EX-99.1 2 d281296dex991.htm PRESENTATION Presentation
A RESPONSE TO RECENTLY
FILED PROXY MATERIAL
Oshkosh Corporation
Exhibit 1


Special note regarding this presentation
2


Sources: Bloomberg, 2012 Estimates are Bloomberg consensus
A new set of comps
Oshkosh management has recently
argued that their low SGA margins
relative to a peer group should be a
positive benchmark
SGA margins alone do not drive
shareholder returns…
Compared to that same peer group
Oshkosh has:
The
LOWEST
projected
operating income margin
The
LOWEST
2012
projected
EPS growth
The
LOWEST
2011
shareholder
return
3
Ticker
2012 Operating
Income Margin
2012 EPS
Growth
2011 Total
Shareholder
Return
ATK
11.7%
-5.4%
-34.42%
CRDN
18.9%
-12.6%
39.33%
CMI
14.2%
12.5%
96.87%
DOV
16.1%
9.0%
45.52%
FSS
6.2%
250.4%
-28.51%
FRPT
5.7%
83.1%
6.53%
GD
12.0%
5.3%
2.41%
MTW
8.3%
169.9%
-6.59%
NAV
5.2%
14.6%
-1.99%
NOC
11.1%
-2.7%
22.99%
PCAR
9.7%
21.9%
8.27%
RTN
11.1%
4.4%
-0.41%
TEX
5.4%
252.0%
-31.80%
DHR
17.5%
16.5%
25.59%
ETN
16.1%
10.9%
44.85%
PH
11.1%
16.5%
46.37%
OSK
3.6%
-52.5%
-42.26%


MOVE without urgency
The company has claimed they have taken “decisive action”
and initiated what
was allegedly a “comprehensive review”
but recently stated that the primary
result of that review was simply –
“business model reaffirmed”
As a shareholder, we would expect, given recent “unprecedented "challenges, Oshkosh would look for ways
to enhance shareholder value and drive operating performance rather than continuing with the existing
business model
How did this reaffirmation help shareholders? It seems to us that the only beneficiary is the management
team who has allegedly been reaffirmed
The company has disclosed their time frames and goals for restructuring
activities
250
basis
points
of
operating
income
margin
opportunity
by              a
portion
of
which
seems
to
be
simply
related
to
an
eventual
market
recovery
through
the
absorption
of
fixed
costs;
it
is
not
clear
what
portion
if
any is actually related to reduction of costs
The company has stated that their manufacturing footprint rationalizations (20% reduction on a company
that
has
over
$7
Billion
in
sales)
will
take
5
years
to
generate
$33
million
of
savings
In our opinion this calls into question the company’s ability to generate any meaningful cost savings on a
going forward basis
4
2016


A more balance board
The company has criticized the Icahn slate for lacking experience in Defense
and Construction Equipment  though the assertion is factually inaccurate
Mr. Alapont was formerly President/CEO of Iveco which built defense, fire and construction products
Mr. Intrieri is on the board of Motorola Solutions which sells to municipal, federal and defense customers
Mr. Krongard spent several years as Executive Director for the CIA
None of Oshkosh board members have substantial experience in construction equipment
None
of
the
Oshkosh
board
members
that
we
are
seeking
to
replace
(other
than
founder’s
son
Mosling
and Szews) have defense experience
6 out of 13 board members at Oshkosh are former CFOs
The Icahn slate brings key skills to the board
5
Key Skills & Experience
brought to the board
Icahn Slate
Outside Oshkosh Directors we are
seeking to replace
International business
YES
NO
Specialty Vehicle
YES
NO
Fire Apparatus Manufacturing
YES
NO
Commercial Vehicle Manufacturing
YES
NO
Developing M&A Strategies
YES
NO
Business turnaround
YES
?
Building strong management teams
YES
?
Strong Financial/Investing
YES
?


Relative track records
The company has criticized Icahn’s investment track record
We believe the Icahn track record speaks for itself
Apparently Icahn and Oshkosh had a different strategy for weathering the
turbulent markets of 2011
Oshkosh stock was lower at the end of 2011 than it was at the end of 2003
From 2007-2011 Oshkosh stock was down 55.84%
6
2011
Oshkosh Price Appreciation
-39.3%
Icahn Investment Funds Performance
34.73%


Management turnover problem
7
Oshkosh has experienced a surprising amount of turnover at the division head
level in the last 5 years
Defense
4
separate
division
heads
(including
Szews
on
an
interim
basis)
with
the
two
recent
appointees
being outsiders
JLG –
Szews (for 5 months after the acquisition) and two other division heads
Fire & Emergency –
at least 4 different division heads
Purchasing / Procurement –
3 different heads, the last two outsiders
Manufacturing –
Two different heads, most recently an outsider, the second of which recently left the
company
The inability to maintain stability or source management internally may
contribute to operational instability
All divisions are currently run by executives with sales/marketing background
and the company has lost two separate manufacturing chiefs in the last few
years
Restructuring
and
FMTV
execution
issues
are
not
surprising
to
us
given
reduced
manufacturing
expertise
Shareholders should ask who is currently responsible for the facility optimization plans?