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WILSHIRE ENTERPRISES, INC.
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Full Value Partners L.P.
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Leading Independent Proxy Advisory Firm Supports Full Value Partners Over
Incumbents at Wilshire Enterprises, Inc. (AMEX: WOC)

Saddle Brook, NJ, March 12, 2009 -- Full Value Partners L.P. announced today
that Proxy Governance, Inc, a leading independent proxy advisory firm,
strongly recommends that shareholders of Wilshire Enterprises vote on Full
Values green proxy card FOR Full Values nominees and FOR all shareholder
proposals at the annual meeting on March 24, 2009.  In making its
recommendation, Proxy Governance provided the following reasons:

1.	While no good strategic plan is without risk, we find the dissidents
        core arguments compelling   this new strategic plan, heavily reliant
        on a management team demonstrably better at promising than executing,
        amid a spectacular market decline which may still not have reached
        its bottom, is at best unlikely.

2.	To argue that success is more likely because the board has added two
        new directors, in Orphanides and Swill, only underscores the point:
        the years-long decline in shareholder value is a phenomenon the
        incumbent board has been either unwilling or unable to address, even
        in when the market was good.

3.	The question facing shareholders, however, is not strategic but
        tactical: is this a board and management team which has demonstrated
        the ability to execute on such a strategy, particularly given its
        risks? Successful execution of a strategy involving purchase of
        promissory notes or mortgages from distressed sellers, for example,
        would seem to rely less on expertise in real estate operations than
        on some advanced expertise in credit analysis, economic modeling, and
        risk management   in none of which the company claims a competitive
        advantage versus the distressed lenders from which it would buy those
        financial assets.

4.	To the extent that the company finances these purchases through lines
        of credit, moreover  particularly if that financing is not
        non-recourse  the strategic plan becomes more about transforming the
        companys core operations from real estate into financial arbitrage.
        Arbitrage may well be a successful business model; it is not, however,
        low-risk, and to our knowledge no one has yet demonstrated that it is
        a natural second act for a struggling real estate company.

5.	Shareholders may be better served, therefore, by electing the two
        dissident nominees to bring new energy and a public shareholder
        perspective to a board which has been demonstrably unable to address
        the companys ongoing decline.

6.	While we also generally question whether liquidation is the best
        solution to being undervalued by the market, we note that a market cap
        which is so significantly below the value of the companys cash on hand
        signals not the markets ignorance, but its strong skepticism, of
        incumbent managements ability to deliver on the strategic plan it has
        articulated. Accordingly, we believe shareholders will also be better
        served by endorsing the dissidents shareholder resolution
        (see Proposal 4) urging the board to consider an orderly liquidation
        event for the company.

Proxy Governance concluded its analysis as follows:

As the incumbent board has been demonstrably unable to address the companys
ongoing decline, and yet has recently articulated a new strategic growth plan
heavily reliant on the executive abilities of incumbent board and management
team, we believe shareholders may be better served by electing the two
dissident nominees.

Commenting on the Proxy Governance recommendation, Phillip Goldstein, a
principal of Full Value Partners said, We are pleased that Proxy Governance
has recognized managements history of failure and that it is time for a
change. Shareholders deserve more than lame excuses.  If we prevail at the
annual meeting, we intend to seek a court order to permit us to conduct a cash
tender offer at $2 per share.

Proxy Governance is widely recognized as a leading independent proxy advisory
firm. Its recommendations are relied upon by many institutional investment
firms and other fiduciaries throughout the United States.


Company Contacts:  Phillip Goldstein: 914-747-5262

                   Andrew Dakos: 201-556-0092


Source: Full Value Partners L.P.