SPDR SERIES TRUST

Supplement dated November 29, 2023 to the Statement of Additional Information (the “SAI”)

dated October 31, 2023, as may be supplemented from time to time

1. Effective immediately, the discussion in the “PROXY VOTING POLICIES” section in the SAI is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

The Board has delegated the responsibility to vote proxies on securities held by the Funds to the Adviser for all Funds, subject to certain exceptions. Proxy voting for the Municipal Bond ETFs (to the extent applicable) has been delegated to the sub-adviser, Nuveen Asset Management, LLC (“Nuveen Asset Management”). The Board has retained authority to vote proxies for certain bank and bank holding company securities (“Bank Securities”) that may be held by one or more Funds from time to time. The Board has adopted the Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.’s (“ISS”) benchmark proxy voting policy with respect to voting such Bank Securities’ proxies. The Board has retained this authority in order to permit the Adviser to utilize exemptions from limitations arising under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended, that might otherwise prevent the Adviser from investing a Fund’s assets in Bank Securities.

Certain Funds that employ an equity index strategy (each such Fund, an “Eligible Fund” and, collectively, the “Eligible Funds”) participate in a proxy voting program (the “Program”) administered by the Adviser through which Eligible Fund shareholders identified by Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (as described below) have the option of selecting an alternative, third-party proxy voting policy that the Fund will use to vote proxies on securities, including Bank Securities, corresponding to the percentage of the Eligible Fund owned by the shareholder as of the record date of the applicable shareholder meeting. The proxy voting policies made available through the Program comprise proxy voting policies maintained by ISS (each such proxy voting policy, a “Program Proxy Voting Policy”). If an Eligible Fund shareholder does not make a Program Proxy Voting Policy selection, the Eligible Fund’s proxies corresponding to the percentage of such shareholder’s ownership of the Eligible Fund will be voted in accordance with the Adviser’s proxy voting policy, except with respect to proxies on Bank Securities, which will be voted in accordance with the ISS benchmark proxy voting policy. In an unusual case, the Adviser may override a vote that would otherwise be made pursuant to a Program Proxy Voting Policy if the Adviser determines that it is not in the best interests of the Eligible Fund and its shareholders to vote pursuant to such Program Proxy Voting Policy. This might be the case, for example, if the Adviser becomes aware that ISS is planning to vote in a way that creates material concerns related to a conflict of interest with ISS; if the Adviser believes that the voting position, if successful, might have a material impact on an Eligible Fund’s ability to trade the security; if the Adviser determines that sanctions affecting a company or an individual prevent such a vote; if issuer specific documentation or market confirmation is required; or if the Adviser determines that custodial restrictions or expenses make voting in accordance with the policy inadvisable or impracticable. In the unusual event the Adviser overrides a proxy vote that would otherwise be made pursuant to a Program Proxy Voting Policy, such proxy will be voted in accordance with the Adviser’s proxy voting policy, except with respect to proxies on Bank Securities, which will be voted in accordance with the ISS benchmark proxy voting policy.

The Adviser has engaged Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”) to periodically, but at least annually, identify beneficial owners of Eligible Fund shares held through a financial intermediary for participation in the Program. Eligible Fund shareholders that do not own their Eligible Fund shares as of the most recent date used by Broadridge for shareholder identification purposes will not be able to participate in the Program (but may be eligible to participate in the future if identified as an Eligible Fund shareholder by Broadridge at a later date). It is also possible that some Eligible Fund shareholders that own Eligible Fund shares as of the most recent date used by Broadridge for shareholder identification purposes may not be able to participate in the Program if the beneficial ownership information for their shares is not immediately available to Broadridge (e.g., where a shareholder’s financial intermediary is not part of Broadridge’s network of financial intermediaries that provides shareholder information to Broadridge or where a shareholder has objected to its financial intermediary releasing the shareholder’s personal

information to issuers for proxy voting purposes). Eligible Fund shareholders identified by Broadridge will receive a communication that will invite such shareholders to participate in the Program by selecting a Program Proxy Voting Policy on the Program’s website. Shareholders should carefully read Program communications and the Program’s website for more details regarding how Eligible Fund shareholders may participate in the Program, how Eligible Fund shareholders may change or cancel their Program Proxy Voting Policy selection, risk factors associated with the Program and how an Eligible Fund shareholder’s selection of a specific Program Proxy Voting Policy will be implemented. Shareholders may call 1-866-787-2257 for a list of Funds that are currently participating in the Program.

Each of the Trust’s, the Adviser’s and Nuveen Asset Management’s proxy voting policy, ISS’ benchmark proxy voting policy, as well as each Program Proxy Voting Policy, is attached as an appendix to this SAI. Information regarding how a Fund voted proxies relating to its portfolio securities during the most recent twelve-month period ended June 30 is available: (1) without charge by calling 1-866-787-2257; (2) on the Funds’ website at https://www.ssga.com/spdrs; and (3) on the SEC’s website at https://www.sec.gov.

2. Effective immediately, the Program Proxy Voting Policy documents attached hereto are attached as an appendix to the SAI.

PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE

APPENDIX F – IVC PROGRAM PROXY VOTING POLICY DOCUMENTS

SSGA – VOTE WITH COMPANY BOARD RECOMMENDATION

Custom Policy developed by ISS for use solely in State Street Global Advisors’ proxy voting program

2023

ISS

Proxy Advisory | Proxy Voting | Securities Class Action Services | Global Proxy Distribution

                             F-1

SSGA – Vote With Company Board Recommendation Policy

Default Position	Vote in accordance with the recommendation of the company’s board of directors as set forth on the applicable proxy statement on all items where a company’s board of directors recommendation can be provided and exists.
	•  If the company’s board of directors provides no vote recommendation (company’s board of directors’ vote recommendation = NONE), then ABSTAIN.
	•  In certain limited cases, proxies seek factual information about shareholders (e.g., if the shareholder is a citizen of the country where the vote is being held, or if the shareholder has a personal interest in the proposed agenda item). In such cases, the proxy form instructs shareholders on how to vote based on factual circumstances and State Street Global Advisors will provide the factual information requested on behalf of the fund holding the securities.

ISS  |  Institutional Shareholder Services                              F-2 2

For more information, please visit: www.issgovernance.com

ISS  |  Institutional Shareholder Services                              F-3 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	F-10
1.    Board of Directors	F-11
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections	F-11
Independence	F-11
ISS Classification of Directors – U.S.	F-12
Composition	F-14
Attendance	F-14
Overboarded Directors	F-14
Gender Diversity	F-14
Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity	F-14
Responsiveness	F-15
Accountability	F-15
Poison Pills	F-15
Unequal Voting Rights	F-16
Classified Board Structure	F-16
Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards	F-16
Problematic Governance Structure	F-16
Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments	F-17
Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals	F-17
Director Performance Evaluation	F-17
Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions	F-18
Problematic Audit-Related Practices	F-18
Problematic Compensation Practices	F-18
Problematic Pledging of Company Stock	F-19
Governance Failures	F-19
Voting on Director Nominees in Contested Elections	F-19
Vote-No Campaigns	F-19
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access	F-19
Other Board-Related Proposals	F-20
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy	F-20
Board Refreshment	F-20
Term/Tenure Limits	F-20
Age Limits	F-20
Board Size	F-20
Classification/Declassification of the Board	F-20
CEO Succession Planning	F-21
Cumulative Voting	F-21
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation	F-21
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	F-22
Establish Other Board Committee Proposals	F-22
Filling Vacancies/Removal of Directors	F-22
Independent Board Chair	F-22
Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees	F-23
Majority Vote Standard for the Election of Directors	F-23
Proxy Access	F-23

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Require More Nominees than Open Seats		F-23
Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee)		F-24
2.    Audit- Related		F-25
Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability		F-25
Auditor Ratification		F-25
Shareholder Proposals Limiting Non-Audit Services		F-25
Shareholder Proposals on Audit Firm Rotation		F-26
3.    Shareholder Rights  & Defenses		F-27
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations		F-27
Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent		F-27
Control Share Acquisition Provisions		F-27
Control Share Cash-Out Provisions		F-28
Disgorgement Provisions		F-28
Fair Price Provisions		F-28
Freeze-Out Provisions		F-28
Greenmail		F-28
Shareholder Litigation Rights		F-28
Federal Forum Selection Provisions		F-28
Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters		F-29
Fee shifting		F-29
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments		F-30
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)	F-30
Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy		F-30
Management Proposals to Ratify a Poison Pill		F-30
Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)		F-31
Proxy Voting Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Tabulation		F-31
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions		F-31
Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses		F-32
Reincorporation Proposals		F-32
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent		F-32
Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings		F-33
Stakeholder Provisions		F-33
State Antitakeover Statutes		F-33
Supermajority Vote Requirements		F-33
Virtual Shareholder Meetings		F-34
4.    Capital/Restructuring		F-35
Capital		F-35
Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock		F-35
Common Stock Authorization		F-35
General Authorization Requests		F-35
Specific Authorization Requests		F-36
Dual Class Structure		F-36
Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan		F-36
Preemptive Rights		F-36
Preferred Stock Authorization		F-36
General Authorization Requests		F-36
Recapitalization Plans		F-37
Reverse Stock Splits		F-38

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Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.		F-38
Share Repurchase Programs		F-38
Share Repurchase Programs Shareholder Proposals		F-39
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends		F-39
Tracking Stock		F-39
Restructuring		F-39
Appraisal Rights		F-39
Asset Purchases		F-39
Asset Sales		F-39
Bundled Proposals		F-40
Conversion of Securities		F-40
Corporate Reorganization/Debt Restructuring/Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans/Reverse Leveraged Buyouts/Wrap Plans		F-40
Formation of Holding Company		F-40
Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)		F-41
Joint Ventures		F-41
Liquidations		F-42
Mergers and Acquisitions		F-42
Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures		F-42
Reorganization/Restructuring Plan (Bankruptcy)		F-43
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)		F-44
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions		F-44
Spin-offs		F-45
Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals		F-45
5.    Compensation		F-46
Executive Pay Evaluation		F-46
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation—Management Proposals (Say-on-Pay)		F-46
Pay-for-Performance Evaluation		F-47
Problematic Pay Practices		F-48
Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness		F-49
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”)		F-49
Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale		F-49
Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans		F-50
Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)		F-51
Three-Year Value-Adjusted Burn Rate		F-51
Egregious Factors		F-51
Liberal Change in Control Definition		F-51
Repricing Provisions		F-52
Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect		F-52
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))		F-52
Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations	F-53
Dividend Equivalent Rights	F-53
Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)	F-53
Other Compensation Plans	F-53
401(k) Employee Benefit Plans	F-53
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)	F-53
Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Qualified Plans	F-53
Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Non-Qualified Plans	F-54

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Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options	F-54
Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash	F-55
Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs	F-55
Director Compensation	F-56
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs	F-56
Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors	F-56
Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans	F-56
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation	F-57
Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”	F-57
Compensation Consultants—Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization	F-57
Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors	F-57
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits	F-57
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time	F-58
Pay Disparity	F-58
Pay for Performance/Performance-Based Awards	F-58
Pay for Superior Performance	F-59
Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)	F-59
Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees	F-59
Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances	F-59
Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes	F-60
Share Buyback Impact on Incentive Program Metrics	F-60
Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)	F-60
Tax Gross-Up Proposals	F-61
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment/Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity	F-61
6.    Routine/Miscellaneous	F-62
Adjourn Meeting	F-62
Amend Quorum Requirements	F-62
Amend Minor Bylaws	F-62
Change Company Name	F-62
Change Date, Time, or Location of Annual Meeting	F-62
Other Business	F-62
7.     Environmental and Social Issues	F-63
Global Approach – E&S-related Proposals	F-63
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals	F-63
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals	F-63
8.    Mutual Fund Proxies	F-64
Election of Directors	F-64
Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes	F-64
Converting Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund	F-64
Proxy Contests	F-64
Investment Advisory Agreements	F-64
Approving New Classes or Series of Shares	F-65
Preferred Stock Proposals	F-65
1940 Act Policies	F-65
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction	F-65
Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Nonfundamental	F-65
Name Change Proposals	F-65
Change in Fund’s Subclassification	F-66
Business Development Companies—Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value	F-66
Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation	F-66

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Changes to the Charter Document	F-66
Changing the Domicile of a Fund	F-67
Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval	F-67
Distribution Agreements	F-67
Master-Feeder Structure	F-67
Mergers	F-67
Shareholder Proposals for Mutual Funds	F-67
Establish Director Ownership Requirement	F-67
Reimburse Shareholder for Expenses Incurred	F-68
Terminate the Investment Advisor	F-68

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Introduction

ISS’ Global Board-Aligned Policy is designed to enable subscribing investors to vote in a manner that upholds foundational corporate governance principles as a means of protecting and maximizing their investments, whilst generally aligning with issuers’ board recommendations for voting on environmental and social matters.

On matters of corporate governance, executive compensation, and corporate structure, the Global Board-Aligned Policy guidelines are focused on widely accepted good standards of corporate governance and shareholder rights protection, and on the creation and preservation of economic value. On environmental or social matters, the Global Board-Aligned Policy will generally be in line with the board’s recommendations, with support limited to circumstances where it is considered that greater disclosure will directly enhance or protect shareholder value and is reflective of a clearly established reporting standard in the market. Details are as further described in these guidelines.

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1.   Board of Directors

Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections

Four fundamental principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:

Independence: Boards should be sufficiently independent from management (and significant shareholders) to ensure that they are able and motivated to effectively supervise management’s performance for the benefit of all shareholders, including in setting and monitoring the execution of corporate strategy, with appropriate use of shareholder capital, and in setting and monitoring executive compensation programs that support that strategy. The chair of the board should ideally be an independent director, and all boards should have an independent leadership position or a similar role in order to help provide appropriate counterbalance to executive management, as well as having sufficiently independent committees that focus on key governance concerns such as audit, compensation, and nomination of directors.

Composition: Companies should ensure that directors add value to the board through their specific skills and expertise and by having sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives.

Responsiveness: Directors should respond to investor input, such as that expressed through significant opposition to management proposals, significant support for shareholder proposals (whether binding or non-binding), and tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered.

Accountability: Boards should be sufficiently accountable to shareholders, including through transparency of the company’s governance practices and regular board elections, by the provision of sufficient information for shareholders to be able to assess directors and board composition, and through the ability of shareholders to remove directors.

General Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees¹ considered on case-by-case basis):

Independence

Vote against² or withhold from non-independent directors (Executive Directors and Non-Independent Non-Executive Directors per ISS’ Classification of Directors) when:

§ Independent directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board;

§ The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;

§ The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or

§ The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.

¹ A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question.

² In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use “Withhold” as the contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use “Against”. However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.

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ISS Classification of Directors – U.S.

1. Executive Director

1.1. Current officer¹ of the company or one of its affiliates².

2. Non-Independent Non-Executive Director

Board Identification

2.1. Director identified as not independent by the board.

Controlling/Significant Shareholder

2.2. Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group).

Current Employment at Company or Related Company

2.3. Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives).

2.4. Officer¹, former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company.

Former Employment

2.5. Former CEO of the company. ^{3, 4}

2.6. Former non-CEO officer¹ of the company or an affiliate² within the past five years. 2.7. Former officer¹ of an acquired company within the past five years.⁴

2.8. Officer¹ of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years.

2.9. Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made.⁵

Family Members

2.10. Immediate family member⁶ of a current or former officer¹ of the company or its affiliates² within the last five years.

2.11. Immediate family member⁶ of a current employee of company or its affiliates² where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role).

Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships

2.12. Director who (or whose immediate family member⁶) currently provides professional services⁷ in excess of $10,000 per year to: the company, an affiliate², or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; or who is (or whose immediate family member⁶ is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services.

2.13. Director who (or whose immediate family member⁶) currently has any material transactional relationship⁸ with the company or its affiliates²; or who is (or whose immediate family member⁶ is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationship⁸ (excluding investments in the company through a private placement).

2.14. Director who (or whose immediate family member⁶) is a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments⁸ from the company or its affiliates².

Other Relationships

2.15. Party to a voting agreement⁹ to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote.

2.16. Has (or an immediate family member⁶ has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its Compensation Committee.¹⁰

2.17. Founder¹¹ of the company but not currently an employee.

2.18. Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers. 2.19. Any material¹² relationship with the company.

3. Independent Director

3.1. No material¹² connection to the company other than a board seat.

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Footnotes:

1. The definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will generally be classified as a Non-Independent Non-Executive Director under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation exceeding $10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Director.

2. “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. ISS uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.

3. Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).

4. When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, ISS will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

5. ISS will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. ISS will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.

6. “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

7. Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services, commercial banking (beyond deposit services), investment services, insurance services, accounting/audit services, consulting services, marketing services, legal services, property management services, realtor services, lobbying services, executive search services, and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services, IT tech support services, educational services, and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of $10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.

8. A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity, exceeding the greater of: $200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, for a company that follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of $1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, for a company that follows NYSE listing standards. For a company that follows neither of the preceding standards, ISS will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).

9. Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as Independent Directors if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders’ interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

10. Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on each other’s boards and at least one serves on the other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).

11. The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, ISS may deem him or her an Independent Director.

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12. For purposes of ISS’s director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal, or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

Composition

Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except nominees who served only part of the fiscal year³) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:

§ Medical issues/illness;

§ Family emergencies; and

§ Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).

In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.

If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.

Overboarded Directors: Generally vote against or withhold from individual directors who:

§ Sit on more than five public company boards; or

§ Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own—withhold only at their outside boards⁴.

Gender Diversity: Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at companies where there are no women on the company’s board. An exception will be made if there was at least one woman on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to return to a gender-diverse status within a year.

Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity:For companies in the Russell 3000 or S&P 1500 indices, generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) where the board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse members⁵. An exception will be made if there was racial and/or ethnic diversity on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to appoint at least one racial and/or ethnic diverse member within a year.

³ Nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy.

⁴ Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards with publicly-traded common stock will be counted as separate boards, ISS will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

⁵ Aggregate diversity statistics provided by the board will only be considered if specific to racial and/or ethnic diversity.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-14 11 of 66

Responsiveness

Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

§ The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:

§ Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;

§ Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;

§ The subject matter of the proposal;

§ The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;

§ Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;

§ The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

§ The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;

§ At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.

Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Say on Pay proposal if:

§ The company’s previous say-on-pay received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast. Factors that will be considered are:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

§ The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.

Accountability

PROBLEMATIC TAKEOVER DEFENSES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Poison Pills: Generally vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if:

§ The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature⁶;

§ The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or

⁶ If a short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, ISS will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-15 12 of 66

§ The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders⁷.

Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill⁶ (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:

§ The disclosed rationale for the adoption;

§ The trigger;

§ The company’s market capitalization (including absolute level and sudden changes);

§ A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; and

§ Other factors as relevant.

Unequal Voting Rights: Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a common stock structure with unequal voting rights⁸.

Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:

§ Newly-public companies⁹ with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public;

§ Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs;

§ Situations where the super-voting shares represent less than 5% of total voting power and therefore considered to be de minimis; or

§ The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained.

Classified Board Structure: The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.

Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards: The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.

Problematic Governance Structure: For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting⁹ of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights:

§ Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ A classified board structure; or

§ Other egregious provisions.

A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.

Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

⁷ Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient.

⁸ This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”).

⁹ Includes companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-16 13 of 66

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments: Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:

§ The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;

§ Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;

§ The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;

§ The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ The company’s existing governance provisions;

§ The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and

§ Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:

§ Classified the board;

§ Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws;

§ Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or

§ Adopted another provision deemed egregious.

Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals:Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the governance committee if:

§ The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.

Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Generally continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.

Director Performance Evaluation:The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:

§ A classified board structure;

§ A supermajority vote requirement;

§ Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections, or a majority vote standard in contested elections;

§ The inability of shareholders to call special meetings;

§ The inability of shareholders to act by written consent;

§ A multi-class capital structure; and/or

§ A non-shareholder-approved poison pill.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-17 14 of 66

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions:Vote against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board, where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the Audit Committee if:

§ The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive;

§ The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or

§ There is persuasive evidence that the Audit Committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote case-by-case on members of the Audit Committee and potentially the full board if:

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted.

Problematic Compensation Practices

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item or in egregious situations, vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

§ The company maintains significant problematic pay practices; or

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Generally vote against or withhold from the Compensation Committee chair, other committee members, or potentially the full board if:

§ The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or

§ The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.

Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-18 15 of 66

Problematic Pledging of Company Stock: Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:

§ The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;

§ The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;

§ Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;

§ Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and

§ Any other relevant factors.

Governance Failures

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:

§ Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight¹⁰, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;

§ Failure to replace management as appropriate; or

§ Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

Voting on Director Nominees in Contested Elections

Vote-No Campaigns

General Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote-no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.

Proxy Contests/Proxy Access

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:

§ Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;

§ Management’s track record;

§ Background to the contested election;

§ Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;

§ Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;

§ Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and

§ Stock ownership positions.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether there are more candidates than board seats).

¹⁰ Examples of failure of risk oversight include but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; significant adverse legal judgments or settlement; or hedging of company stock.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-19 16 of 66

Other Board-Related Proposals

Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use of company stock will be considered.

Board Refreshment

Board refreshment is best implemented through an ongoing program of individual director evaluations, conducted annually, to ensure the evolving needs of the board are met and to bring in fresh perspectives, skills, and diversity as needed.

Term/Tenure Limits

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals regarding director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit;

§ The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process;

§ Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures;

§ Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to non-independent directors; and

§ Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for the company to adopt director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The scope of the shareholder proposal; and

§ Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment.

Age Limits

General Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.

Board Size

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals seeking to fix the board size or designate a range for the board size.

Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board outside of a specified range without shareholder approval.

Classification/Declassification of the Board

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board.

Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-20 17 of 66

CEO Succession Planning

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering, at a minimum, the following factors:

§ The reasonableness/scope of the request; and

§ The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.

Cumulative Voting

General Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulate voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting, unless:

§ The company has proxy access¹¹, thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and

§ The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (insider voting power > 50%).

Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals on director and officer indemnification, liability protection, and exculpation¹².

Consider the stated rationale for the proposed change. Also consider, among other factors, the extent to which the proposal would:

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care.

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of loyalty.

§ Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.

§ Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.

Vote for those proposals providing such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if both of the following apply:

§ If the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and

If only the individual’s legal expenses would be covered.

¹¹ A proxy access right that meets the recommended guidelines.

¹² Indemnification: the condition of being secured against loss or damage.

Limited liability: a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff.

Exculpation: to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director or officer to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-21 18 of 66

Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and the degree to which they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:

§ The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;

§ The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Establish Other Board Committee Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee, as such proposals seek a specific oversight mechanism/structure that potentially limits a company’s flexibility to determine an appropriate oversight mechanism for itself. However, the following factors will be considered:

§ Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Filling Vacancies/Removal of Directors

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.

Vote for proposals to restore shareholders’ ability to remove directors with or without cause.

Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.

Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.

Independent Board Chair

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requiring that the board chair position be filled by an independent director, taking into consideration the following:

§ The scope and rationale of the proposal;

§ The company’s current board leadership structure;

§ The company’s governance structure and practices;

§ Company performance; and

§ Any other relevant factors that may be applicable.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-22 19 of 66

The following factors will increase the likelihood of a “for” recommendation:

§ A majority non-independent board and/or the presence of non-independent directors on key board committees;

§ A weak or poorly-defined lead independent director role that fails to serve as an appropriate counterbalance to a combined CEO/chair role;

§ The presence of an executive or non-independent chair in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chair, and/or departure from a structure with an independent chair;

§ Evidence that the board has failed to oversee and address material risks facing the company;

§ A material governance failure, particularly if the board has failed to adequately respond to shareholder concerns or if the board has materially diminished shareholder rights; or

§ Evidence that the board has failed to intervene when management’s interests are contrary to shareholders’ interests.

Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees

General Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed threshold by ISS’ definition of Independent

Director (See ISS’ Classification of Directors.)

Vote for shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors unless they currently meet that standard.

Majority Vote Standard for the Election of Directors

General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections. Vote against if no carve-out for a plurality vote standard in contested elections is included.

Generally vote for precatory and binding shareholder resolutions requesting that the board change the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.

Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.

Proxy Access

General Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:

§ Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power;

§ Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group;

§ Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group;

§ Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board.

Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access. Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

Require More Nominees than Open Seats

General Recommendation: Vote against shareholder proposals that would require a company to nominate more candidates than the number of open board seats.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-23 20 of 66

Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee)

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:

§ Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board;

§ Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;

§ Company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals, or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and

§ The company has an independent chair or a lead director, according to ISS’ definition. This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-24 21 of 66

2.   Audit-Related

Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the issue of auditor indemnification and limitation of liability. Factors to be assessed include, but are not limited to:

§ The terms of the auditor agreement—the degree to which these agreements impact shareholders’ rights;

§ The motivation and rationale for establishing the agreements;

§ The quality of the company’s disclosure; and

§ The company’s historical practices in the audit area.

Vote against or withhold from members of an audit committee in situations where there is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Auditor Ratification

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to ratify auditors unless any of the following apply:

§ An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;

§ There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position;

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as fraud or misapplication of GAAP; or

§ Fees for non-audit services (“Other” fees) are excessive.

Non-audit fees are excessive if:

§ Non-audit (“other”) fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees

Tax compliance and preparation include the preparation of original and amended tax returns and refund claims, and tax payment planning. All other services in the tax category, such as tax advice, planning, or consulting, should be added to “Other” fees. If the breakout of tax fees cannot be determined, add all tax fees to “Other” fees.

In circumstances where “Other” fees include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (such as initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs) and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees that are an exception to the standard “non-audit fee” category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit/audit-related fees/tax compliance and preparation for purposes of determining whether non-audit fees are excessive.

Shareholder Proposals Limiting Non-Audit Services

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to prohibit or limit their auditors from engaging in non-audit services.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-25 22 of 66

Shareholder Proposals on Audit Firm Rotation

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for audit firm rotation, taking into account:

§ The tenure of the audit firm;

§ The length of rotation specified in the proposal;

§ Any significant audit-related issues at the company;

§ The number of Audit Committee meetings held each year;

§ The number of financial experts serving on the committee; and

§ Whether the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated for both audit quality and competitive price.

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3.   Shareholder Rights & Defenses

Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory, and shareholder review.

To be reasonable, the company’s deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year’s meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120-day window). The submittal window is the period under which shareholders must file their proposals/nominations prior to the deadline.

In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent’s economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.

Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.

Vote case-by-case on proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders, taking into account the following:

§ Any impediments to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws (i.e. supermajority voting requirements);

§ The company’s ownership structure and historical voting turnout;

§ Whether the board could amend bylaws adopted by shareholders; and

§ Whether shareholders would retain the ability to ratify any board-initiated amendments.

Control Share Acquisition Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.

Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.

Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.

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Control Share Cash-Out Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.

Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to “cash-out” of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.

Disgorgement Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.

Disgorgement provisions require an acquirer or potential acquirer of more than a certain percentage of a company’s stock to disgorge, or pay back, to the company any profits realized from the sale of that company’s stock purchased 24 months before achieving control status. All sales of company stock by the acquirer occurring within a certain period of time (between 18 months and 24 months) prior to the investor’s gaining control status are subject to these recapture-of-profits provisions.

Fair Price Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions (provisions that stipulate that an acquirer must pay the same price to acquire all shares as it paid to acquire the control shares), evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.

Generally vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.

Freeze-Out Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions. Freeze-out provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.

Greenmail

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to adopt anti-greenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.

Vote case-by-case on anti-greenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.

Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of its shares, the practice discriminates against all other shareholders.

Shareholder Litigation Rights

Federal Forum Selection Provisions

Federal forum selection provisions require that U.S. federal courts be the sole forum for shareholders to litigate claims arising under federal securities law.

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General Recommendation: Generally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify “the district courts of the United States” as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

Vote against provisions that restrict the forum to a particular federal district court; unilateral adoption (without a shareholder vote) of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters

Exclusive forum provisions in the charter or bylaws restrict shareholders’ ability to bring derivative lawsuits against the company, for claims arising out of state corporate law, to the courts of a particular state (generally the state of incorporation).

General Recommendation: Generally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the state of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

For states other than Delaware, vote case-by-case on exclusive forum provisions, taking into consideration:

§ The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision;

§ Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum;

§ The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and

§ Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.

Generally vote against provisions that specify a state other than the state of incorporation as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters, or that specify a particular local court within the state; unilateral adoption of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Fee shifting

Fee-shifting provisions in the charter or bylaws require that a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation and its directors and officers.

General Recommendation: Generally vote against provisions that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).

Unilateral adoption of a fee-shifting provision will generally be considered an ongoing failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

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Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing 5-percent holder);

§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);

§ The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy

General Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: (1) A shareholder-approved poison pill in place; or (2) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:

§ Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or

§ The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.

If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.

Management Proposals to Ratify a Poison Pill

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:

§ No lower than a 20 percent trigger, flip-in or flip-over;

§ A term of no more than three years;

§ No deadhand, slowhand, no-hand, or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;

§ Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.

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In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.

Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent);

§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);

§ The company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Proxy Voting Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Tabulation

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding proxy voting mechanics, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder rights. Specific issues covered under the policy include, but are not limited to, confidential voting of individual proxies and ballots, confidentiality of running vote tallies, and the treatment of abstentions and/or broker non-votes in the company’s vote-counting methodology.

While a variety of factors may be considered in each analysis, the guiding principles are: transparency, consistency, and fairness in the proxy voting process. The factors considered, as applicable to the proposal, may include:

§ The scope and structure of the proposal;

§ The company’s stated confidential voting policy (or other relevant policies) and whether it ensures a “level playing field” by providing shareholder proponents with equal access to vote information prior to the annual meeting;

§ The company’s vote standard for management and shareholder proposals and whether it ensures consistency and fairness in the proxy voting process and maintains the integrity of vote results;

§ Whether the company’s disclosure regarding its vote counting method and other relevant voting policies with respect to management and shareholder proposals are consistent and clear;

§ Any recent controversies or concerns related to the company’s proxy voting mechanics;

§ Any unintended consequences resulting from implementation of the proposal; and

§ Any other factors that may be relevant.

Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

General Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.

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In addition, voting against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses.

When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:

§ The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;

§ One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected;

§ Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and

§ The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.

Reincorporation Proposals

General Recommendation: Management or shareholder proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation should be evaluated case-by-case, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

§ Reasons for reincorporation;

§ Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and

§ Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Vote for reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.

Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

General Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to act by written consent.

Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent, taking into account the following factors:

§ Shareholders’ current right to act by written consent;

§ The consent threshold;

§ The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;

§ Investor ownership structure; and

§ Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.

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Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions:

§ An unfettered¹³ right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold;

§ A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections;

§ No non-shareholder-approved pill; and

§ An annually elected board.

Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings

General Recommendation: Vote against management or shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.

Generally vote for management or shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account the following factors:

§ Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings;

§ Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10 percent preferred);

§ The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;

§ Investor ownership structure; and

§ Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.

Stakeholder Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that ask the board to consider non-shareholder constituencies or other non-financial effects when evaluating a merger or business combination.

State Antitakeover Statutes

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, and anti-greenmail provisions).

Supermajority Vote Requirements

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote.

Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements. However, for companies with shareholder(s) who have significant ownership levels, vote case-by-case, taking into account:

§ Ownership structure;

§ Quorum requirements; and

§ Vote requirements.

¹³ “Unfettered” means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.

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Virtual Shareholder Meetings

General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only¹⁴ meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:

§ Scope and rationale of the proposal; and

§ Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.

¹⁴ Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.

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4.   Capital/Restructuring

Capital

Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock

General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.

Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value.

Common Stock Authorization

General Authorization Requests

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

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Specific Authorization Requests

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Dual Class Structure

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:

§ The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, such as:

§ The company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or

§ The new class of shares will be transitory;

§ The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; and

§ The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.

Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder-approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).

Preemptive Rights

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that seek preemptive rights, taking into consideration:

§ The size of the company;

§ The shareholder base; and

§ The liquidity of the stock.

Preferred Stock Authorization

General Authorization Requests

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

§ If no preferred shares are currently issued and outstanding, vote against the request, unless the company discloses a specific use for the shares.

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Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;¹⁵

§ The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”);

§ The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they are convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders;

§ The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

Specific Authorization Requests

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Recapitalization Plans

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account the following:

§ More simplified capital structure;

§ Enhanced liquidity;

§ Fairness of conversion terms;

§ Impact on voting power and dividends;

¹⁵ To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan.

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§ Reasons for the reclassification;

§ Conflicts of interest; and

§ Other alternatives considered.

Reverse Stock Splits

General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:

§ The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or

§ The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;

§ Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;

§ The company’s rationale; or

§ Other factors as applicable.

Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.

General Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 20 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.

For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.

Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.

Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.

Share Repurchase Programs

General Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:

§ Greenmail;

§ The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics;

§ Threats to the company’s long-term viability; or

§ Other company-specific factors as warranted.

Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.

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Share Repurchase Programs Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals prohibiting executives from selling shares of company stock during periods in which the company has announced that it may or will be repurchasing shares of its stock. Vote for the proposal when there is a pattern of abuse by executives exercising options or selling shares during periods of share buybacks.

Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends

General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Tracking Stock

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as:

§ Adverse governance changes;

§ Excessive increases in authorized capital stock;

§ Unfair method of distribution;

§ Diminution of voting rights;

§ Adverse conversion features;

§ Negative impact on stock option plans; and

§ Alternatives such as spin-off.

Restructuring

Appraisal Rights

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore or provide shareholders with rights of appraisal.

Asset Purchases

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset purchase proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Purchase price;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ Financial and strategic benefits;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives for the business;

§ Non-completion risk.

Asset Sales

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset sales, considering the following factors:

§ Impact on the balance sheet/working capital;

§ Potential elimination of diseconomies;

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§ Anticipated financial and operating benefits;

§ Anticipated use of funds;

§ Value received for the asset;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest.

Bundled Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.

Conversion of Securities

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities. When evaluating these proposals, the investor should review the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.

Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Corporate Reorganization/Debt Restructuring/Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans/Reverse Leveraged Buyouts/Wrap Plans

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt restructuring plan, after evaluating:

§ Dilution to existing shareholders’ positions;

§ Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; termination penalties; exit strategy;

§ Financial issues - company’s financial situation; degree of need for capital; use of proceeds; effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;

§ Control issues - change in management; change in control, guaranteed board and committee seats; standstill provisions; voting agreements; veto power over certain corporate actions; and

§ Conflict of interest - arm’s length transaction, managerial incentives.

Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Formation of Holding Company

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration the following:

§ The reasons for the change;

§ Any financial or tax benefits;

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§ Regulatory benefits;

§ Increases in capital structure; and

§ Changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.

Absent compelling financial reasons to recommend for the transaction, vote against the formation of a holding company if the transaction would include either of the following:

§ Increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum (see discussion under “Capital”); or

§ Adverse changes in shareholder rights.

Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following:

§ Offer price/premium;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives/offers considered; and

§ Non-completion risk.

Vote case-by-case on going dark transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:

§ Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);

§ Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following:

§ Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction?

§ Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction?

§ Does the company have strong corporate governance?

§ Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?

§ Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders?

Joint Ventures

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account the following:

§ Percentage of assets/business contributed;

§ Percentage ownership;

§ Financial and strategic benefits;

§ Governance structure;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives; and

§ Non-completion risk.

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Liquidations

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on liquidations, taking into account the following:

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;

§ Appraisal value of assets; and

§ The compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.

Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.

Mergers and Acquisitions

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions. Review and evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

§ Valuation - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.

§ Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal.

§ Strategic rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.

§ Negotiations and process - Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value.

§ Conflicts of interest - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. The CIC figure presented in the “ISS Transaction Summary” section of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists.

§ Governance - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements, warrants, and convertible debentures taking into consideration:

§ Dilution to existing shareholders’ position: The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. Although newly issued common stock, absent preemptive rights, is typically dilutive to existing shareholders, share price appreciation is often the necessary event to trigger the exercise of “out of the money” warrants and convertible debt. In these instances from a value standpoint, the negative impact of dilution is mitigated by the increase in the company’s stock price that must occur to trigger the dilutive event.

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§ Terms of the offer (discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion, conversion features, termination penalties, exit strategy):

§ The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial condition. Ideally, the conversion price for convertible debt and the exercise price for warrants should be at a premium to the then prevailing stock price at the time of private placement.

§ When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, consider factors that influence the discount or premium, such as, liquidity, due diligence costs, control and monitoring costs, capital scarcity, information asymmetry, and anticipation of future performance.

§ Financial issues:

§ The company’s financial condition;

§ Degree of need for capital;

§ Use of proceeds;

§ Effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Current and proposed cash burn rate;

§ Going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.

§ Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives: A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger, or sale of part or all of the company.

§ Control issues:

§ Change in management;

§ Change in control;

§ Guaranteed board and committee seats;

§ Standstill provisions;

§ Voting agreements;

§ Veto power over certain corporate actions; and

§ Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium.

§ Conflicts of interest:

§ Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor.

§ Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests?

§ Market reaction:

§ The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

Vote for the private placement, or for the issuance of warrants and/or convertible debentures in a private placement, if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Reorganization/Restructuring Plan (Bankruptcy)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:

§ Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;

§ Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;

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§ Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee);

§ The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);

§ Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and

§ Governance of the reorganized company.

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

§ Valuation - Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target if it is a private entity.

§ Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

§ Deal timing - A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date.

§ Negotiations and process - What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors.

§ Conflicts of interest - How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 percent of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24-month timeframe.

§ Voting agreements - Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights?

§ Governance - What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger?

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC extension proposals taking into account the length of the requested extension, the status of any pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process, any added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders, and any prior extension requests.

§ Length of request: Typically, extension requests range from two to six months, depending on the progression of the SPAC’s acquistion process.

§ Pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process: Sometimes an intial business combination was already put to a shareholder vote, but, for varying reasons, the transaction could not be consummated by the termination date and the SPAC is requesting an extension. Other times, the SPAC has entered into a definitive transaction agreement, but needs additional time to consummate or hold the shareholder meeting.

§ Added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders: Sometimes the SPAC sponsor (or other insiders) will contribute, typically as a loan to the company, additional funds that will be added to the redemption value of each public share as long as such shares are not redeemed in connection with the extension request. The purpose of the “equity kicker” is to incentivize shareholders to hold their shares through the end of the requested extension or until the time the transaction is put to a shareholder vote, rather than electing redeemption at the extension proposal meeting.

§ Prior extension requests: Some SPACs request additional time beyond the extension period sought in prior extension requests.

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Spin-offs

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on spin-offs, considering:

§ Tax and regulatory advantages;

§ Planned use of the sale proceeds;

§ Valuation of spinoff;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ Benefits to the parent company;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Managerial incentives;

§ Corporate governance changes;

§ Changes in the capital structure.

Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by:

§ Hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives;

§ Selling the company; or

§ Liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders.

These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:

§ Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight;

§ Signs of entrenched board and management (such as the adoption of takeover defenses);

§ Strategic plan in place for improving value;

§ Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; and

§ The company actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor.

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5.   Compensation

Executive Pay Evaluation

Underlying all evaluations are five global principles that most investors expect corporations to adhere to in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs:

1. Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment, with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: This principle encompasses overall executive pay practices, which must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. It will take into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance; the mix between fixed and variable pay; performance goals; and equity-based plan costs;

2. Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation;

3. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed);

4. Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly;

5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors is reasonable and does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation—Management Proposals (Say-on-Pay)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on ballot items related to executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation.

Vote against Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay or “SOP”) if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

§ The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP would otherwise be warranted due to pay-for-performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;

§ The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;

§ The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating; or

§ The situation is egregious.

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Primary Evaluation Factors for Executive Pay

Pay-for-Performance Evaluation

ISS annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to identify strong or satisfactory alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the S&P1500, Russell 3000, or Russell 3000E Indices¹⁶, this analysis considers the following:

1. Peer Group¹⁷ Alignment:

§ The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.

2. Absolute Alignment¹⁸ – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.

If the above analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of companies outside the Russell indices, a misalignment between pay and performance is otherwise suggested, our analysis may include any of the following qualitative factors, as relevant to an evaluation of how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

§ The ratio of performance- to time-based incentive awards;

§ The overall ratio of performance-based compensation to fixed or discretionary pay;

§ The rigor of performance goals;

§ The complexity and risks around pay program design;

§ The transparency and clarity of disclosure;

§ The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;

§ Financial/operational results, both absolute and relative to peers;

§ Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards);

§ Realizable pay¹⁹ compared to grant pay; and

§ Any other factors deemed relevant.

¹⁶ The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.

¹⁷ The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group, and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group, with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are comparable to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry, and also within a market-cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s market cap. For Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels companies, market cap is the only size determinant.

¹⁸ Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.

¹⁹ ISS research reports include realizable pay for S&P1500 companies.

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Problematic Pay Practices

Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:

§ Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;

§ Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and

§ Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements.

The list of examples below highlights certain problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:

§ Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);

§ Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups;

§ New or materially amended agreements that provide for:

§ Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus);

§ CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition;

§ CIC excise tax gross-up entitlements (including “modified” gross-ups);

§ Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions;

§ Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;

§ Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible;

§ Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason);

§ Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors.

The above examples are not an exhaustive list. Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Compensation Policies FAQ document for additional detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as problematic and may lead to negative vote recommendations.

Options Backdating

The following factors should be examined case-by-case to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud:

§ Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;

§ Duration of options backdating;

§ Size of restatement due to options backdating;

§ Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and

§ Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.

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Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness

Consider the following factors case-by-case when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

§ Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or

§ Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”)

General Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.

Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers but also considering new or extended arrangements.

Features that may result in an “against” recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):

§ Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;

§ Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;

§ Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control;

§ Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale;

§ Excessive cash severance (generally >3x base salary and bonus);

§ Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable;

§ Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or

§ Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or

§ The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.

Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s advisory vote on compensation (management say-on-pay), ISS will evaluate the say-on-pay proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

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Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans

Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Equity Compensation Plans FAQ document for additional details on the Equity Plan Scorecard policy.

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on certain equity-based compensation plans²⁰ depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “Equity Plan Scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:

§ Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:

§ SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and

§ SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.

§ Plan Features:

§ Quality of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC);

§ Discretionary vesting authority;

§ Liberal share recycling on various award types;

§ Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;

§ Dividends payable prior to award vesting.

§ Grant Practices:

§ The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;

§ Vesting requirements in CEO’s recent equity grants (3-year look-back);

§ The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);

§ The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;

§ Whether the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy;

§ Whether the company maintains sufficient post-exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following egregious factors (“overriding factors”) apply:

§ Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

§ The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies);

§ The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant pay-for-performance disconnect under certain circumstances;

§ The plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings;

§ The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or

§ Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.

²⁰ Proposals evaluated under the EPSC policy generally include those to approve or amend (1) stock option plans for employees and/or employees and directors, (2) restricted stock plans for employees and/or employees and directors, and (3) omnibus stock incentive plans for employees and/or employees and directors; amended plans will be further evaluated case-by-case.

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Further Information on certain EPSC Factors:

Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)

The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors. SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full-value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types.

For proposals that are not subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size, and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company’s benchmark.²¹

Three-Year Value-Adjusted Burn Rate

A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Value-Adjusted Burn Rate benchmarks are calculated as the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.

The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate is calculated as follows:

Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).

Egregious Factors

Liberal Change in Control Definition

Generally vote against equity plans if the plan has a liberal definition of change in control and the equity awards could vest upon such liberal definition of change in control, even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.

²¹ For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company’s SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors.

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Repricing Provisions

Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. “Repricing” typically includes the ability to do any of the following:

§ Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs;

§ Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs;

§ Cancel underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or

§ Provide cash buyouts of underwater options.

While the above cover most types of repricing, ISS may view other provisions as akin to repricing depending on the facts and circumstances.

Also, vote against or withhold from members of the Compensation Committee who approved repricing (as defined above or otherwise determined by ISS), without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.

Vote against plans that do not expressly prohibit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval if the company has a history of repricing/buyouts without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.

Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect

If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for problematic pay practices, vote against the plan.

ISS may recommend a vote against the equity plan if the plan is determined to be a vehicle for pay-for-performance misalignment. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:

§ Severity of the pay-for-performance misalignment;

§ Whether problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or

§ Whether equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the other NEOs.

Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.

Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Addresses administrative features only; or

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent directors, per ISS’ Classification of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time for any reason (including after the company’s initial public offering), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below).

Vote against proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per ISS’ Classification of Directors.

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Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes.

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:

§ If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.

§ If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.

§ If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments do not include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown only for informational purposes.

In the first two case-by-case evaluation scenarios, the EPSC evaluation/score is the more heavily weighted consideration.

Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations

Dividend Equivalent Rights

Options that have Dividend Equivalent Rights (DERs) associated with them will have a higher calculated award value than those without DERs under the binomial model, based on the value of these dividend streams. The higher value will be applied to new shares, shares available under existing plans, and shares awarded but not exercised per the plan specifications. DERS transfer more shareholder equity to employees and non-employee directors and this cost should be captured.

Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

For Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), include the common shares issuable upon conversion of outstanding Operating Partnership (OP) units in the share count for the purposes of determining: (1) market capitalization in the Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) analysis and (2) shares outstanding in the burn rate analysis.

Other Compensation Plans

401(k) Employee Benefit Plans

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).

Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Qualified Plans

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:

§ Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;

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§ Offering period is 27 months or less; and

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the outstanding shares.

Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where when the plan features do not meet all of the above criteria.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Non-Qualified Plans

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:

§ Broad-based participation;

§ Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;

§ Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and

§ No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a company matching contribution.

Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when the plan features do not meet all of the above criteria. If the matching contribution or effective discount exceeds the above, ISS may evaluate the SVT cost of the plan as part of the assessment.

Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:

§ Historic trading patterns--the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;

§ Rationale for the re-pricing--was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?;

§ Is this a value-for-value exchange?;

§ Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?;

§ Timing--repricing should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price;

§ Option vesting--does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?;

§ Term of the option--the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;

§ Exercise price--should be set at fair market or a premium to market;

§ Participants--executive officers and directors must be excluded.

If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company’s total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing and warrants additional scrutiny. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

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Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.

Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange.

Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, ISS will not make any adjustments to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation.

Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs

General Recommendation: One-time Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.

Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:

§ Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating;

§ Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; and

§ There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.

Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management’s control. A review of the company’s historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term.

Ongoing TSO program: Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the ongoing TSO program, structure, and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited, to the following:

§ Eligibility;

§ Vesting;

§ Bid-price;

§ Term of options;

§ Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and

§ Option repricing policy.

Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.

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Director Compensation

Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:

§ If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and

§ An assessment of the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:

§ The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;

§ The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers (in certain circumstances); and

§ The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).

On occasion, non-employee director stock plans will exceed the plan cost or burn-rate benchmarks when combined with employee or executive stock plans. In such cases, vote case-by-case on the plan taking into consideration the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans

General Recommendation: Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors. Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors.

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Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:

§ The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;

§ Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and

§ Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.

Compensation Consultants—Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s), and fees paid.

Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, provided the information requested is relevant to shareholders’ needs, would not put the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its industry, and is not unduly burdensome to the company.

Generally vote against shareholder proposals seeking to set absolute levels on compensation or otherwise dictate the amount or form of compensation (such as types of compensation elements or specific metrics) to be used for executive or directors.

Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.

Vote case-by-case on all other shareholder proposals regarding executive and director pay, taking into account relevant factors, including but not limited to: company performance, pay level and design versus peers, history of compensation concerns or pay-for-performance disconnect, and/or the scope and prescriptive nature of the proposal.

Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals for which the broad-based employee population is eligible.

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Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans. The following factors will be taken into account:

§ The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained;

§ The time period required to retain the shares;

§ Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements;

§ Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives;

§ Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and

§ Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus long-term focus.

Pay Disparity

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals calling for an analysis of the pay disparity between corporate executives and other non-executive employees. The following factors will be considered:

§ The company’s current level of disclosure of its executive compensation setting process, including how the company considers pay disparity;

§ If any problematic pay practices or pay-for-performance concerns have been identified at the company; and

§ The level of shareholder support for the company’s pay programs.

Generally vote against proposals calling for the company to use the pay disparity analysis or pay ratio in a specific way to set or limit executive pay.

Pay for Performance/Performance-Based Awards

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:

§ First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options, or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards.

§ Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.

In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.

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Pay for Superior Performance

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation plan for senior executives. These proposals generally include the following principles:

§ Set compensation targets for the plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median;

§ Deliver a majority of the plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards;

§ Provide the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and non-financial performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan;

§ Establish performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies;

§ Limit payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance.

Consider the following factors in evaluating this proposal:

§ What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven?

§ If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group?

§ Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure?

§ What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to?

Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the addition of certain safeguards in prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives. Safeguards may include:

§ Adoption, amendment, or termination of a 10b5-1 Plan must be disclosed in a Form 8-K;

§ Amendment or early termination of a 10b5-1 Plan allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board;

§ Request that a certain number of days that must elapse between adoption or amendment of a 10b5-1 Plan and initial trading under the plan;

§ Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a 10b5-1 Plan;

§ An executive may not trade in company stock outside the 10b5-1 Plan;

§ Trades under a 10b5-1 Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive.

Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals seeking a policy to prohibit any outside CEO from serving on a company’s compensation committee, unless the company has demonstrated problematic pay practices that raise concerns about the performance and composition of the committee.

Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to recoup incentive cash or stock compensation made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned turn out to have

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been in error, or if the senior executive has breached company policy or has engaged in misconduct that may be significantly detrimental to the company’s financial position or reputation, or if the senior executive failed to manage or monitor risks that subsequently led to significant financial or reputational harm to the company. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where an executive’s fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. However, such policies may be narrow given that not all misconduct or negligence may result in significant financial restatements. Misconduct, negligence, or lack of sufficient oversight by senior executives may lead to significant financial loss or reputational damage that may have long-lasting impact.

In considering whether to support such shareholder proposals, ISS will take into consideration the following factors:

§ If the company has adopted a formal recoupment policy;

§ The rigor of the recoupment policy focusing on how and under what circumstances the company may recoup incentive or stock compensation;

§ Whether the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems;

§ Whether the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent;

§ Disclosure of recoupment of incentive or stock compensation from senior executives or lack thereof; or

§ Any other relevant factors.

Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes

General Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requiring that golden parachutes or executive severance agreements be submitted for shareholder ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval prior to entering into employment contracts.

Vote case-by-case on proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes. An acceptable parachute should include, but is not limited to, the following:

§ The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;

§ The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable W-2 compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs);

§ Change-in-control payments should be double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure.

Share Buyback Impact on Incentive Program Metrics

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the company exclude the impact of share buybacks from the calculation of incentive program metrics, considering the following factors:

§ The frequency and timing of the company’s share buybacks;

§ The use of per-share metrics in incentive plans;

§ The effect of recent buybacks on incentive metric results and payouts; and

§ Whether there is any indication of metric result manipulation.

Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company’s executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.

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Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to limit the executive benefits provided under the company’s supplemental executive retirement plan (SERP) by limiting covered compensation to a senior executive’s annual salary or those pay elements covered for the general employee population.

Tax Gross-Up Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment/Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment and/or eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity.

The following factors will be considered:

§ The company’s current treatment of equity upon employment termination and/or in change-in-control situations (i.e., vesting is double triggered and/or pro rata, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares, etc.);

§ Current employment agreements, including potential poor pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements.

Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits automatic acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives upon a voluntary termination of employment or in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).

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6.   Routine/Miscellaneous

Adjourn Meeting

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.

Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction. Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.”

Amend Quorum Requirements

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration:

§ The new quorum threshold requested;

§ The rationale presented for the reduction;

§ The market capitalization of the company (size, inclusion in indices);

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ Previous voter turnout or attempts to achieve quorum;

§ Any provisions or commitments to restore quorum to a majority of shares outstanding, should voter turnout improve sufficiently; and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

In general, a quorum threshold kept as close to a majority of shares outstanding as is achievable is preferred.

Vote case-by-case on directors who unilaterally lower the quorum requirements below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration the factors listed above.

Amend Minor Bylaws

General Recommendation: Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).

Change Company Name

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to change the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely impact shareholder value.

Change Date, Time, or Location of Annual Meeting

General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the proposed change is unreasonable.

Vote against shareholder proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the current scheduling or location is unreasonable.

Other Business

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to approve other business when it appears as a voting item.

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7.   Environmental and Social Issues

Global Approach – E&S-related Proposals

Environmental and social proposals will be reviewed with a focus on how, and to what extent, the issues dealt with in such proposals will directly affect shareholder value, and with a presumption on environmental and social topics that the board’s recommendations should generally prevail. In those circumstances where it is widely considered that greater disclosure will directly enhance or protect shareholder value and is reflective of a clearly established reporting standard in the market, the Global Board-Aligned Policy will generally recommend in support of such proposals (e.g. proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and/or trade association spending policies and activities). In the absence of a clear determination that environmental and social proposals will have a positive effect on shareholder value or there are proposals that seek information that exceeds a widely endorsed standard in the market or place any burden upon the company beyond a reasonable and clearly established reporting standard in the market, the Global Board-Aligned policy will generally recommend voting against such proposals, or in line with the board’s recommendations if different.

Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote with the board’s recommendation on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan.²²

Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan.

²² Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

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8.   Mutual Fund Proxies

Election of Directors

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings. However, mutual fund boards do not usually have compensation committees, so do not withhold for the lack of this committee.

Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes

General Recommendation: For closed-end management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at CEFs that have not provided a compelling rationale for opting-in to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a by-law amendment to a shareholder vote.

Converting Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on conversion proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance as a closed-end fund;

§ Market in which the fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals.

Proxy Contests

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proxy contests, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance relative to its peers;

§ Market in which the fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the issues;

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals;

§ Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;

§ Independence of directors;

§ Experience and skills of director candidates;

§ Governance profile of the company;

§ Evidence of management entrenchment.

Investment Advisory Agreements

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on investment advisory agreements, considering the following factors:

§ Proposed and current fee schedules;

§ Fund category/investment objective;

§ Performance benchmarks;

§ Share price performance as compared with peers;

§ Resulting fees relative to peers;

§ Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control).

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Approving New Classes or Series of Shares

General Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares.

Preferred Stock Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares, considering the following factors:

§ Stated specific financing purpose;

§ Possible dilution for common shares;

§ Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes.

1940 Act Policies

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors:

§ Potential competitiveness;

§ Regulatory developments;

§ Current and potential returns; and

§ Current and potential risk.

Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.

Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non-fundamental restriction, considering the following factors:

§ The fund’s target investments;

§ The reasons given by the fund for the change; and

§ The projected impact of the change on the portfolio.

Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Nonfundamental

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to change a fund’s fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.

Name Change Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on name change proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Political/economic changes in the target market;

§ Consolidation in the target market; and

§ Current asset composition.

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Change in Fund’s Subclassification

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes in a fund’s sub-classification, considering the following factors:

§ Potential competitiveness;

§ Current and potential returns;

§ Risk of concentration;

§ Consolidation in target industry.

Business Development Companies—Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV) if:

§ The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date no more than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;

§ The sale is deemed to be in the best interests of shareholders by (1) a majority of the company’s independent directors and (2) a majority of the company’s directors who have no financial interest in the issuance; and

§ The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either:

§ Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one- and three-year median TSRs; or

§ Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholders.

Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors:

§ Strategies employed to salvage the company;

§ The fund’s past performance;

§ The terms of the liquidation.

Changes to the Charter Document

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes to the charter document, considering the following factors:

§ The degree of change implied by the proposal;

§ The efficiencies that could result;

§ The state of incorporation;

§ Regulatory standards and implications.

Vote against any of the following changes:

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to reorganize or terminate the trust or any of its series;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement for amendments to the new declaration of trust;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to amend the fund’s management contract, allowing the contract to be modified by the investment manager and the trust management, as permitted by the 1940 Act;

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§ Allow the trustees to impose other fees in addition to sales charges on investment in a fund, such as deferred sales charges and redemption fees that may be imposed upon redemption of a fund’s shares;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to engage in and terminate subadvisory arrangements;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to change the domicile of the fund.

Changing the Domicile of a Fund

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on re-incorporations, considering the following factors:

§ Regulations of both states;

§ Required fundamental policies of both states;

§ The increased flexibility available.

Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate subadvisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one subadviser.

Distribution Agreements

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on distribution agreement proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives;

§ The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance;

§ The competitiveness of the fund in the industry;

§ The terms of the agreement.

Master-Feeder Structure

General Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of a master-feeder structure.

Mergers

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on merger proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Resulting fee structure;

§ Performance of both funds;

§ Continuity of management personnel;

§ Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.

Shareholder Proposals for Mutual Funds

Establish Director Ownership Requirement

General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a specific minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.

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Reimburse Shareholder for Expenses Incurred

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When supporting the dissidents, vote for the reimbursement of the proxy solicitation expenses.

Terminate the Investment Advisor

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to terminate the investment advisor, considering the following factors:

§ Performance of the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV);

§ The fund’s history of shareholder relations;

§ The performance of other funds under the advisor’s management.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Fiduciary Proxy Voting Guidelines for Public Plan Sponsors	F-75
1.    Director Elections	F-76
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections	F-76
Board Independence	F-77
Board Competence	F-77
Board Accountability	F-77
Board Responsiveness	F-81
Other Board-Related Proposals	F-86
Director Diversity	F-86
Stock Ownership Requirements	F-86
Board and Committee Size	F-86
Limit Term of Office	F-87
Cumulative Voting	F-87
Majority Threshold Voting Requirement for Director Elections	F-88
Shareholder Access to the Proxy	F-88
CEO Succession Planning	F-89
Establish an Office of the Board	F-89
Director and Officer Liability Protection and Exculpation	F-89
Director and Officer Indemnification	F-89
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access — Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections	F-90
2.    Compensation	F-91
Evaluation of Executive Pay	F-91
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals	F-96
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay	F-97
Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale	F-97
Equity Pay Plans	F-98
Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options	F-100
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) - Qualified Plans	F-101
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) – Non-Qualified Plans	F-101
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)	F-102
OBRA-Related Compensation Proposals	F-102
Golden and Tin Parachutes	F-102
Director Compensation	F-103
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs	F-103
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation	F-103
Disclosure of Executive and Director Pay	F-103
Limit Executive and Director Pay	F-103
Executive Perks and Retirement/Death Benefits	F-104
Executive Holding Periods	F-104
Pay for Superior Performance	F-104
Performance-Based Options	F-104
Tax Gross-up Proposals	F-105
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals	F-105
Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization	F-105
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy	F-105

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Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”	F-105
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity	F-105
Recoup Bonuses	F-105
Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors	F-106
Pension Plan Income Accounting	F-106
3.    Auditors	F-107
Auditor Independence	F-107
Auditor Ratification	F-107
Auditor Rotation	F-108
Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability	F-108
Disclosures Under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act	F-109
Adverse Opinions	F-109
4.    Takeover Defense	F-110
Poison Pills	F-110
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments	F-110
Greenmail	F-111
Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies	F-111
Shareholder Ability to Alter the Size of the Board	F-112
5.    Shareholder Rights	F-113
Confidential Voting	F-113
Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings	F-113
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent	F-113
Unequal Voting Rights	F-113
Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Amend the Charter or Bylaws	F-114
Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions	F-114
Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Approve Mergers	F-115
Virtual Shareholder Meetings	F-115
Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses	F-115
Exclusive Venue	F-115
Fee-Shifting Bylaws	F-116
Bundled Proposals	F-116
6.    Mergers  & Acquisitions / Corporate Restructurings	F-117
Fair Price Provisions	F-117
Appraisal Rights	F-118
Corporate Restructuring	F-118
Spin-offs	F-118
Asset Sales	F-118
Liquidations	F-118
Going Private Transactions (LBOs, Minority Squeezeouts)	F-118
Changing Corporate Name	F-118
Plans of Reorganization (Bankruptcy)	F-119
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)	F-119
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions	F-120
7.    Capital Structure	F-121
Common Stock Authorization	F-121
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends	F-122
Reverse Stock Splits	F-122

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Share Repurchase Programs	F-123
Preferred Stock Authorization	F-123
Adjust Par Value of Common Stock	F-124
Preemptive Rights	F-124
Debt Restructuring	F-125
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S	F-125
8.    State of Incorporation	F-126
Voting on State Takeover Statutes	F-126
Reincorporation Proposals	F-126
Offshore Reincorporations and Tax Havens	F-126
9.    Corporate Responsibility  & Accountability	F-128
Social, Environmental and Sustainability Issues	F-128
I. GENERAL CSR RELATED	F-129
Special Policy Review and Shareholder Advisory Committees	F-129
International Operations	F-129
Affirm Political Non-Partisanship	F-129
Political Contributions, Lobbying Reporting & Disclosure	F-129
Military Sales	F-130
Report on Operations in Sensitive Regions or Countries	F-130
II. ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE	F-131
Greenhouse Gas Emissions	F-131
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals	F-132
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals	F-132
Investment in Renewable Energy	F-132
Sustainability Reporting and Planning	F-133
Operations in Protected or Sensitive Areas	F-133
Hydraulic Fracturing	F-133
Recycling Policy	F-134
Endorsement of Ceres Roadmap 2030	F-134
Land Use	F-134
Water Use	F-134
III. WORKPLACE PRACTICES & HUMAN RIGHTS	F-135
Equal Employment Opportunity	F-135
High-Performance Workplace	F-135
Workplace Safety	F-135
Non-Discrimination in Retirement Benefits	F-136
Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gaps	F-136
Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audit Guidelines	F-136
Sexual Harassment	F-136
Mandatory Arbitration	F-137
Fair Lending Reporting and Compliance	F-137
MacBride Principles	F-137
Contract Supplier Standards	F-137
Corporate and Supplier Codes of Conduct	F-138
IV. CONSUMER HEALTH & PUBLIC SAFETY	F-138
Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients	F-138
Tobacco-Related Proposals	F-139
Toxic Emissions	F-139

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Toxic Chemicals	F-139
Nuclear Safety	F-140
Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFOs)	F-140
Pharmaceutical Product Reimportation	F-140
Pharmaceutical Product Pricing	F-140

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Fiduciary Proxy Voting Guidelines for Public Plan Sponsors

Public fund fiduciaries and their investment managers are required to vote proxies solely in the best interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. As fiduciaries, public funds trustees must act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.

The execution of proxy-voting rights at shareholder meetings is a required duty of pension fund fiduciaries. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has stated that the fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock and that trustees may delegate this duty to an investment manager.¹ While public pension plans are not directly subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), most do generally comply with the position set forth by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1988 with regard to the fiduciary responsibilities governing the voting of shares of stock owned by the plan.

These proxy voting guidelines are designed to help ensure that public funds fulfill all statutory and common law obligations governing proxy voting, with the intent of maximizing the long-term economic benefits of its plan participants, beneficiaries, and citizens of the state in which the fund resides. This includes an obligation to vote proxies in a manner consistent with sound corporate governance and responsible corporate citizenship. Sound corporate governance and responsible corporate practices lead to increased long-term shareholder value.

While these guidelines often provide explicit guidance on how to vote proxies with regard to specific issues that appear on ballot, they are not intended to be exhaustive. Hundreds of issues appear on proxy ballots every year; as such, it is neither practical nor reasonable to fashion voting guidelines and policies which attempt to address every eventuality. Rather, these guidelines are intended to cover the most significant and frequent proxy issues that arise. Each proxy issue should be subject to a rigorous analysis of the economic impact of the issue on the long-term share value. All votes shall be cast solely in the long-term interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plan.

These proxy voting guidelines address a broad range of issues, including election of directors, executive compensation, auditor ratification, proxy contests, mergers and acquisitions, and tender offer takeover defenses. In addition to governance issues, these guidelines address broader issues of corporate citizenship that can also have a direct impact on corporate performance and important stakeholder interests, including climate risk, job security and wage parity, local economic development and stability, and workplace safety and health issues. In accordance with state laws, the policies take into consideration actions that promote good corporate citizenship through the proxy process.

¹ Most public sector pension plans, regulatory bodies, and professional associations have adopted the views of the U.S. Department of Labor on fiduciary duties related to proxy voting. The Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (previously known as the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration) has stated in opinion letters and an interpretative bulletin that the voting rights related to shares of stock held by pension plans are plans assets. Therefore, according to the Department, “the fiduciary act of managing plan assets which are shares of corporate stock would include the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock.” Sources include: the Department of Labor Opinion Letter (Feb.23, 1988), reprinted in 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA), 391, the Department of Labor Opinion Letter (Jan.23, 1990), reprinted in 17 Pens. Rep. (BNA), 244 and the Interpretative Bulletin, 94-2.

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1.   Director Elections

Electing directors is the single most important stock ownership right that shareholders can exercise. By electing directors who share their views, shareholders can help to define performance standards against which management can be held accountable. Public Fund Advisory Services holds directors to a high standard when voting on their election, qualifications, and compensation. Public Fund Advisory Services evaluates directors fairly and objectively, rewarding them for significant contributions and holding them ultimately accountable to shareholders for corporate performance. Institutional investors should use their voting rights in uncontested elections to influence financial performance and corporate strategies for achieving long term shareholder value.

Director accountability, independence and competence have become issues of prime importance to investors given the failings in oversight exposed by the global financial crisis. There is also concern over the environment in the boardrooms of certain markets, where past failures appear to be no impediment to continued or new appointments at major companies and may not be part of the evaluation process at companies in considering whether an individual is, or continues to be, fit for the role and best able to serve shareholders’ interests.

Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections

Votes concerning the entire board of directors and members of key board committees are examined using the following factors:

Board Independence: Without independence from management, the board and/or its committees may be unwilling or unable to effectively set company strategy and scrutinize performance or executive compensation.

Board Competence: Companies should seek a diverse board of directors who can add value to the board through specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. While directors should not be constrained by arbitrary limits such as age or term limits, directors who are unable to attend board and committee meetings and/or who are overextended (i.e. serving on too many boards) raise concern on the director’s ability to effectively serve in shareholders’ best interests.

Board Accountability: Practices that promote accountability include: transparency into a company’s governance practices, annual board elections, and providing shareholders the ability to remove problematic directors and to vote on takeover defenses or other charter/bylaw amendments. These practices help reduce the opportunity for management entrenchment.

Board Responsiveness: Directors should be responsive to shareholders, particularly in regard to shareholder proposals that receive a majority vote or management proposals that receive low shareholder support, and to tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered. Boards should also be sufficiently responsive to high withhold/against votes on directors. Furthermore, shareholders should expect directors to devote sufficient time and resources to oversight of the company.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on individual director nominees are always made on a case-by-case basis. Specific director nominee withhold/against² votes can be triggered by one or more of the following factors:

² In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use “Withhold” as the valid contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use “Against”. However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.

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Board Independence

§ Lack of a board that is at least majority independent;

§ Lack of independence on key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation, and nominating committees); or

§ Failure to establish any key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation, or nominating).

Board Competence

§ Directors serving on an excessive number of other boards which could compromise their primary duties of care and loyalty; or

§ Attendance of director nominees at board and committee meetings of less than 75 percent in one year without valid reason or explanation.

In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.

Gender Diversity

Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at companies where there are no women on the company’s board. An exception will be made if there was at least one woman on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to return to a gender-diverse status within a year.

Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity

For companies in the Russell 3000 or S&P 1500 indices, generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) where the board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse members³. An exception will be made if there was racial and/or ethnic diversity on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to appoint at least one racial and/or ethnic diverse member within a year.

Board Accountability

Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees⁴ considered on a case-by-case basis):

Problematic Takeover Defenses

§ The board lacks accountability and oversight due to the presence of problematic governance provisions, coupled with long-term poor corporate performance relative to peers;

§ If the company has a classified board and a continuing director is responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote, in addition to potential future withhold/against votes on that director, Public Fund Advisory Services may recommend a vote against or withhold votes from any or all of the nominees up for election, with the exception of new nominees⁴; or

³ Aggregate diversity statistics provided by the board will only be considered if specific to racial and/or ethnic diversity.

⁴ A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question.

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§ The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.

Restriction of Binding Shareholder Proposals

Vote against or withhold from members of the governance committee if:

§ The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include, but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.

Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.

Problematic Compensation Practices

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item or in egregious situations, vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (see Pay-for-Performance policy);

§ The company maintains problematic pay practices including options backdating, excessive perks and overly generous employment contracts etc.;

§ There is evidence that management/board members are using company stock in hedging activities.

§ The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or

§ The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.

Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Performance of audit committee members concerning the approval of excessive non-audit fees, material weaknesses, and/or the lack of auditor ratification upon the proxy ballot;

Vote against or withhold votes from the members of the audit committee when:

§ Consulting (i.e. non-audit) fees paid to the auditor are excessive;

§ Auditor ratification is not included on the proxy ballot;

§ The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor;

§ There is evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm; or

§ Poor accounting practices such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures, exist. Poor accounting practices may warrant voting against or withholding votes from the full board.

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Problematic Pledging of Company Stock

Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:

§ The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;

§ The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;

§ Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;

§ Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and

§ Any other relevant factors.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments and Problematic Capital Structures

Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees⁴, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:

§ The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;

§ Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;

§ The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;

§ The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ The company’s existing governance provisions;

§ The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and

§ Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against directors (except new nominees⁴, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board:

§ Classified the board;

§ Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws;

§ Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or

§ Adopted another provision deemed egregious.

Problematic Governance Structure – Newly public companies

For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting⁵ of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees⁴, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights:

§ Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

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§ A classified board structure; or

§ Other egregious provisions.

A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.

Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

Unequal Voting Rights

Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees⁴, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a common stock structure with unequal voting rights⁶.

Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:

§ Newly-public companies⁵ with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public;

§ Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs;

§ Situations where the super-voting shares represent less than 5% of total voting power and therefore considered to be de minimis; or

§ The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained.

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

Vote against or withhold from directors individually, governance committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees⁴, who should be considered case-by-case), where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Governance Failures

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:

§ The presence of problematic governance practices including interlocking directorships, multiple related-party transactions, excessive risk-taking, imprudent use of corporate assets, etc.;

⁵ Newly-public companies generally include companies that emerge from bankruptcy, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

⁶ This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”).

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§ Inadequate CEO succession planning, including the absence of an emergency and non-emergency/orderly CEO succession plan;

§ Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight⁷, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, failure to replace management as appropriate, flagrant or egregious actions related to the director(s)’ service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company; or

§ Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) violations or fines, and criminal investigations by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Government Accounting Office (GAO) or any other federal agency.

Climate Accountability

For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain⁸, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where Public Fund Advisory Services determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and mitigate risks related to climate change to the company and the larger economy.

Minimum steps to understand and mitigate those risks are considered to be the following. Both minimum criteria will be required to be in compliance:

§ Detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:

§ Board governance measures;

§ Corporate strategy;

§ Risk management analyses; and

§ Metrics and targets.

§ Appropriate GHG emissions reduction targets.

At this time “appropriate GHG emissions reductions targets” will be medium-term GHG reduction targets or Net Zero-by-2050 GHG reduction targets for a company’s operations (Scope 1) and electricity use (Scope 2). Targets should cover the vast majority of the company’s direct emissions.

Board Responsiveness

Vote against or withhold from individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

§ At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the underlying issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against votes;

§ The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of the shareholders tendered their shares; or

§ The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received approval by a majority of the shares cast the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year.

Vote case-by-case on compensation committee members (or, potentially, the full board) and the Say-on-Pay proposal if:

§ The company’s previous say-on-pay proposal received low levels of investor support, taking into account:

§ The company’s response, including: a) disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of

⁷ Examples of failure of risk oversight include but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock.

⁸ Companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.

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engagements and whether independent directors participated); b) disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition; c) disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns; d) other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

§ The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.

Discussion

Independence

Board independence from management is of vital importance to a company and its shareholders. Accordingly, Public Fund Advisory Services believes votes should be cast in a manner that will encourage the independence of boards. Independence will be evaluated based upon a number of factors, including: employment by the company or an affiliate in an executive capacity; past or current employment by a firm that is one of the company’s paid advisors or consultants; a personal services contract with the company; family relationships of an executive or director of the company; interlocks with other companies on which the company’s chair or chief executive officer is also a board member; and service with a non-profit organization that receives significant contributions from the company.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against or withhold votes from non-independent director nominees (executive directors and non-independent, non-executive directors) where the entire board is not at least majority independent.

§ Generally vote against or withhold votes from non-independent director nominees when the nominating, compensation and audit committees are not fully independent.

§ Generally consider directors who have been on the board continually for a period longer than 10 years as non-independent, non-executive directors.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that all key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation and/or nominating) include independent directors exclusively.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the board be comprised of a majority of independent directors.

Non-Independent Chair

Two major components at the top of every public company are the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. Many institutional investors believe there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company that will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision. When there is no clear division between the executive and board branches of a company, poor executive and/or board actions often go unchecked to the ultimate detriment of shareholders. Since executive compensation is so heavily correlated to the managerial power relationship in the boardroom, the separation of the CEO and chair positions is a critical step in curtailing excessive pay, which ultimately can become a drain on shareholder value.

Arguments have been made that a smaller company and its shareholders can benefit from the full-time attention of a joint chair and CEO. This may be so in select cases, and indeed, using a case-by-case review of circumstances there may be worthy exceptions. But, even in these cases, it is the general view of many institutions that a person should only serve in the position of joint CEO and chair on a temporary basis, and that these positions should be separated following their provisional combination.

Public Fund Advisory Services strongly believes that the potential for conflicts of interest in the board’s supervisory and oversight duties trumps any possible corollary benefits that could ensue from a dual CEO/chair scenario. Instead of having an ingrained quid pro quo situation whereby a company has a single leader overseeing both management and the

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boardroom, Public Fund fiduciaries believe that it is the board’s implicit duty to assume an impartial and objective role in overseeing the executive team’s overall performance. Shareholder interests are placed in jeopardy if the CEO of a company is required to report to a board that she/he also chairs.

Inherent in the chair’s job description is the duty to assess the CEO’s performance. This objectivity is obviously compromised when a chair is in charge of evaluating her/his own performance or has a past or present affiliation with management. Moreover, the unification of chair and CEO poses a direct threat to the smooth functioning of the entire board process since it is the ultimate responsibility of the chair to set the agenda, facilitate discussion, and make sure that directors are given complete access to information in order to make informed decisions.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support shareholder proposals calling for the separation of the CEO and chair positions.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals calling for a non-executive director to serve as chair who is not a former CEO or senior-level executive of the company.

Competence

Excessive Directorships

As new regulations mandate that directors be more engaged and vigilant in protecting shareholder interests or else risk civil and/or criminal sanctions, board members have to devote more time and effort to their oversight duties. Recent surveys of U.S. directors confirm a desire for limiting board memberships, to between three and five seats. In view of the increased demands placed on corporate board members, Public Fund fiduciaries believe that directors who are overextended may be impairing their ability to serve as effective representatives of shareholders. Public Fund Advisory Services will recommend a vote against or withhold from directors serving on an excessive number of other boards, which could compromise their primary duties of care and loyalty.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold votes from directors serving on an excessive number of boards. As a general rule, vote against or withhold from director nominees who are:

§ CEOs of publicly-traded companies who serve on more than one public boards besides their own. NOTE: Public Fund Advisory Services will recommend a vote against or withhold from overboarded CEO directors only at their outside directorships⁹ and not at the company in which they presently serve as CEO; or

§ Non-CEO directors who serve on more than four public company boards.

Accountability

Director Performance Evaluation

Many institutional investors believe long-term financial performance and the appropriateness of governance practices should be taken into consideration when determining vote recommendations with regard to directors in uncontested elections. When evaluating whether to recommend a vote against or withhold votes from director nominees, Public Fund Advisory Services will evaluate underperforming companies that exhibit sustained poor performance as measured by total returns to shareholders over a one-, three-, and five-year period.

Public Fund Advisory Services views deficient oversight mechanisms and the lack of board accountability to shareholders especially in the context of sustained poor performance, as problematic. As part of the framework for assessing director performance, Public Fund Advisory Services will also evaluate board accountability and oversight at companies that

⁹ Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Public Fund Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold/against vote from the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but will do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

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demonstrate sustained underperformance. A governance structure that discourages director accountability may lead to board and management entrenchment. For example, the existence of several anti-takeover provisions* has the cumulative effect of deterring legitimate tender offers, mergers, and corporate transactions that may have ultimately proved beneficial to shareholders. When a company maintains entrenchment devices, shareholders of poorly performing companies are left with few effective routes to beneficial change.

Public Fund Advisory Services will assess the company’s response to the ongoing performance issues, and consider recent board and management changes, board independence, overall governance practices, and other factors that may have an impact on shareholders. If a company exhibits sustained poor performance coupled with a lack of board accountability and oversight, Public Fund Advisory Services’ evaluation may also consider the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted.

*Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:

§ A classified board structure;

§ A supermajority vote requirement;

§ Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections or a majority vote standard with no plurality carve-out for contested elections;

§ The inability for shareholders to call special meetings;

§ The inability for shareholders to act by written consent;

§ A multi-class structure; and/or

§ A non-shareholder approved poison pill.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against or withhold votes from all director nominees if the board lacks accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Sustained poor performance for companies outside the Russell 3000 universe is defined as underperforming peers or index on the basis of one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns.

Classified Boards ~ Annual Elections

The ability to elect directors is the single most important use of the shareholder franchise, and all directors should be accountable on an annual basis. Annually elected boards provide the best governance system for accountability to shareholders. A classified board is a board that is divided into separate classes, with directors serving overlapping terms. A company with a classified board usually divides the board into three classes. Under this system, only one class of nominees comes up to shareholder vote at the AGM each year.

As a consequence of these staggered terms, shareholders only have the opportunity to vote on a single director approximately once every three years. A classified board makes it difficult to change control of the board through a proxy contest since it would normally take two years to gain control of a majority of board seats. Under a classified board, the possibility of management entrenchment greatly increases. Classified boards can reduce director accountability by shielding directors, at least for a certain period of time, from the consequences of their actions. Continuing directors who are responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level would avoid shareholders’ reactions to their actions because they would not be up for election in that year. Ultimately, in these cases, the full board should be responsible for the actions of its directors.

Many in management believe that staggered boards provide continuity. Some shareholders believe that in certain cases a staggered board can provide consistency and continuity in regard to decision-making and commitment that may be important to the long-term financial future of the company. Nevertheless, empirical evidence strongly suggests that staggered boards are generally not in the shareholders’ best interest. In addition to shielding directors from being held accountable by shareholders on an annual basis, a classified board can entrench management and effectively preclude most takeover bids or proxy contests.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against management or shareholder proposals seeking to classify the board when the issue comes up for vote.

§ Vote for management or shareholder proposals to repeal a company’s classified board structure.

§ If the company has a classified board and a continuing director is responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote, in addition to potential future withhold/against votes on that director, Public Fund Advisory Services may vote against or withhold votes from any or all of the nominees up for election, with the exception of new nominees⁴.

Shareholder Rights Plan (i.e. Poison Pills)

Institutional investors view shareholder rights plans, or poison pills, as among the most onerous of takeover defenses that may serve to entrench management and have a detrimental impact on their long-term share value. While recognizing that boards have a fiduciary duty to use all available means to protect shareholders’ interests, as a best governance principle, boards should seek shareholder ratification of a poison pill (or an amendment thereof) within a reasonable period, to ensure that the features of the poison pill support the interests of shareholders and do not merely serve as a management entrenchment device. Boards that fail to do so should be held accountable for ultimately disregarding shareholders’ interests. In applying this principle to voting in uncontested director elections, Public Fund Advisory Services considers the term of the pill an important factor, as shorter term pills are generally less onerous as a takeover defense when compared to longer term pills, and may in some cases provide the board with a valuable tool to maximize shareholder value in the event of an opportunistic offer.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

Generally vote against or withhold votes from all nominees (except new nominees4, who should be considered on a case-by-case basis) if;

§ The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders¹⁰;

§ The board makes a material adverse change to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or

§ The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature¹¹.

Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pillError! Bookmark not defined. (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:

§ The disclosed rationale for the adoption;

§ The trigger;

§ The company’s market capitalization (including absolute level and sudden changes);

§ A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; and

§ Other factors as relevant.

Responsiveness

Failure to Act on Shareholder Proposals Receiving Majority Support

Majority-supported proposals represent a request for action (usually the removal of an anti-takeover mechanism) by shareholder proponents. Because they are non-binding or precatory in nature, boards may easily disregard them, forcing proponents to either repeat their submissions, take alternative actions, or withdraw their offer altogether.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from all director nominees at a company that has ignored a shareholder proposal that was approved by a majority of the votes cast at the last annual meeting.

Other Board-Related Proposals

Director Diversity

Gender and ethnic diversity are important components on a company’s board. Diversity brings different perspectives to a board that in turn leads to a more varied approach to board issues. Public Fund fiduciaries generally believe that increasing diversity in the boardroom would better reflect a company’s workforce, customers, and community and enhance shareholder value.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Support proposals asking the board to make greater efforts to search for qualified female and minority candidates for nomination to the board of directors.

§ Support endorsement of a policy of board inclusiveness.

§ Support reporting to shareholders on a company’s efforts to increase diversity on their boards.

Stock Ownership Requirements

Corporate directors should own some amount of stock of the companies on which they serve as board members. Stock ownership is a simple method to align the interests of directors with company shareholders. Nevertheless, many highly qualified individuals such as academics and clergy who can offer valuable perspectives in boardrooms may be unable to purchase individual shares of stock. In such a circumstance, the preferred solution is to look at the board nominees individually and take stock ownership into consideration when voting on the merits of each candidate.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder proposals requiring directors to own a minimum amount of company stock, provided these requests afford a carve-out for directors who do not have the financial means to purchase company stock or a grace period within which to own a reasonable amount of stock.

Board and Committee Size

While there is no hard and fast rule among institutional investors as to what may be an optimal board size, there is an acceptable range that companies should strive to meet and not exceed. A board that is too large may function inefficiently. Conversely, a board that is too small may allow the CEO to exert disproportionate influence or may stretch the time requirements of individual directors too thin.

Proposals seeking to set board size will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Given that the preponderance of boards in the U.S. range between five and fifteen directors, many institutional investors believe this benchmark is a useful standard for evaluating such proposals.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against any proposal seeking to amend the company’s board size to fewer than five seats.

§ Generally vote against any proposal seeking to amend the company’s board size to more than fifteen seats;

§ Evaluate board size on a case-by-case basis and consider withhold or against votes or other action at companies that have fewer than five directors and more than 15 directors on their board.

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Limit Term of Office

Those who support term limits argue that this requirement would bring new ideas and approaches on to a board. While term of office limitations can rid the board of non-performing directors over time, it can also unfairly force experienced and effective directors off the board. When evaluating shareholder proposals on director term limits, consider whether the company’s performance has been poor and whether problematic or entrenching governance provisions are in place at the company. Additionally, consider board independence, including whether the board chair is independent.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors.

Cumulative Voting

Most corporations provide that shareholders are entitled to cast one vote for each share owned. Under a cumulative voting scheme, the shareholder is permitted to have one vote per share for each director to be elected. Shareholders are permitted to apportion those votes in any manner they wish among the director candidates. Thus, under a cumulative-voting scheme, shareholders have the opportunity to elect a minority representative to a board by cumulating their votes, thereby ensuring minority representation for all sizes of shareholders.

For example, if there is a company with a ten-member board and 500 shares outstanding-the total number of votes that may be cast is 5,000. In this case a shareholder with 51 shares (10.2 percent of the outstanding shares) would be guaranteed one board seat because all votes may be cast for one candidate. Without cumulative voting, anyone controlling 51 percent of shares would control the election of all ten directors.

With the advent and prevalence of majority voting for director elections, shareholders now have greater flexibility in supporting candidates for a company’s board of directors. Cumulative voting and majority voting are two different voting mechanisms designed to achieve two different outcomes. While cumulative voting promotes the interests of minority shareholders by allowing them to get some representation on the board, majority voting promotes a democratic election of directors for all shareholders and ensures board accountability in uncontested elections. Though different in philosophic view, cumulative voting and majority voting can work together operationally, with companies electing to use majority voting for uncontested elections and cumulative voting for contested elections to increase accountability and ensure minority representation on the board.

In contested elections, similar to cumulative voting, proxy access allows shareholder access to the ballot without a veto from the nominating committee, but unlike cumulative voting, it also requires majority support to elect such directors.

At controlled companies, where majority insider control would preclude minority shareholders from having any representation on the board, cumulative voting would allow such representation and shareholder proposals for cumulative voting would be supported.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against proposals to eliminate cumulative voting;

§ Generally vote for proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting unless:

§ The company has proxy access thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and

§ The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

§ Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (where insider voting power exceeds 50%).

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Majority Threshold Voting Requirement for Director Elections

Shareholders have expressed strong support for precatory resolutions on majority threshold voting since 2005, with a number of proposals receiving majority support from shareholders. Public Fund fiduciaries believe shareholders should have a greater voice in regard to the election of directors and view majority threshold voting as a viable alternative to the current deficiencies of the plurality system in the U.S.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support reasonably crafted shareholders proposals calling for directors to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast and/or the elimination of the plurality standard for electing directors (including binding resolutions requesting that the board amend the company’s bylaws), provided the proposal includes a carve-out for a plurality voting standard when there are more director nominees than board seats (e.g. in contested elections).

§ Public Fund Advisory Services may vote against or withhold votes from members of the board at companies without the carve-out for plurality voting in contested elections, as the use of a majority vote standard can act as an anti-takeover defense in contested elections. (e.g. although the dissident nominees may have received more shares cast, as long as the combination of withhold/against votes and the votes for the management nominees keep the dissident nominees under 50%, the management nominees will win, due to the holdover rules). This clearly contradicts the expressed will of shareholders.

§ In addition to supporting proposals seeking a majority vote standard in director elections, Public Fund Advisory Services also supports a post-election “director resignation policy” that addresses the situation of holdover directors to accommodate both shareholder proposals and the need for stability and continuity of the board.

Shareholder Access to the Proxy

The current director election process as it exists leaves much to be desired. Companies currently nominate for election only one candidate for each board seat. Shareholders who oppose a candidate have no easy way to do so unless they are willing to undertake the considerable expense of running an independent candidate for the board. The only way for shareholders to register dissent about a certain director candidate is to vote against or “withhold” support from that nominee. But because directors are still largely elected by a plurality (those nominees receiving the most votes win board seats) at a large proportion of firms in the U.S., nominees running unopposed are typically reelected despite shareholder opposition.

Many investors view proxy access as an important shareholder right, one that is complementary to other best-practice corporate governance features. Public Fund Advisory Services is generally supportive of reasonably crafted shareholder proposals advocating for the ability of long-term shareholders to cost-effectively nominate director candidates that represent their interests on management’s proxy card. Shareholder proposals that have the potential to result in abuse of the proxy access right by way of facilitating hostile takeovers will generally not be supported.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:

§ Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power;

§ Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group;

§ Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group;

§ Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board.

Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access.

Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

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CEO Succession Planning

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy.

Establish an Office of the Board

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholders proposals requesting that the board establish an Office of the Board of Directors in order to facilitate direct communication between shareholders and non-management directors, unless the company has effectively demonstrated via public disclosure that it already has an established structure in place.

Director and Officer Liability Protection and Exculpation

Management proposals typically seek shareholder approval to adopt an amendment to the company’s charter to eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors to the company and its shareholders for monetary damages for any breach of fiduciary duty to the fullest extent permitted by state law. Charter amendments may also include limited liability wherein a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff. In contrast, shareholder proposals seek to provide for personal monetary liability for fiduciary breaches arising from gross negligence.

Public Fund Advisory Services may support these proposals when the company persuasively argues that such action is necessary to attract and retain directors, but will likely oppose management proposals and support shareholder proposals in order to promote greater accountability.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case, considering the stated rationale for the proposed change, on proposals to limit or eliminate entirely director and officer liability in regard to: (i) breach of the director’s fiduciary “duty of loyalty” and “duty of care” to shareholders; (ii) acts or omissions not made in “good faith” or involving intentional misconduct or knowledge of violations under the law; (iii) acts involving the unlawful purchases or redemptions of stock; (iv) payment of unlawful dividends; or (v)  use of the position as director for receipt of improper personal benefits.

Director and Officer Indemnification

Indemnification is the payment by a company of the expenses of directors who become involved in litigation as a result of their service to a company. Proposals to indemnify a company’s directors differ from those to eliminate or reduce their liability because with indemnification directors may still be liable for an act or omission, but the company will bear the expense. Public Fund fiduciaries may support these proposals when the company persuasively argues that such action is necessary to attract and retain directors, but should generally oppose indemnification when it is being proposed to insulate directors from actions that have already occurred.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case, considering the stated rationale for the proposed change, on indemnification proposals that would expand individual coverage beyond ordinary legal expenses to also cover specific acts of negligence that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.

§ Vote case-by-case, considering the stated rationale for the proposed change, on proposals that would expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”) but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.

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§ Vote for those proposals which provide expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if: (1) the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and (2) only if the individual’s legal expenses would be covered.

Proxy Contests/Proxy Access — Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections

Contested elections of directors frequently occur when a board candidate or “dissident slate” seeks election for the purpose of achieving a significant change in corporate policy or control of seats on the board. Competing slates will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with a number of considerations in mind. These include, but are not limited to, the following: personal qualifications of each candidate; the economic impact of the policies advanced by the dissident slate of nominees; and their expressed and demonstrated commitment to the interests of the shareholders of the company.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a case-by-case basis with the following seven factors in consideration:

§ Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;

§ Management’s track record;

§ Background to the contested election;

§ Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;

§ Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;

§ Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and

§ Stock ownership positions.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether there are more candidates than board seats).

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2.   Compensation

The housing market collapse and resulting credit crisis resulted in significant erosion of shareholder value, unprecedented levels of market volatility, and a lack of confidence among financial market participants. Many Public Fund trustees have questioned the role of executive compensation in incentivizing inappropriate or excessive risk-taking behavior by executives that could threaten a corporation’s long-term viability. Further, generous severance packages and other payments to departing executives of failed institutions have heightened attention on the issue of pay for performance.

Trustees of funds, which have lost significant value in their investments as a result of the financial crisis, have little patience for “pay for failure” and continue to press for the adoption of executive compensation practices aimed at creating and sustaining long-term shareholder value.

Companies have long argued that legally binding executive compensation obligations cannot be modified. The

Capital Purchase Program implemented under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the “bail out” program for the U.S. financial system, set the tone for executive compensation reform and requires participating firms to accept certain limits and requirements on executive compensation, regardless of existing contractual arrangements. A number of firms agreed to these requirements.

Evolving disclosure requirements have opened a wider window into compensation practices and processes, giving shareholders more opportunity and responsibility to ensure that pay is designed to create and sustain shareholder value. Companies in the U.S. are now required to evaluate and discuss potential risks arising from misguided or misaligned compensation programs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation (management “Say on Pay”), an advisory vote on the frequency of Say on Pay, as well as a shareholder advisory vote on golden parachute compensation. The advent of “Say on Pay” votes for shareholders in the U.S. has provided a new communication mechanism and impetus for constructive engagement between shareholders and managers/directors on pay issues.

Evaluation of Executive Pay

Public Fund Advisory Services believes that executive pay programs should be fair, competitive, reasonable, and appropriate, and that pay for performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. When evaluating executive and director pay programs and practices, Public Fund Advisory Services looks for the following best practice considerations in the design and administration of executive compensation programs:

§ Appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: executive pay practices must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. Evaluating appropriate alignment of pay incentives with shareholder value creation includes taking into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance, the mix between fixed and variable pay, performance goals, and equity-based plan costs.

§ Avoiding arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: this includes assessing the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation.

§ Independent and effective compensation committee: oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed) should be promoted.

§ Clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: shareholders expect companies to provide informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly.

§ Avoiding inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: compensation to outside directors should not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance.

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Examples of best pay practices include:

§ Employment contracts: Companies should enter into employment contracts under limited circumstances for a short time period (e.g., new executive hires for a three-year contract) for limited executives. The contracts should not have automatic renewal feature and should have a specified termination date.

§ Severance agreements: Severance provisions should not be so appealing that they become an incentive for the executive to be terminated. The severance formula should be reasonable and not overly generous to the executive (e.g., use a reasonable severance multiple; use pro-rated target/average historical bonus and not maximum bonus). Failure to renew employment contract, termination under questionable events or for poor performance should not constitute “good reason” for termination with severance payments.

§ Change-in-control payments: Change-in-control payments should be “double-triggered” – i.e. payouts should only made when there is a significant change in company ownership structure, and when there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties associated with the change in company ownership structure. Change-in-control provisions should exclude excise tax gross-ups and should not authorize the acceleration of vesting of equity awards upon a change in control unless provided under a double-trigger scenario. Similarly, change in control provisions in equity plans should be double-triggered. A change in control event should not result in an acceleration of vesting of all unvested stock options or lapsing of vesting/performance requirements on restricted stock/performance shares, unless there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties.

§ Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs): SERPs should not include sweeteners that can increase the payout value significantly or even exponentially, such as additional years of service credited for pension calculations, or inclusion of variable pay (e.g. bonuses and equity awards) into the formula. Pension formulas should not include extraordinary annual bonuses paid close to the time of retirement and should be based on an average, not the maximum, level of compensation earned.

§ Deferred compensation: Above-market returns or guaranteed minimum returns should not be applied on deferred compensation.

§ Disclosure practices: The Compensation, Discussion and Analysis should be written in plain English, with as little “legalese” as possible and formatted using section headers, bulleted lists, tables and charts where possible to ease reader comprehension. Ultimately, the document should provide detail and rationale regarding compensation, strategy, pay mix, goals/metrics, challenges, competition and pay for performance linkage, etc. in a narrative fashion.

§ Responsible use of company stock: Companies should adopt policies that prohibit executives from speculating in company’s stock or using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps or other similar arrangements. Such behavior undermines the ultimate alignment with long-term shareholders’ interests. In addition, the policy should prohibit or discourage the use of company stock as collateral for margin loans, to avoid any potential sudden stock sales (required upon margin calls) that could have a negative impact on the company’s stock price.

§ Long-term focus: Executive compensation programs should be designed to support companies’ long-term strategic goals. A short-term focus on performance does not necessarily create sustainable shareholder value. Instead, long-term goals may be sacrificed to achieve short-term expectations to the detriment of shareholder value, as evidenced by the financial crisis.

Compensation programs embedding a long-term focus with respect to company goals better align with the long-term interests of shareholders. Granting stock options and restricted stock to executives that vest in five years does not necessarily provide a long-term focus, as executives can sell off the company shares once they vest. However, requiring senior executives to hold company stock until retirement or after retirement can encourage a long-term focus on company performance.

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Pay-For-Performance Evaluation

Stock-based pay is often the main driver for excessive executive compensation, which could be fueled by poor plan design or administration. Therefore, it is important to closely examine any discrepancies between CEO pay and total shareholder returns over a sustained period of time in assessing equity-based compensation. Many investors do not consider standard stock options or time-vested restricted stock to be performance-based. If a company provides performance-based incentives to its executives, the company should provide complete disclosure of the performance measures and goals to allow shareholders to assess the rigor of the performance program. Complete and transparent disclosure enables shareholders to better comprehend the company’s pay for performance linkage.

When financial or operational measures are utilized in incentive awards, the achievements related to these measures should ultimately translate into superior shareholder returns in the long-term. The use of non-GAAP financial metrics makes it very challenging for shareholders to ascertain the rigor of the program as shareholders often cannot tell the type of adjustments being made and if the adjustments were made consistently.

Pay-for-performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. In evaluating the degree of alignment between the CEO’s pay with the company’s performance over a sustained period, Public Fund Advisory

Services conducts a pay-for-performance analysis.

With respect to companies in the Russell 3000 or Russell 3000E Indices¹⁰, this analysis considers the following:

1. Peer Group¹¹ Alignment:

§ The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median.

2. Absolute Alignment¹² – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.

If the above analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of companies outside the Russell indices, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, our analysis may include any of the following qualitative factors, as relevant to evaluating how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

§ The ratio of performance- to time-based incentive awards;

§ The overall ratio of performance-based compensation;

§ The completeness of disclosure and rigor of performance goals;

§ The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;

§ Actual results of financial/operational metrics, both absolute and relative to peers;

¹⁰ The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.

¹¹ The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group, and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group, with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are comparable to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry, and also within a market cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s. For Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels companies, market cap is the only size determinant.

¹² Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.

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§ Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards);

§ Realizable pay¹³ compared to grant pay; and

§ Any other factors deemed relevant.

Problematic Compensation Practices

Poor disclosure, the absence or non-transparency of disclosure and flawed compensation plan design can lead to excessive executive pay practices that are detrimental to shareholders.

Companies are expected to meet a minimum standard of tally sheet disclosure as to allow shareholders to readily assess the total executive pay package, understand the actual linkage between pay and performance, and mitigate misinformation to shareholders. The SEC has issued rules on executive and director compensation that require expansive disclosure and a total compensation figure for each of the named executive officers. Poorly designed executive compensation plans or those lacking in transparency can be reflective of a poorly performing compensation committee.

Executive compensation will continue to be in the spotlight in the ensuing years, particularly when shareholders are expected to have access to more complete information.

Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene best practice compensation considerations, including:

§ Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;

§ Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and

§ Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements.

While not exhaustive, the following list represents certain adverse practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration, and may lead to negative vote recommendations:

§ Egregious employment contracts:

§ Contracts containing multi-year guarantees for salary increases, non-performance based bonuses, and equity compensation;

§ New CEO with overly generous new-hire package:

§ Excessive “make whole” provisions without sufficient rationale;

§ Any of the problematic pay practices listed in this policy;

§ Abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or proper disclosure:

§ Includes performance metrics that are changed, canceled, or replaced during the performance period without adequate explanation of the action and the link to performance;

§ Egregious pension/SERP (supplemental executive retirement plan) payouts:

§ Inclusion of additional years of service not worked that result in significant benefits provided in new arrangements;

§ Inclusion of performance-based equity or other long-term awards in the pension calculation;

§ Excessive Perquisites:

§ Perquisites for former and/or retired executives, such as lifetime benefits, car allowances, personal use of corporate aircraft, or other inappropriate arrangements;

§ Extraordinary relocation benefits (including home buyouts);

§ Excessive amounts of perquisites compensation;

¹³  Public Fund Advisory Services research reports include realizable pay for S&P1500 companies.

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§ Excessive severance and/or change in control provisions:

§ Change in control cash payments exceeding 3 times base salary plus target/average/last paid bonus;

§ Arrangements that provide for change-in-control payments without loss of job or substantial diminution of job duties (single-triggered or modified single-triggered - where an executive may voluntarily leave for any reason and still receive the change-in-control severance package) or in connection with a problematic definition of Good Reason;

§ Employment or severance agreements that provide for excise tax gross-ups. Modified gross-ups would be treated in the same manner as full gross-ups;

§ Excessive payments upon an executive’s termination in connection with performance failure;

§ Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason); and

§ Liberal change in control definition in individual contracts or equity plans which could result in payments to executives without an actual change in control occurring;

§ Tax Reimbursements/Gross-ups: income tax reimbursements on executive perquisites or other payments (e.g., related to personal use of corporate aircraft, executive life insurance, bonus, restricted stock vesting, secular trusts, etc.; see also excise tax gross-ups above);

§ Dividends or dividend equivalents paid on unvested performance shares or units;

§ Executives using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps, or other similar arrangements;

§ Internal pay disparity: Excessive differential between CEO total pay and that of next highest-paid named executive officer (NEO);

§ Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/stock appreciation rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts, option exchanges, and certain voluntary surrender of underwater options where shares surrendered may subsequently be re-granted);

§ Options backdating;

§ Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally- managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible; and

§ Other pay practices that may be deemed problematic in a given circumstance but are not covered in the above categories.

Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking

Assess company policies and disclosure related to compensation that could incentivize excessive risk-taking, for example:

§ Guaranteed bonuses or other abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or appropriate disclosure;

§ Mega annual equity grants that provide unlimited upside with no downside risk;

§ A single performance metric used for short- and long-term plans;

§ High pay opportunities relative to industry peers;

§ Disproportionate supplemental pensions; or

§ Lucrative severance packages.

Factors that potentially mitigate the impact of risky incentives include rigorous claw-back provisions, robust stock ownership/holding guidelines, and substantive bonus deferral/escrowing programs.

Options Backdating

Options backdating has serious implications and has resulted in financial restatements, delisting of companies, and/or the termination of executives or directors. Public Fund Advisory Services will adopt a case-by-case approach to differentiate companies that had sloppy administration vs. deliberate action or fraud, as well as those companies which have since taken corrective action. Instances in which companies have committed fraud are considered most egregious, and Public Fund Advisory Services will look to them to adopt formal policies to ensure that such practices will not re-occur in the future.

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Public Fund Advisory Services will consider several factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

§ Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;

§ Duration of options backdating;

§ Size of restatement due to options backdating;

§ Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or repricing backdated options, or recoupment of option gains on backdated grants; and

§ Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creation of a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants going forward.

Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness

Consider the following factors when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

§ Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or

§ Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received a low level of shareholder support, taking into account:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals

The Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 mandates advisory votes on executive compensation (aka management “say on pay” or MSOP) for a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders that includes required SEC compensation disclosures. This non-binding shareholder vote on compensation must be included in a proxy or consent or authorization at least once every 3 years.

In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices – dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather than voting against or withhold from the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then Public Fund fiduciaries should vote against or withhold votes from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then a vote against an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval may be warranted.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a case-by-case basis.

§ Vote against management say on pay (MSOP) proposals if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

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§ The company maintains problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders; or

§ The board has failed to demonstrate good stewardship of investors’ interests regarding executive compensation practices.

§ Vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is no MSOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an MSOP is warranted due to pay for performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;

§ The board fails to respond adequately to a previous MSOP proposal that received low levels of shareholder support;

§ The company has practiced or approved problematic pay practices, including option repricing or option backdating; or

§ The situation is egregious.

§ Vote against an equity plan on the ballot if:

§ A pay for performance misalignment exists, and a significant portion of the CEO’s misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, taking into consideration:

§ Magnitude of pay misalignment;

§ Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and

§ The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer (NEO) level.

Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay

The Dodd-Frank Act, in addition to requiring advisory votes on compensation (aka management “say on pay” or MSOP), requires that each proxy for the first annual or other meeting of the shareholders (that includes required SEC compensation disclosures) occurring after Jan. 21, 2011, include an advisory voting item to determine whether, going forward, the “say on pay” vote by shareholders to approve compensation should occur every one, two, or three years.

Public Fund Advisory Services will recommend a vote for annual advisory votes on compensation. The MSOP is at its essence a communication vehicle, and communication is most useful when it is received in a consistent and timely manner. Support for an annual MSOP vote is merited for many of the same reasons Public Fund Advisory Services supports annual director elections rather than a classified board structure: because this provides the highest level of accountability and direct communication by enabling the MSOP vote to correspond to the majority of the information presented in the accompanying proxy statement for the applicable shareholders’ meeting. Having MSOP votes every two or three years, covering all actions occurring between the votes, would make it difficult to create the meaningful and coherent communication that the votes are intended to provide. Under triennial elections, for example, a company would not know whether the shareholder vote references the compensation year being discussed or a previous year, making it more difficult to understand the implications of the vote.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.

Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

This is a proxy item regarding specific advisory votes on “golden parachute” arrangements for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) that is required under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Public Fund Advisory Services places particular emphasis on severance packages that provide inappropriate windfalls and cover certain executive tax liabilities.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to approve the company’s golden parachute compensation, consistent with Public Fund Advisory Services’ policies on problematic pay practices related to severance packages. Features that may lead to a vote against include:

§ Agreements that include excise tax gross-up provisions;

§ Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;

§ Single trigger acceleration of unvested equity, including acceleration of performance-based equity despite the failure to achieve performance measures;

§ Single-trigger vesting of equity based on a definition of change in control that requires only shareholder approval of the transaction (rather than consummation);

§ Potentially excessive severance payments;

§ Recent amendments or actions that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; and

§ The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote. Such a construction is problematic from a corporate governance perspective.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s separate advisory vote on compensation (“management “say on pay”), Public Fund Advisory Services will evaluate the say on pay proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

Equity Pay Plans

The theory that stock awards including stock options are beneficial to shareholders because they motivate management and align the interests of investors with those of executives is no longer held sacrosanct. Indeed, a number of academic studies have found that there is limited correlation between executive stock ownership and company performance. Misused stock options can give executives an incentive to inflate their company’s earnings, take excessive risks, and make irresponsibly optimistic forecasts in order to keep stock prices high and their paychecks gargantuan.

Therefore, it is vital for shareholders to fully analyze all equity plans that appear on ballot.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: general, Public Fund Advisory Services evaluates executive and director compensation plans on a case-by-case basis. When evaluating equity-based compensation items on ballot, the following elements will be considered:

§ Dilution: Vote against plans in which the potential voting power dilution (VPD) of all shares outstanding exceeds fifteen percent.

§ Full Market Value: Awards must be granted at 100 percent of fair market value on the date of grant. However, in instances when a plan is open to broad-based employee participation and excludes the five most highly compensated employees, Public Fund Advisory Services accepts a 15 percent discount.

§ Burn Rate: Vote against plans where the company’s value-adjusted burn rate exceeds the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index.

§ Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control: Vote against equity plans if the plan provides for the accelerated vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition could include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.

§ Problematic Pay Practices: Vote against equity plans if the plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices (e.g. if the plan allows for change-in-control payouts that are single triggered).

§ Executive Concentration Ratio: Vote against plans where the annual grant rate to the top five executives (“named officers”) exceeds one percent of shares outstanding.

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§ Pay-For-Performance: Vote against plans where there is a misalignment between CEO pay and the company’s performance, or if performance criteria are not disclosed.

§ Evergreen Features: Vote against plans that reserve a specified percentage of outstanding shares for award each year instead of having a termination date.

§ Repricing: Vote against plans if the company’s policy permits repricing of “underwater” options or if the company has a history of repricing past options.

§ Loans: Vote against the plan if the plan administrator may provide loans to officers to assist in exercising the awards.

Stock Option Plans

Compensation to executive and other senior level employees should be strongly correlated to sustained performance. Stock options, restricted stock and other forms of non-cash compensation should be performance-based with an eye toward improving long-term corporate value. Well-designed stock option plans can align the interests of executives and shareholders by providing that executives benefit when stock prices rise so that the employees of the company, along with shareholders, prosper together. Likewise, option plans should not allow for the benefits of share price gains without the risk of share price declines. Poorly designed stock option plans can encourage excessive risk-taking behavior and incentivize executives to pursue corporate strategies that promote short-term stock price to the ultimate detriment of long-term shareholder value.

Many plans sponsored by management provide goals so easily attained that executives can realize massive rewards even though shareholder value is not created. Public Fund Advisory Services supports option plans when they provide legitimately challenging performance targets that serve to truly motivate executives in the pursuit of sustained superior performance. Moreover, equity pay plans should be designed in a fashion that ensures executive compensation is veritably performance driven and “at risk” such that executives are penalized (by either reducing or withholding compensation) for failure to meet pre-determined performance hurdles. Public Fund Advisory Services will oppose those plans that offer unreasonable benefits to executives that are not generally available to other shareholders or employees.

Voting Power Dilution (VPD) Calculation

Voting power dilution, or VPD, measures the amount of voting power represented by the number of shares reserved over the life of the plan. Industry norm dictates that ten percent dilution over the life of a ten-year plan is reasonable for most mature companies. Restricted stock plans or stand-alone stock bonus plans that are not coupled with stock option plans can be held to a lower dilution cap.

Voting power dilution may be calculated using the following formula:

A: Shares reserved for this amendment or plan

B: Shares available under this plan and/or continuing plans prior to proposed amendment

C: Shares granted but unexercised under this plan and/or continuing plans

D: All outstanding shares plus any convertible equity, outstanding warrants, or debt

The formula can be applied as follows:	A + B + C
	A + B + C + D

Fair Market Value, Dilution and Repricing

Consideration will be made as to whether the proposed plan is being offered at fair market value or at a discount; whether the plan excessively dilutes the earnings per share of the outstanding shares; and whether the plan gives management the ability to replace or reprice “underwater” options. Repricing is an amendment to a previously granted stock option contract that reduces the option exercise price. Options are “underwater” when their current price is below the current option contract price. Options can also be repriced through cancellations and re-grants. The typical new grant would have a ten-year term, new vesting restrictions, and a lower exercise price reflecting the current lower market price.

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Burn Rate

The annual burn rate is a measure of dilution that illustrates how rapidly a company is deploying shares reserved for equity compensation plans. A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Public Fund Advisory Services will generally oppose plans whose Value-Adjusted Burn Rates exceed the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.

The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate is calculated as follows:

Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).

Executive Concentration Ratio

In examining stock option awards, restricted stock and other forms of long-term incentives, it is important to consider internal pay equity; that is, the concentration and distribution of equity awards to a company’s top five executives (“named officers”) as a percentage of overall grants. Public Fund Advisory Services will consider voting against equity compensation plans whose annual grant rate to top executives exceeds fifteen percent of shares granted.

Evergreen Provisions

Public Fund Advisory Services will oppose plans that reserve a specified percentage of outstanding shares for award each year (evergreen plans) instead of having a termination date. Such plans provide for an automatic increase in the shares available for grant with or without limits on an annual basis. Because they represent a transfer of shareholder value and have a dilutive impact on a regular basis, evergreen plans are expensive to shareholders. Evergreen features also minimize the frequency that companies seek shareholder approval in increasing the number of shares available under the plan.

Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Historic trading patterns: the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;

§ Rationale for the re-pricing: was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?

§ Option vesting: does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?

§ Term of the option: the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;

§ Exercise price: should be set at fair market or a premium to market;

§ Participants: the plan should be broad-based and executive officers and directors should be excluded;

§ Is this a value-for-value exchange?

§ Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?

§ Timing--repricing should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price.

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If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then Public Fund Advisory Services will also take into consideration the impact on the company’s equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

In addition to the above considerations, Public Fund Advisory Services will evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing. Public Fund Advisory Services does not view market deterioration, in and of itself, as an acceptable reason for companies to reprice stock options and/or reset goals under performance plans. Repricing after a recent decline in stock price triggers additional scrutiny and may warrant a vote against the proposal. At a minimum, the decline should not have happened within the past year. Public Fund Advisory Services also considers the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

Restricted Stock

Public Fund Advisory Services supports the use of performance-vesting restricted stock as long as the absolute amount of restricted stock being granted is a reasonable proportion of an executive’s overall compensation. The best way to align the interests of executives with shareholders is through direct stock holdings, coupled with at-risk variable compensation that is tied to explicit and challenging performance benchmarks. Performance-vesting restricted stock both adds to executives’ direct share holdings and incorporates at-risk features.

To reward performance and not job tenure, restricted stock vesting requirements should be performance-based rather than time lapsing. Such plans should explicitly define the performance criteria for awards to senior executives and may include a variety of corporate performance measures in addition to the use of stock price targets. In addition, executives should be required to hold their vested restricted stock as long as they remain employees of the company.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) - Qualified Plans

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for plans if:

§ Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;

§ Offering period is 27 months or less; and

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is ten percent or less of the outstanding shares.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) – Non-Qualified Plans

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for plans with:

§ Broad-based participation (i.e. all employees with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company);

§ Limits on employee contribution (a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of base salary);

§ Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and

§ No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase since there is a company matching contribution.

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Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)

An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is an employee benefit plan that makes the employees of a company also owners of stock in that company. Recent academic research of the performance of ESOPs in closely held companies found that ESOPs appear to increase overall sales, employment, and sales per employee over what would have been expected absent an ESOP. Studies have also found that companies with an ESOP are also more likely to still be in business several years later, and are more likely to have other retirement oriented benefit plans than comparable non-ESOP companies.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals that request shareholder approval in order to implement an ESOP or to increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs except in cases when the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is deemed excessive (i.e. generally greater than five percent of outstanding shares).

OBRA-Related Compensation Proposals

Cash bonus plans can be an important part of an executive’s overall pay package, along with stock-based plans tied to long-term total shareholder returns. Section 162(m) of the IRS Code Section limits the deductibility of compensation in excess of $1 million to a named executive officer unless certain prescribed actions are taken including shareholder approval and the establishment of performance goals.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for proposals to approve or amend executive incentive bonus plans if the proposal:

§ Is only to include administrative features;

§ Places a cap on the annual grants any one participant may receive to comply with the provisions of Section 162(m);

§ Adds performance goals to existing compensation plans to comply with the provisions of Section 162(m) unless they are clearly inappropriate; or

§ Covers cash or cash and stock bonus plans that are submitted to shareholders for the purpose of exempting compensation from taxes under the provisions of Section 162(m) if no increase in shares is requested.

§ Vote against such proposals if:

§ If the plan provides for awards to individual participants in excess of $2 million a year;

§ The compensation committee does not fully consist of independent directors as defined by Public Fund Advisory Services’ definition of director independence; or

§ The plan contains excessive problematic provisions including lack of rigorous performance measures.

§ Vote case-by-case on such proposals if:

§ In addition to seeking 162(m) tax treatment, the amendment may cause the transfer of additional shareholder value to employees (e.g., by requesting additional shares, extending the option term, or expanding the pool of plan participants);

§ A company is presenting the plan to shareholders for Section 162(m) favorable tax treatment for the first time after the company’s initial public offering (IPO). Perform a full equity plan analysis, including consideration of total shareholder value transfer, burn rate (if applicable), repricing, and liberal change in control. Other factors such as pay-for-performance or problematic pay practices as related to Management Say-on-Pay may be considered if appropriate.

Golden and Tin Parachutes

Golden parachutes are designed to protect the employees of a corporation in the event of a change-in-control. Under most golden parachute agreements, senior level management employees receive a lump sum payout triggered by a change-in-control at usually two to three times their current base salary. The SEC requires disclosure of all golden parachute arrangements in the proxy statement.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on management proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Whether the triggering mechanism is beyond the control of management;

§ Whether the payout amount is based on an excessive severance multiple; and

§ Whether the change-in-control payments are double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure .

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to all have golden parachute agreements submitted for shareholder ratification.

Director Compensation

Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:

§ If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and

§ An assessment of the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The balance of cash vs. equity compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

Disclosure of Executive and Director Pay

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that seek additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, including the preparation of a formal report on executive compensation practices and policies.

Limit Executive and Director Pay

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate outside directors’ retirement benefits.

§ Vote case-by-case on all other shareholder proposals that seek to limit executive and director pay. This includes shareholder proposals that seek to link executive compensation to customer, employee, or stakeholder satisfaction.

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Executive Perks and Retirement/Death Benefits

Public Fund Advisory Services supports enhanced disclosure and shareholder oversight of executive benefits and other in-kind retirement perquisites. For example, compensation devices like executive pensions (SERPs), deferred compensation plans, below-market-rate loans or guaranteed post-retirement consulting fees can amount to significant liabilities to shareholders and it is often difficult for investors to find adequate disclosure of their full terms. Public Fund Advisory Services opposes any perquisite or benefit to executives that exceeds what is generally offered to other company employees. From a shareholder prospective, the cost of these executive entitlements would be better allocated to performance-based forms of executive compensation during their term in office.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company’s executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.

Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of discontinuing or obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive. This could come, for example, in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. However, this would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.

Executive Holding Periods

Senior level executives should be required to hold a substantial portion of their equity compensation awards, including shares received from option exercises (e.g. 75% of their after-tax stock option proceeds), while they are employed at a company or even into retirement. Equity compensation awards are intended to align management interests with those of shareholders, and allowing executives to sell these shares while they are employees of the company undermines this purpose. Given the large size of a typical annual equity compensation award, holding requirements that are based on a multiple of cash compensation may be inadequate.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans while employed or following the termination of their employment.

Pay for Superior Performance

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that request the board to establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation programs for senior executives.

Performance-Based Options

Stock options are intended to align the interests of management with those of shareholders. However, stock option grants without performance-based elements can excessively compensate executives for stock increases due solely to a general stock market rise, rather than improved or superior company stock performance. When option grants reach the hundreds of thousands, a relatively small increase in the share price may permit executives to reap millions of dollars without providing material benefits to shareholders.

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Public Fund Advisory Services advocates for performance-based awards – such as premium-priced or indexed – which encourage executives to outperform peers, certain indices, or the broader market rather than being rewarded for any minimal rise in the share price, which can occur if there are not empirical performance measures incorporated into the structure of the options. Additionally, it should be noted that performance-accelerated vesting and premium priced options allow fixed plan accounting, whereas performance-vested and indexed options entail certain expensing requirements.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that seek to provide for performance-based options such as indexed and/or premium priced options.

Tax Gross-up Proposals

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally, vote for shareholder proposals that call for non-binding shareholder ratification of the compensation of the Named Executive Officers and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the Summary Compensation Table.

Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s) and fees paid.

Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan.

Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees).

Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment, and eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity.

Recoup Bonuses

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to recoup unearned incentive bonuses or other incentive payments made to senior executives if it is later determined that the incentive compensation was based upon figures that later turn out to have been in error.

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Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure on linking executive pay to non-financial factors.

§ Evaluate shareholder proposals calling for linkage of executive pay to non-financial factors, such as corporate downsizing, customer/employee satisfaction, community involvement, human rights, social and environmental goals and performance, and predatory lending on a case-by-case basis.

Pension Plan Income Accounting

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals to exclude pension plan income in the calculation of earnings used in determining executive bonuses/compensation.

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3.   Auditors

Auditors play an integral role in certifying the integrity and reliability of corporate financial statements on which investors rely to gauge the financial well-being of a company and the viability of an investment. The well-documented auditor-facilitated bankruptcies and scandals at several large public companies in recent years underscore the catastrophic consequences that investors can suffer when the audit process breaks down.

Auditor Independence

The wave of accounting scandals over the past decade illuminates the need to ensure auditor independence in the face of consulting services to audit clients. The ratio of non-audit services to total revenues at the large accounting firms grew significantly leading up to the accounting scandals. Public Fund Advisory Services believes the ratio of non-audit fees should make up no more than one-quarter of all fees paid to the auditor so as to properly discourage even the appearance of any undue influence upon an auditor’s objectivity.

Under SEC rules, disclosed categories of professional fees paid for audit and non-audit services are as follows: (1) Audit Fees, (2) Audit-Related Fees, (3) Tax Fees, and (4) All Other Fees. Under the reporting requirements, companies are required to describe – in qualitative terms – the types of services provided under the three categories other than Audit Fees. The following fee categories are defined as: A) tax compliance or preparation fees are excluded from our calculations of non-audit fees; and B) fees for consulting services for tax-avoidance strategies and tax shelters will be included in “other fees” and will be considered non-audit fees if the proxy disclosure does not indicate the nature of the tax services. In circumstances where “Other” fees include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events: initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs; and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees which are an exception to the standard “non-audit fee” category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit/audit-related fees/tax compliance and preparation for purposes of determining whether non-audit fees are excessive.

As auditors are the backbone upon which a company’s financial health is measured, auditor independence is absolutely essential for rendering objective opinions upon which investors then rely. When an auditor is paid excessive consulting fees in addition to fees paid for auditing, the company-auditor relationship is left open to conflicts of interest.

Auditor Ratification

The ratification of auditors is an important component of good governance. In light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and increased shareholder scrutiny, some companies are opting to take auditor ratification off the ballot. Neglecting to include the ratification of auditors on the proxy takes away the fundamental shareholder right to ratify the company’s choice of auditor. Whereas shareholder ratification of auditors was once considered routine by many shareowners, accounting scandals have caused shareholders to be more vigilant about the integrity of the auditors certifying their companies’ financial statements. It is now viewed as best practice for companies to place the item on ballot.

Although U.S. companies are not legally required to allow shareholders to ratify their appointment of independent auditors, submission of the audit firm for approval at the annual meeting on an annual basis gives shareholders the means to weigh in on their satisfaction (or lack thereof) of the auditor’s independent execution of their duties. Public Fund Advisory Services believes mandatory auditor ratification is in line with sound and transparent corporate governance and remains an important mechanism to ensure the integrity of the auditor’s work. In the absence of legislation mandating shareholder ratification of auditors, the failure by a company to present its selection of auditors for shareholder ratification should be discouraged as it undermines good governance and disenfranchises shareholders.

Proposals to ratify auditors is examined for potential conflicts of interest, with particular attention to the fees paid to the auditor, as well as whether the ratification of auditors has been put up for shareholder vote.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to ratify auditors when the amount of audit fees is equal to or greater than three times (75 percent) the amount paid for consulting, unless: i) An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; or ii) There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position.

§ Vote against proposals to ratify auditors when the amount of non-audit consulting fees exceeds a quarter of all fees paid to the auditor.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals seeking to limit companies from buying consulting services from their auditor.

Auditor Rotation

Long-term relationships between auditors and their clients can impede auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism. Such long-standing relationships foster an undesirable coziness between audit firms and their clients, which can cause the auditors to lose their independence and become less questioning especially where lucrative contracts for the provision of non-audit consulting services are involved. Mandatory auditor rotation is a widely supported safeguard against improper audits and is viewed by many as an effective mechanism for mitigating the potential risks borne by long-term auditor-client relationships.

Proponents of compulsory audit firm rotation contend that rotation policies promote objectivity and independence among auditors and minimize the scope of vested interests developing in the audit. Opponents of audit firm rotation argue that regular re-tendering is a costly practice, likely to reduce audit quality and increase the risk of audit failure in the early years due to the time required to gain cumulative knowledge of an often complex and geographically diverse business. A solution around this apparent negative effect of mandatory rotation is to keep a longer rotation period.

Public Fund Advisory Services recommends that companies not maintain the same audit firm in excess of seven years, and will vote against auditors if their tenure at a company exceeds seven years. A revolving seven-year rotation period allows the auditor to develop cumulative knowledge of a company’s business and the effect of changes in the business along with the corresponding changes in its risks, thereby enhancing the quality of the audit and trammeling potential loss of auditor objectivity and independence. Many institutional investors argue that the increased costs associated with compulsory auditor rotation are a lesser evil vis-à-vis the larger evil of the costs to shareholders when the objectionable coziness between clients and long-standing auditors leads to gross erosion of shareholder value.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder proposals to ensure auditor independence through measures such as mandatory auditor rotation (no less than every seven years).

Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability

Indemnification clauses allow auditors to avoid liability for potential damages, including punitive damages. Eliminating concerns about being sued for carelessness could lead to; 1) potential impairment of external auditor independence and impartiality by contractual clauses limiting their liability; and 2) a decrease in the quality and reliability of the audit given the lack of consequence for an inadequate audit.

Given the substantial settlements against auditors in recent years for poor audit practices and the cost of such insurance to the company and its shareholders, there are legitimate concerns over the broader use of indemnification clauses. Such agreements may weaken the objectivity, impartiality and performance of audit firms.

Public Fund Advisory Services believes it is important for shareholders to understand the full risks and implications of these agreements and determine what impact they could have on shareholder value. At the present time, however, due to poor disclosure in this area, it is difficult to identify the existence and extent of limited liability provisions and auditor agreements, and investors lack the information needed to make informed decisions regarding these agreements.

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Without uniform disclosure, it is difficult to consistently apply policy and make informed vote recommendations. As such, Public Fund Advisory Services reviews the use of indemnification clauses and limited liability provisions in auditor agreements on a case-by-case basis, when disclosure is present.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against or withhold from audit committee members if there is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Disclosures Under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that companies document and assess the effectiveness of their internal financial controls. Beginning in 2005, most public companies must obtain annual attestation of the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting from their outside auditors. Companies with significant material weaknesses identified in the Section 404 disclosures potentially have ineffective internal financial reporting controls. This may lead to inaccurate financial statements, which hampers shareholders’ ability to make informed investment decisions, and may lead to destruction of public confidence and shareholder value. The audit committee is ultimately responsible for the integrity and reliability of the company’s financial information and its system of internal controls.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against or withhold votes from audit committee members under certain circumstances when a material weakness rises to a level of serious concern, if there are chronic internal control issues, or if there is an absence of established effective control mechanisms.

§ Vote against management proposals to ratify auditors if there is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position.

Adverse Opinions

An Adverse Opinion on the company’s financial statements is issued when the auditor determines that the financial statements are materially misstated and, when considered as a whole, do not conform to GAAP. It essentially states that the information contained is materially incorrect, unreliable, and inaccurate in order to assess the company’s financial position and results of operations.

Adverse opinions on companies’ financial statements are generally very rare because they essentially state that a significant portion of the financial statements are unreliable, and the auditor had no choice but to issue an adverse opinion after a long process of seeking resolution with the company subjected to the audit.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against or withhold votes from audit committee members if the company receives an Adverse Opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditors.

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4.   Takeover Defense

Poison Pills

Shareholder rights plans, typically known as poison pills, take the form of rights or warrants issued to shareholders and are triggered when a potential acquiring stockholder reaches a certain threshold of ownership. When triggered, poison pills generally allow shareholders to purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company (“flip-in pill”) and/or the potential acquirer (“flip-out pill”) at a price far out of line with fair market value.

Depending on the type of pill, the triggering event can either transfer wealth from the target company or dilute the equity holdings of current shareholders. Poison pills insulate management from the threat of a change in control and provide the target board with veto power over takeover bids. Because poison pills greatly alter the balance of power between shareholders and management, shareholders should be allowed to make their own evaluation of such plans.

In evaluating management proposals on poison pills, Public Fund Advisory Services considers the company’s rationale for adopting the pill and its existing governance structure in determining whether or not the pill appropriately serves in shareholders’ best interests. The rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. Additionally, Public Fund Advisory Services examines the company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, or any problematic governance concerns.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask a company to submit its poison pill for shareholder ratification.

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to redeem a company’s poison pill.

§ Vote case-by-case on management proposals to ratify a poison pill.

§ Vote against or withhold from any board where a dead-hand poison pill provision is in place. From a shareholder perspective, there is no justification for a dead-hand provision. Directors of companies with these lethal protective devices should be held fully accountable.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments

The financial crisis prompted widespread losses in certain industries. This resulted in previously profitable companies considering the adoption of a poison pill and/or NOL protective amendment to protect their NOL tax assets, which may be lost upon an acquisition of 5 percent of a company’s shares.

When evaluating management proposals seeking to adopt NOL pills or protective amendments, the purpose behind the proposal, its terms, and the company’s existing governance structure should be taken into account to assess whether the structure actively promotes board entrenchment or adequately protects shareholder rights. While the high estimated tax value of NOLs would typically benefit shareholders, the ownership acquisition limitations contained in an NOL pill/protective amendment coupled with a company’s problematic governance structure could serve as an antitakeover device.

Given the low ownership thresholds involved, shareholders want to ensure that such pills/amendments do not remain in effect permanently. Public Fund Advisory Services will closely review whether the pill/amendment contains a sunset provision or a commitment to cause the expiration of the NOL pill/protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOLs.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill/ protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the term of the pill/ protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

§ Evaluate management proposals to ratify an NOL pill /adopt an NOL protective amendment if the term of the pill/amendment would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL on a case-by-case basis considering the following factors;

§ The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5% and NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing five-percent holder);

§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);

§ The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Greenmail

Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of shares, the practice discriminates against most shareholders. This transferred cash, absent the greenmail payment, could be put to much better use for reinvestment in the company, payment of dividends, or to fund a public share repurchase program.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to adopt an anti-greenmail provision in their charter or bylaws that would thereby restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments to certain shareholders.

§ Vote case-by-case on all anti-greenmail proposals when they are presented as bundled items with other charter or bylaw amendments.

Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies

Shareholder ability to remove directors, with or without cause, is either prescribed by a state’s business corporation law, individual company’s articles of incorporation, or its corporate bylaws. Many companies have sought shareholder approval for charter or bylaw amendments that would prohibit the removal of directors except for cause, thus ensuring that directors would retain their directorship for their full-term unless found guilty of self-dealing. By requiring cause to be demonstrated through due process, management insulates the directors from removal even if a director has been performing poorly, not attending meetings, or not acting in the best interests of shareholders.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.

§ Vote for proposals which seek to restore the authority of shareholders to remove directors with or without cause.

§ Vote against proposals that provide only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.

§ Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.

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Shareholder Ability to Alter the Size of the Board

Proposals that would allow management to increase or decrease the size of the board at its own discretion are often used by companies as a takeover defense. Proposals to fix the size of the board at a specific number can prevent management from increasing the board size without shareholder approval when facing a proxy context. By increasing the size of the board, management can make it more difficult for dissidents to gain control of the board. Fixing the size of the board also prevents a reduction in the size of the board as a strategy to oust independent directors. Fixing board size also prevents management from increasing the number of directors in order to dilute the effects of cumulative voting.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals that seek to fix the size of the board within an acceptable range.

§ Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board without shareholder approval.

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5.   Shareholder Rights

Confidential Voting

The confidential ballot ensures that voters are not subject to real or perceived coercion. In an open voting system, management can determine who has voted against its nominees or proposals before a final vote count. As a result, shareholders can be pressured to vote with management at companies with which they maintain or would like to establish a business relationship.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that request corporations to adopt confidential voting, the use of independent tabulators, and the use of independent inspectors for an election as long as the proposals include clauses for proxy contests. In the case of a contested election, management is permitted to request that the dissident group honor its confidential voting policy. If the dissidents agree, the policy remains in place. If the dissidents do not agree, the confidential voting policy is waived.

§ Vote for management proposals to adopt confidential voting procedures.

Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings

Most state corporation statutes allow shareholders to call a special meeting when they want to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly scheduled annual meetings. Sometimes this right applies only if a shareholder or a group of shareholders own a specified percentage of shares, with ten percent being the most common. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to call special meetings.

§ Generally vote for proposals that remove restrictions on the right of shareholders to act independently of management.

§ Vote against provisions that would require advance notice of more than sixty days.

Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

Consent solicitations allow shareholders to vote on and respond to shareholder and management proposals by mail without having to act at a physical meeting. A consent card is sent by mail for shareholder approval and only requires a signature for action. Some corporate bylaws require supermajority votes for consents, while at others standard annual meeting rules apply. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act by written consent.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to take action by written consent.

§ Generally vote for proposals to allow or make easier shareholder action by written consent.

Unequal Voting Rights

Incumbent managers are able to use unequal voting rights through the creation of a separate class of shares that has superior voting rights to the common shares of regular shareholders. This separate class of shares with disproportionate voting power allows management to concentrate its power and insulate itself from the wishes of the majority of

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shareholders. Dual class exchange offers involve a transfer of voting rights from one group of shareholders to another group of shareholders typically through the payment of a preferential dividend. A dual class recapitalization plan also establishes two classes of common stock with unequal voting rights, but initially involves an equal distribution of preferential and inferior voting shares to current shareholders.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share-one-vote capital structure.

§ Generally vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super-voting shares.

Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Amend the Charter or Bylaws

Supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments are often the result of “lock-in” votes, which are the votes required to repeal new provisions to the corporate charter. Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company and its corporate governance provisions. Requiring more than this may entrench managers by blocking actions that are in the best interests of shareholders.

The general lack of credit availability for financially distressed companies has resulted in “rescue” or highly dilutive stock and warrant issuances, which often comprise a majority of the company’s voting stock upon conversion. When an investor takes control of the company through the conversion of securities, the new owners often seek statutory amendments, such as adopting written consent, or allowing 50 percent shareholders to call a special meeting, that allow effective control over the company with little or no input from minority shareholders.

In such cases, the existing supermajority vote requirements would serve to protect minority shareholders’ interests. The reduction in the vote requirements, when coupled with low quorum requirements (in Nevada and other states) could shift the balance in power away from small shareholders while overly empowering large shareholders.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve charter and bylaw amendments.

§ Vote against management proposals seeking to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements when they accompany management sponsored proposals to also change certain charter or bylaw amendments.

§ Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments. However, for companies with shareholders who have significant ownership levels, vote on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 1) ownership structure, 2) quorum requirements, and 3) supermajority vote requirements.

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.

In addition, voting against or withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

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§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Approve Mergers

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company and its corporate governance provisions. Requiring more than this may entrench managers by blocking actions that are in the best interests of shareholders.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve mergers and other significant business combinations.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only¹⁴ meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:

§ Scope and rationale of the proposal; and

§ Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.

Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support shareholder proposals to reimburse for proxy solicitation expenses.

§ When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, always support the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

§ Generally support requests seeking to reimburse a shareholder proponent for all reasonable campaign expenditures for a proposal approved by the majority of shareholders.

Exclusive Venue

Issuers began seeking shareholder approval of exclusive venue charter provisions in 2011 after a court opinion suggested that unilaterally adopted exclusive venue bylaw provisions might not be enforceable. All the exclusive venue proposals to date have sought to make Delaware the exclusive forum for resolution on shareholder disputes.

¹⁴ Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.

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Corporations have defended exclusive forum provisions on the grounds that the Delaware Chancery Court moves cases more quickly than other courts and is presided over by judges who are experienced in corporate law. Firms have also argued that making Delaware the sole forum for lawsuits avoids the possibility of duplicative suits arising out of the same events. A number of shareholder advocates have, however, countered that exclusive venue provisions deprive shareholders of the flexibility to choose the forum in which to assert claims of wrongdoing.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to restrict the venue for shareholder claims by adopting charter or bylaw provisions that seek to establish an exclusive judicial forum.

Fee-Shifting Bylaws

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against bylaws that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., in cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).

Bundled Proposals

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on bundled or conditional proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.

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6.   Mergers & Acquisitions / Corporate Restructurings

A number of academic and industry studies have estimated that nearly three quarters of all corporate acquisitions fail to create economically meaningful shareholder value. These studies have also demonstrated that the larger the deal the greater the risk in realizing long-term value for shareholders of the acquiring firm. These risks include integration challenges, over-estimation of expected synergies, incompatible corporate cultures and poor succession planning. Indeed, some studies have found that smaller deals within specialized industries on average outperform “big bet” larger deals by a statistically significant factor.

In analyzing M&A deals, private placements or other transactional related items on proxy, Public Fund Advisory Services performs a well-rounded analysis that seeks to balance all facets of the deal to ascertain whether the proposed acquisition is truly going to generate long-term value for shareholders and enhance the prospects of the ongoing corporation.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on mergers and acquisitions are always considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the following factors:

§ Impact of the merger on shareholder value;

§ Perspective of ownership (target vs. acquirer) in the deal;

§ Form and mix of payment (i.e. stock, cash, debt, etc.);

§ Fundamental value drivers behind the deal;

§ Anticipated financial and operating benefits realizable through combined synergies;

§ Offer price (cost vs. premium);

§ Change-in-control payments to executive officers;

§ Financial viability of the combined companies as a single entity;

§ Was the deal put together in good faith? What kind of auction setting took place? Were negotiations carried out at arm’s length? Was any portion of the process tainted by possible conflicts of interest?

§ Fairness opinion (or lack thereof);

§ Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights;

§ What are the potential legal or environmental liability risks associated with the target firm?

§ Impact on community stakeholders and employees in both workforces; and

§ How will the merger adversely affect employee benefits like pensions and health care?

Fair Price Provisions

Fair price provisions were originally designed to specifically defend against the most coercive of takeover devises- the two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer. In such a hostile takeover, the bidder offers cash for enough shares to gain control of the target. At the same time, the acquirer states that once control has been obtained, the target’s remaining shares will be purchased with cash, cash and securities, or only securities. Since the payment offered for the remaining stock is, by design, less valuable than the original offer for the controlling shares, shareholders are forced to sell out early to maximize the value of their shares. Standard fair price provisions require that in the absence of board or shareholder approval of the acquisition the bidder must pay the remaining shareholders the same price for their shares that brought control.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for fair price proposals as long as the shareholder vote requirement embedded in the provision is no more than a majority of disinterested shares.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to lower the shareholder vote requirement in existing fair price provisions.

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Appraisal Rights

Rights of appraisal provide shareholders who do not approve of the terms of certain corporate transactions the right to demand a judicial review in order to determine the fair value for their shares. The right of appraisal applies to mergers, sale of corporate assets, and charter amendments that may have a materially adverse effect on the rights of dissenting shareholders.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore or provide shareholders with the right of appraisal.

Corporate Restructuring

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes concerning corporate restructuring proposals, including minority squeeze outs, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, liquidations, and asset sales, are considered on a case-by-case basis.

Spin-offs

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on spin-offs depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, market focus, and managerial incentives.

Asset Sales

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes case-by-case on asset sales taking into consideration the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, and potential elimination of diseconomies.

Liquidations

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on liquidations after reviewing management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.

Going Private Transactions (LBOs, Minority Squeezeouts)

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following: offer price/premium, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives/offers considered, and non-completion risk.

§ Vote case-by-case on “going dark” transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock), cash-out value, whether the interests of continuing and cashed-out shareholders are balanced, and market reaction to public announcement of transaction.

Changing Corporate Name

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for changing the corporate name in all instances if proposed and supported by management and the board.

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Plans of Reorganization (Bankruptcy)

The recent financial crisis has placed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations as a potential alternative for distressed companies. While the number of bankruptcies has risen as evidenced by many firms, including General Motors and Lehman Brothers, the prevalence of these reorganizations can vary year over year due to, among other things, market conditions and a company’s ability to sustain its operations. Additionally, the amount of time that lapses between a particular company’s entrance into Chapter 11 and its submission of a plan of reorganization varies significantly depending on the complexity, timing, and jurisdiction of the particular case. These plans are often put to a vote of shareholders (in addition to other interested parties), as required by the Bankruptcy Code.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:

§ Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;

§ Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;

§ Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee);

§ The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);

§ Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and

§ Governance of the reorganized company.

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

§ Valuation - Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity.

§ Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

§ Deal timing - A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date.

§ Negotiations and process - What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors.

§ Conflicts of interest - How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 percent of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24 month timeframe.

§ Voting agreements - Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights

§ Governance - What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger

§ Stakeholder Impact - impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc.

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Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC extension proposals taking into account the length of the requested extension, the status of any pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process, any added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders, and any prior extension requests.

§ Length of request: Typically, extension requests range from two to six months, depending on the progression of the SPAC’s acquisition process.

§ Pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process: Sometimes an initial business combination was already put to a shareholder vote, but, for varying reasons, the transaction could not be consummated by the termination date and the SPAC is requesting an extension. Other times, the SPAC has entered into a definitive transaction agreement, but needs additional time to consummate or hold the shareholder meeting.

§ Added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders: Sometimes the SPAC sponsor (or other insiders) will contribute, typically as a loan to the company, additional funds that will be added to the redemption value of each public share as long as such shares are not redeemed in connection with the extension request. The purpose of the “equity kicker” is to incentivize shareholders to hold their shares through the end of the requested extension or until the time the transaction is put to a shareholder vote, rather than electing redemption at the extension proposal meeting.

§ Prior extension requests: Some SPACs request additional time beyond the extension period sought in prior extension requests.

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7. Capital Structure

The management of a corporation’s capital structure involves a number of important issues including dividend policy, types of assets, opportunities for growth, ability to finance new projects internally, and the cost of obtaining additional capital. Many financing decisions have a significant impact on shareholder value, particularly when they involve the issuance of additional common stock, preferred stock, or debt.

Common Stock Authorization

State statutes and stock exchanges require shareholder approval for increases in the number of common shares. Corporations increase their supply of common stock for a variety of ordinary business purposes: raising new capital, funding stock compensation programs, business acquisitions, implementation of stock splits, or payment of stock dividends.

Clear justification should accompany all management requests for shareholder approval of increases in authorized common stock. Public Fund Advisory Services supports increases in authorized common stock to fund stock splits that are in shareholders’ interests. Dual requests on the same ballot, in which an increase in common stock is requested in tandem with a reverse stock split in which shares are not proportionately reduced may not be in shareholder best interests. Although the reverse stock split may be needed in the face of imminent delisting, there is little justification in effectively approving two increases in common stock on the same ballot.

General Authorization Requests

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes.

Vote for an increase of up to 100 percent of current authorized shares.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if less than or equal to 100 percent, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases above 100 percent of the current authorized shares when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

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Specific Authorization Requests

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support.

Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends

Stock splits/dividends involve the partitioning of the outstanding shares of a corporation into a larger number of shares, while proportionately decreasing the market price of the stock. Stock splits/dividends do not affect the equity of the company. An understanding of forward and reverse stock splits and stock dividends is relevant because proposals to increase authorized common shares may be tied to the implementation of a planned stock distribution.

Shareholders can effectively cancel a split or dividend if the company does not have sufficient shares to implement a split without an increase in authorized shares.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the increase in authorized shares is reasonable in accordance with Public Fund Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Reverse Stock Splits

Reverse splits exchange multiple shares for a lesser amount to increase share price. Increasing share price is sometimes necessary to restore a company’s share price to a level that will allow it to be traded on the national stock exchanges. In addition, some brokerage houses have a policy of not monitoring or investing in very low priced shares. Reverse stock splits can help maintain stock liquidity.

Evaluation of management proposals to implement a reverse stock split will take into account whether there is a corresponding proportional decrease in authorized shares. Without a corresponding decrease, a reverse stock split is effectively an increase in authorized shares by way of reducing the number of shares outstanding, while leaving the number of authorized shares to be issued at the pre-split level.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:

§ The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or

§ The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the company’s existing authorization.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting; or

§ Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;

§ The company’s rationale; or

§ Other factors as applicable.

Shareholders should only vote for non-proportionate reverse stock splits in the most dire of situations. Companies should provide disclosure of external evidence that a potential delisting is imminent to separate the true emergencies from vague potential risks to shareholders.

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Share Repurchase Programs

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:

§ Greenmail,

§ The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics,

§ Threats to the company’s long-term viability, or

§ Other company-specific factors as warranted.

Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.

Preferred Stock Authorization

Preferred stock is an equity security which has certain features similar to debt instruments- such as fixed dividend payments and seniority of claims to common stock - and usually carries little to no voting rights. The terms of blank check preferred stock give the board of directors the power to issue shares of preferred stock at their discretion with voting, conversion, distribution, and other rights to be determined by the board at time of issue.

General Authorization Requests

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes.

Vote for an increase of up to 100 percent of current authorized shares.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if less than or equal to 100 percent, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;¹⁵

§ The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”);

§ The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they’re convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders;

§ The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

¹⁵ To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan.

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However, generally vote for proposed increases above 100 percent of the current authorization when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

Specific Authorization Requests

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support

Blank Check Preferred Stock

Blank check preferred stock, with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend, distribution, and other rights, can be used for sound corporate purposes but can also be used as a device to thwart hostile takeovers without shareholder approval.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of blank check preferred stock.

§ Vote against proposals to increase the number of blank check preferred stock authorized for issuance when no shares have been issued or reserved for a specific purpose.

§ Vote for proposals to create “declawed” blank check preferred stock (stock that cannot be used as a takeover defense).

§ Vote for requests to require shareholder approval for blank check authorizations.

Adjust Par Value of Common Stock

Stock that has a fixed per share value that is on its certificate is called par value stock. The purpose of par value stock is to establish the maximum responsibility of a stockholder in the event that a corporation becomes insolvent. Proposals to reduce par value come from certain state level requirements for regulatory industries such as banks and other legal requirements relating to the payment of dividends.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock.

Preemptive Rights

Preemptive rights permit shareholders to share proportionately in any new issues of stock of the same class. These rights guarantee existing shareholders the first opportunity to purchase shares of new issues of stock in the same class as their own and in the same proportion. The absence of these rights could cause stockholders’ interest in a company to be reduced by the sale of additional shares without their knowledge and at prices unfavorable to them. Preemptive rights, however, can make it difficult for corporations to issue large blocks of stock for general corporate purposes.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to create or abolish preemptive rights. In evaluating proposals on preemptive rights, Public Fund Advisory Services looks at the size of a company and the characteristics of its shareholder base.

Debt Restructuring

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding debt restructurings.

§ Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

§ Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt-restructuring plan. The following factors are considered:

§ Dilution—How much will the ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be?

§ Change in Control—Will the transaction result in a change in control of the company? Are board and committee seats guaranteed? Do standstill provisions and voting agreements exist?

§ Financial Issues— company’s financial situation, degree of need for capital, use of proceeds, and effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Terms of the offer—discount/premium in purchase price to investor including any fairness opinion, termination penalties and exit strategy;

§ Conflict of interest—arm’s length transactions and managerial incentives; and

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives.

Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 10 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.

For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.

Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.

Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.

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8.   State of Incorporation

Voting on State Takeover Statutes

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freeze out provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, anti-greenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions). Public Fund Advisory Services generally supports opting into stakeholder protection statutes if they provide comprehensive protections for employees and community stakeholders. Public Fund Advisory Services is less supportive of takeover statutes that only serve to protect incumbent management from accountability to shareholders and which negatively influence shareholder value.

Reincorporation Proposals

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Management or shareholder proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

§ Reasons for reincorporation;

§ Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and

§ Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Vote for reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.

Offshore Reincorporations and Tax Havens

For a company that seeks to reincorporate, Public Fund Advisory Services evaluates the merits of the move on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the company’s strategic rationale for the move, the potential economic ramifications, potential tax benefits, and any corporate governance changes that may impact shareholders. Public Fund Advisory Services believes there are a number of concerns associated with a company looking to reincorporate from the United States to offshore locales such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands or Panama. With more U.S.-listed companies seeking to move offshore, shareholders are beginning to understand the web of complexities surrounding the legal, tax, and governance implications involved in such a transaction. .

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on proposed offshore moves, taking into consideration:

§ Legal recourse for U.S. stockholders of the new company and the enforcement of legal judgments against the company under the U.S. securities laws;

§ The transparency (or lack thereof) of the new locale’s legal system;

§ Adoption of any shareholder-unfriendly corporate law provisions;

§ Actual, quantifiable tax benefits associated with foreign incorporation;

§ Potential for accounting manipulations and/or discrepancies;

§ Any pending U.S. legislation concerning offshore companies;

§ Prospects of reputational harm and potential damage to brand name via increased media coverage concerning corporate expatriation.

§ Generally vote for shareholder requests calling for “expatriate” companies that are domiciled abroad yet predominantly owned and operated in America to re-domesticate back to a U.S. state jurisdiction.

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While a firm’s country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, Public Fund Advisory Services will generally apply its U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S. policies will also apply to companies listed on U.S. exchanges as Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) and that may be exempt from the disclosure and corporate governance requirements that apply to most companies traded on U.S. exchanges, including a number of SEC rules and stock market listing requirements. Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on the country of incorporation.

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9.   Corporate Responsibility & Accountability

Social, Environmental and Sustainability Issues

Public Fund Advisory Services generally supports social, workforce, and environmental shareholder-sponsored resolutions if they seek to create responsible corporate citizens while at the same time attempting to enhance long-term shareholder value. Public Fund Advisory Services typically supports proposals that ask for disclosure reporting of information that is not available outside the company that is not proprietary in nature. Such reporting is particularly most vital when it appears that a company has not adequately addressed shareholder concerns regarding social, workplace, environmental and/or other issues. A determination whether the request is relevant to the company’s core business and in-line with industry practice will be made on a case-by-case basis. The proponent of the resolution must make the case that the benefits of additional disclosure outweigh the costs of producing the report.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: In analyzing social, workplace, environmental, and other related proposals, Public Fund Advisory Services considers the following factors:

§ Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable;

§ Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company’s short-term or long-term share value;

§ Whether the company’s analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive;

§ The degree to which the company’s stated position on the issues could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to boycott or selective purchasing;

§ Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;

§ Whether the issues presented in the proposal are being appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation, government regulation, or company-specific action;

§ The company’s approach compared with its peers or any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;

§ Whether the company has already responded in an appropriate or sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;

§ Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s practices related to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;

§ If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether sufficient information is publicly available to shareholders and whether it would be unduly burdensome for the company to compile and avail the requested information to shareholders in a more comprehensive or amalgamated fashion; and

§ Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal.

In general, Public Fund Advisory Services supports proposals that request the company to furnish information helpful to shareholders in evaluating the company’s operations from top to bottom. In order to be able to intelligently monitor their investments, shareholders often need information that is best provided by the company in which they have invested on behalf of their end beneficiaries. Qualified requests satisfying the aforementioned criteria usually merit support.

Proposals requesting that the company cease certain actions that the proponent believes are harmful to society or some segment of society will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Special attention will be made to the company’s legal and ethical obligations, its ability to remain profitable, and potential negative publicity if the company fails to honor the request. A high standard will need to be met by proponents requesting specific action like divesture of a business line or operation, legal remuneration, or withdrawal from certain high-risk markets.

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I. GENERAL CSR RELATED

Special Policy Review and Shareholder Advisory Committees

These resolutions propose the establishment of special committees of the board to address broad corporate policy and provide forums for ongoing dialogue on issues including, but not limited to: shareholder relations, the environment, occupational health and safety, and executive compensation.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Support these proposals when they appear to offer a potentially effective method for enhancing shareholder value.

International Operations

The rise of globalization has put increasing importance on the need for U.S. companies to periodically monitor their business operations abroad. As a means to preserve brand integrity and protect against potentially costly litigation and negative public relations, Public Fund Advisory Services generally supports shareholder proposals which call for a report on the company’s core business policies and procedures of its operations outside the United States.

Many of the resolutions which address a company’s international policies can include: impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in emerging market economies; corporate safeguards against money laundering; terrorist financing; economic de-stabilization concerns; relationships with international financial institutions (IFIs); and product sales/marketing abroad (i.e., tobacco, pharmaceutical drug pricing).

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support proposals asking for policy clarification and reporting on international operations that can materially impact the company’s short and long-term bottom-line.

Affirm Political Non-Partisanship

Employees should not be put in a position where professional standing and goodwill within the corporation could be jeopardized as a result of political beliefs. Responsible employment practices should protect workers from an environment characterized by political indoctrination or intimidation. Corporations should not devote resources to partisan political activities, nor should they compel their employees to contribute to or support particular causes. Moreover, it is wise for a corporation to maintain a politically neutral stance as to avoid potentially embarrassing conflicts of interests that could negatively impact the company’s brand name with consumers.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support proposals affirming political non-partisanship within the company.

Political Contributions, Lobbying Reporting & Disclosure

Changes in legislation that governs corporate political giving have, rather than limiting such contributions, increased the complexity of tracking how much money corporations contribute to the political process and where that money ultimately ends up. In January 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission lifted restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections. A company’s involvement in the political process could impact shareholder value if such activities are not properly overseen and managed.

Shareholders have the right to know about corporate political activities, and management’s knowledge that such information can be made publicly available should encourage a company’s lawful and responsible use of political contributions.

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Moreover, it is critical that shareholders understand the internal controls that are in place at a company to adequately manage political contributions and lobbying practices. Given the significant reputational and financial risk involved in political giving, shareholders should expect management to have the necessary capabilities to monitor and track all monies distributed toward political groups and causes. These internal controls should be fully consistent with Section 404 requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

While political contributions, lobbying and other corporate political activity can benefit the strategic interests of a company, it is important that accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure that monies disbursed in support of political objectives actually generate identifiable returns on shareholder wealth. Such mechanisms serve to insure against the use of shareholder funds in the furtherance of narrow management agendas.

When analyzing the proposals, special consideration will be made if the target company has been the subject of significant controversy stemming from its contributions or political activities, if the company fails to disclose a policy to shareholders that outlines the process by which the company considers its political contributions and lobbying activities, or if the company has recently been involved in significant controversy or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or governmental affairs.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Support reporting of political and political action committee (PAC) contributions.

§ Support establishment of corporate political contributions guidelines and internal reporting provisions or controls.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals requesting companies to review and report on their political lobbying activities including efforts to influence governmental legislation.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals asking to publish in newspapers and public media the company’s political contributions as such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.

§ Generally vote case-by-case on proposals requesting comparison of a company’s political spending to objectives that can mitigate material risks for the company, such as limiting global warming.

Military Sales

Shareholder proposals from church groups and other community organizations have asked companies for detailed reports on foreign military sales. These proposals often can be created at reasonable cost to the company and contain no proprietary data. Large companies can supply this information without undue burden and provide shareholders with information affecting corporate performance and decision-making.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support reports on foreign military sales and economic conversion of facilities and where such reporting will not disclose sensitive information that could impact the company adversely or increase its legal exposure.

§ Generally vote against proposals asking a company to develop specific military contracting criteria.

Report on Operations in Sensitive Regions or Countries

Over the past decade, a number of public companies – especially within the extractive sector – have withdrawn from geopolitically sensitive regions as a result of being associated with political controversies involving their host countries (i.e. Myanmar, the Sudan, China, Iran, etc.). Oil and natural gas companies, in particular, continue to be the largest investors in many countries involved in human rights abuse and terrorist activities. As such, these companies become targets of consumer boycotts, public relations backlash and even governmental intervention.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards in connection with involvement in a certain market and other potentially sensitive geopolitical regions.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals seeking a report on operations within a certain market and documentation of costs of continued involvement in a given country or region.

§ Generally support requests for establishment of a board committee to review and report on the reputational risks and legal compliance with U.S. sanctions as a result of the company’s continued operations in countries associated with terrorist sponsored activities.

§ Consider shareholder proposals to pull out of a certain market on a case-by-case basis considering factors such as overall cost, FDI exposure, level of disclosure for investors, magnitude of controversy, and the current business focus of the company.

II. ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE

Shareholder proposals addressing environmental and energy concerns have been plentiful in recent years, and generally seek greater disclosure on an issue or seek to improve a company’s environmental practices in order to protect the world’s natural resources. In addition, some proponents cite the negative financial implications for companies with poor environmental practices, including liabilities associated with site clean-ups and lawsuits, as well as arguments that energy efficient products and clean environmental practices are sustainable business practices that will contribute to long-term shareholder value. Shareholders say the majority of independent atmospheric scientists agree that global warming poses a serious problem to the health and welfare of all countries, citing the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the world’s most authoritative scientific body on the subject. Shareholder proponents argue that companies can report on their greenhouse gas emissions within a few months at reasonable cost.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Scientists generally agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a “greenhouse effect” that traps the planet’s heat. Environmentalists claim that the greenhouse gases produced by the industrial age have caused recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. With notable exceptions, a number of business leaders have described the rise and fall of global temperatures as naturally occurring phenomena and depicted corporate impact on climate change as minimal.

Shareholder proposals asking a company to issue a report to shareholders – at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information – on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the report include descriptions of efforts within companies to reduce emissions, their financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, and their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat. Proponents argue that there is scientific proof that the burning of fossil fuels causes global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, changing market dynamics and consumer preferences may impact demand for fossil fuels, and thus shareholder value, and that a report on the company’s role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for a company to commit to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions under a reasonable timeline.

§ Generally vote for resolutions requesting that a company disclose information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks related to climate change on its operations and investments, or on how the company identifies, measures, and manages such risks.

Generally vote for proposals requesting a report on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from company operations and/or products and operations.

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Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan¹⁶, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

§ The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;

§ Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);

§ The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions in line with Paris Agreement goals (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);

§ Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based;

§ Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;

§ Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;

§ Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance;

§ Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;

§ Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and

§ The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

§ The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure;

§ The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and

§ Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.

Investment in Renewable Energy

Filers of proposals on renewable energy ask companies to increase their investment in renewable energy sources and to work to develop products that rely more on renewable energy sources. Increased use of renewable energy is expected to reduce the negative environmental impact of energy companies. In addition, as supplies of oil and coal exist in the earth in limited quantities, renewable energy sources represent a competitive, and some would even argue essential, long-term business strategy.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder proposals seeking increased investment in renewable energy sources, taking into account whether the terms of the resolution are realistic or overly restrictive for management to pursue.

¹⁶ Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

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Sustainability Reporting and Planning

The concept of sustainability is commonly understood as meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Indeed, the term sustainability is complex and poses significant challenges for companies on many levels. Many in the investment community have termed this broader responsibility the “triple bottom line,” referring to the triad of performance goals related to economic prosperity, social responsibility and environmental quality. In essence, the concept requires companies to balance the needs and interests of their various stakeholders while operating in a manner that sustains business growth for the long-term, supports local communities and protects the environment and natural capital for future generations.

Reporting and enhanced disclosure addressing sustainable development is important to companies namely because it offers a formal structure for decision making that helps management teams anticipate and address important global trends that can have serious consequences for business and society. Shareholders may request general sustainability reports on a specific location or operation, often requesting that the company detail the environmental, social, legal and other risks and/or potential liabilities of the specific project in question.

A number of companies have begun to report on sustainability issues using established standards in the marketplace. Such reporting focuses on corporate compliance and measurement regarding key economic, environmental, and social performance indicators. As a best practice, companies release annual sustainability reports in conjunction to regular annual statement of operations.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company’s environmental and social practices, and/or associated risks and liabilities.

Operations in Protected or Sensitive Areas

Operating in regions protected or established under national or international categorization guidelines, including wildlife refuges, national forests, and International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) categorized areas, expose companies to increased oversight and the potential for associated risk and controversy. While it is important for a company to have the flexibility to operate in these regions to take advantage of strategic placement or growth, additional disclosure could be an important mitigating factor to address increased risk and oversight. Restrictions to the company’s operations, damaging public relations, and costly litigation resulting from failure to comply with the requirements associated with protected or categorized regions could have a significant impact on shareholder value.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder requests for reports outlining potential environmental damage from operations in protected regions, including wildlife refuges, unless the company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions.

Hydraulic Fracturing

Shareholder proponents have elevated concerns on the use of hydraulic fracturing, an increasingly controversial process in which water, sand, and a mix of chemicals is blasted horizontally into tight layers of shale rock to extract natural gas. As this practice has gained more widespread use, environmentalists have raised concerns that the chemicals mixed with sand and water to aid the fracturing process can contaminate ground water supplies. Proponents of resolutions at companies that employ hydraulic fracturing are also concerned that wastewater produced by the process could overload the waste treatment plants to which it is shipped. Shareholders have asked companies that utilize hydraulic fracturing to report on the environmental impact of the practice and to disclose policies designed to reduce hazards from the process.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests seeking greater transparency on the practice of hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks.

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Recycling Policy

A number of companies have received proposals to step-up their recycling efforts, with the goal of reducing the company’s negative impact on the environment and reducing costs over the long-term.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to increase their recycling efforts or to adopt a formal recycling policy.

Endorsement of Ceres Roadmap 2030

These resolutions call for the adoption of principles that encourage the company to protect the environment and the safety and health of its employees. The Ceres Roadmap 2030, formulated by Ceres (formerly known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, CERES), require signing companies to address environmental issues, including protection of the biosphere, sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of wastes, energy conservation, and employee and community risk reduction. A signatory to the Ceres Roadmap 2030 would disclose its efforts in such areas through a standardized report submitted to Ceres and made available to the public.

Public Fund Advisory Services supports proposals that improve a company’s public image, reduce exposure to liabilities, and establish standards so that environmentally responsible companies and markets are not at a competitive financial disadvantage.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for requests asking a company to formally adopt the Ceres Roadmap 2030.

§ Vote for adoption of reports to shareholders on environmental issues.

Land Use

Many large retail stores and real estate development firms have received criticism over their policies and processes for acquiring and developing land. Often, in such cases, there are organizations that support as well as those that oppose the proposed development.

Many of these requests brought forth by the respective stakeholders raise serious issues that can have a real impact on short-term shareholder value. However in some cases, additional reporting may be duplicative of existing disclosure or may fail to provide added benefit to shareholders commensurate with the associated cost or burden of providing additional information. Some of the companies targeted with such resolutions have been subject to recent litigation, significant fines stemming from their land use practices, and/or recent community boycotts.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder resolutions that request better disclosure of detailed information on a company’s policies related to land use or development or compliance with local and national laws and zoning requirements.

Water Use

Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report evaluating the business risks linked to water use and impacts on the company’s supply chain, including subsidiaries and bottling partners. Such proposals also ask companies to disclose current policies and procedures for mitigating the impact of operations on local communities in areas of water scarcity.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s risks linked to water use.

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III. WORKPLACE PRACTICES & HUMAN RIGHTS

Equal Employment Opportunity

These proposals generally request that a company establish a policy of reporting to shareholders its progress with equal opportunity and affirmative action programs. The costs of violating federal laws that prohibit discrimination by corporations are high and can affect corporate earnings.

The Equal Opportunities Employment Commission (EEOC) does not release the company’s filings to the public unless it is involved in litigation, and it is difficult to obtain from other sources. Companies need to be sensitive to minority employment issues as the work force becomes increasingly diverse. This information can be provided with little cost to the company and does not create an unreasonable burden on management.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals calling for action on equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination.

§ Vote for proposals requesting legal and regulatory compliance and public reporting related to non-discrimination, affirmative action, workplace health and safety, environmental issues, and labor policies and practices that affect long-term corporate performance.

§ Vote for proposals advocating for non-discrimination in salary, wages, and all benefits.

High-Performance Workplace

High-performance workplace practices emphasize employee training, participation, and feedback. The concept of a high-performance workplace has been endorsed by the U.S. Department of Labor and refers to a workplace that is designed to provide workers with the information, skills, incentives, and responsibility to make decisions essential for innovation, quality improvement and rapid response to changes in the marketplace. These standards embrace a “what is good for the worker is good for the company” philosophy. Studies have shown that improvement in human resources practices is associated with increases in total return to shareholders. High-performance workplace standards proposals can include linking compensation to social measures such as employee training, morale and safety, environmental performance and workplace lawsuits.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support proposals that incorporate high-performance workplace standards.

Workplace Safety

In light of fatal accidents at oil refineries (Tesoro – Anacortes refinery, April 2010; and BP – Texas City refinery, March 2005), the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico, and the explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine in 2010, shareholders have sought greater transparency and accountability regarding workplace safety by filing resolutions at a number of corporations.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting requests for workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts.

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Non-Discrimination in Retirement Benefits

A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that treats an earned retirement benefit as if it were a credit from a defined contribution plan, but which provides a stated benefit at the end of its term. Because employer contributions to these plans are credited evenly over the life of a plan and not based on a seniority formula, they may reduce payouts to long-term employees who are currently vested in plans.

Cash-balance pension conversions have undergone significant congressional and federal agency scrutiny in the wake of high-profile EEOC complaints on age discrimination and employee anger at several large blue-chip companies. While significant policy reform is unlikely in the short-term, business interests are worried enough that the National Association of Manufacturers and other pro-business lobbies have formed a coalition on Capitol Hill to preserve the essential features of the plans and to overturn an IRS ruling.

Driving the push behind conversions from traditional pension plans to cash-balance plans are the substantial savings that companies generate in the process. Critics point out that this savings is gained at the expense of the most senior employees. Shareholder resolutions may call on corporate boards to establish a committee of outside directors to prepare a report to shareholders on the potential impact of pension-related proposals being considered by national policymakers in reaction to the controversy spawned by the plans.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Support proposals calling for a non-discrimination policy with regard to retirement benefits and pension management at a company.

Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gaps

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender or race/ ethnicity, or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender or race/ethnicity pay gaps, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy on fair and equitable compensation practices;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and

§ Local laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of ethnic and/or racial minorities.

Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audit Guidelines

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, considering company disclosures, policies, actions, and engagements.

Sexual Harassment

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to preventing workplace sexual harassment;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and

§ The company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers.

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Mandatory Arbitration

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; and

§ The company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers.

Fair Lending Reporting and Compliance

These resolutions call for financial institutions to comply with fair lending laws and statutes while avoiding predatory practices in their sub-prime lending. These predatory practices include: lending to borrowers with inadequate income, who will then default; not reporting on payment performances of borrowers to credit agencies; implying that credit life insurance is necessary to obtain the loan (packing); unnecessarily high fees; refinancing with high additional fees rather than working out a loan that is in arrears (flipping); and high pre-payment fees.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Support proposals calling for full compliance with fair-lending laws.

§ Support reporting on overall lending policies and data.

MacBride Principles

These resolutions have called for the adoption of the MacBride Principles for operations located in Northern Ireland. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is well documented that Northern Ireland’s Catholic community faced much higher unemployment figures than the Protestant community. In response to this problem, the U.K. government instituted the New Fair Employment Act of 1989 (and subsequent amendments) to address the sectarian hiring problems.

Many companies believe that the Act adequately addresses the problems and that further action, including adoption of the MacBride Principles, only duplicates the efforts already underway. In evaluating a proposal to adopt the MacBride Principles, shareholders must decide whether the principles will cause companies to divest, and therefore worsen the unemployment problem, or whether the principles will promote equal hiring practices. Proponents believe that the Fair Employment Act does not sufficiently address the sectarian hiring problems. They argue that the MacBride Principles serve to stabilize the situation and promote further investment.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Support the MacBride Principles for operations in Northern Ireland that request companies to abide by equal employment opportunity policies.

Contract Supplier Standards

These resolutions call for compliance with governmental mandates and corporate policies regarding nondiscrimination, affirmative action, work place safety and health, and other basic labor protections.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support proposals that:

§ Seek publication of a “Worker Code of Conduct” to be implemented by the company’s foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring they satisfy all applicable labor standards and laws protecting employees’ wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, right to collectively bargain, and other rights;

§ Request a report summarizing the company’s current practices for enforcement of its Worker Code of Conduct;

§ Seek to establish independent monitoring mechanism in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with the Worker Code of Conduct;

§ Create incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts;

§ Implement policies for ongoing wage adjustments, ensuring adequate purchasing power and a sustainable living wage for employees of foreign suppliers and licensees;

§ Request public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis; and

§ Adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with foreign suppliers that manufacture products for sale in the U.S. using forced or child labor or with suppliers that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employees’ wages and working conditions.

Corporate and Supplier Codes of Conduct

Public Fund Advisory Services generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of clear principles or codes of conduct relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights. These conditions include the use of slave, child, or prison labor, undemocratically elected governments, widespread reports by human rights advocates, fervent pro-democracy protests, or economic sanctions and boycotts.

Many proposals refer to the seven core conventions, commonly referred to as the “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights At Work,” ratified by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The seven conventions fall under four broad categories: i) right to organize and bargain collectively; ii) non-discrimination in employment; iii) abolition of forced labor; and iv) end of child labor. Each member nation of the ILO body is bound to respect and promote these rights to the best of their abilities.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Support the principles and codes of conduct relating to company investment and/or operations in countries with patterns of human rights abuses or pertaining to geographic regions experiencing political turmoil (Northern Ireland, Columbia, Burma, former Soviet Union, and China).

§ Support the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct.

§ Support independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with Codes.

§ Support requests that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operation or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process.

IV. CONSUMER HEALTH & PUBLIC SAFETY

Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients

Shareholder activists request companies engaged in the development of genetically modified agricultural products (GMOs) to adopt a policy of not marketing or distributing such products until long term safety testing demonstrates that they are not harmful to humans, animals or the environment. Until further long term testing demonstrates that these products are not harmful, companies in the restaurant, prepared foods and packaging industries are being asked to remove genetically altered ingredients from products they manufacture, distribute or sell, and label such products in the interim. Shareholders are asking supermarket companies to do the same for their own private label brands.

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Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to label products that contain genetically engineered products.

§ Generally vote against proposals calling for a full phase out of product lines containing GMO ingredients.

Tobacco-Related Proposals

Shareholders file resolutions annually asking that companies with ties to the tobacco industry account for their marketing and distribution strategies, particularly as they impact smoking by young people. While the specific resolutions for shareholder proponents vary from year to year, activist shareholders consistently make the tobacco industry a prominent target. Examples of tobacco proposals include: attempting to link executive compensation with teen smoking rates; the placement of company tobacco products in retail outlets; the impact of second hand smoke; and a review of advertising campaigns and their impact on children and minority groups.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to limit the sale of tobacco products to minors.

§ Generally vote against proposals calling for a full phase out of tobacco related product lines.

Toxic Emissions

Shareholder proposals asking companies to take steps to minimize their emissions of toxic chemicals or release of toxic wastes into the environment can vary greatly. Some focus on reporting on the impact of these chemicals on the communities in which the company operates. Still others ask for a review of the company’s efforts to minimize pollution.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals calling on the company to establish a plan to reduce toxic emissions.

Toxic Chemicals

The use of toxic chemicals in cosmetics, consumables, and household products has become a growing issue of concern for shareholders as international regulations on this topic continue to expand, providing increased scrutiny over potentially toxic materials or compounds used or emitted in the conduct of operations or as an ingredient in consumer goods. Shareholders must recognize the impact that changing regulation and consumer expectations could have on shareholder value and should encourage companies to disclose their policies regarding the use or emission of toxic chemicals. Specific considerations should be made for a company’s geographic markets and the appearance of historical difficulties with controversy, fines, or litigation, requests for disclosure on the potential financial and legal risk associated with toxic chemicals.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support resolutions requesting that a company disclose its policies related to toxic chemicals.

§ Generally support shareholder resolutions requesting that companies evaluate and disclose the potential financial and legal risks associated with utilizing certain chemicals.

§ Consider shareholder proposals requesting companies to substitute or replace existing products on a case-by-case basis, with consideration for applicable regulations and standards in the markets in which the company participates.

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Nuclear Safety

These resolutions are filed at companies that manage nuclear power facilities or produce components for nuclear reactors to request disclosure on the risks to the company associated with these operations, including physical security and the potential for environmental damage. Current reporting requirements for companies that operate nuclear facilities are managed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and include detailed reports on safety and security that are available to the public.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder resolutions requesting that companies report on risks associated with their nuclear reactor designs and/or the production and interim storage of irradiated fuel rods.

Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFOs)

The level of pollution resulting from CAFOs has drawn increased attention in recent years as certain legal decisions have established the precedent that a company can be held liable for the actions of the contract farms it sources from. Fines and remediation expenses stemming from these cases have been significant and could have a notable impact on the companies’ operations and shareholder value.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support resolutions requesting that companies report to shareholders on the risks and liabilities associated with concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) unless the company has publicly disclosed guidelines for its corporate and contract farming operations (including compliance monitoring), or if the company does not directly source from CAFOs.

Pharmaceutical Product Reimportation

One of the most visible aspects of the legal and political debate over rising health care costs in the United States can be seen through prescription drug reimportation through Canada. While U.S. and Canadian regulations limit reimportation, several states have taken steps to encourage employees to actively seek less expensive medications through reimportation.

Shareholder action at major pharmaceutical companies has hinged around requesting increased disclosure of the financial and legal risks associated with company policies, or called on companies to change distribution limits to increase product availability in Canada, thereby encouraging product reimportation to the United States. The level of public concern over this issue and associated impact that a poorly developed policy could have on the companies suggest that additional disclosure of company policies related to reimportation could be beneficial to shareholders and generally merits support.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on the financial and legal impact of their policies regarding prescription drug reimportation, unless such information is already publicly disclosed.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt specific policies to encourage or not constrain prescription drug reimportation.

Pharmaceutical Product Pricing

Pharmaceutical drug pricing, both within the United States and internationally, has raised many questions of the companies that are responsible for creating and marketing these treatments. Shareholder proponents, activists and even some legislators have called upon drug companies to restrain pricing of prescription drugs.

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The high cost of prescription drugs is a vital issue for senior citizens across the country. Seniors have the greatest need for prescription drugs, accounting for a significant portion of all prescription drug sales, but they often live on fixed incomes and are underinsured.

Proponents note that efforts to reign-in pharmaceutical costs will not negatively impact research and development (R&D) costs and that retail drug prices are consistently higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized nations. Pharmaceutical companies often respond that adopting a formal drug pricing policy could put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Against the backdrop of the AIDS crisis in Africa, many shareholders have called on companies to address the issue of affordable drugs for the treatment of AIDS, as well as TB and Malaria throughout the developing world. When analyzing such resolutions, consideration should be made of the strategic implications of pricing policies in the market.

Public Fund Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Proposals asking a company to implement price restraints on its pharmaceutical products will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the following factors:

§ Whether the proposal focuses on a specific drug and region;

§ Whether the economic benefits of providing subsidized drugs (e.g., public goodwill) outweigh the costs in terms of reduced profits, lower R&D spending, and harm to competitiveness;

§ The extent that reduced prices can be offset through the company’s marketing expenditures without significantly impacting R&D spending;

§ Whether the company already limits price increases of its products;

§ Whether the company already contributes life-saving pharmaceuticals to the needy and Third World countries; and

§ The extent to which peer companies implement price restraints.

§ Generally support proposals requesting that companies implement specific price restraints for its pharmaceutical products in developing markets or targeting certain population groups.

§ Generally support proposals requesting that companies evaluate their global product pricing strategy, considering the existing level of disclosure on pricing policies, any deviation from established industry pricing norms, and the company’s existing philanthropic initiatives.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call on companies to develop a policy to provide affordable HIV, AIDS, TB and Malaria drugs to citizens in the developing world.

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UNITED STATES TAFT-HARTLEY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 2023 Policy Recommendations Published January 17, 2023 WWW. ISSGOVERNANCE.COM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Proxy Voting Policy Statement and Guidelines	F-148
1.    Director Elections	F-149
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections	F-149
Board Independence	F-149
Board Competence	F-150
Board Accountability	F-150
Board Responsiveness	F-154
Discussion	F-155
Other Board-Related Proposals	F-159
Director Diversity	F-159
Stock Ownership Requirements	F-159
Board and Committee Size	F-159
Limit Term of Office	F-160
Cumulative Voting	F-160
Majority Threshold Voting Requirement for Director Elections	F-161
Proxy Access	F-161
CEO Succession Planning	F-162
Establish an Office of the Board	F-162
Director and Officer Liability Protection and Exculpation	F-162
Director and Officer Indemnification	F-162
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access — Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections	F-163
2.    Compensation	F-164
Evaluation of Executive Pay	F-164
Pay-For-Performance Evaluation	F-165
Problematic Compensation Practices	F-166
Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness	F-169
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals	F-169
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay	F-170
Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale	F-170
Equity Pay Plans	F-171
Stock Option Plans	F-172
Voting Power Dilution (VPD) Calculation	F-172
Fair Market Value, Dilution and Repricing	F-172
Burn Rate	F-173
Executive Concentration Ratio	F-173
Evergreen Provisions	F-173
Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options	F-173
Restricted Stock	F-174
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) - Qualified Plans	F-174
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) – Non-Qualified Plans	F-174
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)	F-174
OBRA-Related Compensation Proposals	F-175
Golden and Tin Parachutes	F-175
Director Compensation	F-176
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs	F-176

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Shareholder Proposals on Compensation	F-176
Disclosure of Executive and Director Pay	F-176
Limit Executive and Director Pay	F-176
Executive Perks and Retirement/Death Benefits	F-176
Executive Holding Periods	F-177
Pay for Superior Performance	F-177
Performance-Based Options	F-177
Tax Gross-up Proposals	F-178
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals	F-178
Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization	F-178
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy	F-178
Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”	F-178
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity	F-178
Recoup Bonuses	F-178
Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors	F-178
Pension Plan Income Accounting	F-179
3.    Auditors	F-180
Auditor Independence	F-180
Auditor Ratification	F-180
Auditor Rotation	F-181
Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability	F-181
Disclosures Under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act	F-182
Adverse Opinions	F-182
4.    Takeover Defenses	F-183
Poison Pills	F-183
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments	F-183
Greenmail	F-184
Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies	F-184
Shareholder Ability to Alter the Size of the Board	F-184
5.    Shareholder Rights	F-186
Confidential Voting	F-186
Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings	F-186
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent	F-186
Unequal Voting Rights	F-186
Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Amend the Charter or Bylaws	F-187
Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions	F-187
Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Approve Mergers	F-188
Virtual Shareholder Meetings	F-188
Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses	F-188
Exclusive Venue	F-188
Fee-Shifting Bylaws	F-189
Bundled Proposals	F-189
6.    Mergers  & Acquisitions / Corporate Restructurings	F-189
Fair Price Provisions	F-190
Appraisal Rights	F-190
Corporate Restructuring	F-190
Spin-offs	F-190

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Asset Sales	F-190
Liquidations	F-191
Going Private Transactions (LBOs, Minority Squeezeouts)	F-191
Changing Corporate Name	F-191
Plans of Reorganization (Bankruptcy)	F-191
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)	F-191
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) – Proposals for Extensions	F-192
7.    Capital Structure	F-193
Common Stock Authorization	F-193
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends	F-194
Reverse Stock Splits	F-194
Share Repurchase Programs	F-195
Preferred Stock Authorization	F-195
Adjust Par Value of Common Stock	F-196
Preemptive Rights	F-196
Debt Restructuring	F-197
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.	F-197
8.    State of Incorporation	F-198
Voting on State Takeover Statutes	F-198
Reincorporation Proposals	F-198
Offshore Reincorporations and Tax Havens	F-198
9.    Corporate Responsibility  & Accountability	F-200
Social, Environmental and Sustainability Issues	F-200
I. GENERAL CSR RELATED	F-201
Special Policy Review and Shareholder Advisory Committees	F-201
International Operations	F-201
Affirm Political Non-Partisanship	F-201
Political Contributions, Lobbying Reporting & Disclosure	F-201
Military Sales	F-202
Report on Operations in Sensitive Regions or Countries	F-202
II. ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE	F-203
Greenhouse Gas Emissions	F-203
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals	F-204
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals	F-204
Investment in Renewable Energy	F-204
Sustainability Reporting and Planning	F-205
Operations in Protected or Sensitive Areas	F-205
Hydraulic Fracturing	F-205
Recycling Policy	F-206
Endorsement of Ceres Roadmap 2030	F-206
Land Use	F-206
Water Use	F-206
III. WORKPLACE PRACTICES & HUMAN RIGHTS	F-207
Equal Employment Opportunity	F-207
High-Performance Workplace	F-207
Workplace Safety	F-207
Non-Discrimination in Retirement Benefits	F-207
Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gaps	F-208

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Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audit Guidelines	F-208
Sexual Harassment	F-208
Mandatory Arbitration	F-209
Fair Lending Reporting and Compliance	F-209
MacBride Principles	F-209
Contract Supplier Standards	F-209
Corporate and Supplier Codes of Conduct	F-210
IV. CONSUMER HEALTH & PUBLIC SAFETY	F-210
Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients	F-210
Tobacco-Related Proposals	F-211
Toxic Emissions	F-211
Toxic Chemicals	F-211
Nuclear Safety	F-211
Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFOs)	F-212
Pharmaceutical Product Reimportation	F-212
Pharmaceutical Product Pricing	F-212

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Proxy Voting Policy Statement and Guidelines

This statement sets forth the proxy voting policy of ISS’ Taft-Hartley Advisory Services. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has stated that the fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock and that trustees may delegate this duty to an investment manager. ERISA section 3(38) defines an investment manager as any fiduciary who is registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940. ISS is a registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will vote the proxies of its clients solely in the interest of their participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them. The interests of participants and beneficiaries will not be subordinated to unrelated objectives. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall act with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims. When proxies due to Taft-Hartley Advisory Services’ clients have not been received, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will make reasonable efforts to obtain missing proxies. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services is not responsible for voting proxies it does not receive.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall analyze each proxy on a case-by-case basis, informed by the guidelines elaborated below, subject to the requirement that all votes shall be cast solely in the long-term interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plans. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services does not intend for these guidelines to be exhaustive. Hundreds of issues appear on proxy ballots every year, and it is neither practical nor productive to fashion voting guidelines and policies which attempt to address every eventuality. Rather, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services’ guidelines are intended to cover the most significant and frequent proxy issues that arise. Issues not covered by the guidelines shall be voted in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries of the plan based on a worker-owner view of long-term corporate value. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall revise its guidelines as events warrant and will remain in conformity with the AFL-CIO proxy voting policy.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall report annually to its clients on proxy votes cast on their behalf. These proxy voting reports will demonstrate Taft-Hartley Advisory Services’ compliance with its responsibilities and will facilitate clients’ monitoring of Taft-Hartley Advisory Services. A copy of this Proxy Voting Policy Statement and Guidelines is provided to each client at the time Taft-Hartley Advisory Services is retained. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services shall provide its clients with revised copies of this proxy voting policy statement and guidelines whenever significant revisions have been made.

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1.    Director Elections

Electing directors is the single most important stock ownership right that shareholders can exercise. By electing directors who share their views, shareholders can help to define performance standards against which management can be held accountable. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services holds directors to a high standard when voting on their election, qualifications, and compensation. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services evaluates directors fairly and objectively, rewarding them for significant contributions and holding them ultimately accountable to shareholders for corporate performance. Institutional investors should use their voting rights in uncontested elections to influence financial performance and corporate strategies for achieving long term shareholder value.

Director accountability, independence and competence have become issues of prime importance to investors given the failings in oversight exposed by the global financial crisis. There is also concern over the environment in the boardrooms of certain markets, where past failures appear to be no impediment to continued or new appointments at major companies and may not be part of the evaluation process at companies in considering whether an individual is, or continues to be, fit for the role and best able to serve shareholders’ interests.

Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections

Votes concerning the entire board of directors and members of key board committees are examined using the following factors:

Board Independence: Without independence from management, the board and/or its committees may be unwilling or unable to effectively set company strategy and scrutinize performance or executive compensation.

Board Competence: Companies should seek a diverse board of directors who can add value to the board through specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. While directors should not be constrained by arbitrary limits such as age or term limits, directors who are unable to attend board and committee meetings and/or who are overextended (i.e. serving on too many boards) raise concern on the director’s ability to effectively serve in shareholders’ best interests.

Board Accountability: Practices that promote accountability include: transparency into a company’s governance practices, annual board elections, and providing shareholders the ability to remove problematic directors and to vote on takeover defenses or other charter/bylaw amendments. These practices help reduce the opportunity for management entrenchment.

Board Responsiveness: Directors should be responsive to shareholders, particularly in regard to shareholder proposals that receive a majority vote or management proposals that receive low shareholder support, and to tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered. Boards should also be sufficiently responsive to high withhold/against votes on directors. Furthermore, shareholders should expect directors to devote sufficient time and resources to oversight of the company.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on individual director nominees are always made on a case-by-case basis. Specific director nominee withhold/against¹ votes can be triggered by one or more of the following factors:

Board Independence

§ Lack of a board that is at least two-thirds (67 percent) independent – i.e. where the composition of non-independent board members is in excess of 33 percent of the entire board;

¹ In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use “Withhold” as the valid contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use “Against”. However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.

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§ Lack of an independent board chair;

§ Lack of independence on key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation, and nominating committees); or

§ Failure to establish any key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation, or nominating committees).

Board Competence

§ Directors serving on an excessive number of other boards which could compromise their primary duties of care and loyalty; or

§ Attendance of director nominees at board and committee meetings of less than 75 percent in one year without valid reason or explanation.

In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.

Gender Diversity

Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at companies where there are no women on the company’s board. An exception will be made if there was at least one woman on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to return to a gender-diverse status within a year.

Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity

For companies in the Russell 3000 or S&P 1500 indices, generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) where the board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse members². An exception will be made if there was racial and/or ethnic diversity on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to appoint at least one racial and/or ethnic diverse member within a year.

Board Accountability

Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees³ considered on a case-by-case basis):

Problematic Takeover Defenses

§ The board lacks accountability and oversight due to the presence of problematic governance provisions, coupled with long-term poor corporate performance relative to peers;

§ If the company has a classified board and a continuing director is responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote, in addition to potential future withhold/against votes on that director, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services may recommend votes against or withhold votes from any or all of the nominees up for election, with the exception of new nominees³; or

§ The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.

² Aggregate diversity statistics provided by the board will only be considered if specific to racial and/or ethnic diversity.

³ A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question.

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Restriction of Binding Shareholder Proposals

Vote against or withhold from members of the governance committee if:

§ The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include, but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals, or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.

Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.

Problematic Compensation Practices

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item or in egregious situations, vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (see Pay-for-Performance policy);

§ The company maintains problematic pay practices including options backdating, excessive perks and overly generous employment contracts etc.;

§ There is evidence that management/board members are using company stock in hedging activities;

§ The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or

§ The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.

§ Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Performance of audit committee members concerning the approval of excessive non-audit fees, material weaknesses, and/or the lack of auditor ratification upon the proxy ballot;

Vote against or withhold votes from the members of the audit committee when:

§ Consulting (i.e. non-audit) fees paid to the auditor are excessive;

§ Auditor ratification is not included on the proxy ballot;

§ The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor;

§ There is evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm; or

§ Poor accounting practices such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures, exist. Poor accounting practices may warrant voting against or withholding votes from the full board.

Problematic Pledging of Company Stock

Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:

§ The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;

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§ The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;

§ Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;

§ Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and

§ Any other relevant factors.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments and Problematic Capital Structures

Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees³, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:

§ The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;

§ Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;

§ The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;

§ The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ The company’s existing governance provisions;

§ The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and

§ Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against directors (except new nominees³, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board:

§ Classified the board;

§ Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws;

§ Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or

§ Adopted another provision deemed egregious.

Problematic Governance Structure – Newly public companies

For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting⁴ of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees³, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights:

§ Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ A classified board structure; or

§ Other egregious provisions.

A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.

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Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

Unequal Voting Rights

Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees³, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a common stock structure with unequal voting rights⁵.

Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:

§ Newly-public companies⁴ with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public;

§ Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs;

§ Situations where the super-voting shares represent less than 5% of total voting power and therefore considered to be de minimis; or

§ The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained.

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

Vote against or withhold from directors individually, governance committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees³, who should be considered case-by-case), where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Governance Failures

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:

§ The presence of problematic governance practices including interlocking directorships, multiple related-party transactions, excessive risk-taking, imprudent use of corporate assets, etc.;

§ Inadequate CEO succession planning, including the absence of an emergency and non-emergency/orderly CEO succession plan;

§ Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight⁶, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, failure to replace management as appropriate, flagrant or egregious actions related to the director(s)’ service on other boards

⁴ Newly-public companies generally include companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

⁵ This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”).

⁶ Examples of failure of risk oversight include but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock.

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that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company; or

§ Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) violations or fines, and criminal investigations by the Department of Justice (DOJ), Government Accounting Office (GAO) or any other federal agency.

Climate Accountability

For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain⁷, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where Taft-Hartley Advisory Services determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and mitigate risks related to climate change to the company and the larger economy.

Minimum steps to understand and mitigate those risks are considered to be the following. Both minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with the policy:

§ Detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:

§ Board governance measures;

§ Corporate strategy;

§ Risk management analyses; and

§ Metrics and targets.

§ Appropriate GHG emissions reduction targets.

At this time, “appropriate GHG emissions reductions targets” will be medium-term GHG reduction targets or Net Zero-by-2050 GHG reduction targets for a company’s operations (Scope 1) and electricity use (Scope 2). Targets should cover the vast majority of the company’s direct emissions.

Board Responsiveness

Vote against or withhold from individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

§ At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the underlying issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against votes;

§ The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of the shareholders tendered their shares; or

§ The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received approval by a majority of the shares cast the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year.

Vote case-by-case on compensation committee members (or, potentially, the full board) and the Say-on-Pay proposal if:

§ The company’s previous say-on-pay proposal received low levels of investor support, taking into account:

§ The company’s response, including: a) disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated); b) disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition; c) disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns; d) other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

⁷ Companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.

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§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

§ The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.

Discussion

Independence

Board independence from management is of vital importance to a company and its shareholders. Accordingly, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes votes should be cast in a manner that will encourage the independence of boards. Independence will be evaluated based upon a number of factors, including: employment by the company or an affiliate in an executive capacity; tenure on the board, past or current employment by a firm that is one of the company’s paid advisors or consultants; a personal services contract with the company; family relationships of an executive or director of the company; interlocks with other companies on which the company’s chair or chief executive officer is also a board member; and service with a non-profit organization that receives significant contributions from the company.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against or withhold votes from non-independent director nominees (executive directors and non-independent, non-executive directors) where the entire board is not at least two-thirds (67 percent) independent.

§ Generally vote against or withhold votes from non-independent director nominees when the nominating, compensation and audit committees are not fully independent.

§ Generally consider directors who have been on the board continually for a period longer than 10 years as non-independent, non-executive directors.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that all key board committees (i.e. audit, compensation and/or nominating) include independent directors exclusively.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the board be comprised of a two-thirds majority of independent directors.

Non-Independent Chair

Two major components at the top of every public company are the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. Many institutional investors believe there should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company that will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has unfettered powers of decision. When there is no clear division between the executive and board branches of a company, poor executive and/or board actions often go unchecked to the ultimate detriment of shareholders. Since executive compensation is so heavily correlated to the managerial power relationship in the boardroom, the separation of the CEO and chair positions is a critical step in curtailing excessive pay, which ultimately can become a drain on shareholder value.

Arguments have been made that a smaller company and its shareholders can benefit from the full-time attention of a joint chair and CEO. This may be so in select cases, and indeed, using a case-by-case review of circumstances there may be worthy exceptions. But, even in these cases, it is the general view of many institutions that a person should only serve in the position of joint CEO and chair on a temporary basis, and that these positions should be separated following their provisional combination.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services strongly believes that the potential for conflicts of interest in the board’s supervisory and oversight duties trumps any possible corollary benefits that could ensue from a dual CEO/chair scenario. Instead of having an ingrained quid pro quo situation whereby a company has a single leader overseeing both management and the boardroom, Taft-Hartley fiduciaries believe that it is the board’s implicit duty to assume an impartial and objective role in overseeing the executive team’s overall performance. Shareholder interests are placed in jeopardy if the CEO of a company is required to report to a board that she/he also chairs.

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Inherent in the chair’s job description is the duty to assess the CEO’s performance. This objectivity is obviously compromised when a chair is in charge of evaluating her/his own performance or has a past or present affiliation with management. Moreover, the unification of chair and CEO poses a direct threat to the smooth functioning of the entire board process since it is the ultimate responsibility of the chair to set the agenda, facilitate discussion, and make sure that directors are given complete access to information in order to make informed decisions.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against or withhold votes from any non-independent director who serves as board chair.

§ Generally vote against or withhold votes from a CEO who is also serving in the role of chair at the same company.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals calling for the separation of the CEO and chair positions.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals calling for a non-executive director to serve as chair who is not a former CEO or senior-level executive of the company.

Competence

Excessive Directorships

As new regulations mandate that directors be more engaged and vigilant in protecting shareholder interests or else risk civil and/or criminal sanctions, board members have to devote more time and effort to their oversight duties. Recent surveys of U.S. directors confirm a desire for limiting board memberships, to between three and five seats. In view of the increased demands placed on corporate board members, Taft-Hartley fiduciaries believe that directors who are overextended may be impairing their ability to serve as effective representatives of shareholders. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will recommend a vote against or withhold from directors serving on an excessive number of other boards, which could compromise their primary duties of care and loyalty.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold votes from directors serving on an excessive number of boards. As a general rule, vote against or withhold from director nominees who are:

§ CEOs of publicly-traded companies who serve on more than one public board besides their own. NOTE: Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will recommend a vote against or withhold from overboarded CEO directors only at their outside directorships⁸ and not at the company in which they presently serve as CEO; or

§ Non-CEO directors who serve on more than four public company boards.

Accountability

Director Performance Evaluation

Many institutional investors believe long-term financial performance and the appropriateness of governance practices should be taken into consideration when determining vote recommendations with regard to directors in uncontested elections. When evaluating whether to vote against or withhold votes from director nominees, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will evaluate underperforming companies that exhibit sustained poor performance as measured by total returns to shareholders over a one-, three-, and five-year period.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services views deficient oversight mechanisms and the lack of board accountability to shareholders especially in the context of sustained poor performance, as problematic. As part of the framework for assessing director

⁸ Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards with publicly-traded common stock will be counted as separate boards, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold/against vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but will do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

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performance, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will also evaluate board accountability and oversight at companies that demonstrate sustained underperformance. A governance structure that discourages director accountability may lead to board and management entrenchment. For example, the existence of several anti-takeover provisions* has the cumulative effect of deterring legitimate tender offers, mergers, and corporate transactions that may have ultimately proved beneficial to shareholders. When a company maintains entrenchment devices, shareholders of poorly performing companies are left with few effective routes to beneficial change.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will assess the company’s response to the ongoing performance issues, and consider recent board and management changes, board independence, overall governance practices, and other factors that may have an impact on shareholders. If a company exhibits sustained poor performance coupled with a lack of board accountability and oversight, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services’ evaluation may also consider the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted.

*Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:

§ A classified board structure;

§ A supermajority vote requirement;

§ Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections or a majority vote standard with no plurality carve-out for contested elections;

§ The inability for shareholders to call special meetings;

§ The inability for shareholders to act by written consent;

§ A multi-class structure; and/or

§ A non-shareholder approved poison pill.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against or withhold votes from all director nominees if the board lacks accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Sustained poor performance for companies outside the Russell 3000 universe is defined as underperforming peers or index on the basis of one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns.

Classified Boards ~ Annual Elections

The ability to elect directors is the single most important use of the shareholder franchise, and all directors should be accountable on an annual basis. Annually elected boards provide the best governance system for accountability to shareholders. A classified board is a board that is divided into separate classes, with directors serving overlapping terms. A company with a classified board usually divides the board into three classes. Under this system, only one class of nominees comes up to shareholder vote at the AGM each year.

As a consequence of these staggered terms, shareholders only have the opportunity to vote on a single director approximately once every three years. A classified board makes it difficult to change control of the board through a proxy contest since it would normally take two years to gain control of a majority of board seats. Under a classified board, the possibility of management entrenchment greatly increases. Classified boards can reduce director accountability by shielding directors, at least for a certain period of time, from the consequences of their actions. Continuing directors who are responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level would avoid shareholders’ reactions to their actions because they would not be up for election in that year. Ultimately, in these cases, the full board should be responsible for the actions of its directors.

Many in management believe that staggered boards provide continuity. Some shareholders believe that in certain cases a staggered board can provide consistency and continuity in regard to decision-making and commitment that may be important to the long-term financial future of the company. Nevertheless, empirical evidence strongly suggests that staggered boards are generally not in the shareholders’ best interest. In addition to shielding directors from being held

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accountable by shareholders on an annual basis, a classified board can entrench management and effectively preclude most takeover bids or proxy contests.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against management or shareholder proposals seeking to classify the board when the issue comes up for vote.

§ Vote for management or shareholder proposals to repeal a company’s classified board structure.

§ If the company has a classified board and a continuing director is responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote, in addition to potential future withhold/against votes on that director, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services may vote against or withhold votes from any or all of the nominees up for election, with the exception of new nominees3.

Shareholder Rights Plan (i.e. Poison Pills)

Institutional investors view shareholder rights plans, or poison pills, as among the most onerous of takeover defenses that may serve to entrench management and have a detrimental impact on their long-term share value. While recognizing that boards have a fiduciary duty to use all available means to protect shareholders’ interests, as a best governance principle, boards should seek shareholder ratification of a poison pill (or an amendment thereof) within a reasonable period, to ensure that the features of the poison pill support the interests of shareholders and do not merely serve as a management entrenchment device. Boards that fail to do so should be held accountable for ultimately disregarding shareholders’ interests. In applying this principle to voting in uncontested director elections, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services considers the term of the pill an important factor, as shorter-term pills are generally less onerous as a takeover defense when compared to longer term pills, and may in some cases provide the board with a valuable tool to maximize shareholder value in the event of an opportunistic offer.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

Generally vote against or withhold votes from all nominees (except new nominees3, who should be considered on a case-by-case basis) if;

§ The company has a poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by shareholders⁹;

§ The board makes a material adverse change to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or

§ The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature¹⁰.

Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill¹⁰ (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:

§ The disclosed rationale for the adoption;

§ The trigger;

§ The company’s market capitalization (including absolute level and sudden changes);

§ A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; and

§ Other factors as relevant.

⁹ Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient.

¹⁰ If a short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption.

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Responsiveness

Failure to Act on Shareholder Proposals Receiving Majority Support

Majority-supported proposals represent a request for action (usually the removal of an anti-takeover mechanism) by shareholder proponents. Because they are non-binding or precatory in nature, boards may easily disregard them, forcing proponents to either repeat their submissions, take alternative actions, or withdraw their offer altogether.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from all director nominees at a company that has ignored a shareholder proposal that was approved by a majority of the votes cast at the last annual meeting.

Other Board-Related Proposals

Director Diversity

Gender and ethnic diversity are important components on a company’s board. Diversity brings different perspectives to a board that in turn leads to a more varied approach to board issues. Taft-Hartley fiduciaries generally believe that increasing diversity in the boardroom would better reflect a company’s workforce, customers, and community and enhance shareholder value.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Support proposals asking the board to make greater efforts to search for qualified female and minority candidates for nomination to the board of directors.

§ Support endorsement of a policy of board inclusiveness.

§ Support reporting to shareholders on a company’s efforts to increase diversity on their boards.

Stock Ownership Requirements

Corporate directors should own some amount of stock of the companies on which they serve as board members. Stock ownership is a simple method to align the interests of directors with company shareholders. Nevertheless, many highly qualified individuals such as academics and clergy who can offer valuable perspectives in boardrooms may be unable to purchase individual shares of stock. In such a circumstance, the preferred solution is to look at the board nominees individually and take stock ownership into consideration when voting on the merits of each candidate.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against shareholder proposals requiring directors to own a minimum amount of company stock in order to qualify as a director nominee or to remain on the board.

Board and Committee Size

While there is no hard and fast rule among institutional investors as to what may be an optimal board size, there is an acceptable range that companies should strive to meet and not exceed. A board that is too large may function inefficiently. Conversely, a board that is too small may allow the CEO to exert disproportionate influence or may stretch the time requirements of individual directors too thin.

Proposals seeking to set board size will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Given that the preponderance of boards in the U.S. range between five and fifteen directors, many institutional investors believe this benchmark is a useful standard for evaluating such proposals.

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against any proposal seeking to amend the company’s board size to fewer than five seats.

§ Generally vote against any proposal seeking to amend the company’s board size to more than fifteen seats;

§ Evaluate board size on a case-by-case basis and consider withhold or against votes or other action at companies that have fewer than five directors and more than 15 directors on their board.

Limit Term of Office

Those who support term limits argue that this requirement would bring new ideas and approaches on to a board. While term of office limitations can rid the board of non-performing directors over time, it can also unfairly force experienced and effective directors off the board. When evaluating shareholder proposals on director term limits, consider whether the company’s performance has been poor and whether problematic or entrenching governance provisions are in place at the company. Additionally, consider board independence, including whether the board chair is independent.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of outside directors.

Cumulative Voting

Most corporations provide that shareholders are entitled to cast one vote for each share owned. Under a cumulative voting scheme, the shareholder is permitted to have one vote per share for each director to be elected. Shareholders are permitted to apportion those votes in any manner they wish among the director candidates. Thus, under a cumulative voting scheme, shareholders have the opportunity to elect a minority representative to a board by cumulating their votes, thereby ensuring minority representation for all sizes of shareholders.

For example, if there is a company with a ten-member board and 500 shares outstanding-the total number of votes that may be cast is 5,000. In this case a shareholder with 51 shares (10.2 percent of the outstanding shares) would be guaranteed one board seat because all votes may be cast for one candidate. Without cumulative voting, anyone controlling 51 percent of shares would control the election of all ten directors.

With the advent and prevalence of majority voting for director elections, shareholders now have greater flexibility in supporting candidates for a company’s board of directors. Cumulative voting and majority voting are two different voting mechanisms designed to achieve two different outcomes. While cumulative voting promotes the interests of minority shareholders by allowing them to get some representation on the board, majority voting promotes a democratic election of directors for all shareholders and ensures board accountability in uncontested elections. Though different in philosophic view, cumulative voting and majority voting can work together operationally, with companies electing to use majority voting for uncontested elections and cumulative voting for contested elections to increase accountability and ensure minority representation on the board.

In contested elections, similar to cumulative voting, proxy access allows shareholder access to the ballot without a veto from the nominating committee, but unlike cumulative voting, it also requires majority support to elect such directors.

At controlled companies, where majority insider control would preclude minority shareholders from having any representation on the board, cumulative voting would allow such representation and shareholder proposals for cumulative voting would be supported.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against proposals to eliminate cumulative voting;

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§ Generally vote for proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting unless:

§ The company has proxy access thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and

§ The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

§ Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (where insider voting power exceeds 50%).

Majority Threshold Voting Requirement for Director Elections

Shareholders have expressed strong support for precatory resolutions on majority threshold voting since 2005, with a number of proposals receiving majority support from shareholders. Taft-Hartley fiduciaries believe shareholders should have a greater voice in regard to the election of directors and view majority threshold voting as a viable alternative to the current deficiencies of the plurality system in the U.S.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support reasonably crafted shareholders proposals calling for directors to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast and/or the elimination of the plurality standard for electing directors (including binding resolutions requesting that the board amend the company’s bylaws), provided the proposal includes a carve-out for a plurality voting standard when there are more director nominees than board seats (e.g. in contested elections).

§ Taft-Hartley Advisory Services may recommend a vote against or withhold votes from members of the board at companies without the carve-out for plurality voting in contested elections, as the use of a majority vote standard can act as an anti-takeover defense in contested elections. (e.g. although the dissident nominees may have received more shares cast, as long as the combination of withhold/against votes and the votes for the management nominees keep the dissident nominees under 50%, the management nominees will win, due to the holdover rules). This clearly contradicts the expressed will of shareholders.

§ In addition to supporting proposals seeking a majority vote standard in director elections, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services also support a post-election “director resignation policy” that addresses the situation of holdover directors to accommodate both shareholder proposals and the need for stability and continuity of the board.

Proxy Access

The current director election process as it exists leaves much to be desired. Companies currently nominate for election only one candidate for each board seat. Shareholders who oppose a candidate have no easy way to do so unless they are willing to undertake the considerable expense of running an independent candidate for the board. The only way for shareholders to register dissent about a certain director candidate is to vote against or “withhold” support from that nominee. But because directors are still largely elected by a plurality (those nominees receiving the most votes win board seats) at a large proportion of firms in the U.S., nominees running unopposed are typically reelected despite shareholder opposition.

Many investors view proxy access as an important shareholder right, one that is complementary to other best-practice corporate governance features. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services is generally supportive of reasonably crafted shareholder proposals advocating for the ability of long-term shareholders to cost-effectively nominate director candidates that represent their interests on management’s proxy card. Shareholder proposals that have the potential to result in abuse of the proxy access right by way of facilitating hostile takeovers will generally not be supported.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:

§ Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power;

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§ Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group;

§ Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group;

§ Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board.

Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access.

Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

CEO Succession Planning

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy.

Establish an Office of the Board

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholders proposals requesting that the board establish an Office of the Board of Directors in order to facilitate direct communication between shareholders and non-management directors, unless the company has effectively demonstrated via public disclosure that it already has an established structure in place.

Director and Officer Liability Protection and Exculpation

Management proposals typically seek shareholder approval to adopt an amendment to the company’s charter to eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors to the company and its shareholders for monetary damages for any breach of fiduciary duty to the fullest extent permitted by state law. Charter amendments may also include limited liability wherein a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff. In contrast, shareholder proposals seek to provide for personal monetary liability for fiduciary breaches arising from gross negligence.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services may support these proposals when the company persuasively argues that such action is necessary to attract and retain directors but will likely oppose management proposals and support shareholder proposals in order to promote greater accountability.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case, considering the stated rationale for the proposed change, on proposals to limit or eliminate entirely director and officer liability in regard to: (i) breach of the director’s fiduciary “duty of loyalty” and “duty of care” to shareholders; (ii) acts or omissions not made in “good faith” or involving intentional misconduct or knowledge of violations under the law; (iii) acts involving the unlawful purchases or redemptions of stock; (iv) payment of unlawful dividends; or (v)  use of the position as director for receipt of improper personal benefits.

Director and Officer Indemnification

Indemnification is the payment by a company of the expenses of directors who become involved in litigation as a result of their service to a company. Proposals to indemnify a company’s directors differ from those to eliminate or reduce their liability because with indemnification directors may still be liable for an act or omission, but the company will bear the expense. Taft-Hartley fiduciaries may support these proposals when the company persuasively argues that such action is necessary to attract and retain directors, but should generally oppose indemnification when it is being proposed to insulate directors from actions that have already occurred.

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case, considering the stated rationale for the proposed change, on indemnification proposals that would expand individual coverage beyond ordinary legal expenses to also cover specific acts of negligence that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.

§ Vote case-by-case, considering the stated rationale for the proposed change, on proposals that would expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”) but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.

§ Vote for those proposals which provide expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if: (1) the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and (2) only if the individual’s legal expenses would be covered.

Proxy Contests/Proxy Access — Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections

Contested elections of directors frequently occur when a board candidate or “dissident slate” seeks election for the purpose of achieving a significant change in corporate policy or control of seats on the board. Competing slates will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with a number of considerations in mind. These include, but are not limited to, the following: personal qualifications of each candidate; the economic impact of the policies advanced by the dissident slate of nominees; and their expressed and demonstrated commitment to the interests of the shareholders of the company.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a case-by-case basis with the following seven factors in consideration:

§ Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;

§ Management’s track record;

§ Background to the contested election;

§ Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;

§ Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;

§ Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and

§ Stock ownership positions.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether there are more candidates than board seats).

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2.    Compensation

The housing market collapse and resulting credit crisis resulted in significant erosion of shareholder value, unprecedented levels of market volatility, and a lack of confidence among financial market participants. Many Taft-Hartley trustees have questioned the role of executive compensation in incentivizing inappropriate or excessive risk-taking behavior by executives that could threaten a corporation‘s long-term viability. Further, generous severance packages and other payments to departing executives of failed institutions have heightened attention on the issue of pay for performance.

Trustees of Taft-Hartley funds, which have lost significant value in their investments as a result of the financial crisis, have little patience for “pay for failure” and continue to press for the adoption of executive compensation practices aimed at creating and sustaining long-term shareholder value.

Companies have long argued that legally binding executive compensation obligations cannot be modified. The Capital Purchase Program implemented under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the “bail out” program for the U.S. financial system, set the tone for executive compensation reform and requires participating firms to accept certain limits and requirements on executive compensation, regardless of existing contractual arrangements. A number of firms agreed to these requirements.

Evolving disclosure requirements have opened a wider window into compensation practices and processes, giving shareholders more opportunity and responsibility to ensure that pay is designed to create and sustain shareholder value. Companies in the U.S. are now required to evaluate and discuss potential risks arising from misguided or misaligned compensation programs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation (management “Say on Pay”), an advisory vote on the frequency of Say on Pay, as well as a shareholder advisory vote on golden parachute compensation. The advent of “Say on Pay” votes for shareholders in the U.S. has provided a new communication mechanism and impetus for constructive engagement between shareholders and managers/directors on pay issues.

Evaluation of Executive Pay

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes that executive pay programs should be fair, competitive, reasonable, and appropriate, and that pay for performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. When evaluating executive and director pay programs and practices, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services looks for the following best practice considerations in the design and administration of executive compensation programs:

§ Appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: executive pay practices must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. Evaluating appropriate alignment of pay incentives with shareholder value creation includes taking into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance, the mix between fixed and variable pay, performance goals, and equity-based plan costs.

§ Avoiding arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: this includes assessing the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation.

§ Independent and effective compensation committee: oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed) should be promoted.

§ Clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: shareholders expect companies to provide informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly.

§ Avoiding inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: compensation to outside directors should not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance.

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Examples of best pay practices include:

§ Employment contracts: Companies should enter into employment contracts under limited circumstances for a short time period (e.g., new executive hires for a three-year contract) for limited executives. The contracts should not have automatic renewal feature and should have a specified termination date.

§ Severance agreements: Severance provisions should not be so appealing that they become an incentive for the executive to be terminated. The severance formula should be reasonable and not overly generous to the executive (e.g., use a reasonable severance multiple; use pro-rated target/average historical bonus and not maximum bonus). Failure to renew employment contract, termination under questionable events or for poor performance should not constitute “good reason” for termination with severance payments.

§ Change-in-control payments: Change-in-control payments should be “double-triggered” – i.e. payouts should only be made when there is a significant change in company ownership structure, and when there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties associated with the change in company ownership structure. Change-in-control provisions should exclude excise tax gross-ups and should not authorize the acceleration of vesting of equity awards upon a change in control unless provided under a double-trigger scenario. Similarly, change in control provisions in equity plans should be double-triggered. A change in control event should not result in an acceleration of vesting of all unvested stock options or lapsing of vesting/performance requirements on restricted stock/performance shares, unless there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties.

§ Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs): SERPs should not include sweeteners that can increase the payout value significantly or even exponentially, such as additional years of service credited for pension calculations, or inclusion of variable pay (e.g. bonuses and equity awards) into the formula. Pension formulas should not include extraordinary annual bonuses paid close to the time of retirement and should be based on an average, not the maximum, level of compensation earned.

§ Deferred compensation: Above-market returns or guaranteed minimum returns should not be applied on deferred compensation.

§ Disclosure practices: The Compensation, Discussion and Analysis should be written in plain English, with as little “legalese” as possible and formatted using section headers, bulleted lists, tables and charts where possible to ease reader comprehension. Ultimately, the document should provide detail and rationale regarding compensation, strategy, pay mix, goals/metrics, challenges, competition and pay for performance linkage, etc. in a narrative fashion.

§ Responsible use of company stock: Companies should adopt policies that prohibit executives from speculating in company’s stock or using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps or other similar arrangements. Such behavior undermines the ultimate alignment with long-term shareholders’ interests. In addition, the policy should prohibit or discourage the use of company stock as collateral for margin loans, to avoid any potential sudden stock sales (required upon margin calls) that could have a negative impact on the company’s stock price.

§ Long-term focus: Executive compensation programs should be designed to support companies’ long-term strategic goals. A short-term focus on performance does not necessarily create sustainable shareholder value. Instead, long-term goals may be sacrificed to achieve short-term expectations to the detriment of shareholder value, as evidenced by the financial crisis.

§ Compensation programs embedding a long-term focus with respect to company goals better align with the long-term interests of shareholders. Granting stock options and restricted stock to executives that vest in five years does not necessarily provide a long-term focus, as executives can sell off the company shares once they vest. However, requiring senior executives to hold company stock until retirement or after retirement can encourage a long-term focus on company performance.

Pay-For-Performance Evaluation

Stock-based pay is often the main driver for excessive executive compensation, which could be fueled by poor plan design or administration. Therefore, it is important to closely examine any discrepancies between CEO pay and total shareholder returns over a sustained period of time in assessing equity-based compensation. Many investors do not consider standard stock options or time-vested restricted stock to be performance-based. If a company provides performance-based incentives to its executives, the company should provide complete disclosure of the performance measures and goals to

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allow shareholders to assess the rigor of the performance program. Complete and transparent disclosure enables shareholders to better comprehend the company’s pay for performance linkage.

When financial or operational measures are utilized in incentive awards, the achievements related to these measures should ultimately translate into superior shareholder returns in the long-term. The use of non-GAAP financial metrics makes it very challenging for shareholders to ascertain the rigor of the program as shareholders often cannot tell the type of adjustments being made and if the adjustments were made consistently.

Pay-for-performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. In evaluating the degree of alignment between the CEO’s pay with the company’s performance over a sustained period, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services conducts a pay-for-performance analysis.

With respect to companies in the Russell 3000 or Russell 3000E Indices¹¹, this analysis considers the following:

1. Peer Group¹² Alignment:

§ The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.

2. Absolute Alignment¹³ – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.

If the above analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of companies outside the Russell indices, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, our analysis may include any of the following qualitative factors, as relevant to evaluating how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

§ The ratio of performance- to time-based incentive awards;

§ The overall ratio of performance-based compensation;

§ The completeness of disclosure and rigor of performance goals;

§ The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;

§ Actual results of financial/operational metrics, both absolute and relative to peers;

§ Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards);

§ Realizable pay¹⁴ compared to grant pay; and

§ Any other factors deemed relevant.

Problematic Compensation Practices

Poor disclosure, the absence or non-transparency of disclosure and flawed compensation plan design can lead to excessive executive pay practices that are detrimental to shareholders.

¹¹ The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.

¹² The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group, and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group, with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are comparable to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry, and also within a market cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s. For Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels companies, market cap is the only size determinant.

¹³ Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.

¹⁴ Taft-Hartley Advisory Services research reports include realizable pay for S&P1500 companies.

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Companies are expected to meet a minimum standard of tally sheet disclosure as to allow shareholders to readily assess the total executive pay package, understand the actual linkage between pay and performance, and mitigate misinformation to shareholders. The SEC has issued rules on executive and director compensation that require expansive disclosure and a total compensation figure for each of the named executive officers. Poorly designed executive compensation plans or those lacking in transparency can be reflective of a poorly performing compensation committee.

Executive compensation will continue to be in the spotlight in the ensuing years, particularly when shareholders are expected to have access to more complete information.

Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene best practice compensation considerations, including:

§ Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;

§ Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and

§ Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements.

While not exhaustive, the following list represents certain adverse practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration, and may lead to negative vote recommendations:

§ Egregious employment contracts:

§ Contracts containing multi-year guarantees for salary increases, non-performance based bonuses, and equity compensation;

§ New CEO with overly generous new-hire package:

§ Excessive “make whole” provisions without sufficient rationale;

§ Any of the problematic pay practices listed in this policy;

§ Abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or proper disclosure:

§ Includes performance metrics that are changed, canceled, or replaced during the performance period without adequate explanation of the action and the link to performance;

§ Egregious pension/SERP (supplemental executive retirement plan) payouts:

§ Inclusion of additional years of service not worked that result in significant benefits provided in new arrangements;

§ Inclusion of performance-based equity or other long-term awards in the pension calculation;

§ Excessive Perquisites:

§ Perquisites for former and/or retired executives, such as lifetime benefits, car allowances, personal use of corporate aircraft, or other inappropriate arrangements;

§ Extraordinary relocation benefits (including home buyouts);

§ Excessive amounts of perquisites compensation;

§ Excessive severance and/or change in control provisions:

§ Change in control cash payments exceeding 3 times base salary plus target/average/last paid bonus;

§ Arrangements that provide for change-in-control payments without loss of job or substantial diminution of job duties (single-triggered or modified single-triggered - where an executive may voluntarily leave for any reason and still receive the change-in-control severance package) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition;

§ Employment or severance agreements that provide for excise tax gross-ups. Modified gross-ups would be treated in the same manner as full gross-ups;

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§ Excessive payments upon an executive’s termination in connection with performance failure;

§ Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason); and

§ Liberal change in control definition in individual contracts or equity plans which could result in payments to executives without an actual change in control occurring;

§ Tax Reimbursements/Gross-ups: income tax reimbursements on executive perquisites or other payments (e.g., related to personal use of corporate aircraft, executive life insurance, bonus, restricted stock vesting, secular trusts, etc.; see also excise tax gross-ups above);

§ Dividends or dividend equivalents paid on unvested performance shares or units;

§ Executives using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps, or other similar arrangements;

§ Internal pay disparity: Excessive differential between CEO total pay and that of next highest-paid named executive officer (NEO);

§ Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/stock appreciation rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts, option exchanges, and certain voluntary surrender of underwater options where shares surrendered may subsequently be re-granted);

§ Options backdating;

§ Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally- managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible; and

§ Other pay practices that may be deemed problematic in a given circumstance but are not covered in the above categories.

Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking

Assess company policies and disclosure related to compensation that could incentivize excessive risk-taking, for example:

§ Guaranteed bonuses or other abnormally large bonus payouts without justifiable performance linkage or appropriate disclosure;

§ Mega annual equity grants that provide unlimited upside with no downside risk;

§ A single performance metric used for short- and long-term plans;

§ High pay opportunities relative to industry peers;

§ Disproportionate supplemental pensions; or

§ Lucrative severance packages.

Factors that potentially mitigate the impact of risky incentives include rigorous claw-back provisions, robust stock ownership/holding guidelines, and substantive bonus deferral/escrowing programs.

Options Backdating

Options backdating has serious implications and has resulted in financial restatements, delisting of companies, and/or the termination of executives or directors. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will adopt a case-by-case approach to differentiate companies that had sloppy administration vs. deliberate action or fraud, as well as those companies which have since taken corrective action. Instances in which companies have committed fraud are considered most egregious, and Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will look to them to adopt formal policies to ensure that such practices will not re-occur in the future.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will consider several factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

§ Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;

§ Duration of options backdating;

§ Size of restatement due to options backdating;

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§ Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or repricing backdated options, or recoupment of option gains on backdated grants; and

§ Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creation of a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants going forward.

Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness

Consider the following factors when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

§ Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or

§ Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received a low level of shareholder support, taking into account:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals

The Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 mandates advisory votes on executive compensation (aka management “say on pay” or MSOP) for a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders that includes required SEC compensation disclosures. This non-binding shareholder vote on compensation must be included in a proxy or consent or authorization at least once every 3 years.

In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices – dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather than voting against or withhold from the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then Taft-Hartley fiduciaries should vote against or withhold votes from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then a vote against an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval may be warranted.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a case-by-case basis.

§ Vote against management say on pay (MSOP) proposals if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

§ The company maintains problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders; or

§ The board has failed to demonstrate good stewardship of investors’ interests regarding executive compensation practices.

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§ Vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is no MSOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an MSOP is warranted due to pay for performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;

§ The board fails to respond adequately to a previous MSOP proposal that received low levels of shareholder support;

§ The company has practiced or approved problematic pay practices, including option repricing or option backdating; or

§ The situation is egregious.

§ Vote against an equity plan on the ballot if:

§ A pay for performance misalignment exists, and a significant portion of the CEO’s misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, taking into consideration:

§ Magnitude of pay misalignment;

§ Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and

§ The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer (NEO) level.

Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay

The Dodd-Frank Act, in addition to requiring advisory votes on compensation (aka management “say on pay” or MSOP), requires that each proxy for the first annual or other meeting of the shareholders (that includes required SEC compensation disclosures) occurring after Jan. 21, 2011, include an advisory voting item to determine whether, going forward, the “say on pay” vote by shareholders to approve compensation should occur every one, two, or three years.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will recommend a vote for annual advisory votes on compensation. The MSOP is at its essence a communication vehicle, and communication is most useful when it is received in a consistent and timely manner. Support for an annual MSOP vote is merited for many of the same reasons Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports annual director elections rather than a classified board structure: because this provides the highest level of accountability and direct communication by enabling the MSOP vote to correspond to the majority of the information presented in the accompanying proxy statement for the applicable shareholders’ meeting. Having MSOP votes every two or three years, covering all actions occurring between the votes, would make it difficult to create the meaningful and coherent communication that the votes are intended to provide. Under triennial elections, for example, a company would not know whether the shareholder vote references the compensation year being discussed or a previous year, making it more difficult to understand the implications of the vote.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.

Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

This is a proxy item regarding specific advisory votes on “golden parachute” arrangements for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) that is required under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services places particular emphasis on severance packages that provide inappropriate windfalls and cover certain executive tax liabilities.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to approve the company’s golden parachute compensation, consistent with Taft-Hartley Advisory Services’ policies on problematic pay practices related to severance packages. Features that may lead to a vote against include:

§ Agreements that include excise tax gross-up provisions;

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§ Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;

§ Single trigger acceleration of unvested equity, including acceleration of performance-based equity despite the failure to achieve performance measures;

§ Single-trigger vesting of equity based on a definition of change in control that requires only shareholder approval of the transaction (rather than consummation);

§ Potentially excessive severance payments;

§ Recent amendments or actions that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; and

§ The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote. Such a construction is problematic from a corporate governance perspective.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s separate advisory vote on compensation (“management “say on pay”), Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will evaluate the say on pay proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

Equity Pay Plans

The theory that stock awards including stock options are beneficial to shareholders because they motivate management and align the interests of investors with those of executives is no longer held sacrosanct. Indeed, a number of academic studies have found that there is limited correlation between executive stock ownership and company performance. Misused stock options can give executives an incentive to inflate their company’s earnings, take excessive risks, and make irresponsibly optimistic forecasts in order to keep stock prices high and their paychecks gargantuan.

Therefore, it is vital for shareholders to fully analyze all equity plans that appear on ballot.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: In general, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services evaluates executive and director compensation plans on a case-by-case basis. When evaluating equity-based compensation items on ballot, the following elements will be considered:

§ Dilution: Vote against plans in which the potential voting power dilution (VPD) of all shares outstanding exceeds ten percent.

§ Full Market Value: Awards must be granted at 100 percent of fair market value on the date of grant. However, in instances when a plan is open to broad-based employee participation and excludes the five most highly compensated employees, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services accept a 15 percent discount.

§ Burn Rate: Vote against plans where the company’s value-adjusted burn rate exceeds the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index.

§ Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control: Vote against equity plans if the plan provides for the accelerated vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition could include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.

§ Problematic Pay Practices: Vote against equity plans if the plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices (e.g. if the plan allows for change-in-control payouts that are single triggered).

§ Executive Concentration Ratio: Vote against plans where the annual grant rate to the top five executives (“named officers”) exceeds one percent of shares outstanding.

§ Pay-For-Performance: Vote against plans where there is a misalignment between CEO pay and the company’s performance, or if performance criteria are not disclosed.

§ Evergreen Features: Vote against plans that reserve a specified percentage of outstanding shares for award each year instead of having a termination date.

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§ Repricing: Vote against plans if the company’s policy permits repricing of “underwater” options or if the company has a history of repricing past options.

§ Loans: Vote against the plan if the plan administrator may provide loans to officers to assist in exercising the awards.

Stock Option Plans

Compensation to executive and other senior level employees should be strongly correlated to sustained performance. Stock options, restricted stock and other forms of non-cash compensation should be performance-based with an eye toward improving long-term corporate value. Well-designed stock option plans can align the interests of executives and shareholders by providing that executives benefit when stock prices rise so that the employees of the company, along with shareholders, prosper together. Likewise, option plans should not allow for the benefits of share price gains without the risk of share price declines. Poorly designed stock option plans can encourage excessive risk-taking behavior and incentivize executives to pursue corporate strategies that promote short-term stock price to the ultimate detriment of long-term shareholder value.

Many plans sponsored by management provide goals so easily attained that executives can realize massive rewards even though shareholder value is not created. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports option plans when they provide legitimately challenging performance targets that serve to truly motivate executives in the pursuit of sustained superior performance. Moreover, equity pay plans should be designed in a fashion that ensures executive compensation is veritably performance driven and “at risk” such that executives are penalized (by either reducing or withholding compensation) for failure to meet pre-determined performance hurdles. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will oppose those plans that offer unreasonable benefits to executives that are not generally available to other shareholders or employees.

Voting Power Dilution (VPD) Calculation

Voting power dilution, or VPD, measures the amount of voting power represented by the number of shares reserved over the life of the plan. Industry norm dictates that ten percent dilution over the life of a ten-year plan is reasonable for most mature companies. Restricted stock plans or stand-alone stock bonus plans that are not coupled with stock option plans can be held to a lower dilution cap.

Voting power dilution may be calculated using the following formula:

A:            Shares reserved for this amendment or plan

B:            Shares available under this plan and/or continuing plans prior to proposed amendment

C:            Shares granted but unexercised under this plan and/or continuing plans

D:            All outstanding shares plus any convertible equity, outstanding warrants, or debt

The formula can be applied as follows:	A + B + C
	A + B + C + D

Fair Market Value, Dilution and Repricing

Consideration will be made as to whether the proposed plan is being offered at fair market value or at a discount; whether the plan excessively dilutes the earnings per share of the outstanding shares; and whether the plan gives management the ability to replace or reprice “underwater” options. Repricing is an amendment to a previously granted stock option contract that reduces the option exercise price. Options are “underwater” when their current price is below the current option contract price. Options can also be repriced through cancellations and re-grants. The typical new grant would have a ten-year term, new vesting restrictions, and a lower exercise price reflecting the current lower market price.

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Burn Rate

The annual burn rate is a measure of dilution that illustrates how rapidly a company is deploying shares reserved for equity compensation plans. A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will generally oppose plans whose Value-Adjusted Burn Rates exceed the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.

The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate is calculated as follows:

Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).

Executive Concentration Ratio

In examining stock option awards, restricted stock and other forms of long-term incentives, it is important to consider internal pay equity; that is, the concentration and distribution of equity awards to a company’s top five executives (“named officers”) as a percentage of overall grants. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will consider voting against equity compensation plans whose annual grant rate to top executives exceeds one percent of shares outstanding.

Evergreen Provisions

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will oppose plans that reserve a specified percentage of outstanding shares for award each year (evergreen plans) instead of having a termination date. Such plans provide for an automatic increase in the shares available for grant with or without limits on an annual basis. Because they represent a transfer of shareholder value and have a dilutive impact on a regular basis, evergreen plans are expensive to shareholders. Evergreen features also minimize the frequency that companies seek shareholder approval in increasing the number of shares available under the plan.

Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Historic trading patterns: the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;

§ Rationale for the re-pricing: was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?

§ Option vesting: does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?

§ Term of the option: the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;

§ Exercise price: should be set at fair market or a premium to market;

§ Participants: the plan should be broad-based and executive officers and directors must be excluded;

§ Is this a value-for-value exchange?

§ Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?

§ Timing--repricing should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price.

If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will also take into consideration the impact on the company’s equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

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In addition to the above considerations, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing and warrants additional scrutiny. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services does not view market deterioration, in and of itself, as an acceptable reason for companies to reprice stock options and/or reset goals under performance plans. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services also considers the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

Restricted Stock

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports the use of performance-vesting restricted stock as long as the absolute amount of restricted stock being granted is a reasonable proportion of an executive’s overall compensation. The best way to align the interests of executives with shareholders is through direct stock holdings, coupled with at-risk variable compensation that is tied to explicit and challenging performance benchmarks. Performance-vesting restricted stock both adds to executive’s direct share holdings and incorporates at-risk features.

To reward performance and not job tenure, restricted stock vesting requirements should be performance-based rather than time lapsing. Such plans should explicitly define the performance criteria for awards to senior executives and may include a variety of corporate performance measures in addition to the use of stock price targets. In addition, executives should be required to hold their vested restricted stock as long as they remain employees of the company.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) - Qualified Plans

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for plans if:

§ Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;

§ Offering period is 27 months or less; and

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is five percent or less of the outstanding shares.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs) – Non-Qualified Plans

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for plans with:

§ Broad-based participation (i.e. all employees with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company);

§ Limits on employee contribution (a fixed dollar amount or a percentage of base salary);

§ Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and

§ No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a company matching contribution.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)

An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is an employee benefit plan that makes the employees of a company also owners of stock in that company. Recent academic research of the performance of ESOPs in closely held companies found that ESOPs appear to increase overall sales, employment, and sales per employee over what would have been expected absent an ESOP. Studies have also found that companies with an ESOP are also more likely to still be in business several years later, and are more likely to have other retirement oriented benefit plans than comparable non-ESOP companies.

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals that request shareholder approval in order to implement an ESOP or to increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs except in cases when the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is deemed excessive (i.e. generally greater than five percent of outstanding shares).

OBRA-Related Compensation Proposals

Cash bonus plans can be an important part of an executive’s overall pay package, along with stock-based plans tied to long-term total shareholder returns. Section 162(m) of the IRS Code Section limits the deductibility of compensation in excess of $1 million to a named executive officer unless certain prescribed actions are taken including shareholder approval and the establishment of performance goals.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for proposals to approve or amend executive incentive bonus plans if the proposal:

§ Is only to include administrative features;

§ Places a cap on the annual grants any one participant may receive to comply with the provisions of Section 162(m);

§ Adds performance goals to existing compensation plans to comply with the provisions of Section 162(m) unless they are clearly inappropriate; or

§ Covers cash or cash and stock bonus plans that are submitted to shareholders for the purpose of exempting compensation from taxes under the provisions of Section 162(m) if no increase in shares is requested.

§ Vote against such proposals if:

§ The plan provides for awards to individual participants in excess of $2 million a year;

§ The compensation committee does not fully consist of independent directors as defined by Taft-Hartley Advisory Services’ definition of director independence; or

§ The plan contains excessive problematic provisions including lack of rigorous performance measures.

§ Vote case-by-case on such proposals with respect to equity incentive plans if:

§ In addition to seeking 162(m) tax treatment, the amendment may cause additional voting power dilution to shareholders (e.g., by requesting additional shares, extending the option term, or expanding the pool of plan participants);

§ A company is presenting the plan to shareholders for Section 162(m) favorable tax treatment for the first time after the company’s initial public offering (IPO). Perform a full equity plan analysis, including consideration of potential voting power dilution, burn rate (if applicable), repricing, and liberal change in control. Other factors such as pay-for-performance or problematic pay practices as related to Management Say-on-Pay may be considered if appropriate.

Golden and Tin Parachutes

Golden parachutes are designed to protect the employees of a corporation in the event of a change-in-control. Under most golden parachute agreements, senior level management employees receive a lump sum payout triggered by a change-in-control at usually two to three times their current base salary. The SEC requires disclosure of all golden parachute arrangements in the proxy statement.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on management proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Whether the triggering mechanism is beyond the control of management;

§ Whether the payout amount is based on an excessive severance multiple; and

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§ Whether the change-in-control payments are double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to all have golden parachute agreements submitted for shareholder ratification.

Director Compensation

Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:

§ If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and

§ An assessment of the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The balance of cash vs. equity compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

Disclosure of Executive and Director Pay

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that seek additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, including the preparation of a formal report on executive compensation practices and policies.

Limit Executive and Director Pay

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate outside directors’ retirement benefits.

§ Vote case-by-case on all other shareholder proposals that seek to limit executive and director pay. This includes shareholder proposals that seek to link executive compensation to customer, employee, or stakeholder satisfaction.

Executive Perks and Retirement/Death Benefits

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports enhanced disclosure and shareholder oversight of executive benefits and other in-kind retirement perquisites. For example, compensation devices like executive pensions (SERPs), deferred compensation plans, below-market-rate loans or guaranteed post-retirement consulting fees can amount to significant liabilities to shareholders and it is often difficult for investors to find adequate disclosure of their full terms. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services opposes any perquisite or benefit to executives that exceeds what is generally offered to other company employees. From a shareholder prospective, the cost of these executive entitlements would be better allocated to performance-based forms of executive compensation during their term in office.

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company’s executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.

§ Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of discontinuing or obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive. This could come, for example, in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. However, this would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.

Executive Holding Periods

Senior level executives should be required to hold a substantial portion of their equity compensation awards, including shares received from option exercises (e.g. 75% of their after-tax stock option proceeds), while they are employed at a company or even into retirement. Equity compensation awards are intended to align management interests with those of shareholders, and allowing executives to sell these shares while they are employees of the company undermines this purpose. Given the large size of a typical annual equity compensation award, holding requirements that are based on a multiple of cash compensation may be inadequate.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of the net shares acquired through compensation plans while employed or following the termination of their employment.

Pay for Superior Performance

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that request the board to establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation programs for senior executives.

Performance-Based Options

Stock options are intended to align the interests of management with those of shareholders. However, stock option grants without performance-based elements can excessively compensate executives for stock increases due solely to a general stock market rise, rather than improved or superior company stock performance. When option grants reach the hundreds of thousands, a relatively small increase in the share price may permit executives to reap millions of dollars without providing material benefits to shareholders.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services advocates for performance-based awards – such as premium-priced or indexed – which encourage executives to outperform peers, certain indices, or the broader market rather than being rewarded for any minimal rise in the share price, which can occur if there are not empirical performance measures incorporated into the structure of the options. Additionally, it should be noted that performance-accelerated vesting and premium priced options allow fixed plan accounting, whereas performance-vested and indexed options entail certain expensing requirements.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that seek to provide for performance-based options such as indexed and/or premium priced options.

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Tax Gross-up Proposals

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally, vote for shareholder proposals that call for non-binding shareholder ratification of the compensation of the Named Executive Officers and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the Summary Compensation Table.

Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s) and fees paid.

Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan.

Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees).

Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment, and eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity.

Recoup Bonuses

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to recoup unearned incentive bonuses or other incentive payments made to senior executives if it is later determined that the incentive compensation was based upon figures that later turn out to have been in error.

Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure on linking executive pay to non-financial factors.

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§ Evaluate shareholder proposals calling for linkage of executive pay to non-financial factors, such as corporate downsizing, customer/employee satisfaction, community involvement, human rights, social and environmental goals and performance, and predatory lending on a case-by-case basis.

Pension Plan Income Accounting

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals to exclude pension plan income in the calculation of earnings used in determining executive bonuses/compensation.

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3.    Auditors

Auditors play an integral role in certifying the integrity and reliability of corporate financial statements on which investors rely to gauge the financial well-being of a company and the viability of an investment. The well-documented auditor-facilitated bankruptcies and scandals at several large public companies in recent years underscore the catastrophic consequences that investors can suffer when the audit process breaks down.

Auditor Independence

The wave of accounting scandals over the past decade illuminates the need to ensure auditor independence in the face of consulting services to audit clients. The ratio of non-audit services to total revenues at the large accounting firms grew significantly leading up to the accounting scandals. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes the ratio of non-audit fees should make up no more than one-quarter of all fees paid to the auditor so as to properly discourage even the appearance of any undue influence upon an auditor’s objectivity.

Under SEC rules, disclosed categories of professional fees paid for audit and non-audit services are as follows: (1) Audit Fees, (2) Audit-Related Fees, (3) Tax Fees, and (4) All Other Fees. Under the reporting requirements, companies are required to describe – in qualitative terms – the types of services provided under the three categories other than Audit Fees. The following fee categories are defined as: A) tax compliance or preparation fees are excluded from our calculations of non-audit fees; and B) fees for consulting services for tax-avoidance strategies and tax shelters will be included in “other fees” and will be considered non-audit fees if the proxy disclosure does not indicate the nature of the tax services. In circumstances where “Other” fees include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events: initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs; and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees which are an exception to the standard “non-audit fee” category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit/audit-related fees/tax compliance and preparation for purposes of determining whether non-audit fees are excessive.

As auditors are the backbone upon which a company’s financial health is measured, auditor independence is absolutely essential for rendering objective opinions upon which investors then rely. When an auditor is paid excessive consulting fees in addition to fees paid for auditing, the company-auditor relationship is left open to conflicts of interest.

Auditor Ratification

The ratification of auditors is an important component of good governance. In light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and increased shareholder scrutiny, some companies are opting to take auditor ratification off the ballot. Neglecting to include the ratification of auditors on the proxy takes away the fundamental shareholder right to ratify the company’s choice of auditor. Whereas shareholder ratification of auditors was once considered routine by many shareowners, accounting scandals have caused shareholders to be more vigilant about the integrity of the auditors certifying their companies’ financial statements. It is now viewed as best practice for companies to place the item on ballot.

Although U.S. companies are not legally required to allow shareholders to ratify their appointment of independent auditors, submission of the audit firm for approval at the annual meeting on an annual basis gives shareholders the means to weigh in on their satisfaction (or lack thereof) of the auditor’s independent execution of their duties. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes mandatory auditor ratification is in line with sound and transparent corporate governance and remains an important mechanism to ensure the integrity of the auditor’s work. In the absence of legislation mandating shareholder ratification of auditors, the failure by a company to present its selection of auditors for shareholder ratification should be discouraged as it undermines good governance and disenfranchises shareholders.

Proposals to ratify auditors is examined for potential conflicts of interest, with particular attention to the fees paid to the auditor, as well as whether the ratification of auditors has been put up for shareholder vote.

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to ratify auditors when the amount of audit fees is equal to or greater than three times (75 percent) the amount paid for consulting, unless: i) An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent; or ii) There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position.

§ Vote against proposals to ratify auditors when the amount of non-audit consulting fees exceeds a quarter of all fees paid to the auditor.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals seeking to limit companies from buying consulting services from their auditor.

Auditor Rotation

Long-term relationships between auditors and their clients can impede auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism. Such long-standing relationships foster an undesirable coziness between audit firms and their clients, which can cause the auditors to lose their independence and become less questioning especially where lucrative contracts for the provision of non-audit consulting services are involved. Mandatory auditor rotation is a widely supported safeguard against improper audits and is viewed by many as an effective mechanism for mitigating the potential risks borne by long-term auditor-client relationships.

Proponents of compulsory audit firm rotation contend that rotation policies promote objectivity and independence among auditors and minimize the scope of vested interests developing in the audit. Opponents of audit firm rotation argue that regular re-tendering is a costly practice, likely to reduce audit quality and increase the risk of audit failure in the early years due to the time required to gain cumulative knowledge of an often complex and geographically diverse business. A solution around this apparent negative effect of mandatory rotation is to keep a longer rotation period.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services recommends that companies not maintain the same audit firm in excess of seven years, and will vote against auditors if their tenure at a company exceeds seven years. A revolving seven-year rotation period allows the auditor to develop cumulative knowledge of a company’s business and the effect of changes in the business along with the corresponding changes in its risks, thereby enhancing the quality of the audit and trammeling potential loss of auditor objectivity and independence. Many institutional investors argue that the increased costs associated with compulsory auditor rotation are a lesser evil vis-à-vis the larger evil of the costs to shareholders when the objectionable coziness between clients and long-standing auditors leads to gross erosion of shareholder value.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder proposals to ensure auditor independence through measures such as mandatory auditor rotation (no less than every seven years).

Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability

Indemnification clauses allow auditors to avoid liability for potential damages, including punitive damages. Eliminating concerns about being sued for carelessness could lead to; 1) potential impairment of external auditor independence and impartiality by contractual clauses limiting their liability; and 2) a decrease in the quality and reliability of the audit given the lack of consequence for an inadequate audit.

Given the substantial settlements against auditors in recent years for poor audit practices and the cost of such insurance to the company and its shareholders, there are legitimate concerns over the broader use of indemnification clauses. Such agreements may weaken the objectivity, impartiality and performance of audit firms.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes it is important for shareholders to understand the full risks and implications of these agreements and determine what impact they could have on shareholder value. At the present time, however, due to poor disclosure in this area, it is difficult to identify the existence and extent of limited liability provisions and auditor agreements, and investors lack the information needed to make informed decisions regarding these agreements.

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Without uniform disclosure, it is difficult to consistently apply policy and make informed vote recommendations. As such, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services reviews the use of indemnification clauses and limited liability provisions in auditor agreements on a case-by-case basis, when disclosure is present.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against or withhold from audit committee members if there is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Disclosures Under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that companies document and assess the effectiveness of their internal financial controls. Beginning in 2005, most public companies must obtain annual attestation of the effectiveness of their internal controls over financial reporting from their outside auditors. Companies with significant material weaknesses identified in the Section 404 disclosures potentially have ineffective internal financial reporting controls. This may lead to inaccurate financial statements, which hampers shareholders’ ability to make informed investment decisions, and may lead to destruction of public confidence and shareholder value. The audit committee is ultimately responsible for the integrity and reliability of the company’s financial information and its system of internal controls.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against or withhold votes from audit committee members under certain circumstances when a material weakness rises to a level of serious concern, if there are chronic internal control issues, or if there is an absence of established effective control mechanisms.

§ Vote against management proposals to ratify auditors if there is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position.

Adverse Opinions

An Adverse Opinion on the company’s financial statements is issued when the auditor determines that the financial statements are materially misstated and, when considered as a whole, do not conform to GAAP. It essentially states that the information contained is materially incorrect, unreliable, and inaccurate in order to assess the company’s financial position and results of operations.

Adverse opinions on companies’ financial statements are generally very rare because they essentially state that a significant portion of the financial statements are unreliable and the auditor had no choice but to issue an adverse opinion after a long process of seeking resolution with the company subjected to the audit.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against or withhold votes from audit committee members if the company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditors.

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4.    Takeover Defenses

Poison Pills

Shareholder rights plans, typically known as poison pills, take the form of rights or warrants issued to shareholders and are triggered when a potential acquiring stockholder reaches a certain threshold of ownership. When triggered, poison pills generally allow shareholders to purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company (“flip-in pill”) and/or the potential acquirer (“flip-out pill”) at a price far out of line with fair market value.

Depending on the type of pill, the triggering event can either transfer wealth from the target company or dilute the equity holdings of current shareholders. Poison pills insulate management from the threat of a change in control and provide the target board with veto power over takeover bids. Because poison pills greatly alter the balance of power between shareholders and management, shareholders should be allowed to make their own evaluation of such plans.

In evaluating management proposals on poison pills, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services considers the company’s rationale for adopting the pill and its existing governance structure in determining whether or not the pill appropriately serves in shareholders’ best interests. The rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. Additionally, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services examines the company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, or any problematic governance concerns.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask a company to submit its poison pill for shareholder ratification.

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to redeem a company’s poison pill.

§ Vote case-by-case on management proposals to ratify a poison pill.

§ Vote against or withhold from any board where a dead-hand poison pill provision is in place. From a shareholder perspective, there is no justification for a dead-hand provision. Directors of companies with these lethal protective devices should be held fully accountable.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments

The financial crisis prompted widespread losses in certain industries. This resulted in previously profitable companies considering the adoption of a poison pill and/or NOL protective amendment to protect their NOL tax assets, which may be lost upon an acquisition of 5 percent of a company’s shares.

When evaluating management proposals seeking to adopt NOL pills or protective amendments, the purpose behind the proposal, its terms, and the company’s existing governance structure should be taken into account to assess whether the structure actively promotes board entrenchment or adequately protects shareholder rights. While the high estimated tax value of NOLs would typically benefit shareholders, the ownership acquisition limitations contained in an NOL pill/protective amendment coupled with a company’s problematic governance structure could serve as an antitakeover device.

Given the low ownership thresholds involved, shareholders want to ensure that such pills/amendments do not remain in effect permanently. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will closely review whether the pill/amendment contains a sunset provision or a commitment to cause the expiration of the NOL pill/protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOLs.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill/ protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the term of the pill/ protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

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§ Evaluate management proposals to ratify an NOL pill /adopt an NOL protective amendment if the term of the pill/amendment would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL on a case-by-case basis considering the following factors;

§ The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5% and NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing five-percent holder);

§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);

§ The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Greenmail

Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of shares, the practice discriminates against most shareholders. This transferred cash, absent the greenmail payment, could be put to much better use for reinvestment in the company, payment of dividends, or to fund a public share repurchase program.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to adopt an anti-greenmail provision in their charter or bylaws that would thereby restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments to certain shareholders.

§ Vote case-by-case on all anti-greenmail proposals when they are presented as bundled items with other charter or bylaw amendments.

Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies

Shareholder ability to remove directors, with or without cause, is either prescribed by a state’s business corporation law, individual company’s articles of incorporation, or its corporate bylaws. Many companies have sought shareholder approval for charter or bylaw amendments that would prohibit the removal of directors except for cause, thus ensuring that directors would retain their directorship for their full-term unless found guilty of self-dealing. By requiring cause to be demonstrated through due process, management insulates the directors from removal even if a director has been performing poorly, not attending meetings, or not acting in the best interests of shareholders.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.

§ Vote for proposals which seek to restore the authority of shareholders to remove directors with or without cause.

§ Vote against proposals that provide only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.

§ Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.

Shareholder Ability to Alter the Size of the Board

Proposals that would allow management to increase or decrease the size of the board at its own discretion are often used by companies as a takeover defense. Proposals to fix the size of the board at a specific number can prevent management from increasing the board size without shareholder approval when facing a proxy context. By increasing the size of the

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board, management can make it more difficult for dissidents to gain control of the board. Fixing the size of the board also prevents a reduction in the size of the board as a strategy to oust independent directors. Fixing board size also prevents management from increasing the number of directors in order to dilute the effects of cumulative voting.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals that seek to fix the size of the board within an acceptable range.

§ Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board without shareholder approval.

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5.    Shareholder Rights

Confidential Voting

The confidential ballot ensures that voters are not subject to real or perceived coercion. In an open voting system, management can determine who has voted against its nominees or proposals before a final vote count. As a result, shareholders can be pressured to vote with management at companies with which they maintain or would like to establish a business relationship.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that request corporations to adopt confidential voting, the use of independent tabulators, and the use of independent inspectors for an election as long as the proposals include clauses for proxy contests. In the case of a contested election, management is permitted to request that the dissident group honor its confidential voting policy. If the dissidents agree, the policy remains in place. If the dissidents do not agree, the confidential voting policy is waived.

§ Vote for management proposals to adopt confidential voting procedures.

Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings

Most state corporation statutes allow shareholders to call a special meeting when they want to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly scheduled annual meetings. Sometimes this right applies only if a shareholder or a group of shareholders own a specified percentage of shares, with ten percent being the most common. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to call special meetings.

§ Generally vote for proposals that remove restrictions on the right of shareholders to act independently of management.

§ Vote against provisions that would require advance notice of more than sixty days.

Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

Consent solicitations allow shareholders to vote on and respond to shareholder and management proposals by mail without having to act at a physical meeting. A consent card is sent by mail for shareholder approval and only requires a signature for action. Some corporate bylaws require supermajority votes for consents, while at others standard annual meeting rules apply. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act by written consent.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholder ability to take action by written consent.

§ Generally vote for proposals to allow or make easier shareholder action by written consent.

Unequal Voting Rights

Incumbent managers are able to use unequal voting rights through the creation of a separate class of shares that has superior voting rights to the common shares of regular shareholders. This separate class of shares with disproportionate

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voting power allows management to concentrate its power and insulate itself from the wishes of the majority of shareholders. Dual class exchange offers involve a transfer of voting rights from one group of shareholders to another group of shareholders typically through the payment of a preferential dividend. A dual class recapitalization plan also establishes two classes of common stock with unequal voting rights, but initially involves an equal distribution of preferential and inferior voting shares to current shareholders.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for resolutions that seek to maintain or convert to a one-share-one-vote capital structure.

§ Generally vote against requests for the creation or continuation of dual class capital structures or the creation of new or additional super-voting shares.

Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Amend the Charter or Bylaws

Supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments are often the result of “lock-in” votes, which are the votes required to repeal new provisions to the corporate charter. Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company and its corporate governance provisions. Requiring more than this may entrench managers by blocking actions that are in the best interests of shareholders.

The general lack of credit availability for financially distressed companies has resulted in “rescue” or highly dilutive stock and warrant issuances, which often comprise a majority of the company’s voting stock upon conversion. When an investor takes control of the company through the conversion of securities, the new owners often seek statutory amendments, such as adopting written consent, or allowing 50 percent shareholders to call a special meeting, that allow effective control over the company with little or no input from minority shareholders.

In such cases, the existing supermajority vote requirements would serve to protect minority shareholders’ interests. The reduction in the vote requirements, when coupled with low quorum requirements (in Nevada and other states) could shift the balance in power away from small shareholders while overly empowering large shareholders.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve charter and bylaw amendments.

§ Vote against management proposals seeking to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements when they accompany management sponsored proposals to also change certain charter or bylaw amendments.

§ Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments. However, for companies with shareholders who have significant ownership levels, vote on a case-by-case basis, taking into account 1) ownership structure, 2) quorum requirements, and 3) supermajority vote requirements.

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.

In addition, voting against or withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

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§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirement to Approve Mergers

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company and its corporate governance provisions. Requiring more than this may entrench managers by blocking actions that are in the best interests of shareholders.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against management proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote to approve mergers and other significant business combinations.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only¹⁵ meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:

§ Scope and rationale of the proposal; and

§ Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.

Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support shareholder proposals to reimburse for proxy solicitation expenses.

§ When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, always support the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

§ Generally support requests seeking to reimburse a shareholder proponent for all reasonable campaign expenditures for a proposal approved by the majority of shareholders.

Exclusive Venue

Issuers began seeking shareholder approval of exclusive venue charter provisions in 2011 after a court opinion suggested that unilaterally adopted exclusive venue bylaw provisions might not be enforceable. All the exclusive venue proposals to date have sought to make Delaware the exclusive forum for resolution on shareholder disputes.

¹⁵ Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.

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Corporations have defended exclusive forum provisions on the grounds that the Delaware Chancery Court moves cases more quickly than other courts and is presided over by judges who are experienced in corporate law. Firms have also argued that making Delaware the sole forum for lawsuits avoids the possibility of duplicative suits arising out of the same events. A number of shareholder advocates have, however, countered that exclusive venue provisions deprive shareholders of the flexibility to choose the forum in which to assert claims of wrongdoing.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to restrict the venue for shareholder claims by adopting charter or bylaw provisions that seek to establish an exclusive judicial forum.

Fee-Shifting Bylaws

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against bylaws that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., in cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).

Bundled Proposals

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on bundled or conditional proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.

6.    Mergers & Acquisitions / Corporate Restructurings

A number of academic and industry studies have estimated that nearly three quarters of all corporate acquisitions fail to create economically meaningful shareholder value. These studies have also demonstrated that the larger the deal the greater the risk in realizing long-term value for shareholders of the acquiring firm. These risks include integration challenges, over-estimation of expected synergies, incompatible corporate cultures and poor succession planning. Indeed, some studies have found that smaller deals within specialized industries on average outperform “big bet” larger deals by a statistically significant factor.

In analyzing M&A deals, private placements or other transactional related items on proxy, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services performs a well-rounded analysis that seeks to balance all facets of the deal to ascertain whether the proposed acquisition is truly going to generate long-term value for shareholders and enhance the prospects of the ongoing corporation.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on mergers and acquisitions are always considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the following factors:

§ Impact of the merger on shareholder value;

§ Perspective of ownership (target vs. acquirer) in the deal;

§ Form and mix of payment (i.e. stock, cash, debt, etc.);

§ Fundamental value drivers behind the deal;

§ Anticipated financial and operating benefits realizable through combined synergies;

§ Offer price (cost vs. premium);

§ Change-in-control payments to executive officers;

§ Financial viability of the combined companies as a single entity;

§ Was the deal put together in good faith? What kind of auction setting took place? Were negotiations carried out at arm’s length? Was any portion of the process tainted by possible conflicts of interest?

§ Fairness opinion (or lack thereof);

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§ Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights;

§ What are the potential legal or environmental liability risks associated with the target firm?

§ Impact on community stakeholders and employees in both workforces; and

§ How will the merger adversely affect employee benefits like pensions and health care?

Fair Price Provisions

Fair price provisions were originally designed to specifically defend against the most coercive of takeover devises- the two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer. In such a hostile takeover, the bidder offers cash for enough shares to gain control of the target. At the same time, the acquirer states that once control has been obtained, the target’s remaining shares will be purchased with cash, cash and securities, or only securities. Since the payment offered for the remaining stock is, by design, less valuable than the original offer for the controlling shares, shareholders are forced to sell out early to maximize the value of their shares. Standard fair price provisions require that in the absence of board or shareholder approval of the acquisition the bidder must pay the remaining shareholders the same price for their shares that brought control.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for fair price proposals as long as the shareholder vote requirement embedded in the provision is no more than a majority of disinterested shares.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to lower the shareholder vote requirement in existing fair price provisions.

Appraisal Rights

Rights of appraisal provide shareholders who do not approve of the terms of certain corporate transactions the right to demand a judicial review in order to determine the fair value for their shares. The right of appraisal applies to mergers, sale of corporate assets, and charter amendments that may have a materially adverse effect on the rights of dissenting shareholders.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore or provide shareholders with the right of appraisal.

Corporate Restructuring

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes concerning corporate restructuring proposals, including minority squeeze outs, leveraged buyouts, spin-offs, liquidations, and asset sales, are considered on a case-by-case basis.

Spin-offs

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on spin-offs depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, market focus, and managerial incentives.

Asset Sales

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes case-by-case on asset sales taking into consideration the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, and potential elimination of diseconomies.

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Liquidations

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on liquidations after reviewing management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.

Going Private Transactions (LBOs, Minority Squeezeouts)

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following: offer price/premium, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives/offers considered, and non-completion risk.

§ Vote case-by-case on “going dark” transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock), cash-out value, whether the interests of continuing and cashed-out shareholders are balanced, and market reaction to public announcement of transaction.

Changing Corporate Name

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for changing the corporate name in all instances if proposed and supported by management and the board.

Plans of Reorganization (Bankruptcy)

The recent financial crisis has placed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations as a potential alternative for distressed companies. While the number of bankruptcies has risen as evidenced by many firms, including General Motors and Lehman Brothers, the prevalence of these reorganizations can vary year over year due to, among other things, market conditions and a company‘s ability to sustain its operations. Additionally, the amount of time that lapses between a particular company‘s entrance into Chapter 11 and its submission of a plan of reorganization varies significantly depending on the complexity, timing, and jurisdiction of the particular case. These plans are often put to a vote of shareholders (in addition to other interested parties), as required by the Bankruptcy Code.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:

§ Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;

§ Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;

§ Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an official equity committee);

§ The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);

§ Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and

§ Governance of the reorganized company.

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

§ Valuation - Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target

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company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity.

§ Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

§ Deal timing - A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date.

§ Negotiations and process - What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors.

§ Conflicts of interest - How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 percent of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24 month timeframe.

§ Voting agreements - Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights?

§ Governance - What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger?

§ Stakeholder Impact- impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc.

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) – Proposals for Extensions

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC extension proposals taking into account the length of the requested extension, the status of any pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process, any added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders, and any prior extension requests.

§ Length of request: Typically, extension requests range from two to six months, depending on the progression of the SPAC’s acquisition process.

§ Pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process: Sometimes an initial business combination was already put to a shareholder vote, but, for varying reasons, the transaction could not be consummated by the termination date and the SPAC is requesting an extension. Other times, the SPAC has entered into a definitive transaction agreement, but needs additional time to consummate or hold the shareholder meeting.

§ Added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders: Sometimes the SPAC sponsor (or other insiders) will contribute, typically as a loan to the company, additional funds that will be added to the redemption value of each public share as long as such shares are not redeemed in connection with the extension request. The purpose of the “equity kicker” is to incentivize shareholders to hold their shares through the end of the requested extension or until the time the transaction is put to a shareholder vote, rather than electing redemption at the extension proposal meeting.

§ Prior extension requests: Some SPACs request additional time beyond the extension period sought in prior extension requests.

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7.  Capital Structure

The management of a corporation’s capital structure involves a number of important issues including dividend policy, types of assets, opportunities for growth, ability to finance new projects internally, and the cost of obtaining additional capital. Many financing decisions have a significant impact on shareholder value, particularly when they involve the issuance of additional common stock, preferred stock, or debt.

Common Stock Authorization

State statutes and stock exchanges require shareholder approval for increases in the number of common shares. Corporations increase their supply of common stock for a variety of ordinary business purposes: raising new capital, funding stock compensation programs, business acquisitions, implementation of stock splits, or payment of stock dividends.

Clear justification should accompany all management requests for shareholder approval of increases in authorized common stock. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports increases in authorized common stock to fund stock splits that are in shareholders’ interests. Dual requests on the same ballot, in which an increase in common stock is requested in tandem with a reverse stock split in which shares are not proportionately reduced may not be in shareholder best interests. Although the reverse stock split may be needed in the face of imminent delisting, there is little justification in effectively approving two increases in common stock on the same ballot.

General Authorization Requests

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes.

Vote for an increase of up to 50 percent of current authorized shares.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if less than or equal to 50 percent, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases above 50 percent of the current authorized shares when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In or subsequent to the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

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For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

Specific Authorization Requests

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support.

Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends

Stock splits/dividends involve the partitioning of the outstanding shares of a corporation into a larger number of shares, while proportionately decreasing the market price of the stock. Stock splits/dividends do not affect the equity of the company. An understanding of forward and reverse stock splits and stock dividends is relevant because proposals to increase authorized common shares may be tied to the implementation of a planned stock distribution.

Shareholders can effectively cancel a split or dividend if the company does not have sufficient shares to implement a split without an increase in authorized shares.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the increase in authorized shares is reasonable in accordance with Taft-Hartley Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Reverse Stock Splits

Reverse splits exchange multiple shares for a lesser amount to increase share price. Increasing share price is sometimes necessary to restore a company’s share price to a level that will allow it to be traded on the national stock exchanges. In addition, some brokerage houses have a policy of not monitoring or investing in very low priced shares. Reverse stock splits can help maintain stock liquidity.

Evaluation of management proposals to implement a reverse stock split will take into account whether there is a corresponding proportional decrease in authorized shares. Without a corresponding decrease, a reverse stock split is effectively an increase in authorized shares by way of reducing the number of shares outstanding, while leaving the number of authorized shares to be issued at the pre-split level.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:

§ The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or

§ The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than half of the company’s existing authorization.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting; or

§ Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;

§ The company’s rationale; or

§ Other factors as applicable.

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Shareholders should only vote for non-proportionate reverse stock splits in the most dire of situations. Companies should provide disclosure of external evidence that a potential delisting is imminent to separate the true emergencies from vague potential risks to shareholders.

Share Repurchase Programs

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:

§ Greenmail,

§ The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics,

§ Threats to the company’s long-term viability, or

§ Other company-specific factors as warranted.

Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.

Preferred Stock Authorization

Preferred stock is an equity security which has certain features similar to debt instruments- such as fixed dividend payments and seniority of claims to common stock - and usually carries little to no voting rights. The terms of blank check preferred stock give the board of directors the power to issue shares of preferred stock at their discretion with voting, conversion, distribution, and other rights to be determined by the board at time of issue.

General Authorization Requests

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes.

Vote for an increase of up to 50 percent of current authorized shares.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if less than or equal to 50 percent, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;¹⁶

§ The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”);

§ The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they’re convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders;

§ The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares;

¹⁶ To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan.

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§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases above 50 percent of the current authorization when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

Specific Authorization Requests

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support.

Blank Check Preferred Stock

Blank check preferred stock, with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend, distribution, and other rights, can be used for sound corporate purposes but can also be used as a device to thwart hostile takeovers without shareholder approval.

§ Vote against proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of blank check preferred stock.

§ Vote against proposals to increase the number of blank check preferred stock authorized for issuance when no shares have been issued or reserved for a specific purpose.

§ Vote for proposals to create “declawed” blank check preferred stock (stock that cannot be used as a takeover defense).

§ Vote for requests to require shareholder approval for blank check authorizations.

Adjust Par Value of Common Stock

Stock that has a fixed per share value that is on its certificate is called par value stock. The purpose of par value stock is to establish the maximum responsibility of a stockholder in the event that a corporation becomes insolvent. Proposals to reduce par value come from certain state level requirements for regulatory industries such as banks and other legal requirements relating to the payment of dividends.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock.

Preemptive Rights

Preemptive rights permit shareholders to share proportionately in any new issues of stock of the same class. These rights guarantee existing shareholders the first opportunity to purchase shares of new issues of stock in the same class as their

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own and in the same proportion. The absence of these rights could cause stockholders’ interest in a company to be reduced by the sale of additional shares without their knowledge and at prices unfavorable to them. Preemptive rights, however, can make it difficult for corporations to issue large blocks of stock for general corporate purposes.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to create or abolish preemptive rights. In evaluating proposals on preemptive rights, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services looks at the size of a company and the characteristics of its shareholder base.

Debt Restructuring

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding debt restructurings.

§ Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

§ Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt-restructuring plan. The following factors are considered:

§ Dilution—How much will the ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be?

§ Change in Control—Will the transaction result in a change in control of the company? Are board and committee seats guaranteed? Do standstill provisions and voting agreements exist?

§ Financial Issues— company’s financial situation, degree of need for capital, use of proceeds, and effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Terms of the offer—discount/premium in purchase price to investor including any fairness opinion, termination penalties and exit strategy;

§ Conflict of interest—arm’s length transactions and managerial incentives; and

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives.

Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 10 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.

For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.

Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.

Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.

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8.  State of Incorporation

Voting on State Takeover Statutes

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freeze out provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, anti-greenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions). Taft-Hartley Advisory Services generally supports opting into stakeholder protection statutes if they provide comprehensive protections for employees and community stakeholders. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services is less supportive of takeover statutes that only serve to protect incumbent management from accountability to shareholders and which negatively influence shareholder value.

Reincorporation Proposals

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Management or shareholder proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

§ Reasons for reincorporation;

§ Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and

§ Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Vote for reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.

Offshore Reincorporations and Tax Havens

For a company that seeks to reincorporate, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services evaluates the merits of the move on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the company’s strategic rationale for the move, the potential economic ramifications, potential tax benefits, and any corporate governance changes that may impact shareholders. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services believes there are a number of concerns associated with a company looking to reincorporate from the United States to offshore locales such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands or Panama. With more U.S.-listed companies seeking to move offshore, shareholders are beginning to understand the web of complexities surrounding the legal, tax, and governance implications involved in such a transaction.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on proposed offshore moves, taking into consideration:

§ Legal recourse for U.S. stockholders of the new company and the enforcement of legal judgments against the company under the U.S. securities laws;

§ The transparency (or lack thereof) of the new locale’s legal system;

§ Adoption of any shareholder-unfriendly corporate law provisions;

§ Actual, quantifiable tax benefits associated with foreign incorporation;

§ Potential for accounting manipulations and/or discrepancies;

§ Any pending U.S. legislation concerning offshore companies;

§ Prospects of reputational harm and potential damage to brand name via increased media coverage concerning corporate expatriation.

§ Generally vote for shareholder requests calling for “expatriate” companies that are domiciled abroad yet predominantly owned and operated in America to re-domesticate back to a U.S. state jurisdiction.

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While a firm’s country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services will generally apply its U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S. policies will also apply to companies listed on U.S. exchanges as Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) and that may be exempt from the disclosure and corporate governance requirements that apply to most companies traded on U.S. exchanges, including a number of SEC rules and stock market listing requirements. Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on the country of incorporation.

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9.    Corporate Responsibility & Accountability

Social, Environmental and Sustainability Issues

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services generally supports social, workforce, and environmental shareholder-sponsored resolutions if they seek to create responsible corporate citizens while at the same time attempting to enhance long-term shareholder value. Taft-Hartley Advisory Services typically supports proposals that ask for disclosure reporting of information that is not available outside the company that is not proprietary in nature. Such reporting is particularly most vital when it appears that a company has not adequately addressed shareholder concerns regarding social, workplace, environmental and/or other issues. A determination whether the request is relevant to the company’s core business and in-line with industry practice will be made on a case-by-case basis. The proponent of the resolution must make the case that the benefits of additional disclosure outweigh the costs of producing the report.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: In analyzing social, workplace, environmental, and other related proposals, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services considers the following factors:

§ Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable;

§ Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company’s short-term or long-term share value;

§ Whether the company’s analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive;

§ The degree to which the company’s stated position on the issues could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to boycott or selective purchasing;

§ Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;

§ Whether the issues presented in the proposal are being appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation, government regulation, or company-specific action;

§ The company’s approach compared with its peers or any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;

§ Whether the company has already responded in an appropriate or sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;

§ Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s practices related to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;

§ If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether sufficient information is publicly available to shareholders and whether it would be unduly burdensome for the company to compile and avail the requested information to shareholders in a more comprehensive or amalgamated fashion; and

§ Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal.

In general, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports proposals that request the company to furnish information helpful to shareholders in evaluating the company’s operations from top to bottom. In order to be able to intelligently monitor their investments, shareholders often need information that is best provided by the company in which they have invested on behalf of their end beneficiaries. Qualified requests satisfying the aforementioned criteria usually merit support.

Proposals requesting that the company cease certain actions that the proponent believes are harmful to society or some segment of society will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Special attention will be made to the company’s legal and ethical obligations, its ability to remain profitable, and potential negative publicity if the company fails to honor the request. A high standard will need to be met by proponents requesting specific action like divesture of a business line or operation, legal remuneration, or withdrawal from certain high-risk markets.

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I. GENERAL CSR RELATED

Special Policy Review and Shareholder Advisory Committees

These resolutions propose the establishment of special committees of the board to address broad corporate policy and provide forums for ongoing dialogue on issues including, but not limited to: shareholder relations, the environment, occupational health and safety, and executive compensation.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Support these proposals when they appear to offer a potentially effective method for enhancing shareholder value.

International Operations

The rise of globalization has put increasing importance on the need for U.S. companies to periodically monitor their business operations abroad. As a means to preserve brand integrity and protect against potentially costly litigation and negative public relations, Taft-Hartley Advisory Services generally supports shareholder proposals which call for a report on the company’s core business policies and procedures of its operations outside the United States.

Many of the resolutions which address a company’s international policies can include: impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in emerging market economies; corporate safeguards against money laundering; terrorist financing; economic de-stabilization concerns; relationships with international financial institutions (IFIs); and product sales/marketing abroad (i.e., tobacco, pharmaceutical drug pricing).

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support proposals asking for policy clarification and reporting on international operations that can materially impact the company’s short and long-term bottom-line.

Affirm Political Non-Partisanship

Employees should not be put in a position where professional standing and goodwill within the corporation could be jeopardized as a result of political beliefs. Responsible employment practices should protect workers from an environment characterized by political indoctrination or intimidation. Corporations should not devote resources to partisan political activities, nor should they compel their employees to contribute to or support particular causes. Moreover, it is wise for a corporation to maintain a politically neutral stance as to avoid potentially embarrassing conflicts of interests that could negatively impact the company’s brand name with consumers.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support proposals affirming political non-partisanship within the company.

Political Contributions, Lobbying Reporting & Disclosure

Changes in legislation that governs corporate political giving have, rather than limiting such contributions, increased the complexity of tracking how much money corporations contribute to the political process and where that money ultimately ends up. In January 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission lifted restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections. A company’s involvement in the political process could impact shareholder value if such activities are not properly overseen and managed.

Shareholders have the right to know about corporate political activities, and management’s knowledge that such information can be made publicly available should encourage a company’s lawful and responsible use of political contributions.

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Moreover, it is critical that shareholders understand the internal controls that are in place at a company to adequately manage political contributions and lobbying practices. Given the significant reputational and financial risk involved in political giving, shareholders should expect management to have the necessary capabilities to monitor and track all monies distributed toward political groups and causes. These internal controls should be fully consistent with Section 404 requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.

While political contributions, lobbying and other corporate political activity can benefit the strategic interests of a company, it is important that accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure that monies disbursed in support of political objectives actually generate identifiable returns on shareholder wealth. Such mechanisms serve to insure against the use of shareholder funds in the furtherance of narrow management agendas.

When analyzing the proposals, special consideration will be made if the target company has been the subject of significant controversy stemming from its contributions or political activities, if the company fails to disclose a policy to shareholders that outlines the process by which the company considers its political contributions and lobbying activities, or if the company has recently been involved in significant controversy or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or governmental affairs.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Support reporting of political and political action committee (PAC) contributions.

§ Support establishment of corporate political contributions guidelines and internal reporting provisions or controls.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals requesting companies to review and report on their political lobbying activities including efforts to influence governmental legislation.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals asking to publish in newspapers and public media the company’s political contributions as such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.

§ Generally vote case-by-case on proposals requesting comparison of a company’s political spending to objectives that can mitigate material risks for the company, such as limiting global warming.

Military Sales

Shareholder proposals from church groups and other community organizations have asked companies for detailed reports on foreign military sales. These proposals often can be created at reasonable cost to the company and contain no proprietary data. Large companies can supply this information without undue burden and provide shareholders with information affecting corporate performance and decision-making.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support reports on foreign military sales and economic conversion of facilities and where such reporting will not disclose sensitive information that could impact the company adversely or increase its legal exposure.

§ Generally vote against proposals asking a company to develop specific military contracting criteria.

Report on Operations in Sensitive Regions or Countries

Over the past decade, a number of public companies – especially within the extractive sector – have withdrawn from geopolitically sensitive regions as a result of being associated with political controversies involving their host countries (i.e. Myanmar, the Sudan, China, Iran, etc.). Oil and natural gas companies, in particular, continue to be the largest investors in many countries involved in human rights abuse and terrorist activities. As such, these companies become targets of consumer boycotts, public relations backlash and even governmental intervention.

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards in connection with involvement in a certain market and other potentially sensitive geopolitical regions.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals seeking a report on operations within a certain market and documentation of costs of continued involvement in a given country or region.

§ Generally support requests for establishment of a board committee to review and report on the reputational risks and legal compliance with U.S. sanctions as a result of the company’s continued operations in countries associated with terrorist sponsored activities.

§ Consider shareholder proposals to pull out of a certain market on a case-by-case basis considering factors such as overall cost, FDI exposure, level of disclosure for investors, magnitude of controversy, and the current business focus of the company.

II. ENVIRONMENT & CLIMATE CHANGE

Shareholder proposals addressing environmental and energy concerns have been plentiful in recent years, and generally seek greater disclosure on an issue or seek to improve a company’s environmental practices in order to protect the world’s natural resources. In addition, some proponents cite the negative financial implications for companies with poor environmental practices, including liabilities associated with site clean-ups and lawsuits, as well as arguments that energy efficient products and clean environmental practices are sustainable business practices that will contribute to long-term shareholder value. Shareholders say the majority of independent atmospheric scientists agree that global warming poses a serious problem to the health and welfare of all countries, citing the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the world’s most authoritative scientific body on the subject. Shareholder proponents argue that companies can report on their greenhouse gas emissions within a few months at reasonable cost.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Scientists generally agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a “greenhouse effect” that traps the planet’s heat. Environmentalists claim that the greenhouse gases produced by the industrial age have caused recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. With notable exceptions, a number of business leaders have described the rise and fall of global temperatures as naturally occurring phenomena and depicted corporate impact on climate change as minimal.

Shareholder proposals asking a company to issue a report to shareholders – at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information – on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the report include descriptions of efforts within companies to reduce emissions, their financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, and their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat. Proponents argue that there is scientific proof that the burning of fossil fuels causes global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, changing market dynamics and consumer preferences may impact demand for fossil fuels, and thus shareholder value, and that a report on the company’s role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for a company to commit to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions under a reasonable timeline.

§ Generally vote for resolutions requesting that a company disclose information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks related to climate change on its operations and investments, or on how the company identifies, measures, and manages such risks.

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§ Generally vote for proposals requesting a report on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from company operations and/or products and operations.

Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan¹⁷, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

§ The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;

§ Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);

§ The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions in line with Paris Agreement goals (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);

§ Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based;

§ Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;

§ Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;

§ Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance;

§ Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;

§ Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and

§ The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

§ The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure;

§ The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and

§ Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.

Investment in Renewable Energy

Filers of proposals on renewable energy ask companies to increase their investment in renewable energy sources and to work to develop products that rely more on renewable energy sources. Increased use of renewable energy is expected to reduce the negative environmental impact of energy companies. In addition, as supplies of oil and coal exist in the earth in limited quantities, renewable energy sources represent a competitive, and some would even argue essential, long-term business strategy.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder proposals seeking increased investment in renewable energy sources, taking into account whether the terms of the resolution are realistic or overly restrictive for management to pursue.

¹⁷ Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

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Sustainability Reporting and Planning

The concept of sustainability is commonly understood as meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Indeed, the term sustainability is complex and poses significant challenges for companies on many levels. Many in the investment community have termed this broader responsibility the “triple bottom line,” referring to the triad of performance goals related to economic prosperity, social responsibility and environmental quality. In essence, the concept requires companies to balance the needs and interests of their various stakeholders while operating in a manner that sustains business growth for the long-term, supports local communities and protects the environment and natural capital for future generations.

Reporting and enhanced disclosure addressing sustainable development is important to companies namely because it offers a formal structure for decision making that helps management teams anticipate and address important global trends that can have serious consequences for business and society. Shareholders may request general sustainability reports on a specific location or operation, often requesting that the company detail the environmental, social, legal and other risks and/or potential liabilities of the specific project in question.

A number of companies have begun to report on sustainability issues using established standards in the marketplace. Such reporting focuses on corporate compliance and measurement regarding key economic, environmental, and social performance indicators. As a best practice, companies release annual sustainability reports in conjunction to regular annual statement of operations.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company’s environmental and social practices, and/or associated risks and liabilities.

Operations in Protected or Sensitive Areas

Operating in regions protected or established under national or international categorization guidelines, including wildlife refuges, national forests, and International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) categorized areas, expose companies to increased oversight and the potential for associated risk and controversy. While it is important for a company to have the flexibility to operate in these regions to take advantage of strategic placement or growth, additional disclosure could be an important mitigating factor to address increased risk and oversight. Restrictions to the company’s operations, damaging public relations, and costly litigation resulting from failure to comply with the requirements associated with protected or categorized regions could have a significant impact on shareholder value.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder requests for reports outlining potential environmental damage from operations in protected regions, including wildlife refuges, unless the company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions.

Hydraulic Fracturing

Shareholder proponents have elevated concerns on the use of hydraulic fracturing, an increasingly controversial process in which water, sand, and a mix of chemicals is blasted horizontally into tight layers of shale rock to extract natural gas. As this practice has gained more widespread use, environmentalists have raised concerns that the chemicals mixed with sand and water to aid the fracturing process can contaminate ground water supplies. Proponents of resolutions at companies that employ hydraulic fracturing are also concerned that wastewater produced by the process could overload the waste treatment plants to which it is shipped. Shareholders have asked companies that utilize hydraulic fracturing to report on the environmental impact of the practice and to disclose policies designed to reduce hazards from the process.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests seeking greater transparency on the practice of hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks.

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Recycling Policy

A number of companies have received proposals to step-up their recycling efforts, with the goal of reducing the company’s negative impact on the environment and reducing costs over the long-term.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to increase their recycling efforts or to adopt a formal recycling policy.

Endorsement of Ceres Roadmap 2030

These resolutions call for the adoption of principles that encourage the company to protect the environment and the safety and health of its employees. The Ceres Roadmap 2030, formulated by Ceres (formerly known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, CERES), require signing companies to address environmental issues, including protection of the biosphere, sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of wastes, energy conservation, and employee and community risk reduction. A signatory to the Ceres Roadmap 2030 would disclose its efforts in such areas through a standardized report submitted to Ceres and made available to the public.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services supports proposals that improve a company’s public image, reduce exposure to liabilities, and establish standards so that environmentally responsible companies and markets are not at a competitive financial disadvantage.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for requests asking a company to formally adopt the Ceres Roadmap 2030.

§ Vote for adoption of reports to shareholders on environmental issues.

Land Use

Many large retail stores and real estate development firms have received criticism over their policies and processes for acquiring and developing land. Often, in such cases, there are organizations that support as well as those that oppose the proposed development.

Many of these requests brought forth by the respective stakeholders raise serious issues that can have a real impact on short-term shareholder value. However, in some cases, additional reporting may be duplicative of existing disclosure or may fail to provide added benefit to shareholders commensurate with the associated cost or burden of providing additional information. Some of the companies targeted with such resolutions have been subject to recent litigation, significant fines stemming from their land use practices, and/or recent community boycotts.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder resolutions that request better disclosure of detailed information on a company’s policies related to land use or development or compliance with local and national laws and zoning requirements.

Water Use

Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report evaluating the business risks linked to water use and impacts on the company’s supply chain, including subsidiaries and bottling partners. Such proposals also ask companies to disclose current policies and procedures for mitigating the impact of operations on local communities in areas of water scarcity.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s risks linked to water use.

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III. WORKPLACE PRACTICES & HUMAN RIGHTS

Equal Employment Opportunity

These proposals generally request that a company establish a policy of reporting to shareholders its progress with equal opportunity and affirmative action programs. The costs of violating federal laws that prohibit discrimination by corporations are high and can affect corporate earnings.

The Equal Opportunities Employment Commission (EEOC) does not release the company’s filings to the public unless it is involved in litigation, and it is difficult to obtain from other sources. Companies need to be sensitive to minority employment issues as the work force becomes increasingly diverse. This information can be provided with little cost to the company and does not create an unreasonable burden on management.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals calling for action on equal employment opportunity and anti-discrimination.

§ Vote for proposals requesting legal and regulatory compliance and public reporting related to non-discrimination, affirmative action, workplace health and safety, environmental issues, and labor policies and practices that affect long-term corporate performance.

§ Vote for proposals advocating for non-discrimination in salary, wages, and all benefits.

High-Performance Workplace

High-performance workplace practices emphasize employee training, participation, and feedback. The concept of a high-performance workplace has been endorsed by the U.S. Department of Labor and refers to a workplace that is designed to provide workers with the information, skills, incentives, and responsibility to make decisions essential for innovation, quality improvement and rapid response to changes in the marketplace. These standards embrace a “what is good for the worker is good for the company” philosophy. Studies have shown that improvement in human resources practices is associated with increases in total return to shareholders. High-performance workplace standards proposals can include linking compensation to social measures such as employee training, morale and safety, environmental performance and workplace lawsuits.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support proposals that incorporate high-performance workplace standards.

Workplace Safety

In light of fatal accidents at oil refineries (Tesoro – Anacortes refinery, April 2010; and BP – Texas City refinery, March 2005), the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico, and the explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine in 2010, shareholders have sought greater transparency and accountability regarding workplace safety by filing resolutions at a number of corporations.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting for workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts.

Non-Discrimination in Retirement Benefits

A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that treats an earned retirement benefit as if it were a credit from a defined contribution plan, but which provides a stated benefit at the end of its term. Because employer contributions to these plans are credited evenly over the life of a plan and not based on a seniority formula, they may reduce payouts to long-term employees who are currently vested in plans.

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Cash-balance pension conversions have undergone significant congressional and federal agency scrutiny in the wake of high-profile EEOC complaints on age discrimination and employee anger at several large blue-chip companies. While significant policy reform is unlikely in the short-term, business interests are worried enough that the National Association of Manufacturers and other pro-business lobbies have formed a coalition on Capitol Hill to preserve the essential features of the plans and to overturn an IRS ruling.

Driving the push behind conversions from traditional pension plans to cash-balance plans are the substantial savings that companies generate in the process. Critics point out that this savings is gained at the expense of the most senior employees. Shareholder resolutions may call on corporate boards to establish a committee of outside directors to prepare a report to shareholders on the potential impact of pension-related proposals being considered by national policymakers in reaction to the controversy spawned by the plans.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Support proposals calling for a non-discrimination policy with regard to retirement benefits and pension management at a company.

Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gaps

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender or race/ ethnicity, or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender or race/ethnicity pay gaps, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy on fair and equitable compensation practices;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and

§ Local laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of ethnic and/or racial minorities.

Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audit Guidelines

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, considering company disclosures, policies, actions, and engagements.

Sexual Harassment

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to preventing workplace sexual harassment;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and

§ The company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers.

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Mandatory Arbitration

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; and

§ The company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers.

Fair Lending Reporting and Compliance

These resolutions call for financial institutions to comply with fair lending laws and statutes while avoiding predatory practices in their sub-prime lending. These predatory practices include: lending to borrowers with inadequate income, who will then default; not reporting on payment performances of borrowers to credit agencies; implying that credit life insurance is necessary to obtain the loan (packing); unnecessarily high fees; refinancing with high additional fees rather than working out a loan that is in arrears (flipping); and high prepayment fees.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Support proposals calling for full compliance with fair-lending laws.

§ Support reporting on overall lending policies and data.

MacBride Principles

These resolutions have called for the adoption of the MacBride Principles for operations located in Northern Ireland. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is well documented that Northern Ireland’s Catholic community faced much higher unemployment figures than the Protestant community. In response to this problem, the U.K. government instituted the New Fair Employment Act of 1989 (and subsequent amendments) to address the sectarian hiring problems.

Many companies believe that the Act adequately addresses the problems and that further action, including adoption of the MacBride Principles, only duplicates the efforts already underway. In evaluating a proposal to adopt the MacBride Principles, shareholders must decide whether the principles will cause companies to divest, and therefore worsen the unemployment problem, or whether the principles will promote equal hiring practices. Proponents believe that the Fair Employment Act does not sufficiently address the sectarian hiring problems. They argue that the MacBride Principles serve to stabilize the situation and promote further investment.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Support the MacBride Principles for operations in Northern Ireland that request that companies abide by equal employment opportunity policies.

Contract Supplier Standards

These resolutions call for compliance with governmental mandates and corporate policies regarding nondiscrimination, affirmative action, work place safety and health, and other basic labor protections.

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support proposals that:

§ Seek publication of a “Worker Code of Conduct” to be implemented by the company’s foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring they satisfy all applicable labor standards and laws protecting employees’ wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, right to collectively bargain, and other rights;

§ Request a report summarizing the company’s current practices for enforcement of its Worker Code of Conduct;

§ Seek to establish independent monitoring mechanism in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with the Worker Code of Conduct;

§ Create incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts;

§ Implement policies for ongoing wage adjustments, ensuring adequate purchasing power and a sustainable living wage for employees of foreign suppliers and licensees;

§ Request public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis; and

§ Adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with foreign suppliers that manufacture products for sale in the U.S. using forced or child labor or with suppliers that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employees’ wages and working conditions.

Corporate and Supplier Codes of Conduct

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of clear principles or codes of conduct relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights. These conditions include the use of slave, child, or prison labor, undemocratically elected governments, widespread reports by human rights advocates, fervent pro-democracy protests, or economic sanctions and boycotts.

Many proposals refer to the seven core conventions, commonly referred to as the “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights At Work,” ratified by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The seven conventions fall under four broad categories: i) right to organize and bargain collectively; ii) non-discrimination in employment; iii) abolition of forced labor; and iv) end of child labor. Each member nation of the ILO body is bound to respect and promote these rights to the best of their abilities.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Support the principles and codes of conduct relating to company investment and/or operations in countries with patterns of human rights abuses or pertaining to geographic regions experiencing political turmoil (Northern Ireland, Columbia, Burma, former Soviet Union, and China).

§ Support the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct.

§ Support independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with Codes.

§ Support requests that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operation or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process.

IV. CONSUMER HEALTH & PUBLIC SAFETY

Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients

Shareholder activists request companies engaged in the development of genetically modified agricultural products (GMOs) to adopt a policy of not marketing or distributing such products until long term safety testing demonstrates that they are not harmful to humans, animals or the environment. Until further long term testing demonstrates that these products are not harmful, companies in the restaurant, prepared foods and packaging industries are being asked to remove genetically altered ingredients from products they manufacture, distribute or sell, and label such products in the interim. Shareholders are asking supermarket companies to do the same for their own private label brands.

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Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to label products that contain genetically engineered products.

§ Generally vote against proposals calling for a full phase out of product lines containing GMO ingredients.

Tobacco-Related Proposals

Shareholders file resolutions annually asking that companies with ties to the tobacco industry account for their marketing and distribution strategies, particularly as they impact smoking by young people. While the specific resolutions for shareholder proponents vary from year to year, activist shareholders consistently make the tobacco industry a prominent target. Examples of tobacco proposals include: attempting to link executive compensation with teen smoking rates; the placement of company tobacco products in retail outlets; the impact of second hand smoke; and a review of advertising campaigns and their impact on children and minority groups.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to limit the sale of tobacco products to minors.

§ Generally vote against proposals calling for a full phase out of tobacco related product lines.

Toxic Emissions

Shareholder proposals asking companies to take steps to minimize their emissions of toxic chemicals or release of toxic wastes into the environment can vary greatly. Some focus on reporting on the impact of these chemicals on the communities in which the company operates. Still others ask for a review of the company’s efforts to minimize pollution.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals calling on the company to establish a plan to reduce toxic emissions.

Toxic Chemicals

The use of toxic chemicals in cosmetics, consumables, and household products has become a growing issue of concern for shareholders as international regulations on this topic continue to expand, providing increased scrutiny over potentially toxic materials or compounds used or emitted in the conduct of operations or as an ingredient in consumer goods. Shareholders must recognize the impact that changing regulation and consumer expectations could have on shareholder value and should encourage companies to disclose their policies regarding the use or emission of toxic chemicals. Specific considerations should be made for a company’s geographic markets and the appearance of historical difficulties with controversy, fines, or litigation, requests for disclosure on the potential financial and legal risk associated with toxic chemicals.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support resolutions requesting that a company disclose its policies related to toxic chemicals.

§ Generally support shareholder resolutions requesting that companies evaluate and disclose the potential financial and legal risks associated with utilizing certain chemicals.

§ Consider shareholder proposals requesting companies to substitute or replace existing products on a case-by-case basis, with consideration for applicable regulations and standards in the markets in which the company participates.

Nuclear Safety

These resolutions are filed at companies that manage nuclear power facilities or produce components for nuclear reactors to request disclosure on the risks to the company associated with these operations, including physical security and the

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potential for environmental damage. Current reporting requirements for companies that operate nuclear facilities are managed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and include detailed reports on safety and security that are available to the public.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support shareholder resolutions requesting that companies report on risks associated with their nuclear reactor designs and/or the production and interim storage of irradiated fuel rods.

Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFOs)

The level of pollution resulting from CAFOs has drawn increased attention in recent years as certain legal decisions have established the precedent that a company can be held liable for the actions of the contract farms it sources from. Fines and remediation expenses stemming from these cases have been significant and could have a notable impact on the companies’ operations and shareholder value.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally support resolutions requesting that companies report to shareholders on the risks and liabilities associated with concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) unless the company has publicly disclosed guidelines for its corporate and contract farming operations (including compliance monitoring), or if the company does not directly source from CAFOs.

Pharmaceutical Product Reimportation

One of the most visible aspects of the legal and political debate over rising health care costs in the United States can be seen through prescription drug reimportation through Canada. While U.S. and Canadian regulations limit reimportation, several states have taken steps to encourage employees to actively seek less expensive medications through reimportation.

Shareholder action at major pharmaceutical companies has hinged around requesting increased disclosure of the financial and legal risks associated with company policies, or called on companies to change distribution limits to increase product availability in Canada, thereby encouraging product reimportation to the United States. The level of public concern over this issue and associated impact that a poorly developed policy could have on the companies suggest that additional disclosure of company policies related to reimportation could be beneficial to shareholders and generally merits support.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally support shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on the financial and legal impact of their policies regarding prescription drug reimportation, unless such information is already publicly disclosed.

§ Generally support shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt specific policies to encourage or not constrain prescription drug reimportation.

Pharmaceutical Product Pricing

Pharmaceutical drug pricing, both within the United States and internationally, has raised many questions of the companies that are responsible for creating and marketing these treatments. Shareholder proponents, activists and even some legislators have called upon drug companies to restrain pricing of prescription drugs.

The high cost of prescription drugs is a vital issue for senior citizens across the country. Seniors have the greatest need for prescription drugs, accounting for a significant portion of all prescription drug sales, but they often live on fixed incomes and are underinsured.

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Proponents note that efforts to reign-in pharmaceutical costs will not negatively impact research and development (R&D) costs and that retail drug prices are consistently higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized nations. Pharmaceutical companies often respond that adopting a formal drug pricing policy could put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Against the backdrop of the AIDS crisis in Africa, many shareholders have called on companies to address the issue of affordable drugs for the treatment of AIDS, as well as TB and Malaria throughout the developing world. When analyzing such resolutions, consideration should be made of the strategic implications of pricing policies in the market.

Taft-Hartley Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Proposals asking a company to implement price restraints on its pharmaceutical products will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the following factors:

§ Whether the proposal focuses on a specific drug and region;

§ Whether the economic benefits of providing subsidized drugs (e.g., public goodwill) outweigh the costs in terms of reduced profits, lower R&D spending, and harm to competitiveness;

§ The extent that reduced prices can be offset through the company’s marketing expenditures without significantly impacting R&D spending;

§ Whether the company already limits price increases of its products;

§ Whether the company already contributes life-saving pharmaceuticals to the needy and Third World countries; and

§ The extent to which peer companies implement price restraints.

§ Generally support proposals requesting that companies implement specific price restraints for its pharmaceutical products in developing markets or targeting certain population groups.

§ Generally support proposals requesting that companies evaluate their global product pricing strategy, considering the existing level of disclosure on pricing policies, any deviation from established industry pricing norms, and the company’s existing philanthropic initiatives.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call on companies to develop a policy to provide affordable HIV, AIDS, TB and Malaria drugs to citizens in the developing world.

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U N I T E D S T A T E S CATHOLIC FAITH-BASED PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 2023 Policy Recommendations Published January 17, 2023 W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	F-222
1.    Board of Directors	F-223
Uncontested Election of Directors	F-224
Board Accountability	F-224
Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structure	F-224
Problematic Audit-Related Practices	F-227
Problematic Compensation Practices	F-227
Problematic Pledging of Company Stock	F-228
Material Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Risk Oversight Failures	F-228
Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero	F-228
Board Responsiveness	F-229
Director Independence	F-229
Board Composition	F-230
Board Diversity	F-230
Classification of Directors – U.S.	F-231
Board-Related Management Proposals	F-233
Classification/Declassification of the Board	F-233
Majority Vote Threshold for Director Elections	F-233
Cumulative Voting	F-233
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation	F-234
Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies	F-234
Board Size	F-235
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	F-235
Board Refreshment	F-235
Board-Related Shareholder Proposals/Initiatives	F-236
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access	F-236
Annual Election (Declassification) of the Board	F-236
Majority Threshold Voting Shareholder Proposals	F-236
Majority of Independent Directors	F-236
Establishment of Independent Committees	F-237
Independent Board Chair	F-237
Establishment of Board Committees	F-237
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	F-237
Board Policy on Shareholder Engagement	F-238
Proxy Access	F-238
Board Refreshment	F-238
CEO Succession Planning	F-239
Vote No Campaigns	F-239
2.    Ratification of Auditors	F-240
Auditor-Related Shareholder Proposals	F-240
Ratify Auditors/Ensure Auditor Independence	F-240
Auditor Rotation	F-240

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3.    Takeover Defenses / Shareholder Rights	F-241
Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Management Proposals	F-241
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)	F-241
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments	F-242
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions	F-243
Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirements	F-243
Shareholder Ability to Call a Special Meeting	F-243
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent	F-244
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations	F-244
Fair Price Provisions	F-245
Greenmail	F-245
Confidential Voting	F-245
Control Share Acquisition Provisions	F-246
Control Share Cash-Out Provisions	F-246
Disgorgement Provisions	F-246
State Takeover Statutes	F-246
Freeze-Out Provisions	F-246
Reincorporation Proposals	F-247
Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent	F-247
Shareholder Litigation Rights	F-247
Federal Forum Selection Provisions	F-247
Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters	F-247
Fee Shifting	F-248
Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Shareholder Proposals	F-248
Shareholder Proposals to put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy	F-248
Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirements	F-249
Remove Antitakeover Provisions	F-249
Reimburse Proxy Solicitation Expenses	F-249
Virtual Shareholder Meetings	F-249
4.    Miscellaneous Governance Provisions	F-251
Bundled Proposals	F-251
Adjourn Meeting	F-251
Changing Corporate Name	F-251
Amend Quorum Requirements	F-251
Amend Minor Bylaws	F-252
Other Business	F-252
5.    Capital Structure	F-253
Common Stock Authorization	F-253
General Authorization Requests	F-253
Specific Authorization Requests	F-254
Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan	F-254
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends	F-254
Reverse Stock Splits	F-254
Preferred Stock Authorization	F-254
General Authorization Requests	F-255
Specific Authorization Requests	F-256
Blank Check Preferred Stock	F-256

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Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock	F-256
Unequal Voting Rights/Dual Class Structure	F-256
Preemptive Rights	F-257
Debt Restructurings	F-257
Share Repurchase Programs	F-257
Conversion of Securities	F-258
Recapitalization	F-258
Tracking Stock	F-258
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S	F-258
6.    Executive and Director Compensation	F-259
Criteria for Evaluating Executive Pay	F-261
Pay-for-Performance Evaluation	F-261
Pay-for-Performance Elements	F-261
Pay Equity (Quantum) Elements	F-261
Problematic Pay Practices	F-262
Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness	F-263
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation- Management Proposals (Management Say on Pay)	F-263
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay	F-264
Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale	F-264
Equity-Based Incentive Plans	F-265
Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)	F-266
Repricing Provisions	F-267
Pay-for-Performance Misalignment – Application to Equity Plans	F-267
Three-Year Value Adjusted Burn Rate	F-267
Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control	F-268
Other Compensation Plans	F-268
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))	F-268
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs)	F-269
Qualified Plans	F-269
Non-Qualified Plans	F-269
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)	F-270
Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options	F-270
Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash	F-271
Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs	F-271
401(k) Employee Benefit Plans	F-272
Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes	F-272
Director Compensation	F-272
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs	F-273
Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors	F-273
Outside Director Stock Awards/Options in Lieu of Cash	F-273
Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans	F-274
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation	F-274
Increase Disclosure of Executive Compensation	F-274
Limit Executive Compensation	F-274
Stock Ownership Requirements	F-274
Prohibit/Require Shareholder Approval for Option Repricing	F-275
Severance Agreements/Golden Parachutes	F-275

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Cash Balance Plans	F-275
Performance-Based Equity Awards	F-275
Pay for Superior Performance	F-276
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals	F-276
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity	F-277
Tax Gross-up Proposals	F-277
Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization	F-277
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits	F-277
Recoup Bonuses	F-277
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy	F-278
Bonus Banking	F-278
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time	F-278
Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)	F-278
7.     Mergers and Corporate Restructurings	F-279
Mergers and Acquisitions	F-279
Corporate Reorganization/Restructuring Plans (Bankruptcy)	F-280
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)	F-280
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions	F-281
Spin-offs	F-281
Asset Purchases	F-281
Asset Sales	F-281
Liquidations	F-281
Joint Ventures	F-282
Appraisal Rights	F-282
Going Private/Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)	F-282
Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures	F-282
Formation of Holding Company	F-283
Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals	F-283
8.     Social and Environmental Proposals	F-284
Global Approach	F-284
Diversity and Equality	F-285
Add Women and Minorities to the Board	F-285
Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audits	F-286
Report on the Distribution of Stock Options by Gender and Race	F-286
Prepare Report/Promote EEOC-Related Activities	F-286
Report on Progress Towards Glass Ceiling Commission Recommendations	F-286
Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity	F-287
Report on/Eliminate Use of Racial Stereotypes in Advertising	F-287
Gender, Race, or Ethnicity Pay Gap	F-287
Labor and Human Rights	F-288
Codes of Conduct and Vendor Standards	F-288
Adopt/Report on MacBride Principles	F-289
Community Impact Assessment/Indigenous Peoples’ Rights	F-289
Report on Risks of Outsourcing	F-290
Report on the Impact of Health Pandemics on Company Operations	F-290
Mandatory Arbitration	F-290

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Sexual Harassment	F-290
Operations in High Risk Markets	F-290
Reports on Operations in Burma/Myanmar	F-291
Reports on Operations in China	F-291
Product Sales to Repressive Regimes	F-292
Internet Privacy/Censorship and Data Security	F-292
Disclosure on Plant Closings	F-293
Climate Change	F-293
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals	F-293
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals	F-294
Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas Emissions	F-294
Invest in Clean/Renewable Energy	F-294
Energy Efficiency	F-295
Environment	F-295
Environmental/Sustainability Reports	F-295
Operations in Environmentally Sensitive Areas	F-296
Canadian Oil Sands	F-296
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge	F-296
Hydraulic Fracturing	F-297
Phase Out Chlorine-Based Chemicals	F-297
Land Procurement and Development	F-297
Report on the Sustainability of Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFO)	F-297
Adopt a Comprehensive Recycling Policy	F-298
Nuclear Energy	F-298
Water Use	F-298
Kyoto Protocol Compliance	F-298
Health and Safety	F-299
Toxic Materials	F-299
Product Safety	F-299
Workplace/Facility Safety	F-299
Report on Handgun Safety Initiatives	F-299
Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients	F-300
Tobacco-related Proposals	F-300
Adopt Policy/Report on Drug Pricing	F-301
Government and Military	F-301
Prepare Report to Renounce Future Landmine Production	F-301
Prepare Report on Foreign Military Sales	F-302
Depleted Uranium/Nuclear Weapons	F-302
Adopt Ethical Criteria for Weapons Contracts	F-302
Animal Welfare	F-302
Animal Rights/Testing	F-302
Political and Charitable Giving	F-303
Lobbying Efforts	F-303
Political Contributions/Non-Partisanship	F-303
Charitable Contributions	F-304
Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency	F-304
Disclosure on Prior Government Service	F-304

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Consumer Lending and Economic Development	F-305
Adopt Policy/Report on Predatory Lending Practices	F-305
Disclosure on Credit in Developing Countries (LDCs) or Forgive LDC Debt	F-305
Community Investing	F-305
Miscellaneous	F-306
Adult Entertainment	F-306
Abortion/Right to Life Issues	F-306
Anti-Social Proposals	F-306
Violence and Adult Themes in Video Games	F-306
Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors	F-307
9.    Mutual Fund Proxies	F-308
Election of Trustees and Directors	F-308
Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes	F-308
Investment Advisory Agreement	F-308
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Non-fundamental Restriction	F-308
Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Non-fundamental	F-308
Distribution Agreements	F-309
Approving New Classes or Series of Shares	F-309
Convert Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund	F-309
Proxy Contests	F-309
Preferred Stock Proposals	F-310
Mergers	F-310
Business Development Companies – Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value	F-310
Change in Fund’s Subclassification	F-310
Changing the Domicile of a Fund	F-310
Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation	F-310
Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval	F-311
Name Change Proposals	F-311
1940 Act Policies	F-311

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INTRODUCTION

ISS’ Catholic Advisory Services division recognizes that faith-based and other socially responsible investors have dual objectives: financial and social. Religious and socially responsible investors invest for economic gain, as do all investors, but they also require that companies in which they invest conduct their business in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.

The dual objectives carry through to proxy voting activity, after the security selection process is completed. In voting their shares, faith-based socially responsible institutional shareholders are concerned not only with sustainable economic returns to shareholders and good corporate governance, but also with the ethical behavior of corporations and the social and environmental impact of their actions.

Catholic Advisory Services has, therefore, developed faith-based proxy voting guidelines for Catholic and other Christian religious institutions that are consistent with the objectives of socially responsible shareholders as well as the teachings of Catholicism and Christianity as a whole. On matters of social and environmental impact, the guidelines seek to reflect a broad consensus of the faith-based socially responsible investing community. Generally, we take as our frame of reference policies and proposals promulgated by the Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral on economics, the Socially Responsible Investment Guidelines adopted by the Bishops, and the policies developed by members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR).

On matters of corporate governance, executive compensation, and corporate structure, these faith-based proxy voting guidelines are based on a commitment to create and preserve economic value and to advance principles of best practice corporate governance and shareholder rights, consistent with responsibilities to society and the environment as a whole.

The guidelines provide an overview of Catholic Advisory Services’ faith-based proxy voting policy for Catholic and other Christian denomination institutions. We note there may be cases in which the final vote recommendation varies from the vote guideline due to the fact that we closely examine the merits of each proposal and consider relevant information and company-specific circumstances in arriving at our decisions. These guidelines are revised on an annual basis to take into account emerging issues and trends on environmental, social and corporate governance topics, as well as the evolution of market standards, regulatory changes and client feedback.

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1.    Board of Directors

A corporation’s board of directors sits at the apogee of the corporate governance system. Though they normally delegate responsibility for the management of the business to the senior executives they select and oversee, directors bear ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the corporation’s business. The role of directors in publicly held corporations has undergone considerable change in recent years. Once derided as rubber stamps for management, directors of public corporations today are expected to serve as effective guardians of shareholders’ interests.

Voting on directors and board-related issues is the most important use of the shareholder franchise, not simply a routine proxy item. Although uncontested director elections do not present alternative nominees from whom to choose, a high percentage of opposition votes is an expression of shareholder dissatisfaction and should be sufficient to elicit a meaningful response from management.

The role and responsibilities of directors has increasingly been the subject of much discussion and debate, given the current economic climate and the difficulties many companies now face in their respective markets. Influential organizations, including the American Law Institute, the American Bar Association, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the Business Roundtable have issued reports and recommendations regarding the duties and accountability of corporate boards. Both mainstream and alternative media outlets have highlighted the numerous gaps within risk oversight of company boards and individual directors, and many institutional investors, in response, have capitalized on their rights as stakeholders to prompt changes. Corporations have taken notice, implementing many of the reforms championed by their shareholders.

Although differences of opinion remain, a fairly strong consensus has emerged on a number of key issues. It is widely agreed that the board’s most important responsibility is to ensure that the corporation is managed in the shareholders’ best long-term economic interest. This will often require boards to consider the impact of their actions on other constituencies, including employees, customers, local communities, and the environment.

§ The board’s principal functions are widely agreed to consist of the following:

§ To select, evaluate, and if necessary, replace management, including the chief executive officer;

§ To review and approve major strategies and financial objectives;

§ To advise management on significant issues;

§ To assure that effective controls are in place to safeguard corporate assets, manage risk, and comply with the law; and

§ To nominate directors and otherwise ensure that the board functions effectively.

Boards are expected to have a majority of directors independent of management. The independent directors are expected to organize much of the board’s work, even if the chief executive officer also serves as Chair of the board. Key committees of the board are expected to be entirely independent of management. It is expected that boards will engage in critical self-evaluation of themselves and of individual members. Individual directors, in turn, are expected to devote significant amounts of time to their duties, to limit the number of directorships they accept, and to own a meaningful amount of stock in companies on whose boards they serve. Directors are ultimately responsible to the corporation’s shareholders. The most direct expression of this responsibility is the requirement that directors be elected to their positions by the shareholders. Shareholders are also asked to vote on a number of other matters regarding the role, structure, and composition of the board. Catholic Advisory Services classifies directors as either executive, non-independent non-executive, or independent directors.

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Uncontested Election of Directors

Four broad principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:

1. Board Accountability: Accountability refers to the promotion of transparency into a company’s governance practices and annual board elections and the provision to shareholders the ability to remove problematic directors and to vote on takeover defenses or other charter/bylaw amendments. These practices help reduce the opportunity for management entrenchment.

2. Board Responsiveness: Directors should be responsive to shareholders, particularly in regard to shareholder proposals that receive a majority vote or management proposals that receive significant opposition and to tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered. Furthermore, shareholders should expect directors to devote sufficient time and resources to oversight of the company.

3. Director Independence: Without independence from management, the board may be unwilling or unable to effectively set company strategy and scrutinize performance or executive compensation.

4. Director Diversity/Competence: Companies should seek a diverse board of directors who can add value to the board through their specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees¹ considered on a case-by-case basis):

Board Accountability

Vote against² or withhold from the entire board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) for the following:

Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structure

Classified Board Structure: The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.

Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards: The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.

¹ A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question.

² In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use “Withhold” as the contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use “Against”. However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.

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Director Performance Evaluation: The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:

§ A classified board structure;

§ A supermajority vote requirements;

§ Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections, or a majority vote standard in contested elections;

§ The inability of shareholders to call special meetings;

§ The inability of shareholders to act by written consent;

§ A multi-class capital structure; and/or

§ A non-shareholder approved poison pill.

Poison Pills: Generally vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if:

§ The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature³;

§ The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or

§ The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders⁴ feature.

Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill. (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:

§ The disclosed rationale for the adoption;

§ The trigger;

§ The company’s market capitalization (including absolute level and sudden changes);

§ A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; and

§ Other factors as relevant.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments: Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:

§ The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;

§ Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;

§ The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;

§ The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ The company’s existing governance provisions;

§ The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and

§ Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

³ If a short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, Catholic Advisory Services will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption.

⁴ Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient.

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Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against directors (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board:

§ Classified the board;

§ Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws;

§ Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or

§ Adopted another provision deemed egregious.

Problematic Governance Structure: For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting⁵ of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights:

§ Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ A classified board structure; or

§ Other egregious provisions.

A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.

Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

Unequal Voting Rights: Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a common stock structure with unequal voting rights⁶.

Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:

§ Newly-public companies with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public;

§ Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs;

§ Situations where the super-voting shares represent less than 5% of total voting power and therefore considered to be de minimis; or

§ The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained.

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions: Vote against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board, where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

⁵ Includes companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

⁶ This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”).

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§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals: Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the governance committee if:

§ The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.

Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Generally continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Vote against/withhold from the members of the audit committee if:

§ The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive (see discussion under “Auditor Ratification);

§ The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or

§ There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote case-by-case on members of the audit committee and potentially the full board if:

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted.

Problematic Compensation Practices

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item, or, in egregious situations, vote against/withhold from members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

§ The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders;

§ The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or

§ The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.

Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.

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Problematic Pledging of Company Stock

Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:

§ The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;

§ The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;

§ Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;

§ Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and

§ Any other relevant factors.

Material Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Risk Oversight Failures

Vote against/withhold from directors individually, committee members, or potentially the entire board, due to:

§ Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight⁷, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately guard against or manage ESG risks;

§ A lack of sustainability reporting in the company’s public documents and/or website in conjunction with a failure to adequately manage or mitigate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks;

§ Failure to replace management as appropriate; or

§ Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero

For companies that are significant GHG emitters⁸, through its operations or value chain, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where Catholic Advisory Services determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory.

For 2023, minimum steps needed to be considered to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory are (all minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with policy):

§ The company has detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:

§ Board governance measures;

§ Corporate strategy;

§ Risk management analyses; and

§ Metrics and targets.

§ The company has declared a Net Zero target by 2050 or sooner and the target includes scope 1, 2, and relevant scope 3 emissions.

§ The company has set a medium-term target for reducing its GHG emissions.

⁷ Examples of failure of risk oversight include, but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant environmental incidents including spills and pollution; large scale or repeat workplace fatalities or injuries; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock.

⁸ For 2023, companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.

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Expectations about what constitutes “minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory” will increase over time.

Board Responsiveness

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

§ The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:

§ Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;

§ Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;

§ The subject matter of the proposal;

§ The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;

§ Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;

§ The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

§ The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;

§ At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Say on Pay proposal if:

§ The company’s previous say-on-pay received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast. Factors that will be considered are:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

§ The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.

Director Independence

Vote against/withhold from the entire board if the full board is less than majority independent.

Vote against/withhold from non-independent directors (Executive Directors and Non-Independent Non-Executive Directors per the Classification of Directors) when:

§ The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;

§ The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or

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§ The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.

Board Composition

Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except nominees who served only part of the fiscal year⁹) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:

§ Medical issues/illness;

§ Family emergencies; and

§ If the director’s total service was three meetings or fewer and the director missed only one meeting.

In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.

If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.

Overboarded Directors: Vote against or withhold from individual directors who:

§ Sit on more than five public company boards; or

§ Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own— withhold only at their outside boards¹⁰.

Board Diversity

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from incumbent nominees if:

§ The board is not comprised of at 40 percent underrepresented gender identities¹¹; or

§ The board is not comprised of at least 20 percent racially or ethnically diverse directors.

Vote against or withhold from other directors on a case-by-case basis.

⁹ Nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy.

¹⁰ Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Catholic Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

¹¹  Underrepresented gender identities include directors who identify as women or as non-binary.

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Classification of Directors – U.S.

  1. Executive Director

1.1. Current officerⁱ of the company or one of its affiliatesⁱⁱ.

  2. Non-Independent Non-Executive Director

Board Identification

2.1. Director identified as not independent by board.

Controlling/Significant Shareholder

2.2. Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group).

Current Employment at Company or Related Company

2.3. Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives).

2.4. Officerⁱ, former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company.

Former Employment

2.5. Former CEO of the company^iii,iv.

2.6. Former non-CEO officerⁱ of the company, or an affiliateⁱⁱ within the past five years.

2.7. Former officerⁱ of an acquired company within the past five years^iv.

2.8. Officerⁱ of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years.

2.9. Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made^v.

Family Members

2.10. Immediate family member^vi of a current or former officerⁱ of the company or its affiliatesⁱⁱ within the last five years.

2.11. Immediate family member^vi of a current employee of company or its affiliatesⁱⁱ where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role).

Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships

2.12. Director who (or whose immediate family member^vi) currently provides professional services^vii in excess of $10,000 per year to: the company, an affiliateⁱⁱ, or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; or who is (or whose immediate family member^vi is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services.

2.13. Director who (or whose immediate family member^vi ) currently has any material transactional relationship^viii with the company or its affiliatesⁱⁱ; or who is (or whose immediate family member^vi is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationship^viii (excluding investments in the company through a private placement).

2.14. Director who (or whose immediate family member^vi is) a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments^viii from the company or its affiliatesⁱⁱ.

Other Relationships

2.15. Party to a voting agreement^ix to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote.

2.16. Has (or an immediate family member^vi has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its compensation committee^x.

2.17. Founder^xi of the company but not currently an employee.

2.18. Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers.

2.19. Any material^xii relationship with the company.

  3. Independent Director

3.1. No material^xii connection to the company other than a board seat.

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Footnotes:

ⁱThe definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes: the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will generally be classified as a Non-Independent Non-Executive Director under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation exceeding $10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Director.

ⁱⁱ “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. Catholic Advisory Services uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.

ⁱⁱⁱ Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).

^iv When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, Catholic Advisory Services will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

^v Catholic Advisory Services will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. Catholic Advisory Services will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.

^vi “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

^vii Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include, but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; legal services; property management services; realtor services; lobbying services; executive search services; and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services; IT tech support services; educational services; and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of $10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.

^viii A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity exceeding the greater of $200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of $1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NYSE listing standards. In the case of a company which follows neither of the preceding standards, Catholic Advisory Services will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).

^ix Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as Independent Directors if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders’ interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

^x Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on each other’s boards and at least one serves on the other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).

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^xi The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, Catholic Advisory Services may deem him or her an Independent Director.

^xii For purposes of Catholic Advisory Services’ director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

Board-Related Management Proposals

Classification/Declassification of the Board

Under a classified board structure only one class of directors would stand for election each year, and the directors in each class would generally serve three-year terms. Although staggered boards can provide continuity for companies at the board level, there are also a number of downsides to the structure. First, a classified board can also be used to entrench management and effectively preclude most takeover bids or proxy contests. Board classification forces dissidents and would-be acquirers to negotiate with the incumbent board, which has the authority to decide on offers without a shareholder vote. In addition, when a board is classified, it is difficult to remove individual members for either poor attendance or poor performance; shareholders would only have the chance to vote on a given director every third year when he or she comes up for election. The classified board structure can also limit shareholders’ ability to withhold votes from inside directors that sit on key board committee, or to withhold votes from an entire board slate to protest the lack of board diversity. According to ISS’ 2012 Board Practices study, the number of S&P 500 companies with classified boards has continued to fall. In 2015, only 17 percent of S&P 500 companies maintained staggered boards, compared to 2 percent in 2014, 30 percent in 2013, 41 percent in 2009 and 53 percent in 2005. While we recognize that there are some advantages to classified boards, based on the latest studies on classified boards, the fact that classified boards can make it more difficult for shareholders to remove individual directors, and the fact that classified boards can be used as an antitakeover device, Catholic Advisory Services recommends against the adoption of classified boards.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.

§ Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board of directors.

Majority Vote Threshold for Director Elections

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections.

Vote against if no carve-out for plurality in contested elections is included.

Cumulative Voting

Most corporations provide that shareholders are entitled to cast one vote for each share owned. Under a cumulative voting scheme the shareholder is permitted to have one vote per share for each director to be elected. Shareholders are permitted to apportion those votes in any manner they wish among the director candidates. Shareholders have the opportunity to elect a minority representative to a board through cumulative voting, thereby ensuring representation for all sizes of shareholders. For example, if there is a company with a ten-member board and 500 shares outstanding—the total number of votes that may be cast is 5,000. In this case a shareholder with 51 shares (10.2 percent of the outstanding shares) would be guaranteed one board seat because all votes may be cast for one candidate.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulative voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting unless:

§ The company has proxy access¹², thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and

§ The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (insider voting power > 50%).

Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals on director and officer indemnification, liability protection, and exculpation¹³.

Consider the stated rationale for the proposed change. Also consider, among other factors, the extent to which the proposal would:

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care.

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of loyalty.

§ Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.

§ Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.

Vote for those proposals providing such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if both of the following apply:

§ If the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and

If only the individual’s legal expenses would be covered.

Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies

Shareholder ability to remove directors, with or without cause, is either prescribed by a state’s business corporation law, an individual company’s articles of incorporation, or its bylaws. Many companies have sought shareholder approval for charter or bylaw amendments that would prohibit the removal of directors except for cause, thus ensuring that directors would retain their directorship for their full-term unless found guilty of self-dealing. By requiring cause to be demonstrated through due process, management insulates the directors from removal even if a director has been performing poorly, not attending meetings, or not acting in the best interests of shareholders.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.

¹² A proxy access right that meets the recommended guidelines.

¹³ Indemnification: the condition of being secured against loss or damage.
Limited liability: a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff.
Exculpation: to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director or officer to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer.

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§ Vote for proposals to restore shareholder ability to remove directors with or without cause.

§ Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.

§ Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.

Board Size

Proposals which would allow management to increase or decrease the size of the board at its own discretion are often used by companies as a takeover defense. Catholic Advisory Services supports management proposals to fix the size of the board at a specific number, thus preventing management, when facing a proxy contest, from increasing the board size without shareholder approval. By increasing the size of the board, management can make it more difficult for dissidents to gain control of the board. Fixing the size of the board also prevents a reduction in the size of the board as a strategy to oust independent directors. Fixing board size also prevents management from increasing the number of directors in order to dilute the effects of cumulative voting.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals that seek to fix the size of the board.

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals that seek to change the size or range of the board.

§ Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board outside of a specific range without shareholder approval.

Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on how reasonable the criteria are and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

Board Refreshment

Board refreshment is best implemented through an ongoing program of individual director evaluations, conducted annually, to ensure the evolving needs of the board are met and to bring in fresh perspectives, skills, and diversity as needed.

Term/Tenure Limits

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals regarding director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit;

§ The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process;

§ Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures;

§ Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to non-independent directors; and

§ Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner.

Age Limits

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposal to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.

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Board-Related Shareholder Proposals/Initiatives

Proxy Contests/Proxy Access

Contested elections of directors frequently occur when a board candidate or slate runs for the purpose of seeking a significant change in corporate policy or control. Competing slates will be evaluated based upon the personal qualifications of the candidates, the economic impact of the policies that they advance, and their expressed and demonstrated commitment to the interests of all shareholders.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors:

§ Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry;

§ Management’s track record;

§ Background to the proxy contest;

§ Qualifications of director nominees (both slates);

§ Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;

§ Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates);

§ Stock ownership positions; and

§ Impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).

Annual Election (Declassification) of the Board

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to repeal classified (staggered) boards and to elect all directors annually.

Vote against proposals to classify the board.

Majority Threshold Voting Shareholder Proposals

A majority vote standard requires that for directors to be elected (or re-elected) to serve on the company’s board they must receive support from holders of a majority of shares voted. Shareholders have expressed strong support for shareholder proposals on majority threshold voting. Catholic Advisory Services believes shareholders should have a greater voice in the election of directors and believes majority threshold voting represents a viable alternative to the plurality system in the U.S. Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for precatory and binding resolutions requesting that the board change the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.

Majority of Independent Directors

Catholic Advisory Services believes that a board independent from management is of vital importance to a company and its shareholders. Accordingly, Catholic Advisory Services will cast votes in a manner that shall encourage the independence of boards.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed threshold by Catholic Advisory Services’ definition of independence (See Classification of Directors).

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to strengthen the definition of independence for board directors.

Establishment of Independent Committees

Most corporate governance experts agree that the key board committees (audit, compensation, and nominating/corporate governance) of a corporation should include only independent directors. The independence of key committees has been encouraged by regulation. Catholic Advisory Services believes that initiatives to increase the independent representation of these committees or to require that these committees be independent should be supported.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors.

Independent Board Chair

One of the principle functions of the board is to monitor and evaluate the performance of the CEO. The chairperson’s duty to oversee management is obviously compromised when he or she is required to monitor himself or herself; or when he or she is a non-independent director. Generally Catholic Advisory Services recommends a vote for shareholder proposals that would require that the position of board chair be held by an individual with no materials ties to the company other than their board seat.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that would require the board chair to be independent of management.

Establishment of Board Committees

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee to address broad corporate policy topics or to provide a forum for ongoing dialogue on issues such as the environment, human or labor rights, shareholder relations, occupational health and safety etc. when the formation of such committees appears to be a potentially effective method of protecting or enhancing shareholder value. In evaluating such proposals, the following factors will be considered:

§ Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

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Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee candidate who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:

§ The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;

§ The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Board Policy on Shareholder Engagement

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholders proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:

§ Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board;

§ Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;

§ The company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and

§ The company has an independent chair or a lead director (according to Catholic Advisory Services’ definition). This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.

Proxy Access

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:

§ Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power;

§ Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group;

§ Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group;

§ Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board.

Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access.

Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

Board Refreshment

Term/Tenure Limits

Supporters of term limits argue that this requirement would bring new ideas and approaches to a board. However, we prefer to look at directors and their contributions to the board individually rather than impose a strict rule.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for the company to adopt director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The scope of the shareholder proposal; and

§ Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment.

Age Limits

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.

CEO Succession Planning

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering at a minimum, the following factors:

§ The reasonableness/scope of the request; and

§ The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.

Vote No Campaigns

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.

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2.    Ratification of Auditors

Annual election of the outside accountants is best practice standard. While it is recognized that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside accountants, we believe that outside accountants must ultimately be accountable to shareholders. A Blue Ribbon Commission report concluded that audit committees must improve their current level of oversight of independent accountants. Given the rash of accounting misdeeds that were not detected by audit panels or auditors, shareholder ratification is an essential step in restoring investor confidence. Shareholders should have the right to weigh in on the choice of the audit firm, and all companies should put ratification on the ballot of their annual meeting. Special consideration will be given when non-audit fees exceed audit fees, as high non-audit fees can compromise the independence of the auditor. Catholic Advisory Services will also monitor both auditor tenure and whether auditor ratification has been pulled from the ballot.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to ratify auditors, unless any of the following apply:

§ The non-audit fees paid represent 25 percent or more of the total fees paid to the auditor;

§ An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;

§ There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position; or

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures.

Auditor-Related Shareholder Proposals

Ratify Auditors/Ensure Auditor Independence

These shareholder proposals request that the board allow shareholders to ratify the company’s auditor at each annual meeting. Annual ratification of the outside accountants is standard practice. While it is recognized that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside accountants, we believe that outside accountants must ultimately be accountable to shareholders.

Given the rash of accounting irregularities that were not detected by audit panels or auditors, shareholder ratification is an essential step in restoring investor confidence. Catholic Advisory Services believes that shareholders should have the ability to ratify the auditor on an annual basis.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to allow shareholders to vote on auditor ratification.

§ Vote for proposals that ask a company to adopt a policy on auditor independence.

§ Vote for proposals that seek to limit the non-audit services provided by the company’s auditor.

Auditor Rotation

To minimize any conflict of interest that may rise between the company and its auditor, Catholic Advisory Services supports the rotation of auditors. Currently, SEC rules provide that partners should be rotated every five years. However, Catholic Advisory Services also believes that the long tenure of audit firms at U.S. companies can be problematic.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to rotate company’s auditor every five years or more. Catholic Advisory Services believes that proposing a rotation period less than five years is unreasonably restrictive and may negatively affect audit quality and service while increasing expense.

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3.    Takeover Defenses / Shareholder Rights

Corporate takeover attempts come in various guises. Usually, a would-be acquirer makes a direct offer to the board of directors of a targeted corporation. The bidder may offer to purchase the company for cash and/or stock. If the board approves the offer, a friendly transaction is completed and presented to shareholders for approval. If, however, the board of directors rejects the bid, the acquirer can make a tender offer for the shares directly to the targeted corporation’s shareholders. Such offers are referred to as hostile tender bids.

Not wishing to wait until they are subjects of hostile takeover attempts, many corporations have adopted antitakeover measures designed to deter unfriendly bids or buy time. The most common defenses are the shareholders rights protection plan, also known as the poison pill, and charter amendments that create barriers to acceptance of hostile bids. In the U.S., poison pills do not require shareholder approval. However, shareholders must approve charter amendments, such as classified boards or supermajority vote requirements. In brief, the very existence of defensive measures can foreclose the possibility of tenders and hence, opportunities to premium prices for shareholders.

Anti-takeover statutes generally increase management’s potential for insulating itself and warding off hostile takeovers that may be beneficial to shareholders. While it may be true that some boards use such devices to obtain higher bids and to enhance shareholder value, it is more likely that such provisions are used to entrench management. The majority of historical evidence on individual corporate anti-takeover measures indicates that heavily insulated companies generally realize lower returns than those having managements that are more accountable to shareholders and the market. The evidence also suggests that when states adopt their own anti-takeover devices, or endorse those employed by firms, shareholder returns are harmed. Moreover, the body of evidence appears to indicate that companies in states with the strongest anti-takeover laws experience lower returns than they would absent such statutes.

Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Management Proposals

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Poison pills are corporate-sponsored financial devices that, when triggered by potential acquirers, do one or more of the following: 1) dilute the acquirer’s equity holdings in the target company; 2) dilute the acquirer’s voting interests in the target company; or 3) dilute the acquirer’s equity holdings in the post-merger company. Poison pills generally allow shareholders to purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company (flip-in pill) and/or the potential acquirer (flip-out pill) at a price far out of line with fair market value. Depending on the type of pill, the triggering event can either transfer wealth from the target company or dilute the equity holdings of current shareholders. Poison pills insulate management from the threat of a change in control and provide the target board with veto power over takeover bids. Because poison pills greatly alter the balance of power between shareholders and management, shareholders should be allowed to make their own evaluation of such plans.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:

§ No lower than a 20 percent trigger, flip-in or flip-over provision;

§ A term of no more than three years;

§ No deadhand, slowhand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;

§ Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill; and

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§ In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments

The financial crisis has prompted widespread losses in certain industries. This has resulted in previously profitable companies considering the adoption of a poison pill and/or NOL protective amendment to protect their NOL tax assets, which may be lost upon an acquisition of 5 percent of a company’s shares.

When evaluating management proposals seeking to adopt NOL pills or protective amendments, the purpose behind the proposal, its terms, and the company’s existing governance structure should be taken into account to assess whether the structure actively promotes board entrenchment or adequately protects shareholder rights. While Catholic Advisory Services acknowledges the high estimated tax value of NOLs, which benefit shareholders, the ownership acquisition limitations contained in an NOL pill/protective amendment coupled with a company’s problematic governance structure could serve as an antitakeover device.

Given the fact that shareholders will want to ensure that such an amendment does not remain in effect permanently, Catholic Advisory Services will also closely review whether the pill/amendment contains a sunset provision or a commitment to cause the expiration of the NOL pill/protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOLs.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5%);

§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);

§ The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing five-percent holder);

§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);

§ The company‘s existing governance structure including; board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns;

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

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Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.

In addition, voting against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirements

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change at a company.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to reduce supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations. For companies with shareholder(s) who own a significant amount of company stock, vote case-by-case, taking into account: a) ownership structure; b) quorum requirements; and c) supermajority vote requirements.

§ Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations.

Shareholder Ability to Call a Special Meeting

Most state corporation statutes allow shareholders to call a special meeting when they want to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly scheduled annual meetings. Sometimes this right applies only if a shareholder or a group of shareholders own a specified percentage of shares, with 10 percent being the most common. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account: a) shareholders’ current right to call special meetings; b) minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred); c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; d) investor ownership structure; and e) shareholder support of and management’s response to previous shareholder proposals.

§ Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.

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Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

Consent solicitations allow shareholders to vote on and respond to shareholder and management proposals by mail without having to act at a physical meeting. A consent card is sent by mail for shareholder approval and only requires a signature for action. Some corporate bylaws require supermajority votes for consents while at others, standard annual meeting rules apply. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to take action by written consent.

§ Vote for proposals to allow or facilitate shareholder action by written consent, taking into consideration: a) shareholders’ current right to act by written consent; b) consent threshold; c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; d) Investor ownership structure; and e) shareholder support of and management’s response to previous shareholder proposals.

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions; a) an unfettered¹⁴ right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold; b) a majority vote standard in uncontested director elections; c) no non-shareholder-approved pill, and; d) an annually elected board.

Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations

In 2008, the Delaware courts handed down two decisions, which, read together, indicate a judicial move toward a narrower interpretation of companies’ advance notice bylaws. These recent court decisions have encouraged companies to take a closer look at their bylaw provisions to ensure that broad language does not provide loopholes for activist investors. Specifically, companies are including language designed to provide more detailed advance notice provisions and to ensure full disclosure of economic and voting interests in a shareholder’s notice of proposals, including derivatives and hedged positions.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory and shareholder review.

To be reasonable, the company’s deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/ nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year’s meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120 day window). The submittal window is the period under which a shareholder must file their proposals/nominations prior to the deadline.

In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent’s economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.

¹⁴ “Unfettered” means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.

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Fair Price Provisions

Fair price provisions were originally designed to specifically defend against the most coercive of takeover devises, the two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer. In such a hostile takeover, the bidder offers cash for enough shares to gain control of the target. At the same time the acquirer states that once control has been obtained, the target’s remaining shares will be purchased with cash, cash and securities or only securities. Since the payment offered for the remaining stock is, by design less valuable than the original offer for the controlling shares, shareholders are forced to sell out early to maximize their value. Standard fair price provisions require that, absent board or shareholder approval of the acquisition, the bidder must pay the remaining shareholders the same price for their shares that brought control.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.

§ Generally, vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.

Greenmail

Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of shares, the practice discriminates against most shareholders. This transferred cash, absent the greenmail payment, could be put to much better use for reinvestment in the company, payment of dividends, or to fund a public share repurchase program.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to adopt antigreenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.

§ Review on a case-by-case basis antigreenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.

Confidential Voting

Confidential voting, or voting by secret ballot, is one of the key structural issues in the proxy system. It ensures that all votes are based on the merits of proposals and cast in the best interests of fiduciary clients and pension plan beneficiaries. In a confidential voting system, only vote tabulators and inspectors of election may examine individual proxies and ballots; management and shareholders are given only vote totals. In an open voting system, management can determine who has voted against its nominees or proposals and then re-solicit those votes before the final vote count. As a result, shareholders can be pressured to vote with management at companies with which they maintain, or would like to establish, a business relationship. Confidential voting also protects employee shareholders from retaliation. Shares held by employee stock ownership plans, for example, are important votes that are typically voted by employees.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to adopt confidential voting.

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Control Share Acquisition Provisions

Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.

§ Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

§ Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.

Control Share Cash-Out Provisions

Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to “cash-out” of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.

Disgorgement Provisions

Disgorgement provisions require an acquirer or potential acquirer of more than a certain percentage of a company’s stock to disgorge, or pay back, to the company any profits realized from the sale of that company’s stock purchased 24 months before achieving control status. All sales of company stock by the acquirer occurring within a certain period of time (between 18 months and 24 months) prior to the investor’s gaining control status are subject to these recapture-of-profits provisions.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.

State Takeover Statutes

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freezeout provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, antigreenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions).

Vote for opting into stakeholder protection statutes if they provide comprehensive protections for employees and community stakeholders. Catholic Advisory Services would be less supportive of takeover statutes that only serve to protect incumbent management from accountability to shareholders and which negatively influence shareholder value.

Freeze-Out Provisions

Freeze-out provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions.

Reincorporation Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

§ Reasons for reincorporation;

§ Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation;

§ Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Reincorporations into “tax havens” will be given special consideration.

While a firm’s country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, Catholic Advisory Services will generally apply U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on country of incorporation.

Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.

Vote for proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders.

Shareholder Litigation Rights

Federal Forum Selection Provisions

Federal forum selection provisions require that U.S. federal courts be the sole forum for shareholders to litigate claims arising under federal securities law.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify “the district courts of the United States” as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

Vote against provisions that restrict the forum to a particular federal district court; unilateral adoption (without a shareholder vote) of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters

Exclusive forum provisions in the charter or bylaws restrict shareholders’ ability to bring derivative lawsuits against the company, for claims arising out of state corporate law, to the courts of a particular state (generally the state of incorporation).

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the state of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

For states other than Delaware, vote case-by-case on exclusive forum provisions, taking into consideration:

§ The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision;

§ Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum;

§ The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and

§ Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or the bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.

Generally vote against provisions that specify a state other than the state of incorporation as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters, or that specify a particular local court within the state; unilateral adoption of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Fee Shifting

Fee-shifting provisions in the charter or bylaws require that a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation and its directors and officers.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against provisions that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).

Unilateral adoption of a fee-shifting provision will generally be considered an ongoing failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Shareholder Proposals

Shareholder Proposals to put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: 1) a shareholder approved poison pill in place; or 2) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:

§ Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or

§ The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.

If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.

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Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirements

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations.

Remove Antitakeover Provisions

There are numerous antitakeover mechanisms available to corporations that can make takeovers prohibitively expensive for a bidder or at least guarantee that all shareholders are treated equally. The debate over antitakeover devices centers on whether these devices enhance or detract from shareholder value. One theory argues that a company’s board, when armed with these takeover protections, may use them as negotiating tools to obtain a higher premium for shareholders. The opposing view maintains that managements afforded such protection are more likely to become entrenched than to actively pursue the best interests of shareholders. Such takeover defenses also serve as obstacles to the normal functioning of the marketplace which, when operating efficiently, should replace incapable and poorly performing managements.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to remove antitakeover provisions.

Reimburse Proxy Solicitation Expenses

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:

§ The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;

§ One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected;

§ Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors;

§ The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only¹⁵ meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.

¹⁵ Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.

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Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:

§ Scope and rationale of the proposal; and

§ Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.

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4.    Miscellaneous Governance Provisions

Bundled Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Review on a case-by-case basis bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances where the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.

Adjourn Meeting

Companies may ask shareholders to adjourn a meeting in order to solicit more votes. Generally, shareholders already have enough information to make their vote decisions. Once their votes have been cast, there is no justification for spending more money to continue pressing shareholders for more votes.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.

§ Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction. Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.”

Changing Corporate Name

Proposals to change a company’s name are generally routine matters. Generally, the name change reflects a change in corporate direction or the result of a merger agreement.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for changing the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely affect shareholder value.

Amend Quorum Requirements

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration:

§ The new quorum threshold requested;

§ The rationale presented for the reduction;

§ The market capitalization of the company (size, inclusion in indices);

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ Previous voter turnout or attempts to achieve quorum;

§ Any provisions or commitments to restore quorum to a majority of shares outstanding, should voter turnout improve sufficiently; and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

In general, a quorum threshold kept as close to a majority of shares outstanding as is achievable is preferred.

Vote case-by-case on directors who unilaterally lower the quorum requirements below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration the factors listed above.

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Amend Minor Bylaws

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).

Other Business

Other business proposals are routine items to allow shareholders to raise other issues and discuss them at the meeting. Only issues that may be legally discussed at meetings may be raised under this authority. However, shareholders cannot know the content of these issues so they are generally not supported.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against other business proposals.

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5.    Capital Structure

The equity in a corporate enterprise (that is, the residual value of the company’s assets after the payment of all debts) belongs to the shareholders. Equity securities may be employed, or manipulated, in a manner that will ultimately enhance or detract from shareholder value. As such, certain actions undertaken by management in relation to a company’s capital structure can be of considerable significance to shareholders. Changes in capitalization usually require shareholder approval or ratification.

Common Stock Authorization

State statutes and stock exchanges require shareholder approval for increases in the number of common shares. Corporations increase their supply of common stock for a variety of ordinary business purposes: raising new capital, funding stock compensation programs, business acquisitions, and implementation of stock splits or payment of stock dividends.

General Authorization Requests

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

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Specific Authorization Requests

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).

Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Catholic Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Reverse Stock Splits

Reverse splits exchange multiple shares for a lesser amount to increase share price. Increasing share price is sometimes necessary to restore a company’s share price to a level that will allow it to be traded on the national stock exchanges. In addition, some brokerage houses have a policy of not monitoring or investing in very low priced shares. Reverse stock splits help maintain stock liquidity.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:

§ The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or

§ The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Catholic Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;

§ Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;

§ The company’s rationale; or

§ Other factors as applicable.

Preferred Stock Authorization

Preferred stock is an equity security which has certain features similar to debt instruments, such as fixed dividend payments, seniority of claims to common stock, and in most cases no voting rights. The terms of blank check

preferred stock give the board of directors the power to issue shares of preferred stock at their discretion—with voting rights, conversion, distribution and other rights to be determined by the board at time of issue. Blank check preferred

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stock can be used for sound corporate purposes, but could be used as a device to thwart hostile takeovers without shareholder approval.

General Authorization Requests

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are used for general corporate services:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

§ If no preferred shares are currently issued and outstanding, vote against the request, unless the company discloses a specific use for the shares.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;¹⁶

§ The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”);

§ The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they’re convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders;

§ The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

¹⁶ To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan.

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For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

Specific Authorization Requests

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Blank Check Preferred Stock

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend distribution, and other rights (“blank check” preferred stock).

§ Vote against proposals to increase the number of blank check preferred stock authorized for issuance when no shares have been issued or reserved for a specific purpose.

§ Vote for proposals to create “declawed” blank check preferred stock (stock that cannot be used as a takeover defense).

§ Vote for requests to require shareholder approval for blank check authorizations.

Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock

Stock that has a fixed per share value that is on its certificate is called par value stock. The purpose of par value stock is to establish the maximum responsibility of a stockholder in the event that a corporation becomes insolvent. Proposals to reduce par value come from certain state level requirements for regulated industries such as banks, and other legal requirements relating to the payment of dividends.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.

§ Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value.

Unequal Voting Rights/Dual Class Structure

Incumbent managers use unequal voting rights with the voting rights of their common shares superior to other shareholders in order to concentrate their power and insulate themselves from the wishes of the majority of shareholders. Dual class exchange offers involve a transfer of voting rights from one group of shareholders to another group of shareholders typically through the payment of a preferential dividend. A dual class recapitalization also establishes two classes of common stock with unequal voting rights, but initially involves an equal distribution of preferential and inferior voting shares to current shareholders.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:

§ The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, including: a) the company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or b) the new class of shares will be transitory;

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§ The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term;

§ The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.

Preemptive Rights

Preemptive rights permit shareholders to share proportionately in any new issues of stock of the same class. These rights guarantee existing shareholders the first opportunity to purchase shares of new issues of stock in the same class as their own and in the same proportion. The absence of these rights could cause stockholders’ interest in a company to be reduced by the sale of additional shares without their knowledge and at prices unfavorable to them. Preemptive rights, however, can make it difficult for corporations to issue large blocks of stock for general corporate purposes. Both corporations and shareholders benefit when corporations are able to arrange issues without preemptive rights that do not result in a substantial transfer of control.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to create or abolish preemptive rights. In evaluating proposals on preemptive rights, we look at the size of a company, the characteristics of its shareholder base and the liquidity of the stock.

Debt Restructurings

Proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt-restructuring plan will be analyzed considering the following issues:

§ Dilution: How much will the ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be?

§ Change in Control: Will the transaction result in a change in control/management at the company? Are board and committee seats guaranteed? Do standstill provisions and voting agreements exist? Is veto power over certain corporate actions in place?

§ Financial Issues: company’s financial situation, degree of need for capital, use of proceeds, and effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Terms of the offer: discount/premium in purchase price to investor including any fairness opinion, termination penalties and exit strategy;

§ Conflict of interest: arm’s length transactions and managerial incentives;

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Review on a case-by-case basis proposals regarding debt restructurings.

§ Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Share Repurchase Programs

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:

§ Greenmail,

§ The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics,

§ Threats to the company’s long-term viability, or

§ Other company-specific factors as warranted.

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Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.

Conversion of Securities

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities, taking into account the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.

Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Recapitalization

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account:

§ Whether the capital structure is simplified;

§ Liquidity is enhanced;

§ Fairness of conversion terms;

§ Impact on voting power and dividends;

§ Reasons for the reclassification;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives considered.

Tracking Stock

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as:

§ Adverse governance changes;

§ Excessive increases in authorized capital stock;

§ Unfair method of distribution;

§ Diminution of voting rights;

§ Adverse conversion features;

§ Negative impact on stock option plans;

§ Alternatives such as spin-offs.

Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 20 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.

For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.

Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.

Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.

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6.    Executive and Director Compensation

The global financial crisis resulted in significant erosion of shareholder value and highlighted the need for greater assurance that executive compensation is principally performance-based, fair, reasonable, and not designed in a manner that would incentivize excessive risk-taking by managements. The financial crisis raised questions about the role of pay incentives in influencing executive behavior and motivating inappropriate or excessive risk-taking that could threaten a corporation’s long-term viability. The safety lapses that led to the disastrous explosions at BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig and Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine, and the resulting unprecedented losses in shareholder value; a) underscore the importance of incorporating meaningful economic incentives around social and environmental considerations in compensation program design, and b) exemplify the costly liabilities of failing to do so.

Evolving disclosure requirements have opened a wider window into compensation practices and processes, giving shareholders more opportunity and responsibility to ensure that pay is designed to create and sustain value. Companies in the U.S. are now required to evaluate and discuss potential risks arising from misguided or misaligned compensation programs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation (management “say on pay”), an advisory vote on the frequency of say on pay, as well as a shareholder advisory vote on golden parachute compensation. The advent of “say on pay” votes for shareholders in the U.S. has provided a new communication mechanism and impetus for constructive engagement between shareholders and managers/directors on pay issues.

The socially responsible investing community contends that corporations should be held accountable for their actions and decisions, including those around executive compensation. Catholic Advisory Services believes that executive pay programs should be fair, competitive, reasonable, and create appropriate incentives, and that pay for performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. Most investors expect corporations to adhere to certain best practice pay considerations in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs, including:

§ Appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: executive pay practices must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. Evaluating appropriate alignment of pay incentives with shareholder value creation includes taking into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance, the mix between fixed and variable pay, equity-based plan costs, and performance goals - including goals tied to social and environmental considerations.

§ Avoiding arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: this includes assessing the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, guaranteed compensation, and practices or policies that fail to adequately mitigate against or address environmental, social and governance failures.

§ Independent and effective compensation committees: oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed) should be promoted.

§ Clear and comprehensive compensation disclosures: shareholders expect companies to provide informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly.

§ Avoiding inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: compensation to outside directors should not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, this may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.

A non-exhaustive list of best pay practices includes:

§ Employment contracts: Companies should enter into employment contracts under limited circumstances for a short time period (e.g., new executive hires for a three-year contract) for limited executives. The contracts should not have automatic renewal feature and should have a specified termination date.

§ Severance agreements: Severance provisions should not be so appealing that it becomes an incentive for the executive to be terminated. Severance provisions should exclude excise tax gross-up. The severance formula should

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be reasonable and not overly generous to the executive (e.g., severance multiples of 1X, 2X, or 3X and use pro-rated target/average historical bonus and not maximum bonus). Failure to renew employment contract, termination under questionable events, or poor performance should not be considered as appropriate reasons for severance payments.

§ Change-in-control payments: Change-in-control payments should only be made when there is a significant change in company ownership structure, and when there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties associated with the change in company ownership structure (“double-triggered”). Change-in-control provisions should exclude excise tax gross-up and eliminate the acceleration of vesting of equity awards upon a change in control unless provided under a double-trigger scenario. Similarly, change in control provisions in equity plans should be double-triggered. A change in control event should not result in an acceleration of vesting of all unvested stock options or removal of vesting/performance requirements on restricted stock/performance shares, unless there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties.

§ Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs): SERPS should not include sweeteners that can increase the SERP value significantly or even exponentially, such as additional years of service credited for pension calculation, inclusion of variable pay (e.g. bonuses and equity awards) into the formula. Pension formula should not include extraordinary annual bonuses paid close to retirement years, and should be based on the average, not the maximum level of compensation earned.

§ Deferred compensation: Above-market returns or guaranteed minimum returns should not be applied on deferred compensation.

§ Disclosure practices: The Compensation Discussion & Analysis should be written in plain English, with as little “legalese” as possible and formatted using section headers, bulleted lists, tables, and charts where possible to ease reader comprehension. Ultimately, the document should provide detail and rationale regarding compensation, strategy, pay mix, goals/metrics, challenges, competition and pay for performance linkage, etc. in a narrative fashion.

§ Responsible use of company stock: Companies should adopt policies that prohibit executives from speculating in company’s stock or using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps or other similar arrangements. Such behavior undermines the ultimate alignment with long-term shareholders’ interests. In addition, the policy should prohibit or discourage the use of company stock as collateral for margin loans, to avoid any potential sudden stock sales (required upon margin calls), that could have a negative impact on the company’s stock price.

§ Long-term focus: Executive compensation programs should be designed to support companies’ long-term strategic goals. A short-term focus on performance does not necessarily create sustainable shareholder value, since long-term goals may be sacrificed to achieve short-term expectations. Compensation programs embedding a long-term focus with respect to company goals better align with the long-term interests of shareholders. Granting stock options and restricted stock to executives that vest in five years do not necessarily provide a long-term focus, as executives can sell the company shares once they vest. However, requiring senior executives to hold company stock until they retire can encourage a long-term focus on company performance.

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Criteria for Evaluating Executive Pay

Pay-for-Performance Evaluation

Catholic Advisory Services conducts a five-part pay analysis to evaluate the degree of alignment between the CEO’s pay with the company’s performance over a sustained period. From a shareholders’ perspective, performance is predominantly gauged by the company’s stock performance over time. Even when financial, non-financial or operational measures are utilized in incentive awards, the achievement related to these measures should ultimately translate into superior shareholder returns in the long-term. With respect to companies in the S&P1500, Russell 3000 index or Russel 3000E Indices¹⁷ , this analysis considers the following:

Pay-for-Performance Elements

§ The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period,¹⁸ and the rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ Absolute Alignment: The absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years –i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.¹⁹

§ Equity Pay Mix: The ratio of the CEO’s performance- vs. time-based equity awards.

Pay Equity (Quantum) Elements

§ Multiple of Median: The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.

§ Internal Pay Disparity: The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to other named executive officers (NEOs) –i.e., an excessive differential between CEO total pay and that of the next highest-paid NEO as well as CEO total pay relative to the average NEO pay.

If the above pay-for-performance analysis demonstrates unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of non-Russell 3000 index companies, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, the following qualitative factors will be evaluated to determine how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

§ The ratio of performance-based compensation to overall compensation, including whether any relevant social or environmental factors are a component of performance-contingent pay elements;

§ The presence of significant environmental, social or governance (ESG) controversies that have the potential to pose material risks to the company and its shareholders;

§ Any downward discretion applied to executive compensation on the basis of a failure to achieve performance goals, including ESG performance objectives;

§ The completeness of disclosure and rigor of performance goals;

§ The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;

§ Actual results of financial/non-financial and operational metrics, such as growth in revenue, profit, cash flow, workplace safety, environmental performance, etc., both absolute and relative to peers;

§ Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards);

¹⁷ The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.

¹⁸ The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are closest to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry and also within a market cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s.

¹⁹ Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.

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§ Realizable pay compared to grant pay; and

§ Any other factors deemed relevant.

Problematic Pay Practices

Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:

§ Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;

§ Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and

§ Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements.

The list of examples below highlights certain problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:

§ Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);

§ Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups);

§ New or materially amended agreements that provide for:

§ Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus);

§ CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition;

§ CIC excise tax gross-up entitlements (including “modified” gross-ups);

§ Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions;

§ Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;

§ Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible;

§ Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason);

§ E&S Incentives: A lack of any LTI and STI performance metrics and/or a lack of disclosure on LTI and STI performance metrics related to E&S criteria.

§ Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors.

The above examples are not an exhaustive list. Please refer to the U.S. Compensation Policies FAQ document for additional detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as problematic and may lead to negative vote recommendations.

Options Backdating

The following factors should be examined on a case-by-case basis to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud, as well as those instances in which companies that subsequently took corrective action. Cases where companies have committed fraud are considered most egregious.

§ Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;

§ Duration of options backdating;

§ Size of restatement due to options backdating;

§ Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants;

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§ Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.

Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness

Consider the following factors on a case-by-case basis when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

§ Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or

§ Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation- Management Proposals (Management Say on Pay)

The Dodd-Frank Act mandates advisory votes on executive compensation (Say on Pay) for a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders that includes required SEC compensation disclosures. This non-binding shareholder vote on compensation must be included in a proxy or consent or authorization at least once every three years.

In general, the Say on Pay ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices – dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against the Say on Pay proposal rather than voting against or withhold from the compensation committee. However, if there is no Say on Pay on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior Say on Pay proposal, then Catholic Advisory Services will recommend vote against or withhold votes from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then a vote against an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval may be appropriate. In evaluating Say on Pay proposals, Catholic Advisory Services will also assess to what degree social and environmental considerations are incorporated into compensation programs and executive pay decision-making – to the extent that proxy statement Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosures permit.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a case-by-case basis.

§ Vote against management Say on Pay (“SOP”) proposals if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay-for-performance);

§ The company maintains problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

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§ Vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP is warranted due to pay-for-performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;

§ The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;

§ The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating; or

§ The situation is egregious.

§ Vote against an equity plan on the ballot if:

§ A pay for performance misalignment exists, and a significant portion of the CEO’s misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, taking into consideration:

§ Magnitude of pay misalignment;

§ Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and

§ The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer (NEO) level.

Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay

The Dodd-Frank Act, in addition to requiring advisory votes on compensation, requires that each proxy for the first annual or other meeting of the shareholders (that includes required SEC compensation disclosures) occurring after Jan. 21, 2011, include an advisory voting item to determine whether, going forward, the “say on pay” vote by shareholders to approve compensation should occur every one, two, or three years.

Catholic Advisory Services will recommend a vote for annual advisory votes on compensation. The SOP is at its essence a communication vehicle, and communication is most useful when it is received in a consistent and timely manner. Catholic Advisory Services supports an annual SOP vote for many of the same reasons it supports annual director elections rather than a classified board structure: because this provides the highest level of accountability and direct communication by enabling the SOP vote to correspond to the majority of the information presented in the accompanying proxy statement for the applicable shareholders’ meeting. Having SOP votes every two or three years, covering all actions occurring between the votes, would make it difficult to create the meaningful and coherent communication that the votes are intended to provide. Under triennial elections, for example, a company would not know whether the shareholder vote references the compensation year being discussed or a previous year, making it more difficult to understand the implications of the vote.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.

Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

This is a proxy item regarding specific advisory votes on “golden parachute” arrangements for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) that is required under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Catholic Advisory Services places particular focus on severance packages that provide inappropriate windfalls and cover certain tax liabilities of executives.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or extended arrangements.

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Features that may result in an against recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):

§ Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;

§ Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;

§ Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control;

§ Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale;

§ Excessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus);

§ Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable;

§ Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or

§ Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or

§ The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.

Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s advisory vote on compensation (“management “say on pay”), Catholic Advisory Services will evaluate the “say on pay” proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

Equity-Based Incentive Plans

As executive pay levels continue to soar, non-salary compensation remains one of the most sensitive and visible corporate governance issues. The financial crisis raised questions about the role of pay incentives in influencing executive behavior, including their appetite for risk-taking. Although shareholders may have little say about how much the CEO is paid in salary and bonus, they do have a major voice in approving stock incentive plans.

Stock-based plans can transfer significant amounts of wealth from shareholders to executives and directors and are among the most economically significant issues that shareholders are entitled to vote on. Rightly, the cost of these plans must be in line with the anticipated benefits to shareholders. Clearly, reasonable limits must be set on dilution as well as administrative authority. In addition, shareholders must consider the necessity of the various pay programs and examine the appropriateness of award types. Consequently, the pros and cons of these proposals necessitate a case-by-case evaluation.

Factors that increase the cost (or have the potential to increase the cost) of plans to shareholders include: excessive dilution, options awarded at below-market discounts, permissive policies on pyramiding, restricted stock giveaways that reward tenure rather than results, sales of shares on concessionary terms, blank-check authority for administering committees, option repricing or option replacements, accelerated vesting of awards in the event of defined changes in corporate control, stand-alone stock appreciation rights, loans or other forms of assistance, or evidence of improvident award policies.

Positive plan features that can offset costly features include: plans with modest dilution potential (i.e. appreciably below double-digit levels), bars to pyramiding and related safeguards for investor interests. Also favorable are performance programs with a duration of two or more years, bonus schemes that pay off in non-dilutive, fully deductible cash, 401K and other thrift or profit sharing plans, and tax-favored employee stock purchase plans. In general, we believe that stock plans should afford incentives, not sure-fire, risk-free rewards.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on certain equity-based compensation plans²⁰ depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “Equity Plan Scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:

§ Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:

§ SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and

§ SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.

§ Plan Features:

§ Quality of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC);

§ Discretionary vesting authority;

§ Liberal share recycling on various award types;

§ Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;

§ Dividends payable prior to award vesting.

§ Grant Practices:

§ The company’s three year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;

§ Vesting requirements in CEO’s recent equity grants (3-year look-back);

§ The estimated duration of the plan based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years;

§ The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;

§ Whether the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy;

§ Whether the company maintains sufficient post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following (“overriding factors”) apply:

§ Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

§ The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies -- or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies);

§ The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a pay-for-performance disconnect; or

§ The plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings;

§ The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or

§ Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.

Each of these factors is described below.

Generally vote against equity plans if the cost is unreasonable. For non-employee director plans, vote for the plan if certain factors are met.

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CERTAIN EPSC FACTORS:

Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)

The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors. SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types. See discussion of specific types of awards.

²⁰ Proposals evaluated under the EPSC policy generally include those to approve or amend (1) stock option plans for employees and/or employees and directors, (2) restricted stock plans for employees and/or employees and directors, and (3) omnibus stock incentive plans for employees and/or employees and directors.

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Except for proposals subject to Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company’s benchmark.²¹

Repricing Provisions

Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. “Repricing” includes the ability to do any of the following:

§ Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs;

§ Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs;

§ The cancellation of underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or

§ Cash buyouts of underwater options.

While the above cover most types of repricing, Catholic Advisory Services may view other provisions as akin to repricing depending on the facts and circumstances.

Also, vote against or withhold from members of the compensation committee who approved repricing (as defined above or otherwise determined by Catholic Advisory Services) without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.

Vote against plans that do not expressly prohibit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval if the company has a history of repricing/buyouts without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.

Pay-for-Performance Misalignment – Application to Equity Plans

If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for problematic pay practices, vote against the plan.

Catholic Advisory Services may recommend a vote against the equity plan if the plan is determined to be a vehicle for pay-for-performance misalignment. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:

§ Severity of the pay-for-performance misalignment;

§ Whether problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or

§ Whether equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the other NEOs.

Three-Year Value Adjusted Burn Rate

A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Value-Adjusted Burn Rate benchmarks will be calculated as the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.

²¹ For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company’s SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors.

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The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate will be calculated as follows:

Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).

Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control

Generally vote against equity plans if the plan provides for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition could include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.

Other Compensation Plans

Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))

Cash bonus plans can be an important part of an executive’s overall pay package, along with stock-based plans tied to long-term total shareholder returns. Over the long term, stock prices are an excellent indicator of management performance. However, other factors, such as economic conditions and investor reaction to the stock market in general and certain industries in particular, can greatly impact the company’s stock price. As a result, a cash bonus plan can effectively reward individual performance and the achievement of business unit objectives that are independent of short-term market share price fluctuations.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.

Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Addresses administrative features only; or

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent directors, per Catholic Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time after the company’s initial public offering (IPO), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below).

Vote against proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per Catholic Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors.

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes.

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:

§ If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments may potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.

§ If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.

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§ If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments are not deemed to potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown for informational purposes.

In the first two case-by-case evaluation scenarios, the EPSC evaluation/score is the more heavily weighted consideration.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs)

Employee stock purchase plans enable employees to become shareholders, which gives them a stake in the company’s growth. However, purchase plans are beneficial only when they are well balanced and in the best interests of all shareholders. From a shareholder’s perspective, plans with offering periods of 27 months or less are preferable. Plans with longer offering periods remove too much of the market risk and could give participants excessive discounts on their stock purchases that are not offered to other shareholders.

Qualified Plans

Qualified employee stock purchase plans qualify for favorable tax treatment under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code. Such plans must be broad-based, permitting all full-time employees to participate. Some companies also permit part-time staff to participate. Qualified ESPPs must be expensed under SFAS 123 unless the plan meets the following conditions; a) purchase discount is 5 percent or below; b) all employees can participate in the program; and 3) no look-back feature in the program. Therefore, some companies offer nonqualified ESPPs.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:

§ Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;

§ Offering period is 27 months or less; and

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is ten percent or less of the outstanding shares.

Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where any of the following apply:

§ Purchase price is less than 85 percent of fair market value; or

§ Offering period is greater than 27 months; or

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is more than ten percent of the outstanding shares.

Non-Qualified Plans

For nonqualified ESPPs, companies provide a match to employees’ contributions instead of a discount in stock price. Also, limits are placed on employees’ contributions. Some companies provide a maximum dollar value for the year and others specify the limits in terms of a percent of base salary, excluding bonus or commissions. For plans that do not qualify under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code, a plan participant will not recognize income by participating in the plan, but will recognize ordinary compensation income for federal income tax purposes at the time of the purchase.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:

§ Broad-based participation (i.e., all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company);

§ Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;

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§ Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value;

§ No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase since there is a company matching contribution.

Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when any of the plan features do not meet the above criteria. If the matching contribution or effective discount exceeds the above, Catholic Advisory Services may evaluate the SVT cost of the plan as part of the assessment.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)

An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is an employee benefit plan that makes the employees of a company also owners of stock in that company. The plans are designed to defer a portion of current employee income for retirement purposes.

The primary difference between ESOPs and other employee benefit plans is that ESOPs invest primarily in the securities of the employee’s company. In addition, an ESOP must be created for the benefit of non-management level employees and administered by a trust that cannot discriminate in favor of highly paid personnel.

Academic research of the performance of ESOPs in closely held companies found that ESOPs appear to increase overall sales, employment, and sales per employee over what would have been expected absent an ESOP. Studies have also found that companies with an ESOP are also more likely to still be in business several years later, and are more likely to have other retirement oriented benefit plans than comparable non-ESOP companies.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).

Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:

§ Historic trading patterns – the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;

§ Rationale for the re-pricing – was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?

§ Is this a value-for-value exchange?

§ Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?

§ Timing--repricing should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price;

§ Option vesting – does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?

§ Term of the option – the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;

§ Exercise price – should be set at fair market or a premium to market;

§ Participants – executive officers and directors must be excluded.

If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company’s total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing and warrants additional scrutiny. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting

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schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.

§ Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange.

§ Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, Catholic Advisory Services will not make any adjustments to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation.

Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

One-time Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.

Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:

§ Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating;

§ Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models;

§ There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.

Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management’s control. A review of the company’s historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term.

Ongoing TSO program: Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the ongoing TSO program, structure and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited, to the following:

§ Eligibility;

§ Vesting;

§ Bid-price;

§ Term of options;

§ Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and

§ Option repricing policy.

Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.

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401(k) Employee Benefit Plans

The 401(k) plan is one of the most popular employee benefit plans among U.S. companies. A 401(k) plan is any qualified plan under Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code that contains a cash or deferred arrangement. In its simplest form, an employee can elect to have a portion of his salary invested in a 401(k) plan before any income taxes are assessed. The money can only be withdrawn before retirement under penalty. However, because the money contributed to the plan is withdrawn before taxes (reducing the employee’s income tax), a properly planned 401(k) plan will enable an employee to make larger contributions to a 401(k) plan than to a savings plan, and still take the same amount home.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.

Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote on a case-by-case basis on proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes. An acceptable parachute should include, but is not limited to, the following:

§ The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;

§ The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable W-2 compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs;

§ Change-in-control payments should be double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure.

Director Compensation

The board’s legal charge of fulfilling its fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care is put to the ultimate test through the task of the board setting its own compensation. Directors themselves oversee the process for evaluating board performance and establishing pay packages for board members.

Shareholders provide limited oversight of directors by electing individuals who are primarily selected by the board, or a board nominating committee, and by voting on stock-based plans for directors designed by the board compensation committee. Additionally, shareholders may submit and vote on their own resolutions seeking to limit or restructure director pay. While the cost of compensating non-employee directors is small in absolute terms, compared to the cost of compensating executives, it is still a critical aspect of a company’s overall corporate governance structure.

Overall, director pay levels are rising in part because of the new forms of pay in use at many companies, as well as because of the increased responsibilities arising from the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements. In addition to an annual retainer fee, many companies also pay fees for attending board and committee meetings, fees for chairing a committee, or a retainer fee for chairing a committee.

Director compensation packages should be designed to provide value to directors for their contribution. Given that many directors are high-level executives whose personal income levels are generally high, cash compensation may hold little appeal. Stock-based incentives on the other hand reinforce the directors’ role of protecting and enhancing shareholder value. The stock-based component of director compensation should be large enough to ensure that when faced with a situation in which the interests of shareholders and management differ, the board will have a financial incentive to think as a shareholder. Additionally, many companies have instituted equity ownership programs for directors. Catholic Advisory Services recommends that directors receive stock grants equal to three times of their annual retainer, as it is a reasonable starting point for companies of all sizes and industries. A vesting schedule for director grants helps directors to meet the stock ownership guidelines and maintains their long-term interests in the firm.

Director compensation packages should also be designed to attract and retain competent directors who are willing to risk becoming a defendant in a lawsuit and suffer potentially adverse publicity if the company runs into financial difficulties or is mismanaged.

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Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:

§ If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and

§ An assessment of the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors

Stock-based plans may take on a variety of forms including: grants of stock or options, including: discretionary grants, formula based grants, and one-time awards; stock-based awards in lieu of all or some portion of the cash retainer and/or other fees; and deferred stock plans allowing payment of retainer and/or meeting fees to be taken in stock, the payment of which is postponed to some future time, typically retirement or termination of directorship.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:

§ The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;

§ The company’s three year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; and

§ The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).

On occasion, director stock plans that set aside a relatively small number of shares will exceed the plan cost or burn rate benchmark when combined with employee or executive stock compensation plans. In such cases, vote for the plan if all of the following qualitative factors in the board’s compensation are met and disclosed in the proxy statement:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines with a minimum of three times the annual cash retainer;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Outside Director Stock Awards/Options in Lieu of Cash

These proposals seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash. By doing this, a director’s interest may be more closely aligned with those of shareholders.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals that seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash.

Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors.

Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

Increase Disclosure of Executive Compensation

The SEC requires that companies disclose, in their proxy statements, the salaries of the top five corporate executives (who make at least $100,000 a year). Companies also disclose their compensation practices and details of their stock-based compensation plans. While this level of disclosure is helpful, it does not always provide a comprehensive picture of the company’s compensation practices. For shareholders to make informed decisions on compensation levels, they need to have clear, concise information at their disposal. Increased disclosure will help ensure that management: (1) has legitimate reasons for setting specific pay levels; and (2) is held accountable for its actions.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking increased disclosure on executive compensation issues including the preparation of a formal report on executive compensation practices and policies.

Limit Executive Compensation

Proposals that seek to limit executive or director compensation usually focus on the absolute dollar figure of the compensation or focus on the ratio of compensation between the executives and the average worker of a specific company. Proponents argue that the exponential growth of executive salaries is not in the best interests of shareholders, especially when that pay is exorbitant when compared to the compensation of other workers.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to prepare reports seeking to compare the wages of a company’s lowest paid worker to the highest paid workers.

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals that seek to establish a fixed ratio between the company’s lowest paid workers and the highest paid workers.

Stock Ownership Requirements

Corporate directors should own some amount of stock of the companies on which they serve as board members. Stock ownership is a simple method to align the interests of directors with company shareholders. Nevertheless, many highly qualified individuals such as academics and clergy who can offer valuable perspectives in boardrooms may be unable to purchase individual shares of stock. In such a circumstance, the preferred solution is to look at the board nominees individually and take stock ownership into consideration when voting on the merits of each candidate.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.

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Prohibit/Require Shareholder Approval for Option Repricing

Repricing involves the reduction of the original exercise price of a stock option after the fall in share price. Catholic Advisory Services does not support repricing since it undermines the incentive purpose of the plan. The use of options as an incentive means that employees must bear the same risks as shareholders in holding these options. Shareholder resolutions calling on companies to abandon the practice of repricing or to submit repricings to a shareholder vote will be supported.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to limit repricing.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to have option repricings submitted for shareholder ratification.

Severance Agreements/Golden Parachutes

Golden parachutes are designed to protect the employees of a corporation in the event of a change in control. With Golden Parachutes senior level management employees receive a payout during a change in control at usually two to three times base salary.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requiring that golden parachutes or executive severance agreements be submitted for shareholder ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval prior to entering into employment contracts.

Cash Balance Plans

A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that treats an earned retirement benefit as if it was a credit from a defined contribution plan, but which provides a stated benefit at the end of its term. Because employer contributions to these plans are credited evenly over the life of a plan, and not based on a seniority formula they may reduce payouts to long-term employees who are currently vested in plans.

Cash-balance pension conversions have undergone congressional and federal agency scrutiny following high-profile EEOC complaints on age discrimination and employee anger at companies like IBM. While significant change is unlikely in the short-tm, business interests were concerned enough that the National Association of Manufacturers and other business lobbies formed a Capitol Hill coalition to preserve the essential features of the plans and to overturn a IRS ruling. Driving the push behind conversions from traditional pension plans to cash-balance plans are the substantial savings that companies generate in the process. Critics point out that these savings are gained at the expense of the most senior employees. Resolutions call on corporate boards to establish a committee of outside directors to prepare a report to shareholders on the potential impact of pension-related proposals now being considered by national policymakers in reaction to the controversy spawned by the plans.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for non-discrimination in retirement benefits.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking a company to give employees the option of electing to participate in either a cash balance plan or in a defined benefit plan.

Performance-Based Equity Awards

Catholic Advisory Services supports compensating executives at a reasonable rate and believes that executive compensation should be strongly correlated to performance. Catholic Advisory Services supports equity awards that provide challenging performance objectives and serve to motivate executives to superior performance and as performance-contingent stock options as a significant component of compensation.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposal requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:

§ First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards.

§ Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.

In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.

Pay for Superior Performance

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals based on a case-by-case analysis that requests the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation plan for senior executives. The proposal has the following principles:

§ Sets compensation targets for the Plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median;

§ Delivers a majority of the Plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards;

§ Provides the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and non-financial performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan;

§ Establishes performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies;

§ Limits payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance.

Consider the following factors in evaluating this proposal:

§ What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven?

§ If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group?

§ Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure?

§ What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to?

Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally, vote for shareholder proposals that call for non-binding shareholder ratification of the compensation of the Named Executive Officers and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the Summary Compensation Table.

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Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).

Vote on a case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment, and eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity. The following factors will be taken into regarding this policy:

§ The company’s current treatment of equity in change-of-control situations (i.e. is it double triggered, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares;

§ Current employment agreements, including potential problematic pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements.

Tax Gross-up Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s) and fees paid.

Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.

Recoup Bonuses

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote on a case-by-case on proposals to recoup unearned incentive bonuses or other incentive payments made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned later turn out to have been in error. This is line with the clawback provision in the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. The following will be taken into consideration:

§ If the company has adopted a formal recoupment bonus policy;

§ If the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems;

§ If the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent.

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Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use of company stock will be considered.

Bonus Banking

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:

§ The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;

§ Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and

§ Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.

Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans. The following factors will be taken into account:

§ The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained;

§ The time period required to retain the shares;

§ Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements;

§ Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives;

§ Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and

§ Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus long-term focus.

Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the addition of certain safeguards in prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives. Safeguards may include:

§ Adoption, amendment, or termination of a 10b5-1 Plan must be disclosed in a Form 8-K;

§ Amendment or early termination of a 10b5-1 Plan allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board;

§ Request that a certain number of days that must elapse between adoption or amendment of a 10b5-1 Plan and initial trading under the plan;

§ Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a 10b5-1 Plan;

§ An executive may not trade in company stock outside the 10b5-1 Plan;

§ Trades under a 10b5-1 Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive.

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7.    Mergers and Corporate Restructurings

A merger occurs when one corporation is absorbed into another and ceases to exist. The surviving company gains all the rights, privileges, powers, duties, obligations and liabilities of the merged corporation. The shareholders of the absorbed company receive stock or securities of the surviving company or other consideration as provided by the plan of merger. Mergers, consolidations, share exchanges, and sale of assets are friendly in nature, which is to say that both sides have agreed to the combination or acquisition of assets.

Shareholder approval for an acquiring company is generally not required under state law or stock exchange regulations unless the acquisition is in the form of a stock transaction which would result in the issue of 20 percent or more of the acquirer’s outstanding shares or voting power, or unless the two entities involved require that shareholders approve the deal. Under most state laws, however, a target company must submit merger agreements to a shareholder vote. Shareholder approval is required in the formation of a consolidated corporation.

Mergers and Acquisitions

M&A analyses are inherently a balance of competing factors. Bright line rules are difficult if not impossible to apply to a world where every deal is different. Ultimately, the question for shareholders (both of the acquirer and the target) is the following: Is the valuation fair? Shareholders of the acquirer may be concerned that the deal values the target too highly. Shareholders of the target may be concerned that the deal undervalues their interests.

Vote recommendation will be based on primarily an analysis of shareholder value, which itself can be affected by ancillary factors such as the negotiation process. The importance of other factors, including corporate governance and social and environmental considerations however, should not fail to be recognized.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on mergers and acquisitions are considered on a case-by-case basis. A review and evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction is conducted, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

§ Valuation: Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction and strategic rationale;

§ Market reaction: How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal;

§ Strategic rationale: Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions;

§ Negotiations and process: Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable?

§ Conflicts of interest: Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders?

§ Governance: Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction?

§ Stakeholder impact: Impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc.

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Corporate Reorganization/Restructuring Plans (Bankruptcy)

The recent financial crisis has placed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations as a potential alternative for distressed companies. While the number of bankruptcies has risen over the past year as evidenced by many firms, including General Motors and Lehman Brothers, the prevalence of these reorganizations can vary year over year due to, among other things, market conditions and a company’s ability to sustain its operations. Additionally, the amount of time that lapses between a particular company’s entrance into Chapter 11 and its submission of a plan of reorganization varies significantly depending on the complexity, timing, and jurisdiction of the particular case. These plans are often put to a vote of shareholders (in addition to other interested parties), as required by the Bankruptcy Code.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:

§ Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;

§ Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;

§ Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an official equity committee);

§ The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);

§ Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization;

§ Governance of the reorganized company.

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

§ Valuation: Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity.

§ Market reaction: How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

§ Deal timing: A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date.

§ Negotiations and process: What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors.

§ Conflicts of interest: How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 percent of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24 month timeframe.

§ Voting agreements: Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights?

§ Governance: What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger?

§ Stakeholder Impact: Impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc.

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Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC extension proposals taking into account the length of the requested extension, the status of any pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process, any added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders, and any prior extension requests.

§ Length of request: Typically, extension requests range from two to six months, depending on the progression of the SPAC’s acquistion process.

§ Pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process: Sometimes an intial business combination was already put to a shareholder vote, but, for varying reasons, the transaction could not be consummated by the termination date and the SPAC is requesting an extension. Other times, the SPAC has entered into a definitive transaction agreement, but needs additional time to consummate or hold the shareholder meeting.

§ Added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders: Sometimes the SPAC sponsor (or other insiders) will contribute, typically as a loan to the company, additional funds that will be added to the redemption value of each public share as long as such shares are not redeemed in connection with the extension request. The purpose of the “equity kicker” is to incentivize shareholders to hold their shares through the end of the requested extension or until the time the transaction is put to a shareholder vote, rather than electing redeemption at the extension proposal meeting.

§ Prior extension requests: Some SPACs request additional time beyond the extension period sought in prior extension requests.

Spin-offs

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on spin-offs should be considered on a case-by-case basis depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, valuation of spinoff, fairness opinion, benefits to the parent company, conflicts of interest, managerial incentives, corporate governance changes, changes in the capital structure.

Asset Purchases

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on asset purchase proposals should be made on a case-by-case after considering the purchase price, fairness opinion, financial and strategic benefits, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives for the business, non-completion risk.

Asset Sales

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on asset sales should be made on a case-by-case basis after considering the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, potential elimination of diseconomies, anticipated financial and operating benefits, anticipated use of funds, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, and conflicts of interest.

Liquidations

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on liquidations should be made on a case-by-case basis after reviewing management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation. Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.

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Joint Ventures

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account percentage of assets/business contributed, percentage ownership, financial and strategic benefits, governance structure, conflicts of interest, other alternatives and non-completion risk.

Appraisal Rights

Rights of appraisal provide shareholders who do not approve of the terms of certain corporate transactions the right to demand a judicial review in order to determine the fair value for their shares. The right of appraisal generally applies to mergers, sales of essentially all assets of the corporation, and charter amendments that may have a materially adverse effect on the rights of dissenting shareholders.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore, or provide shareholders with, rights of appraisal.

Going Private/Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following: offer price/premium, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives/offers considered, and non-completion risk.

Vote case-by-case on “going dark” transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:

§ Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);

§ Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following:

§ Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction?

§ Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction?

§ Does the company have strong corporate governance?

§ Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?

§ Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders?

Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements taking into consideration:

§ Dilution to existing shareholders’ position.

§ The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion.

§ Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; conversion features; termination penalties; exit strategy.

§ The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial issues.

§ When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, Catholic Advisory Services will consider whether it is affected by liquidity, due diligence, control and monitoring issues, capital scarcity, information asymmetry and anticipation of future performance.

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§ Financial issues include but are not limited to examining the following: a) company’s financial situation; b) degree of need for capital; c) use of proceeds; d) effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital; e) current and proposed cash burn rate; and f) going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.

§ Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives. A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger or sale of part or all of the company.

§ Control issues including: a) Change in management; b) change in control; c) guaranteed board and committee seats; d) standstill provisions; e) voting agreements; f) veto power over certain corporate actions.

§ Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium

§ Conflicts of interest

§ Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor.

§ Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests?

§ Market reaction

§ The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one day impact on the unaffected stock price.

Vote for the private placement if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Formation of Holding Company

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration: a) the reasons for the change; b) any financial or tax benefits; c) regulatory benefits; d) increases in capital structure; and e) changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.

§ Vote against the formation of a holding company, absent compelling financial reasons to support the transaction, if the transaction would include either: a) increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum; or b) adverse changes in shareholder rights.

Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives, selling the company or liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders. These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:

§ Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight;

§ Signs of entrenched board and management;

§ Strategic plan in place for improving value;

§ Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution;

§ Whether company is actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor.

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8.    Social and Environmental Proposals

Socially responsible shareholder resolutions are receiving a great deal more attention from institutional shareholders today than they have in the past. In addition to the moral and ethical considerations intrinsic to many of these proposals, there is a growing recognition of their potential impact on the economic performance of the company. Among the reasons for this change are:

§ The number and variety of shareholder resolutions on social and environmental issues has increased;

§ Many of the sponsors and supporters of these resolutions are large institutional shareholders with significant holdings, and therefore, greater direct influence on the outcomes;

§ The proposals are more sophisticated – better written, more focused, and more sensitive to the feasibility of implementation;

§ Investors now understand that a company’s response to social and environmental issues can have serious economic consequences for the company and its shareholders.

Global Approach

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for social and environmental shareholder proposals that promote good corporate citizens while enhancing long-term shareholder and stakeholder value. Vote for disclosure reports that seek additional information particularly when it appears companies have not adequately addressed shareholders’ social, and environmental concerns. In determining vote recommendations on shareholder social, workforce, and environmental proposals, Catholic Advisory Services will analyze the following factors:

§ Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable;

§ Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company’s short-term or long-term share value;

§ Whether the company’s analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive;

§ The degree to which the company’s stated position on the issues could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to boycott or selective purchasing;

§ Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;

§ Whether the issues presented in the proposal are best dealt with through legislation, government regulation, or company-specific action;

§ The company’s approach compared with its peers or any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;

§ Whether the company has already responded in an appropriate or sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;

§ Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s environmental or social practices;

§ If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether sufficient information is publicly available to shareholders and whether it would be unduly burdensome for the company to compile and avail the requested information to shareholders in a more comprehensive or amalgamated fashion;

§ Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal.

In general, Catholic Advisory Services supports proposals that request the company to furnish information helpful to shareholders in evaluating the company’s operations. In order to be able to intelligently monitor their investments, shareholders often need information best provided by the company in which they have invested. Requests to report such information will merit support. Requests to establish special committees of the board to address broad corporate policy and provide forums for ongoing dialogue on issues including, but not limited to shareholder relations, the environment, human rights, occupational health and safety, and executive compensation, will generally be supported, particularly when they appear to offer a potentially effective method for enhancing shareholder value. We will closely evaluate proposals

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that ask the company to cease certain actions that the proponent believes are harmful to society or some segment of society with special attention to the company’s legal and ethical obligations, its ability to remain profitable, and potential negative publicity if the company fails to honor the request. Catholic Advisory Services supports shareholder proposals that improve the company’s public image, and reduce exposure to liabilities.

Diversity and Equality

Significant progress has been made in recent years in the advancement of women and racial minorities in the workplace and the establishment of greater protections against discriminatory practices in the workplace. In the U.S, there are many civil rights laws that are enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and nationality. However, discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, nationality, and sexual preference continues. The SEC’s revised disclosure rules now require information on how boards factor diversity into the director nomination process, as well as disclosure on how the board assesses the effectiveness of its diversity policy. Shareholder proposals on diversity may target a company’s board nomination procedures or seek greater disclosure on a company’s programs and procedures on increasing the diversity of its workforce, and make reference to one or more of the following points:

§ Violations of workplace anti-discrimination laws lead to expensive litigation and damaged corporate reputations that are not in the best interests of shareholders;

§ Employers already prepare employee diversity reports for the EEOC, so preparing a similar report to shareholders can be done at minimal cost;

§ The presence of women, ethnic minorities and union members in workforce and customer pools gives companies with diversified boards a practical advantage over their competitors as a result of their unique perspectives;

§ Efforts to include women, minorities and union representatives on corporate boards can be made at reasonable costs;

§ Reports can be prepared “at reasonable expense” describing efforts to encourage diversified representation on their boards;

§ Board diversification increases the pool of the company’s potential investors because more and more investors are favoring companies with diverse boards;

§ A commitment to diversity in the workforce can lead to superior financial returns.

Add Women and Minorities to the Board

Board diversification proposals ask companies to put systems in place to increase the representation of women, racial minorities, union members or other underrepresented minority groups on boards of directors. In prior years, board diversification proposals requested that companies nominate board members from certain constituencies, appoint special committees to recommend underrepresented classes of board members, establish board positions reserved for representatives of certain groups, or simply “make greater efforts” to nominate women and ethnic minorities to their boards.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to take steps to nominate more women and racial minorities to the board.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on board diversity.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt nomination charters or amend existing charters to include reasonable language addressing diversity.

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Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audits

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, considering company disclosures, policies, actions, and engagements.

Report on the Distribution of Stock Options by Gender and Race

Companies have received requests from shareholders to prepare reports documenting the distribution of the stock options and restricted stock awards by race and gender of the recipient. Proponents of these proposals argue that, in the future, there will be a shift toward basing racial and gender discrimination suits on the distribution of corporate wealth through stock options. The appearance of these proposals is also in response to the nationwide wage gap and under representation of minorities and women at the highest levels of compensation.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the distribution of stock options by race and gender of the recipient.

Prepare Report/Promote EEOC-Related Activities

Filers of proposals on this issue generally ask a company to make available, at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information, data the company includes in its annual report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) outlining the make-up of its workforce by race, gender and position. Shareholders also ask companies to report on any efforts they are making to advance the representation of women and ethnic minorities in jobs in which they have been historically underrepresented, such as sales and management. The costs of violating federal laws that prohibit discrimination by corporations are high and can affect corporate earnings. The Equal Opportunities Employment Commission does not release the companies’ filings to the public, unless it is involved in litigation, and this information is difficult to obtain from other sources. Companies need to be sensitive to minority employment issues as the new evolving work force becomes increasingly diverse. This information can be provided with little cost to the company and does not create an unreasonable burden on management.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its diversity and/or affirmative action programs.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for legal and regulatory compliance and public reporting related to non-discrimination, affirmative action, workplace health and safety, and labor policies and practices that effect long-term corporate performance.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting nondiscrimination in salary, wages and all benefits.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for action on equal employment opportunity and antidiscrimination.

Report on Progress Towards Glass Ceiling Commission Recommendations

In November 1995, the Glass Ceiling Commission (Commission), a bipartisan panel of leaders from business and government, issued a report describing “an unseen yet unbreachable barrier that keeps women and minorities from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder.” The Commission recommended that companies take practical steps to rectify this disparity, such as including diversity goals in business plans, committing to affirmative action for qualified employees and initiating family-friendly labor policies. Shareholders have submitted proposals asking companies to report on progress made toward the Commission’s recommendations.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its progress against the Glass Ceiling

§ Commission’s recommendations.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to eliminate the “glass ceiling” for women and minority employees.

Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity

Federal law does not ban workplace discrimination against gay and lesbian employees, and only some states have enacted workplace protections for these employees. Although an increasing number of U.S. companies have explicitly banned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in their equal employment opportunity (EEO) statements, many still do not. Shareholder proponents and other activist groups concerned with gay and lesbian rights, such as the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and the Pride Foundation, have targeted U.S. companies that do not specifically restrict discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in their EEO statements. Shareholder proposals on this topic ask companies to change the language of their EEO statements in order to put in place anti-discrimination protection for their gay and lesbian employees. In addition, proposals may seek disclosure on a company’s general initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, including reference to such items as support of gay and lesbian employee groups, diversity training that addresses sexual orientation, and non-medical benefits to domestic partners of gay and lesbian employees.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to include language in EEO statements specifically barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on a company’s initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate protection already afforded to gay and lesbian employees.

Report on/Eliminate Use of Racial Stereotypes in Advertising

Many companies continue to use racial stereotypes or images perceived as racially insensitive in their advertising campaigns. Filers of shareholder proposals on this topic often request companies to give more careful consideration to the symbols and images that are used to promote the company.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking more careful consideration of using racial stereotypes in advertising campaigns, including preparation of a report on this issue.

Gender, Race, or Ethnicity Pay Gap

Over the past several years, shareholders have filed resolutions requesting that companies report whether a gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap exists, and if so, what measures are being taken to eliminate the gap. While primarily filed at technology firms, in 2017, the resolutions were also filed at firms in the financial services, insurance, healthcare, and telecommunication sectors. Proponents are expected to continue this campaign by engaging companies and filing shareholder proposals on this issue.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender, race, or ethnicity, or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender, race, or ethinicity pay gap.

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Labor and Human Rights

Investors, international human rights groups, and labor advocacy groups have long been making attempts to safeguard worker rights in the international marketplace. In instances where companies themselves operate factories in developing countries for example, these advocates have asked that the companies adopt global corporate standards that guarantee sustainable wages and safe working conditions for their workers abroad. Companies that contract out portions of their manufacturing operations to foreign companies have been asked to ensure that the products they receive from those contractors have not been made using forced labor, child labor, or sweatshop labor. These companies are asked to adopt formal vendor standards that, among other things, include some sort of monitoring mechanism. Globalization, relocation of production overseas, and widespread use of subcontractors and vendors, often make it difficult to obtain a complete picture of a company’s labor practices in global markets. Recent deadly accidents at factories, notably in Bangladesh and in Pakistan, have continued to intensify these concerns. Many investors believe that companies would benefit from adopting a human rights policy based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labour Organization’s Core Labor Standards. Efforts that seek greater disclosure on a company’s global labor practices, including its supply chain, and that seek to establish minimum standards for a company’s operations will be supported. In addition, requests for independent monitoring of overseas operations will be supported.

Catholic Advisory Services generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of principles or codes relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights; such as the use of slave, child, or prison labor; a government that is illegitimate; or there is a call by human rights advocates, pro-democracy organizations, or legitimately-elected representatives for economic sanctions. The use of child, sweatshop, or forced labor is unethical and can damage corporate reputations. Poor labor practices can lead to litigation against the company, which can be costly and time consuming.

Codes of Conduct and Vendor Standards

In recent years, an increasing number of shareholder proposals have been submitted that pertain to the adoption of codes of conduct or provision, greater disclosure on a company’s international workplace standards, or that request human rights risk assessment. Companies have been asked to adopt a number of different types of codes, including a workplace code of conduct, standards for international business operations, human rights standards, International Labour Organization (ILO) standards and the SA 8000 principles. The ILO is an independent agency of the United Nations which consists of 187 member nations represented by workers, employers, and governments. The ILO’s general mandate is to promote a decent workplace for all individuals. The ILO sets international labor standards in the form of its conventions and then monitors compliance with the standards. The seven conventions of the ILO fall under four broad categories: Right to organize and bargain collectively, Nondiscrimination in employment, Abolition of forced labor, and End of child labor. Each of the 187 member-nations of the ILO is bound to respect and promote these rights to the best of their abilities. SA 8000 is a set of labor standards, based on the principles of the ILO conventions and other human rights conventions, and covers eight workplace conditions, including: child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours and compensation. The Global Sullivan Principles are a set of guidelines that support economic, social and political justice by companies where they do business; to support human rights and to encourage equal opportunity at all levels of employment.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to implement human rights standards and workplace codes of conduct.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct, SA 8000 Standards, or the Global Sullivan Principles.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call for the adoption of principles or codes of conduct relating to company investments in countries with patterns of human rights abuses (e.g. Northern Ireland, Burma, former Soviet Union, and China).

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§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call for independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with codes.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that seek publication of a “Code of Conduct” by the company’s foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring that they satisfy all applicable standards and laws protecting employees’ wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, and other rights.

§ Vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on, or the adoption of, vendor standards including: reporting on incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts and providing public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with foreign suppliers that manufacture products for sale in the U.S. using forced labor, child labor, or that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employee’s wages and working conditions.

Adopt/Report on MacBride Principles

These resolutions have called for the adoption of the MacBride Principles for operations located in Northern Ireland. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is well documented that Northern Ireland’s Catholic community faced much higher unemployment figures than the Protestant community. In response to this problem, the U.K. government instituted the New Fair Employment Act of 1989 (and subsequent amendments) to address the sectarian hiring problems.

Many companies believe that the Act adequately addresses the problems and that further action, including adoption of the MacBride Principles, only duplicates the efforts already underway. In evaluating a proposal to adopt the MacBride Principles, shareholders must decide whether the principles will cause companies to divest, and therefore worsen the unemployment problem, or whether the principles will promote equal hiring practices. Proponents believe that the Fair Employment Act does not sufficiently address the sectarian hiring problems. They argue that the MacBride Principles serve to stabilize the situation and promote further investment.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to report on or implement the MacBride Principles.

Community Impact Assessment/Indigenous Peoples’ Rights

In recent years, a number of U.S. public companies have found their operations or expansion plans in conflict with local indigenous groups. In order to improve their standing with indigenous groups and decrease any negative publicity companies may face, some concerned shareholders have sought reports requesting that companies review their obligations, actions and presence on these groups. Some have also requested these companies adopt policies based on the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Organization of American States’ (OAS) American Declaration on rights of Indigenous Peoples. Some companies, such as Starbucks, have reached agreements with local governments to ensure better business practices for products produced by indigenous groups. Shareholders, concerned with the negative impact that the company’s operations may have on the indigenous people’s land and community, have sought reports detailing the impact of the company’s actions and presence on these groups.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking to prepare reports on a company’s environmental and health impact on communities.

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Report on Risks of Outsourcing

Consumer interest in keeping costs low through comparison shopping, coupled with breakthroughs in productivity have prompted companies to look for methods of increasing profit margins while keeping prices competitive. Through a practice known as off-shoring, the outsourcing or moving of manufacturing and service operations to foreign markets with lower labor costs, companies have found one method where the perceived savings potential is quite substantial. Shareholder opponents of outsourcing argue that there may be long-term consequences to offshore outsourcing that outweigh short-term benefits such as backlash from a public already sensitive to off-shoring, security risks from information technology development overseas, and diminished employee morale. Shareholder proposals addressing outsourcing ask that companies prepare a report to shareholders evaluating the risk to the company’s brand name and reputation in the U.S. from outsourcing and off-shoring of manufacturing and service work to other countries.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholders proposals asking companies to report on the risks associated with outsourcing or off-shoring.

Report on the Impact of Health Pandemics on Company Operations

Sub-Saharan Africa is the most affected region in the world with regard to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. With limited access to antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS, the increasing death toll is expected to have profound social, political and economic impact on that region and the companies or industries with operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the past, shareholder proposals asked companies to develop policies to provide affordable HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis drugs in third-world countries. However, in recent years, shareholders have changed their tactic, asking instead for reports on the impact of these pandemics on company operations, including both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical companies operating in high-risk areas. This change is consistent with the general shift in shareholder proposals towards risk assessment and mitigation.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking for companies to report on the impact of pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, on their business strategies.

Mandatory Arbitration

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims.

Sexual Harassment

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment.

Operations in High Risk Markets

In recent years, shareholder advocates and human rights organizations have highlighted concerns associated with companies operating in regions that are politically unstable, including state sponsors of terror. The U.S. government has active trade sanction regimes in place against a number of countries, including Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, among others. These sanctions are enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which is part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. However, these countries do not comprise an exhaustive list of countries considered to be high-risk markets.

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Shareholder proponents have filed resolutions addressing a variety of concerns around how investments and operations in high-risk regions may support, or be perceived to support, potentially oppressive governments. Proponents contend that operations in these countries may lead to potential reputational, regulatory, and/or supply chain risks as a result of operational disruptions. Concerned shareholders have requested investment withdrawals or cessation of operations in high-risk markets as well as reports on operations in high-risk markets. Such reports may seek additional disclosure from companies on criteria employed for investing in, continuing to operate in, and withdrawing from specific countries.

Depending on the country’s human rights record, investors have also asked companies to refrain from commencing new projects in the country of concern until improvements are made. In addition, investors have sought greater disclosure on the nature of a company’s involvement in the country and on the impact of their involvement or operations.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests for a review of and a report outlining the company’s potential financial and reputation risks associated with operations in “high-risk” markets, such as a terrorism-sponsoring state or otherwise, taking into account:

§ The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption;

§ Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures;

§ Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws;

§ Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws;

§ Whether the company has been recently involved in significant controversies or violations in “high-risk” markets.

Reports on Operations in Burma/Myanmar

Since the early 1960s, Burma (also known as Myanmar) has been ruled by a military dictatorship that has been condemned for human rights abuses, including slave labor, torture, rape and murder. Many companies have pulled out of Burma over the past decade given the controversy surrounding involvement in the country. Oil companies continue be the largest investors in Burma and therefore are the usual targets of shareholder proposals on this topic. However, proposals have also been filed at other companies, including financial companies, for their involvement in the country.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards in connection with involvement in Burma.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on Burmese operations and reports on costs of continued involvement in the country.

§ Vote shareholder proposals to pull out of Burma on a case-by-case basis.

Reports on Operations in China

Documented human rights abuses in China continue to raise concerns among investors, specifically with respect to alleged use of prison and child labor in manufacturing. Reports have identified U.S. companies with direct or indirect ties to companies controlled by the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and hence links to prison labor. The U.S. Business Principles for Human Rights of Workers in China may help a company with operations in China avoid being blacklisted by U.S. states and municipalities, many of whom have limited their contracts with companies that fail to adopt similar principles in other countries recognized for committing gross human rights violations.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting more disclosure on a company’s involvement in China

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that ask a company to terminate a project or investment in China.

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Product Sales to Repressive Regimes

Certain Internet technology companies have been accused of assisting repressive governments in violating human rights through the knowing misuse of their hardware and software. Human rights groups have accused companies such as Yahoo!, Cisco, Google, and Microsoft of allowing the Chinese government to censor and track down dissenting voices on the internet.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that companies cease product sales to repressive regimes that can be used to violate human rights.

§ Vote for proposals to report on company efforts to reduce the likelihood of product abuses in this manner.

Internet Privacy/Censorship and Data Security

Information technology sector companies have been at the center of shareholder advocacy campaigns regarding concerns over Internet service companies and technology providers’ alleged cooperation with potentially repressive regimes, notably the Chinese government. Shareholder proposals, submitted at Yahoo!, Google, Microsoft, and Cisco, among others, asked companies to take steps to stop abetting repression and censorship of the Internet and/or review their human rights policies taking this issue into consideration. Resolution sponsors generally argue that the Chinese government is using IT company technologies to track, monitor, identify, and, ultimately, suppress political dissent. In the view of proponents, this process of surveillance and associated suppression violates internationally accepted norms outlined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

While early shareholder resolutions on Internet issues focused on censorship by repressive regimes and net neutrality, proponents have recently raised concerns regarding privacy and data security in the wake of increased breaches that result in the misuse of personal information. On Oct. 13, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a guidance document about the disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents. In the document, the SEC references the negative consequences that are associated with cyber-attacks, such as: remediation costs, including those required to repair relationships with customers and clients; increased cyber-security protection costs; lost revenues from unauthorized use of the information or missed opportunities to attract clients; litigation; and reputational damage. The document says that while the federal securities laws do not explicitly require disclosure of cybersecurity risks and incidents, some disclosure requirements may impose an obligation on the company to disclose such information and provides scenarios where disclosure may be required. A 2013 study by the Ponemon Institute found that the median annualized cost of cyber-attacks for the 60 organizations studied was $11.6 million. The study also found that the number of successful cyber-attacks among the 60 companies increased by 18 percent between 2012 and 2013, from 102 successful attacks on average per week to 122.

More recently, data security has been the focus of media outlets and a public concern. During the 2013 holiday shopping season, Target, Neiman Marcus, and other retailers were the targets of hackers looking to steal credit card numbers. It is estimated that as many as 40 million customer credit and debit card accounts were stolen at Target alone. These incidents preceded what many people consider the largest data security breach in the United States. In June 2013, major media outlets began releasing information about leaked classified documents disclosed by Edward Snowden, an NSA contractor. The documents revealed a government-run Internet and telephone surveillance program aimed at collecting metadata. As part of this operation, the government is said to have obtained from major U.S. telecommunications companies the call records of their customers.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for resolutions requesting the disclosure and implementation of Internet privacy and censorship policies and procedures considering:

§ The level of disclosure of policies and procedures relating to privacy, freedom of speech, Internet censorship, and government monitoring of the Internet;

§ Engagement in dialogue with governments and/or relevant groups with respect to the Internet and the free flow of information;

§ The scope of business involvement and of investment in markets that maintain government censorship or monitoring of the Internet;

§ The market-specific laws or regulations applicable to Internet censorship or monitoring that may be imposed on the company; and

§ The level of controversy or litigation related to the company’s international human rights policies and procedures.

Disclosure on Plant Closings

Shareholders have asked that companies contemplating plant closures consider the impact of such closings on employees and the community, especially when such plan closures involve a community’s largest employers. Catholic Advisory Services usually recommends voting for greater disclosure of plant closing criteria. In cases where it can be shown that companies have been proactive and responsible in adopting these criteria, Catholic Advisory Services recommends against the proposal.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on plant closing criteria if the company has not provided such information.

Climate Change

Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan²², taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

§ The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;

§ Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);

§ The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);

§ Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based;

§ Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;

§ Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;

§ Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance;

§ Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;

§ Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and

§ The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

²² Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

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Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

§ The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure;

§ The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and

§ Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.

Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Climate change has emerged as the most significant environmental threat to the planet to date. Scientists generally agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a “greenhouse effect” that traps the planet’s heat. Environmentalists claim that the Greenhouse Gases(GHG) produced by the industrial age have caused recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. Climate change skeptics have described the rise and fall of global temperatures as naturally occurring phenomena and depicted human impact on climate change as minimal. Shareholder proposals requesting companies to issue a report to shareholders, “at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information,” on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the report include descriptions of corporate efforts to reduce emissions, companies’ financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat, and their goals in reducing these emissions from their operations. Shareholder proponents argue that there is scientific proof that the burning of fossil fuels causes global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, and that a report on the company’s role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces related to climate change- on its operations and investments, or on how the company identifies, measures, and manage such risks.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reduction of GHG or adoption of GHG goals in products and operations.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on responses to regulatory and public pressures surrounding climate change, and for disclosure of research that aided in setting company policies around climate change.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting reports on greenhouse gas emissions from companies’ operations and/or products.

Invest in Clean/Renewable Energy

Filers of proposals on renewable energy ask companies to increase their investment in renewable energy sources and to work to develop products that rely more on renewable energy sources. Increased use of renewable energy will reduce the negative environmental impact of energy companies. In addition, as supplies of oil and coal exist in the earth in limited quantities, renewable energy sources represent a competitive, and some would argue essential, long-term business strategy.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s activities related to the development of renewable energy sources.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking increased investment in renewable energy sources unless the terms of the resolution are overly restrictive.

Energy Efficiency

Reducing the negative impact to the environment can be done through the use of more energy efficient practices and products. Shareholders propose that corporations should have energy efficient manufacturing processes and should market more energy efficient products. This can be done by utilizing renewable energy sources that are cost-competitive and by implementing energy efficient operations.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report on company energy efficiency policies and/or goals.

Environment

Proposals addressing environmental and energy concerns are plentiful, and generally seek greater disclosure on a particular issue or seek to improve a company’s environmental practices in order to protect the world’s natural resources. In addition, some proponents cite the negative financial implications for companies with poor environmental practices, including liabilities associated with site clean-ups and lawsuits, as well as arguments that energy efficient products and clean environmental practices are sustainable business practices that will contribute to long-term shareholder value. Shareholders proponents point out that the majority of independent atmospheric scientists agree that global warming poses a serious problem to the health and welfare of our planet, citing the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Shareholder activists argue that companies can report on their greenhouse gas emissions within a few months at reasonable cost. The general trend indicates a movement towards encouraging companies to have proactive environmental policies, focusing on maximizing the efficient use of non-renewable resources and minimizing threats of harm to human health or the environment.

Environmental/Sustainability Reports

Shareholders may request general environmental disclosures or reports on a specific location/operation, often requesting that the company detail the environmental risks and potential liabilities of a specific project. Increasingly, companies have begun reporting on environmental and sustainability issues using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards. The GRI was established in 1997 with the mission of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance. The GRI was developed by Ceres (formerly known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

Ceres was formed in the wake of the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, when a consortium of investors, environmental groups, and religious organizations drafted what were originally named the Valdez Principles. Later named the Ceres Principles, and now branded the Ceres Roadmap 2030, corporate signatories of the Ceres Roadmap 2030 pledge to institute accountability mechanisms that integrate sustainability considerations into core business systems and decision-making on topics such as governance, stakeholder engagement and disclosure. Signatories also pledge to build systems across a corporation’s value chain to enable ongoing improvements in three priority environmental and social impact areas (Climate Change, Natural Resources, and Human Rights).

The Equator Principles are the financial industry’s benchmark for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing. First launched in June 2003, the Principles were ultimately adopted by over

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forty financial institutions over a three-year implementation period. Since its adoption, the Principles have undergone a number of revisions, expanding the use of performance standards and signatory banks’ banks’ commitments to social responsibility, including human rights, climate change, and transparency. The fourth iteration of the Principles was launched in November 2019, incorporating amendments and new commitment to human rights, climate change, Indigenous Peoples and biodiversity related topics. Financial institutions adopt these principles to ensure that the projects they finance are developed in a socially responsible manner and reflect sound environmental management practices. As of 2019, 101 financial institutions have officially adopted the Equator Principles.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company’s environmental and social practices, and/or associated risks and liabilities.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of sustainability reports.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the Ceres Roadmap 2030.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the Equator Principles.

Operations in Environmentally Sensitive Areas

Canadian Oil Sands

Proposals asking for a report on oil sands operations in the Athabasca region of Alberta, Canada have appeared at a number of oil and gas companies. Alberta’s oil sands contain a reserve largely thought to be one of the world’s largest potential energy sources. Rising oil sands production in Alberta has been paralleled with concerns from a variety of stakeholders—including environmental groups, local residents, and shareholders—regarding the environmental impacts of the complicated extraction and upgrading processes required to convert oil sands into a synthetic crude oil. The high viscosity of bitumen makes its extraction a challenging and resource-intensive process; the most common extraction technique involves pumping steam into the oil sands to lower the viscosity of bitumen in order to pump it to the surface.

One of the most prominent issues concerning oil sands is the large volume of greenhouse gases (GHG) associated with production. Oil sands are by far one of the most energy-intensive forms of oil production, releasing three times more GHG emissions from production than conventional oil.

Shareholders have kept up pressure on the issue of potential long-term risks to companies posed by the environmental, social, and economic challenges associated with Canadian oil sands operations. Resolutions on the topic have focused on requesting greater transparency on the ramifications of oil sands development projects.

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) is a federally protected wilderness along Alaska’s North Slope. In the past, legislation proposed in both the House and Senate that, if passed, would allow a portion of this area to be leased to private companies for development and production of oil, has been witnessed. Oil companies have expressed an interest in bidding for these leases given the opportunity. In response, shareholder activists have filed resolutions asking these companies to cancel any plans to drill in the ANWR and cease their lobbying efforts to open the area for drilling. Proponents of shareholder proposals on this issue argue that the Coastal Plain section of the ANWR is the most environmentally sensitive area of the refuge, that the majority of Alaska’s North Slope that is not federally designated wilderness already provides the oil industry with sufficient resources for oil production, and that advocates of drilling in ANWR overstate the benefit to be derived from opening the wilderness to oil production. Those in favor of opening the area up to drilling note that only a small portion of ANWR would be considered for exploration, and if drilling were to take place, it would be on less than one percent of the entire area, that modern technology reduces the environmental impact of oil drilling on both the land and surrounding wildlife, and that oil production in ANWR would have considerable benefit to company shareholders, Alaskans, and the United States as a whole.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for requests for reports on potential environmental damage as a result of company operations in protected regions.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to prepare reports or adopt policies on operations that include mining, drilling or logging in environmentally sensitive areas.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to curb or reduce the sale of products manufactured from materials extracted from environmentally sensitive areas such as old growth forests.

Hydraulic Fracturing

Shareholder proponents have elevated concerns on the use of hydraulic fracturing, an increasingly controversial process in which water, sand, and a mix of chemicals are blasted horizontally into tight layers of shale rock to extract natural gas. As this practice has gained more widespread use, environmentalists have raised concerns that the chemicals mixed with sand and water to aid the fracturing process can contaminate ground water supplies. Proponents of resolutions at companies that employ hydraulic fracturing are also concerned that wastewater produced by the process could overload the waste treatment plants to which it is shipped. Shareholders have asked companies that utilize hydraulic fracturing to report on the environmental impact of the practice and to disclose policies aimed at reducing hazards from the process.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests seeking greater transparency on the practice of hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks.

Phase Out Chlorine-Based Chemicals

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified chlorine bleaching of pulp and paper as a major source of dioxin, a known human carcinogen linked to have negative effects to humans and animals. A number of shareholder proposals have been filed in recent years asking companies to report on the possible phase-out of chlorine bleaching in the production of paper because of the practice’s negative environmental impact.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to prepare a report on the phase-out of chlorine bleaching in paper production.

§ Vote on a case-by-case basis on shareholder proposals asking companies to cease or phase-out the use of chlorine bleaching.

Land Procurement and Development

Certain real estate developers including big-box large retailers have received criticism over their processes for acquiring and developing land. Given a 2005 Supreme Court decision allowing for the usage of eminent domain laws in the U.S. to take land from property-owners for tax generating purposes, as well as certain controversies outside of the U.S. with land procurement, some shareholders would like assurances that companies are acting ethically and with local stakeholders in mind.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for land procurement and utilize the policies in their decision-making.

Report on the Sustainability of Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFO)

The potential environmental impact on water, aquatic ecosystems, and local areas from odor and chemical discharges from CAFOs has led to lawsuits and EPA regulations. Certain shareholders have asked companies to provide additional details on their CAFOs in addition to those with which the companies contract to raise their livestock.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests that companies report on the sustainability and the environmental impacts of both company-owned and contract livestock operations.

Adopt a Comprehensive Recycling Policy

A number of companies have received proposals to step-up their recycling efforts, with the goal of reducing the company’s negative impact on the environment and reducing costs over the long-term.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting the preparation of a report on the company’s recycling efforts.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to increase their recycling efforts or to adopt a formal recycling policy.

Nuclear Energy

Nuclear power continues to be a controversial method of producing electricity. Opponents of nuclear energy are primarily concerned with serious accidents and the related negative human health consequences, and with the difficulties involved in nuclear waste storage.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s nuclear energy procedures.

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals that ask the company to cease the production of nuclear power.

Water Use

Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report evaluating the business risks linked to water use and impacts on the company’s supply chain, including subsidiaries and bottling partners. Such proposals also ask companies to disclose current policies and procedures for mitigating the impact of operations on local communities in areas of water scarcity.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s risks linked to water use.

§ Vote for resolutions requesting companies to promote the “human right to water” as articulated by the United Nations.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for water use that incorporate social and environmental factors.

Kyoto Protocol Compliance

With the Kyoto Protocol operational as of February 2005, ratifying countries have agreed to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases. While some signatories have yet to release specific details of corporate regulations, the impact on multinationals operating in Kyoto-compliant countries is anticipated to be significant.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on how companies will meet GHG reduction targets of the Kyoto-compliant countries in which they operate.

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Health and Safety

Toxic Materials

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on policies and activities to ensure product safety.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to disclose annual expenditures relating to the promotion and/or environmental cleanup of toxins.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the feasibility of removing, or substituting with safer alternatives, all “harmful” ingredients used in company products.

Product Safety

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for proposals requesting the company to report on or adopt consumer product safety policies and initiatives.

§ Generally vote for proposals requesting the study, adoption and/or implementation of consumer product safety programs in the company’s supply chain.

Workplace/Facility Safety

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts.

§ Vote shareholder proposals requesting companies report on or implement procedures associated with their operations and/or facilities on a case-by-case basis.

Report on Handgun Safety Initiatives

Shareholders may ask for a company to report on policies and procedures that are aimed at curtailing the incidence of gun violence. Such a report may include: implementation of the company’s contract instruction to distributors not to sell the company’s weapons at gun shows or through pawn shops; recalls or retro-fits of products with safety-related defects causing death or serious injury to consumers, as well as development of systems to identify and remedy these defects; names and descriptions of products that are developed or are being developed for a combination of higher caliber/maximum capacity and greater conceal-ability; and the company’s involvement in promotion campaigns that could be construed as aimed at children. The Sandy Hook Principles were established to commemorate the victims of gun violence and to encourage positive corporate behavior in response to the proliferation of gun violence in America.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to report on its efforts to promote handgun safety.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to stop the sale of handguns and accessories.

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Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients

Shareholders have asked companies engaged in the development of genetically modified agricultural products to adopt a policy of not marketing or distributing such products until “long term safety testing” demonstrates that they are not harmful to humans, animals or the environment. Until further long term testing demonstrates that these products are not harmful, companies in the restaurant and prepared foods industries have been asked to remove genetically altered ingredients from products they manufacture or sell, and label such products in the interim. Shareholders have also asked supermarket companies to do the same for their own private label brands.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to label products that contain genetically engineered products or products from cloned animals.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to phase out the use of genetically engineered ingredients in their products.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on the use of genetically engineered organisms in their products.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on the financial, legal, and operational risks posed by the use of genetically engineered organisms.

Tobacco-related Proposals

Under the pressure of ongoing litigation and negative media attention, tobacco companies and even non-tobacco companies with ties to the industry have received an assortment of shareholder proposals seeking increased responsibility and social consciousness from tobacco companies and as well as firms affiliated with the tobacco industry.

While the specific resolutions for shareholder proponents vary from year to year, activist shareholders consistently make the tobacco industry a prominent target. Examples of shareholder proposals focused on tobacco include: warnings on the risks of tobacco smoke and smoking-related diseases, attempting to link executive compensation with reductions in teen smoking rates, the placement of company tobacco products in retail outlets, a review of advertising campaigns and their impact on children and minority groups, prohibiting non-tobacco companies from entering into contracts with tobacco companies, and requesting restaurant operators maintain smoke-free restaurants.

In June 2009, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act was signed into law, giving the FDA authority to regulate the tobacco industry for the first time, including the power to block or approve new products as well as the nicotine and other content in existing tobacco products. This legislation empowers the imposition of a ban on tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds, require FDA-approved graphic warning labels that occupy 50 percent of the space on each package of cigarettes.

In September 2009, the FDA issued a ban on the sale of flavored cigarettes, exercising its regulatory power in a major way over tobacco for the first time under the new law. The ban affected tobacco products with chocolate, vanilla, clove, and other similar flavors.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to limit the sale of tobacco products to children.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking producers of tobacco product components (such as filters, adhesives, flavorings, and paper products) to halt sales to tobacco companies.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask restaurants to adopt smoke-free policies and that ask tobacco companies to support smoke-free legislation.

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§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking a report on a tobacco company’s advertising approach.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals at insurance companies to cease investment in tobacco companies.

§ Vote for proposals at producers of cigarette components calling for a report outlining the risks and potential liabilities of the production of these components.

§ Vote for proposals calling for tobacco companies to cease the production of tobacco products.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to stop all advertising, marketing and sale of cigarettes using the terms “light,” “ultra-light,” “mild,” and other similar words and/or colors.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to increase health warnings on cigarette smoking. (i.e.: information for pregnant women, “Canadian Style” warnings, filter safety).

Adopt Policy/Report on Drug Pricing

Pharmaceutical drug pricing, both within the United States and internationally, has raised many questions of the companies that are responsible for creating and marketing these treatments. Shareholder proponents, activists and even some legislators have called upon drug companies to restrain pricing of prescription drugs.

The high cost of prescription drugs is a vital issue for senior citizens across the country. Seniors have the greatest need for prescription drugs, accounting for a significant portion of all prescription drug sales, but they often live on fixed incomes and are underinsured.

Proponents note that efforts to reign-in pharmaceutical costs will not negatively impact research and development (R&D) costs and that retail drug prices are consistently higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized nations. Pharmaceutical companies often respond that adopting a formal drug pricing policy could put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Against the backdrop of the AIDS crisis in Africa, many shareholders have called on companies to address the issue of affordable drugs for the treatment of AIDS, as well as tuberculosis and malaria throughout the developing world. When analyzing such resolutions, consideration should be made of the strategic implications of pricing policies in the market.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to prepare a report on drug pricing.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt a formal policy on drug pricing.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call on companies to develop a policy to provide affordable HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria drugs in third-world nations.

§ Vote for proposals asking for reports on the economic effects and legal risks of limiting pharmaceutical products to Canada or certain wholesalers.

§ Vote case-by-case proposals requesting that companies adopt policies not to constrain prescription drug re-importation by limiting supplies to foreign markets.

Government and Military

Weapons-related proposals may target handguns, landmines, defense contracting, or sale of weapons to foreign governments.

Prepare Report to Renounce Future Landmine Production

Although very few companies currently produce landmines, some companies continue to have links to landmine production or produce components that are used to make landmines. Shareholders have asked companies to renounce the future development of landmines or their components, or to prepare a report on the feasibility of such a renouncement.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking a report on the renouncement of future landmine production.

Prepare Report on Foreign Military Sales

Shareholders have filed proxy resolutions asking companies to account for their policies surrounding the sale of military equipment to foreign governments. The proposals can take various forms. One resolution simply calls on companies to report on their foreign military sales, provide information on military product exports, disclose the company’s basis for determining whether those sales should be made, and any procedures used to market or negotiate those sales. Another resolution calls for companies to report on “offsets” e.g. guarantee of new jobs in the purchasing country and technology transfers. Offsets involve a commitment by military contractors and the U.S. government to direct benefits back to a foreign government as a condition of a military sale.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to report on foreign military sales or offset agreements.

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals that call for outright restrictions on foreign military sales.

Depleted Uranium/Nuclear Weapons

Depleted uranium is the less radioactive uranium that is left behind after enriched uranium is produced for nuclear reactor fuel and fissile material for nuclear weapons. The main difference is that depleted uranium contains at least three times less U-235 than natural uranium. However, it is still weakly radioactive. Shareholders want reports on companies’ policies, procedures and involvement in the said substance and nuclear weapons.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report on involvement, policies, and procedures related to depleted uranium and nuclear weapons.

Adopt Ethical Criteria for Weapons Contracts

Shareholders have requested that companies review their code of conduct and statements of ethical criteria for military production-related contract bids, awards, and execution to incorporate environmental factors and sustainability issues related to the contract bidding process. Sustainability is a business model that requires companies to balance the needs and interests of various stakeholders while concurrently sustaining their businesses, communities, and the environment for future generations.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and amend, if necessary, the company’s code of conduct and statements of ethical criteria for military production-related contract bids, awards and execution.

Animal Welfare

Animal Rights/Testing

Shareholders and animal rights groups, including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), may file resolutions calling for the end to painful and unnecessary animal testing on laboratory animals by companies developing products for the cosmetics and medical supply industry. Since advanced testing methods now produce many reliable results without the use of live animals, Catholic Advisory Services generally supports proposals on this issue. In cases where it can be determined that alternative testing methods are unreliable or are required by law, Catholic Advisory Services recommends voting against such proposals. Other resolutions call for the adoption of animal welfare standards that would ensure humane treatment of animals on vendors’ farms and slaughter houses. Catholic Advisory Services will generally vote in favor of such resolutions.

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Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to limit unnecessary animal testing where alternative testing methods are feasible or not barred by law.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to adopt or/and report on company animal welfare standards or animal-related risks.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the operational costs and liabilities associated with selling animals.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate cruel product testing methods.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to monitor, limit, report, or eliminate the outsourcing of animal testing to overseas laboratories.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt or adhere to a public animal welfare policy at both company and contracted laboratory levels.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to evaluate, adopt, or require suppliers to adopt Controlled Atmosphere Killing (CAK) slaughter methods.

Political and Charitable Giving

Lobbying Efforts

Shareholders have asked companies to report on their lobbying efforts on proposed legislation or to refute established scientific research regarding climate change, the health effects of smoking, fuel efficiency standards etc. Proponents have pointed to potential legislation on climate change, the lethargic pace of improvements in fuel efficiency standards in the U.S. automotive industry, and the highly litigious nature surrounding the tobacco industry as rationales for greater transparency on corporate lobbying practices that would shed light on whether companies are acting in the best long-term interests of their shareholders. Proponents of lobbying resolutions typically request enhanced disclosure of lobbying policies and expenditures, including a report on the policies and procedures related to lobbying, amounts used for various types of lobbying, and any membership or payments to a tax-exempt organization that writes and endorses model legislation.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on their lobbying activities, including efforts to challenge scientific research and influence governmental legislation.

§ Vote for proposals requesting information on a company’s lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures.

Political Contributions/Non-Partisanship

As evidenced by the U.S. Supreme Court’s January 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission that lifted restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections, changes in legislation that governs corporate political giving have, rather than limiting such contributions, increased the potential for corporate contributions to the political process and the complexity of tracking such contributions.

Proponents of political spending resolutions generally call for enhanced disclosure of political contributions, including a report on the policies and procedures for corporate political campaign contributions and trade association expenditures, the respective amounts of such donations using company funds, or an assessment of the impacts of such contributions on the firm’s image, sales and profitability. Shareholder advocates of these proposals are concerned with the lack of transparency on political giving and the increasing involvement and influence of corporations in the political process.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-303 89 of 98

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals calling for a company to disclose political and trade association contributions, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive.

§ Vote for proposals calling for a company to maintain a policy of political non-partisanship.

§ Vote against proposals asking a company to refrain from making any political contributions.

Charitable Contributions

Shareholder proponents of charitable-contributions related resolutions may seek greater disclosure on a company’s charitable donations including dollar amounts, sponsorships, and policies on corporate philanthropy. Catholic Advisory Services is generally supportive of increased transparency around corporate charitable giving. However, some resolutions extend beyond mere disclosure requests and attempt to influence or restrict companies’ contributions to specific types of beneficiaries in a manner that furthers particular objectives supported by the proposal sponsors. Catholic Advisory Services believes that management is better positioned to decide what criteria are appropriate for making corporate charitable contributions. Also, some of the proposals may require companies to poll their shareholders as part of the grant-making process. Since majority of companies generally have thousands of shareholders, contacting, confirming, and processing each individual opinion and/or consent would be a burdensome and expensive exercise.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder resolutions seeking enhanced transparency on corporate philanthropy.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals imposing charitable giving criteria or requiring shareholder ratification of grants.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals requesting that companies prohibit charitable contributions.

Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s alignment of political contributions, lobbying, and electioneering spending with a company’s publicly stated values and policies, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive. Additionally, Catholic Advisory Services will consider whether:

§ The company’s policies, management, board oversight, governance processes, and level of disclosure related to direct political contributions, lobbying activities, and payments to trade associations, political action committees, or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding: the reasons for its support of candidates for public offices; the reasons for support of and participation in trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and other political activities;

§ Any incongruencies identified between a company’s direct and indirect political expenditures and its publicly stated values and priorities;

§ Recent significant controversies related to the company’s direct and indirect lobbying, political contributions, or political activities.

Disclosure on Prior Government Service

Shareholders have asked companies to disclose the identity of any senior executive and/or other high-level employee, consultant, lobbyist, attorney, or investment banker who has served in government. Although the movement of individuals between government and the private sector may benefit both, the potential also exists for conflicts of interest, especially in industries that have extensive dealings with government agencies.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-304 90 of 98

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the disclosure of prior government service of the company’s key executives.

Consumer Lending and Economic Development

Adopt Policy/Report on Predatory Lending Practices

Predatory lending involves charging excessive fees to subprime borrowers without adequate disclosure. More specifically, predatory lending includes misleading subprime borrowers about the terms of a loan, charging excessive fees that are folded into the body of a refinancing loan, including life insurance policies or other unnecessary additions to a mortgage, or lending to homeowners with insufficient income to cover loan payments.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the development of a policy or preparation of a report to guard against predatory lending practices.

Disclosure on Credit in Developing Countries (LDCs) or Forgive LDC Debt

Shareholders have asked banks and other financial services firms to develop and disclose lending policies for less developed countries. Proponents are concerned that, without such policies, lending to developing countries may contribute to the outflow of capital, the inefficient use of capital, and corruption, all of which increase the risk of loan loss. In the interest of promoting improved LDC lending practices and responsible loan disclosure, Catholic Advisory Services generally supports voting for such proposals. In cases where it can be determined that companies have been proactive and responsible in developing policies, Catholic Advisory Services may recommend a vote against the proposal’s adoption. Catholic Advisory Services usually opposes proposals that call for outright loan forgiveness; such action represents an unacceptable loss to lending institutions and their shareholders.

Catholic Advisory Services may support such proposals at banks that have failed to make reasonable provisions for non-performing loans as a means to encourage a change in policy.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking for disclosure on lending practices in developing countries, unless the company has demonstrated a clear proactive record on the issue.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals asking banks to forgive loans outright.

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for loan forgiveness at banks that have failed to make reasonable provisions for non-performing loans.

§ Vote for proposals to restructure and extend the terms of non-performing loans.

Community Investing

Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report addressing the company’s community investing efforts.

Such proposals also ask companies to review their policies regarding their investments in different communities.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals that seek a policy review or report addressing the company’s community investing efforts.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-305 91 of 98

Miscellaneous

Adult Entertainment

Traditionally, there have not been many proposals filed in the area of adult entertainment. However, with the consolidation of the communications industry, a number of large companies have ended up with ownership of cable companies. These cable companies may offer their customers access to pay-per-view programming or channels intended for adult audiences. Proponents of shareholder proposals on this issue ask cable companies and companies with interests in cable companies to assess the costs and benefits of continuing to distribute sexually-explicit content, including the potential negative impact on the company’s image.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that seek a review of the company’s involvement with pornography.

Abortion/Right to Life Issues

Shareholder proposals pertaining to abortion and right to life issues are rare. However, in the past shareholders have asked companies to stop manufacturing abortifacient drugs; to separate abortifacient drug operations from other operations; or to discontinue acute-care or physician management practices that involve support for abortion services.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote on shareholder proposals that address right to life issues in a manner consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church on abortion and right to life issues.

Anti-Social Proposals

A number of ‘anti-social’ shareholder proposals have been filed at companies requesting increased disclosure. While these proposals’ requests are very similar to those submitted by shareholder advocates within traditional socially responsible investor circles, the underlying motives for filing the proposals appear to be very different. In addition to charitable contribution proposals, anti-social proposals addressing climate change, sustainability, and conflicts of interest may be seen at shareholder meetings. Despite implicitly different motivations in some of these proposals, the underlying requests for increased disclosure, in some cases, may be worth shareholder support.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against shareholder proposals that do not seek to ultimately advance the goals of the social investment community.

§ Vote case-by-case on anti-social shareholder proposals seeking a review or report on the company’s charitable contributions.

Violence and Adult Themes in Video Games

Perceptions of increased sex and violence in video games have led certain shareholders to question the availability of adult-themed content to children and teens. The Entertainment Software Ratings Board, which provides ratings for video games, has classified approximately 34 percent of the total games it reviews as either Teen, Mature, or Adults Only.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on company policies related to the sale of mature-rated video games to children and teens.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-306 92 of 98

Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors

Proponents of these proposals feel that social and environmental criteria should be factored into the formulas used in determining executive compensation packages. The shareholder sponsors of the resolutions look to companies to review current compensation practices and to include social or environmental performance criteria such as accounting for “poor corporate citizenship” and meeting environmental or workplace safety objectives and metrics when evaluating executive compensation. Some of the non-financial criteria that proponents of these resolutions seek to be incorporated in compensation program design include workplace safety, environmental stewardship, or diversity and customer/employee satisfaction – as part of a written policy used to align compensation with performance on non-financial factors alongside financial criteria.

Proponents believe that factors such as poor environmental performance, workplace lawsuits, etc. could have a significant adverse impact on a company’s financial performance if not proactively and adequately addressed, and that these factors should be considered along with traditional financial considerations when determining executive pay. The significant stock price declines and massive losses in shareholder value stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster and the tragic explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine that killed 29 employees is a sobering reminder of the need to have the right management incentives in place to ensure that social and environmental risks are actively managed and mitigated against. Given the proliferation of derivative lawsuits targeted at firms such as Halliburton, Transocean and Cameron International that were suppliers to or partners with BP in a capacity that ignored safety considerations or that contributed to the economic and ecological disaster, investors are increasingly mindful of the far-reaching implications that exposure to social or environmental risks could have on shareholder value at portfolio companies.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for linkage of executive pay to non-financial factors including performance against social and environmental goals, customer/employee satisfaction, corporate downsizing, community involvement, human rights, or predatory lending.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on linking executive pay to non-financial factors.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-307 93 of 98

9.    Mutual Fund Proxies

Election of Trustees and Directors

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings. However, mutual fund boards do not usually have compensation committees, so do not withhold for the lack of this committee.

Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: For closed-end management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at CEFs that have not provided a compelling rationale for opting-in to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a by-law amendment to a shareholder vote.

Investment Advisory Agreement

An investment advisory agreement is an agreement between a mutual fund and its financial advisor under which the financial advisor provides investment advice to the fund in return for a fee based on the fund’s net asset size.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on investment advisory agreements should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors:

§ Proposed and current fee schedules;

§ Fund category/investment objective;

§ Performance benchmarks;

§ Share price performance as compared with peers;

§ Resulting fees relative to peers;

§ Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control).

Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Non-fundamental Restriction

Fundamental investment restrictions are limitations within a fund’s articles of incorporation that limit the investment practices of the particular fund.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non-fundamental restriction, considering the following factors:

§ The fund’s target investments;

§ The reasons given by the fund for the change; and

§ The projected impact of the change on the portfolio.

Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Non-fundamental

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals to change a fund’s fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-308 94 of 98

Distribution Agreements

Distribution agreements are agreements between a fund and its distributor which provide that the distributor is paid a fee to promote the sale of the fund’s shares.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on distribution agreement proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives;

§ The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance;

§ The competitiveness of the fund in the industry; and

§ The terms of the agreement.

Approving New Classes or Series of Shares

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares.

Convert Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund

Although approval of these proposals would eliminate the discount at which the fund’s shares trade. The costs associated with converting the fund, in addition to the potential risks to long-term shareholder value, outweigh the potential benefits of the conversion.

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on conversion proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance as a closed-end fund;

§ Market in which the fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals.

Proxy Contests

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proxy contests, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance relative to its peers;

§ Market in which fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the issues;

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals;

§ Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;

§ Independence of directors;

§ Experience and skills of director candidates;

§ Governance profile of the company;

§ Evidence of management entrenchment.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-309 95 of 98

Preferred Stock Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares, considering the following factors:

§ Stated specific financing purpose;

§ Possible dilution for common shares;

§ Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes.

Mergers

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on merger proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Resulting fee structure;

§ Performance of both funds;

§ Continuity of management personnel; and

§ Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.

Business Development Companies – Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV) if:

§ The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date that is less than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;

§ A majority of the independent directors who have no financial interest in the sale have made a determination as to whether such sale would be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders prior to selling shares below NAV; and

§ The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either:

§ Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one- and three-year median TSRs; or

§ Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholders.

Change in Fund’s Subclassification

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes in a fund’s sub-classification, considering the following factors: a) potential competitiveness; b) current and potential returns; c) risk of concentration; d) consolidation in target industry.

Changing the Domicile of a Fund

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on re-incorporations, considering the following factors: a) regulations of both states; b) required fundamental policies of both states; c) the increased flexibility available.

Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors: a) strategies employed to salvage the company; b) the fund’s past performance; c) the terms of the liquidation.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-310 96 of 98

Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate subadvisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one subadviser.

Name Change Proposals

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on name change proposals, considering the following factors: a) political/economic changes in the target market; b) consolidation in the target market; and c) current asset composition.

1940 Act Policies

Catholic Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors: a) potential competitiveness; b) regulatory developments; c) current and potential returns; and d) current and potential risk.

§ Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-311 97 of 98

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W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-312 98 of 98

U N I T E D S T A T E S SRI PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 2023 Policy Recommendations Published January 17, 2023 W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	F-321
1.     Board of Directors	F-322
Uncontested Election of Directors	F-322
Board Accountability	F-323
Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structures	F-323
Problematic Audit-Related Practices	F-326
Problematic Compensation Practices	F-326
Problematic Pledging of Company Stock	F-327
Material Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Risk Oversight Failures	F-327
Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero	F-327
Board Responsiveness	F-328
Director Independence	F-328
Composition	F-329
Board Diversity	F-329
Classification of Directors – U.S.	F-330
Board-Related Management Proposals	F-332
Classification/Declassification of the Board	F-332
Majority Vote Threshold for Director Elections	F-332
Cumulative Voting	F-332
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation	F-333
Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies	F-333
Board Size	F-334
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	F-334
Board Refreshment	F-334
Board-Related Shareholder Proposals/Initiatives	F-335
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access	F-335
Annual Election (Declassification) of the Board	F-335
Majority Threshold Voting Shareholder Proposals	F-335
Majority of Independent Directors	F-336
Establishment of Independent Committees	F-336
Independent Board Chair	F-336
Establishment of Board Committees	F-336
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	F-336
Board Policy on Shareholder Engagement	F-337
Proxy Access	F-337
Board Refreshment	F-337
CEO Succession Planning	F-338

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-314 2 of 98

Vote No Campaigns	F-338
2.    Ratification of Auditors	F-339
Auditor-Related Shareholder Proposals	F-339
Ratify Auditors/Ensure Auditor Independence	F-339
Auditor Rotation	F-339
3.     Takeover Defenses / Shareholder Rights	F-340
Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Management Proposals	F-340
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)	F-340
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments	F-341
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions	F-342
Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirements	F-342
Shareholder Ability to Call a Special Meeting	F-342
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent	F-343
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations	F-343
Fair Price Provisions	F-344
Greenmail	F-344
Confidential Voting	F-344
Control Share Acquisition Provisions	F-345
Control Share Cash-Out Provisions	F-345
Disgorgement Provisions	F-345
State Takeover Statutes	F-345
Freeze-Out Provisions	F-345
Reincorporation Proposals	F-346
Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent	F-346
Shareholder Litigation Rights	F-346
Federal Forum Selection Provisions	F-346
Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters	F-346
Fee Shifting	F-347
Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Shareholder Proposals	F-347
Shareholder Proposals to put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy	F-347
Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirements	F-347
Remove Antitakeover Provisions	F-348
Reimburse Proxy Solicitation Expenses	F-348
Virtual Shareholder Meetings	F-348
4.     Miscellaneous Governance Provisions	F-349
Bundled Proposals	F-349
Adjourn Meeting	F-349
Changing Corporate Name	F-349
Amend Quorum Requirements	F-349

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-315 3 of 98

Amend Minor Bylaws	F-350
Other Business	F-350
5.    Capital Structure	F-351
Common Stock Authorization	F-351
General Authorization Requests	F-351
Specific Authorization Requests	F-352
Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan	F-352
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends	F-352
Reverse Stock Splits	F-352
Preferred Stock Authorization	F-352
General Authorization Requests	F-353
Specific Authorization Requests	F-354
Blank Check Preferred Stock	F-354
Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock	F-354
Unequal Voting Rights/Dual Class Structure	F-354
Preemptive Rights	F-355
Debt Restructurings	F-355
Share Repurchase Programs	F-355
Conversion of Securities	F-356
Recapitalization	F-356
Tracking Stock	F-356
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S	F-356
6.     Executive and Director Compensation	F-357
Criteria for Evaluating Executive Pay	F-359
Pay-for-Performance Evaluation	F-359
Pay-for-Performance Elements	F-359
Pay Equity (Quantum) Elements	F-359
Problematic Pay Practices	F-360
Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking	F-360
Options Backdating	F-361
Board Communications and Responsiveness	F-361
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals	F-361
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay	F-362
Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale	F-362
Equity-Based Incentive Plans	F-363
Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)	F-364
Repricing Provisions	F-365
Pay-for-Performance Misalignment – Application to Equity Plans	F-365
Three-Year Value Adjusted Burn Rate	F-365

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-316 4 of 98

Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control	F-366
Other Compensation Plans	F-366
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))	F-366
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs)	F-367
Qualified Plans	F-367
Non-Qualified Plans	F-367
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)	F-368
Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options	F-368
Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash	F-369
Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs	F-369
401(k) Employee Benefit Plans	F-370
Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes	F-370
Director Compensation	F-370
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs	F-371
Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors	F-371
Outside Director Stock Awards/Options in Lieu of Cash	F-372
Director Retirement Plans	F-372
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation	F-372
Increase Disclosure of Executive Compensation	F-372
Limit Executive Compensation	F-372
Stock Ownership Requirements	F-373
Prohibit/Require Shareholder Approval for Option Repricing	F-373
Severance Agreements/Golden Parachutes	F-373
Cash Balance Plans	F-373
Performance-Based Equity Awards	F-374
Pay for Superior Performance	F-374
Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals	F-375
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity	F-375
Tax Gross-up Proposals	F-375
Compensation Consultants—Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization	F-375
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits	F-375
Recoup Bonuses	F-376
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy	F-376
Bonus Banking	F-376
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time	F-376
Non-Deductible Compensation	F-376
Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)	F-377

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-317 5 of 98

7.     Mergers and Corporate Restructurings	F-378
Mergers and Acquisitions	F-378
Corporate Reorganization/Restructuring Plans (Bankruptcy)	F-379
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)	F-379
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) – Proposals for Extensions	F-380
Spin-offs	F-380
Asset Purchases	F-380
Asset Sales	F-380
Liquidations	F-380
Joint Ventures	F-380
Appraisal Rights	F-381
Going Private/Dark Transactions (Leveraged buyouts and Minority Squeeze-outs)	F-381
Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures	F-381
Formation of Holding Company	F-382
Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals	F-382
8.     Social and Environmental Proposals	F-383
Diversity and Equality	F-384
Add Women and Minorities to the Board	F-384
Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audits	F-384
Report on the Distribution of Stock Options by Gender and Race	F-384
Prepare Report/Promote EEOC-Related Activities	F-385
Report on Progress Towards Glass Ceiling Commission Recommendations	F-385
Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity	F-385
Report on/Eliminate Use of Racial Stereotypes in Advertising	F-386
Gender, Race, or Ethnicity Pay Gap	F-386
Labor and Human Rights	F-386
Codes of Conduct and Vendor Standards	F-387
Adopt/Report on MacBride Principles	F-387
Community Impact Assessment/Indigenous Peoples’ Rights	F-388
Report on Risks of Outsourcing	F-388
Report on the Impact of Health Pandemics on Company Operations	F-388
Mandatory Arbitration	F-389
Sexual Harassment	F-389
Operations in High Risk Markets	F-389
Reports on Operations in Burma/Myanmar	F-390
Reports on Operations in China	F-390
Product Sales to Repressive Regimes	F-390
Internet Privacy/Censorship and Data Security	F-390
Disclosure on Plant Closings	F-391

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Climate Change	F-392
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals	F-392
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals	F-392
Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas Emissions	F-392
Invest in Clean/Renewable Energy	F-393
Energy Efficiency	F-393
Environment	F-393
Environmental/Sustainability Reports	F-394
Operations in Environmentally Sensitive Areas	F-394
Canadian Oil Sands	F-394
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge	F-395
Hydraulic Fracturing	F-395
Phase Out Chlorine-Based Chemicals	F-395
Land Procurement and Development	F-396
Report on the Sustainability of Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFO)	F-396
Adopt a Comprehensive Recycling Policy	F-396
Nuclear Energy	F-396
Water Use	F-397
Kyoto Protocol Compliance	F-397
Health and Safety	F-397
Toxic Materials	F-397
Product Safety	F-397
Workplace/Facility Safety	F-397
Report on Handgun Safety Initiatives	F-398
Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients	F-398
Tobacco-related Proposals	F-398
Adopt Policy/Report on Drug Pricing	F-399
Government and Military	F-400
Prepare Report to Renounce Future Landmine Production	F-400
Prepare Report on Foreign Military Sales	F-400
Depleted Uranium/Nuclear Weapons	F-400
Adopt Ethical Criteria for Weapons Contracts	F-400
Animal Welfare	F-401
Animal Rights/Testing	F-401
Political and Charitable Giving	F-401
Lobbying Efforts	F-401
Political Contributions/Non-Partisanship	F-402
Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency	F-402
Charitable Contributions	F-402
Disclosure on Prior Government Service	F-403

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Consumer Lending and Economic Development	F-403
Adopt Policy/Report on Predatory Lending Practices	F-403
Disclosure on Credit in Developing Countries (LDCs) or Forgive LDC Debt	F-403
Community Investing	F-404
Miscellaneous	F-404
Adult Entertainment	F-404
Abortion/Right to Life Issues	F-404
Anti-Social Proposals	F-404
Violence and Adult Themes in Video Games	F-405
Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors	F-405
9.    Mutual Fund Proxies	F-406
Election of Trustees and Directors	F-406
Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes	F-406
Investment Advisory Agreement	F-406
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Non-fundamental Restriction	F-406
Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Non-fundamental	F-406
Distribution Agreements	F-407
Approving New Classes or Series of Shares	F-407
Convert Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund	F-407
Proxy Contests	F-407
Preferred Stock Proposals	F-407
Mergers	F-408
Business Development Companies – Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value	F-408
Change in Fund’s Subclassification	F-408
Changing the Domicile of a Fund	F-408
Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation	F-408
Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval	F-408
Name Change Proposals	F-409
1940 Act Policies	F-409

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INTRODUCTION

ISS’ Social Advisory Services division recognizes that socially responsible investors have dual objectives: financial and social. Socially responsible investors invest for economic gain, as do all investors, but they also require that the companies in which they invest conduct their business in a socially and environmentally responsible manner.

These dual objectives carry through to socially responsible investors’ proxy voting activity once the security selection process is completed. In voting their shares, socially responsible institutional shareholders are concerned not only with sustainable economic returns to shareholders and good corporate governance but also with the ethical behavior of corporations and the social and environmental impact of their actions.

Social Advisory Services has, therefore, developed proxy voting guidelines that are consistent with the dual objectives of socially responsible shareholders. On matters of social and environmental import, the guidelines seek to reflect a broad consensus of the socially responsible investing community. Generally, we take as our frame of reference policies that have been developed by groups such as the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, the General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church, Domini Social Investments, and other leading church shareholders and socially responsible mutual fund companies. Additionally, we incorporate the active ownership and investment philosophies of leading globally recognized initiatives such as the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI), the United Nations Global Compact, and environmental and social European Union Directives.

On matters of corporate governance, executive compensation, and corporate structure, Social Advisory Services guidelines are based on a commitment to create and preserve economic value and to advance principles of good corporate governance consistent with responsibilities to society as a whole.

The guidelines provide an overview of how Social Advisory Services recommends that its clients vote. We note that there may be cases in which the final vote recommendation on a particular company varies from the vote guideline due to the fact that we closely examine the merits of each proposal and consider relevant information and company-specific circumstances in arriving at our decisions. Where Social Advisory Services acts as voting agent for its clients, it follows each client’s voting policy, which may differ in some cases from the policies outlined in this document. Social Advisory Services updates its guidelines on an annual basis to take into account emerging issues and trends on environmental, social, and corporate governance topics, in addition to evolving market standards, regulatory changes, and client feedback.

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1.    Board of Directors

A corporation’s board of directors sits at the apogee of the corporate governance system. Though they normally delegate responsibility for the management of the business to the senior executives they select and oversee, directors bear ultimate responsibility for the conduct of the corporation’s business. The role of directors in publicly held corporations has undergone considerable change in recent years. Once derided as rubber stamps for management, directors of public corporations today are expected to serve as effective guardians of shareholders’ interests.

Voting on directors and board-related issues is the most important use of the shareholder franchise, not simply a routine proxy item. Although uncontested director elections do not present alternative nominees from whom to choose, a high percentage of opposition votes is an expression of shareholder dissatisfaction and should be sufficient to elicit a meaningful response from management.

The role and responsibilities of directors has increasingly been the subject of much discussion and debate, given the current economic climate and the difficulties many companies now face in their respective markets. Influential organizations, including the American Law Institute, the American Bar Association, the National Association of Corporate Directors, and the Business Roundtable have issued reports and recommendations regarding the duties and accountability of corporate boards. Both mainstream and alternative media outlets have highlighted the numerous gaps within risk oversight of company boards and individual directors, and many institutional investors, in response, have capitalized on their rights as stakeholders to prompt changes. Corporations have taken notice, implementing many of the reforms championed by their shareholders.

Although differences of opinion remain, a fairly strong consensus has emerged on a number of key issues. It is widely agreed that the board’s most important responsibility is to ensure that the corporation is managed in the shareholders’ best long-term economic interest. This will often require boards to consider the impact of their actions on other constituencies, including employees, customers, local communities, and the environment.

§ The board’s principal functions are widely agreed to consist of the following:

§ To select, evaluate, and if necessary, replace management, including the chief executive officer;

§ To review and approve major strategies and financial objectives;

§ To advise management on significant issues;

§ To assure that effective controls are in place to safeguard corporate assets, manage risk, and comply with the law; and

§ To nominate directors and otherwise ensure that the board functions effectively.

Boards are expected to have a majority of directors independent of management. The independent directors are expected to organize much of the board’s work, even if the chief executive officer also serves as Chairman of the board. Key committees of the board are expected to be entirely independent of management. It is expected that boards will engage in critical self-evaluation of themselves and of individual members. Individual directors, in turn, are expected to devote significant amounts of time to their duties, to limit the number of directorships they accept, and to own a meaningful amount of stock in companies on whose boards they serve. Directors are ultimately responsible to the corporation’s shareholders. The most direct expression of this responsibility is the requirement that directors be elected to their positions by the shareholders. Shareholders are also asked to vote on a number of other matters regarding the role, structure, and composition of the board. Social Advisory Services classifies directors as either executive, non-independent non-executive, or independent directors.

Uncontested Election of Directors

Four broad principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:

1. Board Accountability: Accountability refers to the promotion of transparency into a company’s governance practices and annual board elections and the provision to shareholders the ability to remove problematic directors and to vote

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on takeover defenses or other charter/bylaw amendments. These practices help reduce the opportunity for management entrenchment.

2. Board Responsiveness: Directors should be responsive to shareholders, particularly in regard to shareholder proposals that receive a majority vote or management proposals that receive significant opposition and to tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered. Furthermore, shareholders should expect directors to devote sufficient time and resources to oversight of the company.

3. Director Independence: Without independence from management, the board may be unwilling or unable to effectively set company strategy and scrutinize performance or executive compensation.

4. Director Diversity/Competence: Companies should seek a diverse board of directors who can add value to the board through their specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees¹ considered on a case-by-case basis):

Board Accountability

Vote against or withhold from the entire board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) for the following:

Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structures

Classified Board Structure: The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant an against/withhold recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.

Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards: The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.

Director Performance Evaluation: The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted.

Problematic provisions include but are not limited to a classified board structure, supermajority vote requirements, a majority vote standard for director elections with no carve out for contested elections, inability for shareholders to call special meetings or act by written consent, a multi-class capital structure, and/or a non-shareholder approved poison pill.

¹  A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question.

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Poison Pills: Generally vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if:

§ The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature²;

§ The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or

§ The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders³.

Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill² (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:

§ The disclosed rationale for the adoption;

§ The trigger;

§ The company’s market capitalization (including absolute level and sudden changes);

§ A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; and

§ Other factors as relevant.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments: Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders. Considering the following factors:

§ The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;

§ Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;

§ The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;

§ The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ The company’s existing governance provisions;

§ The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and

§ Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:

§ Classified the board;

§ Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws;

§ Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or

§ Adopted another provision deemed egregious.

²  If the short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, Social Advisory Services will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption.

³  Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient.

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Problematic Governance Structure: For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting⁴ of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights:

§ Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ A classified board structure; or

§ Other egregious provisions.

A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.

Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

Unequal Voting Rights: Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a common stock structure with unequal voting rights⁵.

Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:

§ Newly-public companies⁶ with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public;

§ Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs;

§ Situations where the super-voting shares represent less than 5% of total voting power and therefore considered to be de minimis; or

§ The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained.

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions: Vote against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board, where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

⁴ Includes companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

⁵ This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”).

⁶ Newly-public companies generally include companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

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Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals: Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the governance committee if:

§ The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.

Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Generally continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Vote against/withhold from the members of the audit committee if:

§ The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive (see discussion under “Auditor Ratification);

§ The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or

§ There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote case-by-case on members of the audit committee and potentially the full board if:

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted.

Problematic Compensation Practices

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item, or, in egregious situations, vote against/withhold from members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay-for-performance);

§ The company maintains significant problematic pay practices including options backdating, excessive perks and overly generous employment contracts etc.;

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders;

§ The company reprices underwater options for stock, cash, or other consideration without prior shareholder approval, even if allowed in the firm’s equity plan;

§ The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or

§ The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.

Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.

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Problematic Pledging of Company Stock

Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:

§ The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;

§ The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;

§ Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;

§ Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and

§ Any other relevant factors.

Material Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Risk Oversight Failures

Vote against/withhold from directors individually, committee members, or potentially the entire board, due to:

§ Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight⁷, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately guard against or manage ESG risks;

§ A lack of sustainability reporting in the company’s public documents and/or website in conjunction with a failure to adequately manage or mitigate environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks;

§ Failure to replace management as appropriate; or

§ Egregious actions related to the director(s)’ service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero

For companies that are significant GHG emitters⁸, through its operations or value chain, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where Social Advisory Services determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory.

For 2023, minimum steps needed to be considered to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory are (all minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with policy):

§ The company has detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:

§ Board governance measures;

§ Corporate strategy;

§ Risk management analyses; and

§ Metrics and targets.

§ The company has declared a Net Zero target by 2050 or sooner and the target includes scope 1, 2, and relevant scope 3 emissions.

§ The company has set a medium-term target for reducing its GHG emissions.

⁷ Examples of failure of risk oversight include but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant environmental incidents including spills and pollution; large scale or repeat workplace fatalities or injuries; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock.

⁸ For 2023, companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.

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Expectations about what constitutes “minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory” will increase over time.

Board Responsiveness

Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

§ The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:

§ Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;

§ Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;

§ The subject matter of the proposal;

§ The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;

§ Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;

§ The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

§ The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;

§ At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.

Vote case-by-case on compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Say on Pay proposal if:

§ The company’s previous say-on-pay received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast. Factors that will be considered are:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

§ The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.

Director Independence

Vote against/withhold from the entire board if the full board is less than majority independent.

Vote against/withhold from non-independent directors (executive directors and non-independent non-executive directors per the Categorization of Directors) when:

§ The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;

§ The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or

§ The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.

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Composition

Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except nominees who served only part of the fiscal year⁹) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:

§ Medical issues/illness;

§ Family emergencies; and

§ If the director’s total service was three meetings or fewer and the director missed only one meeting.

In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.

If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.

Overboarded Directors: Vote against or withhold from individual directors who:

§ Sit on more than five public company boards; or

§ Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own— withhold only at their outside boards¹⁰.

Board Diversity

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from incumbent nominating committee members if:

§ The board is not comprised of at least 40 percent underrepresented gender identities¹¹; or

§ The board is not comprised of at least 20 percent racially or ethnically diverse directors.

Vote against or withhold from other directors on a case-by-case basis.

⁹ Nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy.

¹⁰ Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Social Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

¹¹ Underrepresented gender identities include directors who identify as women or as non-binary.

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Classification of Directors – U.S.

1. Executive Director

1.1. Current officerⁱ of the company or one of its affiliatesⁱⁱ.

2. Non-Independent Non-Executive Director

Board Identification

2.1. Director identified as not independent by board.

Controlling/Significant Shareholder

2.2. Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group).

Current Employment at Company or Related Company

2.3. Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives).

2.4. Officerⁱ, former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company.

Former Employment

2.5. Former CEO of the company^iii,iv.

2.6. Former non-CEO officerⁱ of the company or an affiliateⁱⁱ within the past five years.

2.7. Former officerⁱ of an acquired company within the past five years^iv.

2.8. Officerⁱ of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years.

2.9. Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made^v.

Family Members

2.10. Immediate family member^vi of a current or former officerⁱ of the company or its affiliatesⁱⁱ within the last five years.

2.11. Immediate family member^vi of a current employee of company or its affiliatesⁱⁱ where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role).

Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships

2.12. Director who (or whose immediate family member^vi) currently provides professional services^vii in excess of $10,000 per year to: the company, an affiliateⁱⁱ, or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; or who is (or whose immediate family member^vi is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services.

2.13. Director who (or whose immediate family member^vi) currently has any material transactional relationship^viii with the company or its affiliatesⁱⁱ; or who is (or whose immediate family member^vi is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationship^viii (excluding investments in the company through a private placement).

2.14. Director who (or whose immediate family member^vi) is a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments^viii from the company or its affiliatesⁱⁱ.

Other Relationships

2.15. Party to a voting agreement^ix to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote.

2.16. Has (or an immediate family member^vi has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its compensation committee^x.

2.17. Founder^xi of the company but not currently an employee.

2.18. Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers.

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2.19. Any material^xii relationship with the company.

3. Independent Director

3.1. No material^xii connection to the company other than a board seat.

Footnotes:

ⁱ The definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes: the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will generally be classified as a Non-Independent Non-Executive Director under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation exceeding $10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Director.

ii “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. Social Advisory Services uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.

ⁱⁱⁱ Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).

^iv When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, Social Advisory Services will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

^v Social Advisory Services will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. Social Advisory Services will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.

^vi “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

^vii Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include, but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; legal services; property management services; realtor services; lobbying services; executive search services; and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services; IT tech support services; educational services; and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of $10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.

^viii A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity exceeding the greater of $200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of $1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NYSE listing standards. In the case of a company which follows neither of the preceding standards, Social Advisory Services will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).

^ix Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as independent directors if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders’ interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

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^x Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on each other’s boards and at least one serves on the other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).

^xi The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, Social Advisory Services may deem him or her an independent outsider.

^xii For purposes of Social Advisory Services’ director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

Board-Related Management Proposals

Classification/Declassification of the Board

Under a classified board structure only one class of directors would stand for election each year, and the directors in each class would generally serve three-year terms. Although staggered boards can provide continuity for companies at the board level, there are also a number of downsides to the structure. First, a classified board can also be used to entrench management and effectively preclude most takeover bids or proxy contests. Board classification forces dissidents and would-be acquirers to negotiate with the incumbent board, which has the authority to decide on offers without a shareholder vote. In addition, when a board is classified, it is difficult to remove individual members for either poor attendance or poor performance; shareholders would only have the chance to vote on a given director every third year when he or she comes up for election. The classified board structure can also limit shareholders’ ability to withhold votes from inside directors that sit on key board committee, or to withhold votes from an entire board slate to protest the lack of board diversity. According to ISS’ 2012 Board Practices study, the number of S&P 500 companies with classified boards has continued to fall. In 2015, only 17 percent of S&P 500 companies maintained staggered boards, compared to 25 percent in 2014, 30 percent in 2013, and 39 percent in 2010. While we recognize that there are some advantages to classified boards, based on the latest studies on classified boards, the fact that classified boards can make it more difficult for shareholders to remove individual directors, and the fact that classified boards can be used as an antitakeover device, Social Advisory Services recommends against the adoption of classified boards.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.

§ Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board of directors.

Majority Vote Threshold for Director Elections

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections.

Vote against if no carve-out for plurality in contested elections is included.

Cumulative Voting

Most corporations provide that shareholders are entitled to cast one vote for each share owned. Under a cumulative voting scheme the shareholder is permitted to have one vote per share for each director to be elected. Shareholders are permitted to apportion those votes in any manner they wish among the director candidates. Shareholders have the opportunity to elect a minority representative to a board through cumulative voting, thereby ensuring representation for all sizes of shareholders. For example, if there is a company with a ten-member board and 500 shares outstanding—the total number of votes that may be cast is 5,000. In this case a shareholder with 51 shares (10.2 percent of the outstanding shares) would be guaranteed one board seat because all votes may be cast for one candidate.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulative voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting unless:

§ The company has proxy access¹², thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and

§ The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (insider voting power > 50%).

Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals on director and officer indemnification, liability protection, and exculpation¹³.

Consider the stated rationale for the proposed change. Also consider, among other factors, the extent to which the proposal would:

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care.

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of loyalty.

§ Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.

§ Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.

Vote for those proposals providing such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if both of the following apply:

§ If the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and

§ If only the individual’s legal expenses would be covered.

Shareholder Ability to Remove Directors/Fill Vacancies

Shareholder ability to remove directors, with or without cause, is either prescribed by a state’s business corporation law, an individual company’s articles of incorporation, or its bylaws. Many companies have sought shareholder approval for charter or bylaw amendments that would prohibit the removal of directors except for cause, thus ensuring that directors would retain their directorship for their full-term unless found guilty of self-dealing. By requiring cause to be demonstrated through due process, management insulates the directors from removal even if a director has been performing poorly, not attending meetings, or not acting in the best interests of shareholders.

¹² A proxy access right that meets the recommended guidelines.

¹³ Indemnification: the condition of being secured against loss or damage.
Limited liability: a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff.
Exculpation: to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director or officer to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.

§ Vote for proposals to restore shareholder ability to remove directors with or without cause.

§ Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.

§ Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.

Board Size

Proposals which would allow management to increase or decrease the size of the board at its own discretion are often used by companies as a takeover defense. Social Advisory Services supports management proposals to fix the size of the board at a specific number, thus preventing management, when facing a proxy contest, from increasing the board size without shareholder approval. By increasing the size of the board, management can make it more difficult for dissidents to gain control of the board. Fixing the size of the board also prevents a reduction in the size of the board as a strategy to oust independent directors. Fixing board size also prevents management from increasing the number of directors in order to dilute the effects of cumulative voting.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals that seek to fix the size of the board.

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals that seek to change the size or range of the board.

§ Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board outside of a specific range without shareholder approval.

Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on how reasonable the criteria are and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

Board Refreshment

Board refreshment is best implemented through an ongoing program of individual director evaluations, conducted annually, to ensure the evolving needs of the board are met and to bring in fresh perspectives, skills, and diversity as needed.

Term/Tenure Limits

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals regarding director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit;

§ The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process;

§ Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures;

§ Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to non-independent directors; and

§ Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner.

Age Limits

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.

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Board-Related Shareholder Proposals/Initiatives

Proxy Contests/Proxy Access

Contested elections of directors frequently occur when a board candidate or slate runs for the purpose of seeking a significant change in corporate policy or control. Competing slates will be evaluated based upon the personal qualifications of the candidates, the economic impact of the policies that they advance, and their expressed and demonstrated commitment to the interests of all shareholders.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes in a contested election of directors are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors:

§ Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry;

§ Management’s track record;

§ Background to the proxy contest;

§ Qualifications of director nominees (both slates);

§ Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;

§ Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates);

§ Stock ownership positions; and

§ Impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).

Annual Election (Declassification) of the Board

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to repeal classified (staggered) boards and to elect all directors annually.

Vote against proposals to classify the board.

Majority Threshold Voting Shareholder Proposals

A majority vote standard requires that for directors to be elected (or re-elected) to serve on the company’s board they must receive support from holders of a majority of shares voted. Shareholders have expressed strong support for shareholder proposals on majority threshold voting. Social Advisory Services believes shareholders should have a greater voice in the election of directors and believes majority threshold voting represents a viable alternative to the plurality system in the U.S. Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for precatory and binding resolutions requesting that the board change the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.

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Majority of Independent Directors

Social Advisory Services believes that a board independent from management is of vital importance to a company and its shareholders. Accordingly, Social Advisory Services will cast votes in a manner that shall encourage the independence of boards.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed threshold by Social Advisory Services’ definition of independence.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to strengthen the definition of independence for board directors.

Establishment of Independent Committees

Most corporate governance experts agree that the key board committees (audit, compensation, and nominating/corporate governance) of a corporation should include only independent directors. The independence of key committees has been encouraged by regulation. Social Advisory Services believes that initiatives to increase the independent representation of these committees or to require that these committees be independent should be supported.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors.

Independent Board Chair

One of the principle functions of the board is to monitor and evaluate the performance of the CEO. The chairperson’s duty to oversee management is obviously compromised when he or she is required to monitor himself or herself. Generally Social Advisory Services recommends a vote for shareholder proposals that would require that the position of board chair be held by an individual with no materials ties to the company other than their board seat.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that would require the board chair to be independent of management.

Establishment of Board Committees

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee to address broad corporate policy topics or to provide a forum for ongoing dialogue on issues such as the environment, human or labor rights, shareholder relations, occupational health and safety etc. when the formation of such committees appears to be a potentially effective method of protecting or enhancing shareholder value. In evaluating such proposals, the following factors will be considered:

§ Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and to what degree they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

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Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee candidate who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:

§ The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;

§ The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Board Policy on Shareholder Engagement

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholders proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:

§ Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board;

§ Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;

§ The company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and

§ The company has an independent chairman or a lead director (according to Social Advisory Services’ definition). This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.

Proxy Access

Social Advisory Services supports proxy access as an important shareholder right, one that is complementary to other best-practice corporate governance features. However, in the absence of a uniform standard, proposals to enact proxy access may vary widely; as such, a case-by-case approach will be undertaken in evaluating these proposals.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:

§ Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power;

§ Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group;

§ Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group;

§ Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board.

Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access.

Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

Board Refreshment

Term/Tenure Limits

Supporters of term limits argue that this requirement would bring new ideas and approaches to a board. However, we prefer to look at directors and their contributions to the board individually rather than impose a strict rule.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for the company to adopt director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The scope of the shareholder proposal; and

§ Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment.

Age Limits

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.

CEO Succession Planning

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering at a minimum, the following factors:

§ The reasonableness/scope of the request; and

§ The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.

Vote No Campaigns

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.

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2.    Ratification of Auditors

Annual election of the outside accountants is best practice standard. While it is recognized that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside accountants, we believe that outside accountants must ultimately be accountable to shareholders. A Blue Ribbon Commission report concluded that audit committees must improve their current level of oversight of independent accountants. Given the rash of accounting misdeeds that were not detected by audit panels or auditors, shareholder ratification is an essential step in restoring investor confidence. Shareholders should have the right to weigh in on the choice of the audit firm, and all companies should put ratification on the ballot of their annual meeting. Special consideration will be given when non-audit fees exceed audit fees, as high non-audit fees can compromise the independence of the auditor. Social Advisory Services will also monitor both auditor tenure and whether auditor ratification has been pulled from the ballot.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to ratify auditors, unless any of the following apply:

§ The non-audit fees paid represent 25 percent or more of the total fees paid to the auditor;

§ An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;

§ There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position; or

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures.

Auditor-Related Shareholder Proposals

Ratify Auditors/Ensure Auditor Independence

These shareholder proposals request that the board allow shareholders to ratify the company’s auditor at each annual meeting. Annual ratification of the outside accountants is standard practice. While it is recognized that the company is in the best position to evaluate the competence of the outside accountants, we believe that outside accountants must ultimately be accountable to shareholders.

Given the rash of accounting irregularities that were not detected by audit panels or auditors, shareholder ratification is an essential step in restoring investor confidence. Social Advisory Services believes that shareholders should have the ability to ratify the auditor on an annual basis.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to allow shareholders to vote on auditor ratification.

§ Vote for proposals that ask a company to adopt a policy on auditor independence.

§ Vote for proposals that seek to limit the non-audit services provided by the company’s auditor.

Auditor Rotation

To minimize any conflict of interest that may rise between the company and its auditor, Social Advisory Services supports the rotation of auditors. Currently, SEC rules provide that partners should be rotated every five years. However, Social Advisory Services also believes that the long tenure of audit firms at U.S. companies can be problematic.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to rotate company’s auditor every five years or more. Social Advisory Services believes that proposing a rotation period less than five years is unreasonably restrictive and may negatively affect audit quality and service while increasing expense.

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3.    Takeover Defenses / Shareholder Rights

Corporate takeover attempts come in various guises. Usually, a would-be acquirer makes a direct offer to the board of directors of a targeted corporation. The bidder may offer to purchase the company for cash and/or stock. If the board approves the offer, a friendly transaction is completed and presented to shareholders for approval. If, however, the board of directors rejects the bid, the acquirer can make a tender offer for the shares directly to the targeted corporation’s shareholders. Such offers are referred to as hostile tender bids.

Not wishing to wait until they are subjects of hostile takeover attempts, many corporations have adopted antitakeover measures designed to deter unfriendly bids or buy time. The most common defenses are the shareholders rights protection plan, also known as the poison pill, and charter amendments that create barriers to acceptance of hostile bids. In the U.S., poison pills do not require shareholder approval. However, shareholders must approve charter amendments, such as classified boards or supermajority vote requirements. In brief, the very existence of defensive measures can foreclose the possibility of tenders and hence, opportunities to premium prices for shareholders.

Anti-takeover statutes generally increase management’s potential for insulating itself and warding off hostile takeovers that may be beneficial to shareholders. While it may be true that some boards use such devices to obtain higher bids and to enhance shareholder value, it is more likely that such provisions are used to entrench management. The majority of historical evidence on individual corporate anti-takeover measures indicates that heavily insulated companies generally realize lower returns than those having managements that are more accountable to shareholders and the market. The evidence also suggests that when states adopt their own anti-takeover devices, or endorse those employed by firms, shareholder returns are harmed. Moreover, the body of evidence appears to indicate that companies in states with the strongest anti-takeover laws experience lower returns than they would absent such statutes.

Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Management Proposals

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Poison pills are corporate-sponsored financial devices that, when triggered by potential acquirers, do one or more of the following: 1) dilute the acquirer’s equity holdings in the target company; 2) dilute the acquirer’s voting interests in the target company; or 3) dilute the acquirer’s equity holdings in the post-merger company. Poison pills generally allow shareholders to purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company (flip-in pill) and/or the potential acquirer (flip-out pill) at a price far out of line with fair market value. Depending on the type of pill, the triggering event can either transfer wealth from the target company or dilute the equity holdings of current shareholders. Poison pills insulate management from the threat of a change in control and provide the target board with veto power over takeover bids. Because poison pills greatly alter the balance of power between shareholders and management, shareholders should be allowed to make their own evaluation of such plans.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:

§ No lower than a 20 percent trigger, flip-in or flip-over provision;

§ A term of no more than three years;

§ No deadhand, slowhand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;

§ Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.

In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.

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Net Operating Loss (NOL) Poison Pills/Protective Amendments

The financial crisis has prompted widespread losses in certain industries. This has resulted in previously profitable companies considering the adoption of a poison pill and/or NOL protective amendment to protect their NOL tax assets, which may be lost upon an acquisition of 5 percent of a company’s shares.

When evaluating management proposals seeking to adopt NOL pills or protective amendments, the purpose behind the proposal, its terms, and the company’s existing governance structure should be taken into account to assess whether the structure actively promotes board entrenchment or adequately protects shareholder rights. While Social Advisory Services acknowledges the high estimated tax value of NOLs, which benefit shareholders, the ownership acquisition limitations contained in an NOL pill/protective amendment coupled with a company’s problematic governance structure could serve as an antitakeover device.

Given the fact that shareholders will want to ensure that such an amendment does not remain in effect permanently, Social Advisory Services will also closely review whether the pill/amendment contains a sunset provision or a commitment to cause the expiration of the NOL pill/protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOLs.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5%);

§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);

§ The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing five-percent holder);

§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);

§ The company‘s existing governance structure including; board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns;

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-341 29 of 98

Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.

In addition, voting against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Supermajority Shareholder Vote Requirements

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change at a company.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to reduce supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations. For companies with shareholder(s) who own a significant amount of company stock, vote case-by-case, taking into account: a) ownership structure; b) quorum requirements; and c) supermajority vote requirements.

§ Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote for charter amendments, mergers and other significant business combinations.

Shareholder Ability to Call a Special Meeting

Most state corporation statutes allow shareholders to call a special meeting when they want to take action on certain matters that arise between regularly scheduled annual meetings. Sometimes this right applies only if a shareholder or a group of shareholders own a specified percentage of shares, with 10 percent being the most common. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account: a) shareholders’ current right to call special meetings; b) minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred); c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; d) investor ownership structure; and e) shareholder support of and management’s response to previous shareholder proposals.

§ Vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-342 30 of 98

Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

Consent solicitations allow shareholders to vote on and respond to shareholder and management proposals by mail without having to act at a physical meeting. A consent card is sent by mail for shareholder approval and only requires a signature for action. Some corporate bylaws require supermajority votes for consents while at others, standard annual meeting rules apply. Shareholders may lose the ability to remove directors, initiate a shareholder resolution, or respond to a beneficial offer without having to wait for the next scheduled meeting if they are unable to act at a special meeting of their own calling.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to take action by written consent.

§ Vote for proposals to allow or facilitate shareholder action by written consent, taking into consideration: a) shareholders’ current right to act by written consent; b) consent threshold; c) the inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language; d) Investor ownership structure; and e) shareholder support of and management’s response to previous shareholder proposals.

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions; a) an unfettered¹⁴ right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold; b) a majority vote standard in uncontested director elections; c) no non-shareholder-approved pill, and; d) an annually elected board.

Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations

In 2008, the Delaware courts handed down two decisions, which, read together, indicate a judicial move toward a narrower interpretation of companies’ advance notice bylaws. These recent court decisions have encouraged companies to take a closer look at their bylaw provisions to ensure that broad language does not provide loopholes for activist investors. Specifically, companies are including language designed to provide more detailed advance notice provisions and to ensure full disclosure of economic and voting interests in a shareholder’s notice of proposals, including derivatives and hedged positions.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory and shareholder review.

To be reasonable, the company’s deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/ nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year’s meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120 day window).The submittal window is the period under which shareholders must file their proposals/nominations prior to the deadline.

In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent’s economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.

¹⁴ “Unfettered” means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.

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Fair Price Provisions

Fair price provisions were originally designed to specifically defend against the most coercive of takeover devises, the two-tiered, front-end loaded tender offer. In such a hostile takeover, the bidder offers cash for enough shares to gain control of the target. At the same time the acquirer states that once control has been obtained, the target’s remaining shares will be purchased with cash, cash and securities or only securities. Since the payment offered for the remaining stock is, by design less valuable than the original offer for the controlling shares, shareholders are forced to sell out early to maximize their value. Standard fair price provisions require that, absent board or shareholder approval of the acquisition, the bidder must pay the remaining shareholders the same price for their shares that brought control.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.

§ Generally, vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.

Greenmail

Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of shares, the practice discriminates against most shareholders. This transferred cash, absent the greenmail payment, could be put to much better use for reinvestment in the company, payment of dividends, or to fund a public share repurchase program.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to adopt antigreenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.

§ Review on a case-by-case basis antigreenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.

Confidential Voting

Confidential voting, or voting by secret ballot, is one of the key structural issues in the proxy system. It ensures that all votes are based on the merits of proposals and cast in the best interests of fiduciary clients and pension plan beneficiaries. In a confidential voting system, only vote tabulators and inspectors of election may examine individual proxies and ballots; management and shareholders are given only vote totals. In an open voting system, management can determine who has voted against its nominees or proposals and then re-solicit those votes before the final vote count. As a result, shareholders can be pressured to vote with management at companies with which they maintain, or would like to establish, a business relationship. Confidential voting also protects employee shareholders from retaliation. Shares held by employee stock ownership plans, for example, are important votes that are typically voted by employees.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to adopt confidential voting.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-344 32 of 98

Control Share Acquisition Provisions

Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.

§ Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

§ Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.

Control Share Cash-Out Provisions

Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to “cash-out” of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.

Disgorgement Provisions

Disgorgement provisions require an acquirer or potential acquirer of more than a certain percentage of a company’s stock to disgorge, or pay back, to the company any profits realized from the sale of that company’s stock purchased 24 months before achieving control status. All sales of company stock by the acquirer occurring within a certain period of time (between 18 months and 24 months) prior to the investor’s gaining control status are subject to these recapture-of-profits provisions.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.

State Takeover Statutes

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including control share acquisition statutes, control share cash-out statutes, freezeout provisions, fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, antigreenmail provisions, and disgorgement provisions).

Vote for opting into stakeholder protection statutes if they provide comprehensive protections for employees and community stakeholders. Social Advisory Services would be less supportive of takeover statutes that only serve to protect incumbent management from accountability to shareholders and which negatively influence shareholder value.

Freeze-Out Provisions

Freeze-out provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-345 33 of 98

Reincorporation Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

§ Reasons for reincorporation;

§ Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation;

§ Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Reincorporations into “tax havens” will be given special consideration.

While a firm’s country of incorporation will remain the primary basis for evaluating companies, Social Advisory Services will generally apply U.S. policies to the extent possible with respect to issuers that file DEF 14As, 10-K annual reports, and 10-Q quarterly reports, and are thus considered domestic issuers by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Corporations that have reincorporated outside the U.S. have found themselves subject to a combination of governance regulations and best practice standards that may not be entirely compatible with an evaluation framework based solely on country of incorporation.

Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.

Vote for proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders.

Shareholder Litigation Rights

Federal Forum Selection Provisions

Federal forum selection provisions require that U.S. federal courts be the sole forum for shareholders to litigate claims arising under federal securities law.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify “the district courts of the United States” as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

Vote against provisions that restrict the forum to a particular federal district court; unilateral adoption (without a shareholder vote) of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters

Exclusive forum provisions in the charter or bylaws restrict shareholders’ ability to bring derivative lawsuits against the company, for claims arising out of state corporate law, to the courts of a particular state (generally the state of incorporation).

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the state of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

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For states other than Delaware, vote case-by-case on exclusive forum provisions, taking into consideration:

§ The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision;

§ Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum;

§ The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and

§ Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.

Generally vote against provisions that specify a state other than the state of incorporation as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters, or that specify a particular local court within the state; unilateral adoption of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Fee Shifting

Fee-shifting provisions in the charter or bylaws require that a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation and its directors and officers.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against provisions that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).

Unilateral adoption of a fee-shifting provision will generally be considered an ongoing failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights-Related Shareholder Proposals

Shareholder Proposals to put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: (1) a shareholder approved poison pill in place; or(2) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:

§ Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or

§ The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.

If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.

Reduce Supermajority Vote Requirements

Supermajority provisions violate the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be all that is necessary to effect change regarding a company.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for charter and bylaw amendments.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to lower supermajority shareholder vote requirements for mergers and other significant business combinations.

Remove Antitakeover Provisions

There are numerous antitakeover mechanisms available to corporations that can make takeovers prohibitively expensive for a bidder or at least guarantee that all shareholders are treated equally. The debate over antitakeover devices centers on whether these devices enhance or detract from shareholder value. One theory argues that a company’s board, when armed with these takeover protections, may use them as negotiating tools to obtain a higher premium for shareholders. The opposing view maintains that managements afforded such protection are more likely to become entrenched than to actively pursue the best interests of shareholders. Such takeover defenses also serve as obstacles to the normal functioning of the marketplace which, when operating efficiently, should replace incapable and poorly performing managements.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to remove antitakeover provisions.

Reimburse Proxy Solicitation Expenses

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:

§ The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;

§ One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected;

§ Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors;

§ The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only¹⁵ meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:

§ Scope and rationale of the proposal; and

§ Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.

¹⁵ Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.

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4.    Miscellaneous Governance Provisions

Bundled Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Review on a case-by-case basis bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances where the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.

Adjourn Meeting

Companies may ask shareholders to adjourn a meeting in order to solicit more votes. Generally, shareholders already have enough information to make their vote decisions. Once their votes have been cast, there is no justification for spending more money to continue pressing shareholders for more votes.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.

§ Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction. Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.”

Changing Corporate Name

Proposals to change a company’s name are generally routine matters. Generally, the name change reflects a change in corporate direction or the result of a merger agreement.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for changing the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely affect shareholder value.

Amend Quorum Requirements

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration:

§ The new quorum threshold requested;

§ The rationale presented for the reduction;

§ The market capitalization of the company (size, inclusion in indices);

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ Previous voter turnout or attempts to achieve quorum;

§ Any provisions or commitments to restore quorum to a majority of shares outstanding, should voter turnout improve sufficiently; and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

In general, a quorum threshold kept as close to a majority of shares outstanding as is achievable is preferred.

Vote case-by-case on directors who unilaterally lower the quorum requirements below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration the factors listed above.

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Amend Minor Bylaws

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).

Other Business

Other business proposals are routine items to allow shareholders to raise other issues and discuss them at the meeting. Only issues that may be legally discussed at meetings may be raised under this authority. However, shareholders cannot know the content of these issues so they are generally not supported.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against other business proposals.

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5.    Capital Structure

The equity in a corporate enterprise (that is, the residual value of the company’s assets after the payment of all debts) belongs to the shareholders. Equity securities may be employed, or manipulated, in a manner that will ultimately enhance or detract from shareholder value. As such, certain actions undertaken by management in relation to a company’s capital structure can be of considerable significance to shareholders. Changes in capitalization usually require shareholder approval or ratification.

Common Stock Authorization

State statutes and stock exchanges require shareholder approval for increases in the number of common shares. Corporations increase their supply of common stock for a variety of ordinary business purposes: raising new capital, funding stock compensation programs, business acquisitions, and implementation of stock splits or payment of stock dividends.

General Authorization Requests

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

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Specific Authorization Requests

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).

Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Social Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Reverse Stock Splits

Reverse splits exchange multiple shares for a lesser amount to increase share price. Increasing share price is sometimes necessary to restore a company’s share price to a level that will allow it to be traded on the national stock exchanges. In addition, some brokerage houses have a policy of not monitoring or investing in very low priced shares. Reverse stock splits help maintain stock liquidity.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:

§ The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or

§ The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Social Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;

§ Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;

§ The company’s rationale; or

§ Other factors as applicable.

Preferred Stock Authorization

Preferred stock is an equity security which has certain features similar to debt instruments, such as fixed dividend payments, seniority of claims to common stock, and in most cases no voting rights. The terms of blank check preferred stock give the board of directors the power to issue shares of preferred stock at their discretion—with voting rights,

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conversion, distribution and other rights to be determined by the board at time of issue. Blank check preferred stock can be used for sound corporate purposes but could be used as a device to thwart hostile takeovers without shareholder approval.

General Authorization Requests

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate services:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

§ If no preferred shares are currently issued and outstanding, vote against the request, unless the company discloses a specific use for the shares.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;¹⁶

§ The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”);

§ The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they’re convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders;

§ The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

¹⁶ To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan.

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Specific Authorization Requests

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Blank Check Preferred Stock

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against proposals that would authorize the creation of new classes of preferred stock with unspecified voting, conversion, dividend distribution, and other rights (“blank check” preferred stock).

§ Vote against proposals to increase the number of blank check preferred stock authorized for issuance when no shares have been issued or reserved for a specific purpose.

§ Vote for proposals to create “declawed” blank check preferred stock (stock that cannot be used as a takeover defense).

§ Vote for requests to require shareholder approval for blank check authorizations.

Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock

Stock that has a fixed per share value that is on its certificate is called par value stock. The purpose of par value stock is to establish the maximum responsibility of a stockholder in the event that a corporation becomes insolvent. Proposals to reduce par value come from certain state level requirements for regulated industries such as banks, and other legal requirements relating to the payment of dividends.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.

§ Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value.

Unequal Voting Rights/Dual Class Structure

Incumbent managers use unequal voting rights with the voting rights of their common shares superior to other shareholders in order to concentrate their power and insulate themselves from the wishes of the majority of shareholders. Dual class exchange offers involve a transfer of voting rights from one group of shareholders to another group of shareholders typically through the payment of a preferential dividend. A dual class recapitalization also establishes two classes of common stock with unequal voting rights, but initially involves an equal distribution of preferential and inferior voting shares to current shareholders.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:

§ The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, including: a) the company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or b) the new class of shares will be transitory;

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§ The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term;

§ The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.

Preemptive Rights

Preemptive rights permit shareholders to share proportionately in any new issues of stock of the same class. These rights guarantee existing shareholders the first opportunity to purchase shares of new issues of stock in the same class as their own and in the same proportion. The absence of these rights could cause stockholders’ interest in a company to be reduced by the sale of additional shares without their knowledge and at prices unfavorable to them. Preemptive rights, however, can make it difficult for corporations to issue large blocks of stock for general corporate purposes. Both corporations and shareholders benefit when corporations are able to arrange issues without preemptive rights that do not result in a substantial transfer of control.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Review on a case-by-case basis proposals to create or abolish preemptive rights. In evaluating proposals on preemptive rights, we look at the size of a company, the characteristics of its shareholder base and the liquidity of the stock.

Debt Restructurings

Proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt-restructuring plan will be analyzed considering the following issues:

§ Dilution: How much will the ownership interest of existing shareholders be reduced, and how extreme will dilution to any future earnings be?

§ Change in Control: Will the transaction result in a change in control/management at the company? Are board and committee seats guaranteed? Do standstill provisions and voting agreements exist? Is veto power over certain corporate actions in place?

§ Financial Issues: company’s financial situation, degree of need for capital, use of proceeds, and effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Terms of the offer: discount/premium in purchase price to investor including any fairness opinion, termination penalties and exit strategy;

§ Conflict of interest: arm’s length transactions and managerial incentives;

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Review on a case-by-case basis proposals regarding debt restructurings.

§ Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Share Repurchase Programs

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:

§ Greenmail,

§ The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics,

§ Threats to the company’s long-term viability, or

§ Other company-specific factors as warranted.

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Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.

Conversion of Securities

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities, taking into account the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.

Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Recapitalization

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account:

§ Whether the capital structure is simplified;

§ Liquidity is enhanced;

§ Fairness of conversion terms;

§ Impact on voting power and dividends;

§ Reasons for the reclassification;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives considered.

Tracking Stock

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as:

§ Adverse governance changes;

§ Excessive increases in authorized capital stock;

§ Unfair method of distribution;

§ Diminution of voting rights;

§ Adverse conversion features;

§ Negative impact on stock option plans;

§ Alternatives such as spin-offs.

Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 20 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.

For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.

Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.

Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.

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6.    Executive and Director Compensation

The global financial crisis resulted in significant erosion of shareholder value and highlighted the need for greater assurance that executive compensation is principally performance-based, fair, reasonable, and not designed in a manner that would incentivize excessive risk-taking by managements. The financial crisis raised questions about the role of pay incentives in influencing executive behavior and motivating inappropriate or excessive risk-taking that could threaten a corporation‘s long-term viability. The safety lapses that led to the disastrous explosions at BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig and Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine, and the resulting unprecedented losses in shareholder value; a) underscore the importance of incorporating meaningful economic incentives around social and environmental considerations in compensation program design, and b) exemplify the costly liabilities of failing to do so.

Evolving disclosure requirements have opened a wider window into compensation practices and processes, giving shareholders more opportunity and responsibility to ensure that pay is designed to create and sustain value. Companies in the U.S. are now required to evaluate and discuss potential risks arising from misguided or misaligned compensation programs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires advisory shareholder votes on executive compensation (management “say on pay”), an advisory vote on the frequency of say on pay, as well as a shareholder advisory vote on golden parachute compensation. The advent of “say on pay” votes for shareholders in the U.S. has provided a new communication mechanism and impetus for constructive engagement between shareholders and managers/directors on pay issues.

The socially responsible investing community contends that corporations should be held accountable for their actions and decisions, including those around executive compensation. Social Advisory Services believes that executive pay programs should be fair, competitive, reasonable, and create appropriate incentives, and that pay for performance should be a central tenet in executive compensation philosophy. Most investors expect corporations to adhere to certain best practice pay considerations in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs, including:

§ Appropriate pay-for-performance alignment with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: executive pay practices must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. Evaluating appropriate alignment of pay incentives with shareholder value creation includes taking into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance, the mix between fixed and variable pay, equity-based plan costs, and performance goals - including goals tied to social and environmental considerations.

§ Avoiding arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: this includes assessing the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, guaranteed compensation, and practices or policies that fail to adequately mitigate against or address environmental, social and governance failures.

§ Independent and effective compensation committees: oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed) should be promoted.

§ Clear and comprehensive compensation disclosures: shareholders expect companies to provide informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly.

§ Avoiding inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: compensation to outside directors should not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, this may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.

A non-exhaustive list of best pay practices includes:

§ Employment contracts: Companies should enter into employment contracts under limited circumstances for a short time period (e.g., new executive hires for a three-year contract) for limited executives. The contracts should not have automatic renewal feature and should have a specified termination date.

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§ Severance agreements: Severance provisions should not be so appealing that it becomes an incentive for the executive to be terminated. Severance provisions should exclude excise tax gross-up. The severance formula should be reasonable and not overly generous to the executive (e.g., severance multiples of 1X, 2X, or 3X and use pro-rated target/average historical bonus and not maximum bonus). Failure to renew employment contract, termination under questionable events, or poor performance should not be considered as appropriate reasons for severance payments.

§ Change-in-control payments: Change-in-control payments should only be made when there is a significant change in company ownership structure, and when there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties associated with the change in company ownership structure (“double-triggered”). Change-in-control provisions should exclude excise tax gross-up and eliminate the acceleration of vesting of equity awards upon a change in control unless provided under a double-trigger scenario. Similarly, change in control provisions in equity plans should be double-triggered. A change in control event should not result in an acceleration of vesting of all unvested stock options or removal of vesting/performance requirements on restricted stock/performance shares, unless there is a loss of employment or substantial change in job duties.

§ Supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs): SERPS should not include sweeteners that can increase the SERP value significantly or even exponentially, such as additional years of service credited for pension calculation, inclusion of variable pay (e.g. bonuses and equity awards) into the formula. Pension formula should not include extraordinary annual bonuses paid close to retirement years, and should be based on the average, not the maximum level of compensation earned.

§ Deferred compensation: Above-market returns or guaranteed minimum returns should not be applied on deferred compensation.

§ Disclosure practices: The Compensation Discussion & Analysis should be written in plain English, with as little “legalese” as possible and formatted using section headers, bulleted lists, tables, and charts where possible to ease reader comprehension. Ultimately, the document should provide detail and rationale regarding compensation, strategy, pay mix, goals/metrics, challenges, competition and pay for performance linkage, etc. in a narrative fashion.

§ Responsible use of company stock: Companies should adopt policies that prohibit executives from speculating in company’s stock or using company stock in hedging activities, such as “cashless” collars, forward sales, equity swaps or other similar arrangements. Such behavior undermines the ultimate alignment with long-term shareholders’ interests. In addition, the policy should prohibit or discourage the use of company stock as collateral for margin loans, to avoid any potential sudden stock sales (required upon margin calls), that could have a negative impact on the company’s stock price.

§ Long-term focus: Executive compensation programs should be designed to support companies’ long-term strategic goals. A short-term focus on performance does not necessarily create sustainable shareholder value, since long-term goals may be sacrificed to achieve short-term expectations. Compensation programs embedding a long-term focus with respect to company goals better align with the long-term interests of shareholders. Granting stock options and restricted stock to executives that vest in five years do not necessarily provide a long-term focus, as executives can sell the company shares once they vest. However, requiring senior executives to hold company stock until they retire can encourage a long-term focus on company performance.

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Criteria for Evaluating Executive Pay

Pay-for-Performance Evaluation

Social Advisory Services conducts a five-part pay analysis to evaluate the degree of alignment between the CEO’s pay with the company’s performance over a sustained period. From a shareholders’ perspective, performance is predominantly gauged by the company’s stock performance over time. Even when financial, non-financial or operational measures are utilized in incentive awards, the achievement related to these measures should ultimately translate into superior shareholder returns in the long-term. With respect to companies in the Russell 3000 or Russel 3000E Indices¹⁷, this analysis considers the following:

Pay-for-Performance Elements

§ The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period,¹⁸ and the rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period

§ Absolute Alignment: The absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.¹⁹

§ Equity Pay Mix: The ratio of the CEO’s performance- vs. time-based equity awards.

Pay Equity (Quantum) Elements

§ Multiple of Median: The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.

§ Internal Pay Disparity: The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to other named executive officers (NEOs) – i.e., an excessive differential between CEO total pay and that of the next highest-paid NEO as well as CEO total pay relative to the average NEO pay.

If the above pay-for-performance analysis demonstrates unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of non-Russell 3000 index companies, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, the following qualitative factors will be evaluated to determine how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

§ The ratio of performance-based compensation to overall compensation, including whether any relevant social or environmental factors are a component of performance-contingent pay elements;

§ The presence of significant environmental, social or governance (ESG) controversies that have the potential to pose material risks to the company and its shareholders;

§ Any downward discretion applied to executive compensation on the basis of a failure to achieve performance goals, including ESG performance objectives;

§ The completeness of disclosure and rigor of performance goals;

§ The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;

§ Actual results of financial/non-financial and operational metrics, such as growth in revenue, profit, cash flow, workplace safety, environmental performance, etc., both absolute and relative to peers;

§ Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards);

¹⁷ The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.

¹⁸ The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are closest to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry and also within a market cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s.

¹⁹ Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.

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§ Realizable pay compared to grant pay; and

§ Any other factors deemed relevant.

Problematic Pay Practices

Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:

§ Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;

§ Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and

§ Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements.

The list of examples below highlights certain problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:

§ Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);

§ Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups);

§ New or materially amended agreements that provide for:

§ Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus);

§ CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition;

§ CIC excise tax gross-up entitlements (including “modified” gross-ups);

§ Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions;

§ Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;

§ Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible;

§ Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason);

§ E&S Incentives: A lack of any LTI and STI performance metrics and/or a lack of disclosure on LTI and STI performance metrics related to E&S criteria.

§ Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors.

The above examples are not an exhaustive list. Please refer to the U.S. Compensation Policies FAQ document for additional detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as problematic and may lead to negative vote recommendations.

Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking

Assess company policies and disclosure related to compensation that could incentivize excessive risk-taking, for example:

§ Multi-year guaranteed bonuses;

§ A single or common performance metric used for short- and long-term plans;

§ Lucrative severance packages;

§ High pay opportunities relative to industry peers;

§ Disproportionate supplemental pensions;

§ Mega annual equity grants that provide unlimited upside with no downside risk.

Factors that potentially mitigate the impact of risky incentives include rigorous claw-back provisions and robust stock ownership/holding guidelines.

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Options Backdating

The following factors should be examined on a case-by-case basis to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud, as well as those instances in which companies that subsequently took corrective action. Cases where companies have committed fraud are considered most egregious.

§ Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;

§ Duration of options backdating;

§ Size of restatement due to options backdating;

§ Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants;

§ Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.

Board Communications and Responsiveness

Consider the following factors case-by-case when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

§ Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or

§ Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation – Management Say-on-Pay Proposals

The Dodd-Frank Act mandates advisory votes on executive compensation (Say on Pay or “SOP”) for a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders that includes required SEC compensation disclosures. This non-binding shareholder vote on compensation must be included in a proxy or consent or authorization at least once every three years.

In general, the SOP ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices – dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against the SOP proposal rather than voting against or withhold from the compensation committee. However, if there is no SOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior SOP proposal, then Social Advisory Services will recommend a vote against or withhold votes from compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then a vote against an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval may be appropriate. In evaluating SOP proposals, Social Advisory Services will also assess to what degree social and environmental considerations are incorporated into compensation programs and executive pay decision-making – to the extent that proxy statement Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) disclosures permit.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation on a case-by-case basis.

§ Vote against management Say on Pay proposals if:

§ There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay-for-performance);

§ The company maintains problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

§ Vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP is warranted due to pay-for-performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;

§ The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;

§ The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, including option repricing or option backdating; or

§ The situation is egregious.

§ Vote against an equity plan on the ballot if:

§ A pay for performance misalignment exists, and a significant portion of the CEO’s misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, taking into consideration:

§ Magnitude of pay misalignment;

§ Contribution of non-performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and

§ The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer (NEO) level.

Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation – Management Say on Pay

The Dodd-Frank Act, in addition to requiring advisory votes on compensation (SOP), requires that each proxy for the first annual or other meeting of the shareholders (that includes required SEC compensation disclosures) occurring after Jan. 21, 2011, include an advisory voting item to determine whether, going forward, the “say on pay” vote by shareholders to approve compensation should occur every one, two, or three years.

Social Advisory Services will recommend a vote for annual advisory votes on compensation. The SOP is at its essence a communication vehicle, and communication is most useful when it is received in a consistent and timely manner. Social Advisory Services supports an annual SOP vote for many of the same reasons it supports annual director elections rather than a classified board structure: because this provides the highest level of accountability and direct communication by enabling the MSOP vote to correspond to the majority of the information presented in the accompanying proxy statement for the applicable shareholders’ meeting. Having SOP votes every two or three years, covering all actions occurring between the votes, would make it difficult to create the meaningful and coherent communication that the votes are intended to provide. Under triennial elections, for example, a company would not know whether the shareholder vote references the compensation year being discussed or a previous year, making it more difficult to understand the implications of the vote.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.

Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

This is a proxy item regarding specific advisory votes on “golden parachute” arrangements for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) that is required under The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Social Advisory Services places particular focus on severance packages that provide inappropriate windfalls and cover certain tax liabilities of executives.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or extended arrangements.

Features that may result in an against recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):

§ Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;

§ Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;

§ Excessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus);

§ Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable (as opposed to a provision to provide excise tax gross-ups);

§ Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or

§ Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or

§ The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.

Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s advisory vote on compensation (“management “say on pay”), Social Advisory Services will evaluate the “say on pay” proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

Equity-Based Incentive Plans

As executive pay levels continue to soar, non-salary compensation remains one of the most sensitive and visible corporate governance issues. The financial crisis raised questions about the role of pay incentives in influencing executive behavior, including their appetite for risk-taking. Although shareholders may have little say about how much the CEO is paid in salary and bonus, they do have a major voice in approving stock incentive plans.

Stock-based plans can transfer significant amounts of wealth from shareholders to executives and directors and are among the most economically significant issues that shareholders are entitled to vote on. Rightly, the cost of these plans must be in line with the anticipated benefits to shareholders. Clearly, reasonable limits must be set on dilution as well as administrative authority. In addition, shareholders must consider the necessity of the various pay programs and examine the appropriateness of award types. Consequently, the pros and cons of these proposals necessitate a case-by-case evaluation.

Factors that increase the cost (or have the potential to increase the cost) of plans to shareholders include: excessive dilution, options awarded at below-market discounts, permissive policies on pyramiding, restricted stock giveaways that reward tenure rather than results, sales of shares on concessionary terms, blank-check authority for administering committees, option repricing or option replacements, accelerated vesting of awards in the event of defined changes in corporate control, stand-alone stock appreciation rights, loans or other forms of assistance, or evidence of improvident award policies.

Positive plan features that can offset costly features include: plans with modest dilution potential (i.e. appreciably below double-digit levels), bars to pyramiding and related safeguards for investor interests. Also favorable are performance programs with a duration of two or more years, bonus schemes that pay off in non-dilutive, fully deductible cash, 401K and other thrift or profit sharing plans, and tax-favored employee stock purchase plans. In general, we believe that stock plans should afford incentives, not sure-fire, risk-free rewards.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on equity-based compensation plans²⁰ depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “equity plan scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:

§ Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:

§ SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and

§ SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.

§ Plan Features:

§ Automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control (CIC);

§ Discretionary vesting authority;

§ Liberal share recycling on various award types;

§ Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;

§ Dividends payable prior to award vesting.

§ Grant Practices:

§ The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;

§ Vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (3-year look-back);

§ The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);

§ The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;

§ Whether the company maintains a claw-back policy;

§ Whether the company has established post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following apply:

§ Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

§ The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies — or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies);

§ The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a pay-for-performance disconnect;

§ The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or

§ Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.

Each of these factors is described below.

Generally vote against equity plans if the cost is unreasonable. For non-employee director plans, vote for the plan if certain factors are met.

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CERTAIN EPSC FACTORS:

Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)

The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors. SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed,

²⁰ Proposals evaluated under the EPSC policy generally include those to approve or amend (1) stock option plans for employees and/or employees and directors, (2) restricted stock plans for employees and/or employees and directors, and (3) omnibus stock incentive plans for employees and/or employees and directors.

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shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types. See discussion of specific types of awards.

Except for proposals subject to Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company’s benchmark.²¹

Repricing Provisions

Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. “Repricing” includes the ability to do any of the following:

§ Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs;

§ Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs.

§ The cancellation of underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or

§ Cash buyouts of underwater options.

While the above cover most types of repricing, Social Advisory Services may view other provisions as akin to repricing depending on the facts and circumstances.

Also, vote against or withhold from members of the compensation committee who approved repricing (as defined above or otherwise determined by Social Advisory Services), without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.

Vote against plans if the company has a history of repricing without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.

Pay-for-Performance Misalignment – Application to Equity Plans

If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for problematic pay practices, vote against the plan.

Social Advisory Services may recommend a vote against the equity plan if the plan is determined to be a vehicle for pay-for-performance misalignment. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:

§ Severity of the pay-for-performance misalignment;

§ Whether problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or

§ Whether equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the other NEOs.

Three-Year Value Adjusted Burn Rate

A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Value-Adjusted Burn Rate benchmarks will be calculated as the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group

²¹ For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company’s SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors.

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segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.

The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate will be calculated as follows:

Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).

Liberal Definition of Change-in-Control

Generally vote against equity plans if the plan provides for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition could include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.

Other Compensation Plans

Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))

Cash bonus plans can be an important part of an executive’s overall pay package, along with stock-based plans tied to long-term total shareholder returns. Over the long term, stock prices are an excellent indicator of management performance. However, other factors, such as economic conditions and investor reaction to the stock market in general and certain industries in particular, can greatly impact the company’s stock price. As a result, a cash bonus plan can effectively reward individual performance and the achievement of business unit objectives that are independent of short-term market share price fluctuations.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.

Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Addresses administrative features only; or

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent directors, per Social Advisory Services’ Categorization of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time after the company’s initial public offering (IPO), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below).

Vote against such proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per Social Advisory Services’ Categorization of Directors.

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes

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Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:

§ If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments may potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.

§ If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.

§ If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments are not deemed to potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown for informational purposes.

In the first two case-by-case evaluation scenarios, the EPSC evaluation/score is the more heavily weighted consideration.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs)

Employee stock purchase plans enable employees to become shareholders, which gives them a stake in the company’s growth. However, purchase plans are beneficial only when they are well balanced and in the best interests of all shareholders. From a shareholder’s perspective, plans with offering periods of 27 months or less are preferable. Plans with longer offering periods remove too much of the market risk and could give participants excessive discounts on their stock purchases that are not offered to other shareholders.

Qualified Plans

Qualified employee stock purchase plans qualify for favorable tax treatment under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code. Such plans must be broad-based, permitting all full-time employees to participate. Some companies also permit part-time staff to participate. Qualified ESPPs must be expensed under SFAS 123 unless the plan meets the following conditions; a) purchase discount is 5 percent or below; b) all employees can participate in the program; and 3) no look-back feature in the program. Therefore, some companies offer nonqualified ESPPs.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:

§ Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;

§ Offering period is 27 months or less; and

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is ten percent or less of the outstanding shares.

Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where any of the following apply:

§ Purchase price is less than 85 percent of fair market value; or

§ Offering period is greater than 27 months; or

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is more than ten percent of the outstanding shares.

Non-Qualified Plans

For nonqualified ESPPs, companies provide a match to employees’ contributions instead of a discount in stock price. Also, limits are placed on employees’ contributions. Some companies provide a maximum dollar value for the year and others specify the limits in terms of a percent of base salary, excluding bonus or commissions. For plans that do not qualify under Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code, a plan participant will not recognize income by participating in the plan, but will recognize ordinary compensation income for federal income tax purposes at the time of the purchase.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:

§ Broad-based participation (i.e., all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company);

§ Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;

§ Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value;

§ No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase since there is a company matching contribution.

Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when any of the plan features do not meet the above criteria. If the company matching contribution exceeds 25  percent of employee’s contribution, evaluate the cost of the plan against its allowable cap.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)

An Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is an employee benefit plan that makes the employees of a company also owners of stock in that company. The plans are designed to defer a portion of current employee income for retirement purposes.

The primary difference between ESOPs and other employee benefit plans is that ESOPs invest primarily in the securities of the employee’s company. In addition, an ESOP must be created for the benefit of non-management level employees and administered by a trust that cannot discriminate in favor of highly paid personnel.

Academic research of the performance of ESOPs in closely held companies found that ESOPs appear to increase overall sales, employment, and sales per employee over what would have been expected absent an ESOP. Studies have also found that companies with an ESOP are also more likely to still be in business several years later, and are more likely to have other retirement oriented benefit plans than comparable non-ESOP companies.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).

Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:

§ Historic trading patterns – the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;

§ Rationale for the re-pricing – was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?

§ Is this a value-for-value exchange?

§ Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?

§ Option vesting – does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?

§ Term of the option – the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;

§ Exercise price – should be set at fair market or a premium to market;

§ Participants – executive officers and directors should be excluded.

If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company’s total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

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In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing. Repricing after a recent decline in stock price triggers additional scrutiny and a potential vote against the proposal. At a minimum, the decline should not have happened within the past year. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.

§ Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange.

§ Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, Social Advisory Services will not make any adjustments to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation.

Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

One-time Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.

Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:

§ Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating;

§ Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models;

§ There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.

Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management’s control. A review of the company’s historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term.

Ongoing TSO program: Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the ongoing TSO program, structure and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited, to the following:

§ Eligibility;

§ Vesting;

§ Bid-price;

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§ Term of options;

§ Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and

§ Option repricing policy.

Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.

401(k) Employee Benefit Plans

The 401(k) plan is one of the most popular employee benefit plans among U.S. companies. A 401(k) plan is any qualified plan under Section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code that contains a cash or deferred arrangement. In its simplest form, an employee can elect to have a portion of his salary invested in a 401(k) plan before any income taxes are assessed. The money can only be withdrawn before retirement under penalty. However, because the money contributed to the plan is withdrawn before taxes (reducing the employee’s income tax), a properly planned 401(k) plan will enable an employee to make larger contributions to a 401(k) plan than to a savings plan, and still take the same amount home.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.

Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote on a case-by-case basis on proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes. An acceptable parachute should include, but is not limited to, the following:

§ The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;

§ The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable W-2 compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs;

§ Change-in-control payments should be double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure.

Director Compensation

The board’s legal charge of fulfilling its fiduciary obligations of loyalty and care is put to the ultimate test through the task of the board setting its own compensation. Directors themselves oversee the process for evaluating board performance and establishing pay packages for board members.

Shareholders provide limited oversight of directors by electing individuals who are primarily selected by the board, or a board nominating committee, and by voting on stock-based plans for directors designed by the board compensation committee. Additionally, shareholders may submit and vote on their own resolutions seeking to limit or restructure director pay. While the cost of compensating non-employee directors is small in absolute terms, compared to the cost of compensating executives, it is still a critical aspect of a company’s overall corporate governance structure.

Overall, director pay levels are rising in part because of the new forms of pay in use at many companies, as well as because of the increased responsibilities arising from the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirements. In addition to an annual retainer fee, many companies also pay fees for attending board and committee meetings, fees for chairing a committee, or a retainer fee for chairing a committee.

Director compensation packages should be designed to provide value to directors for their contribution. Given that many directors are high-level executives whose personal income levels are generally high, cash compensation may hold little

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appeal. Stock-based incentives on the other hand reinforce the directors’ role of protecting and enhancing shareholder value. The stock-based component of director compensation should be large enough to ensure that when faced with a situation in which the interests of shareholders and management differ, the board will have a financial incentive to think as a shareholder. Additionally, many companies have instituted equity ownership programs for directors. Social Advisory Services recommends that directors receive stock grants equal to three times of their annual retainer, as it is a reasonable starting point for companies of all sizes and industries. A vesting schedule for director grants helps directors to meet the stock ownership guidelines and maintains their long-term interests in the firm.

Director compensation packages should also be designed to attract and retain competent directors who are willing to risk becoming a defendant in a lawsuit and suffer potentially adverse publicity if the company runs into financial difficulties or is mismanaged.

Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:

§ If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and

§ An assessment of the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors

Stock-based plans may take on a variety of forms including: grants of stock or options, including: discretionary grants, formula based grants, and one-time awards; stock-based awards in lieu of all or some portion of the cash retainer and/or other fees; and deferred stock plans allowing payment of retainer and/or meeting fees to be taken in stock, the payment of which is postponed to some future time, typically retirement or termination of directorship.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:

§ The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;

§ The company’s three year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; and

§ The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).

On occasion, director stock plans that set aside a relatively small number of shares will exceed the plan cost or burn rate benchmark when combined with employee or executive stock compensation plans. In such cases, vote for the plan if all of the following qualitative factors in the board’s compensation are met and disclosed in the proxy statement:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

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§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirement;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites;

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Outside Director Stock Awards/Options in Lieu of Cash

These proposals seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash. By doing this, a director’s interest may be more closely aligned with those of shareholders.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals that seek to pay outside directors a portion of their compensation in stock rather than cash.

Director Retirement Plans

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors.

Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

Increase Disclosure of Executive Compensation

The SEC requires that companies disclose, in their proxy statements, the salaries of the top five corporate executives (who make at least $100,000 a year). Companies also disclose their compensation practices and details of their stock-based compensation plans. While this level of disclosure is helpful, it does not always provide a comprehensive picture of the company’s compensation practices. For shareholders to make informed decisions on compensation levels, they need to have clear, concise information at their disposal. Increased disclosure will help ensure that management: (1) has legitimate reasons for setting specific pay levels; and (2) is held accountable for its actions.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking increased disclosure on executive compensation issues including the preparation of a formal report on executive compensation practices and policies.

Limit Executive Compensation

Proposals that seek to limit executive or director compensation usually focus on the absolute dollar figure of the compensation or focus on the ratio of compensation between the executives and the average worker of a specific company. Proponents argue that the exponential growth of executive salaries is not in the best interests of shareholders, especially when that pay is exorbitant when compared to the compensation of other workers.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals to prepare reports seeking to compare the wages of a company’s lowest paid worker to the highest paid workers.

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals that seek to establish a fixed ratio between the company’s lowest paid workers and the highest paid workers.

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Stock Ownership Requirements

Corporate directors should own some amount of stock of the companies on which they serve as board members. Stock ownership is a simple method to align the interests of directors with company shareholders. Nevertheless, many highly qualified individuals such as academics and clergy who can offer valuable perspectives in boardrooms may be unable to purchase individual shares of stock. In such a circumstance, the preferred solution is to look at the board nominees individually and take stock ownership into consideration when voting on the merits of each candidate.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.

Prohibit/Require Shareholder Approval for Option Repricing

Repricing involves the reduction of the original exercise price of a stock option after the fall in share price. Social Advisory Services does not support repricing since it undermines the incentive purpose of the plan. The use of options as an incentive means that employees must bear the same risks as shareholders in holding these options. Shareholder resolutions calling on companies to abandon the practice of repricing or to submit repricings to a shareholder vote will be supported.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to limit repricing.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to have option repricings submitted for shareholder ratification.

Severance Agreements/Golden Parachutes

Golden parachutes are designed to protect the employees of a corporation in the event of a change in control. With Golden Parachutes senior level management employees receive a payout during a change in control at usually two to three times base salary.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requiring that golden parachutes or executive severance agreements be submitted for shareholder ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval prior to entering into employment contracts.

Cash Balance Plans

A cash balance plan is a defined benefit plan that treats an earned retirement benefit as if it was a credit from a defined contribution plan, but which provides a stated benefit at the end of its term. Because employer contributions to these plans are credited evenly over the life of a plan, and not based on a seniority formula they may reduce payouts to long-term employees who are currently vested in plans.

Cash-balance pension conversions have undergone congressional and federal agency scrutiny following high-profile EEOC complaints on age discrimination and employee anger at companies like IBM. While significant change is unlikely in the short-tm, business interests were concerned enough that the National Association of Manufacturers and other business lobbies formed a Capitol Hill coalition to preserve the essential features of the plans and to overturn an IRS ruling. Driving the push behind conversions from traditional pension plans to cash-balance plans are the substantial savings that companies generate in the process. Critics point out that these savings are gained at the expense of the most senior employees. Resolutions call on corporate boards to establish a committee of outside directors to prepare a report to shareholders on the potential impact of pension-related proposals now being considered by national policymakers in reaction to the controversy spawned by the plans.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for non-discrimination in retirement benefits.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking a company to give employees the option of electing to participate in either a cash balance plan or in a defined benefit plan.

Performance-Based Equity Awards

Social Advisory Services supports compensating executives at a reasonable rate and believes that executive compensation should be strongly correlated to performance. Social Advisory Services supports equity awards that provide challenging performance objectives and serve to motivate executives to superior performance and as performance-contingent stock options as a significant component of compensation.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposal requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:

§ First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards.

§ Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.

In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.

Pay for Superior Performance

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals based on a case-by-case analysis that requests the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation plan for senior executives. The proposal has the following principles:

§ Sets compensation targets for the Plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median;

§ Delivers a majority of the Plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards;

§ Provides the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and non-financial performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan;

§ Establishes performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies;

§ Limits payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance.

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Consider the following factors in evaluating this proposal:

§ What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven?

§ If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group?

§ Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure?

§ What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to?

Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay) Shareholder Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally, vote for shareholder proposals that call for non-binding shareholder ratification of the compensation of the Named Executive Officers and the accompanying narrative disclosure of material factors provided to understand the Summary Compensation Table.

Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment and Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).

Vote on a case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment, and eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity. The following factors will be taken into regarding this policy:

§ The company’s current treatment of equity in change-of-control situations (i.e. is it double triggered, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares;

§ Current employment agreements, including potential problematic pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements.

Tax Gross-up Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

Compensation Consultants - Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s) and fees paid.

Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.

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Recoup Bonuses

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote on a case-by-case on proposals to recoup unearned incentive bonuses or other incentive payments made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned later turn out to have been in error. This is line with the clawback provision in the Troubled Asset Relief Program. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. The following will be taken into consideration:

§ If the company has adopted a formal recoupment bonus policy;

§ If the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems;

§ If the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent.

Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use of company stock will be considered.

Bonus Banking

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:

§ The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;

§ Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and

§ Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.

Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans. The following factors will be taken into account:

§ The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained;

§ The time period required to retain the shares;

§ Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements;

§ Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives;

§ Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and

§ Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus long-term focus.

Non-Deductible Compensation

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure of the extent to which the company paid non-deductible compensation to senior executives due to Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), while considering the company’s existing disclosure practices.

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Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the addition of certain safeguards in prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives. Safeguards may include:

§ Adoption, amendment, or termination of a 10b5-1 Plan must be disclosed in a Form 8-K;

§ Amendment or early termination of a 10b5-1 Plan allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board;

§ Request that a certain number of days that must elapse between adoption or amendment of a 10b5-1 Plan and initial trading under the plan;

§ Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a 10b5-1 Plan;

§ An executive may not trade in company stock outside the 10b5-1 Plan;

§ Trades under a 10b5-1 Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive.

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7.    Mergers and Corporate Restructurings

A merger occurs when one corporation is absorbed into another and ceases to exist. The surviving company gains all the rights, privileges, powers, duties, obligations and liabilities of the merged corporation. The shareholders of the absorbed company receive stock or securities of the surviving company or other consideration as provided by the plan of merger. Mergers, consolidations, share exchanges, and sale of assets are friendly in nature, which is to say that both sides have agreed to the combination or acquisition of assets.

Shareholder approval for an acquiring company is generally not required under state law or stock exchange regulations unless the acquisition is in the form of a stock transaction which would result in the issue of 20 percent or more of the acquirer’s outstanding shares or voting power, or unless the two entities involved require that shareholders approve the deal. Under most state laws, however, a target company must submit merger agreements to a shareholder vote. Shareholder approval is required in the formation of a consolidated corporation.

Mergers and Acquisitions

M&A analyses are inherently a balance of competing factors. Bright line rules are difficult if not impossible to apply to a world where every deal is different. Ultimately, the question for shareholders (both of the acquirer and the target) is the following: Is the valuation fair? Shareholders of the acquirer may be concerned that the deal values the target too highly. Shareholders of the target may be concerned that the deal undervalues their interests.

Vote recommendation will be based on primarily an analysis of shareholder value, which itself can be affected by ancillary factors such as the negotiation process. The importance of other factors, including corporate governance and social and environmental considerations however, should not fail to be recognized.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on mergers and acquisitions are considered on a case-by-case basis. A review and evaluation of the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction is conducted, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

§ Valuation: Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction and strategic rationale;

§ Market reaction: How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal;

§ Strategic rationale: Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions;

§ Negotiations and process: Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable?

§ Conflicts of interest: Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders?

§ Governance: Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction?

§ Stakeholder impact: Impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc.

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Corporate Reorganization/Restructuring Plans (Bankruptcy)

The recent financial crisis has placed Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations as a potential alternative for distressed companies. While the number of bankruptcies has risen over the past year as evidenced by many firms, including General Motors and Lehman Brothers, the prevalence of these reorganizations can vary year over year due to, among other things, market conditions and a company’s ability to sustain its operations. Additionally, the amount of time that lapses between a particular company’s entrance into Chapter 11 and its submission of a plan of reorganization varies significantly depending on the complexity, timing, and jurisdiction of the particular case. These plans are often put to a vote of shareholders (in addition to other interested parties), as required by the Bankruptcy Code.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:

§ Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;

§ Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;

§ Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an official equity committee);

§ The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);

§ Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization;

§ Governance of the reorganized company.

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

§ Valuation: Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity.

§ Market reaction: How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

§ Deal timing: A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date.

§ Negotiations and process: What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors.

§ Conflicts of interest: How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 percent of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24 month timeframe.

§ Voting agreements: Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights?

§ Governance: What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger?

§ Stakeholder Impact: Impact on community stakeholders and workforce including impact on stakeholders, such as job loss, community lending, equal opportunity, impact on environment etc.

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Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) – Proposals for Extensions

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC extension proposals taking into account the length of the requested extension, the status of any pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process, any added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders, and any prior extension requests.

§ Length of request: Typically, extension requests range from two to six months, depending on the progression of the SPAC’s acquistion process.

§ Pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process: Sometimes an intial business combination was already put to a shareholder vote, but, for varying reasons, the transaction could not be consummated by the termination date and the SPAC is requesting an extension. Other times, the SPAC has entered into a definitive transaction agreement, but needs additional time to consummate or hold the shareholder meeting.

§ Added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders: Sometimes the SPAC sponsor (or other insiders) will contribute, typically as a loan to the company, additional funds that will be added to the redemption value of each public share as long as such shares are not redeemed in connection with the extension request. The purpose of the “equity kicker” is to incentivize shareholders to hold their shares through the end of the requested extension or until the time the transaction is put to a shareholder vote, rather than electing redeemption at the extension proposal meeting.

§ Prior extension requests: Some SPACs request additional time beyond the extension period sought in prior extension requests.

Spin-offs

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on spin-offs should be considered on a case-by-case basis depending on the tax and regulatory advantages, planned use of sale proceeds, valuation of spinoff, fairness opinion, benefits to the parent company, conflicts of interest, managerial incentives, corporate governance changes, changes in the capital structure.

Asset Purchases

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on asset purchase proposals should be made on a case-by-case after considering the purchase price, fairness opinion, financial and strategic benefits, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives for the business, non-completion risk.

Asset Sales

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on asset sales should be made on a case-by-case basis after considering the impact on the balance sheet/working capital, value received for the asset, potential elimination of diseconomies, anticipated financial and operating benefits, anticipated use of funds, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, and conflicts of interest.

Liquidations

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on liquidations should be made on a case-by-case basis after reviewing management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives, appraisal value of assets, and the compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation. Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.

Joint Ventures

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account percentage of assets/business contributed, percentage ownership, financial and strategic benefits, governance structure, conflicts of interest, other alternatives and non-completion risk.

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Appraisal Rights

Rights of appraisal provide shareholders who do not approve of the terms of certain corporate transactions the right to demand a judicial review in order to determine the fair value for their shares. The right of appraisal generally applies to mergers, sales of essentially all assets of the corporation, and charter amendments that may have a materially adverse effect on the rights of dissenting shareholders.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore, or provide shareholders with, rights of appraisal.

Going Private/Dark Transactions (Leveraged buyouts and Minority Squeeze-outs)

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following: offer price/premium, fairness opinion, how the deal was negotiated, conflicts of interest, other alternatives/offers considered, and non-completion risk.

Vote case-by-case on “going dark” transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:

§ Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);

§ Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following:

§ Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction?

§ Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction?

§ Does the company have strong corporate governance?

§ Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?

§ Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders?

Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements taking into consideration:

§ Dilution to existing shareholders’ position.

§ The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion.

§ Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; conversion features; termination penalties; exit strategy.

§ The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial issues.

§ When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, Social Advisory Services will consider whether it is affected by liquidity, due diligence, control and monitoring issues, capital scarcity, information asymmetry and anticipation of future performance.

§ Financial issues include but are not limited to examining the following: a) company’s financial situation; b) degree of need for capital; c) use of proceeds; d) effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital; e) current and proposed cash burn rate; and f) going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.

§ Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives. A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger or sale of part or all of the company.

§ Control issues including: a) Change in management; b) change in control; c) guaranteed board and committee seats; d) standstill provisions; e) voting agreements; f) veto power over certain corporate actions.

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§ Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium

§ Conflicts of interest

§ Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor.

§ Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests?

§ Market reaction

§ The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one day impact on the unaffected stock price.

Vote for the private placement if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Formation of Holding Company

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration: a) the reasons for the change; b) any financial or tax benefits; c) regulatory benefits; d) increases in capital structure; and e) changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.

§ Vote against the formation of a holding company, absent compelling financial reasons to support the transaction, if the transaction would include either: a) increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum; or b) adverse changes in shareholder rights.

Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives, selling the company or liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders. These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:

§ Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight;

§ Signs of entrenched board and management;

§ Strategic plan in place for improving value;

§ Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution;

§ Whether company is actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor.

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8.    Social and Environmental Proposals

Socially responsible shareholder resolutions are receiving a great deal more attention from institutional shareholders today than they have in the past. In addition to the moral and ethical considerations intrinsic to many of these proposals, there is a growing recognition of their potential impact on the economic performance of the company. Among the reasons for this change are:

§ The number and variety of shareholder resolutions on social and environmental issues has increased;

§ Many of the sponsors and supporters of these resolutions are large institutional shareholders with significant holdings, and therefore, greater direct influence on the outcomes;

§ The proposals are more sophisticated – better written, more focused, and more sensitive to the feasibility of implementation;

§ Investors now understand that a company’s response to social and environmental issues can have serious economic consequences for the company and its shareholders.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for social and environmental shareholder proposals that promote good corporate citizens while enhancing long-term shareholder and stakeholder value. Vote for disclosure reports that seek additional information particularly when it appears companies have not adequately addressed shareholders’ social, workforce, and environmental concerns. In determining vote recommendations on shareholder social, workforce, and environmental proposals, Social Advisory Services will analyze the following factors:

§ Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable;

§ Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company’s short-term or long-term share value;

§ Whether the company’s analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive;

§ The degree to which the company’s stated position on the issues could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to boycott or selective purchasing;

§ Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;

§ Whether the issues presented in the proposal are best dealt with through legislation, government regulation, or company-specific action;

§ The company’s approach compared with its peers or any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;

§ Whether the company has already responded in an appropriate or sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;

§ Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s environmental or social practices;

§ If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether sufficient information is publicly available to shareholders and whether it would be unduly burdensome for the company to compile and avail the requested information to shareholders in a more comprehensive or amalgamated fashion;

§ Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal.

In general, Social Advisory Services supports proposals that request the company to furnish information helpful to shareholders in evaluating the company’s operations. In order to be able to intelligently monitor their investments shareholders often need information best provided by the company in which they have invested. Requests to report such information will merit support. Requests to establish special committees of the board to address broad corporate policy and provide forums for ongoing dialogue on issues including, but not limited to shareholder relations, the environment, human rights, occupational health and safety, and executive compensation, will generally be supported, particularly when they appear to offer a potentially effective method for enhancing shareholder value. We will closely evaluate proposals that ask the company to cease certain actions that the proponent believes are harmful to society or some segment of society with special attention to the company’s legal and ethical obligations, its ability to remain profitable, and potential negative publicity if the company fails to honor the request. Social Advisory Services supports shareholder proposals that improve the company’s public image, and reduce exposure to liabilities.

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Diversity and Equality

Significant progress has been made in recent years in the advancement of women and racial minorities in the workplace and the establishment of greater protections against discriminatory practices in the workplace. In the U.S, there are many civil rights laws that are enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and nationality. However, discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, nationality, and sexual preference continues. The SEC’s revised disclosure rules now require information on how boards factor diversity into the director nomination process, as well as disclosure on how the board assesses the effectiveness of its diversity policy. Shareholder proposals on diversity may target a company’s board nomination procedures or seek greater disclosure on a company’s programs and procedures on increasing the diversity of its workforce, and make reference to one or more of the following points:

§ Violations of workplace anti-discrimination laws lead to expensive litigation and damaged corporate reputations that are not in the best interests of shareholders;

§ Employers already prepare employee diversity reports for the EEOC, so preparing a similar report to shareholders can be done at minimal cost;

§ The presence of women, ethnic minorities and union members in workforce and customer pools gives companies with diversified boards a practical advantage over their competitors as a result of their unique perspectives;

§ Efforts to include women, minorities and union representatives on corporate boards can be made at reasonable costs;

§ Reports can be prepared “at reasonable expense” describing efforts to encourage diversified representation on their boards;

§ Board diversification increases the pool of the company’s potential investors because more and more investors are favoring companies with diverse boards;

§ A commitment to diversity in the workforce can lead to superior financial returns.

Add Women and Minorities to the Board

Board diversification proposals ask companies to put systems in place to increase the representation of women, racial minorities, union members or other underrepresented minority groups on boards of directors. In prior years, board diversification proposals requested that companies nominate board members from certain constituencies, appoint special committees to recommend underrepresented classes of board members, establish board positions reserved for representatives of certain groups, or simply “make greater efforts” to nominate women and ethnic minorities to their boards.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to take steps to nominate more women and racial minorities to the board.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on board diversity.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt nomination charters or amend existing charters to include reasonable language addressing diversity.

Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audits

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, considering company disclosures, policies, actions, and engagements.

Report on the Distribution of Stock Options by Gender and Race

Companies have received requests from shareholders to prepare reports documenting the distribution of the stock options and restricted stock awards by race and gender of the recipient. Proponents of these proposals argue that, in the

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future, there will be a shift toward basing racial and gender discrimination suits on the distribution of corporate wealth through stock options. The appearance of these proposals is also in response to the nationwide wage gap and under representation of minorities and women at the highest levels of compensation.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the distribution of stock options by race and gender of the recipient.

Prepare Report/Promote EEOC-Related Activities

Filers of proposals on this issue generally ask a company to make available, at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information, data the company includes in its annual report to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) outlining the make-up of its workforce by race, gender and position. Shareholders also ask companies to report on any efforts they are making to advance the representation of women and ethnic minorities in jobs in which they have been historically underrepresented, such as sales and management. The costs of violating federal laws that prohibit discrimination by corporations are high and can affect corporate earnings. The Equal Opportunities Employment Commission does not release the companies’ filings to the public, unless it is involved in litigation, and this information is difficult to obtain from other sources. Companies need to be sensitive to minority employment issues as the new evolving work force becomes increasingly diverse. This information can be provided with little cost to the company and does not create an unreasonable burden on management.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its diversity and/or affirmative action programs.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for legal and regulatory compliance and public reporting related to non-discrimination, affirmative action, workplace health and safety, and labor policies and practices that effect long-term corporate performance.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting nondiscrimination in salary, wages and all benefits.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for action on equal employment opportunity and antidiscrimination.

Report on Progress Towards Glass Ceiling Commission Recommendations

In November 1995, the Glass Ceiling Commission (Commission), a bipartisan panel of leaders from business and government, issued a report describing “an unseen yet unbreachable barrier that keeps women and minorities from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder.” The Commission recommended that companies take practical steps to rectify this disparity, such as including diversity goals in business plans, committing to affirmative action for qualified employees and initiating family-friendly labor policies. Shareholders have submitted proposals asking companies to report on progress made toward the Commission’s recommendations.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on its progress against the Glass Ceiling Commission’s recommendations.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to eliminate the “glass ceiling” for women and minority employees.

Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity

Federal law does not ban workplace discrimination against gay and lesbian employees, and only some states have enacted workplace protections for these employees. Although an increasing number of US companies have explicitly banned discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in their equal employment opportunity (EEO) statements, many still do not. Shareholder proponents and other activist groups concerned with gay and lesbian rights,

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such as the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and the Pride Foundation, have targeted U.S. companies that do not specifically restrict discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in their EEO statements. Shareholder proposals on this topic ask companies to change the language of their EEO statements in order to put in place anti-discrimination protection for their gay and lesbian employees. In addition, proposals may seek disclosure on a company’s general initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, including reference to such items as support of gay and lesbian employee groups, diversity training that addresses sexual orientation, and non-medical benefits to domestic partners of gay and lesbian employees.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to include language in EEO statements specifically barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on a company’s initiatives to create a workplace free of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals that seek to eliminate protection already afforded to gay and lesbian employees.

Report on/Eliminate Use of Racial Stereotypes in Advertising

Many companies continue to use racial stereotypes or images perceived as racially insensitive in their advertising campaigns. Filers of shareholder proposals on this topic often request companies to give more careful consideration to the symbols and images that are used to promote the company.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking more careful consideration of using racial stereotypes in advertising campaigns, including preparation of a report on this issue.

Gender, Race, or Ethnicity Pay Gap

Over the past several years, shareholders have filed resolutions requesting that companies report whether a gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap exists, and if so, what measures are being taken to eliminate the gap. While primarily filed at technology firms, in 2017, the resolutions were also filed at firms in the financial services, insurance, healthcare, and telecommunication sectors. Proponents are expected to continue this campaign by engaging companies and filing shareholder proposals on this issue.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender, race, or ethnicity, or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender, race, or ethinicity pay gap.

Labor and Human Rights

Investors, international human rights groups, and labor advocacy groups have long been making attempts to safeguard worker rights in the international marketplace. In instances where companies themselves operate factories in developing countries for example, these advocates have asked that the companies adopt global corporate standards that guarantee sustainable wages and safe working conditions for their workers abroad. Companies that contract out portions of their manufacturing operations to foreign companies have been asked to ensure that the products they receive from those contractors have not been made using forced labor, child labor, or sweatshop labor. These companies are asked to adopt formal vendor standards that, among other things, include some sort of monitoring mechanism. Globalization, relocation of production overseas, and widespread use of subcontractors and vendors, often make it difficult to obtain a complete picture of a company’s labor practices in global markets. Recent deadly accidents at factories, notably in Bangladesh and in Pakistan, have continued to intensify these concerns. Many investors believe that companies would benefit from adopting a human rights policy based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labour Organization’s Core Labor Standards. Efforts that seek greater disclosure on a company’s global labor practices, including its supply chain, and that seek to establish minimum standards for a company’s operations will be supported. In addition, requests for independent monitoring of overseas operations will be supported.

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Social Advisory Services generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of principles or codes relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights; such as the use of slave, child, or prison labor; a government that is illegitimate; or there is a call by human rights advocates, pro-democracy organizations, or legitimately-elected representatives for economic sanctions. The use of child, sweatshop, or forced labor is unethical and can damage corporate reputations. Poor labor practices can lead to litigation against the company, which can be costly and time consuming.

Codes of Conduct and Vendor Standards

In recent years, an increasing number of shareholder proposals have been submitted that pertain to the adoption of codes of conduct or provision, greater disclosure on a company’s international workplace standards, or that request human rights risk assessment. Companies have been asked to adopt a number of different types of codes, including a workplace code of conduct, standards for international business operations, human rights standards, International Labour Organization (ILO) standards and the SA 8000 principles. The ILO is an independent agency of the United Nations which consists of 187 member nations represented by workers, employers, and governments. The ILO’s general mandate is to promote a decent workplace for all individuals. The ILO sets international labor standards in the form of its conventions and then monitors compliance with the standards. The seven conventions of the ILO fall under four broad categories: Right to organize and bargain collectively, Nondiscrimination in employment, Abolition of forced labor, and End of child labor. Each of the 187 member-nations of the ILO is bound to respect and promote these rights to the best of their abilities. SA 8000 is a set of labor standards, based on the principles of the ILO conventions and other human rights conventions, and covers eight workplace conditions, including: child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours and compensation. The Global Sullivan Principles are a set of guidelines that support economic, social and political justice by companies where they do business; to support human rights and to encourage equal opportunity at all levels of employment.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to implement human rights standards and workplace codes of conduct.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct, SA 8000 Standards, or the Global Sullivan Principles.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call for the adoption of principles or codes of conduct relating to company investments in countries with patterns of human rights abuses (e.g. Northern Ireland, Burma, former Soviet Union, and China).

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call for independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with codes.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that seek publication of a “Code of Conduct” by the company’s foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring that they satisfy all applicable standards and laws protecting employees’ wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, and other rights.

§ Vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on, or the adoption of, vendor standards including: reporting on incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts and providing public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with foreign suppliers that manufacture products for sale in the U.S. using forced labor, child labor, or that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employee’s wages and working conditions.

Adopt/Report on MacBride Principles

These resolutions have called for the adoption of the MacBride Principles for operations located in Northern Ireland. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they

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operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is well documented that Northern Ireland’s Catholic community faced much higher unemployment figures than the Protestant community. In response to this problem, the U.K. government instituted the New Fair Employment Act of 1989 (and subsequent amendments) to address the sectarian hiring problems.

Many companies believe that the Act adequately addresses the problems and that further action, including adoption of the MacBride Principles, only duplicates the efforts already underway. In evaluating a proposal to adopt the MacBride Principles, shareholders must decide whether the principles will cause companies to divest, and therefore worsen the unemployment problem, or whether the principles will promote equal hiring practices. Proponents believe that the Fair Employment Act does not sufficiently address the sectarian hiring problems. They argue that the MacBride Principles serve to stabilize the situation and promote further investment.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to report on or implement the MacBride Principles.

Community Impact Assessment/Indigenous Peoples’ Rights

In recent years, a number of U.S. public companies have found their operations or expansion plans in conflict with local indigenous groups. In order to improve their standing with indigenous groups and decrease any negative publicity companies may face, some concerned shareholders have sought reports requesting that companies review their obligations, actions and presence on these groups. Some have also requested these companies adopt policies based on the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Organization of American States’ (OAS) American Declaration on rights of Indigenous Peoples. Some companies such as Starbucks have reached agreements with local governments to ensure better business practices for products produced by indigenous groups. Shareholders, concerned with the negative impact that the company’s operations may have on the indigenous people’s land and community, have sought reports detailing the impact of the company’s actions and presence on these groups.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking to prepare reports on a company’s environmental and health impact on communities.

Report on Risks of Outsourcing

Consumer interest in keeping costs low through comparison shopping, coupled with breakthroughs in productivity have prompted companies to look for methods of increasing profit margins while keeping prices competitive. Through a practice known as off-shoring, the outsourcing or moving of manufacturing and service operations to foreign markets with lower labor costs, companies have found one method where the perceived savings potential is quite substantial. Shareholder opponents of outsourcing argue that there may be long-term consequences to offshore outsourcing that outweigh short-term benefits such as backlash from a public already sensitive to off-shoring, security risks from information technology development overseas, and diminished employee morale. Shareholder proposals addressing outsourcing ask that companies prepare a report to shareholders evaluating the risk to the company’s brand name and reputation in the U.S. from outsourcing and off-shoring of manufacturing and service work to other countries.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholders proposals asking companies to report on the risks associated with outsourcing or off-shoring.

Report on the Impact of Health Pandemics on Company Operations

Sub-Saharan Africa is the most affected region in the world with regard to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. With limited access to antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS, the increasing death toll is expected to have profound social, political and economic impact on that region and the companies or industries with operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the past, shareholder

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proposals asked companies to develop policies to provide affordable HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis drugs in third-world countries. However, in recent years, shareholders have changed their tactic, asking instead for reports on the impact of these pandemics on company operations, including both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical companies operating in high-risk areas. This change is consistent with the general shift in shareholder proposals towards risk assessment and mitigation.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking for companies to report on the impact of pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, on their business strategies.

Mandatory Arbitration

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims.

Sexual Harassment

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment.

Operations in High Risk Markets

In recent years, shareholder advocates and human rights organizations have highlighted concerns associated with companies operating in regions that are politically unstable, including state sponsors of terror. The U.S. government has active trade sanction regimes in place against a number of countries, including Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria, among others. These sanctions are enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which is part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. However, these countries do not comprise an exhaustive list of countries considered to be high-risk markets.

Shareholder proponents have filed resolutions addressing a variety of concerns around how investments and operations in high-risk regions may support, or be perceived to support, potentially oppressive governments. Proponents contend that operations in these countries may lead to potential reputational, regulatory, and/or supply chain risks as a result of operational disruptions. Concerned shareholders have requested investment withdrawals or cessation of operations in high-risk markets as well as reports on operations in high-risk markets. Such reports may seek additional disclosure from companies on criteria employed for investing in, continuing to operate in, and withdrawing from specific countries.

Depending on the country’s human rights record, investors have also asked companies to refrain from commencing new projects in the country of concern until improvements are made. In addition, investors have sought greater disclosure on the nature of a company’s involvement in the country and on the impact of their involvement or operations.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests for a review of and a report outlining the company’s potential financial and reputation risks associated with operations in “high-risk” markets, such as a terrorism-sponsoring state or otherwise, taking into account:

§ The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption;

§ Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures;

§ Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws;

§ Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws;

§ Whether the company has been recently involved in significant controversies or violations in “high-risk” markets.

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Reports on Operations in Burma/Myanmar

Since the early 1960s, Burma (also known as Myanmar) has been ruled by a military dictatorship that has been condemned for human rights abuses, including slave labor, torture, rape and murder. Many companies have pulled out of Burma over the past decade given the controversy surrounding involvement in the country. Oil companies continue be the largest investors in Burma and therefore are the usual targets of shareholder proposals on this topic. However, proposals have also been filed at other companies, including financial companies, for their involvement in the country.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards in connection with involvement in Burma.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on Burmese operations and reports on costs of continued involvement in the country.

§ Vote shareholder proposals to pull out of Burma on a case-by-case basis.

Reports on Operations in China

Documented human rights abuses in China continue to raise concerns among investors, specifically with respect to alleged use of prison and child labor in manufacturing. Reports have identified U.S. companies with direct or indirect ties to companies controlled by the Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and hence links to prison labor. The U.S. Business Principles for Human Rights of Workers in China may help a company with operations in China avoid being blacklisted by U.S. states and municipalities, many of whom have limited their contracts with companies that fail to adopt similar principles in other countries recognized for committing gross human rights violations.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting more disclosure on a company’s involvement in China

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that ask a company to terminate a project or investment in China.

Product Sales to Repressive Regimes

Certain Internet technology companies have been accused of assisting repressive governments in violating human rights through the knowing misuse of their hardware and software. Human rights groups have accused companies such as Yahoo!, Cisco, Google, and Microsoft of allowing the Chinese government to censor and track down dissenting voices on the internet.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that companies cease product sales to repressive regimes that can be used to violate human rights.

§ Vote for proposals to report on company efforts to reduce the likelihood of product abuses in this manner.

Internet Privacy/Censorship and Data Security

Information technology sector companies have been at the center of shareholder advocacy campaigns regarding concerns over Internet service companies and technology providers’ alleged cooperation with potentially repressive regimes, notably the Chinese government. Shareholder proposals, submitted at Yahoo!, Google, Microsoft, and Cisco, among others, asked companies to take steps to stop abetting repression and censorship of the Internet and/or review their human rights policies taking this issue into consideration. Resolution sponsors generally argue that the Chinese government is using IT company technologies to track, monitor, identify, and, ultimately, suppress political dissent. In the view of proponents, this process of surveillance and associated suppression violates internationally accepted norms outlined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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While early shareholder resolutions on Internet issues focused on censorship by repressive regimes and net neutrality, proponents have recently raised concerns regarding privacy and data security in the wake of increased breaches that result in the misuse of personal information. On Oct. 13, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a guidance document about the disclosure obligations relating to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents. In the document, the SEC references the negative consequences that are associated with cyber-attacks, such as: remediation costs, including those required to repair relationships with customers and clients; increased cyber-security protection costs; lost revenues from unauthorized use of the information or missed opportunities to attract clients; litigation; and reputational damage. The document says that while the federal securities laws do not explicitly require disclosure of cybersecurity risks and incidents, some disclosure requirements may impose an obligation on the company to disclose such information and provides scenarios where disclosure may be required. A 2013 study by the Ponemon Institute found that the median annualized cost of cyber-attacks for the 60 organizations studied was $11.6 million. The study also found that the number of successful cyber-attacks among the 60 companies increased by 18 percent between 2012 and 2013, from 102 successful attacks on average per week to 122.

More recently, data security has been the focus of media outlets and a public concern. During the 2013 holiday shopping season, Target, Neiman Marcus, and other retailers were the targets of hackers looking to steal credit card numbers. It is estimated that as many as 40 million customer credit and debit card accounts were stolen at Target alone. These incidents preceded what many people consider the largest data security breach in the United States. In June 2013, major media outlets began releasing information about leaked classified documents disclosed by Edward Snowden, an NSA contractor. The documents revealed a government-run Internet and telephone surveillance program aimed at collecting metadata. As part of this operation, the government is said to have obtained from major U.S. telecommunications companies the call records of their customers.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for resolutions requesting the disclosure and implementation of Internet privacy and censorship policies and procedures considering:

§ The level of disclosure of policies and procedures relating to privacy, freedom of speech, Internet censorship, and government monitoring of the Internet;

§ Engagement in dialogue with governments and/or relevant groups with respect to the Internet and the free flow of information;

§ The scope of business involvement and of investment in markets that maintain government censorship or monitoring of the Internet;

§ The market-specific laws or regulations applicable to Internet censorship or monitoring that may be imposed on the company; and

§ The level of controversy or litigation related to the company’s international human rights policies and procedures.

Disclosure on Plant Closings

Shareholders have asked that companies contemplating plant closures consider the impact of such closings on employees and the community, especially when such plan closures involve a community’s largest employers. Social Advisory Services usually recommends voting for greater disclosure of plant closing criteria. In cases where it can be shown that companies have been proactive and responsible in adopting these criteria, Social Advisory Services recommends against the proposal.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on plant closing criteria if the company has not provided such information.

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Climate Change

Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan²², taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

§ The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;

§ Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);

§ The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);

§ Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based;

§ Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;

§ Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;

§ Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance;

§ Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;

§ Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and

§ The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

§ The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure;

§ The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and

§ Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.

Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Climate change has emerged as the most significant environmental threat to the planet to date. Scientists generally agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a “greenhouse effect” that traps the planet’s heat. Environmentalists claim that the Greenhouse Gases(GHG) produced by the industrial age have caused recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. Climate change skeptics have described the rise and fall of global temperatures as naturally occurring phenomena and depicted human impact on climate change as minimal. Shareholder proposals requesting companies to issue a report to shareholders, “at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information,” on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the report include descriptions of corporate efforts to reduce emissions, companies’ financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat, and their goals in reducing these emissions from their operations. Shareholder proponents argue that there

²² Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

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is scientific proof that the burning of fossil fuels causes global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, and that a report on the company’s role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces related to climate change- on its operations and investments, or on how the company identifies, measures, and manage such risks.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reduction of GHG or adoption of GHG goals in products and operations.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on responses to regulatory and public pressures surrounding climate change, and for disclosure of research that aided in setting company policies around climate change.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting reports on greenhouse gas emissions from companies’ operations and/or products.

Invest in Clean/Renewable Energy

Filers of proposals on renewable energy ask companies to increase their investment in renewable energy sources and to work to develop products that rely more on renewable energy sources. Increased use of renewable energy will reduce the negative environmental impact of energy companies. In addition, as supplies of oil and coal exist in the earth in limited quantities, renewable energy sources represent a competitive, and some would argue essential, long-term business strategy.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s activities related to the development of renewable energy sources.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking increased investment in renewable energy sources unless the terms of the resolution are overly restrictive.

Energy Efficiency

Reducing the negative impact to the environment can be done through the use of more energy efficient practices and products. Shareholders propose that corporations should have energy efficient manufacturing processes and should market more energy efficient products. This can be done by utilizing renewable energy sources that are cost-competitive and by implementing energy efficient operations.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report on company energy efficiency policies and/or goals.

Environment

Proposals addressing environmental and energy concerns are plentiful, and generally seek greater disclosure on a particular issue or seek to improve a company’s environmental practices in order to protect the world’s natural resources. In addition, some proponents cite the negative financial implications for companies with poor environmental practices, including liabilities associated with site clean-ups and lawsuits, as well as arguments that energy efficient products and clean environmental practices are sustainable business practices that will contribute to long-term shareholder value. Shareholders proponents point out that the majority of independent atmospheric scientists agree that global warming poses a serious problem to the health and welfare of our planet, citing the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on

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Climate Change. Shareholder activists argue that companies can report on their greenhouse gas emissions within a few months at reasonable cost. The general trend indicates a movement towards encouraging companies to have proactive environmental policies, focusing on maximizing the efficient use of non-renewable resources and minimizing threats of harm to human health or the environment.

Environmental/Sustainability Reports

Shareholders may request general environmental disclosures or reports on a specific location/operation, often requesting that the company detail the environmental risks and potential liabilities of a specific project. Increasingly, companies have begun reporting on environmental and sustainability issues using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards. The GRI was established in 1997 with the mission of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance. The GRI was developed by Ceres (formerly known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, CERES) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

Ceres was formed in the wake of the March 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, when a consortium of investors, environmental groups, and religious organizations drafted what were originally named the Valdez Principles. Later to be renamed the CERES Principles, and now branded as the Ceres Roadmap 2030, corporate signatories to the Ceres Roadmap 2030 pledge to publicly report on environmental issues, including protection of the biosphere, sustainable use of natural resources, reduction and disposal of wastes, energy conservation, and employee and community risk reduction in a standardized form.

The Equator Principles are the financial industry’s benchmark for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing. The Principles were first launched in June 2003 and were ultimately adopted by over forty financial institutions during a three year implementation period. The principles were subsequently revised in July 2006 to take into account the new performance standards approved by the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC). The third iteration of the Principles was launched in June 2013 and it amplified the banks’ commitments to social responsibility, including human rights, climate change, and transparency. Financial institutions adopt these principles to ensure that the projects they venture in are developed in a socially responsible manner and reflect sound environmental management practices.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company’s environmental and social practices, and/or associated risks and liabilities.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of sustainability reports.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the CERES Roadmap 2030.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the Equator Principles.

Operations in Environmentally Sensitive Areas

Canadian Oil Sands

Proposals asking for a report on oil sands operations in the Athabasca region of Alberta, Canada have appeared at a number of oil and gas companies. Alberta’s oil sands contain a reserve largely thought to be one of the world’s largest potential energy sources. Rising oil sands production in Alberta has been paralleled with concerns from a variety of stakeholders—including environmental groups, local residents, and shareholders—regarding the environmental impacts of the complicated extraction and upgrading processes required to convert oil sands into a synthetic crude oil. The high viscosity of bitumen makes its extraction a challenging and resource-intensive process; the most common extraction technique involves pumping steam into the oil sands to lower the viscosity of bitumen in order to pump it to the surface.

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One of the most prominent issues concerning oil sands is the large volume of greenhouse gases (GHG) associated with production. Oil sands are by far one of the most energy-intensive forms of oil production, releasing three times more GHG emissions from production than conventional oil.

Shareholders have kept up pressure on the issue of potential long-term risks to companies posed by the environmental, social, and economic challenges associated with Canadian oil sands operations. Resolutions on the topic have focused on requesting greater transparency on the ramifications of oil sands development projects.

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge

The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) is a federally protected wilderness along Alaska’s North Slope. In the past, legislation proposed in both the House and Senate that, if passed, would allow a portion of this area to be leased to private companies for development and production of oil, has been witnessed. Oil companies have expressed an interest in bidding for these leases given the opportunity. In response, shareholder activists have filed resolutions asking these companies to cancel any plans to drill in the ANWR and cease their lobbying efforts to open the area for drilling. Proponents of shareholder proposals on this issue argue that the Coastal Plain section of the ANWR is the most environmentally sensitive area of the refuge, that the majority of Alaska’s North Slope that is not federally designated wilderness already provides the oil industry with sufficient resources for oil production, and that advocates of drilling in ANWR overstate the benefit to be derived from opening the wilderness to oil production. Those in favor of opening the area up to drilling note that only a small portion of ANWR would be considered for exploration, and if drilling were to take place, it would be on less than one percent of the entire area, that modern technology reduces the environmental impact of oil drilling on both the land and surrounding wildlife, and that oil production in ANWR would have considerable benefit to company shareholders, Alaskans, and the United States as a whole.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for requests for reports on potential environmental damage as a result of company operations in protected regions.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to prepare reports or adopt policies on operations that include mining, drilling or logging in environmentally sensitive areas.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to curb or reduce the sale of products manufactured from materials extracted from environmentally sensitive areas such as old growth forests.

Hydraulic Fracturing

Shareholder proponents have elevated concerns on the use of hydraulic fracturing, an increasingly controversial process in which water, sand, and a mix of chemicals are blasted horizontally into tight layers of shale rock to extract natural gas. As this practice has gained more widespread use, environmentalists have raised concerns that the chemicals mixed with sand and water to aid the fracturing process can contaminate ground water supplies. Proponents of resolutions at companies that employ hydraulic fracturing are also concerned that wastewater produced by the process could overload the waste treatment plants to which it is shipped. Shareholders have asked companies that utilize hydraulic fracturing to report on the environmental impact of the practice and to disclose policies aimed at reducing hazards from the process.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests seeking greater transparency on the practice of hydraulic fracturing and its associated risks.

Phase Out Chlorine-Based Chemicals

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) identified chlorine bleaching of pulp and paper as a major source of dioxin, a known human carcinogen linked to have negative effects to humans and animals. A number of shareholder proposals have been filed in recent years asking companies to report on the possible phase-out of chlorine bleaching in the production of paper because of the practice’s negative environmental impact.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to prepare a report on the phase-out of chlorine bleaching in paper production.

§ Vote on a case-by-case basis on shareholder proposals asking companies to cease or phase-out the use of chlorine bleaching.

Land Procurement and Development

Certain real estate developers including big-box large retailers have received criticism over their processes for acquiring and developing land. Given a 2005 Supreme Court decision allowing for the usage of eminent domain laws in the U.S. to take land from property-owners for tax generating purposes, as well as certain controversies outside of the U.S. with land procurement, some shareholders would like assurances that companies are acting ethically and with local stakeholders in mind.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for land procurement and utilize the policies in their decision-making.

Report on the Sustainability of Concentrated Area Feeding Operations (CAFO)

The potential environmental impact on water, aquatic ecosystems, and local areas from odor and chemical discharges from CAFOs has led to lawsuits and EPA regulations. Certain shareholders have asked companies to provide additional details on their CAFOs in addition to those with which the companies contract to raise their livestock.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for requests that companies report on the sustainability and the environmental impacts of both company-owned and contract livestock operations.

Adopt a Comprehensive Recycling Policy

A number of companies have received proposals to step-up their recycling efforts, with the goal of reducing the company’s negative impact on the environment and reducing costs over the long-term.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting the preparation of a report on the company’s recycling efforts.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to increase their recycling efforts or to adopt a formal recycling policy.

Nuclear Energy

Nuclear power continues to be a controversial method of producing electricity. Opponents of nuclear energy are primarily concerned with serious accidents and the related negative human health consequences, and with the difficulties involved in nuclear waste storage.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s nuclear energy procedures.

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals that ask the company to cease the production of nuclear power.

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Water Use

Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report evaluating the business risks linked to water use and impacts on the company’s supply chain, including subsidiaries and bottling partners. Such proposals also ask companies to disclose current policies and procedures for mitigating the impact of operations on local communities in areas of water scarcity.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the preparation of a report on a company’s risks linked to water use.

§ Vote for resolutions requesting companies to promote the “human right to water” as articulated by the United Nations.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that companies report on or adopt policies for water use that incorporate social and environmental factors.

Kyoto Protocol Compliance

With the Kyoto Protocol operational as of February 2005, ratifying countries have agreed to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases. While some signatories have yet to release specific details of corporate regulations, the impact on multinationals operating in Kyoto-compliant countries is anticipated to be significant.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on how companies will meet GHG reduction targets of the Kyoto-compliant countries in which they operate.

Health and Safety

Toxic Materials

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on policies and activities to ensure product safety.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to disclose annual expenditures relating to the promotion and/or environmental cleanup of toxins.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the feasibility of removing, or substituting with safer alternatives, all “harmful” ingredients used in company products.

Product Safety

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for proposals requesting the company to report on or adopt consumer product safety policies and initiatives.

§ Generally vote for proposals requesting the study, adoption and/or implementation of consumer product safety programs in the company’s supply chain.

Workplace/Facility Safety

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts.

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§ Vote shareholder proposals requesting companies report on or implement procedures associated with their operations and/or facilities on a case-by-case basis.

Report on Handgun Safety Initiatives

Shareholders may ask for a company to report on policies and procedures that are aimed at curtailing the incidence of gun violence. Such a report may include: implementation of the company’s contract instruction to distributors not to sell the company’s weapons at gun shows or through pawn shops; recalls or retro-fits of products with safety-related defects causing death or serious injury to consumers, as well as development of systems to identify and remedy these defects; names and descriptions of products that are developed or are being developed for a combination of higher caliber/maximum capacity and greater conceal-ability; and the company’s involvement in promotion campaigns that could be construed as aimed at children. The Sandy Hook Principles were established to commemorate the victims of gun violence and to encourage positive corporate behavior in response to the proliferation of gun violence in America.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to report on its efforts to promote handgun safety.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking the company to stop the sale of handguns and accessories.

Phase-out or Label Products Containing Genetically Engineered Ingredients

Shareholders have asked companies engaged in the development of genetically modified agricultural products to adopt a policy of not marketing or distributing such products until “long term safety testing” demonstrates that they are not harmful to humans, animals or the environment. Until further long term testing demonstrates that these products are not harmful, companies in the restaurant and prepared foods industries have been asked to remove genetically altered ingredients from products they manufacture or sell, and label such products in the interim. Shareholders have also asked supermarket companies to do the same for their own private label brands.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to label products that contain genetically engineered products or products from cloned animals.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to phase out the use of genetically engineered ingredients in their products.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to report on the use of genetically engineered organisms in their products.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on the financial, legal, and operational risks posed by the use of genetically engineered organisms.

Tobacco-related Proposals

Under the pressure of ongoing litigation and negative media attention, tobacco companies and even non-tobacco companies with ties to the industry have received an assortment of shareholder proposals seeking increased responsibility and social consciousness from tobacco companies and as well as firms affiliated with the tobacco industry.

While the specific resolutions for shareholder proponents vary from year to year, activist shareholders consistently make the tobacco industry a prominent target. Examples of shareholder proposals focused on tobacco include: warnings on the risks of tobacco smoke and smoking-related diseases, attempting to link executive compensation with reductions in teen smoking rates, the placement of company tobacco products in retail outlets, a review of advertising campaigns and their impact on children and minority groups, prohibiting non-tobacco companies from entering into contracts with tobacco companies, and requesting restaurant operators maintain smoke-free restaurants.

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In June 2009, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act was signed into law, giving the FDA authority to regulate the tobacco industry for the first time, including the power to block or approve new products as well as the nicotine and other content in existing tobacco products. This legislation empowers the imposition of a ban on tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds, require FDA-approved graphic warning labels that occupy 50 percent of the space on each package of cigarettes.

In September 2009, the FDA issued a ban on the sale of flavored cigarettes, exercising its regulatory power in a major way over tobacco for the first time under the new law. The ban affected tobacco products with chocolate, vanilla, clove, and other similar flavors.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking to limit the sale of tobacco products to children.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking producers of tobacco product components (such as filters, adhesives, flavorings, and paper products) to halt sales to tobacco companies.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask restaurants to adopt smoke-free policies and that ask tobacco companies to support smoke-free legislation.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking a report on a tobacco company’s advertising approach.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals at insurance companies to cease investment in tobacco companies.

§ Vote for proposals at producers of cigarette components calling for a report outlining the risks and potential liabilities of the production of these components.

§ Vote for proposals calling for tobacco companies to cease the production of tobacco products.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to stop all advertising, marketing and sale of cigarettes using the terms “light,” “ultra-light,” “mild,” and other similar words and/or colors.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to increase health warnings on cigarette smoking. (i.e.: information for pregnant women, “Canadian Style” warnings, filter safety).

Adopt Policy/Report on Drug Pricing

Pharmaceutical drug pricing, both within the United States and internationally, has raised many questions of the companies that are responsible for creating and marketing these treatments. Shareholder proponents, activists and even some legislators have called upon drug companies to restrain pricing of prescription drugs.

The high cost of prescription drugs is a vital issue for senior citizens across the country. Seniors have the greatest need for prescription drugs, accounting for a significant portion of all prescription drug sales, but they often live on fixed incomes and are underinsured.

Proponents note that efforts to reign-in pharmaceutical costs will not negatively impact research and development (R&D) costs and that retail drug prices are consistently higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized nations. Pharmaceutical companies often respond that adopting a formal drug pricing policy could put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Against the backdrop of the AIDS crisis in Africa, many shareholders have called on companies to address the issue of affordable drugs for the treatment of AIDS, as well as tuberculosis and malaria throughout the developing world. When analyzing such resolutions, consideration should be made of the strategic implications of pricing policies in the market.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to prepare a report on drug pricing.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt a formal policy on drug pricing.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call on companies to develop a policy to provide affordable HIV, AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria drugs in third-world nations.

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§ Vote for proposals asking for reports on the economic effects and legal risks of limiting pharmaceutical products to Canada or certain wholesalers.

§ Vote case-by-case proposals requesting that companies adopt policies not to constrain prescription drug re-importation by limiting supplies to foreign markets.

Government and Military

Weapons-related proposals may target handguns, landmines, defense contracting, or sale of weapons to foreign governments.

Prepare Report to Renounce Future Landmine Production

Although very few companies currently produce landmines, some companies continue to have links to landmine production or produce components that are used to make landmines. Shareholders have asked companies to renounce the future development of landmines or their components, or to prepare a report on the feasibility of such a renouncement.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking a report on the renouncement of future landmine production.

Prepare Report on Foreign Military Sales

Shareholders have filed proxy resolutions asking companies to account for their policies surrounding the sale of military equipment to foreign governments. The proposals can take various forms. One resolution simply calls on companies to report on their foreign military sales, provide information on military product exports, disclose the company’s basis for determining whether those sales should be made, and any procedures used to market or negotiate those sales. Another resolution calls for companies to report on “offsets” e.g. guarantee of new jobs in the purchasing country and technology transfers. Offsets involve a commitment by military contractors and the U.S. government to direct benefits back to a foreign government as a condition of a military sale.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to report on foreign military sales or offset agreements.

§ Vote case-by-case on proposals that call for outright restrictions on foreign military sales.

Depleted Uranium/Nuclear Weapons

Depleted uranium is the less radioactive uranium that is left behind after enriched uranium is produced for nuclear reactor fuel and fissile material for nuclear weapons. The main difference is that depleted uranium contains at least three times less U-235 than natural uranium. However, it is still weakly radioactive. Shareholders want reports on companies’ policies, procedures and involvement in the said substance and nuclear weapons.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report on involvement, policies, and procedures related to depleted uranium and nuclear weapons.

Adopt Ethical Criteria for Weapons Contracts

Shareholders have requested that companies review their code of conduct and statements of ethical criteria for military production-related contract bids, awards, and execution to incorporate environmental factors and sustainability issues

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related to the contract bidding process. Sustainability is a business model that requires companies to balance the needs and interests of various stakeholders while concurrently sustaining their businesses, communities, and the environment for future generations.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and amend, if necessary, the company’s code of conduct and statements of ethical criteria for military production-related contract bids, awards and execution.

Animal Welfare

Animal Rights/Testing

Shareholders and animal rights groups, including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), may file resolutions calling for the end to painful and unnecessary animal testing on laboratory animals by companies developing products for the cosmetics and medical supply industry. Since advanced testing methods now produce many reliable results without the use of live animals, Social Advisory Services generally supports proposals on this issue. In cases where it can be determined that alternative testing methods are unreliable or are required by law, Social Advisory Services recommends voting against such proposals. Other resolutions call for the adoption of animal welfare standards that would ensure humane treatment of animals on vendors’ farms and slaughter houses. Social Advisory Services will generally vote in favor of such resolutions.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to limit unnecessary animal testing where alternative testing methods are feasible or not barred by law.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that ask companies to adopt or/and report on company animal welfare standards or animal-related risks.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report on the operational costs and liabilities associated with selling animals.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate cruel product testing methods.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that seek to monitor, limit, report, or eliminate the outsourcing of animal testing to overseas laboratories.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt or adhere to a public animal welfare policy at both company and contracted laboratory levels.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to evaluate, adopt, or require suppliers to adopt Controlled Atmosphere Killing (CAK) slaughter methods.

Political and Charitable Giving

Lobbying Efforts

Shareholders have asked companies to report on their lobbying efforts on proposed legislation or to refute established scientific research regarding climate change, the health effects of smoking, fuel efficiency standards etc. Proponents have pointed to potential legislation on climate change, the lethargic pace of improvements in fuel efficiency standards in the U.S. automotive industry, and the highly litigious nature surrounding the tobacco industry as rationales for greater transparency on corporate lobbying practices that would shed light on whether companies are acting in the best long-term interests of their shareholders. Proponents of lobbying resolutions typically request enhanced disclosure of lobbying policies and expenditures, including a report on the policies and procedures related to lobbying, amounts used for various types of lobbying, and any membership or payments to a tax-exempt organization that writes and endorses model legislation.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to review and report on their lobbying activities, including efforts to challenge scientific research and influence governmental legislation.

§ Vote for proposals requesting information on a company’s lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures.

Political Contributions/Non-Partisanship

As evidenced by the U.S. Supreme Court’s January 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission that lifted restrictions on corporate spending in federal elections, changes in legislation that governs corporate political giving have, rather than limiting such contributions, increased the potential for corporate contributions to the political process and the complexity of tracking such contributions.

Proponents of political spending resolutions generally call for enhanced disclosure of political contributions, including a report on the policies and procedures for corporate political campaign contributions and trade association expenditures, the respective amounts of such donations using company funds, or an assessment of the impacts of such contributions on the firm’s image, sales and profitability. Shareholder advocates of these proposals are concerned with the lack of transparency on political giving and the increasing involvement and influence of corporations in the political process.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for proposals calling for a company to disclose political and trade association contributions, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive.

§ Vote for proposals calling for a company to maintain a policy of political non-partisanship.

§ Vote against proposals asking a company to refrain from making any political contributions.

Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s alignment of political contributions, lobbying, and electioneering spending with a company’s publicly stated values and policies, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive. Additionally, Social Advisory Services will consider whether:

§ The company’s policies, management, board oversight, governance processes, and level of disclosure related to direct political contributions, lobbying activities, and payments to trade associations, political action committees, or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding: the reasons for its support of candidates for public offices; the reasons for support of and participation in trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and other political activities;

§ Any incongruencies identified between a company’s direct and indirect political expenditures and its publicly stated values and priorities;

§ Recent significant controversies related to the company’s direct and indirect lobbying, political contributions, or political activities.

Charitable Contributions

Shareholder proponents of charitable-contributions related resolutions may seek greater disclosure on a company’s charitable donations including dollar amounts, sponsorships, and policies on corporate philanthropy. Social Advisory

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Services is generally supportive of increased transparency around corporate charitable giving. However, some resolutions extend beyond mere disclosure requests and attempt to influence or restrict companies’ contributions to specific types of beneficiaries in a manner that furthers particular objectives supported by the proposal sponsors. Social Advisory Services believes that management is better positioned to decide what criteria are appropriate for making corporate charitable contributions. Also, some of the proposals may require companies to poll their shareholders as part of the grant-making process. Since majority of companies generally have thousands of shareholders, contacting, confirming, and processing each individual opinion and/or consent would be a burdensome and expensive exercise.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for shareholder resolutions seeking enhanced transparency on corporate philanthropy.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals imposing charitable giving criteria or requiring shareholder ratification of grants.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals requesting that companies prohibit charitable contributions.

Disclosure on Prior Government Service

Shareholders have asked companies to disclose the identity of any senior executive and/or other high-level employee, consultant, lobbyist, attorney, or investment banker who has served in government. Although the movement of individuals between government and the private sector may benefit both, the potential also exists for conflicts of interest, especially in industries that have extensive dealings with government agencies.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the disclosure of prior government service of the company’s key executives.

Consumer Lending and Economic Development

Adopt Policy/Report on Predatory Lending Practices

Predatory lending involves charging excessive fees to subprime borrowers without adequate disclosure. More specifically, predatory lending includes misleading subprime borrowers about the terms of a loan, charging excessive fees that are folded into the body of a refinancing loan, including life insurance policies or other unnecessary additions to a mortgage, or lending to homeowners with insufficient income to cover loan payments.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals seeking the development of a policy or preparation of a report to guard against predatory lending practices.

Disclosure on Credit in Developing Countries (LDCs) or Forgive LDC Debt

Shareholders have asked banks and other financial services firms to develop and disclose lending policies for less developed countries. Proponents are concerned that, without such policies, lending to developing countries may contribute to the outflow of capital, the inefficient use of capital, and corruption, all of which increase the risk of loan loss. In the interest of promoting improved LDC lending practices and responsible loan disclosure, Social Advisory Services generally supports voting for such proposals. In cases where it can be determined that companies have been proactive and responsible in developing policies, Social Advisory Services may recommend a vote against the proposal’s adoption. Social Advisory Services usually opposes proposals that call for outright loan forgiveness; such action represents an unacceptable loss to lending institutions and their shareholders. Social Advisory Services may support such proposals at banks that have failed to make reasonable provisions for non-performing loans as a means to encourage a change in policy.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking for disclosure on lending practices in developing countries, unless the company has demonstrated a clear proactive record on the issue.

§ Vote against shareholder proposals asking banks to forgive loans outright.

§ Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for loan forgiveness at banks that have failed to make reasonable provisions for non-performing loans.

§ Vote for proposals to restructure and extend the terms of non-performing loans.

Community Investing

Shareholders may ask for a company to prepare a report addressing the company’s community investing efforts. Such proposals also ask companies to review their policies regarding their investments in different communities.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals that seek a policy review or report addressing the company’s community investing efforts.

Miscellaneous

Adult Entertainment

Traditionally, there have not been many proposals filed in the area of adult entertainment. However, with the consolidation of the communications industry, a number of large companies have ended up with ownership of cable companies. These cable companies may offer their customers access to pay-per-view programming or channels intended for adult audiences. Proponents of shareholder proposals on this issue ask cable companies and companies with interests in cable companies to assess the costs and benefits of continuing to distribute sexually-explicit content, including the potential negative impact on the company’s image.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals that seek a review of the company’s involvement with pornography.

Abortion/Right to Life Issues

Shareholder proposals pertaining to abortion and right to life issues are rare. However, in the past shareholders have asked companies to stop manufacturing abortifacient drugs; to separate abortifacient drug operations from other operations; or to discontinue acute-care or physician management practices that involve support for abortion services. As long as abortion is legal, Social Advisory Services’ position is that issues related to abortion should be a personal decision, not a corporate one. Therefore Social Advisory Services recommends abstaining on anti-abortion and right-to-life proposals.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Abstain on shareholder proposals that address right to life issues.

Anti-Social Proposals

A number of ‘anti-social’ shareholder proposals have been filed at companies requesting increased disclosure. While these proposals’ requests are very similar to those submitted by shareholder advocates within traditional socially responsible investor circles, the underlying motives for filing the proposals appear to be very different. In addition to charitable contribution proposals, anti-social proposals addressing climate change, sustainability, and conflicts of interest may be seen at shareholder meetings. Despite implicitly different motivations in some of these proposals, the underlying requests for increased disclosure, in some cases, may be worth shareholder support.

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Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote against shareholder proposals that do not seek to ultimately advance the goals of the social investment community.

§ Vote case-by-case on anti-social shareholder proposals seeking a review or report on the company’s charitable contributions.

Violence and Adult Themes in Video Games

Perceptions of increased sex and violence in video games have led certain shareholders to question the availability of adult-themed content to children and teens. The Entertainment Software Ratings Board, which provides ratings for video games, has classified approximately 34 percent of the total games it reviews as either Teen, Mature, or Adults Only.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking for reports on company policies related to the sale of mature-rated video games to children and teens.

Link Compensation to Non-Financial Factors

Proponents of these proposals feel that social and environmental criteria should be factored into the formulas used in determining executive compensation packages. The shareholder sponsors of the resolutions look to companies to review current compensation practices and to include social or environmental performance criteria such as accounting for “poor corporate citizenship” and meeting environmental or workplace safety objectives and metrics when evaluating executive compensation. Some of the non-financial criteria that proponents of these resolutions seek to be incorporated in compensation program design include workplace safety, environmental stewardship, or diversity and customer/employee satisfaction – as part of a written policy used to align compensation with performance on non-financial factors alongside financial criteria.

Proponents believe that factors such as poor environmental performance, workplace lawsuits, etc. could have a significant adverse impact on a company’s financial performance if not proactively and adequately addressed, and that these factors should be considered along with traditional financial considerations when determining executive pay. The significant stock price declines and massive losses in shareholder value stemming from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster and the tragic explosion at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch mine that killed 29 employees is a sobering reminder of the need to have the right management incentives in place to ensure that social and environmental risks are actively managed and mitigated against. Given the proliferation of derivative lawsuits targeted at firms such as Halliburton, Transocean and Cameron International that were suppliers to or partners with BP in a capacity that ignored safety considerations or that contributed to the economic and ecological disaster, investors are increasingly mindful of the far-reaching implications that exposure to social or environmental risks could have on shareholder value at portfolio companies.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for linkage of executive pay to non-financial factors including performance against social and environmental goals, customer/employee satisfaction, corporate downsizing, community involvement, human rights, or predatory lending.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on linking executive pay to non-financial factors.

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9.    Mutual Fund Proxies

Election of Trustees and Directors

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings. However, mutual fund boards do not usually have compensation committees, so do not withhold for the lack of this committee.

Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: For closed-end management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at CEFs that have not provided a compelling rationale for opting-in to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a by-law amendment to a shareholder vote.

Investment Advisory Agreement

An investment advisory agreement is an agreement between a mutual fund and its financial advisor under which the financial advisor provides investment advice to the fund in return for a fee based on the fund’s net asset size.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Votes on investment advisory agreements should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, considering the following factors:

§ Proposed and current fee schedules;

§ Fund category/investment objective;

§ Performance benchmarks;

§ Share price performance as compared with peers;

§ Resulting fees relative to peers;

§ Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control).

Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Non-fundamental Restriction

Fundamental investment restrictions are limitations within a fund’s articles of incorporation that limit the investment practices of the particular fund.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non-fundamental restriction, considering the following factors:

§ The fund’s target investments;

§ The reasons given by the fund for the change; and

§ The projected impact of the change on the portfolio.

Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Non-fundamental

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals to change a fund’s fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.

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Distribution Agreements

Distribution agreements are agreements between a fund and its distributor which provide that the distributor is paid a fee to promote the sale of the fund’s shares.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on distribution agreement proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives;

§ The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance;

§ The competitiveness of the fund in the industry; and

§ The terms of the agreement.

Approving New Classes or Series of Shares

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares.

Convert Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund

Although approval of these proposals would eliminate the discount at which the fund’s shares trade. The costs associated with converting the fund, in addition to the potential risks to long-term shareholder value, outweigh the potential benefits of the conversion.

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on conversion proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance as a closed-end fund;

§ Market in which the fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals.

Proxy Contests

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proxy contests, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance relative to its peers;

§ Market in which fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the issues;

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals;

§ Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;

§ Independence of directors;

§ Experience and skills of director candidates;

§ Governance profile of the company;

§ Evidence of management entrenchment.

Preferred Stock Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares, considering the following factors:

§ Stated specific financing purpose;

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§ Possible dilution for common shares;

§ Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes.

Mergers

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on merger proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Resulting fee structure;

§ Performance of both funds;

§ Continuity of management personnel; and

§ Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.

Business Development Companies – Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV) if:

§ The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date that is less than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;

§ A majority of the independent directors who have no financial interest in the sale have made a determination as to whether such sale would be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders prior to selling shares below NAV; and

§ The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either:

§ Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one- and three-year median TSRs; or

§ Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholders.

Change in Fund’s Subclassification

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes in a fund’s sub-classification, considering the following factors: a) potential competitiveness; b) current and potential returns; c) risk of concentration; d) consolidation in target industry.

Changing the Domicile of a Fund

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on re-incorporations, considering the following factors: a) regulations of both states; b) required fundamental policies of both states; c) the increased flexibility available.

Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors: a) strategies employed to salvage the company; b) the fund’s past performance; c) the terms of the liquidation.

Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote against proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate subadvisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one subadviser.

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Name Change Proposals

Social Advisory Services Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on name change proposals, considering the following factors: a) political/economic changes in the target market; b) consolidation in the target market; and c) current asset composition.

1940 Act Policies

Social Advisory Services Recommendation:

§ Vote case-by-case on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors: a) potential competitiveness; b) regulatory developments; c) current and potential returns; and d) current and potential risk.

§ Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.

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UNITED STATES SUSTAINABILITY PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 2023 Policy Recommendations Published January 17, 2023 W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	F-419
1.    Routine/Miscellaneous	F-420
Adjourn Meeting	F-420
Amend Quorum Requirements	F-420
Amend Minor Bylaws	F-420
Change Company Name	F-420
Change Date, Time, or Location of Annual Meeting	F-420
Other Business	F-421
Audit-Related	F-421
Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability	F-421
Auditor Ratification	F-421
Shareholder Proposals Limiting Non-Audit Services	F-421
Shareholder Proposals on Audit Firm Rotation	F-422
2.    Board of Directors	F-423
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections	F-423
Accountability	F-423
Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structures	F-423
Problematic Audit-Related Practices	F-426
Problematic Compensation Practices	F-426
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Failures	F-427
Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero	F-427
Responsiveness	F-428
Composition	F-428
Gender Diversity	F-429
Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity	F-429
Independence	F-429
Sustainability Policy Classification of Directors – U.S.	F-430
Other Board-Related Proposals	F-432
Board Refreshment	F-432
Board Size	F-432
Classification/Declassification of the Board	F-432
CEO Succession Planning	F-433
Cumulative Voting	F-433
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation	F-433
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	F-433
Establish Other Board Committee Proposals	F-434
Filling Vacancies/Removal of Directors	F-434

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-412 2 of 80

Independent Board Chair	F-434
Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees	F-434
Majority Vote Standard for the Election of Directors	F-435
Proxy Access	F-435
Require More Nominees than Open Seats	F-435
Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee)	F-435
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access -Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections	F-436
Vote-No Campaigns	F-436
3.    Shareholder Rights  & Defenses	F-437
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations	F-437
Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent	F-437
Control Share Acquisition Provisions	F-437
Control Share Cash-Out Provisions	F-437
Disgorgement Provisions	F-438
Fair Price Provisions	F-438
Freeze-Out Provisions	F-438
Greenmail	F-438
Shareholder Litigation Rights	F-438
Federal Forum Selection Provisions	F-438
Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters	F-439
Fee Shifting	F-439
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments	F-439
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)	F-440
Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy	F-440
Management Proposals to Ratify a Poison Pill	F-440
Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)	F-440
Proxy Voting Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Tabulation	F-441
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions	F-441
Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses	F-441
Reincorporation Proposals	F-442
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent	F-442
Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings	F-443
Stakeholder Provisions	F-443
State Antitakeover Statutes	F-443
Supermajority Vote Requirements	F-443
Virtual Shareholder Meetings	F-443
4.    Capital/Restructuring	F-444
Capital	F-444
Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock	F-444

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-413 3 of 80

Common Stock Authorization	F-444
General Authorization Requests	F-444
Specific Authorization Requests	F-445
Dual Class Structure	F-445
Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan	F-445
Preemptive Rights	F-445
Preferred Stock Authorization	F-445
General Authorization Requests	F-445
Specific Authorization Requests	F-446
Recapitalization Plans	F-447
Reverse Stock Splits	F-447
Share Repurchase Programs	F-447
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends	F-447
Tracking Stock	F-448
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S	F-448
Restructuring	F-448
Appraisal Rights	F-448
Asset Purchases	F-448
Asset Sales	F-449
Bundled Proposals	F-449
Conversion of Securities	F-449
Corporate Reorganization/Debt Restructuring/Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans/Reverse Leveraged Buyouts/Wrap Plans	F-449
Formation of Holding Company	F-450
Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)	F-450
Joint Ventures	F-450
Liquidations	F-451
Mergers and Acquisitions	F-451
Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures	F-451
Reorganization/Restructuring Plan (Bankruptcy)	F-452
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)	F-453
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions	F-453
Spin-offs	F-454
Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals	F-454
5.    Compensation	F-455
Executive Pay Evaluation	F-455
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation—Management Proposals (Management Say-on-Pay)	F-455
Pay-for-Performance Evaluation	F-456
Problematic Pay Practices	F-456

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-414 4 of 80

Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness	F-457
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”)	F-458
Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale	F-458
Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans	F-458
Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)	F-459
Three-Year Value-Adjusted Burn Rate	F-460
Egregious Factors	F-460
Liberal Change in Control Definition	F-460
Repricing Provisions	F-460
Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect	F-461
Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations	F-461
Dividend Equivalent Rights	F-461
Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)	F-461
Other Compensation Plans	F-461
401(k) Employee Benefit Plans	F-461
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)	F-461
Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Qualified Plans	F-462
Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Non-Qualified Plans	F-462
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))	F-462
Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options	F-463
Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash	F-463
Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs	F-464
Director Compensation	F-464
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs	F-464
Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors	F-465
Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans	F-465
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation	F-465
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy	F-465
Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”	F-465
Compensation Consultants—Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization	F-466
Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors	F-466
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits	F-466
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time	F-466
Pay Disparity	F-467
Pay for Performance/Performance-Based Awards	F-467
Pay for Superior Performance	F-467
Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)	F-468
Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees	F-468
Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances	F-468

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-415 5 of 80

Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes	F-469
Share Buyback Proposals	F-469
Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)	F-469
Tax Gross-Up Proposals	F-469
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment/Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity	F-470
6.     Social and Environmental Issues	F-471
Global Approach	F-471
Animal Welfare	F-471
Animal Welfare Policies	F-471
Animal Testing	F-471
Animal Slaughter	F-472
Consumer Issues	F-472
Genetically Modified Ingredients	F-472
Reports on Potentially Controversial Business/Financial Practices	F-472
Consumer Lending	F-473
Pharmaceutical Pricing, Access to Medicines, Product Reimportation and Health Pandemics	F-473
Health Pandemics	F-473
Product Safety and Toxic/Hazardous Materials	F-474
Tobacco-Related Proposals	F-474
Climate Change	F-474
Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions	F-474
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals	F-475
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals	F-475
Energy Efficiency	F-476
Renewable Energy	F-476
Diversity	F-476
Board Diversity	F-476
Equality of Opportunity	F-476
Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits	F-476
Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gap	F-477
Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audits	F-477
Environment and Sustainability	F-477
Facility and Workplace Safety	F-477
Hydraulic Fracturing	F-477
Operations in Protected Areas	F-477
Recycling	F-478
Sustainability Reporting	F-478
Water Issues	F-478
Equator Principles	F-478

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-416 6 of 80

General Corporate Issues	F-479
Charitable Contributions	F-479
Data Security, Privacy, and Internet Issues	F-479
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Compensation-Related Proposals	F-479
Human Rights, Labor Issues, and International Operations	F-479
Human Rights Proposals	F-480
Mandatory Arbitration	F-480
MacBride Principles	F-481
Community Social and Environmental Impact Assessments	F-481
Operations in High-Risk Markets	F-481
Outsourcing/Offshoring	F-481
Sexual Harassment	F-482
Weapons and Military Sales	F-482
Political Activities	F-482
Lobbying	F-482
Political Contributions	F-482
Political Ties	F-483
Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency	F-483
7.    Mutual Fund Proxies	F-484
Election of Directors	F-484
Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes	F-484
Converting Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund	F-484
Proxy Contests	F-484
Investment Advisory Agreements	F-484
Approving New Classes or Series of Shares	F-485
Preferred Stock Proposals	F-485
1940 Act Policies	F-485
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction	F-485
Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Nonfundamental	F-485
Name Change Proposals	F-485
Change in Fund’s Subclassification	F-486
Business Development Companies—Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value	F-486
Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation	F-486
Changes to the Charter Document	F-486
Changing the Domicile of a Fund	F-487
Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval	F-487
Distribution Agreements	F-487
Master-Feeder Structure	F-487

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-417 7 of 80

Mergers	F-487
Shareholder Proposals for Mutual Funds	F-487
Establish Director Ownership Requirement	F-487
Reimburse Shareholder for Expenses Incurred	F-488
Terminate the Investment Advisor	F-488
8.   Foreign Private Issuers Listed on U.S. Exchanges	F-489

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-418 8 of 80

Introduction

ISS recognizes the growing view among investment professionals that sustainability or environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) factors could present material risks to portfolio investments. Whereas investment managers have traditionally analyzed topics such as board accountability and executive compensation to mitigate risk, greater numbers are incorporating ESG performance into their investment making decisions in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the overall risk profile of the companies in which they invest and ensure sustainable long-term profitability for their beneficiaries.

Investors concerned with portfolio value preservation and enhancement through the incorporation of sustainability factors can also carry out this active ownership approach through their proxy voting activity. In voting their shares, sustainability-minded investors are concerned not only with economic returns to shareholders and good corporate governance, but also with ensuring corporate activities and practices are aligned with the broader objectives of society. These investors seek standardized reporting on ESG issues, request information regarding an issuer’s adoption of, or adherence to, relevant norms, standards, codes of conduct or universally recognized international initiatives including affirmative support for related shareholder resolutions advocating enhanced disclosure and transparency.

ISS’ Sustainability Proxy Voting Guidelines

ISS has, therefore, developed proxy voting guidelines that are consistent with the objectives of sustainability-minded investors and fiduciaries. On matters of ESG import, ISS’ Sustainability Policy seeks to promote support for recognized global governing bodies promoting sustainable business practices advocating for stewardship of environment, fair labor practices, non-discrimination, and the protection of human rights. Generally, ISS’ Sustainability Policy will take as its frame of reference internationally recognized sustainability-related initiatives such as the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI), United Nations Global Compact, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Carbon Principles, International Labour Organization Conventions (ILO), Ceres Roadmap 2030, Global Sullivan Principles, MacBride Principles, and environmental and social European Union Directives. Each of these efforts promote a fair, unified and productive reporting and compliance environment which advances positive corporate ESG actions that promote practices that present new opportunities or that mitigate related financial and reputational risks.

On matters of corporate governance, executive compensation, and corporate structure, the Sustainability Policy guidelines are based on a commitment to create and preserve economic value and to advance principles of good corporate governance.

These guidelines provide an overview of how ISS approaches proxy voting issues for subscribers of the Sustainability Policy. We note there may be cases in which the final vote recommendation at a particular company varies from the voting guidelines due to the fact that we closely examine the merits of each proposal and consider relevant information and company-specific circumstances in arriving at our decisions. To that end, ISS engages with both interested shareholders as well as issuers to gain further insight into contentious issues facing the company. Where ISS acts as voting agent for clients, it follows each client’s voting policy, which may differ in some cases from the policies outlined in this document. ISS updates its guidelines on an annual basis to take into account emerging issues and trends on environmental, social and corporate governance topics, as well as the evolution of market standards, regulatory changes and client feedback.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-419 9 of 80

1.     Routine/Miscellaneous

Adjourn Meeting

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.

§ Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction.

§ Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.”

Amend Quorum Requirements

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration:

§ The new quorum threshold requested;

§ The rationale presented for the reduction;

§ The market capitalization of the company (size, inclusion in indices);

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ Previous voter turnout or attempts to achieve quorum;

§ Any provisions or commitments to restore quorum to a majority of shares outstanding, should voter turnout improve sufficiently; and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

In general, a quorum threshold kept as close to a majority of shares outstanding as is achievable is preferred.

Vote case-by-case on directors who unilaterally lower the quorum requirements below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration the factors listed above.

Amend Minor Bylaws

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).

Change Company Name

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to change the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely impact shareholder value.

Change Date, Time, or Location of Annual Meeting

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the proposed change is unreasonable.

Vote against shareholder proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the current scheduling or location is unreasonable.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-420 10 of 80

Other Business

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to approve other business when it appears as voting item.

Audit-Related

Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the issue of auditor indemnification and limitation of liability. Factors to be assessed include, but are not limited to:

§ The terms of the auditor agreement--the degree to which these agreements impact shareholders’ rights;

§ The motivation and rationale for establishing the agreements;

§ The quality of the company’s disclosure; and

§ The company’s historical practices in the audit area.

Vote against or withhold from members of an audit committee in situations where there is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Auditor Ratification

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to ratify auditors unless any of the following apply:

§ An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;

§ There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position;

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures; or

§ Fees for non-audit services (“Other” fees) are excessive.

Non-audit fees are excessive if:

§ Non-audit (“other”) fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees

Tax compliance and preparation include the preparation of original and amended tax returns and refund claims, and tax payment planning. All other services in the tax category, such as tax advice, planning, or consulting, should be added to “Other” fees. If the breakout of tax fees cannot be determined, add all tax fees to “Other” fees.

In circumstances where “Other” fees include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (such as initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs) and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees that are an exception to the standard “non-audit fee” category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit/audit-related fees/tax compliance and preparation for purposes of determining whether non-audit fees are excessive.

Shareholder Proposals Limiting Non-Audit Services

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to prohibit or limit their auditors from engaging in non-audit services.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-421 11 of 80

Shareholder Proposals on Audit Firm Rotation

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for audit firm rotation, taking into account:

§ The tenure of the audit firm;

§ The length of rotation specified in the proposal;

§ Any significant audit-related issues at the company;

§ The number of audit committee meetings held each year;

§ The number of financial experts serving on the committee; and

§ Whether the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated for both audit quality and competitive price.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-422 12 of 80

2. Board of Directors

Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections

Four fundamental principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:

§ Accountability: Boards should be sufficiently accountable to shareholders, including through transparency of the company’s governance practices and regular board elections, by the provision of sufficient information for shareholders to be able to assess directors and board composition, and through the ability of shareholders to remove directors.

§ Responsiveness: Directors should respond to investor input, such as that expressed through significant opposition to management proposals, significant support for shareholder proposals (whether binding or non-binding), and tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered.

§ Composition: Companies should seek directors who can add value to the board through specific skills or expertise and who can devote sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives.

§ Independence: Boards should be sufficiently independent from management (and significant shareholders) so as to ensure that they are able and motivated to effectively supervise management’s performance for the benefit of all shareholders, including in setting and monitoring the execution of corporate strategy, with appropriate use of shareholder capital, and in setting and monitoring executive compensation programs that support that strategy. The chair of the board should ideally be an independent director, and all boards should have an independent leadership position or a similar role in order to help provide appropriate counterbalance to executive management, as well as having sufficiently independent committees that focus on key governance concerns such as audit, compensation, and nomination of directors.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees¹ considered on a case-by-case basis):

Accountability

Problematic Takeover Defenses, Capital Structure, and Governance Structures

Classified Board Structure: The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.

Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards: The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.

Director Performance Evaluation: The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:

§ A classified board structure;

¹ A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-423 13 of 80

§ A supermajority vote requirement;

§ Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections or a majority vote standard with no plurality carve-out for contested elections;

§ The inability of shareholders to call special meetings;

§ The inability of shareholders to act by written consent;

§ A multi-class capital structure; and/or

§ A non–shareholder-approved poison pill.

Poison Pills: Generally vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if:

§ The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature²;

§ The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or

§ The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders³.

Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill³ (with a term of one year or less) without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:

§ The disclosed rationale for the adoption;

§ The trigger;

§ The company’s market capitalization (including absolute level and sudden changes);

§ A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; and

§ Other factors as relevant.

Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments: Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees², who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:

§ The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;

§ Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;

§ The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;

§ The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ The company’s existing governance provisions;

§ The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and,

§ Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees.

² If the short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, ISS will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption.

³ Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-424 14 of 80

Generally vote against (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:

§ Classified the board;

§ Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws;

§ Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or

§ Adopted another provision deemed egregious.

Problematic Governance Structure: For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting⁷ of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015,⁴ generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights

§ Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ A classified board structure; or

§ Other egregious provisions.

A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.

Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

Unequal Voting Rights: Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a common stock structure with unequal voting rights⁵.

Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:

§ Newly-public companies⁶ with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public;

§ Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs;

§ Situations where the unequal voting rights are considered de minimis; or

§ The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained.

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions: Vote against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board, where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

⁴ Includes companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

⁵ This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”).

⁶ Newly-public companies generally include companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-425 15 of 80

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals: Generally vote against or withhold from members of the governance committee if:

§ The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals, or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirement in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.

Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Generally, continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Generally, vote against or withhold from the members of the audit committee if:

§ The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive (see discussion under “Auditor Ratification”);

§ The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or

§ There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote case-by-case on members of the audit committee and potentially the full board if:

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted.

Problematic Compensation Practices

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item or in egregious situations, vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

§ The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders;

§ The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or

§ The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.

Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.

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Problematic Pledging of Company Stock: Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:

§ The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;

§ The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;

§ Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;

§ Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and

§ Any other relevant factors.

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Failures

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:

§ Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight⁷, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company, including failure to adequately guard against or manage ESG risks;

§ A lack of sustainability reporting in the company’s public documents and/or website in conjunction with a failure to adequately manage or mitigate ESG risks;

§ Failure to replace management as appropriate; or

§ Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

Climate Risk Mitigation and Net Zero

For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain⁸, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where Sustainability Advisory Services determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps need to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory.

For 2023, the minimum steps needed to be considered to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory are (all minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with the policy):

§ The company has detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:

§ Board governance measures;

§ Corporate strategy;

§ Risk management analyses; and

§ Metrics and targets.

§ The company has declared a Net Zero target by 2050 or sooner and the target includes scope 1, 2, and relevant scope 3 emissions.

§ The company has set a medium-term target for reducing its GHG emissions.

⁷ Examples of failure of risk oversight include, but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant environmental incidents including spills and pollution; large scale or repeat workplace fatalities or injuries; significant adverse legal judgments or settlements; or hedging of company stock.

⁸ For 2023, companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.

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Expectations about what constitutes “minimum steps needed to be aligned with a Net Zero by 2050 trajectory” will increase over time.

Responsiveness

Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

§ The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:

§ Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;

§ Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;

§ The subject matter of the proposal;

§ The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;

§ Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;

§ The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

§ The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;

§ At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.

Vote case-by-case on compensation committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Say on Pay proposal if:

§ The company’s previous say-on-pay received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast. Factors that will be considered are:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

§ The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.

Composition

Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except nominees who served only part of the fiscal year⁹) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:

§ Medical issues/illness;

§ Family emergencies; and

⁹ Nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy.

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§ Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).

§ In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.

If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.

Overboarded Directors: Generally, vote against or withhold from individual directors who:

§ Sit on more than five public company boards; or

§ Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own—withhold only at their outside boards¹⁰.

Gender Diversity

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee, or other nominees on a case-by-case basis, if the board lacks at least one director of an underrepresented gender identity¹¹.

Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) where the board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse members¹².

Independence

Vote against or withhold from non-independent directors (Executive Directors and Non-Independent Non-Executive Directors per Sustainability Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors) when:

§ Independent directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board;

§ The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;

§ The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or

§ The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.

¹⁰ Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, Sustainability Advisory Services will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

¹¹ Underrepresented gender identity includes directors who identify as women or as non-binary.

¹² Aggregate diversity statistics provided by the board will only be considered if specific to racial and/or ethnic diversity.

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Sustainability Policy Classification of Directors – U.S.

1. Executive Director

1.1. Current officer^[1] of the company or one of its affiliates^[2].

2. Non-Independent Non-Executive Director

Board Identification

2.1. Director identified as not independent by the board.

Controlling/Significant Shareholder

2.2. Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group).

Current Employment at Company or Partnership

2.3. Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives).

2.4. Officer^[1], former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company.

Former Employment

2.5. Former CEO of the company.^[3],^[4]

2.6. Former non-CEO officer^[1] of the company or an affiliate^[2] within the past five years.

2.7. Former officer[1] of an acquired company within the past five years^[4].

2.8. Officer ^[1] of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years.

2.9. Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made.^[5]

Family Members

2.10. Immediate family member^[6] of a current or former officer^[1] of the company or its affiliates^[2] within the last five years.

2.11. Immediate family member^[6] of a current employee of company or its affiliates^[2] where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role).

Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships

2.12. Director who (or whose immediate family member^[6]) currently provides professional services^[7] in excess of $10,000 per year to: the company, an affiliate^[2], or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; either directly or is (or whose family member is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services.

2.13. Director who (or whose immediate family member^[6]) currently has any material transactional relationship^[8] with the company or its affiliates^[2]; or who is (or whose immediately family member[6] is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationship[8] (excluding investments in the company through a private placement).

2.14. Director who (or whose immediate family member^[6]) is a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments^[8] from the company or its affiliates^[2].

Other Relationships

2.15. Party to a voting agreement^[9] to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote.

2.16. Has (or an immediate family member^[6] has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its Compensation Committee^[10].

2.17. Founder^[11] of the company but not currently an employee.

2.18. Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers.

2.19. Any material^[12] relationship with the company.

3. Independent Director

3.1. No material^[12] connection to the company other than a board seat.

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Footnotes:

^[1]The definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will be classified as an Affiliated Outsider under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation in excess of $10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Outsider.

^[2] “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. Sustainability Advisory Services uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.

^[3] Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).

^[4] When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, Sustainability Advisory Services will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

^[5] Sustainability Advisory Services will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. Sustainability Advisory Services will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.

^[6] “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

^[7] Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include, but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services; commercial banking (beyond deposit services); investment services; insurance services; accounting/audit services; consulting services; marketing services; legal services; property management services; realtor services; lobbying services; executive search services; and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services; IT tech support services; educational services; and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of $10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than

a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.

^[8] A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity exceeding the greater of $200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of $1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, in the case of a company which follows NYSE listing standards. In the case of a company which follows neither of the preceding standards, Sustainability Advisory Services will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).

^[9] Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as independent outsiders if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders’ interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

^[10] Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on each other’s boards and at least one serves on the other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).

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^[11] The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, Sustainability Advisory Services may deem him or her an independent outsider.

^[12] For purposes of Sustainability Advisory Services’ director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

Other Board-Related Proposals

Board Refreshment

Board refreshment is best implemented through an ongoing program of individual director evaluations, conducted annually, to ensure the evolving needs of the board are met and to bring in fresh perspectives, skills, and diversity as needed.

Term/Tenure Limits

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals regarding director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit;

§ The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process;

§ Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures;

§ Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to non-independent directors; and

§ Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for the company to adopt director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The scope of the shareholder proposal; and

§ Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment.

Age Limits

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.

Board Size

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals seeking to fix the board size or designate a range for the board size.

Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board outside of a specified range without shareholder approval.

Classification/Declassification of the Board

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board.

Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.

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CEO Succession Planning

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering, at a minimum, the following factors:

§ The reasonableness/scope of the request; and

§ The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.

Cumulative Voting

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulate voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting, unless:

§ The company has proxy access, thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and

§ The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (insider voting power > 50%).

Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals on director and officer indemnification liability protection, and exculpation¹³.

Consider the stated rationale for the proposed change. Also consider, among other factors, the extent to which the proposal would:

§ Eliminate entirely directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care.

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of loyalty.

§ Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.

§ Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.

Vote for only those proposals providing such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if both of the following apply:

§ If the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and

§ If only the director’s legal expenses would be covered.

Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and the degree to which they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

¹³ Indemnification: the condition of being secured against loss or damage.

Limited liability: a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff.

Exculpation: to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director or officer to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer.

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Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:

§ The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;

§ The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Establish Other Board Committee Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee, as such proposals seek a specific oversight mechanism/structure that potentially limits a company’s flexibility to determine an appropriate oversight mechanism for itself. However, the following factors will be considered:

§ Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Filling Vacancies/Removal of Directors

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.

§ Vote for proposals to restore shareholders’ ability to remove directors with or without cause.

§ Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.

§ Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.

Independent Board Chair

One of the principal functions of the board is to monitor and evaluate the performance of the CEO and other executive officers. The board chair’s duty to oversee management may be compromised when he/she is connected to or a part of the management team. Generally, Sustainability Advisory Services recommends supporting shareholder proposals that would require that the position of board chair be held by an individual with no materials ties to the company other than their board seat.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally, support shareholder proposals that would require the board chair to be independent of management.

Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed threshold by the Sustainability policy’s definition of independent outsider. (See Sustainability Policy Classification of Directors – U.S.)

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Vote for shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors unless they currently meet that standard.

Majority Vote Standard for the Election of Directors

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections. Vote against if no carve-out for a plurality vote standard in contested elections is included.

Generally vote for precatory and binding shareholder resolutions requesting that the board change the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.

Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.

Proxy Access

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:

§ Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power;

§ Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group;

§ Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group;

§ Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board.

Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access.

Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

Require More Nominees than Open Seats

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against shareholder proposals that would require a company to nominate more candidates than the number of open board seats.

Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:

§ Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board;

§ Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;

§ Company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and

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§ The company has an independent chair or a lead director, according to ISS’ Sustainability policy definition. This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.

Proxy Contests/Proxy Access -Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:

§ Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;

§ Management’s track record;

§ Background to the contested election;

§ Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;

§ Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;

§ Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and

§ Stock ownership positions.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).

Vote-No Campaigns

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote-no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.

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3. Shareholder Rights & Defenses

Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory, and shareholder review.

To be reasonable, the company’s deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year’s meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120 day window). The submittal window is the period under which shareholders must file their proposal/nominations prior to the deadline.

In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent’s economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.

Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.

Vote for proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders.

Control Share Acquisition Provisions

Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.

Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.

Control Share Cash-Out Provisions

Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to “cash-out” of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.

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Disgorgement Provisions

Disgorgement provisions require an acquirer or potential acquirer of more than a certain percentage of a company’s stock to disgorge, or pay back, to the company any profits realized from the sale of that company’s stock purchased 24 months before achieving control status. All sales of company stock by the acquirer occurring within a certain period of time (between 18 months and 24 months) prior to the investor’s gaining control status are subject to these recapture-of-profits provisions.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.

Fair Price Provisions

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions (provisions that stipulate that an acquirer must pay the same price to acquire all shares as it paid to acquire the control shares), evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.

Generally vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.

Freeze-Out Provisions

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions. Freeze-out provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.

Greenmail

Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of its shares, the practice discriminates against all other shareholders.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to adopt anti-greenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.

Vote case-by-case on anti-greenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.

Shareholder Litigation Rights

Federal Forum Selection Provisions

Federal forum selection provisions require that U.S. federal courts be the sole forum for shareholders to litigate claims arising under federal securities law.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify “the district courts of the United States” as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

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Vote against provisions that restrict the forum to a particular federal district court; unilateral adoption (without a shareholder vote) of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters

Exclusive forum provisions in the charter or bylaws restrict shareholders’ ability to bring derivative lawsuits against the company, for claims arising out of state corporate law, to the courts of a particular state (generally the state of incorporation).

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the state of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

For states other than Delaware, vote case-by-case on exclusive forum provisions, taking into consideration:

§ The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision;

§ Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum;

§ The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and

§ Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.

Generally vote against provisions that specify a state other than the state of incorporation as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters, or that specify a particular local court within the state; unilateral adoption of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Fee Shifting

Fee-shifting provisions in the charter or bylaws require that a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation and its directors and officers.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against provisions that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).

Unilateral adoption of a fee-shifting provision will generally be considered an ongoing failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments and Problematic Capital Structures policy.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing 5-percent holder);

§ The value of the NOLs;

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§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);

§ The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: (1) A shareholder approved poison pill in place; or (2) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:

§ Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or

§ The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.

If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.

Management Proposals to Ratify a Poison Pill

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:

§ No lower than a 20% trigger, flip-in or flip-over;

§ A term of no more than three years;

§ No dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;

§ Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.

In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.

Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent);

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§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);

§ The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Proxy Voting Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Tabulation

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding proxy voting mechanics, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder rights. Specific issues covered under the policy include, but are not limited to, confidential voting of individual proxies and ballots, confidentiality of running vote tallies, and the treatment of abstentions and/or broker non-votes in the company’s vote-counting methodology.

While a variety of factors may be considered in each analysis, the guiding principles are: transparency, consistency, and fairness in the proxy voting process. The factors considered, as applicable to the proposal, may include:

§ The scope and structure of the proposal;

§ The company’s stated confidential voting policy (or other relevant policies) and whether it ensures a “level playing field” by providing shareholder proponents with equal access to vote information prior to the annual meeting;

§ The company’s vote standard for management and shareholder proposals and whether it ensures consistency and fairness in the proxy voting process and maintains the integrity of vote results;

§ Whether the company’s disclosure regarding its vote counting method and other relevant voting policies with respect to management and shareholder proposals are consistent and clear;

§ Any recent controversies or concerns related to the company’s proxy voting mechanics;

§ Any unintended consequences resulting from implementation of the proposal; and

§ Any other factors that may be relevant.

Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.

In addition, voting against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses.

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When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:

§ The election of fewer than 50% of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;

§ One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected;

§ Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and

§ The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.

Reincorporation Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Management or shareholder proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation should be evaluated case-by-case, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

§ Reasons for reincorporation;

§ Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and

§ Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

§ Vote for reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.

Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to act by written consent.

Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent, taking into account the following factors:

§ Shareholders’ current right to act by written consent;

§ The consent threshold;

§ The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;

§ Investor ownership structure; and

§ Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions:

§ An unfettered¹⁴ right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold;

§ A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections;

§ No non-shareholder-approved pill; and

§ An annually elected board.

¹⁴ “Unfettered” means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.

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Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against management or shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.

Generally vote for management or shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account the following factors:

§ Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings;

§ Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred);

§ The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;

§ Investor ownership structure; and

§ Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.

Stakeholder Provisions

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals that ask the board to consider non-shareholder constituencies or other non-financial effects when evaluating a merger or business combination.

State Antitakeover Statutes

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, and anti-greenmail provisions).

Supermajority Vote Requirements

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote.

Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements. However, for companies with shareholder(s) who have significant ownership levels, vote case-by-case, taking into account:

§ Ownership structure;

§ Quorum requirements; and

§ Vote requirements.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only¹⁵ meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:

§ Scope and rationale of the proposal; and

§ Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.

¹⁵ Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.

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4.  Capital/Restructuring

Capital

Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.

Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value.

Common Stock Authorization

General Authorization Requests

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

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Specific Authorization Requests

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Dual Class Structure

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:

§ The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, such as:

§ The company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or

§ The new class of shares will be transitory;

§ The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; and

§ The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.

Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder- approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).

Preemptive Rights

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that seek preemptive rights, taking into consideration:

§ The size of the company;

§ The shareholder base; and

§ The liquidity of the stock.

Preferred Stock Authorization

General Authorization Requests

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

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§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

§ If no preferred shares are currently issued and outstanding, vote against the request, unless the company discloses a specific use for the shares.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;¹⁶

§ The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”);

§ The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they’re convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders;

§ The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

Specific Authorization Requests

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

¹⁶ To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan.

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Recapitalization Plans

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account the following:

§ More simplified capital structure;

§ Enhanced liquidity;

§ Fairness of conversion terms;

§ Impact on voting power and dividends;

§ Reasons for the reclassification;

§ Conflicts of interest; and

§ Other alternatives considered.

Reverse Stock Splits

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:

§ The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or

§ The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Sustainability Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;

§ Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;

§ The company’s rationale; or

§ Other factors as applicable.

Share Repurchase Programs

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:

§ Greenmail,

§ The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics,

§ Threats to the company’s long-term viability, or

§ Other company-specific factors as warranted.

Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.

Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to

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or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with Sustainability Advisory Services’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Tracking Stock

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as:

§ Adverse governance changes;

§ Excessive increases in authorized capital stock;

§ Unfair method of distribution;

§ Diminution of voting rights;

§ Adverse conversion features;

§ Negative impact on stock option plans; and

§ Alternatives such as spin-off.

Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 20 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.

For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.

Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.

Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.

Restructuring

Appraisal Rights

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore or provide shareholders with rights of appraisal.

Asset Purchases

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset purchase proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Purchase price;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ Financial and strategic benefits;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives for the business;

§ Non-completion risk.

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Asset Sales

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset sales, considering the following factors:

§ Impact on the balance sheet/working capital;

§ Potential elimination of diseconomies;

§ Anticipated financial and operating benefits;

§ Anticipated use of funds;

§ Value received for the asset;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest.

Bundled Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.

Conversion of Securities

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities. When evaluating these proposals, the investor should review the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.

Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Corporate Reorganization/Debt Restructuring/Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans/Reverse Leveraged Buyouts/Wrap Plans

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt restructuring plan, after evaluating:

§ Dilution to existing shareholders’ positions;

§ Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; termination penalties; exit strategy;

§ Financial issues - company’s financial situation; degree of need for capital; use of proceeds; effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;

§ Control issues - change in management; change in control, guaranteed board and committee seats; standstill provisions; voting agreements; veto power over certain corporate actions; and

§ Conflict of interest - arm’s length transaction, managerial incentives.

Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

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Formation of Holding Company

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration the following:

§ The reasons for the change;

§ Any financial or tax benefits;

§ Regulatory benefits;

§ Increases in capital structure; and

§ Changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.

Absent compelling financial reasons to recommend for the transaction, vote against the formation of a holding company if the transaction would include either of the following:

§ Increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum (see discussion under “Capital”); or

§ Adverse changes in shareholder rights.

Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following:

§ Offer price/premium;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives/offers considered; and

§ Non-completion risk.

Vote case-by-case on going dark transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:

§ Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);

§ Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following:

§ Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction?

§ Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction?

§ Does the company have strong corporate governance?

§ Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?

§ Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders?

Joint Ventures

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account the following:

§ Percentage of assets/business contributed;

§ Percentage ownership;

§ Financial and strategic benefits;

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§ Governance structure;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives; and

§ Non-completion risk.

Liquidations

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on liquidations, taking into account the following:

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;

§ Appraisal value of assets; and

§ The compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.

Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.

Mergers and Acquisitions

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions. Review and evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

§ Valuation - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction and strategic rationale.

§ Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal.

§ Strategic rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.

§ Negotiations and process - Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value.

§ Conflicts of interest - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger.

§ Governance - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements, warrants, and convertible debentures taking into consideration:

§ Dilution to existing shareholders’ position: The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. Although newly issued common stock, absent preemptive rights, is typically dilutive to existing shareholders, share price appreciation is often the necessary event to trigger the exercise of “out of the money” warrants and convertible debt. In these instances from

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a value standpoint, the negative impact of dilution is mitigated by the increase in the company’s stock price that must occur to trigger the dilutive event.

§ Terms of the offer (discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion, conversion features, termination penalties, exit strategy):

§ The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial condition. Ideally, the conversion price for convertible debt and the exercise price for warrants should be at a premium to the then prevailing stock price at the time of private placement.

§ When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, consider factors that influence the discount or premium, such as, liquidity, due diligence costs, control and monitoring costs, capital scarcity, information asymmetry and anticipation of future performance.

§ Financial issues:

§ The company’s financial condition;

§ Degree of need for capital;

§ Use of proceeds;

§ Effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Current and proposed cash burn rate;

§ Going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.

§ Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives: A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger or sale of part or all of the company.

§ Control issues:

§ Change in management;

§ Change in control;

§ Guaranteed board and committee seats;

§ Standstill provisions;

§ Voting agreements;

§ Veto power over certain corporate actions; and

§ Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium

§ Conflicts of interest:

§ Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor.

§ Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests?

§ Market reaction:

§ The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one day impact on the unaffected stock price.

Vote for the private placement, or for the issuance of warrants and/or convertible debentures in a private placement, if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Reorganization/Restructuring Plan (Bankruptcy)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:

§ Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;

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§ Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;

§ Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an official equity committee);

§ The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);

§ Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and

§ Governance of the reorganized company.

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

§ Valuation—Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target, if it is a private entity.

§ Market reaction—How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

§ Deal timing—A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date.

§ Negotiations and process—What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors.

§ Conflicts of interest—How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80% rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80% of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24 month timeframe.

§ Voting agreements—Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/ tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights?

§ Governance—What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger?

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC extension proposals taking into account the length of the requested extension, the status of any pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process, any added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders, and any prior extension requests.

§ Length of request: Typically, extension requests range from two to six months, depending on the progression of the SPAC’s acquistion process.

§ Pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process: Sometimes an intial business combination was already put to a shareholder vote, but, for varying reasons, the transaction could not be consummated by the termination date and the SPAC is requesting an extension. Other times, the SPAC has entered into a definitive transaction agreement, but needs additional time to consummate or hold the shareholder meeting.

§ Added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders: Sometimes the SPAC sponsor (or other insiders) will contribute, typically as a loan to the company, additional funds that will be added to the redemption value of each public share as long as such shares are not redeemed in connection with the extension request. The purpose of the “equity kicker” is

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to incentivize shareholders to hold their shares through the end of the requested extension or until the time the transaction is put to a shareholder vote, rather than electing redeemption at the extension proposal meeting.

§ Prior extension requests: Some SPACs request additional time beyond the extension period sought in prior extension requests.

Spin-offs

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on spin-offs, considering:

§ Tax and regulatory advantages;

§ Planned use of the sale proceeds;

§ Valuation of spinoff;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ Benefits to the parent company;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Managerial incentives;

§ Corporate governance changes;

§ Changes in the capital structure.

Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by:

§ Hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives;

§ Selling the company; or

§ Liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders.

These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:

§ Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight;

§ Signs of entrenched board and management (such as the adoption of takeover defenses);

§ Strategic plan in place for improving value;

§ Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; and

§ The company actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor.

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5.    Compensation

Executive Pay Evaluation

Underlying all evaluations are five global principles that most investors expect corporations to adhere to in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs:

1. Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment, with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: This principle encompasses overall executive pay practices, which must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. It will take into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance; the mix between fixed and variable pay; performance goals; and equity-based plan costs;

2. Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation;

3. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed);

4. Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly;

5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation—Management Proposals (Management Say-on-Pay)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on ballot items related to executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation.

Vote against Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay or “SOP”) if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

§ The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Vote against or withhold from the members of the compensation committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP is warranted due to pay for performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;

§ The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;

§ The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating; or

§ The situation is egregious.

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PRIMARY EVALUATION FACTORS FOR EXECUTIVE PAY

Pay-for-Performance Evaluation

Sustainability Advisory Services annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to identify strong or satisfactory alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the Russell 3000 or Russell 3000E Indices¹⁷, this analysis considers the following:

1. Peer Group¹⁸ Alignment:

§ The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.

2. Absolute Alignment¹⁹ – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.

If the above analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of companies outside the Russell indices, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, our analysis may include any of the following qualitative factors, as relevant to evaluating how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

§ The ratio of performance- to time-based incentive awards;

§ The overall ratio of performance-based compensation;

§ The rigor of performance goals;

§ The complexity and risks around pay program design;

§ The transparency and clarity of disclosure;

§ The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;

§ Financial/operational results, both absolute and relative to peers;

§ Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards);

§ Realizable pay²⁰ compared to grant pay; and

§ Any other factors deemed relevant.

Problematic Pay Practices

Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:

§ Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;

¹⁷ The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.

¹⁸ The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group, and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group, with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are comparable to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry, and also within a market cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s. For Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels companies, market cap is the only size determinant.

¹⁹ Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.

²⁰ Sustainability Advisory Services research reports include realizable pay for S&P1500 companies.

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§ Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and

§ Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements.

The list of examples below highlights certain problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:

§ Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);

§ Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups;

§ New or materially amended agreements that provide for:

§ Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus);

§ CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition;

§ CIC excise tax gross-up entitlements (including “modified” gross-ups);

§ Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions;

§ Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;

§ Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason);

§ Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible;

§ Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors.

The above examples are not an exhaustive list. Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Compensation Policies FAQ document for additional detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as problematic and may lead to negative vote recommendations.

Options Backdating

The following factors should be examined case-by-case to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud:

§ Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;

§ Duration of options backdating;

§ Size of restatement due to options backdating;

§ Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and

§ Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.

Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness

Consider the following factors case-by-case when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

§ Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or

§ Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account:

§ The company’s response, including:

◾ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors regarding the issues that contributed to the low level of support (including the timing and frequency of engagements and whether independent directors participated);

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◾ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

◾ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

◾ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.

Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing primarily on new or extended arrangements.

Features that may result in an “against” recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):

§ Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;

§ Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;

§ Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control;

§ Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale;

§ Excessive cash severance (>3x base salary and bonus);

§ Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable;

§ Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or

§ Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or

§ The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.

Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s advisory vote on compensation (management say-on-pay), the say-on-pay proposal will be evaluated in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans

Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Equity Compensation Plans FAQ document for additional details on the Equity Plan Scorecard policy.

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Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on certain equity-based compensation plans²¹ depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “Equity Plan Scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:

§ Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:

§ SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and

§ SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.

§ Plan Features:

§ Quality of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC);

§ Discretionary vesting authority;

§ Liberal share recycling on various award types;

§ Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;

§ Dividends payable prior to award vesting.

§ Grant Practices:

§ The company’s three year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;

§ Vesting requirements in CEO’S recent equity grants (3-year look-back);

§ The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);

§ The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;

§ Whether the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy;

§ Whether the company maintains sufficient post exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following egregious factors (“overriding factors”) apply:

§ Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

§ The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies -- or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies);

§ The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant pay-for-performance disconnect under certain circumstances;

§ The plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings;

§ The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or

§ Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CERTAIN EPSC FACTORS

Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)

The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors.

²¹ Proposals evaluated under the EPSC policy generally include those to approve or amend (1) stock option plans for employees and/or employees and directors, (2) restricted stock plans for employees and/or employees and directors, and (3) omnibus stock incentive plans for employees and/or employees and directors; amended plans will be further evaluated case-by-case.

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SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types.

For proposals subject to Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company’s benchmark.²²

Three-Year Value-Adjusted Burn Rate

A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Value-Adjusted Burn Rate benchmarks are calculated as the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.

The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate will be calculated as follows:

Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).

Egregious Factors

Liberal Change in Control Definition

Generally vote against equity plans if the plan has a liberal definition of change in control and the equity awards could vest upon such liberal definition of change-in-control, even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.

Repricing Provisions

Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. “Repricing” includes the ability to do any of the following:

§ Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs;

§ Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs;

§ Cancel underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or

§ Provide cash buyouts of underwater options.

²² For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company’s SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors.

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While the above cover most types of repricing, Sustainability Advisory Services may view other provisions as akin to repricing depending on the facts and circumstances.

Also, vote against or withhold from members of the Compensation Committee who approved repricing (as defined above or otherwise determined by Sustainability Advisory Services) without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.

Vote against plans that do not expressly prohibit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval if the company has a history of repricing/buyouts without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.

Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect

If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for problematic pay practices, vote against the plan.

If a significant portion of the CEO’s misaligned pay is attributed to non-performance-based equity awards, and there is an equity plan on the ballot with the CEO as one of the participants, Sustainability Advisory Services may recommend a vote against the equity plan. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:

§ Magnitude of pay misalignment;

§ Contribution of non–performance-based equity grants to overall pay; and

§ The proportion of equity awards granted in the last three fiscal years concentrated at the named executive officer level.

Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations

Dividend Equivalent Rights

Options that have Dividend Equivalent Rights (DERs) associated with them will have a higher calculated award value than those without DERs under the binomial model, based on the value of these dividend streams. The higher value will be applied to new shares, shares available under existing plans, and shares awarded but not exercised per the plan specifications. DERS transfer more shareholder equity to employees and non-employee directors and this cost should be captured.

Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

For Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), include the common shares issuable upon conversion of outstanding Operating Partnership (OP) units in the share count for the purposes of determining: (1) market capitalization in the Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) analysis and (2) shares outstanding in the burn rate analysis.

Other Compensation Plans

401(k) Employee Benefit Plans

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).

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Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Qualified Plans

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:

§ Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;

§ Offering period is 27 months or less; and

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the outstanding shares.

Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where any of the following apply:

§ Purchase price is less than 85 percent of fair market value; or

§ Offering period is greater than 27 months; or

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is more than ten percent of the outstanding shares.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Non-Qualified Plans

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:

§ Broad-based participation (i.e., all employees of the company with the exclusion of individuals with 5 percent or more of beneficial ownership of the company);

§ Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;

§ Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value;

§ No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a company matching contribution.

Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when any of the plan features do not meet the above criteria. If the company matching contribution or effective discount exceeds the above, Sustainability Advisory Services may evaluate the SVT cost as part of the assessment.

Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.

Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Addresses administrative features only; or

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent outsiders, per Sustainability Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time after the company’s initial public offering (IPO), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below).

Vote against such proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent outsiders, per Sustainability Advisory Services’ Classification of Directors.

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Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:

§ If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments may potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.

§ If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO, whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.

§ If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments are not deemed to potentially increase the transfer of shareholder value to employees, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown for informational purposes.

Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:

§ Historic trading patterns--the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;

§ Rationale for the re-pricing--was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?

§ Is this a value-for-value exchange?

§ Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?

§ Timing--repricing should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price;

§ Option vesting--does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?

§ Term of the option--the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;

§ Exercise price--should be set at fair market or a premium to market;

§ Participants--executive officers and directors must be excluded.

If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company’s total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing. and warrants additional scrutiny. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.

Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange.

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Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, no adjustments will be made to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation.

Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: One-time Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.

Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:

§ Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating;

§ Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models;

§ There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.

Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management’s control. A review of the company’s historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term.

Ongoing TSO program: Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the ongoing TSO program, structure and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited, to the following:

§ Eligibility;

§ Vesting;

§ Bid-price;

§ Term of options;

§ Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense

§ Option repricing policy.

Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.

Director Compensation

Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:

§ If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and

§ An assessment of the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

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§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:

§ The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;

§ The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers; and

§ The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).

On occasion, director stock plans will exceed the plan cost or burn rate benchmarks when combined with employee or executive stock plans. In such cases, vote case-by-case on the plan taking into consideration the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors.

Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors.

Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use of company stock will be considered.

Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:

§ The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;

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§ Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and

§ Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.

Compensation Consultants—Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s), and fees paid.

Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, provided the information requested is relevant to shareholders’ needs, would not put the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its industry, and is not unduly burdensome to the company.

Vote against shareholder proposals seeking to set absolute levels on compensation or otherwise dictate the amount or form of compensation.

Vote against shareholder proposals seeking to eliminate stock options or any other equity grants to employees or directors.

Vote against shareholder proposals requiring director fees be paid in stock only.

Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.

Vote case-by-case on all other shareholder proposals regarding executive and director pay, taking into account company performance, pay level versus peers, pay level versus industry, and long-term corporate outlook.

Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.

Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans. The following factors will be taken into account:

§ The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained;

§ The time period required to retain the shares;

§ Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements;

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§ Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives;

§ Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and

Pay Disparity

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case on proposals calling for an analysis of the pay disparity between corporate executives and other non-executive employees.

Pay for Performance/Performance-Based Awards

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:

§ First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards.

§ Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.

In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.

Pay for Superior Performance

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation plan for senior executives. These proposals generally include the following principles:

§ Set compensation targets for the plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median;

§ Deliver a majority of the plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards;

§ Provide the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and non-financial performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan;

§ Establish performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies;

§ Limit payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance.

Consider the following factors in evaluating this proposal:

§ What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven?

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§ If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group?

§ Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure?

§ What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to?

Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the addition of certain safeguards in prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives. Safeguards may include:

§ Adoption, amendment, or termination of a 10b5-1 Plan must be disclosed in a Form 8-K;

§ Amendment or early termination of a 10b5-1 Plan allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board;

§ Request that a certain number of days that must elapse between adoption or amendment of a 10b5-1 Plan and initial trading under the plan;

§ Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a 10b5-1 Plan;

§ An executive may not trade in company stock outside the 10b5-1 Plan;

§ Trades under a 10b5-1 Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive.

Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals seeking a policy to prohibit any outside CEO from serving on a company’s compensation committee, unless the company has demonstrated problematic pay practices that raise concerns about the performance and composition of the committee.

Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to recoup incentive cash or stock compensation made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned turn out to have been in error, or if the senior executive has breached company policy or has engaged in misconduct that may be significantly detrimental to the company’s financial position or reputation, or if the senior executive failed to manage or monitor risks that subsequently led to significant financial or reputational harm to the company. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where an executive’s fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. However, such policies may be narrow given that not all misconduct or negligence may result in significant financial restatements. Misconduct, negligence or lack of sufficient oversight by senior executives may lead to significant financial loss or reputational damage that may have long-lasting impact.

In considering whether to support such shareholder proposals, the following factors will be taken into consideration:

§ If the company has adopted a formal recoupment policy;

§ The rigor of the recoupment policy focusing on how and under what circumstances the company may recoup incentive or stock compensation;

§ Whether the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems;

§ Whether the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent;

§ Disclosure of recoupment of incentive or stock compensation from senior executives or lack thereof; or

§ Any other relevant factors.

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Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requiring that golden parachutes or executive severance agreements be submitted for shareholder ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval prior to entering into employment contracts.

Vote case-by-case on proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes. An acceptable parachute should include, but is not limited to, the following:

§ The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;

§ The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable W-2 compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs);

§ Change-in-control payments should be double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure.

Share Buyback Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals prohibiting executives from selling shares of company stock during periods in which the company has announced that it may or will be repurchasing shares of its stock. Vote for the proposal when there is a pattern of abuse by executives exercising options or selling shares during periods of share buybacks.

Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the company exclude the impact of share buybacks from the calculation of incentive program metrics, considering the following factors:

§ The frequency and timing of the company’s share buybacks;

§ The use of per-share metrics in incentive plans;

§ The effect of recent buybacks on incentive metric results and payouts; and

§ Whether there is any indication of metric result manipulation.

Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company’s executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.

Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to limit the executive benefits provided under the company’s supplemental executive retirement plan (SERP) by limiting covered compensation to a senior executive’s annual salary or those pay elements covered for the general employee population.

Tax Gross-Up Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

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Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment/Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment and/or eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity.

The following factors will be considered:

§ The company’s current treatment of equity in change-of-control situations (i.e. is it double triggered, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares, etc.);

§ Current employment agreements, including potential poor pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements.

Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).

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6.   Social and Environmental Issues

Global Approach

Socially responsible shareholder resolutions receive a great deal more attention from institutional shareholders today than in the past. While focusing on value enhancement through risk mitigation and exposure to new sustainability-related opportunities, these resolutions also seek standardized reporting on ESG issues, request information regarding an issuer’s adoption of, or adherence to, relevant norms, standards, codes of conduct or universally recognized international initiatives to promote disclosure and transparency. ISS’ Sustainability Policy generally supports standards-based ESG shareholder proposals that enhance long-term shareholder and stakeholder value while aligning the interests of the company with those of society at large. In particular, the policy will focus on resolutions seeking greater transparency and/or adherence to internationally recognized standards and principles.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: In determining our vote recommendation on standardized ESG reporting shareholder proposals, we also analyze the following factors:

§ Whether the proposal itself is well framed and reasonable;

§ Whether adoption of the proposal would have either a positive or negative impact on the company’s short-term or long-term share value;

§ The percentage of sales, assets and earnings affected;

§ Whether the company has already responded in some appropriate manner to the request embodied in a proposal;

§ Whether the company’s analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders is persuasive;

§ Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s environmental or social practices;

§ What other companies have done in response to the issue addressed in the proposal;

§ Whether implementation of the proposal would achieve the objectives sought in the proposal; and

§ The degree to which the company’s stated position on the issues raised in the proposal could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to a boycott or selective purchasing.

Animal Welfare

Animal Welfare Policies

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a report on a company’s animal welfare standards, or animal welfare-related risks, unless:

§ The company has already published a set of animal welfare standards and monitors compliance;

§ The company’s standards are comparable to industry peers; and

§ There are no recent significant fines, litigation, or controversies related to the company’s and/or its suppliers’ treatment of animals.

Animal Testing

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to phase out the use of animals in product testing, unless:

§ The company is conducting animal testing programs that are unnecessary or not required by regulation;

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§ The company is conducting animal testing when suitable alternatives are commonly accepted and used by industry peers; or

§ There are recent, significant fines or litigation related to the company’s treatment of animals.

Animal Slaughter

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting the implementation of Controlled Atmosphere Killing (CAK) methods at company and/or supplier operations unless such methods are required by legislation or generally accepted as the industry standard.

Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting a report on the feasibility of implementing CAK methods at company and/or supplier operations considering the availability of existing research conducted by the company or industry groups on this topic and any fines or litigation related to current animal processing procedures at the company.

Consumer Issues

Genetically Modified Ingredients

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting that a company voluntarily label genetically engineered (GE) ingredients in its products. The labeling of products with GE ingredients is best left to the appropriate regulatory authorities.

Vote case-by-case on proposals asking for a report on the feasibility of labeling products containing GE ingredients, taking into account:

§ The potential impact of such labeling on the company’s business;

§ The quality of the company’s disclosure on GE product labeling, related voluntary initiatives, and how this disclosure compares with industry peer disclosure; and

§ Company’s current disclosure on the feasibility of GE product labeling.

Generally vote FOR proposals seeking a report on the social, health, and environmental effects of genetically modified organism (GMOs).

Generally vote against proposals to eliminate GE ingredients from the company’s products, or proposals asking for reports outlining the steps necessary to eliminate GE ingredients from the company’s products. Such decisions are more appropriately made by management with consideration of current regulations.

Reports on Potentially Controversial Business/Financial Practices

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s potentially controversial business or financial practices or products, taking into account:

§ Whether the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent abuses;

§ Whether the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the products/practices in question;

§ Whether the company has been subject to violations of related laws or serious controversies; and

§ Peer companies’ policies/practices in this area.

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Consumer Lending

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on the company’s lending guidelines and procedures taking into account:

§ Whether the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent abusive lending practices;

§ Whether the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the lending products in question;

§ Whether the company has been subject to violations of lending laws or serious lending controversies; and

§ Peer companies’ policies to prevent abusive lending practices.

Pharmaceutical Pricing, Access to Medicines, Product Reimportation and Health Pandemics

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting that companies implement specific price restraints on pharmaceutical products unless the company fails to adhere to legislative guidelines or industry norms in its product pricing practices.

Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting that a company report on its product pricing or access to medicine policies, considering:

§ The potential for reputational, market, and regulatory risk exposure;

§ Existing disclosure of relevant policies;

§ Deviation from established industry norms;

§ Relevant company initiatives to provide research and/or products to disadvantaged consumers;

§ Whether the proposal focuses on specific products or geographic regions;

§ The potential burden and scope of the requested report; and

§ Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines at the company.

Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on the financial and legal impact of its prescription drug reimportation policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.

Generally vote against proposals requesting that companies adopt specific policies to encourage or constrain prescription drug reimportation. Such matters are more appropriately the province of legislative activity and may place the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its peers.

Health Pandemics

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports outlining the impact of health pandemics (such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and avian flu) on the company’s operations and how the company is responding to the situation, taking into account:

§ The scope of the company’s operations in the affected/relevant area(s);

§ The company’s existing healthcare policies, including benefits and healthcare access; and

§ Company donations to relevant healthcare providers.

Vote against proposals asking companies to establish, implement, and report on a standard of response to health pandemics (such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and avian flu), unless the company has significant operations in the affected markets and has failed to adopt policies and/or procedures to address these issues comparable to those of industry peers.

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Product Safety and Toxic/Hazardous Materials

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its policies, initiatives/procedures, and oversight mechanisms related to toxic/hazardous materials or product safety in its supply chain.

Generally vote for resolutions requesting that companies develop a feasibility assessment to phase-out of certain toxic/hazardous materials, or evaluate and disclose the potential financial and legal risks associated with utilizing certain materials.

Generally vote against resolutions requiring that a company reformulate its products.

Tobacco-Related Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on resolutions regarding the advertisement of tobacco products, considering:

§ Recent related fines, controversies, or significant litigation;

§ Whether the company complies with relevant laws and regulations on the marketing of tobacco;

§ Whether the company’s advertising restrictions deviate from those of industry peers;

§ Whether the company entered into the Master Settlement Agreement, which restricts marketing of tobacco to youth; and

§ Whether restrictions on marketing to youth extend to foreign countries.

Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding second-hand smoke, considering;

§ Whether the company complies with all laws and regulations;

§ The degree that voluntary restrictions beyond those mandated by law might hurt the company’s competitiveness; and

§ The risk of any health-related liabilities.

Generally vote against resolutions to cease production of tobacco-related products, to avoid selling products to tobacco companies, to spin-off tobacco-related businesses, or prohibit investment in tobacco equities. Such business decisions are better left to company management or portfolio managers.

Generally vote against proposals regarding tobacco product warnings. Such decisions are better left to public health authorities.

Climate Change

Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

Climate change has emerged as the most significant environmental threat to the planet to date. Scientists agree that gases released by chemical reactions including the burning of fossil fuels contribute to a “greenhouse effect” that traps the planet’s heat. Environmentalists claim that the greenhouse gases produced by the industrial age have caused recent weather crises such as heat waves, rainstorms, melting glaciers, rising sea levels and receding coastlines. With notable exceptions, business leaders have described the rise and fall of global temperatures as naturally occurring phenomena and depicted corporate impact on climate change as minimal. Shareholder proposals asking a company to issue a report to shareholders, “at reasonable cost and omitting proprietary information,” on greenhouse gas emissions ask that the

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report include descriptions of efforts within companies to reduce emissions, their financial exposure and potential liability from operations that contribute to global warming, their direct or indirect efforts to promote the view that global warming is not a threat and their goals in reducing these emissions from their operations. Proponents argue that there is scientific proof that the burning of fossil fuels causes global warming, that future legislation may make companies financially liable for their contributions to global warming, and that a report on the company’s role in global warming can be assembled at reasonable cost.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces related to climate change- on its operations and investments, or on how the company identifies, measures, and manage such risks.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reduction of GHG emissions.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on responses to regulatory and public pressures surrounding climate change, and for disclosure of research that aided in setting company policies around climate change.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals requesting a report/disclosure of goals on GHG emissions from company operations and/or products.

Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan²³, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

§ The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;

§ Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);

§ The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);

§ Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based;

§ Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;

§ Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;

§ Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance;

§ Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;

§ Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and

§ The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

§ The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure;

§ The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;

²³ Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

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§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and

§ Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.

Energy Efficiency

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its energy efficiency policies.

Renewable Energy

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on the feasibility of developing renewable energy resources.

Generally vote for proposals requesting that the company invest in renewable energy resources.

Diversity

Board Diversity

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on a company’s efforts to diversify the board, unless:

§ The gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; and

§ The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company.

Generally vote for shareholder proposals that ask the company to take reasonable steps to increase the levels of underrepresented gender identities and racial minorities on the board.

Equality of Opportunity

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting a company disclose its diversity policies or initiatives, or proposals requesting disclosure of a company’s comprehensive workforce diversity data, including requests for EEO-1 data.

Generally vote for proposals seeking information on the diversity efforts of suppliers and service providers.

Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking to amend a company’s EEO statement or diversity policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, unless the change would be unduly burdensome.

Generally vote for proposals to extend company benefits to domestic partners.

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Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gap

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender or race/ethnicity or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender or race/ethnicity pay gaps, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy and fair and equitable compensation practices;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and

§ Local laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of ethnic and/or racial minorities.

Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audits

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, considering company disclosures, policies, actions, and engagements.

Environment and Sustainability

Facility and Workplace Safety

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on resolutions requesting that a company report on safety and/or security risks associated with its operations and/or facilities, considering:

§ The company’s compliance with applicable regulations and guidelines;

§ The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its security and safety policies, procedures, and compliance monitoring; and

§ The existence of recent, significant violations, fines, or controversy regarding the safety and security of the company’s operations and/or facilities.

Hydraulic Fracturing

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s (natural gas) hydraulic fracturing operations, including measures the company has taken to manage and mitigate the potential community and environmental impacts of those operations.

Operations in Protected Areas

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on potential environmental damage as a result of company operations in protected regions, unless:

§ Operations in the specified regions are not permitted by current laws or regulations;

§ The company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions; or

§ The company’s disclosure of its operations and environmental policies in these regions is comparable to industry peers.

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Recycling

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote FOR proposals to adopt a comprehensive recycling strategy, taking into account:

§ The nature of the company’s business;

§ The current level of disclosure of the company’s existing related programs;

§ The timetable and methods of program implementation prescribed by the proposal;

§ The company’s ability to address the issues raised in the proposal; and

§ How the company’s recycling programs compare to similar programs of its industry peers.

Sustainability Reporting

The concept of sustainability is commonly understood as meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Indeed, the term sustainability is complex and poses significant challenges for companies on many levels. Many in the investment community have termed this broader responsibility the “triple bottom line,” referring to the triad of performance goals related to economic prosperity, social responsibility and environmental quality. In essence, the concept requires companies to balance the needs and interests of their various stakeholders while operating in a manner that sustains business growth for the long-term, supports local communities and protects the environment and natural capital for future generations.

Shareholders may request general environmental reports or reports on a specific location/operation, often requesting that the company detail the environmental risks and potential liabilities of a specific project. Companies have begun to report on environmental and sustainability issues using the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards. The GRI was established in 1997 with the mission of developing globally applicable guidelines for reporting on economic, environmental, and social performance. The GRI was developed by Ceres (formerly known as the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies, CERES) in partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

Sustainability Policy Recommendation:

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking greater disclosure on the company’s environmental and social practices, and/or associated risks and liabilities.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals asking companies to report in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI).

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to prepare a sustainability report.

Water Issues

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for on proposals requesting a company to report on, or to adopt a new policy on, water-related risks and concerns, taking into account:

§ The company’s current disclosure of relevant policies, initiatives, oversight mechanisms, and water usage metrics;

§ Whether or not the company’s existing water-related policies and practices are consistent with relevant internationally recognized standards and national/local regulations;

§ The potential financial impact or risk to the company associated with water-related concerns or issues; and

§ Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding water use by the company and its suppliers.

Equator Principles

The Equator Principles are the financial industry’s benchmark for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing. First launched in June 2003, the Principles were ultimately adopted by over forty

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financial institutions over a three-year implementation period. Since its adoption, the Principles have undergone a number of revisions, expanding the use of performance standards and signatory banks’ banks’ commitments to social responsibility, including human rights, climate change, and transparency. The fourth iteration of the Principles was launched in November 2019, incorporating amendments and new commitment to human rights, climate change, Indigenous Peoples and biodiversity related topics. Financial institutions adopt these principles to ensure that the projects they finance are developed in a socially responsible manner and reflect sound environmental management practices. As of 2019, 101 financial institutions have officially adopted the Equator Principles.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals to study or implement the Equator Principles.

General Corporate Issues

Charitable Contributions

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals restricting a company from making charitable contributions. Charitable contributions are generally useful for assisting worthwhile causes and for creating goodwill in the community. In the absence of bad faith, self-dealing, or gross negligence, management should determine which, and if, contributions are in the best interests of the company.

Data Security, Privacy, and Internet Issues

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the disclosure or implementation of data security, privacy, or information access and management policies and procedures, considering:

§ The level of disclosure of company policies and procedures relating to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, information access and management, and Internet censorship;

§ Engagement in dialogue with governments or relevant groups with respect to data security, privacy, or the free flow of information on the Internet;

§ The scope of business involvement and of investment in countries whose governments censor or monitor the Internet and other telecommunications;

§ Applicable market-specific laws or regulations that may be imposed on the company; and

§ Controversies, fines, or litigation related to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, or Internet censorship.

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Compensation-Related Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to link, or report on linking, executive compensation to environmental and social criteria (such as corporate downsizings, customer or employee satisfaction, community involvement, human rights, environmental performance, or predatory lending).

Human Rights, Labor Issues, and International Operations

Investors, international human rights groups, and labor advocacy groups have long been making attempts to safeguard worker rights in the international marketplace. In instances where companies themselves operate factories in developing countries for example, these advocates have asked that the companies adopt global corporate human rights standards that guarantee sustainable wages and safe working conditions for their workers abroad. Companies that contract out portions of their manufacturing operations to foreign companies have been asked to ensure that the products they receive from those contractors have not been made using forced labor, child labor, or sweatshop labor. These companies are asked to adopt formal vendor standards that, among other things, include monitoring or auditing mechanisms. Globalization, relocation of production overseas, and widespread use of subcontractors and vendors, often make it

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difficult to obtain a complete picture of a company’s labor practices in global markets. Many Investors believe that companies would benefit from adopting a human rights policy based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Labor Organization’s Core Labor Standards. Efforts that seek greater disclosure on a company’s labor practices and that seek to establish minimum standards for a company’s operations will be supported. In addition, requests for independent monitoring of overseas operations will be supported.

The Sustainability Policy generally supports proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of principles or codes relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights; such as the use of slave, child, or prison labor; a government that is illegitimate; or there is a call by human rights advocates, pro-democracy organizations, or legitimately-elected representatives for economic sanctions. The use of child, sweatshop, or forced labor is unethical and can damage corporate reputations. Poor labor practices can lead to litigation against the company, which can be costly and time consuming.

Human Rights Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation:

§ Generally vote for proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to implement human rights standards and workplace codes of conduct.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals calling for the implementation and reporting on ILO codes of conduct, SA 8000 Standards, or the Global Sullivan Principles.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call for the adoption and/or enforcement of principles or codes relating to countries in which there are systematic violations of human rights.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that call for independent monitoring programs in conjunction with local and respected religious and human rights groups to monitor supplier and licensee compliance with codes.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals that seek publication of a “Code of Conduct” to the company’s foreign suppliers and licensees, requiring they satisfy all applicable standards and laws protecting employees’ wages, benefits, working conditions, freedom of association, and other rights.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals seeking reports on, or the adoption of, vendor standards including: reporting on incentives to encourage suppliers to raise standards rather than terminate contracts and providing public disclosure of contract supplier reviews on a regular basis.

§ Vote for shareholder proposals to adopt labor standards for foreign and domestic suppliers to ensure that the company will not do business with foreign suppliers that manufacture products for sale using forced labor, child labor, or that fail to comply with applicable laws protecting employee’s wages and working conditions.

§ Vote for proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process.

Mandatory Arbitration

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; and

§ The company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers.

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MacBride Principles

These resolutions have called for the adoption of the MacBride Principles for operations located in Northern Ireland. They request companies operating abroad to support the equal employment opportunity policies that apply in facilities they operate domestically. The principles were established to address the sectarian hiring problems between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. It is well documented that Northern Ireland’s Catholic community faced much higher unemployment figures than the Protestant community. In response to this problem, the U.K. government instituted the New Fair Employment Act of 1989 (and subsequent amendments) to address the sectarian hiring problems.

Many companies believe that the Act adequately addresses the problems and that further action, including adoption of the MacBride Principles, only duplicates the efforts already underway. In evaluating a proposal to adopt the MacBride Principles, shareholders must decide whether the principles will cause companies to divest, and therefore worsen the unemployment problem, or whether the principles will promote equal hiring practices. Proponents believe that the Fair Employment Act does not sufficiently address the sectarian hiring problems. They argue that the MacBride Principles serve to stabilize the situation and promote further investment.

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Support the MacBride Principles for operations in Northern Ireland that request companies to abide by equal employment opportunity policies.

Community Social and Environmental Impact Assessments

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports outlining policies and/or the potential (community) social and/or environmental impact of company operations considering:

§ Current disclosure of applicable policies and risk assessment report(s) and risk management procedures;

§ The impact of regulatory non-compliance, litigation, remediation, or reputational loss that may be associated with failure to manage the company’s operations in question, including the management of relevant community and stakeholder relations;

§ The nature, purpose, and scope of the company’s operations in the specific region(s);

§ The degree to which company policies and procedures are consistent with industry norms; and

§ Scope of the resolution.

Operations in High-Risk Markets

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s potential financial and reputational risks associated with operations in “high-risk” markets, such as a terrorism-sponsoring state or politically/socially unstable region, taking into account:

§ The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption;

§ Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures;

§ Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws;

§ Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws; and

§ Whether the company has been recently involved in recent, significant controversies, fines or litigation related to its operations in “high-risk” markets.

Outsourcing/Offshoring

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals calling for companies to report on the risks associated with outsourcing/plant closures, considering:

§ Controversies surrounding operations in the relevant market(s);

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§ The value of the requested report to shareholders;

§ The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant information on outsourcing and plant closure procedures; and

§ The company’s existing human rights standards relative to industry peers.

Sexual Harassment

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to preventing workplace sexual harassment;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and

§ The company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers.

Weapons and Military Sales

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against reports on foreign military sales or offsets. Such disclosures may involve sensitive and confidential information. Moreover, companies must comply with government controls and reporting on foreign military sales.

Generally vote against proposals asking a company to cease production or report on the risks associated with the use of depleted uranium munitions or nuclear weapons components and delivery systems, including disengaging from current and proposed contracts. Such contracts are monitored by government agencies, serve multiple military and non-military uses, and withdrawal from these contracts could have a negative impact on the company’s business.

Political Activities

Lobbying

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting information on a company’s lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures, considering:

§ The company’s current disclosure of relevant lobbying policies, and management and board oversight;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding trade associations or other groups that it supports, or is a member of, that engage in lobbying activities; and

§ Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s lobbying-related activities.

Political Contributions

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, considering:

§ The company’s policies, and management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and

§ Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.

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Vote against proposals barring a company from making political contributions. Businesses are affected by legislation at the federal, state, and local level; barring political contributions can put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Vote against proposals to publish in newspapers and other media a company’s political contributions. Such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.

Political Ties

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals asking a company to affirm political nonpartisanship in the workplace, so long as:

§ There are no recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s political contributions or trade association spending; and

§ The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibit coercion.

Vote against proposals asking for a list of company executives, directors, consultants, legal counsels, lobbyists, or investment bankers that have prior government service and whether such service had a bearing on the business of the company. Such a list would be burdensome to prepare without providing any meaningful information to shareholders.

Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s alignment of political contributions, lobbying, and electioneering spending with a company’s publicly stated values and policies, unless the terms of the proposal are unduly restrictive. Additionally, Sustainability Advisory Services will consider whether:

§ The company’s policies, management, board oversight, governance processes, and level of disclosure related to direct political contributions, lobbying activities, and payments to trade associations, political action committees, or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding: the reasons for its support of candidates for public offices; the reasons for support of and participation in trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and other political activities;

§ Any incongruencies identified between a company’s direct and indirect political expenditures and its publicly stated values and priorities;

§ Recent significant controversies related to the company’s direct and indirect lobbying, political contributions, or political activities.

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7.  Mutual Fund Proxies

Election of Directors

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings. However, mutual fund boards do not usually have compensation committees, so do not withhold for the lack of this committee.

Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: For closed-end management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at CEFs that have not provided a compelling rationale for opting-in to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a by-law amendment to a shareholder vote.

Converting Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on conversion proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance as a closed-end fund;

§ Market in which the fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals.

Proxy Contests

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proxy contests, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance relative to its peers;

§ Market in which fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the issues;

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals;

§ Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;

§ Independence of directors;

§ Experience and skills of director candidates;

§ Governance profile of the company;

§ Evidence of management entrenchment.

Investment Advisory Agreements

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on investment advisory agreements, considering the following factors:

§ Proposed and current fee schedules;

§ Fund category/investment objective;

§ Performance benchmarks;

§ Share price performance as compared with peers;

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§ Resulting fees relative to peers;

§ Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control).

Approving New Classes or Series of Shares

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares.

Preferred Stock Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares, considering the following factors:

§ Stated specific financing purpose;

§ Possible dilution for common shares;

§ Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes.

1940 Act Policies

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors:

§ Potential competitiveness;

§ Regulatory developments;

§ Current and potential returns; and

§ Current and potential risk.

Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.

Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non-fundamental restriction, considering the following factors:

§ The fund’s target investments;

§ The reasons given by the fund for the change; and

§ The projected impact of the change on the portfolio.

Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Nonfundamental

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals to change a fund’s fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.

Name Change Proposals

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on name change proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Political/economic changes in the target market;

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§ Consolidation in the target market; and

§ Current asset composition.

Change in Fund’s Subclassification

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes in a fund’s sub-classification, considering the following factors:

§ Potential competitiveness;

§ Current and potential returns;

§ Risk of concentration;

§ Consolidation in target industry.

Business Development Companies—Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV) if:

§ The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date no more than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;

§ The sale is deemed to be in the best interests of shareholders by (1) a majority of the company’s independent directors and (2) a majority of the company’s directors who have no financial interest in the issuance; and

§ The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either:

§ Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one- and three-year median TSRs; or

§ Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholders.

Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors:

§ Strategies employed to salvage the company;

§ The fund’s past performance;

§ The terms of the liquidation.

Changes to the Charter Document

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes to the charter document, considering the following factors:

§ The degree of change implied by the proposal;

§ The efficiencies that could result;

§ The state of incorporation;

§ Regulatory standards and implications.

Vote against any of the following changes:

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to reorganize or terminate the trust or any of its series;

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§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement for amendments to the new declaration of trust;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to amend the fund’s management contract, allowing the contract to be modified by the investment manager and the trust management, as permitted by the 1940 Act;

§ Allow the trustees to impose other fees in addition to sales charges on investment in a fund, such as deferred sales charges and redemption fees that may be imposed upon redemption of a fund’s shares;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to engage in and terminate subadvisory arrangements;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to change the domicile of the fund.

Changing the Domicile of a Fund

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on re-incorporations, considering the following factors:

§ Regulations of both states;

§ Required fundamental policies of both states;

§ The increased flexibility available.

Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate subadvisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one subadviser.

Distribution Agreements

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on distribution agreement proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives;

§ The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance;

§ The competitiveness of the fund in the industry;

§ The terms of the agreement.

Master-Feeder Structure

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of a master-feeder structure.

Mergers

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on merger proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Resulting fee structure;

§ Performance of both funds;

§ Continuity of management personnel;

§ Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.

Shareholder Proposals for Mutual Funds

Establish Director Ownership Requirement

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a specific minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.

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Reimburse Shareholder for Expenses Incurred

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses. When supporting the dissidents, vote for the reimbursement of the proxy solicitation expenses.

Terminate the Investment Advisor

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to terminate the investment advisor, considering the following factors:

§ Performance of the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV);

§ The fund’s history of shareholder relations;

§ The performance of other funds under the advisor’s management.

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8.  Foreign Private Issuers Listed on U.S. Exchanges

Sustainability Policy Recommendation: Vote against (or withhold from) non-independent director nominees at companies which fail to meet the following criteria: a majority-independent board, and the presence of an audit, a compensation, and a nomination committee, each of which is entirely composed of independent directors.

Where the design and disclosure levels of equity compensation plans are comparable to those seen at U.S. companies, U.S. compensation policy will be used to evaluate the compensation plan proposals. Otherwise, they, and all other voting items, will be evaluated using the relevant regional or market approach under the Sustainability proxy voting guidelines.

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UNITED STATES Proxy Voting Guidelines Benchmark Policy Recommendations Effective for Meetings on or after February 1, 2023 Published December 13, 2022 WWW.ISSGOVERNANCE.COM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Coverage	F-499
1.    Board of Directors	F-500
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections	F-500
Independence	F-500
ISS Classification of Directors – U.S.	F-501
Composition	F-503
Attendance	F-503
Overboarded Directors	F-503
Gender Diversity	F-503
Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity	F-503
Responsiveness	F-504
Accountability	F-504
Poison Pills	F-504
Unequal Voting Rights	F-505
Classified Board Structure	F-505
Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards	F-505
Problematic Governance Structure	F-505
Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments	F-506
Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals	F-506
Director Performance Evaluation	F-506
Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions	F-507
Problematic Audit-Related Practices	F-507
Problematic Compensation Practices	F-507
Problematic Pledging of Company Stock	F-508
Climate Accountability	F-508
Governance Failures	F-508
Voting on Director Nominees in Contested Elections	F-509
Vote-No Campaigns	F-509
Proxy Contests/Proxy Access	F-509
Other Board-Related Proposals	F-509
Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy	F-509
Board Refreshment	F-509
Term/Tenure Limits	F-509
Age Limits	F-510
Board Size	F-510
Classification/Declassification of the Board	F-510
CEO Succession Planning	F-510
Cumulative Voting	F-510
Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation	F-511
Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications	F-511
Establish Other Board Committee Proposals	F-512
Filling Vacancies/Removal of Directors	F-512
Independent Board Chair	F-512

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Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees	F-512
Majority Vote Standard for the Election of Directors	F-513
Proxy Access	F-513
Require More Nominees than Open Seats	F-513
Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee)	F-513
2.    Audit-Related	F-514
Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability	F-514
Auditor Ratification	F-514
Shareholder Proposals Limiting Non-Audit Services	F-514
Shareholder Proposals on Audit Firm Rotation	F-514
3.    Shareholder Rights  & Defenses	F-516
Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations	F-516
Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent	F-516
Control Share Acquisition Provisions	F-516
Control Share Cash-Out Provisions	F-516
Disgorgement Provisions	F-517
Fair Price Provisions	F-517
Freeze-Out Provisions	F-517
Greenmail	F-517
Shareholder Litigation Rights	F-517
Federal Forum Selection Provisions	F-517
Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters	F-518
Fee shifting	F-518
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments	F-518
Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)	F-519
Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy	F-519
Management Proposals to Ratify a Poison Pill	F-519
Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)	F-519
Proxy Voting Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Tabulation	F-520
Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions	F-520
Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses	F-520
Reincorporation Proposals	F-521
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent	F-521
Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings	F-522
Stakeholder Provisions	F-522
State Antitakeover Statutes	F-522
Supermajority Vote Requirements	F-522
Virtual Shareholder Meetings	F-522
4.    Capital/Restructuring	F-523
Capital	F-523

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Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock	F-523
Common Stock Authorization	F-523
General Authorization Requests	F-523
Specific Authorization Requests	F-524
Dual Class Structure	F-524
Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan	F-524
Preemptive Rights	F-524
Preferred Stock Authorization	F-524
General Authorization Requests	F-524
Recapitalization Plans	F-525
Reverse Stock Splits	F-526
Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.	F-526
Share Repurchase Programs	F-526
Share Repurchase Programs Shareholder Proposals	F-527
Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends	F-527
Tracking Stock	F-527
Restructuring	F-527
Appraisal Rights	F-527
Asset Purchases	F-527
Asset Sales	F-528
Bundled Proposals	F-528
Conversion of Securities	F-528
Corporate Reorganization/Debt Restructuring/Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans/Reverse Leveraged Buyouts/Wrap Plans	F-528
Formation of Holding Company	F-529
Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)	F-529
Joint Ventures	F-529
Liquidations	F-530
Mergers and Acquisitions	F-530
Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures	F-530
Reorganization/Restructuring Plan (Bankruptcy)	F-531
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)	F-532
Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)—Proposals for Extensions	F-532
Spin-offs	F-533
Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals	F-533
5.    Compensation	F-534
Executive Pay Evaluation	F-534
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation—Management Proposals (Say-on-Pay)	F-534
Pay-for-Performance Evaluation	F-535
Problematic Pay Practices	F-535
Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness	F-536

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Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”)	F-537
Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale	F-537
Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans	F-537
Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)	F-538
Three-Year Value-Adjusted Burn Rate	F-539
Egregious Factors	F-539
Liberal Change in Control Definition	F-539
Repricing Provisions	F-539
Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect	F-540
Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))	F-540
Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations	F-541
Dividend Equivalent Rights	F-541
Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)	F-541
Other Compensation Plans	F-541
401(k) Employee Benefit Plans	F-541
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)	F-541
Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Qualified Plans	F-541
Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Non-Qualified Plans	F-541
Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options	F-542
Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash	F-542
Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs	F-542
Director Compensation	F-543
Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs	F-543
Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors	F-544
Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans	F-544
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation	F-544
Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”	F-544
Compensation Consultants—Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization	F-544
Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors	F-544
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits	F-545
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time	F-545
Pay Disparity	F-545
Pay for Performance/Performance-Based Awards	F-546
Pay for Superior Performance	F-546
Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)	F-546
Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees	F-547
Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances	F-547
Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes	F-547
Share Buyback Impact on Incentive Program Metrics	F-548
Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)	F-548
Tax Gross-Up Proposals	F-548
Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment/Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity	F-548

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6.    Routine/Miscellaneous	F-549
Adjourn Meeting	F-549
Amend Quorum Requirements	F-549
Amend Minor Bylaws	F-549
Change Company Name	F-549
Change Date, Time, or Location of Annual Meeting	F-549
Other Business	F-549
7.     Social and Environmental Issues	F-550
Global Approach – E&S Shareholder Proposals	F-550
Endorsement of Principles	F-550
Animal Welfare	F-550
Animal Welfare Policies	F-550
Animal Testing	F-551
Animal Slaughter	F-551
Consumer Issues	F-551
Genetically Modified Ingredients	F-551
Reports on Potentially Controversial Business/Financial Practices	F-551
Pharmaceutical Pricing, Access to Medicines, and Prescription Drug Reimportation	F-552
Product Safety and Toxic/Hazardous Materials	F-552
Tobacco-Related Proposals	F-553
Climate Change	F-553
Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals	F-553
Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals	F-554
Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions	F-554
Energy Efficiency	F-554
Renewable Energy	F-555
Diversity	F-555
Board Diversity	F-555
Equality of Opportunity	F-555
Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits	F-556
Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gap	F-556
Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audit Guidelines	F-556
Environment and Sustainability	F-556
Facility and Workplace Safety	F-556
General Environmental Proposals and Community Impact Assessments	F-557
Hydraulic Fracturing	F-557
Operations in Protected Areas	F-557
Recycling	F-557
Sustainability Reporting	F-558

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Water Issues	F-558
General Corporate Issues	F-558
Charitable Contributions	F-558
Data Security, Privacy, and Internet Issues	F-558
ESG Compensation-Related Proposals	F-559
Human Rights, Human Capital Management, and International Operations	F-559
Human Rights Proposals	F-559
Mandatory Arbitration	F-559
Operations in High-Risk Markets	F-560
Outsourcing/Offshoring	F-560
Sexual Harassment	F-560
Weapons and Military Sales	F-560
Political Activities	F-561
Lobbying	F-561
Political Contributions	F-561
Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency	F-561
Political Ties	F-562
8.    Mutual Fund Proxies	F-563
Election of Directors	F-563
Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes	F-563
Converting Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund	F-563
Proxy Contests	F-563
Investment Advisory Agreements	F-563
Approving New Classes or Series of Shares	F-564
Preferred Stock Proposals	F-564
1940 Act Policies	F-564
Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction	F-564
Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Nonfundamental	F-564
Name Change Proposals	F-564
Change in Fund’s Subclassification	F-565
Business Development Companies—Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value	F-565
Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation	F-565
Changes to the Charter Document	F-565
Changing the Domicile of a Fund	F-566
Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval	F-566
Distribution Agreements	F-566
Master-Feeder Structure	F-566
Mergers	F-566

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Shareholder Proposals for Mutual Funds	F-566
Establish Director Ownership Requirement	F-566
Reimburse Shareholder for Expenses Incurred	F-567
Terminate the Investment Advisor	F-567

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Coverage

The U.S. research team provides proxy analyses and voting recommendations for the common shareholder meetings of U.S. - incorporated companies that are publicly-traded on U.S. exchanges, as well as certain OTC companies, if they are held in our institutional investor clients’ portfolios. Coverage generally includes corporate actions for common equity holders, such as written consents and bankruptcies. ISS’ U.S. coverage includes investment companies (including open-end funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and unit investment trusts), limited partnerships (“LPs”), master limited partnerships (“MLPs”), limited liability companies (“LLCs”), and business development companies. ISS reviews its universe of coverage on an annual basis, and the coverage is subject to change based on client need and industry trends.

Foreign-incorporated companies

In addition to U.S.- incorporated, U.S.- listed companies, ISS’ U.S. policies are applied to certain foreign-incorporated company analyses. Like the SEC, ISS distinguishes two types of companies that list but are not incorporated in the U.S.:

§ U.S. Domestic Issuers – which have a majority of outstanding shares held in the U.S. and meet other criteria, as determined by the SEC, and are subject to the same disclosure and listing standards as U.S. incorporated companies (e.g. they are required to file DEF14A proxy statements) – are generally covered under standard U.S. policy guidelines.

§ Foreign Private Issuers (FPIs) – which are allowed to take exemptions from most disclosure requirements (e.g., they are allowed to file 6-K for their proxy materials) and U.S. listing standards – are generally covered under a combination of policy guidelines:

§ FPI Guidelines (see the Americas Regional Proxy Voting Guidelines), may apply to companies incorporated in governance havens, and apply certain minimum independence and disclosure standards in the evaluation of key proxy ballot items, such as the election of directors; and/or

§ Guidelines for the market that is responsible for, or most relevant to, the item on the ballot.

U.S. incorporated companies listed only on non-U.S. exchanges are generally covered under the ISS guidelines for the market on which they are traded.

An FPI is generally covered under ISS’ approach to FPIs outlined above, even if such FPI voluntarily files a proxy statement and/or other filing normally required of a U.S. Domestic Issuer, so long as the company retains its FPI status.

In all cases – including with respect to other companies with cross-market features that may lead to ballot items related to multiple markets – items that are on the ballot solely due to the requirements of another market (listing, incorporation, or national code) may be evaluated under the policy of the relevant market, regardless of the “assigned” primary market coverage.

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1.    Board of Directors

Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections

Four fundamental principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:

Independence: Boards should be sufficiently independent from management (and significant shareholders) to ensure that they are able and motivated to effectively supervise management’s performance for the benefit of all shareholders, including in setting and monitoring the execution of corporate strategy, with appropriate use of shareholder capital, and in setting and monitoring executive compensation programs that support that strategy. The chair of the board should ideally be an independent director, and all boards should have an independent leadership position or a similar role in order to help provide appropriate counterbalance to executive management, as well as having sufficiently independent committees that focus on key governance concerns such as audit, compensation, and nomination of directors.

Composition: Companies should ensure that directors add value to the board through their specific skills and expertise and by having sufficient time and commitment to serve effectively. Boards should be of a size appropriate to accommodate diversity, expertise, and independence, while ensuring active and collaborative participation by all members. Boards should be sufficiently diverse to ensure consideration of a wide range of perspectives.

Responsiveness: Directors should respond to investor input, such as that expressed through significant opposition to management proposals, significant support for shareholder proposals (whether binding or non-binding), and tender offers where a majority of shares are tendered.

Accountability: Boards should be sufficiently accountable to shareholders, including through transparency of the company’s governance practices and regular board elections, by the provision of sufficient information for shareholders to be able to assess directors and board composition, and through the ability of shareholders to remove directors.

General Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances (with new nominees¹ considered on case-by-case basis):

Independence

Vote against² or withhold from non-independent directors (Executive Directors and Non-Independent Non-Executive Directors per ISS’ Classification of Directors) when:

§ Independent directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board;

§ The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;

§ The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or

§ The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.

¹ A “new nominee” is a director who is being presented for election by shareholders for the first time. Recommendations on new nominees who have served for less than one year are made on a case-by-case basis depending on the timing of their appointment and the problematic governance issue in question.

² In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use “Withhold” as the contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use “Against”. However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.

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ISS Classification of Directors – U.S.

  1. Executive Director

1.1. Current officer¹ of the company or one of its affiliates².

  2. Non-Independent Non-Executive Director

Board Identification

2.1. Director identified as not independent by the board.

Controlling/Significant Shareholder

2.2. Beneficial owner of more than 50 percent of the company’s voting power (this may be aggregated if voting power is distributed among more than one member of a group).

Current Employment at Company or Related Company

2.3. Non-officer employee of the firm (including employee representatives).

2.4. Officer¹, former officer, or general or limited partner of a joint venture or partnership with the company.

Former Employment

2.5. Former CEO of the company. ^{3, 4}

2.6. Former non-CEO officer¹ of the company or an affiliate² within the past five years.

2.7. Former officer¹ of an acquired company within the past five years.⁴

2.8. Officer¹ of a former parent or predecessor firm at the time the company was sold or split off within the past five years.

2.9. Former interim officer if the service was longer than 18 months. If the service was between 12 and 18 months an assessment of the interim officer’s employment agreement will be made.⁵

Family Members

2.10. Immediate family member⁶ of a current or former officer¹ of the company or its affiliates² within the last five years.

2.11. Immediate family member⁶ of a current employee of company or its affiliates² where additional factors raise concern (which may include, but are not limited to, the following: a director related to numerous employees; the company or its affiliates employ relatives of numerous board members; or a non-Section 16 officer in a key strategic role).

Professional, Transactional, and Charitable Relationships

2.12. Director who (or whose immediate family member⁶) currently provides professional services⁷ in excess of $10,000 per year to: the company, an affiliate², or an individual officer of the company or an affiliate; or who is (or whose immediate family member⁶ is) a partner, employee, or controlling shareholder of an organization which provides the services.

2.13. Director who (or whose immediate family member⁶) currently has any material transactional relationship⁸ with the company or its affiliates²; or who is (or whose immediate family member⁶ is) a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or an executive officer of, an organization which has the material transactional relationship⁸ (excluding investments in the company through a private placement).

2.14. Director who (or whose immediate family member⁶) is a trustee, director, or employee of a charitable or non-profit organization that receives material grants or endowments⁸ from the company or its affiliates².

Other Relationships

2.15. Party to a voting agreement⁹ to vote in line with management on proposals being brought to shareholder vote.

2.16. Has (or an immediate family member⁶ has) an interlocking relationship as defined by the SEC involving members of the board of directors or its Compensation Committee.¹⁰

2.17. Founder¹¹ of the company but not currently an employee.

2.18. Director with pay comparable to Named Executive Officers.

2.19. Any material¹² relationship with the company.

  3. Independent Director

3.1. No material¹² connection to the company other than a board seat.

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Footnotes:

1. The definition of officer will generally follow that of a “Section 16 officer” (officers subject to Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) and includes the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, technology, and accounting officers of a company (including the president, treasurer, secretary, controller, or any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or policy function). Current interim officers are included in this category. For private companies, the equivalent positions are applicable. A non-employee director serving as an officer due to statutory requirements (e.g. corporate secretary) will generally be classified as a Non-Independent Non-Executive Director under “Any material relationship with the company.” However, if the company provides explicit disclosure that the director is not receiving additional compensation exceeding $10,000 per year for serving in that capacity, then the director will be classified as an Independent Director.

2. “Affiliate” includes a subsidiary, sibling company, or parent company. ISS uses 50 percent control ownership by the parent company as the standard for applying its affiliate designation. The manager/advisor of an externally managed issuer (EMI) is considered an affiliate.

3. Includes any former CEO of the company prior to the company’s initial public offering (IPO).

4. When there is a former CEO of a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) serving on the board of an acquired company, ISS will generally classify such directors as independent unless determined otherwise taking into account the following factors: the applicable listing standards determination of such director’s independence; any operating ties to the firm; and the existence of any other conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

5. ISS will look at the terms of the interim officer’s employment contract to determine if it contains severance pay, long-term health and pension benefits, or other such standard provisions typically contained in contracts of permanent, non-temporary CEOs. ISS will also consider if a formal search process was under way for a full-time officer at the time.

6. “Immediate family member” follows the SEC’s definition of such and covers spouses, parents, children, step-parents, step-children, siblings, in-laws, and any person (other than a tenant or employee) sharing the household of any director, nominee for director, executive officer, or significant shareholder of the company.

7. Professional services can be characterized as advisory in nature, generally involve access to sensitive company information or to strategic decision-making, and typically have a commission- or fee-based payment structure. Professional services generally include but are not limited to the following: investment banking/financial advisory services, commercial banking (beyond deposit services), investment services, insurance services, accounting/audit services, consulting services, marketing services, legal services, property management services, realtor services, lobbying services, executive search services, and IT consulting services. The following would generally be considered transactional relationships and not professional services: deposit services, IT tech support services, educational services, and construction services. The case of participation in a banking syndicate by a non-lead bank should be considered a transactional (and hence subject to the associated materiality test) rather than a professional relationship. “Of Counsel” relationships are only considered immaterial if the individual does not receive any form of compensation (in excess of $10,000 per year) from, or is a retired partner of, the firm providing the professional service. The case of a company providing a professional service to one of its directors or to an entity with which one of its directors is affiliated, will be considered a transactional rather than a professional relationship. Insurance services and marketing services are assumed to be professional services unless the company explains why such services are not advisory.

8. A material transactional relationship, including grants to non-profit organizations, exists if the company makes annual payments to, or receives annual payments from, another entity, exceeding the greater of: $200,000 or 5 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, for a company that follows NASDAQ listing standards; or the greater of $1,000,000 or 2 percent of the recipient’s gross revenues, for a company that follows NYSE listing standards. For a company that follows neither of the preceding standards, ISS will apply the NASDAQ-based materiality test. (The recipient is the party receiving the financial proceeds from the transaction).

9. Dissident directors who are parties to a voting agreement pursuant to a settlement or similar arrangement may be classified as Independent Directors if an analysis of the following factors indicates that the voting agreement does not compromise their alignment with all shareholders’ interests: the terms of the agreement; the duration of the standstill provision in the agreement; the limitations and requirements of actions that are agreed upon; if the dissident director nominee(s) is subject to the standstill; and if there any conflicting relationships or related party transactions.

10. Interlocks include: executive officers serving as directors on each other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board); or executive officers sitting on each other’s boards and at least one serves on the other’s compensation or similar committees (or, in the absence of such a committee, on the board).

11. The operating involvement of the founder with the company will be considered; if the founder was never employed by the company, ISS may deem him or her an Independent Director.

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12. For purposes of ISS’s director independence classification, “material” will be defined as a standard of relationship (financial, personal, or otherwise) that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to satisfy requisite fiduciary standards on behalf of shareholders.

Composition

Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except nominees who served only part of the fiscal year³) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:

§ Medical issues/illness;

§ Family emergencies; and

§ Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).

In cases of chronic poor attendance without reasonable justification, in addition to voting against the director(s) with poor attendance, generally vote against or withhold from appropriate members of the nominating/governance committees or the full board.

If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.

Overboarded Directors: Generally vote against or withhold from individual directors who:

§ Sit on more than five public company boards; or

§ Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own—withhold only at their outside boards⁴.

Gender Diversity: Generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at companies where there are no women on the company’s board. An exception will be made if there was at least one woman on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to return to a gender-diverse status within a year.

Racial and/or Ethnic Diversity: For companies in the Russell 3000 or S&P 1500 indices, generally vote against or withhold from the chair of the nominating committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) where the board has no apparent racially or ethnically diverse members⁵. An exception will be made if there was racial and/or ethnic diversity on the board at the preceding annual meeting and the board makes a firm commitment to appoint at least one racial and/or ethnic diverse member within a year.

³ Nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy.

⁴ Although all of a CEO’s subsidiary boards with publicly-traded common stock will be counted as separate boards, ISS will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

⁵ Aggregate diversity statistics provided by the board will only be considered if specific to racial and/or ethnic diversity.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-503 13 of 78

Responsiveness

Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

§ The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year or failed to act on a management proposal seeking to ratify an existing charter/bylaw provision that received opposition of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:

§ Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;

§ Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;

§ The subject matter of the proposal;

§ The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;

§ Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;

§ The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

§ The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;

§ At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.

Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Say on Pay proposal if:

§ The company’s previous say-on-pay received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast. Factors that will be considered are:

§ The company’s response, including:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);

§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

§ The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.

Accountability

PROBLEMATIC TAKEOVER DEFENSES, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Poison Pills: Generally vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if:

§ The company has a poison pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature⁶;

§ The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval; or

⁶ If a short-term pill with a deadhand or slowhand feature is enacted but expires before the next shareholder vote, ISS will generally still recommend withhold/against nominees at the next shareholder meeting following its adoption.

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§ The company has a long-term poison pill (with a term of over one year) that was not approved by the public shareholders⁷.

Vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial short-term pill⁶ (with a term of one year or less)

without shareholder approval, taking into consideration:

§ The disclosed rationale for the adoption;

§ The trigger;

§ The company’s market capitalization (including absolute level and sudden changes);

§ A commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote; and

§ Other factors as relevant.

Unequal Voting Rights: Generally vote withhold or against directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case), if the company employs a common stock structure with unequal voting rights⁸.

Exceptions to this policy will generally be limited to:

§ Newly-public companies⁹ with a sunset provision of no more than seven years from the date of going public;

§ Limited Partnerships and the Operating Partnership (OP) unit structure of REITs;

§ Situations where the super-voting shares represent less than 5% of total voting power and therefore considered to be de minimis; or

§ The company provides sufficient protections for minority shareholders, such as allowing minority shareholders a regular binding vote on whether the capital structure should be maintained.

Classified Board Structure: The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.

Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards: The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.

Problematic Governance Structure: For companies that hold or held their first annual meeting⁹ of public shareholders after Feb. 1, 2015, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted the following bylaw or charter provisions that are considered to be materially adverse to shareholder rights:

§ Supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ A classified board structure; or

§ Other egregious provisions.

A provision which specifies that the problematic structure(s) will be sunset within seven years of the date of going public will be considered a mitigating factor.

Unless the adverse provision is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

⁷ Approval prior to, or in connection, with a company’s becoming publicly-traded, or in connection with a de-SPAC transaction, is insufficient.

⁸ This generally includes classes of common stock that have additional votes per share than other shares; classes of shares that are not entitled to vote on all the same ballot items or nominees; or stock with time-phased voting rights (“loyalty shares”).

⁹ Includes companies that emerge from bankruptcy, SPAC transactions, spin-offs, direct listings, and those who complete a traditional initial public offering.

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Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments: Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:

§ The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;

§ Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;

§ The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;

§ The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ The company’s existing governance provisions;

§ The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and

§ Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against (except new nominees¹, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:

§ Classified the board;

§ Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter;

§ Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws;

§ Adopted a fee-shifting provision; or

§ Adopted another provision deemed egregious.

Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals: Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the governance committee if:

§ The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals or share ownership requirements, subject matter restrictions, or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis.

Submission of management proposals to approve or ratify requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8 for the submission of binding bylaw amendments will generally be viewed as an insufficient restoration of shareholders’ rights. Generally continue to vote against or withhold on an ongoing basis until shareholders are provided with an unfettered ability to amend the bylaws or a proposal providing for such unfettered right is submitted for shareholder approval.

Director Performance Evaluation: The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one-, three-, and five-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s operational metrics and other factors as warranted. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:

§ A classified board structure;

§ A supermajority vote requirement;

§ Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections, or a majority vote standard in contested elections;

§ The inability of shareholders to call special meetings;

§ The inability of shareholders to act by written consent;

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§ A multi-class capital structure; and/or

§ A non-shareholder-approved poison pill.

Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions: Vote against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board, where boards ask shareholders to ratify existing charter or bylaw provisions considering the following factors:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the Audit Committee if:

§ The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive;

§ The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or

§ There is persuasive evidence that the Audit Committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote case-by-case on members of the Audit Committee and potentially the full board if:

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted.

Problematic Compensation Practices

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item or in egregious situations, vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

§ The company maintains significant problematic pay practices; or

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Generally vote against or withhold from the Compensation Committee chair, other committee members, or potentially the full board if:

§ The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or

§ The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.

Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-507 17 of 78

Problematic Pledging of Company Stock: Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:

§ The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;

§ The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;

§ Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;

§ Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and

§ Any other relevant factors.

Climate Accountability

For companies that are significant greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters, through their operations or value chain¹⁰, generally vote against or withhold from the incumbent chair of the responsible committee (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) in cases where ISS determines that the company is not taking the minimum steps needed to understand, assess, and mitigate risks related to climate change to the company and the larger economy.

Minimum steps to understand and mitigate those risks are considered to be the following. Both minimum criteria will be required to be in alignment with the policy:

§ Detailed disclosure of climate-related risks, such as according to the framework established by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), including:

§ Board governance measures;

§ Corporate strategy;

§ Risk management analyses; and

§ Metrics and targets.

§ Appropriate GHG emissions reduction targets.

At this time, “appropriate GHG emissions reductions targets” will be medium-term GHG reduction targets or Net Zero-by-2050 GHG reduction targets for a company’s operations (Scope 1) and electricity use (Scope 2). Targets should cover the vast majority of the company’s direct emissions.

Governance Failures

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:

§ Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight¹¹, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;

§ Failure to replace management as appropriate; or

§ Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

¹⁰ Companies defined as “significant GHG emitters” will be those on the current Climate Action 100+ Focus Group list.

¹¹ Examples of failure of risk oversight include but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; demonstrably poor risk oversight of environmental and social issues, including climate change; significant adverse legal judgments or settlement; or hedging of company stock.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-508 18 of 78

Voting on Director Nominees in Contested Elections

Vote-No Campaigns

General Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote-no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.

Proxy Contests/Proxy Access

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:

§ Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;

§ Management’s track record;

§ Background to the contested election;

§ Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;

§ Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;

§ Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and

§ Stock ownership positions.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether there are more candidates than board seats).

Other Board-Related Proposals

Adopt Anti-Hedging/Pledging/Speculative Investments Policy

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits named executive officers from engaging in derivative or speculative transactions involving company stock, including hedging, holding stock in a margin account, or pledging stock as collateral for a loan. However, the company’s existing policies regarding responsible use of company stock will be considered.

Board Refreshment

Board refreshment is best implemented through an ongoing program of individual director evaluations, conducted annually, to ensure the evolving needs of the board are met and to bring in fresh perspectives, skills, and diversity as needed.

Term/Tenure Limits

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals regarding director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The rationale provided for adoption of the term/tenure limit;

§ The robustness of the company’s board evaluation process;

§ Whether the limit is of sufficient length to allow for a broad range of director tenures;

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§ Whether the limit would disadvantage independent directors compared to non-independent directors; and

§ Whether the board will impose the limit evenly, and not have the ability to waive it in a discriminatory manner.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for the company to adopt director term/tenure limits, considering:

§ The scope of the shareholder proposal; and

§ Evidence of problematic issues at the company combined with, or exacerbated by, a lack of board refreshment.

Age Limits

General Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to limit the tenure of independent directors through mandatory retirement ages. Vote for proposals to remove mandatory age limits.

Board Size

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals seeking to fix the board size or designate a range for the board size.

Vote against proposals that give management the ability to alter the size of the board outside of a specified range without shareholder approval.

Classification/Declassification of the Board

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to classify (stagger) the board.

Vote for proposals to repeal classified boards and to elect all directors annually.

CEO Succession Planning

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking disclosure on a CEO succession planning policy, considering, at a minimum, the following factors:

§ The reasonableness/scope of the request; and

§ The company’s existing disclosure on its current CEO succession planning process.

Cumulative Voting

General Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to eliminate cumulate voting, and for shareholder proposals to restore or provide for cumulative voting, unless:

§ The company has proxy access¹², thereby allowing shareholders to nominate directors to the company’s ballot; and

§ The company has adopted a majority vote standard, with a carve-out for plurality voting in situations where there are more nominees than seats, and a director resignation policy to address failed elections.

Vote for proposals for cumulative voting at controlled companies (insider voting power > 50%).

¹² A proxy access right that meets the recommended guidelines.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-510 20 of 78

Director and Officer Indemnification, Liability Protection, and Exculpation

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals on director and officer indemnification, liability protection, and exculpation¹³.

Consider the stated rationale for the proposed change. Also consider, among other factors, the extent to which the proposal would:

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of care.

§ Eliminate directors’ and officers’ liability for monetary damages for violating the duty of loyalty.

§ Expand coverage beyond just legal expenses to liability for acts that are more serious violations of fiduciary obligation than mere carelessness.

§ Expand the scope of indemnification to provide for mandatory indemnification of company officials in connection with acts that previously the company was permitted to provide indemnification for, at the discretion of the company’s board (i.e., “permissive indemnification”), but that previously the company was not required to indemnify.

Vote for those proposals providing such expanded coverage in cases when a director’s or officer’s legal defense was unsuccessful if both of the following apply:

§ If the individual was found to have acted in good faith and in a manner that the individual reasonably believed was in the best interests of the company; and

If only the individual’s legal expenses would be covered.

Establish/Amend Nominee Qualifications

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals that establish or amend director qualifications. Votes should be based on the reasonableness of the criteria and the degree to which they may preclude dissident nominees from joining the board.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder resolutions seeking a director nominee who possesses a particular subject matter expertise, considering:

§ The company’s board committee structure, existing subject matter expertise, and board nomination provisions relative to that of its peers;

§ The company’s existing board and management oversight mechanisms regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ The company’s disclosure and performance relating to the issue for which board oversight is sought and any significant related controversies; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

¹³ Indemnification: the condition of being secured against loss or damage.
Limited liability: a person’s financial liability is limited to a fixed sum, or personal financial assets are not at risk if the individual loses a lawsuit that results in financial award/damages to the plaintiff.
Exculpation: to eliminate or limit the personal liability of a director or officer to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director or officer.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-511 21 of 78

Establish Other Board Committee Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals to establish a new board committee, as such proposals seek a specific oversight mechanism/structure that potentially limits a company’s flexibility to determine an appropriate oversight mechanism for itself. However, the following factors will be considered:

§ Existing oversight mechanisms (including current committee structure) regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Level of disclosure regarding the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Company performance related to the issue for which board oversight is sought;

§ Board committee structure compared to that of other companies in its industry sector; and

§ The scope and structure of the proposal.

Filling Vacancies/Removal of Directors

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that provide that directors may be removed only for cause.

Vote for proposals to restore shareholders’ ability to remove directors with or without cause.

Vote against proposals that provide that only continuing directors may elect replacements to fill board vacancies.

Vote for proposals that permit shareholders to elect directors to fill board vacancies.

Independent Board Chair

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requiring that the board chair position be filled by an independent director, taking into consideration the following:

§ The scope and rationale of the proposal;

§ The company’s current board leadership structure;

§ The company’s governance structure and practices;

§ Company performance; and

§ Any other relevant factors that may be applicable.

The following factors will increase the likelihood of a “for” recommendation:

§ A majority non-independent board and/or the presence of non-independent directors on key board committees;

§ A weak or poorly-defined lead independent director role that fails to serve as an appropriate counterbalance to a combined CEO/chair role;

§ The presence of an executive or non-independent chair in addition to the CEO, a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chair, and/or departure from a structure with an independent chair;

§ Evidence that the board has failed to oversee and address material risks facing the company;

§ A material governance failure, particularly if the board has failed to adequately respond to shareholder concerns or if the board has materially diminished shareholder rights; or

§ Evidence that the board has failed to intervene when management’s interests are contrary to shareholders’ interests.

Majority of Independent Directors/Establishment of Independent Committees

General Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals asking that a majority or more of directors be independent unless the board composition already meets the proposed threshold by ISS’ definition of Independent Director (See ISS’ Classification of Directors.)

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Vote for shareholder proposals asking that board audit, compensation, and/or nominating committees be composed exclusively of independent directors unless they currently meet that standard.

Majority Vote Standard for the Election of Directors

General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to adopt a majority of votes cast standard for directors in uncontested elections. Vote against if no carve-out for a plurality vote standard in contested elections is included.

Generally vote for precatory and binding shareholder resolutions requesting that the board change the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with an affirmative majority of votes cast, provided it does not conflict with the state law where the company is incorporated. Binding resolutions need to allow for a carve-out for a plurality vote standard when there are more nominees than board seats.

Companies are strongly encouraged to also adopt a post-election policy (also known as a director resignation policy) that will provide guidelines so that the company will promptly address the situation of a holdover director.

Proxy Access

General Recommendation: Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:

§ Ownership threshold: maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power;

§ Ownership duration: maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group;

§ Aggregation: minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group;

§ Cap: cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board.

Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access. Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

Require More Nominees than Open Seats

General Recommendation: Vote against shareholder proposals that would require a company to nominate more candidates than the number of open board seats.

Shareholder Engagement Policy (Shareholder Advisory Committee)

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the board establish an internal mechanism/process, which may include a committee, in order to improve communications between directors and shareholders, unless the company has the following features, as appropriate:

§ Established a communication structure that goes beyond the exchange requirements to facilitate the exchange of information between shareholders and members of the board;

§ Effectively disclosed information with respect to this structure to its shareholders;

§ Company has not ignored majority-supported shareholder proposals, or a majority withhold vote on a director nominee; and

§ The company has an independent chair or a lead director, according to ISS’ definition. This individual must be made available for periodic consultation and direct communication with major shareholders.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-513 23 of 78

2.    Audit-Related

Auditor Indemnification and Limitation of Liability

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the issue of auditor indemnification and limitation of liability.

Factors to be assessed include, but are not limited to:

§ The terms of the auditor agreement—the degree to which these agreements impact shareholders’ rights;

§ The motivation and rationale for establishing the agreements;

§ The quality of the company’s disclosure; and

§ The company’s historical practices in the audit area.

Vote against or withhold from members of an audit committee in situations where there is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Auditor Ratification

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to ratify auditors unless any of the following apply:

§ An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;

§ There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion that is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position;

§ Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as fraud or misapplication of GAAP; or

§ Fees for non-audit services (“Other” fees) are excessive.

Non-audit fees are excessive if:

§ Non-audit (“other”) fees > audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees

Tax compliance and preparation include the preparation of original and amended tax returns and refund claims, and tax payment planning. All other services in the tax category, such as tax advice, planning, or consulting, should be added to “Other” fees. If the breakout of tax fees cannot be determined, add all tax fees to “Other” fees.

In circumstances where “Other” fees include fees related to significant one-time capital structure events (such as initial public offerings, bankruptcy emergence, and spin-offs) and the company makes public disclosure of the amount and nature of those fees that are an exception to the standard “non-audit fee” category, then such fees may be excluded from the non-audit fees considered in determining the ratio of non-audit to audit/audit-related fees/tax compliance and preparation for purposes of determining whether non-audit fees are excessive.

Shareholder Proposals Limiting Non-Audit Services

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to prohibit or limit their auditors from engaging in non-audit services.

Shareholder Proposals on Audit Firm Rotation

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking for audit firm rotation, taking into account:

§ The tenure of the audit firm;

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§ The length of rotation specified in the proposal;

§ Any significant audit-related issues at the company;

§ The number of Audit Committee meetings held each year;

§ The number of financial experts serving on the committee; and

§ Whether the company has a periodic renewal process where the auditor is evaluated for both audit quality and competitive price.

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3.    Shareholder Rights & Defenses

Advance Notice Requirements for Shareholder Proposals/Nominations

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on advance notice proposals, giving support to those proposals which allow shareholders to submit proposals/nominations as close to the meeting date as reasonably possible and within the broadest window possible, recognizing the need to allow sufficient notice for company, regulatory, and shareholder review.

To be reasonable, the company’s deadline for shareholder notice of a proposal/nominations must be no earlier than 120 days prior to the anniversary of the previous year’s meeting and have a submittal window of no shorter than 30 days from the beginning of the notice period (also known as a 90-120-day window). The submittal window is the period under which shareholders must file their proposals/nominations prior to the deadline.

In general, support additional efforts by companies to ensure full disclosure in regard to a proponent’s economic and voting position in the company so long as the informational requirements are reasonable and aimed at providing shareholders with the necessary information to review such proposals.

Amend Bylaws without Shareholder Consent

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals giving the board exclusive authority to amend the bylaws.

Vote case-by-case on proposals giving the board the ability to amend the bylaws in addition to shareholders, taking into account the following:

§ Any impediments to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws (i.e. supermajority voting requirements);

§ The company’s ownership structure and historical voting turnout;

§ Whether the board could amend bylaws adopted by shareholders; and

§ Whether shareholders would retain the ability to ratify any board-initiated amendments.

Control Share Acquisition Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes unless doing so would enable the completion of a takeover that would be detrimental to shareholders.

Vote against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

Vote for proposals to restore voting rights to the control shares.

Control share acquisition statutes function by denying shares their voting rights when they contribute to ownership in excess of certain thresholds. Voting rights for those shares exceeding ownership limits may only be restored by approval of either a majority or supermajority of disinterested shares. Thus, control share acquisition statutes effectively require a hostile bidder to put its offer to a shareholder vote or risk voting disenfranchisement if the bidder continues buying up a large block of shares.

Control Share Cash-Out Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of control share cash-out statutes.

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Control share cash-out statutes give dissident shareholders the right to “cash-out” of their position in a company at the expense of the shareholder who has taken a control position. In other words, when an investor crosses a preset threshold level, remaining shareholders are given the right to sell their shares to the acquirer, who must buy them at the highest acquiring price.

Disgorgement Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state disgorgement provisions.

Disgorgement provisions require an acquirer or potential acquirer of more than a certain percentage of a company’s stock to disgorge, or pay back, to the company any profits realized from the sale of that company’s stock purchased 24 months before achieving control status. All sales of company stock by the acquirer occurring within a certain period of time (between 18 months and 24 months) prior to the investor’s gaining control status are subject to these recapture-of-profits provisions.

Fair Price Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to adopt fair price provisions (provisions that stipulate that an acquirer must pay the same price to acquire all shares as it paid to acquire the control shares), evaluating factors such as the vote required to approve the proposed acquisition, the vote required to repeal the fair price provision, and the mechanism for determining the fair price.

Generally vote against fair price provisions with shareholder vote requirements greater than a majority of disinterested shares.

Freeze-Out Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to opt out of state freeze-out provisions. Freeze-out provisions force an investor who surpasses a certain ownership threshold in a company to wait a specified period of time before gaining control of the company.

Greenmail

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to adopt anti-greenmail charter or bylaw amendments or otherwise restrict a company’s ability to make greenmail payments.

Vote case-by-case on anti-greenmail proposals when they are bundled with other charter or bylaw amendments.

Greenmail payments are targeted share repurchases by management of company stock from individuals or groups seeking control of the company. Since only the hostile party receives payment, usually at a substantial premium over the market value of its shares, the practice discriminates against all other shareholders.

Shareholder Litigation Rights

Federal Forum Selection Provisions

Federal forum selection provisions require that U.S. federal courts be the sole forum for shareholders to litigate claims arising under federal securities law.

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General Recommendation: Generally vote for federal forum selection provisions in the charter or bylaws that specify “the district courts of the United States” as the exclusive forum for federal securities law matters, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

Vote against provisions that restrict the forum to a particular federal district court; unilateral adoption (without a shareholder vote) of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Exclusive Forum Provisions for State Law Matters

Exclusive forum provisions in the charter or bylaws restrict shareholders’ ability to bring derivative lawsuits against the company, for claims arising out of state corporate law, to the courts of a particular state (generally the state of incorporation).

General Recommendation: Generally vote for charter or bylaw provisions that specify courts located within the state of Delaware as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters for Delaware corporations, in the absence of serious concerns about corporate governance or board responsiveness to shareholders.

For states other than Delaware, vote case-by-case on exclusive forum provisions, taking into consideration:

§ The company’s stated rationale for adopting such a provision;

§ Disclosure of past harm from duplicative shareholder lawsuits in more than one forum;

§ The breadth of application of the charter or bylaw provision, including the types of lawsuits to which it would apply and the definition of key terms; and

§ Governance features such as shareholders’ ability to repeal the provision at a later date (including the vote standard applied when shareholders attempt to amend the charter or bylaws) and their ability to hold directors accountable through annual director elections and a majority vote standard in uncontested elections.

Generally vote against provisions that specify a state other than the state of incorporation as the exclusive forum for corporate law matters, or that specify a particular local court within the state; unilateral adoption of such a provision will generally be considered a one-time failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Fee shifting

Fee-shifting provisions in the charter or bylaws require that a shareholder who sues a company unsuccessfully pay all litigation expenses of the defendant corporation and its directors and officers.

General Recommendation: Generally vote against provisions that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the merits (i.e., including cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).

Unilateral adoption of a fee-shifting provision will generally be considered an ongoing failure under the Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments policy.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing 5-percent holder);

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§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);

§ The company’s existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Shareholder Proposals to Put Pill to a Vote and/or Adopt a Pill Policy

General Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requesting that the company submit its poison pill to a shareholder vote or redeem it unless the company has: (1) A shareholder-approved poison pill in place; or (2) The company has adopted a policy concerning the adoption of a pill in the future specifying that the board will only adopt a shareholder rights plan if either:

§ Shareholders have approved the adoption of the plan; or

§ The board, in its exercise of its fiduciary responsibilities, determines that it is in the best interest of shareholders under the circumstances to adopt a pill without the delay in adoption that would result from seeking stockholder approval (i.e., the “fiduciary out” provision). A poison pill adopted under this fiduciary out will be put to a shareholder ratification vote within 12 months of adoption or expire. If the pill is not approved by a majority of the votes cast on this issue, the plan will immediately terminate.

If the shareholder proposal calls for a time period of less than 12 months for shareholder ratification after adoption, vote for the proposal, but add the caveat that a vote within 12 months would be considered sufficient implementation.

Management Proposals to Ratify a Poison Pill

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:

§ No lower than a 20 percent trigger, flip-in or flip-over;

§ A term of no more than three years;

§ No deadhand, slowhand, no-hand, or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;

§ Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.

In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.

Management Proposals to Ratify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company’s net operating losses (NOL) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.

Vote case-by-case on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:

§ The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent);

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§ The value of the NOLs;

§ Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);

§ The company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and

§ Any other factors that may be applicable.

Proxy Voting Disclosure, Confidentiality, and Tabulation

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding proxy voting mechanics, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder rights. Specific issues covered under the policy include, but are not limited to, confidential voting of individual proxies and ballots, confidentiality of running vote tallies, and the treatment of abstentions and/or broker non-votes in the company’s vote-counting methodology.

While a variety of factors may be considered in each analysis, the guiding principles are: transparency, consistency, and fairness in the proxy voting process. The factors considered, as applicable to the proposal, may include:

§ The scope and structure of the proposal;

§ The company’s stated confidential voting policy (or other relevant policies) and whether it ensures a “level playing field” by providing shareholder proponents with equal access to vote information prior to the annual meeting;

§ The company’s vote standard for management and shareholder proposals and whether it ensures consistency and fairness in the proxy voting process and maintains the integrity of vote results;

§ Whether the company’s disclosure regarding its vote counting method and other relevant voting policies with respect to management and shareholder proposals are consistent and clear;

§ Any recent controversies or concerns related to the company’s proxy voting mechanics;

§ Any unintended consequences resulting from implementation of the proposal; and

§ Any other factors that may be relevant.

Ratification Proposals: Management Proposals to Ratify Existing Charter or Bylaw Provisions

General Recommendation: Generally vote against management proposals to ratify provisions of the company’s existing charter or bylaws, unless these governance provisions align with best practice.

In addition, voting against/withhold from individual directors, members of the governance committee, or the full board may be warranted, considering:

§ The presence of a shareholder proposal addressing the same issue on the same ballot;

§ The board’s rationale for seeking ratification;

§ Disclosure of actions to be taken by the board should the ratification proposal fail;

§ Disclosure of shareholder engagement regarding the board’s ratification request;

§ The level of impairment to shareholders’ rights caused by the existing provision;

§ The history of management and shareholder proposals on the provision at the company’s past meetings;

§ Whether the current provision was adopted in response to the shareholder proposal;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Previous use of ratification proposals to exclude shareholder proposals.

Reimbursing Proxy Solicitation Expenses

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses.

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When voting in conjunction with support of a dissident slate, vote for the reimbursement of all appropriate proxy solicitation expenses associated with the election.

Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a contested election where the following apply:

§ The election of fewer than 50 percent of the directors to be elected is contested in the election;

§ One or more of the dissident’s candidates is elected;

§ Shareholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors; and

§ The election occurred, and the expenses were incurred, after the adoption of this bylaw.

Reincorporation Proposals

General Recommendation: Management or shareholder proposals to change a company’s state of incorporation should be evaluated case-by-case, giving consideration to both financial and corporate governance concerns including the following:

§ Reasons for reincorporation;

§ Comparison of company’s governance practices and provisions prior to and following the reincorporation; and

§ Comparison of corporation laws of original state and destination state.

Vote for reincorporation when the economic factors outweigh any neutral or negative governance changes.

Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent

General Recommendation: Generally vote against management and shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to act by written consent.

Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent, taking into account the following factors:

§ Shareholders’ current right to act by written consent;

§ The consent threshold;

§ The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;

§ Investor ownership structure; and

§ Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions:

§ An unfettered¹⁴ right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold;

§ A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections;

§ No non-shareholder-approved pill; and

§ An annually elected board.

¹⁴ “Unfettered” means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.

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Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings

General Recommendation: Vote against management or shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.

Generally vote for management or shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account the following factors:

§ Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings;

§ Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10 percent preferred);

§ The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;

§ Investor ownership structure; and

§ Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.

Stakeholder Provisions

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that ask the board to consider non-shareholder constituencies or other non-financial effects when evaluating a merger or business combination.

State Antitakeover Statutes

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to opt in or out of state takeover statutes (including fair price provisions, stakeholder laws, poison pill endorsements, severance pay and labor contract provisions, and anti-greenmail provisions).

Supermajority Vote Requirements

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to require a supermajority shareholder vote.

Vote for management or shareholder proposals to reduce supermajority vote requirements. However, for companies with shareholder(s) who have significant ownership levels, vote case-by-case, taking into account:

§ Ownership structure;

§ Quorum requirements; and

§ Vote requirements.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals allowing for the convening of shareholder meetings by electronic means, so long as they do not preclude in-person meetings. Companies are encouraged to disclose the circumstances under which virtual-only¹⁵ meetings would be held, and to allow for comparable rights and opportunities for shareholders to participate electronically as they would have during an in-person meeting.

Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals concerning virtual-only meetings, considering:

§ Scope and rationale of the proposal; and

§ Concerns identified with the company’s prior meeting practices.

¹⁵ Virtual-only shareholder meeting” refers to a meeting of shareholders that is held exclusively using technology without a corresponding in-person meeting.

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4.    Capital/Restructuring

Capital

Adjustments to Par Value of Common Stock

General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to reduce the par value of common stock unless the action is being taken to facilitate an anti-takeover device or some other negative corporate governance action.

Vote for management proposals to eliminate par value.

Common Stock Authorization

General Authorization Requests

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ The proposal seeks to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights to other share classes;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

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Specific Authorization Requests

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Dual Class Structure

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to create a new class of common stock unless:

§ The company discloses a compelling rationale for the dual-class capital structure, such as:

§ The company’s auditor has concluded that there is substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern; or

§ The new class of shares will be transitory;

§ The new class is intended for financing purposes with minimal or no dilution to current shareholders in both the short term and long term; and

§ The new class is not designed to preserve or increase the voting power of an insider or significant shareholder.

Issue Stock for Use with Rights Plan

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals that increase authorized common stock for the explicit purpose of implementing a non-shareholder-approved shareholder rights plan (poison pill).

Preemptive Rights

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that seek preemptive rights, taking into consideration:

§ The size of the company;

§ The shareholder base; and

§ The liquidity of the stock.

Preferred Stock Authorization

General Authorization Requests

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase the number of authorized shares of preferred stock that are to be used for general corporate purposes:

§ If share usage (outstanding plus reserved) is less than 50% of the current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to 50% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is 50% to 100% of the current authorized, vote for an increase of up to 100% of current authorized shares.

§ If share usage is greater than current authorized shares, vote for an increase of up to the current share usage.

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§ In the case of a stock split, the allowable increase is calculated (per above) based on the post-split adjusted authorization.

§ If no preferred shares are currently issued and outstanding, vote against the request, unless the company discloses a specific use for the shares.

Generally vote against proposed increases, even if within the above ratios, if the proposal or the company’s prior or ongoing use of authorized shares is problematic, including, but not limited to:

§ If the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes;¹⁶

§ The company seeks to increase a class of non-convertible preferred shares entitled to more than one vote per share on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders “supervoting shares”);

§ The company seeks to increase a class of convertible preferred shares entitled to a number of votes greater than the number of common shares into which they are convertible (“supervoting shares”) on matters that do not solely affect the rights of preferred stockholders;

§ The stated intent of the increase in the general authorization is to allow the company to increase an existing designated class of supervoting preferred shares;

§ On the same ballot is a proposal for a reverse split for which support is warranted despite the fact that it would result in an excessive increase in the share authorization;

§ The company has a non-shareholder approved poison pill (including an NOL pill); or

§ The company has previous sizeable placements (within the past 3 years) of stock with insiders at prices substantially below market value, or with problematic voting rights, without shareholder approval.

However, generally vote for proposed increases beyond the above ratios or problematic situations when there is disclosure of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request, such as:

§ In, or subsequent to, the company’s most recent 10-K filing, the company discloses that there is substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern;

§ The company states that there is a risk of imminent bankruptcy or imminent liquidation if shareholders do not approve the increase in authorized capital; or

§ A government body has in the past year required the company to increase its capital ratios.

For companies incorporated in states that allow increases in authorized capital without shareholder approval, generally vote withhold or against all nominees if a unilateral capital authorization increase does not conform to the above policies.

Specific Authorization Requests

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with transaction(s) (such as acquisitions, SPAC transactions, private placements, or similar transactions) on the same ballot, or disclosed in the proxy statement, that warrant support. For such transactions, the allowable increase will be the greater of:

§ twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and

§ the allowable increase as calculated for general issuances above.

Recapitalization Plans

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on recapitalizations (reclassifications of securities), taking into account the following:

§ More simplified capital structure;

¹⁶ To be acceptable, appropriate disclosure would be needed that the shares are “declawed”: i.e., representation by the board that it will not, without prior stockholder approval, issue or use the preferred stock for any defensive or anti-takeover purpose or for the purpose of implementing any stockholder rights plan.

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§ Enhanced liquidity;

§ Fairness of conversion terms;

§ Impact on voting power and dividends;

§ Reasons for the reclassification;

§ Conflicts of interest; and

§ Other alternatives considered.

Reverse Stock Splits

General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to implement a reverse stock split if:

§ The number of authorized shares will be proportionately reduced; or

§ The effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that do not meet either of the above conditions, taking into consideration the following factors:

§ Stock exchange notification to the company of a potential delisting;

§ Disclosure of substantial doubt about the company’s ability to continue as a going concern without additional financing;

§ The company’s rationale; or

§ Other factors as applicable.

Share Issuance Mandates at U.S. Domestic Issuers Incorporated Outside the U.S.

General Recommendation: For U.S. domestic issuers incorporated outside the U.S. and listed solely on a U.S. exchange, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 20 percent of currently issued common share capital, where not tied to a specific transaction or financing proposal.

For pre-revenue or other early-stage companies that are heavily reliant on periodic equity financing, generally vote for resolutions to authorize the issuance of common shares up to 50 percent of currently issued common share capital. The burden of proof will be on the company to establish that it has a need for the higher limit.

Renewal of such mandates should be sought at each year’s annual meeting.

Vote case-by-case on share issuances for a specific transaction or financing proposal.

Share Repurchase Programs

General Recommendation: For U.S.-incorporated companies, and foreign-incorporated U.S. Domestic Issuers that are traded solely on U.S. exchanges, vote for management proposals to institute open-market share repurchase plans in which all shareholders may participate on equal terms, or to grant the board authority to conduct open-market repurchases, in the absence of company-specific concerns regarding:

§ Greenmail;

§ The use of buybacks to inappropriately manipulate incentive compensation metrics;

§ Threats to the company’s long-term viability; or

§ Other company-specific factors as warranted.

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Vote case-by-case on proposals to repurchase shares directly from specified shareholders, balancing the stated rationale against the possibility for the repurchase authority to be misused, such as to repurchase shares from insiders at a premium to market price.

Share Repurchase Programs Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals prohibiting executives from selling shares of company stock during periods in which the company has announced that it may or will be repurchasing shares of its stock. Vote for the proposal when there is a pattern of abuse by executives exercising options or selling shares during periods of share buybacks.

Stock Distributions: Splits and Dividends

General Recommendation: Generally vote for management proposals to increase the common share authorization for stock split or stock dividend, provided that the effective increase in authorized shares is equal to or is less than the allowable increase calculated in accordance with ISS’ Common Stock Authorization policy.

Tracking Stock

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the creation of tracking stock, weighing the strategic value of the transaction against such factors as:

§ Adverse governance changes;

§ Excessive increases in authorized capital stock;

§ Unfair method of distribution;

§ Diminution of voting rights;

§ Adverse conversion features;

§ Negative impact on stock option plans; and

§ Alternatives such as spin-off.

Restructuring

Appraisal Rights

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to restore or provide shareholders with rights of appraisal.

Asset Purchases

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset purchase proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Purchase price;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ Financial and strategic benefits;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives for the business;

§ Non-completion risk.

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Asset Sales

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on asset sales, considering the following factors:

§ Impact on the balance sheet/working capital;

§ Potential elimination of diseconomies;

§ Anticipated financial and operating benefits;

§ Anticipated use of funds;

§ Value received for the asset;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest.

Bundled Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on bundled or “conditional” proxy proposals. In the case of items that are conditioned upon each other, examine the benefits and costs of the packaged items. In instances when the joint effect of the conditioned items is not in shareholders’ best interests, vote against the proposals. If the combined effect is positive, support such proposals.

Conversion of Securities

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding conversion of securities. When evaluating these proposals, the investor should review the dilution to existing shareholders, the conversion price relative to market value, financial issues, control issues, termination penalties, and conflicts of interest.

Vote for the conversion if it is expected that the company will be subject to onerous penalties or will be forced to file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Corporate Reorganization/Debt Restructuring/Prepackaged Bankruptcy Plans/Reverse Leveraged Buyouts/Wrap Plans

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to increase common and/or preferred shares and to issue shares as part of a debt restructuring plan, after evaluating:

§ Dilution to existing shareholders’ positions;

§ Terms of the offer - discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion; termination penalties; exit strategy;

§ Financial issues - company’s financial situation; degree of need for capital; use of proceeds; effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;

§ Control issues - change in management; change in control, guaranteed board and committee seats; standstill provisions; voting agreements; veto power over certain corporate actions; and

§ Conflict of interest - arm’s length transaction, managerial incentives.

Vote for the debt restructuring if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

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Formation of Holding Company

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding the formation of a holding company, taking into consideration the following:

§ The reasons for the change;

§ Any financial or tax benefits;

§ Regulatory benefits;

§ Increases in capital structure; and

§ Changes to the articles of incorporation or bylaws of the company.

Absent compelling financial reasons to recommend for the transaction, vote against the formation of a holding company if the transaction would include either of the following:

§ Increases in common or preferred stock in excess of the allowable maximum (see discussion under “Capital”); or

§ Adverse changes in shareholder rights.

Going Private and Going Dark Transactions (LBOs and Minority Squeeze-outs)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on going private transactions, taking into account the following:

§ Offer price/premium;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ How the deal was negotiated;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Other alternatives/offers considered; and

§ Non-completion risk.

Vote case-by-case on going dark transactions, determining whether the transaction enhances shareholder value by taking into consideration:

§ Whether the company has attained benefits from being publicly-traded (examination of trading volume, liquidity, and market research of the stock);

§ Balanced interests of continuing vs. cashed-out shareholders, taking into account the following:

§ Are all shareholders able to participate in the transaction?

§ Will there be a liquid market for remaining shareholders following the transaction?

§ Does the company have strong corporate governance?

§ Will insiders reap the gains of control following the proposed transaction?

§ Does the state of incorporation have laws requiring continued reporting that may benefit shareholders?

Joint Ventures

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to form joint ventures, taking into account the following:

§ Percentage of assets/business contributed;

§ Percentage ownership;

§ Financial and strategic benefits;

§ Governance structure;

§ Conflicts of interest;

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§ Other alternatives; and

§ Non-completion risk.

Liquidations

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on liquidations, taking into account the following:

§ Management’s efforts to pursue other alternatives;

§ Appraisal value of assets; and

§ The compensation plan for executives managing the liquidation.

Vote for the liquidation if the company will file for bankruptcy if the proposal is not approved.

Mergers and Acquisitions

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions. Review and evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:

§ Valuation - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.

§ Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal.

§ Strategic rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.

§ Negotiations and process - Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value.

§ Conflicts of interest - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. The CIC figure presented in the “ISS Transaction Summary” section of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists.

§ Governance - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

Private Placements/Warrants/Convertible Debentures

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding private placements, warrants, and convertible debentures taking into consideration:

§ Dilution to existing shareholders’ position: The amount and timing of shareholder ownership dilution should be weighed against the needs and proposed shareholder benefits of the capital infusion. Although newly issued common stock, absent preemptive rights, is typically dilutive to existing shareholders, share price appreciation is often the necessary event to trigger the exercise of “out of the money” warrants and convertible debt. In these instances from a value standpoint, the negative impact of dilution is mitigated by the increase in the company’s stock price that must occur to trigger the dilutive event.

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§ Terms of the offer (discount/premium in purchase price to investor, including any fairness opinion, conversion features, termination penalties, exit strategy):

§ The terms of the offer should be weighed against the alternatives of the company and in light of company’s financial condition. Ideally, the conversion price for convertible debt and the exercise price for warrants should be at a premium to the then prevailing stock price at the time of private placement.

§ When evaluating the magnitude of a private placement discount or premium, consider factors that influence the discount or premium, such as, liquidity, due diligence costs, control and monitoring costs, capital scarcity, information asymmetry, and anticipation of future performance.

§ Financial issues:

§ The company’s financial condition;

§ Degree of need for capital;

§ Use of proceeds;

§ Effect of the financing on the company’s cost of capital;

§ Current and proposed cash burn rate;

§ Going concern viability and the state of the capital and credit markets.

§ Management’s efforts to pursue alternatives and whether the company engaged in a process to evaluate alternatives: A fair, unconstrained process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Financing alternatives can include joint ventures, partnership, merger, or sale of part or all of the company.

§ Control issues:

§ Change in management;

§ Change in control;

§ Guaranteed board and committee seats;

§ Standstill provisions;

§ Voting agreements;

§ Veto power over certain corporate actions; and

§ Minority versus majority ownership and corresponding minority discount or majority control premium.

§ Conflicts of interest:

§ Conflicts of interest should be viewed from the perspective of the company and the investor.

§ Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s length? Are managerial incentives aligned with shareholder interests?

§ Market reaction:

§ The market’s response to the proposed deal. A negative market reaction is a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

Vote for the private placement, or for the issuance of warrants and/or convertible debentures in a private placement, if it is expected that the company will file for bankruptcy if the transaction is not approved.

Reorganization/Restructuring Plan (Bankruptcy)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to common shareholders on bankruptcy plans of reorganization, considering the following factors including, but not limited to:

§ Estimated value and financial prospects of the reorganized company;

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§ Percentage ownership of current shareholders in the reorganized company;

§ Whether shareholders are adequately represented in the reorganization process (particularly through the existence of an Official Equity Committee);

§ The cause(s) of the bankruptcy filing, and the extent to which the plan of reorganization addresses the cause(s);

§ Existence of a superior alternative to the plan of reorganization; and

§ Governance of the reorganized company.

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC mergers and acquisitions taking into account the following:

§ Valuation - Is the value being paid by the SPAC reasonable? SPACs generally lack an independent fairness opinion and the financials on the target may be limited. Compare the conversion price with the intrinsic value of the target company provided in the fairness opinion. Also, evaluate the proportionate value of the combined entity attributable to the SPAC IPO shareholders versus the pre-merger value of SPAC. Additionally, a private company discount may be applied to the target if it is a private entity.

§ Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction may be a cause for concern. Market reaction may be addressed by analyzing the one-day impact on the unaffected stock price.

§ Deal timing - A main driver for most transactions is that the SPAC charter typically requires the deal to be complete within 18 to 24 months, or the SPAC is to be liquidated. Evaluate the valuation, market reaction, and potential conflicts of interest for deals that are announced close to the liquidation date.

§ Negotiations and process - What was the process undertaken to identify potential target companies within specified industry or location specified in charter? Consider the background of the sponsors.

§ Conflicts of interest - How are sponsors benefiting from the transaction compared to IPO shareholders? Potential conflicts could arise if a fairness opinion is issued by the insiders to qualify the deal rather than a third party or if management is encouraged to pay a higher price for the target because of an 80 percent rule (the charter requires that the fair market value of the target is at least equal to 80 percent of net assets of the SPAC). Also, there may be sense of urgency by the management team of the SPAC to close the deal since its charter typically requires a transaction to be completed within the 18-24-month timeframe.

§ Voting agreements - Are the sponsors entering into enter into any voting agreements/tender offers with shareholders who are likely to vote against the proposed merger or exercise conversion rights?

§ Governance - What is the impact of having the SPAC CEO or founder on key committees following the proposed merger?

Special Purpose Acquisition Corporations (SPACs) - Proposals for Extensions

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on SPAC extension proposals taking into account the length of the requested extension, the status of any pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process, any added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders, and any prior extension requests.

§ Length of request: Typically, extension requests range from two to six months, depending on the progression of the SPAC’s acquistion process.

§ Pending transaction(s) or progression of the acquisition process: Sometimes an intial business combination was already put to a shareholder vote, but, for varying reasons, the transaction could not be consummated by the termination date and the SPAC is requesting an extension. Other times, the SPAC has entered into a definitive transaction agreement, but needs additional time to consummate or hold the shareholder meeting.

§ Added incentive for non-redeeming shareholders: Sometimes the SPAC sponsor (or other insiders) will contribute, typically as a loan to the company, additional funds that will be added to the redemption value of each public share as long as such shares are not redeemed in connection with the extension request. The purpose of the “equity kicker” is to incentivize shareholders to hold their shares through the end of the requested extension or until the time the transaction is put to a shareholder vote, rather than electing redeemption at the extension proposal meeting.

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§ Prior extension requests: Some SPACs request additional time beyond the extension period sought in prior extension requests.

Spin-offs

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on spin-offs, considering:

§ Tax and regulatory advantages;

§ Planned use of the sale proceeds;

§ Valuation of spinoff;

§ Fairness opinion;

§ Benefits to the parent company;

§ Conflicts of interest;

§ Managerial incentives;

§ Corporate governance changes;

§ Changes in the capital structure.

Value Maximization Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking to maximize shareholder value by:

§ Hiring a financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives;

§ Selling the company; or

§ Liquidating the company and distributing the proceeds to shareholders.

These proposals should be evaluated based on the following factors:

§ Prolonged poor performance with no turnaround in sight;

§ Signs of entrenched board and management (such as the adoption of takeover defenses);

§ Strategic plan in place for improving value;

§ Likelihood of receiving reasonable value in a sale or dissolution; and

§ The company actively exploring its strategic options, including retaining a financial advisor.

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5.    Compensation

Executive Pay Evaluation

Underlying all evaluations are five global principles that most investors expect corporations to adhere to in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs:

1. Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment, with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: This principle encompasses overall executive pay practices, which must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. It will take into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance; the mix between fixed and variable pay; performance goals; and equity-based plan costs;

2. Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation;

3. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed);

4. Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly;

5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors is reasonable and does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation—Management Proposals (Say-on-Pay)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on ballot items related to executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation.

Vote against Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay or “SOP”) if:

§ There is an unmitigated misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);

§ The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;

§ The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

§ There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP would otherwise be warranted due to pay-for-performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;

§ The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;

§ The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, such as option repricing or option backdating; or

§ The situation is egregious.

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Primary Evaluation Factors for Executive Pay

Pay-for-Performance Evaluation

ISS annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to identify strong or satisfactory alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the S&P1500, Russell 3000, or Russell 3000E Indices¹⁷, this analysis considers the following:

1. Peer Group¹⁸ Alignment:

§ The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.

§ The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.

2. Absolute Alignment¹⁹ – the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years – i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.

If the above analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of companies outside the Russell indices, a misalignment between pay and performance is otherwise suggested, our analysis may include any of the following qualitative factors, as relevant to an evaluation of how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

§ The ratio of performance- to time-based incentive awards;

§ The overall ratio of performance-based compensation to fixed or discretionary pay;

§ The rigor of performance goals;

§ The complexity and risks around pay program design;

§ The transparency and clarity of disclosure;

§ The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;

§ Financial/operational results, both absolute and relative to peers;

§ Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards);

§ Realizable pay²⁰ compared to grant pay; and

§ Any other factors deemed relevant.

Problematic Pay Practices

Problematic pay elements are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:

§ Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;

¹⁷ The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.

¹⁸ The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group, and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group, with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are comparable to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry, and also within a market-cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s market cap. For Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels companies, market cap is the only size determinant.

¹⁹ Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.

²⁰ ISS research reports include realizable pay for S&P1500 companies.

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§ Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking or present a windfall risk; and

§ Pay decisions that circumvent pay-for-performance, such as options backdating or waiving performance requirements.

The list of examples below highlights certain problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:

§ Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARs without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);

§ Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups;

§ New or materially amended agreements that provide for:

§ Excessive termination or CIC severance payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus);

§ CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers) or in connection with a problematic Good Reason definition;

§ CIC excise tax gross-up entitlements (including “modified” gross-ups);

§ Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions;

§ Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;

§ Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible;

§ Severance payments made when the termination is not clearly disclosed as involuntary (for example, a termination without cause or resignation for good reason);

§ Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors.

The above examples are not an exhaustive list. Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Compensation Policies FAQ document for additional detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as problematic and may lead to negative vote recommendations.

Options Backdating

The following factors should be examined case-by-case to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud:

§ Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;

§ Duration of options backdating;

§ Size of restatement due to options backdating;

§ Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and

§ Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.

Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness

Consider the following factors case-by-case when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

§ Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or

§ Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account:

§ Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);

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§ Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;

§ Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;

§ Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;

§ Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;

§ The company’s ownership structure; and

§ Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (“Say When on Pay”)

General Recommendation: Vote for annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies’ executive pay programs.

Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on say on Golden Parachute proposals, including consideration of existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers but also considering new or extended arrangements.

Features that may result in an “against” recommendation include one or more of the following, depending on the number, magnitude, and/or timing of issue(s):

§ Single- or modified-single-trigger cash severance;

§ Single-trigger acceleration of unvested equity awards;

§ Full acceleration of equity awards granted shortly before the change in control;

§ Acceleration of performance awards above the target level of performance without compelling rationale;

§ Excessive cash severance (generally >3x base salary and bonus);

§ Excise tax gross-ups triggered and payable;

§ Excessive golden parachute payments (on an absolute basis or as a percentage of transaction equity value); or

§ Recent amendments that incorporate any problematic features (such as those above) or recent actions (such as extraordinary equity grants) that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders; or

§ The company’s assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote.

Recent amendment(s) that incorporate problematic features will tend to carry more weight on the overall analysis. However, the presence of multiple legacy problematic features will also be closely scrutinized.

In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company’s advisory vote on compensation (management say-on-pay), ISS will evaluate the say-on-pay proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.

Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans

Please refer to ISS’ U.S. Equity Compensation Plans FAQ document for additional details on the Equity Plan Scorecard policy.

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General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on certain equity-based compensation plans²¹ depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “Equity Plan Scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:

§ Plan Cost: The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:

§ SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and

§ SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.

§ Plan Features:

§ Quality of disclosure around vesting upon a change in control (CIC);

§ Discretionary vesting authority;

§ Liberal share recycling on various award types;

§ Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;

§ Dividends payable prior to award vesting.

§ Grant Practices:

§ The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;

§ Vesting requirements in CEO’s recent equity grants (3-year look-back);

§ The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);

§ The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;

§ Whether the company maintains a sufficient claw-back policy;

§ Whether the company maintains sufficient post-exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following egregious factors (“overriding factors”) apply:

§ Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;

§ The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it – for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies – or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing – for non-listed companies);

§ The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant pay-for-performance disconnect under certain circumstances;

§ The plan is excessively dilutive to shareholders’ holdings;

§ The plan contains an evergreen (automatic share replenishment) feature; or

§ Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.

Further Information on certain EPSC Factors:

Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT)

The cost of the equity plans is expressed as Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT), which is measured using a binomial option pricing model that assesses the amount of shareholders’ equity flowing out of the company to employees and directors. SVT is expressed as both a dollar amount and as a percentage of market value, and includes the new shares proposed, shares available under existing plans, and shares granted but unexercised (using two measures, in the case of plans

²¹ Proposals evaluated under the EPSC policy generally include those to approve or amend (1) stock option plans for employees and/or employees and directors, (2) restricted stock plans for employees and/or employees and directors, and (3) omnibus stock incentive plans for employees and/or employees and directors; amended plans will be further evaluated case-by-case.

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subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, as noted above). All award types are valued. For omnibus plans, unless limitations are placed on the most expensive types of awards (for example, full-value awards), the assumption is made that all awards to be granted will be the most expensive types.

For proposals that are not subject to the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation, Shareholder Value Transfer is reasonable if it falls below a company-specific benchmark. The benchmark is determined as follows: The top quartile performers in each industry group (using the Global Industry Classification Standard: GICS) are identified. Benchmark SVT levels for each industry are established based on these top performers’ historic SVT. Regression analyses are run on each industry group to identify the variables most strongly correlated to SVT. The benchmark industry SVT level is then adjusted upwards or downwards for the specific company by plugging the company-specific performance measures, size, and cash compensation into the industry cap equations to arrive at the company’s benchmark.²²

Three-Year Value-Adjusted Burn Rate

A “Value-Adjusted Burn Rate” is used for stock plan evaluations. Value-Adjusted Burn Rate benchmarks are calculated as the greater of: (1) an industry-specific threshold based on three-year burn rates within the company’s GICS group segmented by S&P 500, Russell 3000 index (less the S&P 500) and non-Russell 3000 index; and (2) a de minimis threshold established separately for each of the S&P 500, the Russell 3000 index less the S&P 500, and the non-Russell 3000 index. Year-over-year burn-rate benchmark changes will be limited to a predetermined range above or below the prior year’s burn-rate benchmark.

The Value-Adjusted Burn Rate is calculated as follows:

Value-Adjusted Burn Rate = ((# of options * option’s dollar value using a Black-Scholes model) + (# of full-value awards * stock price)) / (Weighted average common shares * stock price).

Egregious Factors

Liberal Change in Control Definition

Generally vote against equity plans if the plan has a liberal definition of change in control and the equity awards could vest upon such liberal definition of change in control, even though an actual change in control may not occur. Examples of such a definition include, but are not limited to, announcement or commencement of a tender offer, provisions for acceleration upon a “potential” takeover, shareholder approval of a merger or other transactions, or similar language.

Repricing Provisions

Vote against plans that expressly permit the repricing or exchange of underwater stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval. “Repricing” typically includes the ability to do any of the following:

§ Amend the terms of outstanding options or SARs to reduce the exercise price of such outstanding options or SARs;

§ Cancel outstanding options or SARs in exchange for options or SARs with an exercise price that is less than the exercise price of the original options or SARs;

§ Cancel underwater options in exchange for stock awards; or

§ Provide cash buyouts of underwater options.

While the above cover most types of repricing, ISS may view other provisions as akin to repricing depending on the facts and circumstances.

²² For plans evaluated under the Equity Plan Scorecard policy, the company’s SVT benchmark is considered along with other factors.

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Also, vote against or withhold from members of the Compensation Committee who approved repricing (as defined above or otherwise determined by ISS), without prior shareholder approval, even if such repricings are allowed in their equity plan.

Vote against plans that do not expressly prohibit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval if the company has a history of repricing/buyouts without shareholder approval, and the applicable listing standards would not preclude them from doing so.

Problematic Pay Practices or Significant Pay-for-Performance Disconnect

If the equity plan on the ballot is a vehicle for problematic pay practices, vote against the plan.

ISS may recommend a vote against the equity plan if the plan is determined to be a vehicle for pay-for-performance misalignment. Considerations in voting against the equity plan may include, but are not limited to:

§ Severity of the pay-for-performance misalignment;

§ Whether problematic equity grant practices are driving the misalignment; and/or

§ Whether equity plan awards have been heavily concentrated to the CEO and/or the other NEOs.

Amending Cash and Equity Plans (including Approval for Tax Deductibility (162(m))

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on amendments to cash and equity incentive plans.

Generally vote for proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Addresses administrative features only; or

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee consists entirely of independent directors, per ISS’ Classification of Directors. Note that if the company is presenting the plan to shareholders for the first time for any reason (including after the company’s initial public offering), or if the proposal is bundled with other material plan amendments, then the recommendation will be case-by-case (see below).

Vote against proposals to amend executive cash, stock, or cash and stock incentive plans if the proposal:

§ Seeks approval for Section 162(m) purposes only, and the plan administering committee does not consist entirely of independent directors, per ISS’ Classification of Directors.

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend cash incentive plans. This includes plans presented to shareholders for the first time after the company’s IPO and/or proposals that bundle material amendment(s) other than those for Section 162(m) purposes.

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to amend equity incentive plans, considering the following:

§ If the proposal requests additional shares and/or the amendments include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments.

§ If the plan is being presented to shareholders for the first time (including after the company’s IPO), whether or not additional shares are being requested, the recommendation will be based on the Equity Plan Scorecard evaluation as well as an analysis of the overall impact of any amendments.

§ If there is no request for additional shares and the amendments do not include a term extension or addition of full value awards as an award type, then the recommendation will be based entirely on an analysis of the overall impact of the amendments, and the EPSC evaluation will be shown only for informational purposes.

In the first two case-by-case evaluation scenarios, the EPSC evaluation/score is the more heavily weighted consideration.

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Specific Treatment of Certain Award Types in Equity Plan Evaluations

Dividend Equivalent Rights

Options that have Dividend Equivalent Rights (DERs) associated with them will have a higher calculated award value than those without DERs under the binomial model, based on the value of these dividend streams. The higher value will be applied to new shares, shares available under existing plans, and shares awarded but not exercised per the plan specifications. DERS transfer more shareholder equity to employees and non-employee directors and this cost should be captured.

Operating Partnership (OP) Units in Equity Plan Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

For Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS), include the common shares issuable upon conversion of outstanding Operating Partnership (OP) units in the share count for the purposes of determining: (1) market capitalization in the Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) analysis and (2) shares outstanding in the burn rate analysis.

Other Compensation Plans

401(k) Employee Benefit Plans

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement a 401(k) savings plan for employees.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to implement an ESOP or increase authorized shares for existing ESOPs, unless the number of shares allocated to the ESOP is excessive (more than five percent of outstanding shares).

Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Qualified Plans

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on qualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for employee stock purchase plans where all of the following apply:

§ Purchase price is at least 85 percent of fair market value;

§ Offering period is 27 months or less; and

§ The number of shares allocated to the plan is 10 percent or less of the outstanding shares.

Vote against qualified employee stock purchase plans where when the plan features do not meet all of the above criteria.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans—Non-Qualified Plans

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on nonqualified employee stock purchase plans. Vote for nonqualified employee stock purchase plans with all the following features:

§ Broad-based participation;

§ Limits on employee contribution, which may be a fixed dollar amount or expressed as a percent of base salary;

§ Company matching contribution up to 25 percent of employee’s contribution, which is effectively a discount of 20 percent from market value; and

§ No discount on the stock price on the date of purchase when there is a company matching contribution.

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Vote against nonqualified employee stock purchase plans when the plan features do not meet all of the above criteria. If the matching contribution or effective discount exceeds the above, ISS may evaluate the SVT cost of the plan as part of the assessment.

Option Exchange Programs/Repricing Options

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking approval to exchange/reprice options taking into consideration:

§ Historic trading patterns--the stock price should not be so volatile that the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term;

§ Rationale for the re-pricing--was the stock price decline beyond management’s control?;

§ Is this a value-for-value exchange?;

§ Are surrendered stock options added back to the plan reserve?;

§ Timing--repricing should occur at least one year out from any precipitous drop in company’s stock price;

§ Option vesting--does the new option vest immediately or is there a black-out period?;

§ Term of the option--the term should remain the same as that of the replaced option;

§ Exercise price--should be set at fair market or a premium to market;

§ Participants--executive officers and directors must be excluded.

If the surrendered options are added back to the equity plans for re-issuance, then also take into consideration the company’s total cost of equity plans and its three-year average burn rate.

In addition to the above considerations, evaluate the intent, rationale, and timing of the repricing proposal. The proposal should clearly articulate why the board is choosing to conduct an exchange program at this point in time. Repricing underwater options after a recent precipitous drop in the company’s stock price demonstrates poor timing and warrants additional scrutiny. Also, consider the terms of the surrendered options, such as the grant date, exercise price and vesting schedule. Grant dates of surrendered options should be far enough back (two to three years) so as not to suggest that repricings are being done to take advantage of short-term downward price movements. Similarly, the exercise price of surrendered options should be above the 52-week high for the stock price.

Vote for shareholder proposals to put option repricings to a shareholder vote.

Stock Plans in Lieu of Cash

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on plans that provide participants with the option of taking all or a portion of their cash compensation in the form of stock.

Vote for non-employee director-only equity plans that provide a dollar-for-dollar cash-for-stock exchange.

Vote case-by-case on plans which do not provide a dollar-for-dollar cash for stock exchange. In cases where the exchange is not dollar-for-dollar, the request for new or additional shares for such equity program will be considered using the binomial option pricing model. In an effort to capture the total cost of total compensation, ISS will not make any adjustments to carve out the in-lieu-of cash compensation.

Transfer Stock Option (TSO) Programs

General Recommendation: One-time Transfers: Vote against or withhold from compensation committee members if they fail to submit one-time transfers to shareholders for approval.

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Vote case-by-case on one-time transfers. Vote for if:

§ Executive officers and non-employee directors are excluded from participating;

§ Stock options are purchased by third-party financial institutions at a discount to their fair value using option pricing models such as Black-Scholes or a Binomial Option Valuation or other appropriate financial models; and

§ There is a two-year minimum holding period for sale proceeds (cash or stock) for all participants.

Additionally, management should provide a clear explanation of why options are being transferred to a third-party institution and whether the events leading up to a decline in stock price were beyond management’s control. A review of the company’s historic stock price volatility should indicate if the options are likely to be back “in-the-money” over the near term.

Ongoing TSO program: Vote against equity plan proposals if the details of ongoing TSO programs are not provided to shareholders. Since TSOs will be one of the award types under a stock plan, the ongoing TSO program, structure, and mechanics must be disclosed to shareholders. The specific criteria to be considered in evaluating these proposals include, but not limited, to the following:

§ Eligibility;

§ Vesting;

§ Bid-price;

§ Term of options;

§ Cost of the program and impact of the TSOs on company’s total option expense; and

§ Option repricing policy.

Amendments to existing plans that allow for introduction of transferability of stock options should make clear that only options granted post-amendment shall be transferable.

Director Compensation

Shareholder Ratification of Director Pay Programs

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals seeking ratification of non-employee director compensation, based on the following factors:

§ If the equity plan under which non-employee director grants are made is on the ballot, whether or not it warrants support; and

§ An assessment of the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

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Equity Plans for Non-Employee Directors

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on compensation plans for non-employee directors, based on:

§ The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants;

§ The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers (in certain circumstances); and

§ The presence of any egregious plan features (such as an option repricing provision or liberal CIC vesting risk).

On occasion, non-employee director stock plans will exceed the plan cost or burn-rate benchmarks when combined with employee or executive stock plans. In such cases, vote case-by-case on the plan taking into consideration the following qualitative factors:

§ The relative magnitude of director compensation as compared to companies of a similar profile;

§ The presence of problematic pay practices relating to director compensation;

§ Director stock ownership guidelines and holding requirements;

§ Equity award vesting schedules;

§ The mix of cash and equity-based compensation;

§ Meaningful limits on director compensation;

§ The availability of retirement benefits or perquisites; and

§ The quality of disclosure surrounding director compensation.

Non-Employee Director Retirement Plans

General Recommendation: Vote against retirement plans for non-employee directors. Vote for shareholder proposals to eliminate retirement plans for non-employee directors.

Shareholder Proposals on Compensation

Bonus Banking/Bonus Banking “Plus”

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking deferral of a portion of annual bonus pay, with ultimate payout linked to sustained results for the performance metrics on which the bonus was earned (whether for the named executive officers or a wider group of employees), taking into account the following factors:

§ The company’s past practices regarding equity and cash compensation;

§ Whether the company has a holding period or stock ownership requirements in place, such as a meaningful retention ratio (at least 50 percent for full tenure); and

§ Whether the company has a rigorous claw-back policy in place.

Compensation Consultants—Disclosure of Board or Company’s Utilization

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking disclosure regarding the company, board, or compensation committee’s use of compensation consultants, such as company name, business relationship(s), and fees paid.

Disclosure/Setting Levels or Types of Compensation for Executives and Directors

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director pay information, provided the information requested is relevant to shareholders’ needs, would not put the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its industry, and is not unduly burdensome to the company.

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Generally vote against shareholder proposals seeking to set absolute levels on compensation or otherwise dictate the amount or form of compensation (such as types of compensation elements or specific metrics) to be used for executive or directors.

Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.

Vote case-by-case on all other shareholder proposals regarding executive and director pay, taking into account relevant factors, including but not limited to: company performance, pay level and design versus peers, history of compensation concerns or pay-for-performance disconnect, and/or the scope and prescriptive nature of the proposal.

Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals for which the broad-based employee population is eligible.

Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain a portion of net shares acquired through compensation plans. The following factors will be taken into account:

§ The percentage/ratio of net shares required to be retained;

§ The time period required to retain the shares;

§ Whether the company has equity retention, holding period, and/or stock ownership requirements in place and the robustness of such requirements;

§ Whether the company has any other policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by executives;

§ Executives’ actual stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s existing requirements; and

§ Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may demonstrate a short-term versus long-term focus.

Pay Disparity

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals calling for an analysis of the pay disparity between corporate executives and other non-executive employees. The following factors will be considered:

§ The company’s current level of disclosure of its executive compensation setting process, including how the company considers pay disparity;

§ If any problematic pay practices or pay-for-performance concerns have been identified at the company; and

§ The level of shareholder support for the company’s pay programs.

Generally vote against proposals calling for the company to use the pay disparity analysis or pay ratio in a specific way to set or limit executive pay.

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Pay for Performance/Performance-Based Awards

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals requesting that a significant amount of future long-term incentive compensation awarded to senior executives shall be performance-based and requesting that the board adopt and disclose challenging performance metrics to shareholders, based on the following analytical steps:

§ First, vote for shareholder proposals advocating the use of performance-based equity awards, such as performance contingent options or restricted stock, indexed options, or premium-priced options, unless the proposal is overly restrictive or if the company has demonstrated that it is using a “substantial” portion of performance-based awards for its top executives. Standard stock options and performance-accelerated awards do not meet the criteria to be considered as performance-based awards. Further, premium-priced options should have a meaningful premium to be considered performance-based awards.

§ Second, assess the rigor of the company’s performance-based equity program. If the bar set for the performance-based program is too low based on the company’s historical or peer group comparison, generally vote for the proposal. Furthermore, if target performance results in an above target payout, vote for the shareholder proposal due to program’s poor design. If the company does not disclose the performance metric of the performance-based equity program, vote for the shareholder proposal regardless of the outcome of the first step to the test.

In general, vote for the shareholder proposal if the company does not meet both of the above two steps.

Pay for Superior Performance

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the board establish a pay-for-superior performance standard in the company’s executive compensation plan for senior executives. These proposals generally include the following principles:

§ Set compensation targets for the plan’s annual and long-term incentive pay components at or below the peer group median;

§ Deliver a majority of the plan’s target long-term compensation through performance-vested, not simply time-vested, equity awards;

§ Provide the strategic rationale and relative weightings of the financial and non-financial performance metrics or criteria used in the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan;

§ Establish performance targets for each plan financial metric relative to the performance of the company’s peer companies;

§ Limit payment under the annual and performance-vested long-term incentive components of the plan to when the company’s performance on its selected financial performance metrics exceeds peer group median performance.

Consider the following factors in evaluating this proposal:

§ What aspects of the company’s annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven?

§ If the annual and long-term equity incentive programs are performance driven, are the performance criteria and hurdle rates disclosed to shareholders or are they benchmarked against a disclosed peer group?

§ Can shareholders assess the correlation between pay and performance based on the current disclosure?

§ What type of industry and stage of business cycle does the company belong to?

Pre-Arranged Trading Plans (10b5-1 Plans)

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals calling for the addition of certain safeguards in prearranged trading plans (10b5-1 plans) for executives. Safeguards may include:

§ Adoption, amendment, or termination of a 10b5-1 Plan must be disclosed in a Form 8-K;

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§ Amendment or early termination of a 10b5-1 Plan allowed only under extraordinary circumstances, as determined by the board;

§ Request that a certain number of days that must elapse between adoption or amendment of a 10b5-1 Plan and initial trading under the plan;

§ Reports on Form 4 must identify transactions made pursuant to a 10b5-1 Plan;

§ An executive may not trade in company stock outside the 10b5-1 Plan;

§ Trades under a 10b5-1 Plan must be handled by a broker who does not handle other securities transactions for the executive.

Prohibit Outside CEOs from Serving on Compensation Committees

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals seeking a policy to prohibit any outside CEO from serving on a company’s compensation committee, unless the company has demonstrated problematic pay practices that raise concerns about the performance and composition of the committee.

Recoupment of Incentive or Stock Compensation in Specified Circumstances

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to recoup incentive cash or stock compensation made to senior executives if it is later determined that the figures upon which incentive compensation is earned turn out to have been in error, or if the senior executive has breached company policy or has engaged in misconduct that may be significantly detrimental to the company’s financial position or reputation, or if the senior executive failed to manage or monitor risks that subsequently led to significant financial or reputational harm to the company. Many companies have adopted policies that permit recoupment in cases where an executive’s fraud, misconduct, or negligence significantly contributed to a restatement of financial results that led to the awarding of unearned incentive compensation. However, such policies may be narrow given that not all misconduct or negligence may result in significant financial restatements. Misconduct, negligence, or lack of sufficient oversight by senior executives may lead to significant financial loss or reputational damage that may have long-lasting impact.

In considering whether to support such shareholder proposals, ISS will take into consideration the following factors:

§ If the company has adopted a formal recoupment policy;

§ The rigor of the recoupment policy focusing on how and under what circumstances the company may recoup incentive or stock compensation;

§ Whether the company has chronic restatement history or material financial problems;

§ Whether the company’s policy substantially addresses the concerns raised by the proponent;

§ Disclosure of recoupment of incentive or stock compensation from senior executives or lack thereof; or

§ Any other relevant factors.

Severance Agreements for Executives/Golden Parachutes

General Recommendation: Vote for shareholder proposals requiring that golden parachutes or executive severance agreements be submitted for shareholder ratification, unless the proposal requires shareholder approval prior to entering into employment contracts.

Vote case-by-case on proposals to ratify or cancel golden parachutes. An acceptable parachute should include, but is not limited to, the following:

§ The triggering mechanism should be beyond the control of management;

§ The amount should not exceed three times base amount (defined as the average annual taxable W-2 compensation during the five years prior to the year in which the change of control occurs);

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§ Change-in-control payments should be double-triggered, i.e., (1) after a change in control has taken place, and (2) termination of the executive as a result of the change in control. Change in control is defined as a change in the company ownership structure.

Share Buyback Impact on Incentive Program Metrics

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the company exclude the impact of share buybacks from the calculation of incentive program metrics, considering the following factors:

§ The frequency and timing of the company’s share buybacks;

§ The use of per-share metrics in incentive plans;

§ The effect of recent buybacks on incentive metric results and payouts; and

§ Whether there is any indication of metric result manipulation.

Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs)

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to put extraordinary benefits contained in SERP agreements to a shareholder vote unless the company’s executive pension plans do not contain excessive benefits beyond what is offered under employee-wide plans.

Generally vote for shareholder proposals requesting to limit the executive benefits provided under the company’s supplemental executive retirement plan (SERP) by limiting covered compensation to a senior executive’s annual salary or those pay elements covered for the general employee population.

Tax Gross-Up Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals calling for companies to adopt a policy of not providing tax gross-up payments to executives, except in situations where gross-ups are provided pursuant to a plan, policy, or arrangement applicable to management employees of the company, such as a relocation or expatriate tax equalization policy.

Termination of Employment Prior to Severance Payment/Eliminating Accelerated Vesting of Unvested Equity

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals seeking a policy requiring termination of employment prior to severance payment and/or eliminating accelerated vesting of unvested equity.

The following factors will be considered:

§ The company’s current treatment of equity upon employment termination and/or in change-in-control situations (i.e., vesting is double triggered and/or pro rata, does it allow for the assumption of equity by acquiring company, the treatment of performance shares, etc.);

§ Current employment agreements, including potential poor pay practices such as gross-ups embedded in those agreements.

Generally vote for proposals seeking a policy that prohibits automatic acceleration of the vesting of equity awards to senior executives upon a voluntary termination of employment or in the event of a change in control (except for pro rata vesting considering the time elapsed and attainment of any related performance goals between the award date and the change in control).

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6.    Routine/Miscellaneous

Adjourn Meeting

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to provide management with the authority to adjourn an annual or special meeting absent compelling reasons to support the proposal.

Vote for proposals that relate specifically to soliciting votes for a merger or transaction if supporting that merger or transaction. Vote against proposals if the wording is too vague or if the proposal includes “other business.”

Amend Quorum Requirements

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to reduce quorum requirements for shareholder meetings below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration:

§ The new quorum threshold requested;

§ The rationale presented for the reduction;

§ The market capitalization of the company (size, inclusion in indices);

§ The company’s ownership structure;

§ Previous voter turnout or attempts to achieve quorum;

§ Any provisions or commitments to restore quorum to a majority of shares outstanding, should voter turnout improve sufficiently; and

§ Other factors as appropriate.

In general, a quorum threshold kept as close to a majority of shares outstanding as is achievable is preferred.

Vote case-by-case on directors who unilaterally lower the quorum requirements below a majority of the shares outstanding, taking into consideration the factors listed above.

Amend Minor Bylaws

General Recommendation: Vote for bylaw or charter changes that are of a housekeeping nature (updates or corrections).

Change Company Name

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals to change the corporate name unless there is compelling evidence that the change would adversely impact shareholder value.

Change Date, Time, or Location of Annual Meeting

General Recommendation: Vote for management proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the proposed change is unreasonable.

Vote against shareholder proposals to change the date, time, or location of the annual meeting unless the current scheduling or location is unreasonable.

Other Business

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to approve other business when it appears as a voting item.

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7.    Social and Environmental Issues

Global Approach – E&S Shareholder Proposals

ISS applies a common approach globally to evaluating social and environmental proposals which cover a wide range of topics, including consumer and product safety, environment and energy, labor standards and human rights, workplace and board diversity, and corporate political issues. While a variety of factors goes into each analysis, the overall principle guiding all vote recommendations focuses on how the proposal may enhance or protect shareholder value in either the short or long term.

General Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case, examining primarily whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value. The following factors will be considered:

§ If the issues presented in the proposal are being appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or government regulation;

§ If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;

§ Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive;

§ The company’s approach compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;

§ Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s practices related to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;

§ If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources; and

§ If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Endorsement of Principles

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals seeking a company’s endorsement of principles that support a particular public policy position. Endorsing a set of principles may require a company to take a stand on an issue that is beyond its own control and may limit its flexibility with respect to future developments.

Management and the board should be afforded the flexibility to make decisions on specific public policy positions based on their own assessment of the most beneficial strategies for the company.

Animal Welfare

Animal Welfare Policies

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking a report on a company’s animal welfare standards, or animal welfare-related risks, unless:

§ The company has already published a set of animal welfare standards and monitors compliance;

§ The company’s standards are comparable to industry peers; and

§ There are no recent significant fines, litigation, or controversies related to the company’s and/or its suppliers’ treatment of animals.

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Animal Testing

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals to phase out the use of animals in product testing, unless:

§ The company is conducting animal testing programs that are unnecessary or not required by regulation;

§ The company is conducting animal testing when suitable alternatives are commonly accepted and used by industry peers; or

§ There are recent, significant fines or litigation related to the company’s treatment of animals.

Animal Slaughter

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting the implementation of Controlled Atmosphere Killing (CAK) methods at company and/or supplier operations unless such methods are required by legislation or generally accepted as the industry standard.

Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting a report on the feasibility of implementing CAK methods at company and/or supplier operations considering the availability of existing research conducted by the company or industry groups on this topic and any fines or litigation related to current animal processing procedures at the company.

Consumer Issues

Genetically Modified Ingredients

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting that a company voluntarily label genetically engineered (GE) ingredients in its products. The labeling of products with GE ingredients is best left to the appropriate regulatory authorities.

Vote case-by-case on proposals asking for a report on the feasibility of labeling products containing GE ingredients, taking into account:

§ The potential impact of such labeling on the company’s business;

§ The quality of the company’s disclosure on GE product labeling, related voluntary initiatives, and how this disclosure compares with industry peer disclosure; and

§ Company’s current disclosure on the feasibility of GE product labeling.

Generally vote against proposals seeking a report on the social, health, and environmental effects of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Studies of this sort are better undertaken by regulators and the scientific community.

Generally vote against proposals to eliminate GE ingredients from the company’s products, or proposals asking for reports outlining the steps necessary to eliminate GE ingredients from the company’s products. Such decisions are more appropriately made by management with consideration of current regulations.

Reports on Potentially Controversial Business/Financial Practices

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s potentially controversial business or financial practices or products, taking into account:

§ Whether the company has adequately disclosed mechanisms in place to prevent abuses;

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§ Whether the company has adequately disclosed the financial risks of the products/practices in question;

§ Whether the company has been subject to violations of related laws or serious controversies; and

§ Peer companies’ policies/practices in this area.

Pharmaceutical Pricing, Access to Medicines, and Prescription Drug Reimportation

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals requesting that companies implement specific price restraints on pharmaceutical products unless the company fails to adhere to legislative guidelines or industry norms in its product pricing practices.

Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting that a company report on its product pricing or access to medicine policies, considering:

§ The potential for reputational, market, and regulatory risk exposure;

§ Existing disclosure of relevant policies;

§ Deviation from established industry norms;

§ Relevant company initiatives to provide research and/or products to disadvantaged consumers;

§ Whether the proposal focuses on specific products or geographic regions;

§ The potential burden and scope of the requested report;

§ Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines at the company.

Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on the financial and legal impact of its prescription drug reimportation policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.

Generally vote against proposals requesting that companies adopt specific policies to encourage or constrain prescription drug reimportation. Such matters are more appropriately the province of legislative activity and may place the company at a competitive disadvantage relative to its peers.

Product Safety and Toxic/Hazardous Materials

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its policies, initiatives/procedures, and oversight mechanisms related to toxic/hazardous materials or product safety in its supply chain, unless:

§ The company already discloses similar information through existing reports such as a supplier code of conduct and/or a sustainability report;

§ The company has formally committed to the implementation of a toxic/hazardous materials and/or product safety and supply chain reporting and monitoring program based on industry norms or similar standards within a specified time frame; and

§ The company has not been recently involved in relevant significant controversies, fines, or litigation.

Vote case-by-case on resolutions requesting that companies develop a feasibility assessment to phase-out of certain toxic/hazardous materials, or evaluate and disclose the potential financial and legal risks associated with utilizing certain materials, considering:

§ The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its product safety policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms;

§ Current regulations in the markets in which the company operates; and

§ Recent significant controversies, litigation, or fines stemming from toxic/hazardous materials at the company.

Generally vote against resolutions requiring that a company reformulate its products.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-552 62 of 78

Tobacco-Related Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on resolutions regarding the advertisement of tobacco products, considering:

§ Recent related fines, controversies, or significant litigation;

§ Whether the company complies with relevant laws and regulations on the marketing of tobacco;

§ Whether the company’s advertising restrictions deviate from those of industry peers;

§ Whether the company entered into the Master Settlement Agreement, which restricts marketing of tobacco to youth; and

§ Whether restrictions on marketing to youth extend to foreign countries.

Vote case-by-case on proposals regarding second-hand smoke, considering;

§ Whether the company complies with all laws and regulations;

§ The degree that voluntary restrictions beyond those mandated by law might hurt the company’s competitiveness; and

§ The risk of any health-related liabilities.

Generally vote against resolutions to cease production of tobacco-related products, to avoid selling products to tobacco companies, to spin-off tobacco-related businesses, or prohibit investment in tobacco equities. Such business decisions are better left to company management or portfolio managers.

Generally vote against proposals regarding tobacco product warnings. Such decisions are better left to public health authorities.

Climate Change

Say on Climate (SoC) Management Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on management proposals that request shareholders to approve the company’s climate transition action plan²³, taking into account the completeness and rigor of the plan. Information that will be considered where available includes the following:

§ The extent to which the company’s climate related disclosures are in line with TCFD recommendations and meet other market standards;

§ Disclosure of its operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3);

§ The completeness and rigor of company’s short-, medium-, and long-term targets for reducing operational and supply chain GHG emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3 if relevant);

§ Whether the company has sought and received third-party approval that its targets are science-based;

§ Whether the company has made a commitment to be “net zero” for operational and supply chain emissions (Scopes 1, 2, and 3) by 2050;

§ Whether the company discloses a commitment to report on the implementation of its plan in subsequent years;

§ Whether the company’s climate data has received third-party assurance;

§ Disclosure of how the company’s lobbying activities and its capital expenditures align with company strategy;

§ Whether there are specific industry decarbonization challenges; and

§ The company’s related commitment, disclosure, and performance compared to its industry peers.

²³ Variations of this request also include climate transition related ambitions, or commitment to reporting on the implementation of a climate plan.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-553 63 of 78

Say on Climate (SoC) Shareholder Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals that request the company to disclose a report providing its GHG emissions levels and reduction targets and/or its upcoming/approved climate transition action plan and provide shareholders the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of its GHG emissions reduction plan, taking into account information such as the following:

§ The completeness and rigor of the company’s climate-related disclosure;

§ The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to its GHG emissions; and

§ Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive.

Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

General Recommendation: Generally vote for resolutions requesting that a company disclose information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces related to climate change on its operations and investments or on how the company identifies, measures, and manages such risks, considering:

§ Whether the company already provides current, publicly-available information on the impact that climate change may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;

§ The company’s level of disclosure compared to industry peers; and

§ Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s climate change-related performance.

Generally vote for proposals requesting a report on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from company operations and/or products and operations, unless:

§ The company already discloses current, publicly-available information on the impacts that GHG emissions may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;

§ The company’s level of disclosure is comparable to that of industry peers; and

§ There are no significant, controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s GHG emissions.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that call for the adoption of GHG reduction goals from products and operations, taking into account:

§ Whether the company provides disclosure of year-over-year GHG emissions performance data;

§ Whether company disclosure lags behind industry peers;

§ The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;

§ The company’s current GHG emission policies, oversight mechanisms, and related initiatives; and

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to GHG emissions.

Energy Efficiency

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its energy efficiency policies, unless:

§ The company complies with applicable energy efficiency regulations and laws, and discloses its participation in energy efficiency policies and programs, including disclosure of benchmark data, targets, and performance measures; or

§ The proponent requests adoption of specific energy efficiency goals within specific timelines.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-554 64 of 78

Renewable Energy

General Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on the feasibility of developing renewable energy resources unless the report would be duplicative of existing disclosure or irrelevant to the company’s line of business.

Generally vote against proposals requesting that the company invest in renewable energy resources. Such decisions are best left to management’s evaluation of the feasibility and financial impact that such programs may have on the company.

Generally vote against proposals that call for the adoption of renewable energy goals, taking into account:

§ The scope and structure of the proposal;

§ The company’s current level of disclosure on renewable energy use and GHG emissions; and

§ The company’s disclosure of policies, practices, and oversight implemented to manage GHG emissions and mitigate climate change risks.

Diversity

Board Diversity

General Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on a company’s efforts to diversify the board, unless:

§ The gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; and

§ The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company.

Vote case-by-case on proposals asking a company to increase the gender and racial minority representation on its board, taking into account:

§ The degree of existing gender and racial minority diversity on the company’s board and among its executive officers;

§ The level of gender and racial minority representation that exists at the company’s industry peers;

§ The company’s established process for addressing gender and racial minority board representation;

§ Whether the proposal includes an overly prescriptive request to amend nominating committee charter language;

§ The independence of the company’s nominating committee;

§ Whether the company uses an outside search firm to identify potential director nominees; and

§ Whether the company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding equal employment practices.

Equality of Opportunity

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting a company disclose its diversity policies or initiatives, or proposals requesting disclosure of a company’s comprehensive workforce diversity data, including requests for EEO-1 data, unless:

§ The company publicly discloses equal opportunity policies and initiatives in a comprehensive manner;

§ The company already publicly discloses comprehensive workforce diversity data; and

§ The company has no recent significant EEO-related violations or litigation.

Generally vote against proposals seeking information on the diversity efforts of suppliers and service providers.

Such requests may pose a significant burden on the company.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-555 65 of 78

Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals seeking to amend a company’s EEO statement or diversity policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, unless the change would be unduly burdensome.

Generally vote against proposals to extend company benefits to, or eliminate benefits from, domestic partners.

Decisions regarding benefits should be left to the discretion of the company.

Gender, Race/Ethnicity Pay Gap

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender or race/ ethnicity, or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender or race/ethnicity pay gaps, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy on fair and equitable compensation practices;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap issues;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding gender, race, or ethnicity pay gap policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers; and

§ Local laws regarding categorization of race and/or ethnicity and definitions of ethnic and/or racial minorities.

Racial Equity and/or Civil Rights Audit Guidelines

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals asking a company to conduct an independent racial equity and/or civil rights audit, taking into account:

§ The company’s established process or framework for addressing racial inequity and discrimination internally;

§ Whether the company adequately discloses workforce diversity and inclusion metrics and goals;

§ Whether the company has issued a public statement related to its racial justice efforts in recent years, or has committed to internal policy review;

§ Whether the company has engaged with impacted communities, stakeholders, and civil rights experts;

§ The company’s track record in recent years of racial justice measures and outreach externally; and

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to racial inequity or discrimination.

Environment and Sustainability

Facility and Workplace Safety

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for workplace safety reports, including reports on accident risk reduction efforts, taking into account:

§ The company’s current level of disclosure of its workplace health and safety performance data, health and safety management policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms;

§ The nature of the company’s business, specifically regarding company and employee exposure to health and safety risks;

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§ Recent significant controversies, fines, or violations related to workplace health and safety; and

§ The company’s workplace health and safety performance relative to industry peers.

Vote case-by-case on resolutions requesting that a company report on safety and/or security risks associated with its operations and/or facilities, considering:

§ The company’s compliance with applicable regulations and guidelines;

§ The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its security and safety policies, procedures, and compliance monitoring; and

§ The existence of recent, significant violations, fines, or controversy regarding the safety and security of the company’s operations and/or facilities.

General Environmental Proposals and Community Impact Assessments

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for reports on policies and/or the potential (community) social and/or environmental impact of company operations, considering:

§ Current disclosure of applicable policies and risk assessment report(s) and risk management procedures;

§ The impact of regulatory non-compliance, litigation, remediation, or reputational loss that may be associated with failure to manage the company’s operations in question, including the management of relevant community and stakeholder relations;

§ The nature, purpose, and scope of the company’s operations in the specific region(s);

§ The degree to which company policies and procedures are consistent with industry norms; and

§ The scope of the resolution.

Hydraulic Fracturing

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s (natural gas) hydraulic fracturing operations, including measures the company has taken to manage and mitigate the potential community and environmental impacts of those operations, considering:

§ The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant policies and oversight mechanisms;

§ The company’s current level of such disclosure relative to its industry peers;

§ Potential relevant local, state, or national regulatory developments; and

§ Controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s hydraulic fracturing operations.

Operations in Protected Areas

General Recommendation: Generally vote for requests for reports on potential environmental damage as a result of company operations in protected regions, unless:

§ Operations in the specified regions are not permitted by current laws or regulations;

§ The company does not currently have operations or plans to develop operations in these protected regions; or

§ The company’s disclosure of its operations and environmental policies in these regions is comparable to industry peers.

Recycling

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to report on an existing recycling program, or adopt a new recycling program, taking into account:

§ The nature of the company’s business;

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§ The current level of disclosure of the company’s existing related programs;

§ The timetable and methods of program implementation prescribed by the proposal;

§ The company’s ability to address the issues raised in the proposal; and

§ How the company’s recycling programs compare to similar programs of its industry peers.

Sustainability Reporting

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting that a company report on its policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms related to social, economic, and environmental sustainability, unless:

§ The company already discloses similar information through existing reports or policies such as an environment, health, and safety (EHS) report; a comprehensive code of corporate conduct; and/or a diversity report; or

§ The company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar standard within a specified time frame.

Water Issues

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting a company report on, or adopt a new policy on, water-related risks and concerns, taking into account:

§ The company’s current disclosure of relevant policies, initiatives, oversight mechanisms, and water usage metrics;

§ Whether or not the company’s existing water-related policies and practices are consistent with relevant internationally recognized standards and national/local regulations;

§ The potential financial impact or risk to the company associated with water-related concerns or issues; and

§ Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding water use by the company and its suppliers.

General Corporate Issues

Charitable Contributions

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals restricting a company from making charitable contributions. Charitable contributions are generally useful for assisting worthwhile causes and for creating goodwill in the community. In the absence of bad faith, self-dealing, or gross negligence, management should determine which, and if, contributions are in the best interests of the company.

Data Security, Privacy, and Internet Issues

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the disclosure or implementation of data security, privacy, or information access and management policies and procedures, considering:

§ The level of disclosure of company policies and procedures relating to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, information access and management, and Internet censorship;

§ Engagement in dialogue with governments or relevant groups with respect to data security, privacy, or the free flow of information on the Internet;

§ The scope of business involvement and of investment in countries whose governments censor or monitor the Internet and other telecommunications;

§ Applicable market-specific laws or regulations that may be imposed on the company; and

§ Controversies, fines, or litigation related to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, or Internet censorship.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-558 68 of 78

ESG Compensation-Related Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals seeking a report or additional disclosure on the company’s approach, policies, and practices on incorporating environmental and social criteria into its executive compensation strategy, considering:

§ The scope and prescriptive nature of the proposal;

§ The company’s current level of disclosure regarding its environmental and social performance and governance;

§ The degree to which the board or compensation committee already discloses information on whether it has considered related E&S criteria; and

§ Whether the company has significant controversies or regulatory violations regarding social or environmental issues.

Human Rights, Human Capital Management, and International Operations

Human Rights Proposals

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.

Vote case-by-case on proposals to implement company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies, considering:

§ The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed;

§ Whether or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized standards;

§ Whether company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how;

§ Company participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally recognized human rights initiatives;

§ Scope and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of workplace labor/human rights abuse;

§ Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers;

§ The scope of the request; and

§ Deviation from industry sector peer company standards and practices.

Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting that a company conduct an assessment of the human rights risks in its operations or in its supply chain, or report on its human rights risk assessment process, considering:

§ The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed, including information on the implementation of these policies and any related oversight mechanisms;

§ The company’s industry and whether the company or its suppliers operate in countries or areas where there is a history of human rights concerns;

§ Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights involving the company or its suppliers, and whether the company has taken remedial steps; and

§ Whether the proposal is unduly burdensome or overly prescriptive.

Mandatory Arbitration

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s use of mandatory arbitration on employment-related claims, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims;

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§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements on workplace claims; and

§ The company’s disclosure of its policies and practices related to the use of mandatory arbitration agreements compared to its peers.

Operations in High-Risk Markets

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on a company’s potential financial and reputational risks associated with operations in “high-risk” markets, such as a terrorism-sponsoring state or politically/socially unstable region, taking into account:

§ The nature, purpose, and scope of the operations and business involved that could be affected by social or political disruption;

§ Current disclosure of applicable risk assessment(s) and risk management procedures;

§ Compliance with U.S. sanctions and laws;

§ Consideration of other international policies, standards, and laws; and

§ Whether the company has been recently involved in recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to its operations in “high-risk” markets.

Outsourcing/Offshoring

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals calling for companies to report on the risks associated with outsourcing/plant closures, considering:

§ Controversies surrounding operations in the relevant market(s);

§ The value of the requested report to shareholders;

§ The company’s current level of disclosure of relevant information on outsourcing and plant closure procedures; and

§ The company’s existing human rights standards relative to industry peers.

Sexual Harassment

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on requests for a report on company actions taken to strengthen policies and oversight to prevent workplace sexual harassment, or a report on risks posed by a company’s failure to prevent workplace sexual harassment, taking into account:

§ The company’s current policies, practices, oversight mechanisms related to preventing workplace sexual harassment;

§ Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to workplace sexual harassment issues; and

§ The company’s disclosure regarding workplace sexual harassment policies or initiatives compared to its industry peers.

Weapons and Military Sales

General Recommendation: Vote against reports on foreign military sales or offsets. Such disclosures may involve sensitive and confidential information. Moreover, companies must comply with government controls and reporting on foreign military sales.

Generally vote against proposals asking a company to cease production or report on the risks associated with the use of depleted uranium munitions or nuclear weapons components and delivery systems, including disengaging from current and proposed contracts. Such contracts are monitored by government agencies, serve multiple military and non-military uses, and withdrawal from these contracts could have a negative impact on the company’s business.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-560 70 of 78

Political Activities

Lobbying

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting information on a company’s lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures, considering:

§ The company’s current disclosure of relevant lobbying policies, and management and board oversight;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding trade associations or other groups that it supports, or is a member of, that engage in lobbying activities; and

§ Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s lobbying-related activities.

Political Contributions

General Recommendation: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, considering:

§ The company’s policies, and management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and

§ Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.

Vote against proposals barring a company from making political contributions. Businesses are affected by legislation at the federal, state, and local level; barring political contributions can put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Vote against proposals to publish in newspapers and other media a company’s political contributions. Such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.

Political Expenditures and Lobbying Congruency

General Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case on proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s alignment of political contributions, lobbying, and electioneering spending with a company’s publicly stated values and policies, considering:

§ The company’s policies, management, board oversight, governance processes, and level of disclosure related to direct political contributions, lobbying activities, and payments to trade associations, political action committees, or other groups that may be used for political purposes;

§ The company’s disclosure regarding: the reasons for its support of candidates for public offices; the reasons for support of and participation in trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and other political activities;

§ Any incongruencies identified between a company’s direct and indirect political expenditures and its publicly stated values and priorities.

§ Recent significant controversies related to the company’s direct and indirect lobbying, political contributions, or political activities.

Generally vote case-by-case on proposals requesting comparison of a company’s political spending to objectives that can mitigate material risks for the company, such as limiting global warming.

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Political Ties

General Recommendation: Generally vote against proposals asking a company to affirm political nonpartisanship in the workplace, so long as:

§ There are no recent, significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s political contributions or trade association spending; and

§ The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibit coercion.

Vote against proposals asking for a list of company executives, directors, consultants, legal counsels, lobbyists, or investment bankers that have prior government service and whether such service had a bearing on the business of the company. Such a list would be burdensome to prepare without providing any meaningful information to shareholders.

W W W . I S S G O V E R N A N C E . C O M                              F-562 72 of 78

8.    Mutual Fund Proxies

Election of Directors

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors and trustees, following the same guidelines for uncontested directors for public company shareholder meetings. However, mutual fund boards do not usually have compensation committees, so do not withhold for the lack of this committee.

Closed End Funds- Unilateral Opt-In to Control Share Acquisition Statutes

General Recommendation: For closed-end management investment companies (CEFs), vote against or withhold from nominating/governance committee members (or other directors on a case-by-case basis) at CEFs that have not provided a compelling rationale for opting-in to a Control Share Acquisition statute, nor submitted a by-law amendment to a shareholder vote.

Converting Closed-end Fund to Open-end Fund

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on conversion proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance as a closed-end fund;

§ Market in which the fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the discount; and

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals.

Proxy Contests

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proxy contests, considering the following factors:

§ Past performance relative to its peers;

§ Market in which the fund invests;

§ Measures taken by the board to address the issues;

§ Past shareholder activism, board activity, and votes on related proposals;

§ Strategy of the incumbents versus the dissidents;

§ Independence of directors;

§ Experience and skills of director candidates;

§ Governance profile of the company;

§ Evidence of management entrenchment.

Investment Advisory Agreements

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on investment advisory agreements, considering the following factors:

§ Proposed and current fee schedules;

§ Fund category/investment objective;

§ Performance benchmarks;

§ Share price performance as compared with peers;

§ Resulting fees relative to peers;

§ Assignments (where the advisor undergoes a change of control).

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Approving New Classes or Series of Shares

General Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of new classes or series of shares.

Preferred Stock Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the authorization for or increase in preferred shares, considering the following factors:

§ Stated specific financing purpose;

§ Possible dilution for common shares;

§ Whether the shares can be used for antitakeover purposes.

1940 Act Policies

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on policies under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, considering the following factors:

§ Potential competitiveness;

§ Regulatory developments;

§ Current and potential returns; and

§ Current and potential risk.

Generally vote for these amendments as long as the proposed changes do not fundamentally alter the investment focus of the fund and do comply with the current SEC interpretation.

Changing a Fundamental Restriction to a Nonfundamental Restriction

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to change a fundamental restriction to a non-fundamental restriction, considering the following factors:

§ The fund’s target investments;

§ The reasons given by the fund for the change; and

§ The projected impact of the change on the portfolio.

Change Fundamental Investment Objective to Nonfundamental

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals to change a fund’s fundamental investment objective to non-fundamental.

Name Change Proposals

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on name change proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Political/economic changes in the target market;

§ Consolidation in the target market; and

§ Current asset composition.

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Change in Fund’s Subclassification

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes in a fund’s sub-classification, considering the following factors:

§ Potential competitiveness;

§ Current and potential returns;

§ Risk of concentration;

§ Consolidation in target industry.

Business Development Companies—Authorization to Sell Shares of Common Stock at a Price below Net Asset Value

General Recommendation: Vote for proposals authorizing the board to issue shares below Net Asset Value (NAV)

if:

§ The proposal to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date no more than one year from the date shareholders approve the underlying proposal, as required under the Investment Company Act of 1940;

§ The sale is deemed to be in the best interests of shareholders by (1) a majority of the company’s independent directors and (2) a majority of the company’s directors who have no financial interest in the issuance; and

§ The company has demonstrated responsible past use of share issuances by either:

§ Outperforming peers in its 8-digit GICS group as measured by one- and three-year median TSRs; or

§ Providing disclosure that its past share issuances were priced at levels that resulted in only small or moderate discounts to NAV and economic dilution to existing non-participating shareholders.

Disposition of Assets/Termination/Liquidation

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to dispose of assets, to terminate or liquidate, considering the following factors:

§ Strategies employed to salvage the company;

§ The fund’s past performance;

§ The terms of the liquidation.

Changes to the Charter Document

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on changes to the charter document, considering the following factors:

§ The degree of change implied by the proposal;

§ The efficiencies that could result;

§ The state of incorporation;

§ Regulatory standards and implications.

Vote against any of the following changes:

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to reorganize or terminate the trust or any of its series;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement for amendments to the new declaration of trust;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to amend the fund’s management contract, allowing the contract to be modified by the investment manager and the trust management, as permitted by the 1940 Act;

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§ Allow the trustees to impose other fees in addition to sales charges on investment in a fund, such as deferred sales charges and redemption fees that may be imposed upon redemption of a fund’s shares;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to engage in and terminate subadvisory arrangements;

§ Removal of shareholder approval requirement to change the domicile of the fund.

Changing the Domicile of a Fund

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on re-incorporations, considering the following factors:

§ Regulations of both states;

§ Required fundamental policies of both states;

§ The increased flexibility available.

Authorizing the Board to Hire and Terminate Subadvisers Without Shareholder Approval

General Recommendation: Vote against proposals authorizing the board to hire or terminate subadvisers without shareholder approval if the investment adviser currently employs only one subadviser.

Distribution Agreements

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on distribution agreement proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Fees charged to comparably sized funds with similar objectives;

§ The proposed distributor’s reputation and past performance;

§ The competitiveness of the fund in the industry;

§ The terms of the agreement.

Master-Feeder Structure

General Recommendation: Vote for the establishment of a master-feeder structure.

Mergers

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on merger proposals, considering the following factors:

§ Resulting fee structure;

§ Performance of both funds;

§ Continuity of management personnel;

§ Changes in corporate governance and their impact on shareholder rights.

Shareholder Proposals for Mutual Funds

Establish Director Ownership Requirement

General Recommendation: Generally vote against shareholder proposals that mandate a specific minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board.

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Reimburse Shareholder for Expenses Incurred

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on shareholder proposals to reimburse proxy solicitation expenses.

When supporting the dissidents, vote for the reimbursement of the proxy solicitation expenses.

Terminate the Investment Advisor

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on proposals to terminate the investment advisor, considering the following factors:

§ Performance of the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV);

§ The fund’s history of shareholder relations;

§ The performance of other funds under the advisor’s management.

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We empower investors and companies to build

for long-term and sustainable growth by providing

high-quality data, analytics, and insight.

G E T  S T A R T E D  W I T H  I S S  S O L U T I O N S

Email sales@issgovernance.com or visit www.issgovernance.com for more information.

Founded in 1985, Institutional Shareholder Services group of companies (ISS) empowers investors and companies to build for long-term and sustainable growth by providing high-quality data, analytics and insight. ISS, which is majority owned by Deutsche Bourse Group, along with Genstar Capital and ISS management, is a leading provider of corporate governance and responsible investment solutions, market intelligence, fund services, and events and editorial content for institutional investors and corporations, globally. ISS’ 2,600 employees operate worldwide across 29 global locations in 15 countries. Its approximately 3,400 clients include many of the world’s leading institutional investors who rely on ISS’ objective and impartial offerings, as well as public companies focused on ESG and governance risk mitigation as a shareholder value enhancing measure. Clients rely on ISS’ expertise to help them make informed investment decisions. This document and all of the information contained in it, including without limitation all text, data, graphs, and charts (collectively, the “Information”) is the property of Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS), its subsidiaries, or, in some cases third party suppliers.

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