycle of each model. As evidenced during model development and confirmed via annual performance monitoring, typically discriminatory power of credit models is well above industry standard and calibration targets are set conservatively.
The following table provides backtesting data to validate the reliability of PD calculations. The estimated PDs are compared with the actual default rates by PD ranges within each exposure class. The estimated PDs are forward-looking average PDs at the beginning of the twelve-month period, which started at the end of December 2019. The estimated PDs are compared with the simple average of historical default rates covering a period starting at the earliest in 2001 and ending at the end of 2020.
37

CR9 - Backtesting of PD per portfolio
      Number of obligors
(thousands)




Master scale
from CRM S&P




Master scale
from CRM Fitch




Master scale
from CRM Moody




Weighted
average PD


Arithmetic
average
PD by
obligors
1


End of
previous
year




End of
the year



Defaulted
obligors in
the year
2 of which:
new
defaulted
obligors
in the
year
2
Average
historical
annual
default
rate
2
Sovereigns  
0.00% to <0.15% AAA to BBB+ AAA to BBB+ Aaa to Baa1 0.03% 0.03% < 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 0.04%
0.15% to <0.25% BBB BBB Baa2 0.22% 0.21% < 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 0.00%
0.25% to <0.50% BBB- BBB- Baa3 0.37% 0.37% < 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 0.00%
0.50% to <0.75% BB+ BB+ Ba1 0.64% 0.59% < 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 0.00%
0.75% to <2.50% BB to BB- BB to BB- Ba2 to Ba3 1.83% 1.53% < 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 0.00%
2.50% to <10.00% B+ to B- B+ to B- B1 to B3 6.31% 5.98% < 0.1 < 0.1 1 0 1.15%
10.00% to <100.00% CCC+ to CC CCC+ to CC Caa1 to Ca 16.44% 16.44% < 0.1 < 0.1 2 0 11.76%
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer  
0.00% to <0.15% AAA to BBB+ AAA to BBB+ Aaa to Baa1 0.06% 0.07% 1.6 1.6 0 0 0.03%
0.15% to <0.25% BBB BBB Baa2 0.22% 0.22% 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.14%
0.25% to <0.50% BBB- BBB- Baa3 0.37% 0.37% 0.2 0.1 0 0 0.27%
0.50% to <0.75% BB+ BB+ Ba1 0.61% 0.60% 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 0.18%
0.75% to <2.50% BB to BB- BB to BB- Ba2 to Ba3 1.62% 1.56% 0.1 0.1 1 0 0.16%
2.50% to <10.00% B+ to B- B+ to B- B1 to B3 4.81% 5.28% 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.59%
10.00% to <100.00% CCC+ to CC CCC+ to CC Caa1 to Ca 27.26% 22.87% < 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 2.35%
Institutions - Other institutions  
0.00% to <0.15% AAA to BBB+ AAA to BBB+ Aaa to Baa1 0.05% 0.05% 0.4 < 0.1 0 0 0.00%
0.15% to <0.25% BBB BBB Baa2 0.23% 0.20% < 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 0.00%
0.25% to <0.50% BBB- BBB- Baa3 0.36% 0.34% < 0.1 < 0.1 0 0 0.00%
0.50% to <0.75% BB+ BB+ Ba1 0.58% 0.58% < 0.1 0 0 0.07%
0.75% to <2.50% BB to BB- BB to BB- Ba2 to Ba3 1.09% 1.33% < 0.1 0 0 0.00%
2.50% to <10.00% B+ to B- B+ to B- B1 to B3 3.94% 3.89% < 0.1 < 0.1
Corporates - Specialized lending  
0.00% to <0.15% AAA to BBB+ AAA to BBB+ Aaa to Baa1 0.06% 0.07% 0.8 0.8 0 0 0.01%
0.15% to <0.25% BBB BBB Baa2 0.20% 0.20% 0.7 0.7 0 0 0.03%
0.25% to <0.50% BBB- BBB- Baa3 0.37% 0.37% 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.04%
0.50% to <0.75% BB+ BB+ Ba1 0.58% 0.60% 0.3 0.3 3 0 0.21%
0.75% to <2.50% BB to BB- BB to BB- Ba2 to Ba3 1.45% 1.38% 0.8 0.7 2 0 0.40%
2.50% to <10.00% B+ to B- B+ to B- B1 to B3 4.20% 4.06% 0.2 0.2 0 0 4.53%
10.00% to <100.00% CCC+ to CC CCC+ to CC Caa1 to Ca 17.01% 16.04% < 0.1 < 0.1 1 0 20.06%
1
The number of obligors used in the calculation is based on the transactional-based approach.
2
Reflects risk data where prudential portfolios are not captured. Accordingly for these columns approximations are required. For the qualifying revolving retail portfolio - CR7 (PD range 10.00% to <100.00%), no results are reported as portfolio in that scope has moved to standardized approach in 2020. Further, fast defaults are in tendency understated since capturing of fast defaults is not available for all clients in risk data. Underlying default rates are determined on client level, i.e. a client can have more than one transaction/credit.
38 / 39

CR9 - Backtesting of PD per portfolio (continued)
      Number of obligors
(thousands)




Master scale
from CRM S&P




Master scale
from CRM Fitch




Master scale
from CRM Moody




Weighted
average PD


Arithmetic
average
PD by
obligors
1


End of
previous
year




End of
the year



Defaulted
obligors in
the year
2 of which:
new
defaulted
obligors
in the
year
2
Average
historical
annual
default
rate
2
Corporates without specialized lending  
0.00% to <0.15% AAA to BBB+ AAA to BBB+ Aaa to Baa1 0.07% 0.07% 2.7 2.6 0 0 0.03%
0.15% to <0.25% BBB BBB Baa2 0.21% 0.20% 1.2 1.3 1 0 0.10%
0.25% to <0.50% BBB- BBB- Baa3 0.37% 0.37% 1.7 1.6 3 0 0.11%
0.50% to <0.75% BB+ BB+ Ba1 0.62% 0.63% 1.3 0.9 2 0 0.26%
0.75% to <2.50% BB to BB- BB to BB- Ba2 to Ba3 1.48% 1.40% 1.9 2.1 16 0 0.80%
2.50% to <10.00% B+ to B- B+ to B- B1 to B3 5.17% 5.27% 1.6 1.8 47 1 2.08%
10.00% to <100.00% CCC+ to CC CCC+ to CC Caa1 to Ca 18.24% 19.60% 0.1 0.1 24 1 14.07%
Residential mortgages  
0.00% to <0.15% AAA to BBB+ AAA to BBB+ Aaa to Baa1 0.09% 0.09% 43.5 44.0 10 0 0.02%
0.15% to <0.25% BBB BBB Baa2 0.18% 0.17% 38.2 38.4 8 0 0.05%
0.25% to <0.50% BBB- BBB- Baa3 0.30% 0.30% 52.9 52.5 43 0 0.09%
0.50% to <0.75% BB+ BB+ Ba1 0.58% 0.60% 6.9 6.4 13 0 0.15%
0.75% to <2.50% BB to BB- BB to BB- Ba2 to Ba3 1.24% 1.28% 7.0 6.5 22 0 0.29%
2.50% to <10.00% B+ to B- B+ to B- B1 to B3 4.44% 4.26% 0.8 0.7 20 0 3.98%
10.00% to <100.00% CCC+ to CC CCC+ to CC Caa1 to Ca 17.22% 16.37% < 0.1 < 0.1 6 0 19.11%
Qualifying revolving retail  
0.75% to <2.50% BB to BB- BB to BB- Ba2 to Ba3 1.30% 1.30% 794.4 767.2 5,029 0 1.01%
10.00% to <100.00% CCC+ to CC CCC+ to CC Caa1 to Ca 25.00% 25.00% 96.0
Other retail  
0.00% to <0.15% AAA to BBB+ AAA to BBB+ Aaa to Baa1 0.04% 0.04% 50.1 50.8 14 0 0.05%
0.15% to <0.25% BBB BBB Baa2 0.19% 0.19% 3.6 3.9 2 0 0.02%
0.25% to <0.50% BBB- BBB- Baa3 0.36% 0.36% 5.8 3.5 5 0 0.06%
0.50% to <0.75% BB+ BB+ Ba1 0.60% 0.59% 11.8 1.4 0 0 0.00%
0.75% to <2.50% BB to BB- BB to BB- Ba2 to Ba3 1.49% 1.68% 84.3 81.5 1,157 99 1.15%
2.50% to <10.00% B+ to B- B+ to B- B1 to B3 4.92% 5.43% 84.2 80.7 3,042 212 3.79%
10.00% to <100.00% CCC+ to CC CCC+ to CC Caa1 to Ca 17.12% 16.09% 0.4 0.3 0 0.17%
1
The number of obligors used in the calculation is based on the transactional-based approach.
2
Reflects risk data where prudential portfolios are not captured. Accordingly for these columns approximations are required. For the qualifying revolving retail portfolio - CR7 (PD range 10.00% to <100.00%), no results are reported as portfolio in that scope has moved to standardized approach in 2020. Further, fast defaults are in tendency understated since capturing of fast defaults is not available for all clients in risk data. Underlying default rates are determined on client level, i.e. a client can have more than one transaction/credit.
40 / 41

Specialized lending
The following tables present the carrying values, exposure amounts and RWA for the Group’s specialized lending under the supervisory slotting approach.
CR10 – Specialized lending

end of



On-
balance
sheet
amount
Off-
balance
sheet
amount


Risk
weight


Exposure
amount
1


RWA


Expected
losses
4Q21 (CHF million, except where indicated)    
Other than high-volatility commercial real estate 
Regulatory categories and remaining maturity
Strong Less than 2.5 years 423 747 50% 833 442 0
Equal to or more than 2.5 years 555 695 70% 897 666 4
Good Less than 2.5 years 732 143 70% 750 557 3
Equal to or more than 2.5 years 926 270 90% 1,074 1,024 9
Satisfactory 998 38 115% 2 774 944 22
Weak 16 11 250% 22 59 2
Default 14 0 14 0 7
Total  3,664 1,904 4,364 3,692 47
High-volatility commercial real estate 
Regulatory categories and remaining maturity
Satisfactory 35 0 140% 35 53 1
Weak 111 0 250% 111 295 9
Default 0 2 2 0 1
Total  146 2 148 348 11
2Q21 (CHF million, except where indicated)    
Other than high-volatility commercial real estate 
Regulatory categories and remaining maturity
Strong Less than 2.5 years 227 1,115 50% 840 445 0
Equal to or more than 2.5 years 703 390 70% 917 681 4
Good Less than 2.5 years 584 90 70% 633 443 2
Equal to or more than 2.5 years 1,072 322 90% 1,250 1,176 10
Satisfactory 795 50 115% 2 823 867 20
Weak 50 53 250% 79 209 6
Default 46 0 46 0 23
Total  3,477 2,020 4,588 3,821 65
High-volatility commercial real estate 
Regulatory categories and remaining maturity
Good Equal to or more than 2.5 years 18 7 120% 9 27 0
Satisfactory 37 0 140% 38 55 1
Weak 146 0 250% 127 386 12
Default 0 2 2 0 1
Total  201 9 176 468 14
1
Exposure amounts in connection with IPRE.
2
For a portion of the exposure, a risk weight of 120% is applied.
42

Equity positions in the banking book
For equity type securities in the banking book, risk weights are determined using the simple risk-weight approach, which differentiates by equity sub-asset types, such as exchange-traded and other equity exposures.
CR10 – Equity positions in the banking book under the simple risk-weight approach

end of
On-balance
sheet
amount
Off-balance
sheet
amount


Risk weight

Exposure
amount


RWA
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Exchange-traded equity exposures 1,004 0 300% 1,004 3,193
Other equity exposures 1,031 52 400% 915 3,878
Total  2,035 52 1,919 7,071
2Q21 (CHF million)  
Exchange-traded equity exposures 1,083 0 300% 1,083 3,444
Other equity exposures 1,021 0 400% 1,021 4,328
Total  2,104 0 2,104 7,772
Equity investments in funds exposures of CHF 697 million are not included in the above table.
43

Counterparty credit risk
General
Counterparty exposure
CCR arises from over-the-counter (OTC) and exchange-traded derivatives, as well as SFTs, such as repurchase agreements, securities lending and borrowing and other similar products. CCR exposures depend on the value of underlying market factors, for example, interest rates and foreign exchange rates, which may be volatile.
Credit Suisse has received approval from FINMA to use the IMM for measuring CCR for the majority of the derivatives and the value-at-risk (VaR) model for SFTs.
> Refer to “Credit risk” (pages 151 to 154) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk coverage and management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on counterparty credit risk, including transaction rating, credit approval process and provisioning.
> Refer to “Credit risk reporting” (page 12) in Credit risk – General for information on our counterparty risk reporting.
Credit limits
All credit exposure is approved, either through approval of an individual transaction/facility (e.g., lending facilities), or under a system of credit limits (e.g., OTC derivatives). Credit exposure is monitored daily to ensure it does not exceed the approved credit limit. Credit limits are set either on a potential exposure basis or on a notional exposure basis. Moreover, these limits are ultimately governed by the Group Risk Appetite Framework. Potential exposure means the possible future value that would be lost upon default of the counterparty on a particular future date, and is taken as a high percentile of a distribution of possible exposures computed by the internal exposure models. Secondary debt inventory positions are subject to separate limits that are set at the issuer level.
> Refer to “Credit risk” (pages 151 to 154) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk coverage and management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on credit limits.
Central counterparties risk
The Basel III framework provides specific requirements for exposures the Group has to CCPs arising from OTC derivatives, exchange-traded derivative transactions and SFTs. Exposures to CCPs which are considered to be qualifying CCPs by the regulator will receive a preferential capital treatment compared to exposures to non-qualifying CCPs.
The Group can incur exposure to CCPs as either a clearing member, or clearing through another member. Qualifying CCPs are expected to be subject to best-practice risk management, and sound regulation and oversight to ensure that they reduce risk, both for their participants and for the financial system. Most CCPs are benchmarked against standards issued by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, herein collectively referred to as “CPSS-IOSCO”.
The exposures to CCP (represented as “Central counterparties (CCP) risks”) consist of trade exposure, default fund exposure and contingent exposure based on trade replacement due to a clearing member default. Trade exposure represents the current and potential future exposure of the clearing member (or a client) to a CCP arising from the underlying transaction and the initial margin posted to the CCP. Default fund exposure represents existing and potential future additional contributions to a CCPs default fund. Credit Risk Management performs credit assessment and annual review of the risk profile of CCPs as counterparties including an assessment of qualitative and quantitative factors. As part of its assessment, Credit Risk Management conducts periodic due diligence and in conjunction with General Counsel will make a determination whether (i) the CCP is a qualifying CCP and (ii) the collateral posted is considered bankruptcy remote. The determinations are subject to Credit Risk Management guidelines and include a review of collateral bankruptcy remoteness and verification that CCP collateral positions are held in custody with entities that employ account segregation and safekeeping procedures with internal controls that fully protect these securities. The determination is made in the context of “Authorization of CCP” (European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), Article 14) and “Third Countries” (EMIR, Article 25). This information will be appropriately reflected in the risk weightings within the capital calculations.
The Group monitors its daily exposure to the CCP as part of its ongoing limit and exposure monitoring process.
> Refer to “Risk management objectives and policies for credit risk” (page 12) in Credit risk – General for further information.
Credit valuation adjustment risk
Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) is a regulatory capital charge designed to capture the risk associated with potential mark-to-market losses associated with the deterioration in the creditworthiness of a counterparty.
Under Basel III, banks are required to calculate capital charges for CVA under either the Standardized CVA approach or the Advanced CVA approach (ACVA). The CVA rules stipulate that where banks have permission to use market risk VaR and counterparty risk IMM, they are to use the ACVA unless their regulator decides otherwise. FINMA has confirmed that the ACVA should be used for both IMM and non-IMM exposures.
The regulatory CVA capital charge applies to all counterparty exposures arising from OTC derivatives, excluding those with CCP. Exposures arising from SFTs are not required to be included in the CVA charge unless they could give rise to a material loss. FINMA has confirmed that Credit Suisse can exclude these exposures from the regulatory capital charge.
Guarantees and other risk mitigants
> Refer to “Credit risk mitigation” (pages 16 to 17) in Credit risk for further information on policies relating to guarantees and other risk mitigants.
44

Wrong-way exposure
Wrong-way risk arises when Credit Suisse enters into a financial transaction in which exposure is adversely correlated to the creditworthiness of the counterparty. In a wrong-way situation, the exposure to the counterparty increases while the counterparty’s financial condition and its ability to pay on the transaction diminishes.
Exposure adjusted risk calculation
Regulatory guidance distinguishes two types of wrong-way risk, general and specific:
General wrong-way risk arises when the probability of default of counterparties is positively correlated with general market risk factors.
Specific wrong-way risk arises when the exposure to a particular counterparty is positively correlated with the probability of default of the counterparty due to the nature of the transactions with the counterparty.
Capturing wrong-way risk requires checking if there is a legal relationship or a correlation between the trade/collateral and the counterparty.
The management of wrong-way risk is integrated within Credit Suisse’s overall credit risk assessment approach and is subject to a framework for identification and treatment of wrong-way risk, which includes multiple processes, methodologies, governance, reporting, review and escalation. A conservative treatment for the purpose of calculating exposure profiles is applied to material trades with wrong-way risk features. The wrong-way risk framework applies to OTC, SFTs, loans and centrally cleared trades.
In instances where a material wrong-way risk has been identified, limit utilization and default capital are accordingly adjusted through more conservative exposure calculations. These adjustments cover both transactions and collateral and form part of the daily credit exposure calculation process, resulting in a higher utilization of the counterparty credit limit.
Regular reporting of wrong-way risk at both the individual trade and portfolio level allows wrong-way risk to be identified and corrective actions taken by Credit Risk Management. The Front Office is responsible as a first line of defense for identifying and escalating trades that could potentially give rise to wrong-way risk. Any material wrong-way risk at portfolio or trade level would be escalated to senior Credit Risk Management executives and risk committees.
Effect of a credit rating downgrade
On a daily basis, we monitor the level of incremental collateral that would be required by derivative counterparties in the event of a Credit Suisse ratings downgrade. Collateral triggers are maintained by our collateral management department and vary by counterparty.
> Refer to “Credit ratings” (pages 119 to 120) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Liquidity and funding management – Funding management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on the effect of a one, two or three notch downgrade as of December 31, 2021.
The impact of downgrades in the Bank’s long-term debt ratings are considered in the stress assumptions used to determine the conservative funding profile of our balance sheet and would not be material to our liquidity and funding needs.
45

Details of counterparty credit risk exposures
Analysis of counterparty credit risk exposure by approach
The following table presents a comprehensive view of the methods used to calculate CCR regulatory requirements and the main parameters used within each method.
CCR1 – Analysis of counterparty credit risk exposure by approach

end of




Re-placement cost




PFE




EEPE
Alpha
used for
computing
regulatory
EAD



EAD
post-CRM




RWA
4Q21 (CHF million, except where indicated)  
SA-CCR (for derivatives) 2,300 3,684 1.4 8,377 2,842
IMM (for derivatives) 14,750 1.6 1 23,572 6,691
Comprehensive Approach for CRM (for SFTs) 6 6
VaR for SFTs 21,163 4,782
Total  53,118 14,321
2Q21 (CHF million, except where indicated)  
SA-CCR (for derivatives) 3,133 5,085 1.4 11,505 3,937
IMM (for derivatives) 17,080 1.6 1 27,213 8,338
VaR for SFTs 28,958 4,517
Total  67,676 16,792
1
Alpha factor is set equal to 1.0 in case of wrong way risk.
CVA capital charge
The following table presents the CVA regulatory calculations by advanced and standardized approaches.
RWA decreased CHF 1.6 billion to CHF 5.0 billion compared to the end of 2Q21, mainly driven by a decrease in exposures across counterparties in line with default risk.
CCR2 – CVA capital charge
   4Q21 2Q21

end of
EAD
post-CRM

RWA
EAD
post-CRM

RWA
CHF million  
Total portfolios subject to the advanced CVA capital charge 30,024 5,046 37,166 6,651
   of which VaR component (including the 3 x multiplier)  890 1,507
   of which stressed VaR component (including the 3 x multiplier)  4,156 5,144
All portfolios subject to the standardized CVA capital charge 0 0 0 0
Total subject to the CVA capital charge  30,024 5,046 37,166 6,651
EAD post-CRM is disclosed as of the end of the period (end of day), whereas the RWA is an average as of the last 12 weeks.
46

CCR exposures by regulatory portfolio and risk weight – standardized approach
The following table presents a breakdown of CCR exposures by regulatory portfolio (type of counterparties) and by risk weight (riskiness attributed to the exposure according to the standardized approach).
CCR3 – CCR exposures by regulatory portfolio and risk weight - standardized approach
   Risk weight

end of


0%


20%


50%


75%


100%


150%
Exposures
post-CCF
and CRM
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Sovereigns 335 0 0 0 18 0 353
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer 0 161 785 0 1 0 947
Institutions - Other institutions 0 0 205 0 0 0 205
Corporates 0 347 7 0 947 35 1,336
Retail 0 0 0 64 336 0 400
Other exposures 0 0 0 0 316 0 316
Total  335 508 997 64 1,618 35 3,557
2Q21 (CHF million)  
Sovereigns 359 0 0 0 5 0 364
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer 0 203 294 0 7 0 504
Institutions - Other institutions 0 0 215 0 0 0 215
Corporates 0 705 7 0 1,461 51 2,224
Retail 0 0 0 71 145 0 216
Other exposures 0 0 0 0 760 0 760
Total  359 908 516 71 2,378 51 4,283
47

CCR exposures by portfolio and PD scale – IRB models
The following table presents all relevant parameters used for the calculation of CCR capital requirements for IRB models.
> Refer to “Rating models” (pages 24 to 25) in Credit risk – Credit risk under internal risk-based approaches for further information on key models used at the group-wide level, an explanation of how the scope of models was determined and the risk-weighted assets covered by the models shown for each of the regulatory portfolios.
CCR4 – CCR exposures by portfolio and PD scale - IRB models

end of 4Q21
EAD
post-
CRM

Average
PD
Number of
obligors
(thousands)

Average
LGD
Average
maturity
(years)


RWA

RWA
density
Sovereigns (CHF million, except where indicated)  
0.00% to <0.15% 1,636 0.03% < 0.1 48% 0.5 92 6%
0.15% to <0.25% 0 0.22% < 0.1 58% 1.0 0 44%
0.25% to <0.50% 155 0.37% < 0.1 45% 0.7 66 42%
2.50% to <10.00% 91 3.86% < 0.1 44% 0.8 112 122%
Sub-total  1,882 0.24% < 0.1 48% 0.5 270 14%
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer  
0.00% to <0.15% 11,467 0.06% 0.4 58% 0.6 2,136 19%
0.15% to <0.25% 409 0.22% 0.1 57% 0.7 197 48%
0.25% to <0.50% 357 0.37% 0.1 56% 0.6 230 64%
0.50% to <0.75% 58 0.64% < 0.1 55% 0.7 42 72%
0.75% to <2.50% 278 1.80% 0.1 54% 0.3 330 119%
2.50% to <10.00% 88 4.33% 0.1 53% 0.6 141 160%
10.00% to <100.00% 2 24.90% < 0.1 53% 1.0 7 284%
100.00% (Default) 0 100.00% < 0.1 60% 1.0 0 100%
Sub-total  12,659 0.15% 0.8 58% 0.6 3,083 24%
Institutions - Other institutions  
0.00% to <0.15% 99 0.04% < 0.1 9% 0.6 2 2%
0.50% to <0.75% 0 0.72% < 0.1 44% 1.0 0 65%
Sub-total  99 0.04% < 0.1 9% 0.6 2 2%
Corporates - Specialized lending  
0.25% to <0.50% 5 0.37% < 0.1 50% 1.0 2 52%
0.50% to <0.75% 1 0.58% < 0.1 50% 1.0 1 66%
0.75% to <2.50% 4 1.78% < 0.1 48% 1.0 4 103%
2.50% to <10.00% 6 3.38% < 0.1 50% 1.0 8 130%
Sub-total  16 1.88% < 0.1 50% 1.0 15 96%
48

CCR4 – CCR exposures by portfolio and PD scale - IRB models (continued)

end of 4Q21
EAD
post-
CRM

Average
PD
Number
obligors
(thousands)

Average
LGD
Average
maturity
(years)


RWA

RWA
density
Corporates without specialized lending (CHF million, except where indicated)  
0.00% to <0.15% 25,294 0.05% 7.8 47% 0.5 2,867 11%
0.15% to <0.25% 1,690 0.22% 0.5 43% 0.8 534 32%
0.25% to <0.50% 1,218 0.37% 0.6 47% 0.8 633 52%
0.50% to <0.75% 395 0.63% 0.2 67% 0.5 382 97%
0.75% to <2.50% 1,188 1.65% 0.8 61% 0.6 1,617 136%
2.50% to <10.00% 746 5.32% 0.5 59% 0.8 2,018 271%
10.00% to <100.00% 7 15.76% < 0.1 39% 0.9 15 201%
100.00% (Default) 5 100.00% < 0.1 56% 0.7 5 106%
Sub-total  30,543 0.29% 10.4 48% 0.6 8,071 26%
Other retail  
0.00% to <0.15% 3,217 0.04% 5.9 61% 0.8 230 7%
0.15% to <0.25% 908 0.22% 0.5 60% 1.1 252 28%
0.25% to <0.50% 107 0.34% 0.3 31% 0.9 21 19%
0.50% to <0.75% 13 0.59% 0.2 47% 0.7 5 39%
0.75% to <2.50% 52 1.93% 0.1 19% 4.0 13 26%
2.50% to <10.00% 13 3.73% < 0.1 64% 0.9 13 98%
10.00% to <100.00% 0 19.31% < 0.1 65% 1.0 0 151%
100.00% (Default) 0 100.00% < 0.1 53% 1.0 0 106%
Sub-total  4,310 0.12% 7.1 60% 0.9 534 12%
Total (all portfolios)  
0.00% to <0.15% 41,713 0.05% 14.2 51% 0.6 5,327 13%
0.15% to <0.25% 3,007 0.22% 1.1 50% 0.9 983 33%
0.25% to <0.50% 1,842 0.37% 1.0 48% 0.8 952 52%
0.50% to <0.75% 467 0.63% 0.5 65% 0.5 430 92%
0.75% to <2.50% 1,522 1.68% 1.0 58% 0.7 1,964 129%
2.50% to <10.00% 944 5.05% 0.6 57% 0.8 2,292 243%
10.00% to <100.00% 9 17.97% < 0.1 42% 0.9 22 221%
100.00% (Default) 5 100.00% < 0.1 56% 0.7 5 106%
Total (all portfolios)  49,509 0.24% 18.4 51% 0.6 11,975 24%
EAD post-CRM decreased CHF 13.8 billion to CHF 49.5 billion, compared to the end of 2Q21, primarily reflecting decreases in corporates without specialized lending as well as banks and securities dealers exposures.
49

CCR4 – CCR exposures by portfolio and PD scale - IRB models

end of 2Q21
EAD
post-
CRM

Average
PD
Number of
obligors
(thousands)

Average
LGD
Average
maturity
(years)


RWA

RWA
density
Sovereigns (CHF million, except where indicated)  
0.00% to <0.15% 2,066 0.03% < 0.1 48% 0.4 107 5%
0.15% to <0.25% 0 0.22% < 0.1 58% 1.0 0 44%
0.25% to <0.50% 111 0.37% < 0.1 41% 1.0 47 43%
2.50% to <10.00% 126 3.27% < 0.1 41% 1.0 138 109%
Sub-total  2,303 0.22% < 0.1 47% 0.5 292 13%
Institutions - Banks and securities dealer  
0.00% to <0.15% 14,344 0.06% 0.5 58% 0.7 2,823 20%
0.15% to <0.25% 429 0.22% < 0.1 57% 0.8 207 48%
0.25% to <0.50% 471 0.37% < 0.1 58% 0.4 285 61%
0.50% to <0.75% 53 0.64% < 0.1 55% 0.7 37 72%
0.75% to <2.50% 218 1.69% < 0.1 55% 0.4 246 113%
2.50% to <10.00% 105 5.30% < 0.1 54% 0.7 182 173%
10.00% to <100.00% 19 28.06% < 0.1 59% 1.0 64 329%
100.00% (Default) 0 100.00% < 0.1 60% 1.0 0 100%
Sub-total  15,639 0.17% 0.8 58% 0.7 3,844 25%
Institutions - Other institutions  
0.00% to <0.15% 149 0.05% < 0.1 9% 0.5 4 3%
0.50% to <0.75% 0 0.72% < 0.1 44% 1.0 0 65%
Sub-total  149 0.05% < 0.1 9% 0.5 4 3%
Corporates - Specialized lending  
0.25% to <0.50% 9 0.37% < 0.1 7% 1.0 1 8%
0.50% to <0.75% 2 0.58% < 0.1 50% 1.0 2 66%
0.75% to <2.50% 1 1.24% < 0.1 50% 1.0 1 90%
2.50% to <10.00% 14 4.26% < 0.1 49% 1.0 19 137%
Sub-total  26 2.43% < 0.1 35% 1.0 23 84%
50

CCR4 – CCR exposures by portfolio and PD scale - IRB models (continued)

end of 2Q21
EAD
post-
CRM

Average
PD
Number of
obligors
(thousands)

Average
LGD
Average
maturity
(years)


RWA

RWA
density
Corporates without specialized lending (CHF million, except where indicated)  
0.00% to <0.15% 35,073 0.05% 8.6 47% 0.5 3,808 11%
0.15% to <0.25% 1,906 0.21% 0.6 46% 0.8 673 35%
0.25% to <0.50% 1,182 0.37% 0.6 53% 0.8 652 55%
0.50% to <0.75% 315 0.63% 0.3 61% 0.6 275 87%
0.75% to <2.50% 1,347 1.58% 0.9 63% 0.8 1,894 141%
2.50% to <10.00% 916 5.75% 0.5 46% 1.0 1,776 194%
10.00% to <100.00% 13 16.44% < 0.1 34% 1.0 23 179%
100.00% (Default) 15 100.00% < 0.1 39% 1.0 16 106%
Sub-total  40,767 0.29% 11.6 48% 0.5 9,117 22%
Other retail  
0.00% to <0.15% 3,717 0.04% 6.4 61% 0.9 258 7%
0.15% to <0.25% 301 0.18% 0.5 57% 1.0 67 22%
0.25% to <0.50% 132 0.33% 0.3 30% 1.0 25 19%
0.50% to <0.75% 102 0.58% 0.3 62% 1.0 53 51%
0.75% to <2.50% 74 1.82% 0.1 21% 3.4 19 26%
2.50% to <10.00% 126 4.12% < 0.1 59% 1.4 113 90%
10.00% to <100.00% 1 19.04% < 0.1 20% 0.2 0 45%
100.00% (Default) 0 100.00% < 0.1 53% 1.0 0 109%
Sub-total  4,453 0.22% 7.7 59% 1.0 535 12%
Total (all portfolios)  
0.00% to <0.15% 55,349 0.05% 15.5 51% 0.6 7,000 13%
0.15% to <0.25% 2,636 0.21% 1.2 49% 0.9 947 36%
0.25% to <0.50% 1,905 0.37% 1.0 52% 0.7 1,010 53%
0.50% to <0.75% 472 0.62% 0.6 61% 0.7 367 78%
0.75% to <2.50% 1,640 1.61% 1.1 60% 0.8 2,160 132%
2.50% to <10.00% 1,287 5.30% 0.7 48% 1.0 2,228 173%
10.00% to <100.00% 33 23.33% < 0.1 49% 1.0 87 263%
100.00% (Default) 15 100.00% < 0.1 39% 1.0 16 106%
Total (all portfolios)  63,337 0.25% 20.2 51% 0.6 13,815 22%
51

Composition of collateral for CCR exposure
The following table presents a breakdown of all types of collateral posted or received by banks to support or reduce CCR exposures related to derivative transactions or SFTs, including transactions cleared through CCPs. For disclosure purposes, the collateral values are presented as the market value of the collateral without any adjustments for haircuts.
CCR5 – Composition of collateral for CCR exposure
   Collateral used in derivative transactions Collateral used in SFTs
        

Fair value of collateral received


Fair value of posted collateral
Fair value of
collateral
received
Fair value
of posted
collateral

end of

Segregated
Un-
segregated

Total

Segregated
1 Un-
segregated

Total


4Q21 (CHF million)  
Cash - domestic currency 0 6,792 6,792 0 881 881 356 5,528
Cash - other currencies 0 40,953 40,953 324 39,045 39,369 67,077 99,417
Domestic sovereign debt 0 71 71 0 0 0 1,388 20
Other sovereign debt 0 20,944 20,944 5,184 14,702 19,886 118,452 58,342
Government agency debt 0 74 74 0 28 28 662 1,813
Corporate bonds 0 10,678 10,678 0 333 333 39,211 21,833
Equity securities 0 22,945 22,945 1,031 1,475 2,506 78,434 2 29,005 2
Other collateral 0 3,908 3,908 0 5 5 25,678 14,638
Total  0 106,365 106,365 6,539 56,469 63,008 331,258 230,596
2Q21 (CHF million)  3
Cash - domestic currency 0 8,237 8,237 0 1,132 1,132 342 6,332
Cash - other currencies 0 45,677 45,677 678 50,589 51,267 82,205 105,819
Domestic sovereign debt 0 50 50 0 0 0 2,920 38
Other sovereign debt 0 19,999 19,999 5,041 13,154 18,195 129,404 75,975
Government agency debt 0 130 130 0 24 24 1,409 2,742
Corporate bonds 0 10,924 10,924 0 311 311 52,000 26,333
Equity securities 0 28,309 28,309 919 1,499 2,418 170,262 2 40,744 2
Other collateral 0 3,809 3,809 5 45 50 29,829 14,835
Total  0 117,135 117,135 6,643 66,754 73,397 468,371 272,818
1
Includes collateral provided in cleared derivative transactions that is held in a bankruptcy remote manner by a custodian. Collateral posted to a custodian in bilateral OTC trades is shown as unsegregated.
2
The equity prime brokerage business consists of clients acquiring long and short positions in the market in a Credit Suisse account along with the appropriate margins. In the case of a counterparty default, Credit Suisse gains control over the long positions and are free to sell them to cover the exposure and the long positions are thus considered as "collateral received". On the other hand, the short positions are considered as "trades" and are not reported in the disclosure as "posted collateral".
3
Reflects an update of the dataset, primarily related to the revised reporting of agency lending transactions. Prior period has been revised.
52

Credit derivatives exposures
We enter into derivative contracts in the normal course of business for market making, positioning and arbitrage purposes, as well as for our own risk management needs, including mitigation of interest rate, foreign currency and credit risk. Derivative exposure also includes economic hedges where the Group enters into derivative contracts for its own risk management purposes, but where the contracts do not qualify for hedge accounting under US GAAP. Derivative exposures are calculated according to regulatory methods, using either the current exposures method or approved IMM. These regulatory methods take into account potential future movements and as a result generate risk exposures that are greater than the net replacement values disclosed for US GAAP.
As of the end of 4Q21, no credit derivatives were utilized that qualify for hedge accounting under US GAAP.
> Refer to “Derivative instruments” (pages 171 to 173) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk portfolio analysis in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on derivative instruments, including counterparties and their creditworthiness.
> Refer to “Note 33 – Derivatives and hedging activities” (pages 363 to 369) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on the fair value of derivative instruments and the distribution of current credit exposures by types of credit exposures.
> Refer to “Note 28 – Offsetting of financial assets and financial liabilities” (pages 338 to 341) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on netting benefits, netted current credit exposures, collateral held and net derivatives credit exposure.
The following table presents the extent of the Group’s exposures to credit derivative transactions as protection bought or sold.
CCR6 – Credit derivatives exposures
   4Q21 2Q21

end of
Protection
bought
Protection
sold
Protection
bought
Protection
sold
Notionals (CHF billion)  
Single-name CDS 102.9 94.0 108.1 90.5
Index CDS 139.4 119.9 179.6 154.6
Total return swaps 6.7 5.3 7.8 6.5
Credit options 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Other credit derivatives 40.3 33.6 49.9 34.4
   of which credit default swaptions  40.3 33.6 49.9 34.4
Total notionals  289.3 252.8 345.5 286.0
Fair values (CHF billion)  
Positive fair value (asset) 2.0 3.8 2.3 3.4
Negative fair value (liability) 5.4 2.0 5.5 1.9
Includes the client leg of cleared credit derivatives.
RWA flow statements of CCR exposures under IMM
The following table presents the 4Q21 flow statement explaining changes in CCR RWA determined under the IMM for CCR (derivatives and SFTs).
CCR7 – Risk-weighted assets flow statements of CCR exposures under IMM
4Q21
CHF million  
Risk-weighted assets at beginning of period  12,453
Asset size (1,804)
Credit quality of counterparties (7)
Model and parameter updates 1,172
Foreign exchange impact (278)
Risk-weighted assets at end of period  11,536
> Refer to “RWA flow statement of credit risk exposures under IRB” (pages 36 to 37) in Credit risk for definitions of the RWA flow statements components.
CCR RWA under IMM decreased CHF 0.9 billion to CHF 11.5 billion compared to the end of 3Q21. The decrease was primarily driven by decreases in asset size risk levels on the back of reduced OTC derivatives, exchange traded derivatives and securities financing business as well as the negative foreign exchange impact. The decrease was partially offset by an increase in model and parameters updates mainly driven by spike in strategic enhance factors for equity variance swap trades and correction of trading/banking book flag for SFTs.
Exposures to central counterparties
The following table presents a comprehensive picture of the Group’s exposure to CCPs.
CCR8 – Exposures to central counterparties
   4Q21 2Q21

end of
EAD
(post-CRM)

RWA
EAD
(post-CRM)

RWA
CHF million  
QCCPs 
Exposures for trades at QCCPs 16,101 350 18,477 397
   of which OTC derivatives  7,674 182 10,301 233
   of which exchange-traded    derivatives    7,723 154 6,838 137
   of which SFTs  704 14 1,338 27
Segregated initial margin 2,428 2,737
Pre-funded default fund contributions 3,583 949 3,908 1,085
Total exposures to QCCPs  1,299 1,482
Non-QCCPs 
Pre-funded default fund contributions 2 20 2 20
Total exposures to non-QCCPs  20 20
1
Exposures associated with initial margin, where the exposures are measured under the IMM/SA-CCR, have been included within the exposures for trades.
53

Securitization
General
The following disclosures, which also considers the “Industry good practice guidelines on Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for securitization”, refer to traditional and synthetic securitizations held in the banking and trading book and regulatory capital on these exposures calculated according to the Basel framework for securitizations.
> Refer to “Note 35 – Transfers of financial assets and variable interest entities” (pages 373 to 382) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on securitization, the various roles, the use of SPEs, the involvement of the Group in consolidated and non-consolidated SPEs, the accounting policies for securitization activities and methods and key assumptions applied in valuing positions retained/purchased and gains/losses relating to RMBS and CMBS securitization activity in 2021.
A traditional securitization is a structure where an underlying pool of assets is sold to an SPE which pays for the assets by issuing tranched securities collateralized by the underlying asset pool. A synthetic securitization is a tranched structure where the credit risk of an underlying pool of assets is transferred, in whole or in part, through the use of credit derivatives or guarantees that may serve to hedge the credit risk of the portfolio. Many synthetic securitizations are not accounted for as securitizations under US GAAP. In both traditional and synthetic securitizations, risk is dependent on the seniority of the retained interest and the performance of the underlying asset pool.
Roles and activities in connection with securitization
Securitization in the banking book
The Group is active in various roles in connection with securitization, including originator, investor and sponsor. As originator, the Group creates or purchases financial assets (e.g., commercial mortgages or corporate loans) and then securitizes them in a traditional or synthetic transaction that achieves significant risk transfer to third party investors. The Group acts as liquidity provider to Alpine Securitization Ltd. (Alpine), a multi-seller commercial paper conduit administered by Credit Suisse and also provides liquidity to three Asset Backed Commercial Paper programs managed by third party administrators.
In addition, the Group invests in securitization-related products created by third parties.
The Group has both securitization and re-securitization transactions in the trading and banking book referencing different types of underlying assets including real estate loans (commercial and residential).
Securitization in the trading book
Within its mortgage business there are four key roles that the Group undertakes within securitization markets: issuer, underwriter, market maker and financing counterparty. The Group holds one of the top trading franchises in market making in all major securitized product types and is a top issuer and underwriter in the re-securitization market in the US as well as being one of the top underwriters in asset-backed securities (ABS) and residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) securitization in the US. Since the last quarter of 2019, the Group has not held eligible correlation trading positions.
The Group’s key objective in relation to trading book securitization is to meet clients’ investment and divestment needs by making markets in securitized products across all major collateral types, including residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, asset finance (i.e. auto loans, credit card receivables, etc.) and corporate loans. The Group focuses on opportunities to intermediate transfers of risk between sellers and buyers.
The Group is also active in new issue securitization and re-securitization. The Group’s Securitized Products Finance team provides short-term secured warehouse financing to clients who originate credit card, auto loan, and other receivables, and the Group sells asset-backed securities collateralized by these receivables to provide its clients long-term financing that matches the lives of their assets.
At times, the Group purchases loans and bonds for the purpose of securitization and sells these assets to SPEs which in turn issue new securities. Re-securitizations of previously issued mortgage-backed securities (typically RMBS) securities occur when certificates issued out of an existing securitization vehicle are sold into a newly created and separate securitization vehicle.
Risks assumed and retained
Key risks retained while securities or loans remain in inventory are related to the performance of the underlying assets (residential real estate loans, commercial loans, credit card loans, etc.) and to movements in spreads. These risks are summarized in the securitization pool level attributes: PD of underlying loans (default rate), the severity of loss and prepayment speeds. The transactions may also be exposed to general market risk, credit spread and counterparty credit risk.
The Group maintains models for both government-guaranteed and private label mortgage products. These models project the above risk drivers based on market interest rates and volatility as well as macro-economic variables such as housing price index, projected GDP and inflation, unemployment etc.
In its role as a market maker, the Group actively trades in and out of positions. Both Front Office and Risk Management continuously monitor liquidity risk as reflected in trading spreads and trading volumes. To address liquidity concerns a specific set of limits on the size of aged positions are in place for the securitized positions we hold.
The Group classifies securities within the transactions by the nature of the collateral (residential, commercial, ABS, collateralized loan obligations, etc.) and the seniority each security has in the capital structure (i.e. senior, mezzanine, subordinate etc.), which in turn will be reflected in the transaction risk assessment.
54

Risk Management monitors portfolio composition by capital structure and collateral type on a daily basis with subordinate exposure and each collateral type subject to separate risk limits and risk flags. In addition, the Group’s internal risk methodology is designed such that risk charges are based on the place the particular security holds in the capital structure, the less senior the bond the higher the risk charges.
For re-securitization risk, the Group’s risk management models take a ‘look through’ approach where they model the behavior of the underlying securities or constituent counterparties based on their own particular collateral and then transmit that to the re-securitized position. No additional risk factors are considered within the re-securitization portfolios in addition to those identified and measured within securitization risk.
With respect to both the wind-down corporate correlation trading portfolio and the on-going transactions the key risks that need to be managed includes default risk, counterparty credit risk, correlation risk and cross effects between spread and correlation. The impacts of liquidity risk for securitization products is embedded within the firm’s historical simulation model through the incorporation of market data from stressed periods, and in the scenario framework through the calibration of price shocks to the same period.
Both correlation and first-to-default are valued using a correlation model which uses the market implied correlation and detailed market data such as constituent spread term structure and constituent recovery. The risks embedded in securitization and re-securitizations are similar and include spread risk, recovery risk, default risk and correlation risk. The risks for different seniority of tranches will be reflected in the tranche price sensitivities to each constituent in the pools. The complexity of the correlation portfolio’s risk lies in the level of convexity and cross risk inherent, for example, the risks to large spread moves and the risks to spread and correlation moving together. The risk limit framework is carefully designed to address the key risks for the correlation trading portfolio.
Monitoring of changes in credit and market risk of securitization exposures
The Group has in place a comprehensive risk management process whereby the Front Office and Risk Management work together to monitor positions and position changes, portfolio structure and trading activity and calculate a set of risk measures on a daily basis using risk sensitivities and exposures.
For the mortgage business the Group also uses monthly remittance reports (available from public sources) to get up to date information on collateral performance (delinquencies, defaults, pre-payment etc.). Monthly or quarterly reports (sourced directly from the originator or sponsor of the securitization) are used to monitor performance of most banking book securitizations.
Risk Management has also put in place a set of key risk limits for the purpose of managing the Group’s risk appetite framework in relation to securitizations/re-securitizations. These limits will cover exposure measures, risk sensitivities, VaR and capital measures with the majority monitored on a daily basis. In addition within the Group’s risk management framework an extensive scenario analysis framework is in place whereby all underlying risk factors are stressed to determine portfolio sensitivity.
Re-securitized products in the mortgage business go through the same risk management process but looking through the structures with the focus on the risk of the underlying securities or constituent names.
Retained banking book exposures for mortgage, ABS, commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and collateralized debt obligation transactions are risk managed on the same basis as similar trading book transactions.
Risk mitigation
In addition to the strict exposure limits noted above, the Group uses a number of different risk mitigation approaches to manage risk appetite for securitization and re-securitization exposures. Where true counterparty credit risk exposure is identified for a particular transaction, there is a requirement for it to be approved through normal credit risk management processes with collateral taken as required. The Group also may use various proxies including corporate single name and index hedges and equity hedges to mitigate the price and spread risks to which it is exposed. Hedging decisions are made by the trading desk based on current market conditions and will be made in consultation with Risk Management. Trades that are unusual and material trades are required to be reviewed and approved under the Group’s Pre-Trade Approval governance process. International investment banks are the main counterparties to the hedges that are used across these business areas.
Affiliated entities
In the normal course of business it is possible for the Group’s managed separate account portfolios and the Group’s controlled investment entities, such as mutual funds, fund of funds, private equity funds and other fund linked products to invest in the securities issued by other vehicles sponsored by the Group engaged in securitization and re-securitization activities. To address potential conflicts, standards governing investments in affiliated products and funds have been adopted.
55

Regulatory capital treatment of securitization structures
Banking book securitization
For banking book securitizations, the regulatory capital requirements are calculated since January 2018 with the following approaches: the Securitization Internal Ratings-Based Approach (SEC-IRBA), the Securitization External Ratings-Based Approach (SEC-ERBA), or the Securitization Standardized Approach (SEC-SA). External ratings used in regulatory capital calculations for securitization risk exposures in the banking book are obtained from Fitch, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s or Dominion Bond Rating Service.
Trading book securitization
We use the standardized measurement method (SMM) which is based on the ratings-based approach and the supervisory formula approach for securitization purposes and other supervisory approaches for trading book securitization positions covering the approach for nth-to-default products and portfolios covered by the weighted average risk weight approach.
Securitization exposures in the banking book
Securitization exposures presented in the following table represent the EAD.
SEC1 – Securitization exposures in the banking book
   Bank acts as originator Bank acts as sponsor Bank acts as investor
end of Traditional Synthetic Total Traditional Synthetic Total Traditional Synthetic Total
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Residential mortgages 120 408 528 0 0 0 2,332 0 2,332
Credit cards 0 0 0 1,002 0 1,002 874 0 874
Other retail exposures 325 309 634 3,067 0 3,067 2,611 0 2,611
Re-securitization 14 0 14 0 0 0 23 0 23
Total retail  459 717 1,176 4,069 0 4,069 5,840 0 5,840
Loans to corporates 0 26,801 26,801 632 0 632 3,276 0 3,276
Commercial mortgages 0 12,267 12,267 0 0 0 839 0 839
Lease and receivables 0 1,096 1,096 1,952 0 1,952 2,019 0 2,019
Other wholesale 826 0 826 827 0 827 1,371 0 1,371
Total wholesale  826 40,164 40,990 3,411 0 3,411 7,505 0 7,505
Total  1,285 40,881 42,166 7,480 0 7,480 13,345 0 13,345
2Q21 (CHF million)  1
Residential mortgages 135 950 1,085 0 0 0 1,793 0 1,793
Credit cards 0 0 0 861 0 861 776 0 776
Other retail exposures 310 183 493 2,627 0 2,627 3,530 0 3,530
Re-securitization 19 0 19 0 0 0 48 0 48
Total retail  464 1,133 1,597 3,488 0 3,488 6,147 0 6,147
Loans to corporates 0 27,616 27,616 1,247 0 1,247 2,887 0 2,887
Commercial mortgages 49 12,568 12,617 0 0 0 947 0 947
Lease and receivables 0 0 0 1,289 0 1,289 871 0 871
Other wholesale 936 0 936 1,149 0 1,149 1,566 0 1,566
Total wholesale  985 40,184 41,169 3,685 0 3,685 6,271 0 6,271
Total  1,449 41,317 42,766 7,173 0 7,173 12,418 0 12,418
1
Prior period has been revised.
56

Securitization exposures in the trading book
SEC2 – Securitization exposures in the trading book
   Bank acts as originator Bank acts as sponsor Bank acts as investor
end of Traditional Synthetic Total Traditional Synthetic Total Traditional Synthetic Total
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Residential mortgages 23 0 23 0 0 0 1,120 0 1,120
Other retail exposures 0 0 0 0 0 0 209 0 209
Re-securitization 18 0 18 0 0 0 122 37 159
Total retail  41 0 41 0 0 0 1,451 37 1,488
Loans to corporates 0 0 0 0 0 0 186 0 186
Commercial mortgages 96 0 96 0 0 0 359 0 359
Re-securitization 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 17
Total wholesale  96 0 96 0 0 0 545 17 562
Total  137 0 137 0 0 0 1,996 54 2,050
2Q21 (CHF million)  1
Residential mortgages 6 0 6 0 0 0 1,508 0 1,508
Credit cards 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 0 33
Other retail exposures 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 0 115
Re-securitization 0 16 16 0 0 0 72 30 102
Total retail  6 16 22 0 0 0 1,728 30 1,758
Loans to corporates 0 0 0 0 0 0 275 0 275
Commercial mortgages 124 0 124 0 0 0 768 0 768
Lease and receivables 0 0 0 0 0 0 379 0 379
Re-securitization 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 27 30
Total wholesale  124 1 125 0 0 0 1,425 27 1,452
Total  130 17 147 0 0 0 3,153 57 3,210
1
Prior period has been revised.
57

Calculation of capital requirements
The following tables present the securitization exposures in the banking book and the associated regulatory capital requirements.
> Refer to “Market risk under standardized approach” (page 62) in Market risk for capital charges related to securitization positions in the trading book.
SEC3 – Securitization exposures in the banking book and associated regulatory capital requirements - Credit Suisse acting as originator or as sponsor
   Exposure value (by RW band) Exposure value (by regulatory approach) RWA (by regulatory approach) Capital charge after cap

end of

<=20% RW
>20% to
50% RW
>50% to
100% RW
>100% to
<1250% RW

1250% RW

SEC-IRBA

SEC-ERBA

SEC-SA

1250% RW

SEC-IRBA

SEC-ERBA

SEC-SA

1250% RW

SEC-IRBA

SEC-ERBA

SEC-SA

1250% RW
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Total exposures  44,428 4,083 868 263 4 41,014 959 7,669 4 7,688 1,259 1,858 44 586 70 148 4
Traditional securitization 5,432 2,476 641 212 4 826 959 6,976 4 650 1,259 1,707 44 23 70 136 4
   of which securitization  5,432 2,476 629 210 4 826 959 6,962 4 650 1,259 1,689 44 23 70 135 4
      of which retail underlying  3,623 691 130 66 4 0 681 3,829 4 0 689 713 44 0 24 57 4
      of which wholesale  1,809 1,785 499 144 0 826 278 3,133 0 650 570 976 0 23 46 78 0
   of which re-securitization  0 0 12 2 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 1 0
      of which senior  0 0 9 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0
      of which non-senior  0 0 3 2 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 1 0
Synthetic securitization 38,996 1,607 227 51 0 40,188 0 693 0 7,038 0 151 0 563 0 12 0
   of which securitization  38,996 1,607 227 51 0 40,188 0 693 0 7,038 0 151 0 563 0 12 0
      of which retail underlying  607 106 2 2 0 717 0 0 0 146 0 0 0 12 0 0 0
      of which wholesale  38,389 1,501 225 49 0 39,471 0 693 0 6,892 0 151 0 551 0 12 0
2Q21 (CHF million)  
Total exposures  43,891 3,859 1,223 927 39 41,696 701 7,503 39 7,862 953 2,519 485 608 62 181 39
Traditional securitization 4,576 2,074 1,055 878 39 936 701 6,946 39 529 953 2,319 485 21 62 165 39
   of which securitization  4,576 2,074 1,055 878 20 936 701 6,946 20 529 953 2,319 248 21 62 165 20
      of which retail underlying  3,157 538 146 83 9 0 430 3,494 9 0 400 898 115 0 18 52 9
      of which wholesale  1,419 1,536 909 795 11 936 271 3,452 11 529 553 1,421 133 21 44 113 11
   of which re-securitization  0 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 237 0 0 0 19
      of which senior  0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 161 0 0 0 13
      of which non-senior  0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 76 0 0 0 6
Synthetic securitization 39,315 1,785 168 49 0 40,760 0 557 0 7,333 0 200 0 587 0 16 0
   of which securitization  39,315 1,785 168 49 0 40,760 0 557 0 7,333 0 200 0 587 0 16 0
      of which retail underlying  1,073 58 1 1 0 1,133 0 0 0 220 0 0 0 18 0 0 0
      of which wholesale  38,242 1,727 167 48 0 39,627 0 557 0 7,113 0 200 0 569 0 16 0
58 / 59

SEC4 – Securitization exposures in the banking book and associated regulatory capital requirements - Credit Suisse acting as investor
   Exposure value (by RW band) Exposure value (by regulatory approach) RWA (by regulatory approach) Capital charge after cap

end of

<=20% RW
>20% to
50% RW
>50% to
100% RW
>100% to
<1250% RW

1250% RW

SEC-IRBA

SEC-ERBA

SEC-SA

1250% RW

SEC-IRBA

SEC-ERBA

SEC-SA

1250% RW

SEC-IRBA

SEC-ERBA

SEC-SA

1250% RW
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Total exposures  9,930 2,469 757 175 14 2,738 630 9,963 14 411 315 2,608 250 33 25 186 20
Traditional securitization 9,930 2,469 757 175 14 2,738 630 9,963 14 411 315 2,608 250 33 25 186 20
   of which securitization  9,930 2,469 757 152 14 2,738 630 9,940 14 411 315 2,577 250 33 25 184 20
      of which retail underlying  3,757 1,466 488 106 0 0 246 5,571 0 0 159 1,576 0 0 13 109 0
      of which wholesale  6,173 1,003 269 46 14 2,738 384 4,369 14 411 156 1,001 250 33 12 75 20
   of which re-securitization  0 0 0 23 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 2 0
      of which senior  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
      of which non-senior  0 0 0 23 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 2 0
2Q21 (CHF million)  1
Total exposures  8,643 2,510 946 319 0 2,251 771 9,396 0 338 415 2,656 3 27 33 199 0
Traditional securitization 8,643 2,510 946 319 0 2,251 771 9,396 0 338 415 2,656 3 27 33 199 0
   of which securitization  8,643 2,510 946 271 0 2,251 771 9,348 0 338 415 2,599 0 27 33 194 0
      of which retail underlying  4,163 1,605 128 203 0 0 285 5,814 0 0 200 1,393 0 0 16 107 0
      of which wholesale  4,480 905 818 68 0 2,251 486 3,534 0 338 215 1,206 0 27 17 87 0
   of which re-securitization  0 0 0 48 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 57 3 0 0 5 0
      of which senior  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
      of which non-senior  0 0 0 48 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 5 0
1
Prior period has been revised.
60 / 61

Market risk
General
We use the advanced approach for calculating the market risk capital requirements for majority of our market risk exposures. As of December 31, 2021, 90% of our market risk RWA was computed using internal models. In line with regulatory requirements, the SMM is used for the specific risk of securitized exposures.
> Refer to “Regulatory capital treatment of securitization structures” (page 56) in Securitization – General for further information on the standardized measurement method and other supervisory approaches.
Risk management objectives and policies for market risk
> Refer to “Market risk” (pages 154 to 158) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk coverage and management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for information on our risk management objectives and policies for market risk.
> Refer to “Note 1 – Summary of significant accounting policies – Derivatives” (pages 294 to 295) and “Note 33 – Derivatives and hedging activities” (pages 363 to 369) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on policies for hedging risk and strategies/processes for monitoring the continuing effectiveness of hedges.
Market risk reporting
Market risk reporting is performed on a daily, weekly and monthly basis across various levels of the organization, including the Group, its legal entities and the business divisions. The audience of these reports includes senior management within CRO, the Front Office and the Board of Directors.
Market risk under standardized approach
The following table shows the components of RWA under the standardized approach for market risk. In line with regulatory requirements, the standardized measurement method is used for the specific risk of securitized exposures.
MR1 – Market risk under standardized approach
end of 4Q21 2Q21
Risk-weighted assets (CHF million)  
Securitization 1,648 1,593
Total risk-weighted assets  1,648 1,593
Market risk under internal model approach
General
The market risk internal model approach (IMA) framework includes regulatory VaR, stressed VaR, risks not in VaR (RNIV), its stressed equivalent (SRNIV) and Incremental Risk Charge (IRC). There is no Comprehensive Risk Measure as the Group does not hold eligible correlation trading positions.
The following table shows the main characteristics of the different models.
MRB - Internal model approach - overview
Regulatory VaR Stressed VaR IRC
Method applied   Historical simulation
Historical simulation
Portfolio loss
simulation
Data set  2 years 1 Year
Holding period  10 days (overlapping) 10 days (overlapping) One-year liquidity horizon
Confidence level  99% equivalent 99% equivalent 99.9%
Population      Regulatory trading book
(where applicable, foreign
exchange and commodity
risks in the regulatory
banking book are added)
Regulatory trading book
(where applicable, foreign
exchange and commodity
risks in the regulatory
banking book are added)
Regulatory trading book
subject to issuer default
and migration risk
(excl. securitizations and
correlation trades)
62

The following table shows a breakdown of RWA covered by each of the models.
MRB - IMA - Risk-weighted assets
end of 4Q21 CHF billion in %
Risk-weighted assets  
Regulatory VaR 4.1 28
Stressed VaR 4.8 33
RNIV 3.7 25
IRC 2.1 14
Total risk-weighted assets  14.7 100
Regulatory VaR, stressed VaR and risks not in VaR
The regulatory VaR and stressed VaR models primarily cover the activities of Credit Suisse’s business units that are held within trading books. The models are predominantly based on the industry standard historical simulation approach. They include risk types covering equity, currency, interest rate, commodity and credit spread risks. The models are also used to capture foreign exchange and commodity risk within banking books where required by the regulator.
The objective of Credit Suisse is to ensure the greatest consistency possible between the model used for the Group and the one used for subsidiaries and other legal entities. The model used in all instances is based on the same historical simulation approach, but its’ precise configuration and inclusion of risk types may differ for a variety of reasons. These include timing differences in receiving the necessary regulatory approvals (in which case the differences may be temporary) or different supervisory requirements or interpretations (in which case the differences may be expected to remain).
The Group model is used for Credit Suisse AG (consolidated and parent company), Credit Suisse (Schweiz) AG and Credit Suisse (Hong Kong) Ltd. The model used for Credit Suisse Holdings (USA), Credit Suisse Capital LLC, Credit Suisse International and Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited is similar but is based on a one-tailed percentile rather than expected shortfall.
The market data in the model is updated on an at least weekly basis. An expected shortfall measure is used and calibrated to be equivalent to a 99% confidence level and 10-day holding period. The 10-day holding period is calculated using 10-day overlapping historical returns. The model uses a two-year lookback window and an exponential weighting scheme with a time decay factor of 0.994 to ensure responsiveness to shifts in market environments.
The risk management VaR model for the Group is similar to the regulatory VaR model with a few differences. Certain positions excluded from regulatory and stressed VaR can be included for risk management purposes, such as specific risk from securitization positions and certain banking book exposures. The holding period for risk management VaR is 1 day. The tail measure for risk management is calibrated to be equivalent to a 98% confidence level rather than the regulatory 99%.
The methods used to simulate the potential movements, i.e. the historical scenarios, in risk factors are primarily dependent on the risk types. For risk types pertaining to equity prices, foreign exchange rates and volatilities, the scenarios are modelled as a function of proportional historical moves. For certain spread risks, the scenarios are modelled as a function of absolute historical moves. For some risk types, such as swap spreads and emerging markets credit spreads, a mixed approach is used. The P&L vectors are generated by applying the historical scenarios to a variety of exposure measures; Taylor Series approximations, partial revaluation ladders and grids as well as full revaluation, depending on the complexity and linearity of the underlying risks.
The stressed VaR model for the Group and its entities uses 10 day historical scenarios calculated within a 1 year historical stressed observation period with no exponential weighting applied, except for Credit Suisse Holdings (USA) where stressed VaR uses regulatory VaR time weighting parameters. The underlying risk types are simulated using the same approaches as for regulatory VaR. The 1-year period of stress is assessed on a monthly basis by calculating stressed VaR for a range of alternative 1-year periods taking into account recent portfolio compositions.
The Group has IMA permission for modelling both general market and specific risk of debt and equity instruments. There are two approaches used to model general and specific risk:
Full simulation approach: This approach uses an individual risk factor for each security. Therefore, for each security, this approach incorporates both specific risk and general risk within the same risk factor.
Regression approach: This approach uses a common risk factor across related securities in conjunction with additional specific risk add-ons for each security. This modelling approach segregates historical price variations into general and specific risk components.
Under the full simulation approach, scenario P&Ls incorporating both specific and general risk are aggregated in the historical simulation VaR via individual risk factor time series. Under the regression approach, scenario P&Ls corresponding to general risk are aggregated in the historical simulation VaR, while for each specific risk, a VaR is calculated by applying either a 1st or a 99th percentile historical move (depending on the direction of the position). Specific risk VaR components are then aggregated with historical simulation VaR under a zero correlation assumption (square root sum of squares).
In addition to the regulatory VaR and stressed VaR models, Credit Suisse operates a RNIV framework. This is applied to the same activities as the VaR/stressed VaR model but covers risk types that are not included in the internal model due, for example, to a lack of historical data or other model constraints. The purpose of
63

the RNIV framework is to ensure that capital is held to meet all risks which are not captured, or not captured adequately, by the firm’s VaR and stressed VaR models. These include, but are not limited to risk factors such as cross-risks and higher-order risks.
The performance of our internal models is regularly monitored and discussed at internal risk governance committees which review the regulatory backtesting results in addition to internal metrics of model performance. Position information flowing into the VaR model is reviewed daily, historical market data is reviewed before going live on a weekly basis, and model parameters are reviewed regularly.
Stress testing analysis is performed on a periodic basis to ensure model stability and robustness against adverse market environments. For this purpose, impacts from large changes in inputs and parameters are simulated and assessed against expected model outputs under different stress scenarios.
> Refer to “Market risk” (pages 154 to 158) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Risk management – Risk coverage and management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on VaR, including VaR limitations, VaR backtesting, stress testing, VaR governance and differences between the model used for risk management purposes and the model used for regulatory purposes.
Incremental Risk Charge
The IRC capitalizes issuer default and migration risk in the trading book, arising from positions such as bonds or CDS, but excluding securitizations and the correlation trading portfolio. Credit Suisse has received approval from FINMA, as well as from regulators of several of our subsidiaries, to use our IRC model.
The IRC model assesses risk at 99.9% confidence level over a one-year time horizon assuming the Constant Position Assumption, i.e. a single liquidity horizon of one year. This corresponds to the most conservative assumption on liquidity that is available under IRC regulatory rules.
The IRC portfolio model is a Merton-type portfolio model designed to calculate the cumulative loss at the 99.9% confidence level. The model’s design is based on the same principles as industry standard credit portfolio models including the Basel II A-IRB model. Systematic risks are captured in the IRC model by employing a multi-factor asset correlation framework that enables the capture of sectorial and regional concentrations.
As part of the exposure aggregation model, stochastic recovery rates are used to capture recovery rate uncertainty, including the case of basis risks on default, where different instruments issued by the same issuer can experience different recovery rates.
To achieve the IRB soundness standard, Credit Suisse uses IRC parameters that typically are either based on the A-IRB reference data sets (migration matrices including PDs, LGDs, LGD correlation and volatility), or parameters based on other internal or external data covering more than ten years of history and including periods of stress.
RWA flow statements of market risk exposures under an IMA
The following table presents the 4Q21 flow statement explaining variations in the market risk RWA determined under an IMA.
Market risk RWA under an IMA decreased CHF 1.2 billion to CHF 14.7 billion compared to the end of 3Q21, primarily due to a decrease in regulatory VaR, stressed VaR and risks not in VaR reflecting a decrease in average risk levels, mainly in Securitized Products and Global Trading Solutions within the Investment Bank.
MR2 – Risk-weighted assets flow statements of market risk exposures under an IMA

4Q21
Regulatory
VaR
Stressed
VaR

IRC

Other
1
Total
CHF million  
Risk-weighted assets at beginning of period  4,586 5,159 2,027 4,118 15,890
Regulatory adjustment 836 1,594 (180) (273) 1,977
Risk-weighted assets at beginning of period (end of day)  5,422 6,753 1,847 3,845 17,867
Movement in risk levels (1,090) (2,155) 89 (36) (3,192)
Model and parameter updates (345) (122) 0 0 (467)
Foreign exchange impact (98) (111) (44) (89) (342)
Risk-weighted assets at end of period (end of day)  3,889 4,365 1,892 3,720 13,866
Regulatory adjustment 179 474 195 (7) 841
Risk-weighted assets at end of period  4,068 4,839 2,087 3,713 14,707
1
Risks not in VaR.
64

Definitions of risk-weighted assets movement components related to market risk
Description Definition
RWA as of the end of the previous/current reporting periods  Represents RWA at quarter-end
Regulatory adjustment  Indicates the difference between RWA and RWA (end of day) at beginning and end of period
RWA as of the previous/current quarters end (end of day)    For a given component (e.g., VaR) it refers to the RWA that would be computed if the snapshot
quarter end amount of the component determines the quarter end RWA, as opposed to a 60-day
average for regulatory
Movement in risk levels  Represents movements due to position changes
Model and parameter updates   Represents movements arising from internally driven or externally mandated updates to models
and recalibrations of model parameters specific only to Credit Suisse
Methodology and policy changes    Represents movements arising from externally mandated regulatory methodology and policy
changes to accounting and exposure classification and treatment policies not specific only
to Credit Suisse
Acquisitions and disposals  Represents changes in book sizes due to acquisitions and disposals of entities
Foreign exchange impact  Represents changes in exchange rates of the transaction currencies compared to the Swiss franc
Other  Represents changes that cannot be attributed to any other category
IMA approach values for trading portfolios
The following table presents the maximum, minimum, average and period-end values resulting from the different types of models used for computing regulatory capital charges at the Group level, before any additional capital charge is applied.
MR3 – Regulatory VaR, stressed VaR and Incremental Risk Charge
in / end of 2H21 1H21
CHF million  
Regulatory VaR (10 day 99%) 
   Maximum value  147 178
   Average value  116 144
   Minimum value  96 118
   Period-end value  104 127
Stressed VaR (10 day 99%) 
   Maximum value  186 247
   Average value  134 164
   Minimum value  103 118
   Period-end value  116 157
IRC (99.9%) 
   Maximum value  188 199
   Average value  161 147
   Minimum value  135 111
   Period-end value  167 136
During 2H21, the decreases in average regulatory VaR and average stressed VaR reflected reduced risk in Securitized Products and Global Trading Solutions within the Investment Bank.
Comparison of VaR estimates with gains/losses
The following chart compares the results of estimates from the regulatory VaR model with both hypothetical and actual trading outcomes.
Backtesting involves comparing the results produced by the VaR model with the hypothetical trading revenues on the trading book. Hypothetical trading revenues are defined in compliance with regulatory requirements and aligned with the VaR model output by excluding (i) non-market elements (such as fees, commissions, cancellations and terminations, net cost of funding and credit-related valuation adjustments) and (ii) gains and losses from intra-day trading. A backtesting exception occurs when a hypothetical trading loss exceeds the daily VaR estimate.
For capital purposes and in line with Bank for International Settlements (BIS) requirements, FINMA increases the capital multiplier for every regulatory VaR backtesting exception above four in the prior rolling 12-month period, resulting in an incremental market risk capital requirement for the Group. VaR models with less than five backtesting exceptions are considered by regulators to be classified in a defined “green zone”. The “green zone” corresponds to backtesting results that do not themselves suggest a problem with the quality or accuracy of a bank’s model.
In 2H21, there were no backtesting exceptions in our regulatory VaR model. Since there were fewer than five backtesting exceptions in the rolling 12-month period through the end of 4Q21, in line with BIS industry guidelines, the bank is in the “green zone”.
65

Interest rate risk in the banking book
Risk management objectives and policies
Overview
The Group manages interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB) both in terms of risk to earnings as well as risk to the economic value of the asset and liability position, arising from changes in interest rates.
The Group monitors IRRBB through established systems, processes and controls. Risk measures are provided to estimate the impact of changes in interest rates, which is one of the primary ways in which IRRBB is assessed for risk management purposes.
The Group does not have a regulatory requirement to hold capital against IRRBB. The economic impacts of adverse shifts in interest rates from FINMA-defined scenarios are significantly below 15% of tier 1 capital the threshold used by the regulator to identify banks that potentially run excessive levels of interest rate risk at group and legal entity levels.
Major sources of interest rate risk in the banking book
We assume interest rate risks in our banking book through lending and deposit-taking, money market and funding activities, and the deployment of our consolidated equity, as well as other activities involving banking book positions at the divisional level. Non-maturing products, such as savings accounts, have no contractual maturity date or direct market-linked interest rate and are risk-managed on a pooled basis using replication portfolios on behalf of the business divisions. Replicating portfolios transform non-maturing products into a series of fixed-term products that approximate the re-pricing and volume behavior of the pooled client transactions.
Risk management and control governance
The Group’s overarching objective is to manage the risk of banking book positions in an efficient and controlled manner, across both regulatory constraints and the Group’s risk appetite frameworks. The Group applies the three lines of defense model to IRRBB with clear segregation between the CFO and the businesses (first line), the CRO (second line) and Internal Audit (third line).
Oversight of business strategies, new initiatives, risk measures and risk appetite is provided by a set of governance committees. The Group Capital Allocation and Liability Management Committee (Group CALMC) is the main governance committee for the Group’s funding, liquidity and capital management. The Group CALMC is responsible for the Group’s IRRBB risk control framework and escalation of risk constraint breaches.
The Group’s RPSC and associated sub-committees are responsible for the oversight and approval of IRRBB-related risk models, global policies, manuals, guidelines and procedures. Divisional and legal entity risk management committees review IRRBB-related matters specific to their local entities and jurisdictions.
Independent model validation is performed by the model risk management function, a CRO unit independent from model developers, which follows specific quality standards and procedures, such as minimum revalidation cycles. The validation outcome is presented to management and to the RPSC for model approval, in accordance with model development policies.
IRRBB is integrated into the Group’s risk appetite framework and is considered by risk constraints formulated by the Group’s Board of Directors for both earnings- and economic value-based risk measures. The Group’s IRRBB risk appetite level – in terms of the change in net present values, also referred to as “delta economic value of equity (∆EVE)” – is primarily driven by the available capital and is allocated to the Group’s material legal entities.
Additionally, the crisis response framework can be triggered by management, for example, due to changing market conditions, and requires IRRBB to be quantitatively assessed in response to a specific crisis event. Since crisis reporting can be triggered anytime, the risk measures may need to be generated on an ad hoc basis, outside the recurring production cycles, to provide management with timely reports focused on the identified driver.
Internal Audit regularly assesses the design and operating effectiveness of our interest rate risk management processes and controls, according to the annual audit plan. Internal Audit is independent from the departments involved in the measurement and management of IRRBB and directly reports to the Group’s Board of Directors.
Hedging
The Group assumes a conservative IRRBB risk strategy, which aims to keep a low exposure profile to economic value risks while maintaining high earnings’ stability. This is achieved mainly by systematic hedging of issued debt and open interest rate risk arising from loans and deposit maturity mismatches in the private banking business.
The main instruments used for hedging are interest rate swaps. Most of these swaps qualify for hedge accounting treatment under US GAAP, which allows for the reduction of economic risks without increasing accounting volatility.
66

Key risk measures
We monitor the change in net interest income, also referred to as “delta net interest income (∆NII)” on a monthly basis at both the Group and the divisional levels. This is performed by running internal interest rate stress test scenarios on a proprietary model, which follows the Group’s business logic and the expected client behavior. The regulatory ∆NII uses the modelling and parameter assumptions summarized below.
From an economic value perspective, key risk measures are the ∆EVE, representing the change in economic value based on shocked interest rate curves, and the interest rate sensitivity of a one basis point parallel increase in yield curves (DV01). Both are available to management on a daily basis. For internal risk management purposes, we monitor a ∆EVE measure, which covers all banking book positions. For the regulatory ∆EVE measure, we exclude bonds issued as additional tier 1 capital; this is in line with FINMA guidance. Additional ∆EVE modelling and parameter assumptions are summarized below. The regulatory ∆EVE measure is used for both the IRRBB outlier test and for the Pillar 3 disclosures. We monitor this regulatory risk measure on a monthly basis.
Risk measure scenarios
The Group has implemented the FINMA-mandated scenarios on the regulatory ∆EVE and ∆NII risk measures. Beyond the regulatory scenarios, we have also defined a comprehensive set of internal stress test scenarios. The scenarios are reviewed periodically in terms of both scenario selection and calibration of the shocks applied, reflecting changes in macroeconomic conditions and specific interest rate environments.
Key modelling and parametric assumptions
The following list summarizes the key modelling and parameter assumptions used in the IRRBBA1 and IRRBB1 tables:
Regulatory ∆EVE:
∆EVE is measured by excluding commercial margins and other spread components and applying risk-free discounting.
Following the internal approach for ∆EVE, the aggregation logic for each of the six prescribed regulatory scenarios allows for diversification between the different currencies.
Additional tier 1 capital is excluded from the regulatory ∆EVE measure.
∆EVE is calculated using a sensitivity-based approach.
Regulatory ∆NII:
The regulatory constant balance sheet assumptions prescribe using both constant volumes and constant margins throughout the one-year horizon.
Volumes are kept constant, both in balance sheet size and product composition.
Margins are kept at a constant level for the new positions, in line with the maturing positions.
In accordance with regulatory guidance, cash positions held at central banks are excluded.
Under the regulatory banking book definition, the Group’s banking book contains more liabilities than assets. This is mainly due to trading book assets, which are funded out of banking books. The funding costs out of the banking book are included, while trading book revenues are excluded from the reporting. As a result, the banking book ∆NII disclosed does not include a material source of income.
∆NII is measured including additional tier 1 capital instruments.
As of the reporting date, there are no material exposures to customer loans with prepayment optionality.
Additional assumptions and internal approach:
All the above-mentioned risk measures are generated based on granular position data and reflect the individual contractual details, while utilizing the latest available market data.
The non-maturing deposits’ average repricing maturity has been calculated based on the internal term-replication strategy.
The regulatory ∆EVE disclosure results are higher than the internal ∆EVE. This is due to the previously noted exclusion of additional tier 1 capital instruments in the regulatory ∆EVE.
The Group manages risks to NII considering internal models that differ from the regulatory ∆NII definition by including dynamic adjustments to client margins and volumes, benefits to or costs from holding cash at central banks and interest received from internal funding of assets by excess banking book liabilities. Under these assumptions, the NII results for the regulatory interest rate scenarios are more stable.
67

Quantitative disclosures
The following table presents the exposure’s structure and repricing period.
IRRBBA1 - Quantitative information on the exposure's structure and repricing period
              



Volume
1


Average repricing
period (years)
Maximum repricing
period for exposures
with modelled
(not determined)
repricing date (years)

end of 4Q21

Total
of which
CHF
of which
USD
of which
EUR

Total
of which
CHF

Total
of which
CHF
CHF million, except where indicated  
Definite repricing date 2
Due from banks 145,670 5,692 98,985 11,505 0.0 0.0
Due from customers 149,792 22,161 84,452 26,402 1.0 1.0
Money market mortgages 36,166 34,530 95 57 0.0 0.0
Fixed-rate mortgages 106,579 102,814 1,295 198 4.8 4.9
Financial investments 4,100 140 170 858 1.8 0.0
Other receivables 24 0 16 0 0.2
Receivables from interest rate derivatives 3 1,384,906 371,719 755,134 153,127 1.0 0.6
Due to banks (84,230) (5,369) (64,831) (4,006) 0.1 0.1
Customer deposits (111,053) (15,197) (53,070) (18,475) 0.2 0.2
Cash bonds (133) (133) 0 0 1.7 1.7
Bonds issues and central mortgage institution loans (120,659) (16,656) (65,543) (29,602) 3.7 7.6
Other payables (39,816) (2,174) (25,751) (8,449) 0.1 0.2
Payables to interest rate derivatives 3 (1,381,534) (444,742) (700,425) (143,372) 0.8 0.8
Indefinite repricing date 
Variable mortgages 1,183 1,183 0 0 0.0 0.0
Other receivables on demand 2,134 485 861 631 0.1 0.1
Payables on demand from personal accounts and current accounts (201,718) (94,411) (64,542) (30,969) 1.4 2.1
Other payables on demand 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0
Payables arising from client deposits, terminable but not transferable (savings) (33,081) (33,081) 0 0 2.6 2.6
Total  8.0 8.0
1
Volume figures may differ from the respective accounting values under US GAAP, due to the impact of effective interest rate calculations and the treatment of loan loss provisions.
2
Additional Tier 1 capital is excluded.
3
Receivables and payables from interest rate derivatives are shown as gross figures, including intercompany transactions.
68

The following table presents information on the exposure’s regulatory ∆EVE and regulatory ∆NII.
IRRBB1 - Quantitative information on the regulatory ∆EVE and regulatory ∆NII
   ΔEVE 1 ΔNII 2
end of 4Q21 4Q20 4Q21 4Q20
Interest rate shock scenarios (CHF million)  3
Parallel up (1,599) (1,955) (3,214) (3,103)
Parallel down 2,015 2,585 5,354 3,812
Steepener shock (311) (428)
Flattener shock 47 90
Rise in short-term interest rates (672) (755)
Fall in short-term interest rates 877 1,075
Maximum  (1,599) (1,955) (3,214) (3,103)
1
Reflects changes in the net present value.
2
Reflects changes in the earnings value.
3
All scenarios are in line with FINMA circular 2019/2.
IRRBB1 - Tier 1 capital
end of 4Q21 4Q20
Tier 1 capital (CHF million)  
Swiss CET1 capital and additional tier 1 capital 1 54,372 51,192
1
Excludes tier 1 capital, which is used to fulfill gone concern requirements.
The change in ∆EVE was due to DV01 exposure movements on our banking book positions in 2021. The main drivers are related to a revised approach, implemented in connection with the IBOR transition work, to exclude commercial margins from cash flows in a low interest rate environment as well as our regular management of banking book and net interest income hedging activities, partially offset by the depreciation of the Swiss franc against the US dollar. The results are inflated due to the required exclusion of additional tier 1 capital instruments while the respective hedges have to be included in the ∆EVE.
The embedded rate floors on loan contracts were extended from currencies with negative interest rates to all currencies resulting in an increase in ∆NII for a parallel-down scenario, whilst the ∆NII for a parallel-up scenario is reported stable compared to last year. The ∆NII for a parallel-up scenario continues to be driven by the banking book liability excess that primarily arises from the trading book assets being funded out of banking books as well as from the exclusion of the cash at central banks and shareholders’ equity from the regulatory definition of ∆NII.
69

Additional regulatory disclosures
Composition of capital
Credit Suisse is a systemically important financial institution.
> Refer to “Swiss capital requirements” (pages 4 to 5) for the systemically important financial institution view.
The following tables provide details on the composition of Swiss regulatory capital including common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital, additional tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital as if the Group was not a systemically important financial institution.
CC1 - Composition of regulatory capital
end of 4Q21 Amounts Reference 1
Swiss CET1 capital (CHF million)
1 Directly issued qualifying common share (and equivalent for non-joint stock companies) capital plus related stock surplus 35,044 1
2 Retained earnings 31,064 2
3 Accumulated other comprehensive income (and other reserves) 2 (22,154) 3
6 CET1 capital before regulatory adjustments 43,954
7 Prudent valuation adjustments (84)
8 Goodwill, net of tax (2,893) 4
9 Other intangible assets (excluding mortgage servicing rights), net of tax (50) 5
10 Deferred tax assets that rely on future profitability (excluding temporary differences), net of tax (881) 6
11 Cash flow hedge reserve 77
12 Shortfall of provisions to expected losses (220)
14 Gains/(losses) due to changes in own credit on fair-valued liabilities 2,144
15 Defined benefit pension plan assets (3,280) 7
16 Investments in own shares (477)
26b National specific regulatory adjustments 239
28 Total regulatory adjustments to CET1 capital (5,425)
29 CET1 capital 38,529
30 Directly issued qualifying additional tier 1 instruments plus related stock surplus 3 15,880
32   of which classified as liabilities under applicable accounting standards 15,880 9
36 Additional tier 1 capital before regulatory adjustments 15,880
37 Investments in own additional tier 1 instruments (37)
43 Total regulatory adjustments to additional tier 1 capital (37)
44 Additional tier 1 capital 15,843
Swiss tier 1 capital (CHF million)
45 Tier 1 capital 54,372
Swiss tier 2 capital (CHF million)
46 Directly issued qualifying tier 2 instruments plus related stock surplus 4 479 10
47 Directly issued capital instruments subject to phase-out from tier 2 capital 222 11
58 Tier 2 capital 701
Swiss eligible capital (CHF million)
59 Total eligible capital 55,073
1
Refer to the balance sheet under regulatory scope of consolidation in the table "CC2 - Reconciliation of regulatory capital to balance sheet". Only material items are referenced to the balance sheet.
2
Includes treasury shares.
3
Consists of high-trigger and low-trigger capital instruments. Of this amount, CHF 11.4 billion consists of capital instruments with a capital ratio write-down trigger of 7% and CHF 4.4 billion consists of capital instruments with a capital ratio write-down trigger of 5.125%.
4
Consists of low-trigger capital instruments with a capital ratio write-down trigger of 5%.
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CC1 - Composition of regulatory capital (continued)
end of 4Q21 Amounts Reference 1
Swiss risk-weighted assets (CHF million)  
60 Risk-weighted assets 268,418
Swiss risk-based capital ratios as a percentage of risk-weighted assets (%)  
61 CET1 capital ratio 14.4
62 Tier 1 capital ratio 20.3
63 Total capital ratio 20.5
BIS CET1 buffer requirements (%)  2    
64 Total BIS CET buffer requirement 3.528
65   of which capital conservation buffer 2.5
66   of which extended countercyclical buffer 0.028
67   of which progressive buffer for G-SIB and/or D-SIB 1.0
68 CET1 capital ratio available after meeting the bank's minimum capital requirements 3 9.9
Amounts below the thresholds for deduction (before risk weighting) (CHF million)  
72 Non-significant investments in the capital and other TLAC liabilities of other financial entities 3,066
73 Significant investments in the common stock of financial entities 1,802
74 Mortgage servicing rights, net of tax 202
75 Deferred tax assets arising from temporary differences, net of tax 3,189
Applicable caps on the inclusion of provisions in tier 2 (CHF million)  
77 Cap on inclusion of provisions in tier 2 under standardized approach 283
79 Cap for inclusion of provisions in tier 2 under internal ratings-based approach 722
Capital instruments subject to phase-out arrangements (CHF million)
84 Current cap on tier 2 instruments subject to phase-out arrangements 222
1
Refer to the balance sheet under regulatory scope of consolidation in the table "CC2 - Reconciliation of regulatory capital to balance sheet". Only material items are referenced to the balance sheet.
2
CET1 buffer requirements are based on BIS requirements as a percentage of Swiss risk-weighted assets.
3
Reflects the Swiss CET1 capital ratio, less the BIS minimum CET1 ratio requirement of 4.5%.
Prudent valuation adjustments (PVAs) are applied to the exposures in the banking and trading book measured at fair value under US GAAP and are incremental to the US GAAP fair value measurement. For capital adequacy reporting purposes, however, the Group’s PVA methodology addresses fair value uncertainties arising from concentration risk. PVAs for concentration risk are deducted from CET1 capital. The Group has established systems, controls and governance to ensure that the valuation of positions measured at fair value comply with the prudent valuation requirements.
> Refer to “Fair valuations” (page 69) in II – Operating and financial review – Credit Suisse – Other information, to “Fair value” (page 105) in II – Operating and financial review – Critical accounting estimates and to “Note 36 – Financial instruments” (pages 383 to 409) in VI – Consolidated financial statements – Credit Suisse Group in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on fair value measurement.
The following table provides a breakdown of PVAs to CET1 capital.
PV1 – Prudent valuation adjustments

end of



Equity


Interest
rates



FX



Credit



Commodities



Total
of which
in the
trading
book
of which
in the
banking
book
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Closeout uncertainty 84 0 0 0 0 84 30 54
   of which concentration  84 0 0 0 0 84 30 54
Total adjustments  84 0 0 0 0 84 30 54
71

The following table presents the balance sheet as published in the consolidated financial statements of the Group and the balance sheet under the regulatory scope of consolidation.
CC2 - Reconciliation of regulatory capital to balance sheet

end of 4Q21

Financial
statements
Regulatory
scope of
consolidation
Reference to
composition
of capital
Assets (CHF million)  
Cash and due from banks 164,818 164,524
Interest-bearing deposits with banks 1,323 1,590
Central bank funds sold, securities purchased under resale agreements and securities borrowing transactions 103,906 103,900
Securities received as collateral, at fair value 15,017 15,017
Trading assets, at fair value 111,141 110,246
Investment securities 1,005 1,005
Other investments 5,826 5,770
Net loans 291,686 292,126
Goodwill 2,917 2,921 4
Other intangible assets 276 276
   of which other intangible assets (excluding mortgage servicing rights)  52 52 5
Brokerage receivables 16,687 16,687
Other assets 41,231 40,701
   of which deferred tax assets related to net operating losses  881 881 6
   of which deferred tax assets from temporary differences  2,826 2,185 8
   of which defined benefit pension plan assets  4,215 4,215 7
Total assets  755,833 754,763
Liabilities and equity (CHF million)  
Due to banks 18,965 19,016
Customer deposits 392,819 392,784
Central bank funds purchased, securities sold under repurchase agreements and securities lending transactions 35,274 35,274
Obligation to return securities received as collateral, at fair value 15,017 15,017
Trading liabilities, at fair value 27,535 27,563
Short-term borrowings 19,393 19,473
Long-term debt 166,896 165,670
Brokerage payables 13,060 13,060
Other liabilities 22,644 22,606
Total liabilities  711,603 710,463
   of which additional tier 1 instruments, fully eligible  16,766 15,843 9
   of which tier 2 instruments, fully eligible  2,401 479 10
   of which tier 2 instruments subject to phase-out  316 222 11
Common shares 106 106 1
Additional paid-in capital 34,938 34,938 1
Retained earnings 31,064 31,029 2
Treasury shares, at cost (828) (828) 3
Accumulated other comprehensive income/(loss) (21,326) (21,293) 3
Total shareholders' equity 1 43,954 43,952
Noncontrolling interests 2 276 348
Total equity  44,230 44,300
Total liabilities and equity  755,833 754,763
1
Eligible as CET1 capital, prior to regulatory adjustments.
2
The difference between the accounting and regulatory scope of consolidation primarily represents private equity and other fund type vehicles, which FINMA does not require to consolidate for capital adequacy reporting.
72

Composition of TLAC
The following table presents the composition of our TLAC.
TLAC1 - TLAC composition for G-SIBs
end of 4Q21
TLAC (CHF million)    
CET1 capital 38,529
Additional tier 1 instruments eligible under TLAC framework 15,843
Tier 2 capital before TLAC adjustments 701
TLAC adjustments 1,944
   of which amortized portion of tier 2 instruments where remaining maturity > 1 year  1,944
Tier 2 instruments eligible under TLAC framework 2,645
TLAC arising from regulatory capital  57,017
External TLAC instruments issued directly by Credit Suisse Group AG and subordinated to excluded liabilities 44,307
External TLAC instruments issued by funding vehicles prior to January 1, 2022 5,107
TLAC arising from non-regulatory capital instruments before adjustments  49,414
TLAC before deductions  106,431
Deduction of investment in own other TLAC liabilities 59
Other adjustments to TLAC 5,103
TLAC  101,269
Risk-weighted assets and leverage exposure (CHF million)    
Swiss risk-weighted assets 268,418
Leverage exposure 889,137
TLAC ratios and buffers (%)    
TLAC ratio 37.7
TLAC leverage ratio 11.4
CET1 capital ratio available after meeting the resolution group’s minimum capital and TLAC requirements 9.9
Institution-specific buffer requirement (capital conservation buffer plus countercyclical buffer requirements plus higher loss absorbency requirement, expressed as a percentage of risk-weighted assets) 3.528
   of which capital conservation buffer requirement  2.5
   of which bank specific countercyclical buffer requirement  0.028
   of which higher loss absorbency requirement  1.0
73

The following table presents information regarding creditors’ rankings of the liabilities structure of the resolution entity.
TLAC3 - Resolution entity - Creditor ranking at legal entity level
   Creditor ranking

end of 4Q21



Shareholders'
equity
1 Subordinated
debt
instruments
Additional
tier 1
Bail-in debt
instruments
and pari
passu
liabilities
2



Total
CHF million  
Total capital and liabilities net of credit risk mitigation 42,764 15,971 46,238 104,973
Excluded liabilities 84 84
Total capital and liabilities less excluded liabilities 42,764 15,971 46,154 104,889
   of which potentially eligible as TLAC 3 42,764 15,708 44,138 102,610
      of which residual maturity between 1 to 2 years  4,600 4,600
      of which residual maturity between 2 to 5 years  17,121 17,121
      of which residual maturity between 5 to 10 years  13,988 13,988
      of which residual maturity greater than 10 years, excluding perpetual securities  8,429 8,429
      of which perpetual securities  42,764 15,708 58,472
Presented for Credit Suisse Group AG at the legal entity level and therefore instruments issued by subsidiaries and special purpose entities are excluded. Amounts are prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Swiss Law on Accounting and Financial Reporting (32nd title of the Swiss Code of Obligations).
1
Includes nominal share capital of CHF 106 million.
2
Amount does not include CHF 7,550 million of intercompany liabilities, which are pari passu to the external bail-in debt instruments and are not considered to be excluded liabilities.
3
Notes with a maturity of less than one year, notes called but not yet redeemed and accrued but not yet paid interest on TLAC instruments are not eligible as TLAC, but can be bailed in by FINMA.
74

Key prudential metrics
Most line items in the following table presents the view as if the Group was not a systemically important financial institution.
KM1 - Key metrics
end of 4Q21 3Q21 2Q21 1Q21 4Q20
Capital (CHF million)            
Swiss CET1 capital 38,529 39,951 38,934 36,959 35,351
Fully loaded CECL accounting model Swiss CET1 capital 1 38,529 39,951 38,934 36,959 35,297
Swiss tier 1 capital 54,372 56,252 55,148 53,406 51,192
Fully loaded CECL accounting model Swiss tier 1 capital 1 54,372 56,252 55,148 53,406 51,139
Swiss total eligible capital 55,073 56,998 56,394 54,682 52,426
Fully loaded CECL accounting model Swiss total eligible capital 1 55,073 56,998 56,394 54,682 52,373
Minimum capital requirement (8% of Swiss risk-weighted assets) 2 21,473 22,304 22,744 24,270 22,046
Risk-weighted assets (CHF million)            
Swiss risk-weighted assets 268,418 278,801 284,295 303,380 275,576
Risk-based capital ratios as a percentage of risk-weighted assets (%)            
Swiss CET1 capital ratio 14.4 14.3 13.7 12.2 12.8
Fully loaded CECL accounting model Swiss CET1 capital ratio 1 14.4 14.3 13.7 12.2 12.8
Swiss tier 1 capital ratio 20.3 20.2 19.4 17.6 18.6
Fully loaded CECL accounting model Swiss tier 1 capital ratio 1 20.3 20.2 19.4 17.6 18.6
Swiss total capital ratio 20.5 20.4 19.8 18.0 19.0
Fully loaded CECL accounting model Swiss total capital ratio 1 20.5 20.4 19.8 18.0 19.0
BIS CET1 buffer requirements (%)  3          
Capital conservation buffer 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Extended countercyclical buffer 0.028 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.022
Progressive buffer for G-SIB and/or D-SIB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Total BIS CET1 buffer requirement 3.528 3.521 3.522 3.521 3.522
CET1 capital ratio available after meeting the bank's minimum capital requirements 4 9.9 9.8 9.2 7.7 8.3
Basel III leverage ratio (CHF million)  5          
Leverage exposure 889,137 937,419 931,041 981,979 812,996 6
Basel III leverage ratio (%) 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.4 6.3
Fully loaded CECL accounting model Basel III leverage ratio (%) 1 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.4 6.3
Liquidity coverage ratio (CHF million)  7          
High-quality liquid assets 227,193 228,352 209,256 211,307 203,536
Net cash outflows 112,156 103,504 97,007 103,088 107,376
Liquidity coverage ratio (%) 203 221 216 205 190
Net stable funding ratio (CHF million)                      
Available stable funding 436,856 446,805
Required stable funding 342,870 353,492
Net stable funding ratio (%) 127 126
1
The fully loaded US GAAP CECL accounting model excludes the transitional relief of recognizing CECL allowances and provisions in CET1 capital in accordance with FINMA Circular 2013/1 “Eligible capital – banks”.
2
Calculated as 8% of Swiss risk-weighted assets, based on total capital minimum requirements, excluding the BIS CET1 buffer requirements.
3
CET1 buffer requirements are based on BIS requirements as a percentage of Swiss risk-weighted assets.
4
Reflects the Swiss CET1 capital ratio, less the BIS minimum CET1 ratio requirement of 4.5%.
5
Prior periods have been revised.
6
Reflects the temporary exclusion of central bank deposits in all currencies from the leverage exposure, after adjusting for the dividend paid in 2020, in accordance with FINMA Guidance.
7
Calculated using a three-month average, which is calculated on a daily basis.
75

> Refer to “Swiss capital requirements” (pages 4 to 5) for the systemically important financial institution view.
> Refer to “Swiss metrics” (pages 131 to 132) and “Risk-weighted assets” (pages 128 to 130) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Capital management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on movements in capital, capital ratios, risk-weighted assets and leverage ratios.
> Refer to “Liquidity coverage ratio” (page 115) and “Net stable funding ratio” (page 116) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Liquidity and funding management – Liquidity management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on movements in the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio.
> Refer to “Swiss requirements” (pages 122 to 124) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Capital management – Regulatory framework in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on additional CET1 buffer requirements.
The following table presents information about available TLAC and TLAC requirements applied at the resolution group level, which is defined as Credit Suisse Group AG consolidated.
KM2 - Key metrics - TLAC requirements (at resolution group level)
end of 4Q21 3Q21 2Q21 1Q21 4Q20
CHF million            
TLAC 101,269 106,048 107,027 105,862 93,390
Fully loaded CECL accounting model TLAC 1 101,269 106,048 107,027 105,862 93,336
Swiss risk-weighted assets 268,418 278,801 284,295 303,380 275,576
TLAC ratio (%) 37.7 38.0 37.6 34.9 33.9
Fully loaded CECL accounting model TLAC ratio (%) 1 37.7 38.0 37.6 34.9 33.9
Leverage exposure 2 889,137 937,419 931,041 981,979 812,996 3
TLAC leverage ratio (%) 2 11.4 11.3 11.5 10.8 11.5
Fully loaded CECL accounting model TLAC leverage ratio (%) 1,2 11.4 11.3 11.5 10.8 11.5
Does the subordination exemption in the antepenultimate paragraph of Section 11 of the FSB TLAC Term Sheet apply? No No No No No
Does the subordination exemption in the penultimate paragraph of Section 11 of the FSB TLAC Term Sheet apply? No No No No No
If the capped subordination exemption applies, the amount of funding issued that ranks pari passu with Excluded Liabilities and that is recognized as external TLAC, divided by funding issued that ranks pari passu with Excluded Liabilities and that would be recognized as external TLAC if no cap was applied (%) N/A - refer to our response above N/A - refer to our response above N/A - refer to our response above N/A - refer to our response above N/A - refer to our response above
1
The fully loaded US GAAP CECL accounting model excludes the transitional relief of recognizing CECL allowances and provisions in CET1 capital in accordance with FINMA Circular 2013/1 “Eligible capital – banks”.
2
Prior periods have been revised.
3
Reflects the temporary exclusion of central bank deposits in all currencies from the leverage exposure, after adjusting for the dividend paid in 2020, in accordance with FINMA Guidance.
76

Macroprudential supervisor measures
The following table presents an overview of the geographical distribution of RWA for private sector credit exposures used in the calculation of the extended countercyclical buffer (CCyB).
CCyB1 - Geographical distribution of risk-weighted assets used in the CCyB

end of


CCyB
rate (%)
RWA used
in the
computation
of the CCyB
Bank-
specific
CCyB
rate (%)


CCyB
amount
4Q21 (CHF million)  
Hong Kong 1.00 1,835
Sweden 0.00 445
UK 0.00 10,969
France 0.00 2,232
Luxembourg 0.50 4,740
Germany 0.00 3,353
Subtotal  23,574
Other countries 0.00 125,890
Total 1 149,464 0.028 76
2Q21 (CHF million)  
Hong Kong 1.00 2,303
Sweden 0.00 547
UK 0.00 11,277
France 0.00 3,186
Luxembourg 0.25 4,644
Germany 0.00 3,402
Subtotal  25,359
Other countries 0.00 133,151
Total 1 158,510 0.022 62
1
Reflects the total of RWA for private sector credit exposures across all jurisdictions to which the Group is exposed, including jurisdictions with no CCyB rate or with a CCyB rate set at zero, and value of the Group specific CCyB rate and resulting CCyB amount.
77

Leverage metrics
Credit Suisse has adopted the BIS leverage ratio framework, as issued by the BCBS and implemented in Switzerland by FINMA.
> Refer to “Leverage metrics” (page 131) and “Swiss metrics” (pages 131 to 132) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Capital management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on leverage metrics, including the calculation methodology and movements in leverage exposures.
LR1 - Summary comparison of accounting assets vs leverage ratio exposure
end of 4Q21
Reconciliation of consolidated assets to leverage exposure (CHF million)  
Total consolidated assets as per published financial statements 755,833
Adjustment for investments in banking, financial, insurance or commercial entities that are consolidated for accounting purposes but outside the scope of regulatory consolidation   1 (9,386)
Adjustments for derivatives financial instruments 55,901
Adjustments for SFTs (i.e. repos and similar secured lending) (8,546)
Adjustments for off-balance sheet items (i.e. conversion to credit equivalent amounts of off-balance sheet exposures) 93,286
Other adjustments 2,049
Leverage exposure  889,137
1
Includes adjustments for investments in banking, financial, insurance or commercial entities that are consolidated for accounting purposes but outside the scope of regulatory consolidation and tier 1 capital deductions related to balance sheet assets.
LR2 - Leverage ratio common disclosure template
end of 4Q21 3Q21 1
Reconciliation of consolidated assets to leverage exposure (CHF million)  
On-balance sheet items (excluding derivatives and SFTs, but including collateral) 613,137 623,923
Asset amounts deducted from Basel III tier 1 capital (7,965) (8,716)
Total on-balance sheet exposures  605,172 615,207
Reconciliation of consolidated assets to leverage exposure (CHF million)  
Replacement cost associated with all derivatives transactions (i.e. net of eligible cash variation margin) 20,381 25,591
Add-on amounts for PFE associated with all derivatives transactions 52,405 59,850
Gross-up for derivatives collateral provided where deducted from the balance sheet assets pursuant to the operative accounting framework 17,869 19,298
Deductions of receivables assets for cash variation margin provided in derivatives transactions (17,118) (18,525)
Exempted CCP leg of client-cleared trade exposures (4,324) (5,609)
Adjusted effective notional amount of all written credit derivatives 201,987 253,031
Adjusted effective notional offsets and add-on deductions for written credit derivatives (197,528) (248,213)
Derivative Exposures  73,672 85,423
Securities financing transaction exposures (CHF million)  
Gross SFT assets (with no recognition of netting), after adjusting for sale accounting transactions 127,152 150,128
Netted amounts of cash payables and cash receivables of gross SFT assets (16,616) (16,569)
Counterparty credit risk exposure for SFT assets 6,471 8,554
Securities financing transaction exposures  117,007 142,113
Other off-balance sheet exposures (CHF million)  
Off-balance sheet exposure at gross notional amount 294,755 298,722
Adjustments for conversion to credit equivalent amounts (201,469) (204,046)
Other off-balance sheet exposures  93,286 94,676
Swiss tier 1 capital (CHF million)  
Swiss tier 1 capital  54,372 56,252
Leverage exposure (CHF million)  
Leverage exposure  889,137 937,419
Leverage ratio (%)  
Basel III leverage ratio  6.1 6.0
1
Prior period has been revised.
78

Liquidity
Liquidity risk management framework
Our liquidity and funding policy is designed to ensure that funding is available to meet all obligations in times of stress, whether caused by market events or issues specific to Credit Suisse.
> Refer to “Liquidity and funding management” (pages 112 to 120) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on our liquidity risk management framework including governance, stress testing, liquidity metrics, funding sources and uses and contractual maturity of assets and liabilities.
Liquidity coverage ratio
Our calculation methodology for the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is prescribed by the Liquidity Ordinance and the FINMA circular 2015/2 “Liquidity risk – banks”, as amended (Liquidity circular), and uses a three-month average that is measured using daily calculations during the quarter.
> Refer to “Liquidity metrics” (pages 114 to 116) and “Funding sources” (page 117) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Liquidity and funding management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on the Group’s liquidity coverage ratio, including high-quality liquid assets, liquidity pool and funding sources.
LIQ1 - Liquidity coverage ratio

end of 4Q21
Unweighted
value
1 Weighted
value
2
High-quality liquid assets (CHF million)
High-quality liquid assets 3 227,193
Cash outflows (CHF million)
Retail deposits and deposits from small business customers 161,444 19,555
   of which less stable deposits  161,444 19,555
Unsecured wholesale funding 256,295 95,093
   of which operational deposits (all counterparties) and deposits in networks of cooperative banks  51,456 12,864
   of which non-operational deposits (all counterparties)  128,747 65,849
   of which unsecured debt  16,328 16,328
Secured wholesale funding 29,344
Additional requirements 167,500 35,640
   of which outflows related to derivative exposures and other collateral requirements  59,383 13,763
   of which outflows related to loss of funding on debt products  199 199
   of which credit and liquidity facilities  107,918 21,678
Other contractual funding obligations 85,492 85,492
Other contingent funding obligations 201,750 3,663
Total cash outflows  268,787
Cash inflows (CHF million)
Secured lending 109,297 40,049
Inflows from fully performing exposures 60,810 28,270
Other cash inflows 88,312 88,312
Total cash inflows  258,419 156,631
Liquidity cover ratio (CHF million)
High-quality liquid assets 227,193
Net cash outflows 112,156
Liquidity coverage ratio (%)  203
Calculated based on an average of 67 data points in 4Q21.
1
Calculated as outstanding balances maturing or callable within 30 days.
2
Calculated after the application of haircuts for high-quality liquid assets or inflow and outflow rates.
3
Consists of cash and eligible securities as prescribed by FINMA and reflects a post-cancellation view.
79

Net stable funding ratio
Our calculation methodology for the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is prescribed by the Liquidity Ordinance and the Liquidity circular.
> Refer to “Net stable funding ratio” (page 116) in III – Treasury, Risk, Balance sheet and Off-balance sheet – Liquidity and funding management – Liquidity management in the Credit Suisse Annual Report 2021 for further information on the Group’s net stable funding ratio.
LIQ2 – Liquidity: information on the NSFR
   Values not weighted, according to residual maturities

end of 4Q21

No maturity

< 6 months
≥ 6 months
up to 1 year

≥ 1 year
Weighted
values
Information on the available stable funding (CHF million)  
Equity instruments 44,012 0 0 14,936 58,948
   of which regulatory capital 1 44,012 0 0 14,936 58,948
   of which other equity instruments  0 0 0 0 0
Demand deposits and/or term deposits of private customers and small business customers 131,067 22,298 9,476 13 146,869
   of which "stable" deposits  6,000 0 0 0 5,700
   of which "less stable" deposits  125,067 22,298 9,476 13 141,169
Funding deposited by non-financial institutions (without small business customers) (wholesale customers) 101,256 85,912 6,575 382 91,527
   of which operational deposits  36,387 0 0 0 18,193
   of which non-operational deposits  64,869 85,912 6,575 382 73,334
Liabilities with matching interdependent assets 0 0 0 0 0
Other exposures 91,282 88,938 23,854 118,899 139,512
   of which exposures arising from derivative transactions  9,263 0 0
   of which other exposures and equity instruments  91,282 79,675 23,854 118,899 139,512
Total available stable funding  436,856
Information on the required stable funding (CHF million)  
Total of HQLA NSFR 4,731
Operational deposits held at other financial institutions 8,540 4,270
Performing loans and securities 44,745 171,152 42,391 192,882 258,401
   of which performing loans to companies in the financial sector, secured    with category 1 and 2a HQLA    0 54,263 0 0 5,496
   of which performing loans to companies in the financial sector, secured    with non-category 1 or 2a HQLA or unsecured    7,544 41,707 11,753 20,289 33,965
   of which performing loans to companies outside the financial sector, to retail and small    business customers, to countries, central banks and sub-national public sector entities    7,697 62,686 17,144 74,475 105,598
      of which risk-weighted up to 35% under the SA-BIS  2 0 1 9,668 6,951
   of which performing loans for residential properties  0 10,762 12,555 84,572 75,288
      of which risk-weighted up to 35% under the SA-BIS  0 4,335 5,151 74,524 59,832
   of which non-defaulted securities that do not qualify as HQLA, including    exchange-traded shares    29,504 1,734 939 13,546 38,054
Assets with matching interdependent liabilities 0 0 0 0 0
Other assets 172,031 1,121 149 99,813 68,500
   of which physically traded commodities, including gold  1,389 1,181
   of which assets posted as initial margin for derivative contracts    and contributions to default funds of central counterparties    0 0 17,189 14,611
   of which NSFR assets in the form of derivatives  0 0 16,010 6,746
   of which NSFR derivative liabilities before deduction of variation margin posted  0 0 28,745 6,823
   of which all remaining assets  170,642 1,121 149 37,869 39,139
Off-balance sheet items 0 0 336,685 6,968
Total required stable funding  342,870
Net stable funding ratio (%)  127
1
Prior to regulatory deductions.
80

List of abbreviations
A  
ABS Asset-backed securities
ACVA Advanced credit valuation adjustment approach
A-IRB Advanced-internal ratings-based
AMA Advanced measurement approach
Art. Article
B  
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS Bank for International Settlements
C  
CALMC Capital Allocation and Liability Management Committee
CAO Capital Adequacy Ordinance
CCF Credit conversion factor
CCP Central counterparties
CCR Counterparty credit risk
CCyB Countercyclical buffer
CDS Credit default swap
CECL Current expected credit loss
CET1 Common equity tier 1
CFO Chief Financial Officer
CMBS Commercial mortgage-backed securities
CRO Chief Risk and Compliance Officer
CRM Credit risk mitigation
CVA Credit valuation adjustment
D  
D-SIB Domestic systemically important bank
E  
EAD Exposure at default
ECAI External credit assessment institutions
EEPE Effective expected positive exposure
EMIR European Market Infrastructure Regulation
EVE Economic value of equity
F  
FINMA Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA
F-IRB Foundation-internal ratings-based
FSB Financial Stability Board
G  
GDP Gross Domestic Product
G-SIB Global systemically important bank
I  
IAA Internal assessment approach
IMA Internal model approach
IMM Internal model method
IPRE Income producing real estate
IRB Internal ratings-based
IRRBB Interest rate risk in the banking book
IRC Incremental Risk Charge
L    
LCR Liquidity coverage ratio
LGD Loss given default
LRD Leverage ratio denominator
LTV Loan-to-value
M    
MACC Model Approval and Controls Committee
N    
NII Net interest income
N/A Not applicable
O    
OTC Over-the-counter
P    
P&L Profits and losses
PD Probability of default
PFE Potential future exposure
Q    
QCCP Qualifying central counterparty
R    
RMBS Residential mortgage-backed securities
RNIV Risks not in value-at-risk
RPSC Risk Processes & Standards Committee
RW Risk weight
RWA Risk-weighted assets
S    
SA Standardized approach
SA-CCR Standardized approach - counterparty credit risk
SEC-ERBA Securitization external ratings-based approach
SEC-IRBA Securitization internal ratings-based approach
SEC-SA Securitization standardized approach
SFT Securities financing transactions
SMM Standardized measurement method
SPE Special purpose entity
T    
TLAC Total loss-absorbing capacity
U    
US GAAP US generally accepted accounting principles
V    
VaR Value-at-risk
    
∆EVE Delta economic value of equity
∆NII Delta net interest income
81

Cautionary statement regarding forward-looking information
This document contains statements that constitute forward-looking statements. In addition, in the future we, and others on our behalf, may make statements that constitute forward-looking statements. Such forward-looking statements may include, without limitation, statements relating to the following:
our plans, targets or goals;
our future economic performance or prospects;
the potential effect on our future performance of certain contingencies; and
assumptions underlying any such statements.
Words such as “believes,” “anticipates,” “expects,” “intends” and “plans” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements but are not the exclusive means of identifying such statements. We do not intend to update these forward-looking statements.
By their very nature, forward-looking statements involve inherent risks and uncertainties, both general and specific, and risks exist that predictions, forecasts, projections and other outcomes described or implied in forward-looking statements will not be achieved. We caution you that a number of important factors could cause results to differ materially from the plans, targets, goals, expectations, estimates and intentions expressed in such forward-looking statements and that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic creates significantly greater uncertainty about forward-looking statements in addition to the factors that generally affect our business. These factors include:
the ability to maintain sufficient liquidity and access capital markets;
market volatility, increases in inflation and interest rate fluctuations or developments affecting interest rate levels;
the ongoing significant negative consequences of the Archegos and supply chain finance funds matters and our ability to successfully resolve these matters;
our ability to improve our risk management procedures and policies and hedging strategies;
the strength of the global economy in general and the strength of the economies of the countries in which we conduct our operations, in particular the risk of negative impacts of COVID-19 on the global economy and financial markets and the risk of continued slow economic recovery or downturn in the EU, the US or other developed countries or in emerging markets in 2022 and beyond;
the emergence of widespread health emergencies, infectious diseases or pandemics, such as COVID-19, and the actions that may be taken by governmental authorities to contain the outbreak or to counter its impact;
potential risks and uncertainties relating to the severity of impacts from COVID-19 and the duration of the pandemic, including potential material adverse effects on our business, financial condition and results of operations;
the direct and indirect impacts of deterioration or slow recovery in residential and commercial real estate markets;
adverse rating actions by credit rating agencies in respect of us, sovereign issuers, structured credit products or other credit-related exposures;
the ability to achieve our strategic goals, including those related to our targets, ambitions and financial goals;
the ability of counterparties to meet their obligations to us and the adequacy of our allowance for credit losses;
the effects of, and changes in, fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, trade and tax policies;
the effects of currency fluctuations, including the related impact on our business, financial condition and results of operations due to moves in foreign exchange rates;
geopolitical and diplomatic tensions, instabilities and conflicts, including war, civil unrest, terrorist activity, sanctions or other geopolitical events or escalations of hostilities;
political, social and environmental developments, including climate change;
the ability to appropriately address social, environmental and sustainability concerns that may arise from our business activities;
the effects of, and the uncertainty arising from, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU;
the possibility of foreign exchange controls, expropriation, nationalization or confiscation of assets in countries in which we conduct our operations;
operational factors such as systems failure, human error, or the failure to implement procedures properly;
the risk of cyber attacks, information or security breaches or technology failures on our reputation, business or operations, the risk of which is increased while large portions of our employees work remotely;
the adverse resolution of litigation, regulatory proceedings and other contingencies;
actions taken by regulators with respect to our business and practices and possible resulting changes to our business organization, practices and policies in countries in which we conduct our operations;
the effects of changes in laws, regulations or accounting or tax standards, policies or practices in countries in which we conduct our operations;
the discontinuation of LIBOR and other interbank offered rates and the transition to alternative reference rates;
the potential effects of changes in our legal entity structure;
competition or changes in our competitive position in geographic and business areas in which we conduct our operations;
the ability to retain and recruit qualified personnel;
the ability to protect our reputation and promote our brand;
the ability to increase market share and control expenses;
technological changes instituted by us, our counterparties or competitors;
the timely development and acceptance of our new products and services and the perceived overall value of these products and services by users;
acquisitions, including the ability to integrate acquired businesses successfully, and divestitures, including the ability to sell non-core assets; and
other unforeseen or unexpected events and our success at managing these and the risks involved in the foregoing.
We caution you that the foregoing list of important factors is not exclusive. When evaluating forward-looking statements, you should carefully consider the foregoing factors and other uncertainties and events, including the information set forth in “Risk factors” in I – Information on the company in our Annual Report 2021.
82

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